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ANALYSIS OF THE CONTENTS OF THIS VOLUME.

CHAPTER L

Of this Redress of Private

Wrongs by the mere Act of the Parties
1-17
2
wrongs are divisible into private wrongs and public wrongs,
tbe
private wrongs or civil injuries are an infringement or privation of
private
2
or civil rights belonging to individuals, considered as individuals,
2
for their redress courts of justice are instituted,
the redress is effected. 1, by the mere act of the parties; 2, by mere opera
tion of law; 8, by suit or action in courts
8
redress by the mere act of the parties is, 1, that from the act of the in8
jured party only; 2, that from the joint act of all the parlies,
of the first sort are:
1. defence of one's self, and those who stand in the relation of hus
S
band and wife, parent and child, master and servant
2. recaption of goods wrongfully taken, or wife, child or servant
4
wrongfully detained
5
8. entry on lands and tenements occupied by another without right,
5
4. abatement or removal of nuisance,
6
5. distress for rent or other duties, or of cattle damage feasant,
which is a taking of a personal chattel of the wrongdoer into the
6
custody of the party injured to procure satisfaction,
7
the things which may be distrained
10
distress should be made by day except in case of damage feasant,
11
and generally upon the premises,
11
and for the whole duty at once
and must be reasonable in amount,
12
the property must be impounded,
12
13
replevin of the property,
6. seizing of heriots, &c,
15
of the second sort are.
1. accord, which is a satisfaction agreed upon between the party in
16
jured and the party injuring
2. arbitration, which is where the parties submit the matters in dis
pute to the judgment of arbitrators, sometimes adding an um
16
pire
ltt
right to real property cannot be submitted
10
the submission may be made a rule of court

CHAPTER IL

Of

Redress bt the mere Operation of Law

by mere operation of law is by retainer and remitter
retainer is where a creditor becomes executor or administrator to his debtor,
in which case he may retain tbe amount of his own debt before paying
other debts of equal degree,
remitter is where one who has a good title to lands, &c. , comes into posses
sion by a bad one, and is thereupon remitted to his ancient good title, which
protects his possession,
but the new title must be cast upon him, not gained by his own act or folly,.

redress

18-21
18

18

19
20

CHAPTER 1IL
Of Courts in General

redress of injuries in courts is effected
ties and the act of the law,

by tbe co-operation of the act of the par

82-89
22

vi
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Of Courts in General — (continued.)

pa»«.

where s party has a remedy by his own act, he has a remedy in court at his
option
a court is a place where justice is judicially administered,
the power to hold which is derived from the king, who, in contemplation of
law, is always present,
some courts are of record, whose acts and proceedings are enrolled for a per
petual memorial and testimony
against the truth of which records nothing can be averred,
other courts are not of record, and have limited power
in every court there are three constituent parts, the actor, the rent, and the
judex,
also in superior courts, attorneys and advocates, or counsel
the advocates are either barristers or sergeants,
some of whom are king's counsel
they cannot maintain action for fees,
their privileges and responsibilities,

22
23
23
24
24
25
25
25
26
27
28
29

CHAPTER IV.
Of the Public Courts of

80-60
Common Law and EqurrT
courts of justice are either, 1, of a public or general jurisdiction throughout the
30
realm; or 2, of a private or special jurisdiction,
historical view of courts
80-32
redress
of
there
are:
of the courts for the
civil injuries
32
1. the court of piepoudre, incident to fairs and markets
88
2. the court-baron, incident to every manor, and holden by the steward,. .
84
3. the hundred court, a larger species of court-baron
85
4. the county court, incident to the jurisdiction of the sheriff,
86n
the new county courts
37
5. the court of common pleas, or common bench
held by Judges appointed by the king, with jurisdiction in all civil
cases,
6. the court of king's bench
which has general control of inferior jurisdictions
and cognizance of civil and criminal causes,
7. the court of exchequer
which is a court both of equity and common law,
8. the court of chancery
which has certain common law jurisdiction
but its equity powers are of chief consequence

historical view thereof

41
41

and corporations,

9. the court of exchequer chamber, which is a court of appeal
10. the house of peers
11. the courts of assize and nisi prius,
courts of the United States

42
44
45
47
48
50
50-56
56
57
58
60»

CHAPTER V.
Of Courts Ecclesiastical, Military

61-70
and Maritime
61-64
history of the ecclesiastical courts
64
court, the most inferior,
1. the archdeacon's
64
2. the consistory court, of every diocesan bishop
8. the court of arches, a court of appeal belonging to the archbishop of Can
65
terbury,
65
4. the court of peculiars, a branch of the court of arches
5. the prerogative court for testamentary causes where there are bona notabUia
65
in two dioceses
66
6. the court of delegates, the great court of appeal in ecclesiastical causes,. . .
7. a commission of review, sometimes
granted to revise the sentence of the
67
court of delegates
67n
transfer of jurisdiction to matrimonial and probate courts
08
of military courts, the only permanent one is the court of chivalry
maritime courts have authority to determine all maritime injuries arising upon the
law,
69
high seas or in parts out of the reach of the common
69
they are only the court of admiralty and its courts of appeal
69n
of which the highest is now the judicial committee of the privy council,
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vii

CHAPTER VI.
Op Courts of Special Jurisdiction,

71-85

courts of a special or private jurisdiction are:
1. the forests courts
2. the courts of commissioners of sewers
3 the court of policies of insurance
4. the court of the marsh alsea and palace court
5. the courts of the principality of Wales
6. the court of the duchy chamber of Lancaster
7. the courts of counties palatine
8. the stannary courts,
9. the courts of London and other corporations
10. the university courts

71
78
74
76
77
78
79
80
81
83

CHAPTER VTL

Or

thb Cognizance

of Private Wrongs,

the jurisdiction
of the ecclesiastical, military
the common law determines
maritime courts, and keeps them within bounds,
injuries cognizable in the ecclesiastical courts are:
1. pecuniary, including,

86-114

and

86-87

subtraction of tithes
». .
non-payment of ecclesiastical fees and dues
spoliation, by a clerk or incumbent taking the fruits of his benefice with
out right
remedy by decree for account
dilapidations, which are a sort of waste,
remedy, by action for damages,
neglect of repair of church, &c,
2. matrimonial, which are :
jactitation of marriage, for which the remedy is to enjoin perpetual silence
on that head,
subtraction of conjugal rights; the court being empowered to award
restitution
cruelty, adultery, &c., for which a divorce a mensa et thoro may be
decreed

88
89
90
91
91
91
92

93
94
94

marriage infraudem legit, in which case it will be adjudged void
94
refusal of proper maintenance to the wife, in which case alimony will be
awarded,
94
causes, which are the probate of wills, the granting of ad
8. testamentary
ministrations and suing for legacies
95-98
these courts proceed according to the civil and canon laws, and enforce their de
crees by excommunication
98-103
civil injuries cognizable in the court military or court of chivalry are injuries in
matters of honor, and encroachments
upon distinctions of degrees and quality,,.
103
civil injuries cognizable by the courts maritime are such as are committed on the
high sea, or out of the reach of common-law remedies
106
their proceedings resemble those of the civil law
108
all other injuries fall within the cognizance of the courts of common law
109
of which the refusal or neglect of justice is remedied by writ of procedendo or
mandamus,
an encroachment of jurisdiction

109

Ill

is remedied by writ of prohibition,

CHAPTER VIIL

Of

Wrongs and their Remedies Respecting the Rights

op

Persons

115-143

all wrong may be considered merely a privation of right, and the natural remedy
is the being put in possession of that right
this may be effected either by a delivery of the thing detained to the owner,
or by satisfaction in damages
the instruments by which remedy is obtained are suits and actions,
which are divided into personal, real, and mixed
civil injuries are to the rights of persons or to the rights of property
injuries to the rights of persons are, 1, to the absolute, 2, to the relative rights,
the absolute rights of individuals are, 1, personal security, 2, personal liberty,
8, private property

116
116
116
117
118
119
119

viii

,
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Ok Wrongs and their Remedies Respecting the Rights of Persons —(continued. )
injuries against a man's personal security are:
1. affecting his life, to be hereafter considered
2, 3. affecting his limbs or body, which may be by threats of bodily harm,
by assault, by battery, by wounding, or by mayhem
4. affecting his health by unwholesome practices
6. affecting his reputation,
which may be by slander,
or by libel
or by malicious prosecution,
Injuries against a man's personal liberty are by false imprisonment
to remove which the remedies are. 1, by writ of mainprize; 2, by writ de odio
et atia; 3, by writ de homine replegiando; 4, by writ of Jtaieas corpus, . .
of which the last is the principal
the habeas corpus act
damages may also be recovered in an action of trespass
injuries to private property are considered hereafter
injuries to relative rights affect:
L husbands, and may be,
1. abduction, or taking away his wife, for which he may recover

II.

III.

IV.

'■»<>■.

ltd
120
121
123
123
125
126
127
128
129
185
138
188

139
damages
139
2. adultery, for which trespass or action on the case will lie
8. beating or ill-treating the wife, for which husband and wife join
in suing, or the husband may sue separately for loss of services,
140
140
parents, by the abduction of children
guardians, when their wards are stolen or ravished away from them, . 141
masters, and these are:
142
1. retaining a man's hired servant before his time has expired
142
2. beating him, per quod servitium amisit
143n
8. to which may be added the seduction of his female servant
the remedy for each is an action for damages,
142

CHAPTER IX.
Property
Or Injuries to Personal

144-165
144

personal property is either in possession or in action
the injuries to rights thereto are either by deprivation of possession, or by abuse
or damage to the chattels while the owner continues in possession, . .
1. in case of an unlawful taking, remedy to restore the property may be
bad by replevin
which was formerly applicable only to distress
damages may be recovered instead
2. for an unlawful detainer of goods, remedy to recover possession may
be by replevin or detinue
or damages may be recovered in trover
for injuries to property in the owner's possession, the remedies are :
1. by action of trespass, where the act was immediately injurious to the
property
2. by action on the case, where the injury was only consequential,
injuries to rights in action are by breach of contract
contracts are express or implied,
express, include debts, covenants and promises,
a debt is a sum due by certain and express agreement,
,
for which action of debt or on the case may be brought,
a covenant is an undertaking by deed
remedy for breach, an action of covenant to recover damages,
or, in case of covenant real, to compel performance
who may take advantage of covenants
a promise is in the nature of a verbal covenant,
remedy for breach, an action of assumpsit
certain promises required by the statute of frauds to be in writing,. .
implied contracts are such as reason and justice dictate and which
therefore the law presumes the man has contracted to perform.. . .
of which are, 1, those arising from the nature and constitution of
government,
as to pay judgments, penalties, &c
2. those which arise from natural reason and the just construction

of law

145
145
145
151
151
159

158
154
154
154
154
154
155
158
157
157
158
158
158
159
160
160
160
1C2
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Injukibb to Personal Property. — (continued.)

as 1. to psy quantum meruit for labor
2. to pay quantum valebat for goods,
8. to account for money had and received to the use of another,
4. to repay money laid out and expended for one's own use,. . . .
6. to pay the balance on an account stated,
6. to perform one's duty in any undertaking,
in some cases, also, there is an implied warranty on sales,
in all these cases an action lies on the implied assumpsit,
and sometimes an action of deceit,

CHAPTER
Of Injuries to Real Property;
Freehold,

and

first of

vabk.
162
163
163
168
164
165
166
166
16ft

X
Dispossession

or Ouster of the
167-197

injuries affecting real property are, 1. ouster; 2. trespass; 8. nuisance; 4. waste
5. subtraction; 6. disturbance,
167
ouster or dispossession may be
1. by abatement, where, on death of the person seized, a stranger enters
before the heir
168
a stranger
2. by intrusion, where after a particular estate is determined,
enters before the remainder man or reversioner,
169
8. by disseisin, which is a wrongful putting one out of possession
169
4. by discontinuance, which is where tenant in tail or husband of tenant
in fee makes a larger estate of the land than he is entitled to,
171
which is where the entry was originally lawful, bat
5. by deforcement,
the detainer is become unlawful
172
the remedies for these wrongs are,
L peaceable entry, which is applicable only to the first three cases,
17S
and the right of which may be loUed
17ft
and which must be made within twenty years,
178
law,
which are,
IL actions at
1. writ of entry
180
2. writ of assize,
184
hath
the
actual
doer
of
gained
right
possession, the
III. where the wrong
remedy is by writ of right or other writ in the nature thereof,
190
the present remedy for these wrongs is by action of ejectment.
19?n

CHAPTER XI.
Of

Dispossession, or Ouster, of Chattels Real
198-207
ouster from chattels real is,
1. from estates by statute or elegit, for which the remedy is by assize of novel
19g
disseisin
2. from estates for years, for which the remedies are:
1. a writ of ejeetione firmm
199
2. a writ quart ejeeit infra terminum,
199
first,
or
of
is
the
the
action
now
usual mode of trying title, 200
ejectment,
in it the party recovers possession, and also damages,
200
in
ejectment,
proceedings
200-205
after recovery of possession an action may be brought for mesne profits, 205
200
ejectment does not lie for incorporeal hereditaments except tithes,
3. a writ quart ejeeit infra terminum lies against one who has come in under
the wrong doer,
207

Of

Tkespass

CHAPTER XII.
208-215
trespass is an injury directly and immediately injurious to the person or property
of another, and therefore necessarily accompanied with some force
208
trespass to lands, signifies an entry on another man's ground without lawful
authority, doing some damage, however inconsiderable
209
remedy, by action of trespass quart clautum regit,
210>
to maintain which one must have both property in the soil and pos
session
210
where the trespass is by cattle, they may be distrained damage feasant, . . 211
on
another's
lands
is
justifiable
in some cases an entry
212
but if the person entering abuses his privilege, he becomes trespasser
ab initio,
213

f
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CHAPTER XIIL

Of Nuisance

216-223
216

nuisances are: 1, public or common; 2, private
i
of the lands,
a private nuisance is anything done to the hurt or annoyance
tenements or hereditaments of another,
this may be,
1. to corporeal hereditaments
as by obstructing a way, &c
2. to incorporeal hereditaments,
the remedies for private nuisances, besides that by abatement, are:
1. by action on the case for damages,
2. by assize of nuisance, in which damages may be recovered
and the
nuisance abated,
8. by writ quod permittat prosternere,
but an action on the case is now the sole remedy

216
216
218
220
231
221
223

CHAPTER XIV.

Of

Waste,

waste is a spoil or destruction

223-229

in lands or

tenements,

being either voluntary or

permissive,
to be injured by waste, one must have an interest in the estate
which may be either a present interest (as by right of common)
or an interest in remainder or reversion

223
223
224
224

the remedies are :
1. preventive by writ of eslrepemmt,

225

or by injunction in equity
227
228
2. corrective, by writ of waste, to recover the place wasted and damages,
for which an action on the case is now substituted
229a

CHAPTER XV.
Of Subtraction

230-235

subtraction is when one who owes services to another withdraws or neglects to
perform them
230
this may be, 1, of rents or other services due by tenure; 2, of those due by
custom

of those due by tenure, the general remedy is by distress
other remedies are, 1. action of debt; 2. assize; 3. writ de consuetudinibus et servitiis; 4. writ of cessavit; 5. writ of right sur disclaimer, . . .
to remedy the oppression of the lord, the tenant has, 1. writ n» injuste
vexes; 2. writ of mesne
of those due by custom, the remedies are, 1. writ of secta ad molendinum.
Sec, 2. action on the case

230
231
231
234
235

CHAPTER XVI.
Of Disturbance

236-253

8.

is

a

a

is

is

is

2.

1.

I.

is

it,

disturbance is a hindering or disquieting the owner of an incorporeal heredita
ment in his regular and lawful enjoyment of
236
remedied by action on the case
disturbance of franchises
236
by intercommoning without
II. disturbance of common, which may be,
by surcharging the common;
by enclosure or obstruction,
right;
for each of which there
appropriate remedy
237-241
III. disturbance of ways redressed by action on the case,
241
IV. disturbance of tenure has the like remedy
242
the hindrance of
patron to present his
V. disturbance of patronage,
clerk to benefice
243
for which there were various remedies, of which quare impedit
the
24G-&j3

present

CHAPTER XVII.
Of Injuries Proceeding from or Affecting the Croww

.

is

2.

lished

2

is

2. 1.

is

1.

254-219
where the crown
where the crown
the sufferer, . . 254
these are,
aggressor;
the maxim that the king can do no wrong
254
injuries to rights of property by the crown are remedied:
by petition of right, grounded on facts set forth in the petition,. . . 256
estab
by monstrans de droit, when the right already appears, and

j6
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Of Injuries Proceeding from or Affecting the Crown — {continued.)

taok.

injuries to the rights of the crown arc redressed:
L. by the usual common-law actions
257
2. by inquest of office, to recover possession
258
3. by scire facias, to repeal the king's letters patent or grant
261
4. by information in the exchequer to recover moneys or chattels, or to
obtain damages fur wrongs to the possessions of the crown,
261
5. by writ of quo warranto, or information in the nature thereof, when
offices, franchises or liberties are usurped,
.'
262
6. by mandamus, to admit or restore a person entitled to a place or office,
264
or to compel elections, &c,
265
recapitulation: completeness of the remedies given for wrongs,
265-269

CHAPTER XVIII.

Of

the Pursuit of Remedies bt Action; and, first, of thb Original Writ,
the common pleas, the original court for civil actions,

Of

Process,
after the original writ comes

270-278
271
the king's bench and exchequer have now concurrent jurisdiction generally, 271
of the orderly parts of a suit the first is the original writ from the court of
272
chancery,
which is either optional or peremptory
272
return thereof
275-278
four
terms
court,
the
of
275

CHAPTER XIX.
278-293

process,

or the means of compelling the defendant

to appear

279

this includes, 1. summons; 2. writ of attachment or pone, sometimes the first
process; 3. writ of distringas; 4 capias ad respondendum, and, testatum
capiat, or, instead of these, in the king's bench, the bill of Middlesex
and writ of latitat, and in the exchequer, the writ of quo minus; 5. the
alias and pluries writs; 6. the exigeat, or writ of exigx facias, proclama
tions and outlawry; 7. appearance
and common bail; 8. arrest; 9.
special bail, first, to the sheriff and then to the action
279-293
for all which a writ of summons is now substituted in ordinary cases.

CHAPTER XX.

Of

Pleadings,

293-313

pleadings are the mutual altercations between the plaintiff and defendant, form
293
erly oral, but now in writing,
L the declaration, narratio or count, which is an amplification of the original
writ, with the addition of time and place of the injury
293
the venue in which is in some cases local,
294
295
it may contain several counts
395, 296
of non-pros, retraxit and discontinuance,
IL the defence, claim of cognizance, imparlance, view, oyer, aid-prayer,
voucher, or parol demurrer
297-301
301
HI the plea, which is either dilatory or to the actinn
dilatory pleas, merely to delay or put off the suit, are:
1. to the jurisdiction of the court
301
301
2. to the disability of the plaintiff
303
3. in abatement of the writ or counts,
302, 303
these must be verified and pray judgment, Ac
pleas to the action either confess the complaint in whole or in part, as
in tender and set-off
303
or totally deny the cause of complaint; as the general issue or special
805, 306
plea in bar
306, 308
instances of special pleas,
the qualities of a plea are, 1. that it be single; 2. direct and positive and
not argumentative; 8. with convenient certainty of time, place and
persons; 4. answering the plaintiff's allegations in every material
308
point, and, 5. so pleaded as to be capable of trial
special pleas must advance some new fact not mentioned in the declara
309
tion, and are bad if only amounting to general issue
309
they may give color to the plaintiff,
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Of Pleading — (continued.)
IV.

riat-

of the plaintiff, which may be followed by rejoinder, sur
810
rejoinder, rebutter, and sur-rebutter
810-813
concerning departure, new assignment, duplicity, &c,
the replication

CHAPTER XXI.
Of

1

Isstra and Dem u rhru,
814-824
issue is either upon matter of fact or matter of law,
314
issue of law is called a demurrer, and it admits the facts to be true, as stated,
314
but denies their legal sufficiency
this issue is tried by the court,
81S, 323
issues of fact are to be tried by jury
815
new matter after issue joined may be pleaded puis darrien continuance
816
pleadings were formerly in Norman or law-french, and then in Latin, but now in
English
817-328

CHAPTER XXII.
Species of Trial
the uncertainty in legal proceedings discussed,
trial is the examination of the matter of fact in issue

Of thk Several

825-348
825-830
330

the several species are:
1. by the record, where matter of record is in issue
2. by inspection, or examination, which is by the court, where the mat
ter in issue is the evident object of the senses
8. by certificate, where the evidence of the person certifying is the only
proper criterion of the point in dispute
4. by witnesses, which is only used on writ of dower, where the death of
the husband is denied
0. by wager of battel, now abolished
6. by wager of law, also now abolished,

331
381
838
836
887
841

CHAPTER XXIIL
Of the Trial bt Jury,

trial by jury, called also trial per pais, or by the country
is of two kinds, extraordinary or ordinary
the first is by the grand assize in writs of right, and
writs of attaint,
in the ordinary jury trial the process is:
1. the venire facias to the sheriff to summon jurors
with the subsequent compulsive habere corpora,
if the sheriff be not indifferent, the process
elisors
3. the carrying down the record to nisi prius,
3. the sheriff's return of common or special jurors,
4. the challenges, which are to the whole array or

849-385
340
351

by the grand jury in

851
352

or distringas
854
issues to coroners or

354
856
357
858
360

to the polls,
de medietate Ungues,
challenges to the polls are either propter honoris respeetum, propter
defectum, propter affectum, or propter delictum
861-364
5. the tales de drcumstantibus to fill the jury
864
6. the swearing of the jury
865
of the case on the evidence,
7. the presentation
866
which must relate to the fact or point in issue
367
evidence is of two kinds, by proofs, or by the private knowledge of
the jurors,
367
proofs are either written or by parol
3C7
the best evidence the case will admit of is always required, if to be
obtained
368
witnesses are brought in by subpoena ad testificandum
86!)
infamous and interested parties are excluded,
369
one credible witness generally sufficient,
870
proof may be positive or circumstantial
871
swearing of the witness; exceptions,
872
demurrer to evidence
872

jury

Analysis of the Contents of this Volume,
Of

the

Trial

by Jukt— {continued.)
judge's summing up
verdict, general or special
t considerations regarding jury trials

xiii
pass.
374
875-879
379-385

CHAPTER XXIV.
OF JUDOICKKT

AKD ITS INCIDENTS
886-401
return of the postea
886
886
judgment may t>esuspended or arrested
887
1. new trial may be granted for matter extrinsic the record
as for misbehavior of party or iury, excessive damages, &c
887
for which cause must be shown by affidavit, if the matter was not apparent
to the judge,
891
and terms may be imposed
893
893
3. judgment may be arrested for cause apparent on the record
as where declaration does not pursue the writ, or is insufficient,
8'.l:*
but certain defects in the declaration are cured by verdict
394
and if the issue be immaterial, repleader may be awarded
895
judgments are the sentence of the law pronounced by the court upon the matter
395
contained in the record
they are either, 1. upon demurrer; 2. on verdict; 3. by confession or default;
895
4. upon nonsuit or retraxit
896
they are also, 1. interlocutory; 2. final,
897
warrants of attorney to confess judgment
assess
writ of inquiry to
damages
894
are
now
of
suit
the
of
costs or expenses
necessary consequence
judgment, 899
but the king generally neither pays nor receives them
400
&c., and paupers
case of executors,
400

CHAPTER XXV.

Or

Proceedings in the Nature of Appeals

402-411

proceedings in the nature of appeals from judgments are:
1. a writ of attaint (now superseded) to impeach the verdict
403
3. a writ of deceit in the common pleas to reverse a judgment there had by
frand or collusion
405
3. a writ of audita querela, to discharge a judgment by matter that has since
happened
4. a writ of error to some superior court of appeal
which is only upon matter of law appearing on the face of the proceed

306
407

407
ings
and slight mistakes and errors are cured under the statutes of amend
ments and jeofails
407
407-410
history of these statutes
writs of error are to the king's bench from all inferior courts of record, 410
formerly also from the common pleas and the court of king's bench
in Ireland
410
they are now from the three superior courts at Westminster to the
410n
exchequer chamber
and from the exchequer chamber and the superior courts of Ireland
411n
to the house of lords.

CHAPTER XXVI.
Ox Exbctjtiow

412-425

412
execution is the putting the sentence of the law in force
is recovered the execution is an
L when possession of any hereditament
habere facias seisinam possessionem, &c
413
PL. in other actions where something special is to be done, a special writ is
413
awarded according to the nature of the case,
413
as in nuisance, replevin, &c
either,
the
writ
is
HL when money is recovered
I
In'
debtor's
body
ad
414
1. a capiat
satisfaciendum against
416
or in default thereof, a scire facia* against his bail
417
3. a fieri facias, aeainst his goods and chattels
417
3. a levari facias, against goods and profits of lands,
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Or Execution—

(continued.)
4. an tltgit. against goods and the possession of lands
statutes, recognizances,
6. an extendi facias, and other process, on
against the body, lands and goods,

418

Ac. ,
420-425

CHAPTER XXVII.
Of Proceedings in the Coubts of Equity

426-455

the court of
of equity which belong to the peculiar jurisdiction of
chancery are:
427
1. the guardianship of Infants
427
2. the custody of idiots and lunatics
428
8. the superintendence of charities
428
away,
4. jurisdiction in bankruptcy, now taken
heard in the exchequer and duchy court of
some peculiar equity causes are
429
Lancaster
429
is the soul and spirit of all law
equity in its true and genuine meaning
other will be found either wholly or to a
to set law and equity in opposition to each
430
certain degree erroneous
interpret the law according to its spirit;
that equity follows the law; that both
that both follow rules and precedents, and
that both have the same object;
480-436
evidence, <fcc,
observe the same rules of property,
of equity and of law are:
the essential differences between the courts
on the oath of the party, which gives
L the mode of proof, by a discovery
437
fraud,
jurisdiction in matters of account and
438
taken in any part of the world
2. the mode of trial, by depositions
a more specific and extensive remedy than
8. the mode of relief, by giving
438
can be bad in courts of law
deeds, enjoining waste, &c., 438
examples, specific performance, setting aside
them
merely
true construction of securities for money by considering
matters

4. the
as a pledge
nearly the same rules as would govern the
5. the execution of trusts under
estate at law
are:
the proceedings in a suit in equity
L the bill of complaint, in the nature of a declaration
which must bring all interested parties before the court
&c, to compel
followed, if necessary, by attachment,
2. the subpoena,
appearance

or against corporations, a distringas,
8.
4.
5.
6.

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

12.

appearance

demurrer, which corresponds to that at law
to the person, or in bar
pleas, either to the jurisdiction,
answer, which is given upon oath,
to different parts of the
but defendant may plead, answer and demur
•
same bill,
exceptions to answer for insufficiency
of revivor, of interpleader, &c., . .
amendments of bill, bill of supplement,
hearing upon bill and answer,
replication and issue
examination of witnesses upon interrogatories
examinations,
publication of
bill to perpetuate testimony
hearing of the cause upon evidence

cross-causes to be heard together,
18. decree interlocutory
feigned issue and trial; question of law
court; reference to master, &c
14. final decree
of review
15. petition for rehearing, or bill
16. appeal to the house of lords

for opinion of common-law

439
439
442
442
443
444
445
446
446
446
446
448
448
448
448
449
449
450
450
451
452
452
453
453
454

APPENDIX
No. 1. proceedings on a writ of righjt patent,
in the king's bench.
in an action of trespass in ejectment by original
2. proceedings
in the court of common pleas removed into the
3. proceedings in an action of debt
king's bench on writ of error.
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BOOK IV. OF PUBLIC WRONGS.

CHAPTEH L
general division of the subject,
••••
the king the proper prosecutor for public offences
« crime or misdemeanor is an act committed or omitted in violation of a public law
..
...
either forbidding or commanding
;>v
the two terms properly synonymous, though "crimes"
used to denote the
more serious offences
crimes are distinguished from civil injuries in that they are
breach and vio
lation of the public rights due to the whole community in its social aggre
.■
gate capacity
private wrong and something more,
every public offence
punishments and their purpose
the right to inflict them for offences mala in te
by nature in every indi

7 5 5
11

8.

1.

is

a

is

vidual
in state of society the right
transferred to the sovereign power,
this power may also punish acts not mala in it
the rightfulness of capital punishment considered
the purpose of punishment
to prevent future offences
this may be either,
by the amendment of the offender himself; 2.
by deterring others by his example;
by depriving him of the
power to do future mischief,
the measure of punishment must be determined by the wisdom of the
legislative power
punishments unreasonably severe are to be avoided
the certainty rather than the severity of punishment deters
they should be graduated to the offence

!> 8 8 7

is

a

a

is

.

........

1-19
1
2

*

thh Nature of Crimes and their Punishment,

it,
;

Of

»*•«•

11
12
10
17
17

CHAPTER II.
Of thb Persons Capable of

a

is

is

a

is

7.

a

is

.■

a

a

is

8.

is

5. 4.

is

8. 2.

7

7

,

1.

a

is

3.

is is
a

2. 1.

a

Committing Crimes,
20-83
want or defect of will alone excuses from punishment for forbidden acts,
20
vicious act and vicious will,
to constitute crime there must be both
21
the will does not join with the act:
defect of understanding
where there
21
understanding and will, but not called forth at the time, as
where there
in case of offences by chance or ignorance,
21
where the act
constrained by outward force or violence,
21
vicious will may be wanting in cases of:
infancy; in certain cases of omission of duty, &c., one under 21 not being
punishable
22
responsible at 14,
but for breaches of the peace, &c. he
23
under one cannot be guilty of felony,
23
and 14 he
between
presumed incapable, but evidence of mal.<*e may be
23
given
idiocy or lunacy,
24
drunkenness; which does not generally excuse,
25
but may in cases where intent
the gist of the offence,
25u
misfortune or chance, without design,
20
27
ignorance or mistake of fact
27
Dut ignorance of law
no excuse,
27
compulsion, or inevitable necessity,
as in case of wife coerced by husband
28
however,
murder,
not excused in
20
who,
manslaughter or treason, . .
20
nor in case of keeping
brothel
when
nor
she offends alone,
29
harm
or
menaces,
induce
death
or
other
threats
which
fear of
bodily
30
may also excuse,
also the necessity of choosing between two evils, as in case of homicide
resisted
30
by an officer in some cases where his authority
81
want of food, &c, not legal excuse,
crime,
82
in case of the king, who
legally incapable of committing
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CHAPTER III.
Or Principals

and Accessories
84-40
persons are guilty of crimes either as principals or accessories,
34
a principal is cither,
in the first degree, when he is the actor or absolute perpetrator of the crime, 34
in the second degree, when he is present aiding and abetting the fact to
be done,
34
presence may be either actual or constructive,
84
an accessory is one who neither commits the offence, nor is present, but is some
way concerned therein
35
1. accessories can only be in petit treason and felony: in high treasons and
misdemeanors
all are principals,
2. an accessory before the fact is one who, being absent at the time of the
crime committed, doth yet piocure, counsel or command it to be done, . .
3. an accessory after the fact is one who, knowing a felony to have been com
mitted, receives, relieves, comforts, or assists the felon
87
but the felony must be complete at the time of assistance given,
83
husband,....
the wife is excused for concealing her
39
accessories,
4.
39
formerly liable to the same punishment as principal.-,
and could not be tried till principal convicted
40
but changes in these particulars are made by statutes
39-40

CHAPTER IV.
Of Offences against

Ood and Religion
41-65
private vices not the object of municipal law except as, by their evil example or
effects, they prejudice the community
41
offences punishable by the laws of England are those against, 1. God and his holy
religion; 2. the law of nations; 3. the king and his government; 4. the public
or commonwealth; 5. the rights of individuals
42
offences against Ood and religion are:
1 apostacy, punishable by certain incapacities and imprisonment
44
2. heresy, cognizable generally in spiritual courts
45
8. reviling the ordinances of the church,
SO
or non-conformity to its worship,
51
53
which is excused in case of dissenters,
or professing the popish religion, &c
55
the laws against papists considered,
57-69
4. blasphemy, or denial of the being or providence of the Almighty, or con
tumelious reproaches of the Saviour
59
5. profane swearing and cursing
60
6. pretending to use witchcraftor conjuration
00-02
62
7. religious impostures,
8. simony, or the corrupt presentation of any one to nn ecclesiastical benefice
for gift or reward,
62
63
9. profanation of the Lord's day,
64
10. drunkenness
64
11. open and notorious lewdness or indecency
65
including the having of bastard children,

CHAPTER V
Of Offences against tiie Law of Nations,

.66-73
the law of nations is a system of rules deducible by natural reason and estab
lished by universal consent, to regulate the intercourse between independ
ent states
no
which in England is adopted by the common law as part of the law of the

land,

offences against it are principally by whole states or nations, in which case
resort can only be had to war,
but when individuals violate it, the government under which they live should
take notice of the offence,
the principal offences against the law of nations are :
1. violation of safe conducts or passports
2. infringement of the rights or ambassadors
8. piracy, or robbery and depredation upon the high seas,

68
68
68
70
71
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Offences against the Laws of Nations — {continued.)

faqb.

which every nation may punish,
71
certain other acts, including dealing in slaves, are statutory felonies,. .72, 73

CHAPTER VI.

Of

High Treason

74-93

offences more immediately affecting the royal person, crown and
1. treason; 3. felonies injurious to the prerogative; 8. praemunire;

dignity, are,
4. other mis

74
prisions and contempts
treason, under statute 25 E<lw.
may be either :
consort,
or their
1. compassing or imagining the death of the king or queen
76
eldest son and heir
77
by king is meant the king in possession
Ac,
79
must be evidenced by an overt act,
the compassing,
79-81
mere words not treasonable
unmarried,
or
2. violating the king's companion, or eldest daughter
wife of
81
the king's eldest son and heir,
realm,
81
3. levying war against the king in his
enemies,
4. adhering to the king's
83
5. counterfeiting the king's great or privy seal
88
6. formerly, counterfeiting the king's money, or importing counterfeit money,
was treason
83
7. slaying the chancellor, treasurer, or a judge, in their places, during their
offices
84
subsequent statutory treasons relating to papists, coining, and the protectant
succession
85-92
punishment of treason in case of males formerly, to be drawn, hanged, em
bowel led alive, beheaded, quartered: tho head and quarters to be at
the king's disposal
92
now modified so that the hanging be until death
92n
of females, formerly to be burned, now to be hanged,
93n

Ill,

CHAPTER VIL
Injurious
to tits King's Prerogative
Of Felonies

04-102

felonies are such offences as at common law occasioned forfeiture of lands or

94

goods,

usually punished by death, unless clergy allowed
97
those injurious to the king's prerogative are, 1. relating to the coin ; 8. against
the King's council;
8. serving a foreign prince; 4. embezzling the king's
, armor or stores; 5. desertion from the king's forces
98-102

CHAPTER VIIL
Of Pr«munire

103-113
praemunire, in its original sense, is the offence of adhering to the temporal power
of the pope, in derogation of regal authority,
103-116
origin and progress of the papal usurpation,
105
statutes of praemunire
110
other cases of statutory .'praemunire were:
molesting possessors of abbey lands,
116
acting as broker in usurious contracts
116
obtaining stay of proceedings in suit for monopoly
116
116
monopoly of making or importing gunpowder
exerting power of purveyance or pre-emption
116
116
asserting legislative power in parliament without the king
sending a subject out of the realm a prisoner,
116
refusing to take oaths of allegiance, supremacy, &c
117
defending the right of the pretender, or denying the right of parliament
to limit the descent of the crown,
117
treating of other matters by the peers of Scotland, when convened to
elect representatives
117
117
undertaking unlawful subscriptions
117
assisting at unlawful marriage in royal family
punishment of praemunire, to be out of king's protection, lands and goods
forfeited, and imprisoned at the king's pleasure,
118

xviii
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OF MISPRISIONS AND CONTEMPTS APFEOTINQ THE KlNO AND GOVERNMENT
119-126misprisions are such high offences as are under the degree of capital, but nearly
bordering thereon
Hfl.
these are: 1. negative, in concealing what ought to be revealed; 2. positive,
in doing something which ought not to be done,
119negative are:
1. misprision of treason, consisting in the bare knowledge and conceal
ment of treason, without assent thereto
120
2. misprision of felony, in the concealment of a felony which a man
knows, but never assented to
121
8. concealment of treasure-trove
121
positive are: 1. maladminstration of public trusts, punished usually by im
peachment
121
including embezzlement of public moneys,
12$
as, by refusing him assist
2. contempts against the king's prerogative*
ance, neglecting to join the posst eomitatus when required, receiving
pension from foreign power, &c
122
8. contempts against the king's person and government, as, by speaking
or writing against them, &c
128
4. contempts against the king's title, as, by heedlessly denying his right,
or refusing to take the oaths for securing the government
123
6. contempts against his palaces or courts of justice, as, by assaults
therein, threats to a judge, obstructing the administration of jus
tice, etc.,
124-126

CHAPTER X.
Or Offences against Public Justice,

127-141

12S

-

12»
128
12U
129
130181
182
182182
133.
134
134
135-

a

is

is

a

is

a

a

18&
136
136
137

a

it

is

is

if

a

it,

crimes specially affecting the commonwealth are: 1. against public justice; 2.
against public peace; 3. against public trade; 4. against public health; 5. against
public peace and economy,
offences against public justice are:
1. embezzling, vacating or falsifying records, or personating others in courts of
justice
2. compelling prisoners to become approvers
8, obstructing the execution of lawful process
4. escapes by prisoners, and allowing the same by officers
5. prison breach
6. rescues of others from arrest or imprisonment,
7. returning from transportation before term expired
8. taking reward under pretence of helping the owner to stolen goods,
9. receiving stolen goods, knowing them to be stolen
10. compounding felony,
11. common barretry, or the frequent exciting and stirring up suits and quarrels,
,
or suing for fictitious plaintiff, or without authority,
12. maintenance, or an officious intermeddling with a suit which no way concerni one, by maintaining or assisting a party to prosecute or defend
bargain to carry on the suit of another at the bargainor's
13. champerty, or
successful,
expense, and share the subject-matter
14. compounding information on penal statutes
15. conspiracy to indict an innocent man of felony
and sending letters threatening to accuse of crime,
the wilfully swearing false in
judicial proceeding in
16. perjury, which
matter material to the issue or point in question, by person to whom
administered, ...»
lawful oath
and subornation of perjury,
the taking of an undue reward by one concerned in the
17. bribery, which
administration of justice to influence his official conduct
or the offering such bribe,
jury corruptly
an attempt to influence
18. embracery, which
19. false verdict of jurors, formerly punished
20. negligence of public officers in the administration of justice
21. oppression and partiality in public officers,
22. extortion by public officers,

137
187
.
139
140
140
140140
141
141
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CHAPTER XL

O?

pam.

Offences against the Pctblic Peace,

Offences against the public peace, are:
1. riotous assembling of twelve or more persons

«
and

143-153

not dispersing on pro

clamation,
unlawful hunting by night or in disguise,
sending letters demanding money, or threatening violence, Ac,
destroying locks, flood-gates, &c
affrays, or tho fighting of two or more persons in a public place to the ter
ror of others
0. riots, routs and unlawful assemblies, the last of which is where three or
more assemble to do an unlawful act
the second is where three or more meet to do an unlawful act upon a
common quarrel, and make some advances towards it
a riot is where three or more actually do an unlawful act of violence
7. tumultuous petitioning
8. forcible entry or detainer, which is the violently taking, or keeping posses
sion of lands and tenements, with menaces, force and arms, and without
authority of law
9. riding or going armed with dangerous or unusual weapons,
10. spreading false news in some cases
11. false and pretended prophecies with intent to disturb the peace,
13. challenges to fight duels, or bearing such challenges
13. libels, which are malicious defamations of any person, made public by
printing, writing, signs or pictures, in order to anger him, or expose him
to public hatred, contempt and ridicule
punishing which does not abridge the liberty of the press
which consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and
not In freedom from censure for criminal publications,
2.
3.
4.
5.

143
143
144
144
145
140
146
146
147

148
149
149
149
150

150
151
153

CHAPTER XIL

Of

Offences against Public Trade

154-160
offences against public trade are:
1. owling, or transporting sheep or wool out of the kingdom, to the detri
154
ment of its staple manufacture,
of importing goods without paying the duties
3. smuggling, or the offence
155
Imposed thereon,
155
3. fraudulent bankruptcy
4. usury, or the unlawful contract on a loan of money to receive the same
156
again with exorbitant increase,
5. cheating, breaking the assize of bread, selling by false weights and meas
ures, &c.
157

or defrauding another of any thing of value by color of any false token,
letter or pretence
6. forestalling the market,
7. regrating, or buying and selling again in the same market or near the same,
or getting into one s possession, or buying up large quantities
8. engrossing,
of corn, &c., to sell again,
9. monopolies, which are a license or privilege allowed by the king for the
sole buying and selling, making, working, or using of any thing,
now void, and the monopolist punishable, except in case of patents for
inventions, &c
combinations to raise the price of provision^, &c., are also punishable, ....
10. exercising a trade without having previously served as an apprentice, ....
11. enticing or seducing artisans to go abroad

0»

Offences against the
Economy,

CHAPTER XIII.
Public Health, and the Public Police

158
158
158
158
159
159
15!)
160
160

ob

161-174
Offences against the public health are:
1. disregarding lawful orders in time of plague, or quarantine regulations, . .. 163
163
2. selling unwholesome provisions, or adulterating wine,
offences against the public police and economy are:
162
1. clandestine or irregular marriages
8. bigamy, or (more properly) polygamy, or the having a plurality of wives
'.
163
at once,
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Of Offences against the Public Health, &c— (continued.)

8.
4.
6.

0.
7.
8.
0.

in which case the marriages, except the first, are mere nullities,
in three cases, namely: 1. where the party had been continually abroad
for seven years, or, 2. was not known to be living during that time; 8.
was divorced a menm et thoro: though the second marriage is void, it
is not a felony
in other cases, namely, 1. where there is a divorce a vinculo, and 2. where
the first marriage was voidable for want of age, and was afterwards
not agreed to, the second marriage is valid
idle soldiers and mariners wandering about the realm,
gypsies remaining in the kingdom, &c.
common nuisances, which are either the doing of a thing to the annoyance
of all the king's subjects, or neglecting to do a thing the common good
requires
as obstructions to the highways, bridges, or public rivers,
offensive trades and manufactures
disorderly inns, bawdy-houses, gaming-nouses, Ac
lotteries, fireworks, &c
and common scolds
eavesdroppers
being idle and disorderly, rogues and vagabonds
luxury, the laws against which are generally repealed,
gaming, which is made punishable by penalties, and the securities obtained
thereby are void
offences against the game laws,

rui.

103

164

164
165
165

10'i
167
167
167
164
168
169
170
171
174

CHAPTER XIV.
Of

Homicide
176-204
crimes against persons are principally, 1. against their persons; 2. against their
habitations; 8. against their property
177
of crimes injurious to the persons of subjects, the first is homicide, or the killing
of a human creature,
177
which is either justifiable, excusable or felonious
177
justifiable homicide is,
1. such as is owing to unavoidable necessity, without any will, intention, or
desire, inadvertence or negligence in the party killing,
178
as when done by command of the law,
178
or to prevent some atrocious crime
179
S. such as are committed for the advancement of public justice,
where
an
officer
kills
as
one that assaults or resists him
179
or one charged with felony is killed in the endeavor to arrest him,
179
or where persons are killed in dispersing a mob
180
or where jailor or officer kills the prisoner who assaults him
180
or where the trespassers in parks, &c., will not surrender to the keepers,
180
but in all these cases the killing must bo an apparent necessity,
180
formerly, where one was killed in trial by battel,
180
8. such as are committed for the prevention of any forcible and atrocious
crime
180
as where one is slain who attempts robbery, murder or burglary,
180
or in the defence of chastity
180
in all these cases the slayer is faultless and not punishable
182
excusable homicide is,
1. per infortuniam, or by misadventure
182
but if this occur in consequence
of an idle, dangerous and unlawful
sport or other act, it is manslaughter,
183
2. se defendendo, or in self-defence
183
but here it must appear that the slayer had no other possible (or prob
184
able) means of escaping from his assailant,
this head includes defence of one's family
186
also the case where both parties are innocent, as shipwrecked persons
180
contending for the same plank
in these cases there was formerly forfeiture of goods
188
felonious homicide is the killing of a human creature without justification or
excuse
188
this may be self-murder, punished by ignominious burial and forfeiture of
goods,

189
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Op Homicide— (continued.)
or killing another, which is either manslaughter or murder,

manslaughter is the unlawful killing of another without malice express or im
plied
which is either voluntary or involuntary
instances of the first, where in a sudden fight one kills another, or the hus
band slays one taken in adultery with his wife
instances of the second, where one kills another in doing a lawful act negli
gently or in an unlawful manner,
these homicides felony, but not capital, generally
murder is the unlawful killing by one of sound mind and memory of any reason
able creature in being, and under the king's peace, with malice afore
thought, express or implied,
express malice is where one with deliberate mind and formed design, doth kill
another,

and this exists when one kills another in a duel,
and where one upon a sudden provocation beats another in a cruel and
unusual manner
the malice need not be towards the person killed in particular,
malice is implied without proof in case of deliberate killing, or killing with
out provocation
and where one kills an officer in the performance of his duty,
and where one is killed in the attempt to commit a felony,
parricide is the murder of one's parents or children
petit treason is the murder of the master by the servant, the husband by the
wife, or his superior by an ecclesiastical person
the distinction between which and murder is now abolished,

xxi
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CHAPTER XV.

Of

Offences against the Persons of Individuals,

205-219
offences against the persons of individuals are :
1. mayhem, or the violently depriving another of the use of such of his memDen as may render him the less able in fighting to defend himself or
annoy his adversary,
205
which includes loss or disabling of a hand, finger, eye or foretooth,
205
to which offence may be added malicious shooting at any one
207
2. forcible abduction and marriage or defilement of females,
208
and taking away female child under sixteen years of age from parent or
209
guardian
8. rape, or the carnal knowledge of a woman, forcibly and against her will, . 210
which a male infant under fourteen is presumed incapable of committing, 212
forcible violation of a harlot is rape,
213
evidence of the party ravished,
213
4. the crime agaiust nature
215
all which offences are felonies
216
5, 6, 7. assaults, batteries and wounding, which are punishable as misdemean
210
ors
of which beating a clerk in orders or clergyman is more severely punished, 217
218
8. false imprisonment also a misdemeanor
9. kidnapping, or the forcible abducting or stealing away of a person from
his own country and sending him into another,
219

CHAPTER XVI.
OF

THE HABITATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS
OPFENCESAGAINBT
offences more immediately affecting the habitations of individuals,

220-228
are arson and
220
burglary,
arson is the malicious and wilful burning of the dwelling-house of another
220
1. out-houses which are parcel of the dwelling, though not contiguous, are
221
subjects of arson,
also, a barn filled with hay or corn, or a stack of corn by the old com
mon law
221
221
the house must be the house of another
2. the attempt to burn a dwelling is not arson, but the consuming of any part
222
is sufficient,
223
but malice is essential
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Op Offences against the Habitations of Individuals — {continu-cd.)
the offence is felony
223
burglary is the breaking and entering by night into a dwelling-house with intent
to commit a felony
224
1. it is night when there is not daylight enough begun or left to discern a
man's face withal
224
2. the offence may be committed in a church,
224
and in any house where a man resides, though he may be temporarily
absent
and in any building inclosed with the house by the same common fence,
a chamber in college or inn of court, &c, is the occupant's mansion,. . .
tents and booths not dwelling-houses, though the owner lodge there
3. there must be both a breaking and an entry
the removal of any obstruction to entering is a sufficient breaking
the entering a chimney, or getting in by fraudulent artifice
the entry with any part of the body, or with an instrument held in the
hand, is sufficient
4. the intent must be to commit either a common-law or statutory felony,. .

225
225
225
226
226
226
226
827
228

CHAPTER XVII.
Of Offences against Private Property

229-230
offences more immediately affecting the property of individuals are:
1. larceny, which is either simple or compound,
229
simple larceny is the felonious taking and carrying away of the personal
229
goods of another
the taking must be against the owner's consent,
280
and breach of trust is not larceny
280
281, 234
but embezzlement by servants is made felony
the taking of one's own goods to defraud another is felony in some cases, 231
any removal of the goods, though the thief does not make off with them,
is a sufficient carrying away,
231
the intent must be felonious
282
the property must be the personal goods of another
232
animals ferot natura, unreclaimed, not subjects of larceny generally, . . . 285
but domestic animals (except dogs and the like) are
286
so may be the property of unknown persous
286
the offence is a felony at common law
287
other,
with the aggrava
compound larceny has all the properties of the
tion of a taking from one's house or person,
240
larceny from the person is:
1. by privately stealing
242
2. by open and violent taking, which is robbery
248
the taking must be complete
243
and from the person, or from one's presence, and be accom
243
plished by menaces or violence,
the value is immaterial,
243
the taking must be by force or a previous putting In fear
243
2. malicious mischief to property from wanton cruelty or revenge
244-247
8. forgery, or the fraudulent making or alteration of a writing to the preju
247
dice of another man's right
248-250
the statutes for the punishment thereof

CHAPTER XVIII.
Of the Means of Preventing

Offences

201-267
justice consists in obliging persons suspected of future misbehavior
preventive
behavior,
the
or
for
or
securities
for
. . 251
good
peace
keeping
to give pledge
the security consists in being bound in a recognizance in a certain sum, to
252
be void if the condition is observed
the condition may be to keep the peace generally, or particularly also, with
253
regard to the person craving the security
if the condition is broken, the recognizance is estreated and sent up to the
253
exchequer for suit,
253
any justice of the peace may demand such security
253
or the superior courts may take it,
femes covert and infants give security by their friends and not in person, . . 254
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Means of Preventing Offences— {continued.)
the security is discharged 1. by demise of the king; 2. by death
of the principal before forfeiture; 3. by order of the court on
cause; 4. if granted on private account, by release, &c
any justice may ex officio bind parties to keep the peace who make af
fray in his presence, &c
and private parties may swear the pence against others, where
there is just cause to fear injury
what will constitute a breach of the recognizance
any justice may bind over to good behavior any that be not of
good fame,

how the recognizance

may be forfeited,

""*■

264
254
255
255
258
257

CHAPTER XIX.

Or

,
Courts op a Crtmtnai, Jurisdiction
958-279
courts of criminal jurisdiction are cither of a public and general jurisdiction, or
only of a private and special jurisdiction
258
criminal courts of public and general jurisdiction are,
1. the high court of parliament, which may by bill attaint persons or inflict
pains and penalties,
259
and the commons may impeach before the lords a commoner for high mis
demeanors, or a peer for any crime
259
proceedings on impeachment
200
2. the court or the lord high steward, for the trial of peers for treason, felony
or misprision of either
261
the trial being by peers upon indictment previously found
263
all the peers being summoned except the bishops
2&<
8. the court of king's bench, which takes cognizance of crimes of all grades,.
265
4. the court of chivalry, now disused
268
5. the high court of admiralty, having cognizance of offences on the sea, or
on the coast out of the body of any county, &c.
268
the powers now transferred to the central criminal court
209»
.•
269
6. 7. the courts of oyer and terminer and general gaol delivery,
8. the court of general quarter sessions of the peace,
271
9. the sheriff's tourn or great court-leet of the county, ..
278
10. the court-leet, or view of frankpledge
273
11. the court of the coroner, to enquire concerning deaths in prison or sudden
or violent deaths
274
12. the court of the clerk of the market
275
criminal courts of a private and special jurisdiction are,
1. the court of the lord steward, treasurer or controller of the king's house
hold
276
*
2. the court of the lord steward of the king's household, or in his absence, of
the treasurer, controller and steward of the marshalsea,
27(5
8. the courts of the two universities
277
t

Of

Summary Convictions
880-288
summary convictions, except in case of contempts are unknown to the common
law,
280
in these there is no intervention of a jury,
280
allowed,
these are
laws,
1. in cases of offences against the revenue
281
2. in cases of vagrancy and other disorderly offences,
281
a summons in these cases Is requisite,
282
to this head may also be referred,
court
attachment
of
of
by
the
contempts
3.
283
punishment
incident to every superior
the power to do which is an inseparable
court
286
if the offence be in the presence of the court it maybe punished with
out further proof or examination
286
in other cases a party is generally ruled to show cause, and examined
on interrogatories
287
and if convicted may be fined and imprisoned,
287
but if he clears himself by his answer he is discharged
288

CHAPTER XX.
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Of Arrkstb,

mm
289-295

an arrest is the apprehending or restraining one's person, in order to be forthcom
ing to answer an alleged or suspected crime,
it is made, in general,
1. by warrant, which, in extraordinary cases, may be granted by the
privy council or secretaries of state,
but ordinarily by justices of the peace
and upon cause shown on oath
form of the warrant; which must be under seal
a general warrant to apprehend all persons suspected or guilty of a
crime, naming none, is void
if the warrant is fair on its face the officer is justified in exe

cuting it,

warrant, which may be by a justice iu case of fel
ony or breach of peace in his presence,
or by sheriff or coroner, of any felon in his county
or by constable, in case of breach of peace in his view, or of felony
actually committed, or dangerous wounding
or by watchmen, of all offenders
8. private persons and officers present at the commission of a felony
must arrest the felon,
and may justify breaking doors for the purpose
and upon probable suspicion in case of felony actually committed
may arrest the supposed felon,
i. hue and cry is the old common-law process of pursuing, with horn
and voice, felons and such as have dangerously wounded another, . .
which may be raised by precept of a justice, or by a peace officer, or
by any person knowing of a felony,
and those prosecuting it have the same powers as under a warrant, ....
rewards sometimes offered for arrests

2. by officers without

289
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290
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CHAPTER XXII.
Of

296-300
Commitment on Bail
29(i
when a person is arrested, he is taken before a justice and examined
2!>6>
if the charges prove unfounded, he is discharged
297
otherwise, he is committed for safe custody, or held to bail
297
bail must not be refused in bailable cases, nor excessive bail required
298
anciently all felonies were bailable, but statutes make some exceptions
a prisoner committed to await trial is to be treated with the utmost humanity, 809

Of

801-816
the Several Modes of Prosecution
prosecution of offenders is either with or without the previous finding of the fact
801
by inquest or grand jury,
801
the first is either by presentment or indictment
a presentment, properly speaking, is the notice taken by a grand jury of an
301
offence from their own knowledge or observation,
an inquisition of office is the act of a jury summoned by the proper officer to
801
inquire of matters relating to the crown,
801
as in case olfelode se, deodands, &c
an indictment is a written accusation of crime, preferred to and presented
802
upon oath by a grand jury,
which is a tribunal of not less than twelve nor more than twenty-three, . . 802
803
who are charged by the judge and proceed upon evidence,
303
and inquire only for the body of the county
305
they return a bill "not a true bill," or "a true bill,"
306
twelve must concur in finding a bill
806
indictments must be certain as to person, place, time and offence
306
though time and place are generally immaterial
Informations are either at suit of the king and a subject jointly, or at suit of
308
the king alone
308
the first are a sort of qui tarn action
or are on the
the second are either filed, ex officio, by the attorney-general,
308
relation of some private person or common informer,

CHAPTER XXTIL
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BevkraTj Modes op Prosecution — (continued.)
tab*.
the trial must be by jury of the county of the offence
809
these informations are confined to misdemeanors
810
informations in the nature of quo teaiTanio are employed, instead of the writ
of that name
313
formerly there might he an appeal, or a criminal accusation by a private sub
ject against another, demanding punishment on account of the partic
ular injury suffered by a crime
812
•which could be had in case of larceny, rape, arson, aud murder
814
trial on which was a bar to indictment, but an appeal might be had after
acquittal on indictment
815
the king could not pardon in case of appeal, but the appellee might re
lease

81ft

CHAPTER XXIV.

Of

Process lton an Indictment,

818-321
process to bring in an offender, when indicted in his absence, is by venire facias,
distress infinite, capias, and, if he absconds, outlawry
31S
the punishment of outlawry is forfeiture, and, in treason and felony, conviction
of the offence charged
819
by certiorari the indictment and proceedings may be removed into the king's bench
before trial,
820
which is done, 1. to determine the validity of proceedings; 2. to obtain
an impartial trial ; 8. to plead a pardon ; or, 4. to obtain process
of
outlawry,
820
in case of a peer the indictment is transmitted on certiorari into parliament, 821

CHAPTER XXV.
Op Arraignment and its Incidents,

322-831

arraignment is call ing the prisoner to the bar of the court to answer the indictment, 822
when arraigned the indictment is read to him, and it is demanded whether he
is guilty or not guilty
823
if he makes no answer, or answers foreign to the purpose, or, after pleading
not guilty, refuses to put himself upon the country, he is said to stand
mute
824
which in treason, petit larceny and misdemeanors was equivalent to con
viction
82ft
in other cases the prisoner was subjected to the peine forte et dure,
825
in
torture illegal
England,
820
now if the prisoner stands mute a plea of not guilty is entered
324n
if he pleads guilty, judgment is awarded
320
if he confesses and accuses another to obtain pardon, he is called an approver, 320

CHAPTER XXVL
Ok Plea and Issue,

882-841
the defence of the accused is made either by, 1. plea to the jurisdiction, 2, demur
rer; 3. plea in abatement; 4. special plea in bar; 5. general issue
832
833
formerly plea of sanctuary and benefit of clergy
plea to the jurisdiction is when an indictment is taken before a court that bath no
cognizance of the offence
83IS
demurrer admits the fact, but denies that in law a crime" is charged
333
which, if adjudged against the prisoner in case of felony, he shall plead over, 884
plea in abatement is principally for misnomer, and must show how the defect may
be remedied
834
special plea in bar is either autrefois aeqy.it, autrefois convict, autrefois attaint, or a
885-838
pardon
which if found against the prisoner he may plead not guilty,
888
the general issue is the plea of not guilty
838

CHAPTER XXVIL
Of Trial

and Conviction
formerly there were methods of trial not now allowed
1. trial by ordeal
2. trial by the corsned or morsel of execration
8. trini by battle

Vol. II.— iv.

842-364
342
842-345
345
84ft
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Trial

and Conviction— (continued.)
rta*.
the methods now in use are:
4. in the court of the lord high steward when a peer is capitally indicted
848
5. trial by jury secured by magna charta
849
the advantages of which considered
349
the process to obtain jury
850
the prisoner entitled to a copy of the indictment
851
and list of witnesses against him
351
and compulsory process for his witnesses
351
the jury consists of twelve, who must be sworn
852
challenges may be had either by the crown or the prisoner; 1. to the
array; 2. to the polls
852
an alien may have a jury de mtdittate, except in treason
852
at common law the prisoner may have 35 peremptory challenges, . .353, 354
if by reason of challenges the jury be not full a tales is issued,
854
the prisoner is now, though not formerly, allowed a full defence by
counsel in all cases
35 ~u
the doctrine of evidence generally the same as in civil cases,
856
but in treason and misprision of treason, two witnesses
are
required
356
presumptive evidence of felony to be admitted cautiously,
358
the witnesses for the prisoner now examined on oath,
300
the verdict of the jury is either, 1. general, guilty, or not guilty; or,
2. special, setting forth the facts and praying the judgment of
the court whether they establish the crime
860
if not guilty, the prisoner is forever discharged
861
if guilty, there may be allowance to the prosecutor for expenses,
and restitution of stolen goods
862
and in some cases the prisoner is allowed to speak (or settle)
with the prosecutor,
863

CHAPTER XXVIII.
Of the Benefit of Clergy,
benefit

of clergy had its origin in the usurped jurisdiction

865-874

of the popish ecclesi

astics,
865
originally none but the clergy admitted ; afterwards all who could read
867
on plea of clergy the prisoner was burned in the hand and discharged; by the
statute 18 Eliz , might be imprisoned a year
868, 869
subsequent
statutory changes, until benefit of clergy means exemption
from capital punishment
369-373
now it is wholly abolished
865re
it was allowable only in petit treason and capital felonies
874
and was accompanied
by forfeiture of goods
874

CHAPTER XXIX.
Of Judgment

and its Consequences
875-389
when the prisoner is brought in to receive judgment, he may move in arrest for
defect in the indictment
375
or plead pardon or pray benefit of clergy
876
if these fail, the court pronounces the judgment prescribed by law,
876
punishments in general considered
876-380
attainder is a consequence of judgment of death,
380
forfeiture and corruption of blood are consequences of attainder,
381
forfeiture of real estate to the king was formerly, in treason, of the whole
estate; in felonies, for a year and a day; for misprision of treason,
assault on a judge, <fec.,for the life of the offender
381-885
chattel interests are forfeited absolutely in treason, misprision of trea
son, felony, excusable homicide, petit larceny, standing mute, as
sault upon a judge, <ftc
886
and for flight on accusation of treason or felony, chattels are for
feited,
lands are forfeited upon attainder; goods upon conviction,
the forfeiture of lands is from the offence committed; that of goods
has no relation back
by corruption of blood, the party becomes incapable of being heir to
another, or transmitting by descent, or being the medium of de
scent

this rule now modified

887
887
887

888
389a
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CHAPTER XXX.

Of

Rrvebsai, of Judgment,

Of

Reprieve and Pardon,

Of

Execution

*ao«-

890-393
reversal of judgment may be:
300
1. without writ of error, for matter de1u>rtthe record,
391
2. by writ of error, for errors apparent in the record
392
8. by act of parliament,
the effect of which, after judgment upon conviction, is that all the pro
893
ceedings are set aside,
893
but there may be a new prosecution for the same offence,

CHAPTER XXXI.
894-402
a reprieve is a withdrawing of the sentence for a time, whereby execution is sus
894
pended,
which may be for pregnancy of a female convict
894
or on account of insanity, or non-identity
395
a pardon may be grunted by the king in all but a few excepted cases
898
which must be under the great seal,
400
fraud,
for
and may be avoided
400
is strictly construed, and should describe the offence
400
and may be conditional
401
and may be granted by act of parliament, which may not be pleaded as the
king's pardon must be
402
pardon acquits of all corporal penalties and forfeitures, and restores credit,. . 402
but to purify the blood corrupted by attainder requires an act of parliament, 402

CHAPTER XXXIL
403-400

execution is the completion of human punishment, and must be performed by the
legal officer
and one mode of death cannot be substituted for another
but the king may remit a part of the sentence
in capital cases, if the first effort at execution is ineffectual, the
must be banged again,

prisoner

408
404
405
400

CHAPTER XXX1IL

Of

m

Risk, Pkoohbm and Gradual Improvements or the Lawbof England, 407-443

COMMENTARIES

THE LAWS OF ENGLAND.
BOOK THE THIRD.

OF PRIVATE WRONGS.
CHAPTEE I.

OP THE REDRESS OF PRIVATE WRONGS BY THE
MERE ACT OF THE PARTIES.
At the opening of these Commentaries (a) municipal law was in general
defined to be, "a rule of civil conduct, prescribed by the supreme power in a
Prom
state, commanding what is right, and prohibiting what is wrong."(6)
hence, therefore, it followed, that the primary objects of the law are the
establishment of rights, and the prohibition of wrongs. And this occasioned
(c) the distribution of these collections into two general heads; under the
former of which we have already considered the rights that were defined and
established, and under the latter are now to consider the wrongs that are for
bidden, and redressed by the laws of England.
*In the prosecution of the first of these enquiries, we distinguished
*• -I
rights into two sorts: first, such as concern, or are annexed to, the persons of men, and are then called jura personarum, or the rights of persons
which, together with the means of acquiring and losing them, composed the
first book of these Commentaries: and secondly, such as a man may acquire
over external objects, or things unconnected with his person, which are called
jura rerum, or the rig/its of things: and these, with the means of transferring
am now,
them from man to man, were the subject of the second book.
which for the most part
therefore, to proceed to the consideration of wrongs
convey to us an idea merely negative, as being nothing else but a privation of
right. For which reason it was necessary, that before we entered at all into
the discussion of wrongs, we should entertain a clear and distinct notion of
rights: the contemplation of what is jus being necessarily prior to what may
be termed injuria, and the definition of fas precedent to that of nefas.
Wrongs are divisible into two sorts or species: private wrongs, and publio
The former are an infringement or privation of the private or civil
wrongs.
rights belonging to individuals, considered as individuals; and are thereupon
frequently termed civil injuries : the latter are a breach and violation of pub
lic rights and duties, which affect the whole community, considered as a oom-

;

I

;

(a) Introduc. { 2.
(6) Sanclio jutta, jubem honetta, tt prohibent eontraria.
(e) Book 1, ch. 1.
1
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and are distinguished by the harsher appellations of crimes and mis
demeanors.
To investigate the first of these species of wrongs, with their legal
remedies, will be oar employment in the present book; and the other species
will be reserved till the next or concluding volume.
The more effectually to acoomplish the redress of private injuries, courts of
justice are instituted in every civilized society, in order to protect the weak
from the insults of the stronger, by expounding and enforcing those laws by
which rights are defined, and wrongs prohibited.
This remedy is therefore
to
be sought by application to these *courts of justice; that
principally
T *Sl
J
For which reason, our chief employment in
by civil suit or action.
this book will be to consider the redress of private wrongs, by suit or action
in courts.
But as there are certain injuries of such
nature, that some of
them furnish and others require more speedy remedy than can be had in the
allowed in those cases an extrajudicial, or
ordinary forms of justice, there
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eccentrical kind of remedy; of which
shall first of all treat, before consider
the several remedies by suit: and to that end, shall distribute the redress of
obtained by the
private wrongs into three several species: first, that which
mere act of the parties themselves; secondly, that which
effected by the
mere act and operation of law; and, thirdly, that which arises from suit or ac
tion in courts, which consists in
conjunction of the other two, the act of the
parties co-operating with the act of law.
And, first, of that redress of private injuries, which
obtained by the mere
act of the parties. This
of two sorts: first, that which arises from the act
of the injured party only; and, secondly, that which arises from the joint
act of all the parties together: both which
shall consider in their order.
Of the first sort, or that which arises from the sole act of the injured party,
The defence of one's self, or the mutual and reciprocal defence of such as
stand in the relations of husband and wife, parent and child, master and ser
vant. In these cases,
the party himself, or any of these his relations, (1) be
lawful for him to repel force
forcibly attacked in his person or property,
chargeable upon him
by force; and the breach of the peace which happens,
only who began the affray, (d) For the law, in this case, respects the passions
man himself,
of the human mind; and (when external violence
offered to
lawful in him to do
or those to whom he bears
near connexion), makes
r
himself that immediate justice, to which he *is prompted by nature,
It con
and which no prudential motives are strong enough to restrain.
siders that the future process of law
by no means an adequate remedy for
injuries accompanied with force; since
impossible to Bay to what wanton
P. 0. UL
Abr.
Hawk.
MS.
(d) Boa
2 a
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right to em
man has
(1) In the defense of one's self, or any member of his family,
N. Y., 193;
ploy all necessary violence, even to the taking of life. Shorter v. People,
285;
St.,
Commonwealth,
Pond v. Peo
88 Penn.
Yates v. People, 82 N. Y., 509; Logue v.
Mich., 150; Maker v. People, 24 111., 241. Bui except where a forcible felony is
ple,
always to avoid such lamentable consequences
attempted against person or property, he
possible, and he cannot Justify standing up and resisting to the death when the assailant
man
N. Y., 890. But when
People v. Sullivan,
might have been avoided by retreat.
his castle,
under no obligation to retreat; his house
assaulted in his dwelling, he
which he may defend to any extremity. And this means not simply the dwelling-house
entitled to the same protec
within the curtilage
proper; whatever at the common law
is necessary to employ
Mich., 150. And in deciding what force
tion. Pond v. People,
in resisting the assault, a man must act upon the circumstances as they appear to him at
calm survey of the facts after
the time, and he
not to be held criminal because ou
See the cases cited above; also
wards
appears that the force employed was excessive.
Hinton v. State, 24 Texas, 454; Schnier v. People, 23 III.. 17; Patten v. People, 18 Mich.,
814.
In the last case was held that where man's dwelling, in which was his mother in
feeble health, was assailed by rioters, and he had reason to believe that the noise and threat*
of the assailants endangered his mother's life, be had the same right to employ force to
quell the riot that he would have had to defend his mother against an actual attack upon
her person.
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lengths of rapine or cruelty outrages of this sort might be carried, unless it
Selfwere permitted a man immediately to oppose one violence with another.
defence, therefore, as it is justly called the primary law of nature, so it is not,
neither can it be in fact, taken away by the law of society. In the English
law, particularly, it is held an excuse for breaches of the peace, nay even for
homicide itself: but care must be taken, that the resistance does not exceed
the bounds of mere defence and prevention; for then the defender would him
self become an aggressor.
II. Recaption or reprisal is another species of remedy by the mere act of
the party injured.
This happens, when any one hath deprived another of his
property in goods or chattels personal, or wrongfully detains one's wife, child,
or servant: in which case the owner of the goods, and the husband, parent, or
master, may lawfully claim and retake them, wherever he happens to find
them; so it be not in a riotous manner, or attended with a breach of the
The reason for this is obvious; since it may frequently happen
peace. («)
that the owner may have this only opportunity of doing himself justice: his
goods may be afterwards conveyed away or destroyed; and his wife, children,
or servants, concealed or carried out of his reach; if he had no speedier remedy
than the ordinary process of law. If, therefore, he can so contrive it as to
gain possession of his property again, without force or terror, the law favours
and will justify his proceeding. But, as the public peace is a superior con
sideration to any one man's private property; and, as, if individuals were once
allowed to use private force as a remedy for private injuries, all social justice
must cease, the strong would give law to the weak, and every man would re
vert to a state of nature; for these reasons it is provided, that this natural
right of recaption *shall never be exerted, where such exertion must occa- r
*
If,
sion strife and bodily contention, or endanger the peace of society.
for instance, my horse is taken away, and find him in a common, a fair, or a
oannot justify
may lawfully seize him to ray own use; but
publio inn,
breaking open a private stable, or entering on the grounds of a third person,
but must have recourse to
to take him, except he be feloniously stolen;
an action at law. (2)
IIL As recaption is a remedy given to the party himself, for an injury to
his personal property, so, thirdly, a remedy of the same kind for injuries to
real property, is by entry on lands and tenements, when another person with
out any right has taken possession thereof. This depends in some measure on
like reasons with the former; and like that, too, must be peaceable and without
force. There is some nicety required to define and distinguish the cases, in
which such entry is lawful or otherwise; it will therefore be more fully con
sidered in a subsequent chapter; being only mentioned in this place for the sake
of regularity and order.
IV. A fourth species of remedy by the mere act of the party injured, is the
What nuisances are, and their several
abatement or removal of nuisances. (3)

I

I

I

(/)

(«)

I Inrt.

184. HaL AnaL 1 48.

(/) 2 BO&

Bep. 55,68, 208. 2 Boll. Abr. 585,688.

(2) A man may not lawfully enter upon the lands of a third party who is not a wrong
doer, for the purpose of retaking his own property: Heermance v. Vernoy, 6 Johns.. 5;
Blake v. Jerome, 14 Johns., 406; and his attempt to do so may be resisted by force. Newkirfcrv. Sabler, 9 Barb., 652.
(8) Any obstruction to a navigable river is a nuisance, which any citizen having occasion
to use the river for the passage of his vessel may lawfully remove.
Inhab. of Arundel v.
McCulloch, 10 Mass., 70. And the permission of the town to create the obstruction will
not preclude the abatement Id. But that which the legislature of the state permits can
not be a public nuisance: Williams v. N. Y. Central R. R. Co., 18 Barb., 222; unless the
permission is exceeded: Renwick v. Morris, 7 Hill, 575; Hinchman v. Railroad Co., 2 Green
N. J., 75; it may nevertheless be a private nuisance, as where a dam erected by state per
mission floods the lands of an individual, in which case he may abate it.
State v. Moffett,
1 Qreene, Iowa, 247.
Generally a legislative act permitting the construction of a bridge or
dam across a navigable stream is a complete protection to the structure.
Commonwealth v.
3
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species, we shall find a more proper place to inquire under some of the subse
At present shall only observe, that whatsoever unlawfully
quent divisions.
annoys or doth damage to another is a nuisance; and such nuisance may be
taken away or removed by the party aggrieved thereby, so as
abated, that
If house or wall erected so near
he commits no riot in the doing of it.(^)
to mine that
private nuisance,
may en
stops my ancient lights, which
ter my neighbor's land, and peaceably pull
down. (A) Or
new gate be
common nuisance, any of the
erected across the public highway, which
down and destroy it.(t)
king's subjects passing that way, may cut
*And the reason why the law allows this private and summary method
■-„,„
*•
because injuries of this kind, which obstruct
-"of doing one's self justice,
or annoy such things as are of daily convenience and use, require an immedi
ate remedy, and cannot wait for the slow progress of the ordinary forms of

I
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a
a
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V. A fifth case, in which the law allows a man to be his own avenger, or tothat of distraining cattle or goods for non-pay
minister redress to himself,
ment of rent, or other duties; or, distraining another's cattle, damage-feasant,
that
doing damage, or trespassing, upon his land. The former intended
for the benefit of landlords, to prevent tenants from secreting or withdrawingtheir effects to his prejudice; the latter arising from the necessity of the thing
future time to ascertain whoseitself, as
might otherwise be impossible at
cattle they were that committed the trespass or damage.
As the law of distresses
shall con
point of great use and consequence,
sider
with some minuteness: by inquiring, first, for what injuries
distress
may be taken; secondly, what things may be distrained; and, thirdly, themanner of taking, disposing of, and avoiding distresses.
1. And, first,
the
necessary to premise, that a distress, (J) districtio,
taking
personal chattel out of the possession of the wrongdoer into the cus
tody of the party injured, to procure
satisfaction for the wrong committed.
distress may be taken,
1. The most usual injury, for which
that of non
payment of rent. It was observed in a former book, (A) that distresses were
incident by the common law to every rent-service, and by particular reservation
to rent-charges also; but not to rent-seek, till the statute
Geo. II, c. 28, ex
tended the same remedy to all rents alike, and thereby in effect abolished all
So that now we may lay
material distinction beiween them.
down as an
distress may be taken for any kind of rent in
"r **! universal principle, *that
* arrear; the detaining whereof beyond the day of payment
an injury to
him that
entitled to receive it. 2. For neglecting to do suit to the lord'*
or other certain personal service, (m) the lord may distrain of comoourt,
8.

t

6

Rep. 65.
(i) Cro. Car. 1S4.
(a) Salk. 459.
to) Rep. 101.
(j> The thing Itself taken by this process, as well as the process itself, Is In our law-books very fre
quently called a distress.
(m) Co. Lltt. 48.
(*) Book IX ch.
(!) Bro. Abr. tit. Diitreu, 15.
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Breed, Pick., 460; Depew v. Trusteesof W. and E. Canal, Ind.,
Dover v. Portsmouth
highway for foreign or inter
Bridge, 17 N. H., 200. Except where the river constitutes
commerce,
which
state
in which case the regulations
congress might prescribe would be su
McLean, 70; United States v. New
preme. See Columbus Ins. Co. v. Peoria Bridge Co.,
Wood,
Case, 18 How., 518.
M.,
Bridge
Bedford Bridge,
and
401; Wheeling
A statutory
penalty or other remedy for abating private nuisance does not exclude the private remedy.
Wetmore v. Tracy, 14 Wend., 250; State v. Moffett, Greene, Iowa, 247. But in exercising
Moffet v. Brewer, id., 348. Ana
the right to abate, as little injury
to be done as possible.
building for an unlawful purpose,
the nuisance consists in occupying
seems that thia
does notjustify tearing down the building: Welch v. Stowell,
Doug. Mich., 332; State v.
Paul,
C,
R. I., 185; Ely v. Supervisors, 36 N. Y., 297; Miller v. Burch, 82 Texas, 208;
has been held that
such as to breed disease,
Am. Rep., 242; though
the occupation
Meeker v. Van Rensselaer, 15 Wend., 897.
might be destroyed
necessary.
As to the right to abate private nuisances in general, see, further, Dimes v. Petley, 15
B., 276; Jones v. Williams, 11 M. and W., 176; Davies v. Williams. 16 Q. B., 546; Hyde v.
Graham,
H. and C, 593; Indianapolis v. Miller, 27 Ind 394. The abatement must beExch., 82; Indianapolis v. MiLwithout doing unnecessary injury. Roberts V. Rose, L. R.
ler, 27 Ind., 894.
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in a court-leet a distress may be had of com
mon right.
8. For amercements
mon right; but not for amercements in a court-baron, without a special pre
4. Another injury, for which distresses
scription to warrant it. (n)
may be
taken, is where a man finds beasts of a stranger wandering in his grounds,

L

*

a

a

a

(a) Burr. B89.
Sid. 440.
1

c

(()

1

(p) Stat. 43 Eltx.
(o) Stat. Ana c. 10.
(«) Davis v. Powell, C. B. BU. 11Geo. IL
7

(n) Brownl. 80.
(r) Co. Litt. 47.
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damage-feasant / that
doing him hurt or damage, by treading down his
grass, or the like; in which case the owner of the soil may distrain them, till
satisfaction be made him for the injury he has thereby sustained.
5. Lastly,
for several duties and penalties inflicted by special acts of parliament (as for
assessments made by commissioners of sewers, (o) or for relief of the poor),(p)
given; for the particulars of which we must
remedy by distress and sale
have recourse to the statutes themselves: remarking only, that such distresses
(q) are partly analogous to the ancient distress at common law, as being reple viable and the like; but more resembling the common law process of execu
tion, by seizing and selling the goods of the debtor under writ of fieri facias,
•of which hereafter.
2. Secondly; as to the things which may be distrained, or taken in distress,
down as general rule that all chattels personal are liable to be
we may lay
Instead, therefore, of
•distrained, unless particularly protected or exempted.
will be easier to recount those which
mentioning what things are distrainable,
are not so, with the reason of their particular exemptions, (r) And,
As
distrained
presumed to be the property of the wrong
every thing which
will follow that such things wherein no man can have an absolute and
doer,
valuable property (as dogs, cats, rabbits, and *all animals feroB natural) rmf.-.
Yet
deer (which are /era) natural) are kept in
•cannot be distrained.
private inclosure for the purpose of sale or profit, this so far changes their
nature, by reducing them to kind of stock or merchandise, that they may be
in the personal use or occupation of any
Whatever
distrained for rent.
for the time privileged and protected from distress; as an axe with
man,
man
which
cutting wood, or horse while man
riding him. But horses
cart, may (cart and all) be distrained for rent-arrere; and also,
■drawing
or trespassing
horse, though a man be riding him, be taken damage-feasant,
in another's grounds, the horse (notwithstanding his rider) may be distrained
and led away to the pound. (<) (4) Valuable things in the way of trade shall
As a horse standing in smith shop to be shoed, or
not be liable to distress.
in a common inn; or cloth at tailor's house; or corn sent to mill or market.
For all these are protected and privileged for the benefit of trade; and are
supposed in common presumption not to belong to the owner of the house, but
But, generally speaking, whatever goods and chattels
to his customers. (5)
the landlord finds upon the premises, whether they in fact belong to the ten
ant or stranger, are distrainable by him for rent: for otherwise
door would
and the stranger has his remedy
be open to infinite frauds upon the landlord;
over by action on the case against the tenant,
by the tenant's default the

1

«79.

Q.

a

it

6

T. R., 138, decided, contrary to
(4) The court of king's bench, in Story v. Robinson,
would lead to
this dictum, that such a distress could not be made, as
breach of the
And see Field v. Adames, 12 Ad. and Ell., 649; Bunch v. Kennington,
peace.
B„

1

5

,

9.

6

7

9

4

2

1

1

As to what may and what may not be taken by distress, see Simpson v. Hartopp, Willes,
612, and the notes thereto,
Smith Lead. Cas., 187.
(5) Upon the subject of exemptions from distress the following American cases are re
ferred to: Himely v. Wyatt,
Bay, 102; Fhaelon v. McBride,
Bay, 170; Youngblood v.
McCord, 39; Walker v. Johnson,
McCord, 552; Hoskins v. Paul,
N. J., 110;
Lowrey,
Hill, 428; Connah v. Hale, 23
Brown v. Sims, 17 S. and R., 188; Stone v. Mathews,
Wend., 462. These cases hold, generally, that wherever the tenant, in the regular course
of his business, comes into possession of the goods of his customers, they are not subject to
Whart.
•distress for his rent
See Riddle v. Welden,
Many of the United States have, by statute, abolished the landlord's remedy by distress.
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(v) Co. Iitt. 47.
de diitriciume teaecarii.

(te) Lutw. 1590.
(y) Burr. 989.
1

(u) Cro. Eliz. 649.
Or) Stat. 51Hen. Ill, it.
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chattels are distrained, so that he cannot render them when called upon.
With regard to a stranger's beasts which are found upon the tenant's land,
If they are put in by consent
the following distinctions are however taken.
of the owner of the beasts, they are distrainable immediately afterwards for
rent-arrere by the landlord, (u) So also if the stranger's cattle break the
fences, and commit a trespass by coming on the land, they are distrainable
immediately by the lessor for his tenant's rent, as a punishment to the owner
of the beasts for the wrong committed through his negligence. («) But if the
r*--, lands were not *sufficiently fenced so as to keep out cattle, the landlord
-* cannot distrain
them, till they have been levant and couchant (levantes et
have been long enough there to have lain down
on
the
that
land;
cubantes)
held to be one night at least: and
and rose up to feed; which in general
then the law presumes, that the owner may have notice whether his cattle
have strayed, and
his own negligence not to have taken them away. Yet,
the lessor or his tenant were bound to repair the fences and did not, and
thereby the cattle escaped into their grounds, without the negligence or default
of the owner; in this case, though the cattle may have been levant and couch
ant, yet they are not distrainable for rent, till actual notice
given to the
owner that they are there, and he neglects to remove them (to) for the law
will not suffer the landlord to take advantage of his own or his tenant's wrong.
4. There are also other things privileged by the ancient common
law; as
man's tools and utensils of his trade, the axe of
carpenter, the books of a
scholar, and the like: which are said to be privileged for the sake of the pub
lic, because the taking them away would disable the owner from serving the
commonwealth in his station. So, beasts of the plough averia carucai, and
sheep, are privileged from distresses at common law; (sc) while dead goods or
other sorts of beasts, which Bracton calls cataUa otiosa, may be distrained.
But an beasts of the plough may be taken in execution for debt, so they may
be for distresses by statute, which partake of the nature of executions, (y)
man's trade were
And perhaps the true reason why these and the tools of
privileged at the common law, was because the distress was then merely in
satisfaction for its
tended to compel the payment of the rent, and not as
non-payment: and therefore, to deprive the party of the instruments and
would counteract the very end of the distress. (2) 5.
means of paying
Nothing shall be distrained for rent, which may not be rendered again in as
was distrained
for which reason milk, fruit and the
good plight as when
distress at *common law being only in the
r $ln -1 like, cannot be distrained,
nature of
pledge or security, to be restored in the same plight when
So, anciently, sheaves or shocks of corn could not be dis
the debt
paid.
cart
trained, because some damage must needs accrue in their removal, but
But now by statute
loaded with corn might; as that could be safely restored.
corn in sheaves or cocks, or loose in the straw, or hay in
2. W. and M., c.
6.
barns or ricks, or otherwise, may be distrained, as well as other chattels.
Lastly, things fixed to the freehold may not be distrained; as caldrons, win
dows, doors and chimney-pieces: for they savour of the realty. For this rea
son also corn growing could not be distrained; till the statute 11 Geo. II, c. 19,
landlords to distrain corn, grass, or other products of the earth,
empowered
and to cut and gather them when ripe.
Let us next consider, thirdly, how distresses may be taken, disposed of or
must premise, that the law of distresses
And, first,
greatly
avoided.
altered within
few years last past.
Formerly, they were looked upon in no
mere pledge or security, for payment of rent or other
other light than as
And so the law still continues with
duties, or satisfaction for damage done.
regard to distresses of beasts taken damage-feasant, and for other causes, not
altered by act of parliament; over which the distrainor has no other power
(*) ibid. 588.
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than to retain them till satisfaction is made.
But distresses for rent-arrere
being found by the legislature to be the shortest and most effectual method of
compelling the payment of such rent, many beneficial laws for this purpose
have been made in the present century; which have much altered the common
law, as laid down in our ancient writers.
In pointing out, therefore, the methods of distraining,
shall in general
suppose the distress to be made for rent; and remark, where necessary, the
differences between such distress, and one taken for other causes.
*In the first place then all distresses must be made by day unless
r*n i
in the case of damage-feasant ; an exception being there allowed, lest *the beasts should escape before they are taken, (a)
And, when a person in
tends to make a distress, he must, by himself or his bailiff, enter on the demised
premises; formerly during the continuance of the lease, but now, (6) if the
tenant holds over, the landlord may distrain within six months after the deter
mination of the lease; provided his own title or interest, as well as the tenant's
If the lessor does not find
possession, continue at the time of the distress.
sufficient distress on the premises, formerly he could resort nowhere else; and,
therefore, tenants who were knavish made a practice to convey away their
goods and stock fraudulently from the house or lands demised, in order to
cheat their landlords.
But now (c) the landlord may distrain any goods of
his tenant, carried off the premises clandestinely, wherever he finds them
within thirty days after, unless they have been bona fide sold for a valuable
consideration: and all persons privy to, or assisting in, such fraudulent con
The landlord may also dis
veyance, forfeit double the value to the landlord.
train the beasts of his tenant, feeding upon any commons or wastes, appendant
or appurtenant to the demised premises.
The landlord might not formerly
break open a house, to make a distress, for that is a breach of the peace. But
when he was in the house, it was held that he might break open an inner door;
(d) and now (e) he may, by the assistance of the peace-officer of the parish,
break open in the daytime any place whither the goods have been fraudulently
removed and locked up to prevent a distress; oath being first made, in case itbe a dwelling-house, of a reasonable ground to suspect that such goods are
concealed therein.
Where a man is entitled to distrain for an entire duty, he ought to distrain
for the whole at once; and not for part at one time, and part at another, (f)
But if he distrains for the whole, and there is not sufficient on the premises, or
he happens *to mistake in the value of the thing distrained, and so r*in-i
takes an insufficient distress, he may take a second distress to complete
his remedy, (g)
Distresses must be proportioned to the thing distrained for. By the statute of
Marlbridge, 52 Hen. Ill, c. 4, if any man takes a great or unreasonable distress,
for rent-arrere, he shall be heavily amerced for the same. As if (h) the land
lord distrains two oxen for twelve-pence rent; the taking of both is an unrea
sonable distress; but if there were no other distress nearer the value to be
found, he might reasonably have distrained one of them; but for homage,
fealty, or suit and service, as also for parliamentary wages it is said that no
distress can be excessive,
For as these distresses cannot be sold, the owner,
upon making satisfaction, may have his chattels again. The remedy for exces
sive distresses
by
special action on the statute of Marlbridge; for an action
of trespass
not maintainable upon this account,
being no injury at the
•ommon law. (J)
When the distress
thus taken, the next consideration
the disposal of it.
For which purpose the things distrained must in the first place be carried to
some pound, and there impounded by the taker.
But, in their way thither,
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Ann. c. 14. 11Geo. n. c. 19.
(«) Oo. Lltt. 142.
(e) Stat
(6) Stet. Ann. o. 14.
f) Lutw. 1632.
id) Co. Lltt 161. Oomberb. 17.
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Burr. 590.
(o) Cro. Eliz. 13. Stat. 17Car. IL c.
(A) Inst. 107.
(Utile, 291,prerogative, 98.
Bro. Abr.
Burr. 690.
(J) Ventr. 104. Fitzgibb. 86.
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(I)

they may be rescued by the owner, in case the distress was taken without
cause, or contrary to law: aa if no rent be due; if they were taken upon the
highway, or the like; in these cases the tenant may lawfully make rescue, (k)
But if they be once impounded, even though taken without any cause, the
owner may not break the pound and take them out; for they are then in the
custody of the law.
A pound (parous, which signifies any inclosure)
either pound-o»er£, that
and
P.
close.
By the statute
open overhead; or pound-co»eri, that
and M., c. 12, no distress of cattle can be driven out of the hundred where
taken, *unless to
pound-overt within the same shire; and within
»j3
three miles of the place where
for the benefit of
was taken. This
the tenants, that they may know where to find and replevy the distress.
And
by statute 11 Geo. II, c. 19, which was made for the benefit of landlords, any
person distraining for rent may turn any part of the premises, upon which
distress
If
taken, into
pound, pro hoc vice, for securing of such distress.
a live distress, of animals, be impounded in
common pound-overt, the owner
must take notice of
at his peril; but
in any special pound-overt, so consti
tuted for this particular purpose, the distrainor must give notice to the owner:
and in both these cases, the owner, and not the distrainor,
bound to provide
the beasts with food and necessaries.
But
they are put in pound-covert, as
in stable or the like, the landlord or distrainor must feed and sustain them, (m)
A distress of household goods, or other dead chattels, which are liable to be
stolen or damaged by weather, ought to be impounded in
pound-covert, else
the distrainor must answer for the consequences.
When impounded, the goods were formerly, as was before observed, only in
the nature of
pledge or security to compel the performance of satisfaction
and upon this account
hath been held, (») that the distrainor
not at liberty
to work or use distrained beast. And thus the law still continues with re
gard to beasts taken damage-feasant,
and distresses for suit or services; which
must remain impounded, till the owner makes satisfaction; or contests the
To replevy (replegiare, that
right of distraining, by replevying the chattels.
to take back the pledge)
when
person distrained upon applies to the
sheriff or his officers, and has the distress returned into his own possession,
in suit at law, and,
upon giving good security to try the right of taking
that be determined against him, to return the cattle or goods once more into
the hands of the distrainor.
This
called
replevin, of which more will be
said hereafter. At present
shall only observe, that, as
distress
at com-1 mon *law only in nature of
for the rent or damages done,
security
*14
replevin answers the same end to the distrainor as the distress itself
since the party replevying gives security to return the distress,
the right be
determined against him.
This kind of distress, though
puts the owner to inconvenience, and
therefore
he continues obstinate and will make no
punishment to him, yet
satisfaction or payment,
But for
no remedy at all to the distrainor.
debt due to the crown, unless paid within forty days, the distress was always
salable at the common law. (o) And for an amercement imposed at court-leet,
the lord may also sell the distress (p) partly because, being the king's court
of record, its process partakes of the royal prerogative
(q) but principally
in the nature of an execution to levy
And, so in
because
legal debt.
the several statute-distresses before mentioned, which are also in the nature of
likewise usually given, to effectuate and com
executions, the power of sale
And, in like manner, by several acts of parliament, (r) in
plete the remedy.
all cases of distress for rent,
the tenant or owner do not, within five days
taken, and notice of the cause thereof given him, replevy
after the distress
the same with sufficient security; the distrainor, with the sheriff or constable,
(m) Ibid.
Rep. 41.
(o) Bro. Ibi
II, o. 88. 11Oeo. H, o. 18.
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shall cause the same to be appraised by two sworn appraisers, and sell the
same towards satisfaction of the rent and charges; rendering the overplus,
full and entire satisfaction
any, to the owner himself. And, by this means,
may now be had for rent in arrere, by the mere act of the party himself, viz.:
by distress, the remedy given at common law; and sale consequent thereon,
added by act of parliament.
which
must observe, that the many particulars which
Before
quit this article,
distress, used formerly to make
•attend the taking of
hazardous kind of
■,
any *one irregularity was committed,
vitiated the
proceeding for
But now
whole, and made the distrainors trespassers ab initio,
(6)
provided, that, for any unlawful act done,
by the statute 11 Geo. II, c. 19,
the whole shall not be unlawful, or the parties trepassers ab initio but that
the party grieved shall only have an action for the real damage sustained, and
tender of amends
made before any action is brought.
not even that,
VL The seizing of heriots, when due on the death of tenant, also another
species of self-remedy; not much unlike that of taking cattle or goods in dis
As for that division of heriots, which
called heriot-service, and
tress.
only
species of rent, the lord may distrain for this, as well as seize, but for
lies only in prender, and not
henot-custom (which Sir Edward Coke says
in render) the lord may seize the identical thing itself, but cannot distrain any
other chattel for it. («) The like speedy and effectual remedy, of seizing,
given with regard to many things that are said to lie in franchise; as waifs,
wrecks, estrays, deodands, and the like; all which the person entitled thereto
suit or action. Not that they are
may seize, without the formal process of
debarred of this remedy by action; but have also the other and more speedy
one, for the better asserting their property; the thing to be claimed being
nature, as might be out of the reach of the law before any
frequently of such
action could be brought.
These are the several species of remedies which may be had by the mere act
shall next briefly mention such as arise from the joint
of the party injured.
And these are only two, accord and arbitration.
act of all the parties together.
satisfaction agreed upon between the party injuring and the
Accord
bar of all actions upon this account.
party injured, which, when performed,
house or deliver
man contract *to build
horse, and fail in it;
As
*lfl
this
an injury for which the sufferer may have his remedy by action,
sum of money, or other thing, as
but
the party injured accepts
satisfac
redress of that injury, and entirely takes away the action, (w)
tion, this
(7) By several late statutes (particularly 11 Geo. II, c. 19, in case of irreguEep. 78.
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remedy ex parte, which may result in depriving another
party pursuing
(6) Generally,
of his property, must pursue strictly the authority the law gives him. In Newsam v. Hart,
was held that, under statute which authorized freeholders to take up
14^1ich., 233,
third person
♦•strays, freeholder could not justify the taking up of an estray for him by
without his previous authorization, notwithstanding he had assumed to ratify the act.
This was merely the application of general rule which has been often declared under
See Commonwealth v. Four
Minutes to prevent the running at large of domestic animals.
Mo., 302; Crook v. Peebly,
R., 393; Hanyman v. Titus,
Mo., 344;
teen Hogs, 10
Morse v. Reed, 28 Me., 481; Kinder v. Gillespie, 63 111., 88; Spect v. Arnold, 52 Cal., 455;
Cold., 399; Thompson v. Corpstein, 52 Cal., 653. A statute authorizing
Hearn v. Ervin,
the taking up of bulls will not justify the taking up of cows, heifers or steers.
Oil v.
applied in tax
Rowley, 69 111., 469. As to the strictness with which the same principle
cases, see Blackwell on Tax Titles, 45; Cooley on Taxation, 323.
to the creditor; and
(7) To be good, an accord and satisfaction must be advantageous
creditor of
part of his demand then due has
receipt by
upon this ground that
been held no answer to an action for the remainder, notwithstanding his agreement to
Johns., 386; Blanchard v. Noyes,
in satisfaction. Watkinson v. Inglesby,
receive
N.
H, 518; Wheeler v. Wheeler, 11 Vt., 60; Hinckley v. Arey, 27 Me.. 362; Daniels v. Hatch,
Strobh.,
203;
Warren
v.
Skinner,
20 Conn., 659. But
N. J.. 91; Eve v. Moseley,
in dispute.
Stockton v. Frey,
the claim
not liquidated, or
Gill, 406;
otherwise
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24 Geo. II, c. 24, in case of mistakes
committed by justices of the peace), even tender of sufficient amends to the
party injured is a bar of all actions, whether he thinks proper to accept such
amends or no. (8)
H. Arbitration is where the parties, injuring and injured, submit all matters
in dispute, concerning any personal chattels or personal wrong, to the judg
ment of two or more arbitrators ; who are to decide the controversy: and if
they do not agree, it is usual to add, that another person be called in as umpire,
{imperator, or impar,) (x) to whose sole judgment it is then referred : or fre
quently there is only one arbitrator originally appointed. This decision, in
any of these cases, is called an award. And thereoy the question is as fully
determined, and the right transferred or settled, as it could have been by the
But the
agreement of the parties, or the judgment of a court of justice, (y)
right of real property cannot thns pass by a mere award : (z) which subtilty in
point of form (for it is now reduced to nothing else) had its rise from feudal
principles; for, if this had been permitted, the land might have been aliened
collusively without the consent of the superior. Yet, doubtless, an arbitrator
may now award a conveyance or a release of land ; and it will be a breach of
the arbitration bond to refuse compliance. For, though originally the sub
mission to arbitration used to be by word, or by deed, yet both of these being
revocable in their nature, it is now become the practice to enter into mutual
bonds, with condition to stand to the award or arbitration of the arbitrators,
*or umP're therein named, (a) And experience having shown the great
r *17 ->
1
L
use of these peaceable and domestic tribunals, especially in settling mat
ters of account, and other mercantile transactions, which are difficult and almost
impossible to be adjusted on a trial at law; (9) the legislature has now estab
lished the use of them, as well in controversies where causes are depending, as

larity in tbe method of distraining, and

(x) Whart. Angl. tacr. 1,772. NlcoU, Soot. Hist, libr oh. 1, prop; /litem.
(v) Brovrnl. 55. 1 Freem. 410.
(z) 1 Boll. Abr. 842. 1 Lord Kaym. IIS.
(a) Append. No. m, ( 6.

Tuttle v. Tuttle, 12 Met., 551. Or if the debtor give a negotiable note for part of the debt
Sibree v. Tripp, 15 M. and W., 23. Or any chattel though of much less value than the
Jones v. Bullitt, 2 Lit., 49; Reed v. Bartlett; 19 Pick., 273. Or the
amount of the debt.
Booth v. Smith, 3 Wend., 66. Or pay part before it is due.
note of a third person.
Brooks v. White. 2 Met., 283. And in any other case it is a good accord and satisfaction if
the creditor receive some distinct benefit which he would not otherwise have been entitled
to.
See Douglass v. White, 3 Barb. Ch., 621.
And it has been held that where a vendee
who has ordered goods from a manufacturer, consents to receive them and waive strict
compliance with the contract, he is bound by this waiver, notwithstanding there was no
distinct consideration for it Moore v. Detroit Locomotive Works, 14 Mich., 266; and see
Monroe v. Perkins, 9 Pick., 805; Lattimore v. Harsen, 14 Johns., 330; Conyer v. Lynde, 10
Ind., 282. And of late the courts have inclined towards upholding agreements to accept
part of a demand in satisfaction of the whole. See Pepper v. Aikens, 2 Bush, 251.
(8) In some of the United States statutes will be found adding to the number of cases in
which tender of amends may be made, and in some a disposition has been manifested
to permit the defendant in any suit brought for the recovery of debt or damages, to
make an offer of such a sum as he is willing to allow judgment to pass for, and if the
plaintiff declines to accept, to give costs against him unless the verdict in his favor is larger
than the offer.
(9) It has been very common of late to introduce into certain species of contract a clause
requiring the parties to submit to arbitration any disputes that may arise under them; but
it has been generally supposed these stipulations could not be enforced, because they ousted
But recently an agreement not to bring suit until the damages
the courts of jurisdiction.
were adjusted by a committee, or by arbitration, has been sustained.
Avery v. Scott, 8
Exch., 487; S. C. in House of Lords, 5 H. L. Cas., 811; and see Russell v. Pellegrini, 6 El.
and Bl., 1020.
The statement above that the marriage of a feme-sole revokes a submission to arbitration
Is probably not applicable in those states where the disabilities of coverture are removed
and the woman is allowed to act on her own behalf the same after marriage as before.
Although it is perhaps true that the bankruptcy of one of the parties will not revoke a
submission, yet the assignee would have the same power to revoke which the bankrupt
See Marsh v. Wood, 9 B. and C, 659.
possessed before the assignment
10
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where no action is brought: enacting by statute 8 and 10 Wm. Ill, c.
all merchants and others, who desire to end any controversy, suit, or
(for which there is no other remedy but by personal action or suit in
may agree, that their submission of the suit to arbitration or umpirage
made a rule of any of the king's courts of record, and may insert such
or promise, or condition of the arbitrationagreement in their submission,
bond : which agreement being proved upon oath by one of the witnesses
thereto, the court shall make a rule that such submission and award shall be
conclusive : and, after suoh rule made, the parties disobeying the award shall
be liable to be punished, as for a contempt of the court; unless such award
shall be set aside, for corruption or other misbehaviour in the arbitrators or
umpire, proved on oath to the court, within one term after the award is made.
And, in consequence of this statute, it is now become a considerable part of
the business of the superior courts, to set aside suoh awards when partially or
illegally made; or to enforce their execution, when legal, by the same process
of contempt, as is awarded for disobedience to those rules and orders, which
are issued by the courts themselves. (10)

in those
15, that
quarrel,
equity),
shall be

CHAPTER

II.

OF REDRESS BY THE MERE OPERATION OF LAW.

is,

Tub remedies for private wrongs, which are effected by the mere operation
of law, will fall within a very narrow compass; there being only two instances
of this sort that at present occur to my recollection: the one that of retainer,
where a creditor is made executor or administrator to his debtor; the other in
the case of what the law calls a remitter.
I. If a person indebted to another makes bis creditor or debtee his executor,
or if such a creditor obtains letters of administration to his debtor; in these
cases the law gives him a remedy for his debt, by allowing him to retain so
much as will pay himself, before any other creditors whose debts are of equal
This is a remedy by the mere act of law, and grounded upon
degree, (a)(1)
ihis reason; that the executor cannot, without an apparent absurdity, commenoe
a suit against himself as a representative of the deceased, to recover that which
is due to him in his own private capacity: but having the whole personal estate
in his hands, so much as is sufficient to answer his own demand
by opera
Else, by being made executor,
tion of law, applied to that particular purpose.
*he would be put in
worse condition than all the rest of the world
For, though ratable payment of all the debts of the deceased,
besides.
(a)

1

a

'

a

r,..,

BolL Abr. *29. Plowd. 543. See book II, page 51L
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(10) The common law procedure act, 1854, contains various provisions designed to givertill effect to an agreement to arbitrate, where the parties fail to select
sole arbitrator or
umpire, or where two are to be chosen and one party neglects or refuses to make choice.
In the first case an arbitrator or umpire may be chosen by judge of one of the superior
courts, and in the other, the arbitrator who has been selected by one party may proceed as
And
reference
to two arbitrators, they may without special authority
sole arbitrator.
in the submission appoint an umpire, unless the terms of the submission forbid
and if
they fail to award, and fail to appoint an umpire, one may be appointed by
judge. The
act also contains provisions for expediting the award, and
empowers the court to set
aside in proper cases.
It also empowers the court, where the award directs possession
of land to be delivered, to enforce the award by summary process, as
might
judgment

in

is

is

ejectment.
not the law in the United States.
Debts of equal degree are paid ratably, and
(1) This
the executor in his accounting
allowed for no payment to himself beyond his just pro

portion.
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equal degree, is clearly the most equitable method, yet as every scheme for
a proportionable distribution of the assets among all the creditors hath been
hitherto found to be impracticable, and productive of more mischiefs than it
would remedy; so that the creditor who first commences his suit is entitled to
a preference in payment; it follows that as the executor can commence no suit,
he must be paid the last of any, and, of course, must lose his debt in case tha
-estate of his testator should prove insolvent, unless he be allowed to retain it.
The doctrine of retainer is therefore the necessary consequence of that other
-doctrine of the law, the priority of such creditor who first commences his aotion.
But the executor shall not retain his own debt, in prejudice to those of a
higher degree; for the law only puts him in the same situation, as if he had
sueu himself as executor, and recovered his debt; which he never could be sup
Neither shall
posed to have done, while debts of a higher nature subsisted.
-one executor be allowed to retain his own debt, in prejudice to that of his coexecutor in equal degree; but both shall be discharged in proportion. (b) Nor
«hall an executor of his own wrong be in any oase permitted to retain, (c)
II. Remitter is where he who hath the true property or jus proprietatis in
lands, but is out of possession thereof, and hath no right to enter without re•covering possession in an action, hath afterwards the freehold cast upon him
by some subsequent, and of course defective, title; in this case he is remitted,
or sent back by operation of law, to his ancient and more certain title, (d) The
right of entry, which he hath gained by a bad title, shall be ipso facto annexed
to his own inherent good one: and his defeasible estate shall be utterly defeated
and annulled by the instantaneous
act of law, without his participation or conA8
A
disseizes B, that *is, turns him out of possession, and
8ent
f*20l
*■
the son of A, and
dies, leaving a son C; hereby the estate deseends to
barred from entering thereon till he proves his right in an action; now
the heir of the disseizor, makes
lease for life to D, with remain
-afterwards
der to B, the disseizee, for life, and D dies; hereby the remainder accrues to
new freehold by virtue of the remainder,
the disseizee: who thus gaining
bad title,
which
by act of law remitted, in of his former and surer est
new right of possession, to which the
ate^/) For he hath hereby gained
law immediately annexes his ancient right of property.
If the subsequent estate, or right of possession, be gained by man's own
-act or consent, as by immediate purchase,
being of full age, he shall not be
remitted. For the taking such subsequent estate was his own folly, and shall
waiver of his prior right, (g) Therefore
to be observ
be looked upon as
ed, that to every remitter there are regularly these incidents; an ancient right,
new defeasible estate of freehold, uniting in one and the same person
and
which defeasible estate must be cast upon the tenant, not gained by his own
aot or folly. The reason given by Littkton (A) why this remedy, which oper
somewhat similar to
ates silently, and by the mere act of law, was allowed,
that given in the preceding article; because otherwise he who hath right
For as he himself
the person in posses
would be deprived of all remedy.
no other person against whom he can bring an
sion of the freehold, there
And for this cause the law doth adjudge
action to establish his prior right.
in such plight as
he had lawfully recovered the
him in by remitter; that
For, as Lord Bacon observes, (t) the benignity of the law
same land by suit.
such, as when, to preserve the principles and grounds of law,
depriveth a
will rather put him in a better
man of his remedy without his own fault,
Nam quod remedio destituitur, ipsa re
worse.
degree and condition than in
But there shall be no *remitter to a right, for
** culpa O'bsit.
va^i
f*211
*■
the issue in tail be
which the party has no remedy by action: (k) as
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659.
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(o) Co. Litt. 348,330.
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{I)

barred by the fine or warranty (2) of his ancestor, and the freehold is after
wards cast npon him; he shall not be remitted to his estate-tail:
for the
exactly the same, after the union of the two
operation of the remitter
rights, as that of real action would have been before it. As, therefore, theissue in tail could not by any action have recovered his ancient estate, he shall
not recover
by remitter.
And thus much for these extra judicial remedies, as well for real as personal
injuries, which are furnished or permitted by the law, where the parties are so
eligible, or in some cases even pos
peculiarly circumstanced, as not to make
sible, to apply for redress in the usual and ordinary methods to the courts of
public justice.

CHAPTEK III.
OF COURTS

IN GENERAL.
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the redress of injuries byThe next, and principal, object of our inquiries
suit in courts: wherein the act of the parties and the act of law co-operate; theact of the parties being necessary to set the law in motion, and the process of
the law being in general the only instrument by which the parties are enabled
to procure
certain and adequate redress.
And here will not be improper to observe, that although in the several cases
of redress by the act of the parties mentioned in
former chapter, (a) the
law allows an extrajudicial remedy, yet that does not exclude the ordinary
course of justice; but
only an additional weapon put into the hands of'
certain persons in particular instances, where natural equity or the peculiar
circumstances
of their situation require
more expeditious remedy, than theformal process of any court of judicature can furnish.
Therefore, though
may defend myself, or relations, from external violence,
yet am afterwards,
entitled to an action of assault and battery: though
may retake my goods,
have a fair and peaceable opportunity, this power of recaption does not
debar me from my action of trover or detinue:
may either enter on the lands,
on which
have
real action
right of entry, or may demand possession by
nuisance by my own authority, or call upon the law to do
may either abate
for me:
may distrain for rent, or have an action of debt, at my own
do not distrain my neighbor's cattle damage-feasant,
•option;
r*9q-i
fair satisfaction:
may compel him by action of trespass ->to make me
heriot, or
deodand, be withheld from me by fraud or force,
may
recover
never seized it. And with regard to accords and arbitra
though
tions, these, in their nature, being merely an agreement or compromise, most
indisputably suppose
previous right of obtaining redress some other way
which
But as to remedies by the mere opera
given up by such agreement.
tion of law, those are indeed given, because no remedy can be ministered by
suit or action, without running into the palpable absurdity of
man's bring
ing an action against himself the two cases wherein they happen being such
wherein the only possible legal remedy would be directed against the very
person himself who seeks relief.
Andr. 288.

(a) Oh.

;
2

is

is

§

4

3

See statute
and
Wm.
(2) Estates tall are no longer barrable by these means.
14
74.
barred by the statute of limitations.
There
no remitter where the right
See
v. Woodrofte, 10 M. and W., 008; 15 id., 709
H. L. Ca., 811.
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In all other oases it is a general and indisputable rule, that where there is a
legal right, there is also a legal remedy, by suit or action at law, whenever
that right is invaded. And in treating or these remedies by suit in courts,
shall pursue the following method: first, shall oonsider the nature and several
shall point out in which of
and, secondly,
species of courts of justice;
these courts, and in what manner, the proper remedy may be had for any pri
vate injury, or, in other words, what injuries are cognizable, andhow redressed,
in each respective species of courts.
First, then, of courts of justice. And herein we will consider, first, their
nature and incidents in general; and then, the several species of them, erected
and acknowledged by the laws of England.
A court is defined to be a place wherein justice is judicially administered, (b)
And, as by our excellent constitution the sole executive power of the laws is
vested in the person of the king, it will follow that all courts of justice which
are **ne medium by which he administers the laws, are derived from the
J power of the crown, (c) For, whether created by act of parliament, or
letters patent, or subsisting by prescription (the only methods by which any
courts of judicature (d) can exist), the king's consent in the two former is
expressly, and in the latter impliedly given. In all these courts the king is
supposed in contemplation of law. to be always present; but as that is in fact
impossible, he is there represented by his judges, whose power is only an
emanation of the royal prerogative.
For the more speedy, universal, and impartial administration of justice be
tween subject and subject, the law hath appointed a prodigious variety of
courts, some with a more limited, others with a more extensive, jurisdiction;
some constituted to inquire only, others to hear and determine; some to deter
mine in the first instance, others upon appeal and by way of review. All these
in their turns will be taken notice of in their respective places: and
shall
therefore here only mention one distinction, that runs throughout them all,
viz.: that some of them are courts of record, others not of record. A court
of reoord is that, where the acts and judicial proceedings are enrolled in parch
ment for a perpetual memorial and testimony: which rolls are called the
records of the oourt, and are of such high and supereminent authority, that
their truth is not to be called in question.
For it is a settled rule and maxim
that nothing shall be averred against a record, nor shall any plea, or even
proof, be admitted to the contrary, (e) (1) And if the existence of a record
be denied, it shall be tried by nothing but itself: that
upon bare inspection
whether there be any such record or no; else there would be no end of dis
there appear any mistake of the clerk in making up such
putes. But,
record, the oourt will direct him to amend it. All courts of record are the
king's courts, .in right of his crown and royal dignity, (f) and therefore no
other oourt hath authority to fine or imprison
so that the very erection
r *„. -I *of
new jurisdiction with the power of fine or imprisonment makes
court of record, (g) A court not of record
the court of
instantly
private man; whom the law will not intrust with any discretionary power
over the fortune or liberty of his fellow subjects. Such are the courts-baron
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Finch, L. 231.

(d) Co. Lltt. 880.
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void
the court which assumed to render
had no jurisdiction.
But
(1)
Judgment
is not competent to show a want of jurisdiction in opposition to the recitals in
generally
Whether, where
the record.
brought into controversy
judgment rendered in one state
want of jurisdiction in contradiction of the record,
in another,
competent to show
Wend., 148; Hall v. Williams,
in dispute upon the authorities. See Starbuck v. Murray,
Met., 333; Norwood
Pick. 233; BradsliHW v. Heath, 13 Wend., 407; Gleaaon v. Dodd,
Texas,
S51;
evidence,
v. Cobb, 24
which allow such
and Newcomb v. Peck, 17 Vt., 302;
Mich., 165: Bimelar v. Dmvson,
111.,536; Roberts v. Caldwell,
Wilcox v. Kassick,
McLean, 473. which exclude it. The recent case of
Dana. 512, and Lincoln v. Tower
Knowles v. Gas Light Co., 19 Wall., 58, admits of such evidence.
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(h) Inst. 311.
(<)Pope Boniface viil, In Decretal,
bus attornati nuncupantur."
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(k) Stiernhook ae jure Goth.
(n) Bro. Abr.
(n») F. N. B. 87.
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incident to every manor, and other inferior jurisdictions: where the proceed
ings are not enrolled or recorded; but as well their existence as the truth of
the matters therein contained shall, if disputed, be tried and determined by a
These courts can hold no plea of matters cognizable by the oommon
jury.
law, unless under the value of 46s., nor of any forcible injury whatsoever, not
having any process to arrest the person of the defendant. (A) (2)
In every court there must be at least three constituent parts, the actor, reus,
and judex; the actor, or plaintiff, who complains of an injury done; the reus,
or defendant, who is called upon to make satisfaction for it; and the judex, or
judicial power, which is to examine the truth of the fact, to determine the
law arising upon that fact, and if any injury appears to have been done, to
ascertain and, by its officers, to apply the remedy. It is also usual in the
superior courts to have attorneys and advocates, or counsel, as assistants.
An attorney-at-law answers to the procurator, or proctor, of the civilians
And he
one who
and canonists,
put in the place, stead, or turn of
another, to manage his matters of law. Formerly every suitor was obliged
to appear in person to prosecute or defend his suit (according to the old
Gothic constitution), (k) unless by special license under the king's letters
still the law in criminal cases. (3) And an idiot cannot to
This
patent.
this day appear by attorney, but in person, (m) for he hath not discretion to
and upon his being r
enable him to appoint *a proper substitute
condition, the judges are
brought before the court in so defenceless
bound to take care of his interests, and they shall admit the best plea in his
behalf that any one present can suggest, (n) But as in the Roman law, " cum
olim in usu fuisset, alterius nomine agi non posse, sed, quia hoc non minimam
incommoditatem habebat, coeperunt homines per procuratores litigare," (o) so
with us upon the same principle of convenience,
now permitted in general,
statute Westm.
c. 10, that
by divers ancient statutes, whereof the first
attorneys may be made to prosecute or defend an action in the absence of
the parties to the suit. These attorneys are now formed into
regular corps;
they are admitted to the execution of their office by the superior courts of
Westminster-hall; and are in all points officers of the respective courts in
which they are admitted; and, as they have many privileges on account of
their attendance there, so they are peculiarly subject to the censure and
animadversion of the judges. (4) No man can practice as an attorney in any
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(2) The courts not of record in the United States, as well as the superior courts, are the
creatures of statute, and are held by officers elected or appointed for the-purpose.
But
they are not in any proper sense the courts of private men, and some of them are vested
with large powers, and try cases in the common law mode, with jury.
Courts of justices
of the peace in the several states are generally held not to be courts of record.
full defense
allowed to be made by counsel in all cases of felony.
(3) Now in England
and Wm. IV, c. 114.
See statute
allowed also in the United States in all cases,
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civil and criminal.
(4) Upon the general power of the court to deal summarily with attorneys, see In re
C, 28 Am. Dec, 657; Matter of Mills, Mich., 392; In re
Austin et al., Rawle, 202;
El. and El., 34; Walker v. 8tate,
Percy, 86 N. Y., 651; Matter of Blake,
W. Va., 749;
Beene v. State, 22 Ark., 149; Dickens' Case, 67 Penn. St., 169; Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall.,
835. A person appearing as attorney
presumed to have due authority. Lagow v. Patter
Blackf., 327; Osborne v. Bank of U. 8.,
Wheat., 738; Hamilton v. Wright, 37 N.
son.
Y., 502. Having been connected on one side he will not be permitted to engage on the
other.
Cholmondeley v. Clinton, 19 Vesey, 261; Wilson v. State, 16 Ind., 3<J2; Goulden
He will be liable to his client for any damages sustained by the latter
v. 8tate, 11 Ga., 47.
in consequence of his negligence, misconduct or disobedience
of instructions.
Wilcox v.
Plummer,
Pet., 174; Holmes v. Peck,
K. I., 242; Reilly v. Cavanaugh, 29 Ind., 435.
A purchase made byhim of his client of the subject matter of an existing litigation
Johns., 479;
will not be upheld.
Wood v. Downer, 18 Vesey, 119; Jackson v. Ketcham,
West v. Raymond, 21 Ind., 305.
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those courts, Dut such as is admitted, and sworn an attorney of that par
ticular court: an attorney of the court of king's bench cannot practice in the
court of common pleas; nor vice versa.
To practice in the court of chancery
it is also necessary to be admitted a solicitor therein: and by the statute 22
Geo. II, c. 46, no person shall act as an attorney at the court of quarter ses
sions, but such as has been regularly admitted in some superior court of
record. So early as the statute 4 Henry IV, c. 18, it was enacted, that attor
neys should be examined by the judges, and none admitted but such as werevirtuous, learned, and sworn to do their duty. And many subsequent statutes
(p) have laid them under farther regulations.
Of advocates, or (as we generally call them) counsel, there are two species
or degrees; barristers, and Serjeants.
The former are admitted after a con
siderable period of study, or at least standing, in the inns of court; (q) and are
ln our old books *styled apprentices, apprenticii ad legem, being looked
r
*
J] upon as merely learners, and not qualified to execute the full office of
an advocate till they were sixteen years standing; at which time, according toFortescue, (r) they might be called to the state and degree of Serjeants, or
servientes ad, legem. How ancient and honorable this state and degree
with
the form, splendour, and profits attending
hath been so fully displayed by
need not be here enlarged on.
shall only
many learned writers, (a) that
solemn oath
to do their duty
observe, that Serjeants at law are bound by
to their clients, and that by custom (w) the judges of the courts of Westmin
ster are always admitted into this venerable order, before they are advanced
to the bench; the original of which was probably to qualify the puisne baronsof the exchequer to become justices of assize, according to the exigence of the
statute of 14 Edvv. Ill, c. 16.
From both these degrees some are usually se
lected to be his majesty's counsel learned in the law; the two principal of whom
are usually called his attorney, and solicitor general.
The first king's counsel,
under the degree of Serjeant, was Sir Francis Bacon, who was made so honoris
causa, without either patent or fee; (u>) so that the first of the modern order
(who are now the sworn servants of the crown, with standing salary) seems tohave been Sir Francis North, afterwards lord keeper of the great seal to King
Charles II. (x) These king's counsel answer, in some measure, to the advo
cates of the revenue, advocati fisci, among the Romans.
For they must not.
be employed in any cause against the crown without special license
(5) in
which restriction they agree with the advocates of the fisc
(y) but in the im
perial law the prohibition was carried still further, and perhaps was more for
the dignity of the sovereign: for, excepting some peculiar causes, the fiscal
a^vocates 'were not permitted to be at all concerned *in private suits
*28
between subject and subject,
A custom has of late years prevailed
of granting letters patent of precedence to such barristers as the crown thinks
proper to honour with that mark of distinction, whereby they are entitled to
such rank and pre-audience (a) as are assigned in their respective patents; some-
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12Oeo. a.29. 30eo.ILe. 23. 22Geo. IL c. 48. 23Geo. II, o. 26.
c
(p) Jac.
lntroduc.
(r) De LL. o. 60.
(?) See book
(») Fortesc. ibid. 10Rep. pref. Dade. Orig. Jurid. To which may be added a tract by the late Ser
jeant Wynne, printed in 1785,entitled ''Observations touching the antiquity and dignity of the degree of
law.
gerjleantat
Fortesc. o. BO.
(to) See his letters, 256.
(x) See his life by Roger North. 37.
13.
(») Cod.
(*) Ibid.
reckoned of so much consequence, that
may not be amiss to subjoin
(a) Pre-audience in the courts
a short table of the precedence which usually obtains among the practisers:
The king's premier serjeant (so constituted by special patent.) (6)
The king's ancient serjeant, or the eldest among the king's Serjeants.
The king's advocate general,
4. The king's attorney -general. (6)
The king's solicitor-general. (6)

sergeant,
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never refused, but some expense must be incurred
prisoner
(6) The license to defend
in obtaining it.
(6) The king's attorney and solicitor-general now take precedence of the king's premier
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times next after the king's attorney-general, but usually next after his majesty's
counsel then being. These (as well as the queen's attorney and solicitor-gen
eral), (6) rank promiscuously with the king's counsel, and together with them
sit within the bar of the respective courts ; but receive no salaries, and are not
sworn; and therefore are at liberty to be retained in causes against the crown.
And all other Serjeants and barristers indiscriminately (except in the court of
common pleas, where only Serjeants are admitted) (7) may take upon them the
protection and defence of any suitors, whether plaintiff or defendant; who are
therefore called their clients, like the dependents upon the ancient Roman
orators. Those indeed practiced gratis, for honor merely, or at most for the
sake of gaining influence : and so likewise it is established with us, (c) that a
counsel can maintain no action for his fees; which are given, not as locatio vel
conductio, but as quiddam honorarium ; not as a salary or hire, but as a mere
gratuity, which a counsellor cannot demand without doing wrong to his repu
tation: (d) (8) as is also laid down with regard to advocates in the civil law,
whose honorarium was directed by
decree of the senate not to exceed in
any case ten thousand sesterces, *or about SOl. of English money, (f) r
And, in order to encourage due freedom of speech in the lawful defence of their clients, and at the same time to give a check to the unseemly
licentiousness of prostitute and illiberal men
few of whom may sometimes
insinuate themselves even into the most honourable professions), it hath been
holden that counsel
not answerable for any matter by him spoken, relative
to the cause in hand, and suggested in his client's instructions
although
should reflect upon the reputation of another, and even prove absolutely
he mentions an untruth of his own invention, or even upon
groundless; but
instructions
be impertinent to the cause in hand, he
then liable to an
action from the party injured, (g) (9) And counsel guilty of deceit or collu
sion are punishable by the statute Westm.
Edw.
c. 28, with imprison
ment for a year and
punishment
day, and perpetual silence in the courts
still sometimes inflicted for gross misdemeanors in practice. (A)
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The king's Serjeants.
The king's counsel, with the queen's attorney and solicitor.
Serjeants at law.
The recorder of London.
10. Advocates of the civil law.
11. Barristers.
In the courts of exchequer two of the most experienced barristers, called the post-man and the tub
man (from the places in which they sit) have also a precedence in motions.
Seld. tit. hon.
Ch. Eep. 88.
e) Davis prof. 22.
<e)Ff. 11,
(d) Davis 23.
11,
Tac. onn.
(ff) Cro. Jac 80.
(A) Sir T. Raym. 878.
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no longer the case.
(7) This
counsellor
not only entitled to stipulate for reasonable fee,
(8) In the United States
but he may recover upon the client's implied promise to pay
reasonable compensation.
In the state of New Jersey, however, the rule appears to be otherwise.
Seeley v. Crane,
18 N. J., 35; Van Atta v. McKinney's Ex'rs, 19 N. J., 235.
It has been held that
an attorney renders
bill on the understanding that
to be
immediately paid, and the client disputes it, and compels its collection by legal proceedings,
the attorney is not bound by the bill rendered, but may recover what the evidence shows
the services to be reasonably worth.
Romeyn v. Campau, 17 Mich., 827.
Physicians also in the United States may recover upon an implied promise to pay reason
able fees.
See Ordronaux, Juris, of Med., 40.
Binn., 178; Hoar v. Wood,
Wheeler,
Met., 193; Ring
(fl) See McMillian v. Birch,
Cow., 725; Hastings v. Lusk, 22 Wend., 410; Garr v. Selden,
N. Y., 91; Jennings v. Paine,
Wis., 358; Cooley Const. Linx, 443.
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Wk are next to consider the several species and distinctions of courts of jus
tice, which are acknowledged and used in this kinsdnm. And those are, either
suoh as are of public and general jurisdiction throughout the whole realm; or
such as are only of a private and special jurisdiction in some particular parts
of it. Of the former there are four sorts; the universally established courts
of common law and equity; the ecclesiastical courts; the courts military; and
courts maritime. And, first, of such publio courts as are courts of common law
and equity. (1)
(1) This seems an appropriate place in which to note the very great changes which have
recently been made in the English judicial system, in the creation of the supreme court of
judicature, and the merger therein of the several ancient courts.
By the judicature acts of 1873 and 1875, the supreme court of judicature is to consist of
two permanent divisions, the high court of justice and the court of appeal.
An appeal
will lie from the high court of justice to the court of appeal, and from the court of appeal
to the house of lords. Two lords of appeal in ordinary are appointed to aid the house of
lords in determining appeals.
They hold the title of baron for life only, and have a salary
of £6,000 per annum. The house of lords may now sit for hearing appeals during the pro
rogation and dissolution of parliament. The lords of appeal consist of the lord chancellor,
the lords of appeal in ordinary, and those peers who have held "high judicial office." Three
lords of appeal must be present in hearing every case.
The high court of justice has original jurisdiction, with appellate jurisdiction from the
inferior courts.
It has the jurisdiction formerly exercised by the court of chancery, the
three common law courts, the courts of admiralty, probate and divorce, the courts of pleas
at Lancaster and Durham, and the courts created by commissions of assize, oyer and termi
ner, and gaol delivery. It consists of five divisions: 1. the chancery division; 2. the
queen's bench division; 8. the common pleas division; 4. the exchequer division, and 5. the
In 1881 the queen's bench division, the common
probate, divorce and admiralty division.
pleas division and the exchequer division were consolidated into one, called the queen's
bench division.
The court of appeal exercises appellate jurisdiction corresponding to that exercised by
the court of appeal in chancery, exchequer chamber, the court of the lord warden of the
stannaries, and the appellate jurisdiction of the judicial committee in admiralty and heresy
It consists of the lord chancellor as its president, the lord chief justice of Eng
matters.
land, the master of the rolls, and six other judges. The court may be divided into divis
ions by its president, but every appeal must be heard by at least three judges.
By 11 and 12 Vict, c. 78, the court of crown cases reserved was established for hearing
such questions of law in criminal trials as should be remitted to them by the trial judge.
There was no appeal from its judgment. These cases are now to be heard by at least bve
of the judges of the high court of justice.
The high court of admiralty has jurisdiction over all maritime causes, that is, injuries
occurring on the high seas. It has an instance jurisdiction and in time of war a prize jur
isdiction. The independent criminal jurisdiction of this court has been taken away and
conferred upon the common law courts, but the judge of the admiralty court may still sit
with the commissioners of oyer and terminer. Vice admiralty courts are established in the
English colonies and foreign possessions.
A court for divorce and matrimonial causes was created by 20 and 21 Vict., c. 85. The
court has jurisdiction over suits for dissolution of marriages, for judicial separation, for
The
nullity of marriage, for restitution of conjugal rights, and for jactitation of marriage.
judge of the court of probate is the judge ordinary of this court. Questions of fact may
be tried before the court itself or before a Jury.
Ai appeal lies from the judge ordinary to
the full court.
The probate court had conferred upon it by statute in 1857 the jurisdiction over testa
The courts of admiralty,
mentary matters formerly exercised by the ecclesiasi ical courts.
probate and divorce now constitute one of the divisions of the high court of justice.
The judicial committee of the privy council is the ultimate court of appeal from the
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The policy of our ancient constitution, as regulated and established by the
great Alfred, was to bring justice home to every man's door, by constituting
as many courts of judicature as there are manors and townships in the king
dom; wherein injuries were redressed in an easy and expeditious manner, by
the suffrage of neighbours and friends. These little courts, however, com
municated with others of a larger jurisdiction, and those with others of a still
greater power; ascending gradually from the lowest to the supreme oourts,
which were respectively constituted to correct the errors of the inferior ones,
and to determine such causes as, by reason of their weight and difficulty, de
manded a more solemn discussion. *The course of justice flowing in r*qi-i
-*
large streams from the king, as the fountain, to his superior courts of L
record; and being then subdivided into smaller channels, till the whole and
every part of the kingdom were plentifully watered and refreshed. An insti
tution that seems highly agreeable to the dictates of natural reason, as well as
of more enlightened policy; being equally similar to that which prevailed in
Mexico and Peru before they were discovered by the Spaniards, and to that
whioh was established in the Jewish republic by Moses.
In Mexico each town
and province had its proper judges, who heard and decided causes, except when
the point in litigation was toointrioate for their determination ; and then it was
remitted to the supreme court of the empire, established in the capital, and
consisting of twelve judges. (a) Peru, according to Gracilasso de Vega (an
historian descended from the ancient Incas of that country), was divided into
small districts containing ten families each, all registered and under one mag
istrate; who had authority to decide little differences and punish petty crimes.
Five of these composed a higher class of fifty families; and two of these last
Ten hundreds constituted the largest
composed another, oalled a hundred.
division, consisting of a thousand families; and each division had its separate
judge or magistrate, with a proper degree of subordination, (b) In like man
ner we read of Moses, that, finding the sole administration of justice too heavy
for him, he "chose able men out of all Israel, such as feared God, men of truth,
hating oovetousness; and made them heads over the people, rulers of thousands
rulers of hundreds, rulers of fifties, and rulers of tens; and they judged the
people at all seasons; the hard causes they brought unto Moses; but every small
matter they judged
These inferior courts, at least the name
themselves."^)
and form of them, still continue in our legal constitution: but as the superior
courts of record have in practice obtained a concurrent original jurisdiction
with these, and as there
besides,
power of removing plaints or actions thi
ther from all the inferior jurisdictions; upon these accounts (amongst others)
has happened that *these petty tribunals have fallen into decay, and r*qoi
almost into oblivion; whether for the better or the worse, may be mat- <■
(6) Mod. Un. Hist, xxxlx,

(a) Hod. Un. Hist. xxitIU, 480.

M.

(e) Exod.

a

18.

of Great Britain and the ecclesiastical
courts of the various colonies and dependencies
The ecclesiastical courts have now virtually lost their jurisdiction in civil cases.
have
in
where the amount involved does
county
courts
actions
jurisdiction
personal
The
not exceed £50, and in ejectment where the annual value of the land does not exceed £20.
In 1865 an equitable jurisdiction was conferred upon them. Some of them have also juris
diction in probate, admiralty and bankruptcy cases. There are fifty-eight county courts in
concurrent with the superior courts, but
England, and their jurisdiction
case which
commenced in the superior court, costs will
might have been begun in the county court
The judge of the county court may determine mat
generally be denied to the plaintiff.
An appeal lies to the divisional courts of the high court of
ters of fact as well as of law.
justice.
Justices of the peace possess preliminary jurisdiction In criminal cases. They commit
prisoners for trial at quarter sessions or assize, and may punish petty offenses summarily.
They are required to possess certain amount of property, and except in the larger cities and
towns serve gratuitously.
either
Criminal cases are heard
judge of the high court, the court of quarter ses
sions in counties, or the recorder in corporate towns and cities. The court of quarter ses
sions or the recorder cannot impose
greater sentence than seven years penal servitude.
a

a

by

a
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courts.
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ter of some speculation, when we consider on the one hand the increase of ex
pense and delay, and on the other the more able and impartial decision, that
follow from this change of jurisdiction.
The order shall observe in discoursing on these several courts, constituted
for the redress of civil injuries (for with those of a jurisdiction merely criminal
shall not at present concern myself), will be by beginning with the lowest,
and those whose jurisdiction, though public and generally dispersed through
out the kingdom, is yet, (with regard to each particular court) confined tovery narrow limits; and so ascending gradually to those of the most extensive
and transcendent power.
I. The lowest, and at the same time the most expeditious, court of justice
known to the law of England, is the court of piepoudre, curia pedis pulverizati;
so called from the dusty feet of the suitors: or, according to Sir Edward Coke,
—
(<f) because justice is there done as speedily as dust can fall from the foot;
upon the same principle that justice among the Jews was administered in the
gate of the city (e) that the proceedings might be the more speedy, as well as
publio. But the etymology given us by a learned modern writer (/") is much
more ingenious and satisfactory;
it being derived, according to him, from
pied pvldreaux, (a pedlar, in old French), and therefore signifying the court of
It is a court of record, in
such petty chapmen as resort to fairs or markets.
cident to every fair and market; of which the steward of him who owns or
has the toll of the market, is the judge; and its jurisdiction extends to admin
ister justice for all commercial injuries done in that very fair or market, and
not in any preceding one. So that the injury must be done, complained of,
heard, and determined, within the compass of one and the same day, unless
the fair continues longer. The court hath cognizance of *all matters
J of contract that can possibly arise within the precinct of that fair or
*■
market; and the plaintiff must make oath that the cause of action arose there.
From this court a writ of error lies, in the nature of an appeal, to the
(g)
courts at Westminster; (h) which are now also bound by the statute 19 Geo.
III., c. 70, to issue writs of execution, in aid of its process, after judgment,
where the person or effects of the defendant are not within the limits of this
inferior jurisdiction; which may possibly occasion the revival of the practice
and proceedings in these courts, which are now in a manner forgotten.
The
reason of their origional institution seems to have been, to do justice expedi
tiously among the variety of persons that resort from distant places to a fair
or market; since it is probable that no other inferior court might be able toserve its process, or execute its judgments, on both or perhaps either of the
parties; and therefore unless this court had been erected, the complainant
must necessarily have resorted, even in the first instance, to some superior
judicature.
EL The court-baron is a court incident to every manor in the kingdom, to
This court-baron is of two
be holden by the steward within the said manor.
the one
natures:
customary court, of which we formerly spoke, (k)
appertaining entirely to the copyholders, in which their estates are transferred
by surrender and admittance, and other matters transacted relative to their
court of common law,
tenures only. The other, of which we now speak,
and
the court of the barons, by which name the freeholders were sometimes
held before the freeholders who owe suit and
anciently called: for that
service to the manor, the steward being rather the register than the judge.
These courts, though in their nature distinct, are frequently confounded to
gether. The court we are now considering, viz.: the freeholders' court, was
oomposed of the lord's tenants, who were the pares of each other, and were
bound by their feudal tenure to assist their lord in the dispensation of do
mestic justice. This was formerly held every three weeks; and its most im-

I

I

is

4.

it

is

(tf) Inst. 272.
(e) Ruth, c.
ip) Stat. 17Edw. IV. c.
(ft) Cro.
ch.
ch. and ch. 22.
(*) Book

20

2.

6

4,

2,

4

it

is
a

a

(»)

is

i

(/) Barrington's observat. on the
(it Co. Litt. 58.
Elk 778.

Stat. 337.

County Court.

Chap. 4.]

33

■*

a

is

a

is

'

is

:

;

*

a

a

(t)

it

is

a

a

is

is

a

is

a

a

a

e a

a

L

is

(I)

portant business is to determine, by writ of right, all controversies relating t«
It may also hold plea of any personal
the right of lands within the manor.
actions, of debt, trespass on the case, or the like, where the debt or damages
do not *amount to forty shillings:
which
the same sum, or three r*34i
marks, that bounded the jurisdiction of the ancient Gothio courts in
their lowest instance, or fier ding -courts, so called, because four were instituted
within every superior district or hundred, (to)
But the proceedings on writ
of right may be removed into the county court by precept from the sheriff
" quia tollit atque eximit causam
-called
curia baronum." (o) (2)
tolt, (n)
And the proceedings in all other actions may be removed into the superior
courts by the king's writs of pone, (p) or accedas ad curiam, according to the
nature of the suit, (q) After judgment given,
writ also of false judgment
{r) lies to the courts at Westminster to rehear and review the cause, and not
writ of error/ for this
not court of record: and therefore in some of these
writs of removal, the first direction given
to cause the plaint to be recorded,
recordari facias loquelam.
III. A hundred-court only larger court-baron, being held for all the in
habitants of particular hundred instead of manor. (3) The free suitors are
here also the judges, and the steward the registrar, as in the case of a courtbaron. It
likewise no court of record; resembling the former in all points,
of greater jurisdiction.(s)
This
said
except that in point of territory
by Sir Edward Coke to have been derived out of the county court for the ease
•of the people, that they might have justice done to them at their own doors,
but its institution was probably coeval
without any charge or loss of time;
with that of hundreds themselves, which were formerly observed (m) to have
been introduced, though not invented, by Alfred, being derived from the polity
The centeni, we may remember, were the principal
•of the ancient Germans.
inhabitants of district composed of different villages, originally in number
hundred, but afterwards only *called by that name; (v) and who prob- r*og-|
ably gave the same denomination to the district out of which they were
chosen.
Caesar speaks positively of the judicial power exercised in their hun
" Principes regionum atque pagorum "
dred-courts and courts-baron.
(which
the
lords
of hundreds and manors), " inter suos jus
construe,
we may fairly
minuunt." (w)
And Tacitus, who had examined
dicu'nt,
controversiasque
their constitution still more attentively, informs us not only of the authority
of the lords, but that of the centeni, the hundredors, or jury who were taken out
of the common freeholders, and had themselves a share in the determination.
"Eliguntur in concUiis et principes, qui jura perpagos vicosque reddunt centeni
This
singulis, ex plebe comites, consilium simul et auctoritas, adsunt." (x\
hundred-court was denominated hcereda in the Gothio constitution, (y) But
this court, as causes are equally liable to removal from hence as from the com
mon court-baron, and by the same writs, and may also be reviewed by writ of
therefore fallen into equal disuse with regard to the trial of
false judgment,
actions.

IV.

is
a

a

a

is

court incident to the jurisdiction of the sheriff.
The county court (4)
not court of record, but may hold pleas of debt or damages under the
Over some of which causes these inferior courts
value of forty shillings, (z)
jurisdiction
have, by the express words of the statute of Gloucester, (a)
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4. See Appen. No.
Finch, 24a
o.
(m) Stiernhook de jure Goth.
(n) P. N. B.
70. Finch. I*. 444,445.
Rep. pref.
See Append. No.
(o) F. N. B.
Finch,
L. 848. Inst. 867.
Inst. 71.
p. 116.
F. N. B. 18.
(«)
(f)
(uj Book
Centeni ex singulis pagis sunt, idque ipsum inter suos vocantur; et, quod prlmo numerus fuit,
Jamnomen et honor est. Tac. de mor. Oerm. c.
c. 28.
e.
(x) De Morib. German, c 18.
(v) Stiernhook,
(w) De Bell. Qall.
c.
Inst. 266.
(a) Edw.
(2) Writs of right are now abolished.
(3) The courts-baron and hundred-court

diction.
(4) Very different county courts, created

have long been obsolete

as courts of civil juris

by statute, are now in existence.
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(e) Finch, 818. r. N. B. 152.
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For in order to be entitled to
totally exclusive of the king's superior courts.
sue an action of trespass for goods before the king's justiciars, the plaintiff is
directed to make affidavit that the cause of action does really and bona fide
amount to 40*.; which affidavit is now unaccountably disused, (b) except in
the court of exchequer.
The statute, also, 43 Eliz. c. 6, which gives the
judges in many personal actions, where the jury assess less damages than 40s.,
a
t0 certify the same and *abridge the plaintiff of his full costs,
r*881■* Power
was also meant to prevent vexation by litigious plaintiffs; who, for
purposes of mere oppression, might be inclinable to institute suits in the
The county court may also
superior courts for injuries of a trifling value.
hold plea of many real actions, and of all personal actions to any amount, by
virtue of a special writ called a justicies ; which is a writ empowering the
sheriff for the sake of dispatch to do the same justice in his county court, as
might otherwise be had at Westminster, (c) The freeholders of the county
are the real judges in this court, and the sheriff is the ministerial officer. The great
conflux of freeholders, which are supposed always to attend at the county court
(which Spelman calls forum plebeicejusticicB et theatrum comitivoB potestatis (d) is
the reason why all acts of parliament at the end of every session were wont to be
there published by the sheriff; why all outlawries of absconding offenders are
there proclaimed; and why all popular elections which the freeholders are to
make, as formerly of sheriffs and conservators of the peace, and still of coro
ners, verderors, and knights of the shire, must ever be made in pleno comitatu
or in full county court. By the statute 2 Edw. VI, o. 25, no county court
shall be adjourned longer than for one month, consisting of twenty-eight days.
And this was also the ancient usage, as appears from the laws of King Edward
the sheriff) ad quartam oirciter septimanam
the elder;
"propositus (that
caique jus dicito; lilesque singula*
frequentem populi concionem celebrato
dirimito." In those times the county court was court of great dignity and
splendour, the bishop and the ealdorman (or earl), with the principal men of
the shire sitting therein to administer justice both in lay and ecclesiastical
causes. (/) But its dignity was much impaired, when the bishop was prohibited
and the earl neglected to attend it. And, in modern times, as proceedings are
removable from hence into the king's superior courts, by writ of pone or recormanner as from *hundred-courts, and courts-baron;
r*i"7l ^arh iff) m the same
and as the same writ of false judgment may be had, in nature of a writ
of error; this has occasioned the same disuse of bringing action therein.
These are the several species of common law courts, which, though dispersed
universally throughout the realm, are nevertheless of partial jurisdiction, and
were mem
confined to particular districts: yet communicating with, and as
more extended ana general nature; which are
bers of, the superior courts of
calculated for the administration of redress, not in any one lordship, hundred,
or county only, but throughout the whole kingdom at large. Of which sort is,
is frequently termed in law, the
V. The court of common pleas, or, as
court of common bench.
By the ancient Saxon constitution, there was only one superior court of jus
tice in the kingdom; and that court had cognizance both of civil and spiritual
causes, viz. the witlena-g emote, or general council, which assembled annually
or oftener, wherever the king kept his Christmas, Easter, or Whitsuntide, as
At the conquest
well to do private justice as to consult upon public business.
the ecclesiastical jurisdiction was diverted into another channel; and the con
queror, fearing danger from these annual parliaments, contrived also to separ
ate their ministerial power, as judges, from their deliberative, as counsellors to
the crown. He therefore established constant court in his own hall, thence
called by Bracton, (h) and other ancient authors aula regia, or aula regis.
This court was composed of the king's great officers of state resident in his
(e) 0. 1U
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and usually attendant on his person: such as the lord high constahle
and lord mareschal, who chiefly presided in matters of honour and of arms;
Besides
determining according to the law military and the law of nations.
these there were the lord high steward, and lord great chamberlain; the stew
ard of the household; the lord chancellor, whose peculiar *business it
r*afi-iJ
was to keep the king's seal, and examine all such writs, grants, and
letters, as were to pass under that authority; and the lord high treasurer, who
was the principal adviser in all matters relating to the revenue.
These high
officers were assisted by certain persons learned in the laws, who were called
the king's justiciars or justices; and by the greater barons of parliament, all
of whom had a seat in the aula regia, and formed a kind of court of appeal, or .
All these in their
rather of advice, in matters of great moment and difficulty.
several departments transacted all secular business both criminal and civil, and
likewise the matters of the revenue: and over all presided one special magis
trate, called the chief justiciar, or capitalis justiciarius totius Anglim ; who was
also the principal minister of state, the second man in the kingdom, and by
virtue of his office guardian of the realm in the king's absence.
And this officer
it was, who principally determined all the vast variety of oauses that arose in
this extensive jurisdiction; and from the plenitude of his power grew at length
both obnoxious to the people, and dangerous to the government which
employed him.
This great universal court being bound to follow the king's household in all
his progresses and expeditions, the trial of common causes therein was found
very burthensome to the subject. Wherefore King John, who dreaded also
the power of the justiciar, very readily consented to that article which now
forms the eleventh chapter of magna carta, and enacts, " that communiaplacita non sequantur curiam regis, sed teneantur in aliquo loco certo."
This
certain place was established in Westminster-hall, the place where the aula
hath ever
regis originally sat, when the king resided in that city; and there
since continued.
And the court being thus rendered fixed and stationary, the
judges became so too, and a chief with other justices of the common pleas was
thereupon appointed; with jurisdiction to hear and determine all pleas of land,
and injuries merely civil, between subject and subject. Which critical estab
lishment of this principal court of *comraon law, at that particular
r*afl-i
juncture and that particular place, gave rise to the inns of court in its «■
neighbourhood; and thereby collecting together the whole body of the common
lawyers, enabled the law itself to withstand the attacks of the canonists and
This precedent was
civilians, who laboured to extirpate and destroy it.
soon after copied by King Philip the Fair in France, who about the year 1302
fixed the parliament of Paris to abide constantly in that metropolis; which
before used to follow the person of the king wherever he went, and in which
he himself used frequently to decide the causes that were there depending; but
all were then referred to the sole cognizance of the parliament and its learned
fixed the im
judges, (k) And thus, also, in 1495, the Emperor Maximilian
perial chamber (which before always traveled with the court and household)
to be constantly held at Worms, from whence
was afterwards translated to
Spire.
The aula regia being thus stripped of so considerable
branch of its juris
diction, and the power of the chief justiciar being also considerably curbed by
many articles in the great charter, the authority of both began to decline apace
under the long and troublesome reign of King Henry IIL And, in further
pursuance of this example, the other several officers of the chief justiciar were
under Edward the First (who rfew-modeled the whole frame of our judicial
A court of
polity) subdivided and broken into distinct courts of judicature.
chivalry was erected, over which the constable and mareschal presided; as did

1

U)

See Book

introduc.
23

1
1.

2.
S.

Gtlb. Hist. 0. P. Introduc. 17.
(1)SfMlm. 01. 331,
(k) Mod. Un. Hiat. xxili, 386.
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the steward of the household over another, constituted to regulate the king's
domestic servants.
The high steward, with the barons of parliament, formed
an august tribunal for the trial of delinquent peers; and the barons reserved to
themselves in parliament the right of reviewing the sentences of other courts
in the last resort.
The distribution of common justice between man and man
■was thrown into so provident an order, that the great judicial officers were
*ma<^e *° f°rm a check upon each other; the court of chancery issuing
r*40l
L
J all original writs under the great seal to the other courts; the common
pleas being allowed to determine all causes between private subjects; the ex
chequer managing the king's revenue; and the court of king's bench retaining
all the jurisdiction which was not cantoned out toother courts, and particularly
the superintendence of all the rest by way of appeal; and the sole cognizance
of pleas of the crown or criminal causes. For pleas or suits are regularly
divided into two sorts: pleas of the crown, which comprehend all crimes and
wherein the king (on behalf of the public) is the plaintiff; and
misdemeanors,
common pleas, which include all civil actions, depending between subject and
subject. The former of these were the proper object of the jurisdiction of the
court of king's bench; the latter of the court of common pleas: which is a
court of record, and is styled by Sir Edward Coke
the lock and key of the
(m)
common law; for herein only oan real actions, that is, actions which concern
the right of freehold or the realty, be originally brought: and all other, or
personal pleas between man and man, are likewise here determined; though in
most of them the king's bench has also a concurrent authority.
The judges of this court are at present (ft) four in number, one chief and
three puisne justices, created by the king's letters patent, who sit every day in
the four terms to hear and determine all matters of law arising in civil causes,
whether real, personal, or mixed and compounded of both. These it takes
cognizance of, as well originally, as upon removal from the inferior courts be
fore-mentioned. But a writ of error, in the nature of an appeal, lies from this
oourt into the court of king's bench.
*VI. The court of king's bench (so called because the king used forp»41-i
J merly to sit there in person,
!■
(o) the style of the court still being coram
ipso rege) is the supreme court of common law in the kingdom; consisting of
a chief justice and three puisne justices, who are by their office the sovereign
conservators of the peace, and supreme coroners of the land.
Yet, though the
king himself used to sit in this court, and still is supposed so to do; he did not,
neither by law is he empowered (p) to, determine any cause or motion, but by
the mouth of his judges, to whom he hath committed his whole judicial
authority, (q)
This court, which (as we have said) is the remnant of the aula regia, is not,
nor can be, from the very nature and constitution of it, fixed to any certain
place, but may follow the king's person wherever he goes: for which reason all
process issuing out of this court in the king's name is returnable "ubicunque
fuerimus in Anglia." It hath indeed, for some centuries past, usually sat at
Westminster, being an ancient palace of the crown; but might remove with
the king to York or Exeter, if he thought proper to command it. And we
find that, after Edward
had conquered Scotland, it actually sat at Roxburgh,
(r) And this movable quality, as well as its dignity and power, are fully

I

(m) 4 Inst. 99.
(n) King James I, during the greater part of his reign, appointed five Judges in the courts of Icing's
bench and common pleas, for the benefit of a casting voice In case of a difference in opinion, and that
the circuits might at all times be fully supplied with judges of the superior courts. Ana, in subsequent
reigns, upon the permanent indisposition of a judge, a fifth hath been sometimes appointed. Sir T.
Raym. 475.
fo) 4 Inst. 73.
(p) See book I. ch. 7. The king used to decide causes In person In the aula regia. "/» curia domini
regit ism in propria persona Jura decernit."
(Dial, de Scacch. 1. L 1 4.) After its dissolution King
Edward I frequently sat in the court of king's bench. (See the records cited. 4 Burr. 851.) And in later
times, James I is said to have sat there In person, but was informed by his judges that he could not
deliver an opinion.
(O 4 Inst. 7L
(r) M. 80. 21 Edw. I, Hale Hist. C. L. 200.
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expressed by Bracton, when he says that the justices of this court are "capitaj.es, generates, perpetui, et majores; a latere regis residentes, qui omnium aliorum corrigere tenentur injuria* et errores." (s) And it is moreover especially
provided in the articuli super cartas, (£) that the king's chancellor, and the
justices of his bench, shall follow him, so that he may have at all times near
unto him some that be learned in the laws.
*The jurisdiction of this court is very high and transcendent. It r^o-i
*
keeps all inferior jurisdictions within the bounds of their authority, and
may either remove their proceedings to be determined here, or prohibit their
It
progress below. It superintends all civil corporations in the kingdom.
•commands magistrates and others to do what their duty requires, in every
case where there is no other specific remedy.
It protects the liberty of the
It takes cognizance both of
subject, by speedy and summary interposition.
•criminal and civil causes; the former in what is called the crown-side or crownoffice; the latter in the plea-side of the court. The jurisdiction of the crownside it is not our present business to consider; that will be more properly dis
cussed in the ensuing book. But on the plea-side, or civil branch, it hath an
original jurisdiction and cognizance of all actions of trespass, or other injury
alleged to be committed vi et armis; or actions of forgery of deeds, mainten
ance, conspiracy, deceit, and actions on the case which allege any falsity or
fraud; all of which savour of a criminal nature, although the action is brought
for a civil remedy; and make the defendant liable in strictness to pay a fine to
the king, as well as damages to the injured party, (w) The same doctrine is
also now extended to all actions on the case whatsoever; (to) but no action
of debt or detinue, or other mere civil action, can by the common law be prose
cuted by any subject in this court, by original writ out of chancery; (as)
though an action of debt, given by statute, may be brought in the king's bench
as well as in the common pleas, (y)
And yet this court might always have
held plea of any civil action (other than actions real) provided the defendant
was an officer of the court; or in the custody of the marshal, or prison-keeper,
of this court; for a breach of the peace or any other offence,
And, in
fiction to hold plea of all personal actions what
process of time,
began by
soever, and has continued to do so for ages: (a)
being surmised that the
defendant
arrested for *a supposed trespass, which he never has in rt.„,
reality committed and being thus in the custody of the marshal of this
at liberty to proceed against him for any other personal
court, the plaintiff
not
injury: which surmise of being in the marshal's custody, the defendant
at liberty to dispute, (b) And these fictions of law, though at first they may
startle the student, he will find upon further consideration to be highly bene
ficial and useful; especially as this maxim
ever invariably observed, that no
fiction shall extend to work an injury; its proper operation being to prevent
a mischief, or remedy an inconvenience, that might result from the general
rule of law. (c) So true
that in fictione juris semper subsistit wquitas. (d)
In the present case,
gives the suitor his choice of more than one tribunal,
before which he may institute his action; and prevents the circuity and delay
of justice, by allowing that suit to be originally, and in the first instance, com
menced in this court, which, after
determination in another, might ultimately
on
be brought before
writ of error.
For this court
likewise
court of appeal, into which may be removed by
a writ of error all determinations of the court of common pleas, and of all
writ of error lies also
inferior courts of record in England; and to which
from the court of king's bench in Ireland.
Yet even this so high and honour-
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c. 10.
o.
(»)
(t) 28Edw.
in) Finch L. 198. Inst. 23. Dyversite de courtet c. bank !« roy.
Lilly Prao. Reg. 503.
(x) Inst. 78. Trye's Jus Fillzar. 101.
(to) F. N. B. 86, 93.
(y) Carth. 234.
(z) Inst. 71.
(a) Ibid. 72.
Thus, too, in the elvll law; contra Actionem non admittitur probatio
quid enim efflceret probatio
ventatia, nbi fictio ad versus veritatem fingit. Nam fictio nihil aliud est, quam legit adversus veritatem
in re postibiti exjusta cansa dispositio. lOothofred. in Ff. 22, 3.)
Roll. Rep. 602.
(c) Rep. 30.
(d) 11Rep. 51. Go. Litt. 150.
25
H.—

Public Courts of

43

Common

Law and Equity.

[Book

III.

able court is not the dernier resort of the subject; for, if he be not satisfied
with any determination here, he may remove it by writ of error into the house
of lords, or the court of exchequer chamber, as the case may happen, according
to the nature of the suit, and the manner in which it has been prosecuted.
VIL The court of exchequer is inferior in rank not only to the court of
king's bench, but to the common pleas also: but have chosen to consider it in
this order, on account of its double capacity, as a court of law and a court of
It is a very ancient court of record, set up by William the
equity *also.
-*
as
Conqueror,
part of the aula regia,
though regulated and re
duced to its present order by King Edward
(g) and intended principally to
order the revenues of the crown, and to recover the king's debts and duties. (A)
It called the exchequer, scaccharium, from the checked .cloth, resembling
chess-board, which covers the table there: and on which, when certain of the
king's accounts are made up, the sums are marked and scored with counters.
It consists of two divisions: the receipt of the exchequer, which manages the
royal revenue, and with which these Commentaries have no concern: and the
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court or judicial part of
which
court of equity,
again subdivided into
and
court of common law.
The court of equity
held in the exchequer chamber before the lord treas
urer, the chancellor of the exchequer, the chief baron, and three puisne ones.
These Mr. Selden conjectures
to have been anciently made out of such as
were barons of. the kingdom, or parliamentary barons; and thence to have
derived their name; which conjecture receives great strength from Bracton's
explanation of magna carta, c. 14, which directs that t)he earls and barons be
amerced by their peers; that
says he, by the barons of the exchequer, (k)
The primary and original business of this court
to call the king's debtors to
account, by bill filed by the attorney-general; and to recover any lands, tene
ments, or hereditaments, any goods, chattels, or other profits or benefits,
belonging to the crown. So that by their original constitution the jurisdiction
of the courts of common pleas, king's bench, and exchequer, was entirely separ
ate and distinct; the common pleas being intended to decide all controversies
between subject and subject; the king's bench to correct all crimes and mis
breach of the peace, the king being then plaintiff,
demeanors that amount to
as such offences are in open derogation of the jura regalia of his crown; and
. _-■ the exchequer to adjust *and recover his revenue, wherein the king also
■* plaintiff, as the withholding and
an injury to his
non-payment thereof
jura fiscalia. But, as by fiction almost all sorts of civil actions are now
allowed to be brought in the king's bench, in like manner by another fiction all
For as
kinds of personal suits may be prosecuted in the court of exchequer.
all the officers and ministers of this court have, like those of other superior
courts, the privilege of suing and being sued only in their own court; so also
the king's debtors and farmers, and all accomptants of the exchequer, are
privileged to sue and implead all manner of persons in the same court of equity
that they themselves are called into. They have likewise privilege to sue and
implead one another, or any stranger, in the same kind of common law actions
(where the personalty only
concerned) as are prosecuted in the court of com
mon pleas.

(1) 10Edw.

c. 1L
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Lamb. Archeion. 84.
Madox, hist. excu. 108.
(g) Spelm. Ouil.
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This gives original to the common law part of their jurisdiction, which was
exercised
established merely for the benefit of the king's accomptants, and
by the barons only of the exchequer, and not the treasurer or chancellor. The
called
writ upon which all proceedings here are grounded
quo mimts in
the king's farmer or debtor, and that the
which the plaintiff suggests that he
defendant hath done him the injury or damage complained of; quo minus sufthe less able to pay the king his debt or rent. And
ficiens existit, by which he
these suits are expressly directed, by what
called the statute of Rutland, (/)
Inat. 108-114.
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to be confined to such matters only as specially concern the king or his minis
And by the artieuli super cartas, (m) it is enacted,
ters of the exchequer.
that no common pleas be thenceforth holden in the exchequer contrary to the

(t)

is

(s)

form of the great charter. But now, by the suggestion of privilege, any per
son may be admitted to sue in the exchequer as well as the king's accomptant.
The surmise of being debtor to the king, is therefore become matter of form
and mere words of course, and the court is open to all the nation equally.
The same holds with regard to the equity side of the court: for there any per
son may file *a bill against another upon a bare suggestion that he is r
-»
■*
the king's accomptant; but whether he is so or not is never controverted. In this court, on the equity side, the clergy have long used to exhibit
their bills for the non-payment of tithes: in which case the surmise of being
the king's debtor is no fiction, they being bound to pay him their first fruits,
and annual tenths. But the chancery has of late years obtained a large share
in this business.
An appeal from the equity side of this court lies immediately to the house
of peers; but from the common law side, in pursuance of the statute 31 Edw.
HI, o. 12, a writ of error must be first brought into the court of exchequer
And from the determination there had, there lies, in the dernier
chamber.
resort, a writ of error to the house of lords.
viii- The high court of chancery is the only remaining, and in matters of
civil property by much the most important of any, of the king's superior and
It has its name of chancery, cancellaria, from the
original courts of justice.
judge who presides here, the lord chancellor or cancettarius ; who, Sir Edward
Coke tells us, is so termed a canceUando, from cancelling the king's letters
patent when granted contrary to law, which is the highest point of his juris
diction, (n) But the office and name of chancellor (however derived) was
certainly known to the courts of the Roman emperors: where it originally
seems to have signified a chief scribe or secretary, who was afterwards in
vested with several judicial powers, and a general superintendency over the
rest of the officers of the prince. From the Roman empire it passed to the
Roman church, ever emulous of imperial state; and hence every bishop has to
this day his chancellor, the principal judge of his consistory. And when the
modern kingdoms of Europe were established upon the ruins of the empire,
almost every state preserved its chancellor, with different jurisdictions and
But in all of them he
dignities, according to their different constitutions.
seems to have had the supervision of all charters, letters, and such other pub
lic instruments of the crown, as were authenticated in the most solemn man
ner; and, therefore, *when seals came in use, he had always the custody r*.i,-j
of the king's great seal. So that the office of chancellor, or lord keeper *■ J
(whose authority by statute 5 Eliz. c. 18, is declared to be exactly the same),
is with us at this day created by the mere delivery of the king's great seal
into his custody: (o) whereby he becomes, without writ or patent, an officer
of the greatest weight and power of any now subsisting in the kingdom; and
superior in point of precedency to every temporal lord. ( p) He is a privy
counsellor by his office, (q) and, according to Lord Chancellor EUesmere, (r)
To him belongs the appoint
prolocutor of the house of lords by prescription.
Being formerly
ment of all justices of the peace throughout the kingdom.
usually an ecclesiastic (for none else were then capable of an office so conver
he became keeper
sant in writings), and presiding over the royal chapel,
of the king's conscience; visitor, in right of the king, of all hospitals and col
leges of the king's foundation; and patron of all the king's livings under the
He
the general
per annum in the king's books.
value of twenty marks
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Roll. Abr. 886.
(o) Lamb. Archeion, 65.
c.
(n) Inst. 88.
(m) 28Edw.
p) Stat. 81Hen. VIII, c. 10.
(q) Selden, office of lord chano.
(r) Of the office of lord chancellor, edit. 1651.
'«) Hadox. hist, of exch. 42.
F. N. B. 86,though Hobart (214),extends this value to twenty pound*.
88Edw. BXc.
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guardian of all infants, idiots, and lunatics; and has the general superintend
ence of all charitable uses in the kingdom.
And all this, over and above the
vast and extensive jurisdiction which he exercises in his judicial capacity in
the court of chancery; wherein, as in the exchequer, there are two distinct
tribunals: the one ordinary, being a court of common law; the other extra
ordinary, being a court of equity.
The ordinary legal court is much more ancient than the court of equity.
Its jurisdiction is to hold plea upon a scire facias to repeal and cancel the
king's letters patent, when made against law, or upon untrue suggestions; and
to hold plea of petitions, monstrans de droit, traverses of offices, and the
like; when the king hath been advised to do any act, or is put in possession
of any lands or goods, in prejudice of a subject's right (m) On proof of
to do any
rx.Q-i which, as the king can never *be supposed intentionally
-I wrong, the law questions not, but he will immediately
the in
^redress
jury; and refers that conscientious task to the chancellor, the keeper of his
It also appretains to this court to hold plea of all personal
conscience.
Actions, where any officer or minister of the court is a party, (o) It might
likewise hold plea (by scire facias) of partitions of land in coparoenery,
(to)
and of dower, (aj) where any ward of the crown was concerned in interest, so
long as the military tenures subsisted: as it now may also do of the tithes of
forest land, where granted by the king, and claimed by a stranger against the
in
grantee of the crown; (y) and of executions on statutes, or recognizances
But
nature thereof, by the statute 23 Hen. VIII., c. 6.
any cause comes
to issue in this court, that is,
any fact be disputed between the parties, the
■chancellor cannot try
jury; but must deliver
having no power to summon
shall be tried
the record propria manu into the court of king's bench, where
by the country, and judgment shall be there given thereon, (a) And when
writ of error in
judgment
given in chancery upon demurrer or the like,
nature of an appeal lies out of this ordinary court into the court of king's
bench: (J) though so little
usually done on the common law side of the
have met with no traces of any writ of error (c) being actually
•court, that
brought, since the fourteenth year of Queen Elizabeth, A. D. 1572.
also kept the officina justifies
In this ordinary, or legal, court
out of
which all original writs that pass under the great seal, all commissions of
-charitable uses, sewers, bankruptcy, idiotcy, lunacy, and the like, do issue; and
for which
always open to the subject, who may there at any time demand
and have, ex debito justitias, any writ that his occasions
*may call for.
r*4.al
*■
These writs (relating to the business of the subject) and the returns to
them were, according to the simplicity of ancient times, originally kept in
hamper, in hanaperio; and the others (relating to such matters wherein the
•crown
immediately or mediately concerned) were preserved in little sack
or bag, in parva baga; and thence hath arisen the distinction of the hanaper
office, and petty bag office, which both belong to the commou law court in

is

is

•chancery.
But the extraordinary court, or court of equity,
now become the court of
This distinction between law and equity,
the greatest judicial consequence.
not at present known, nor seems to have
as administered in different courts,
over been known, in any other country at any time: (d) and yet the difference
of one from the other, when administered by the same tribunal, was perfectly

1

(1

4

1

2

4

4

(v) Inst. 80.
(«> rep. 54.
(u>)Co. Lit*. 171.P. N. B. 62.
(y) Bro. Abr. tit. dumes. 10.
(x) Bro. Abr. tit. dower, 68. Moor. 665.
(«) Roll. Abr. 489.
Cro.
Latch.
112.
Jac.
12.
(a)
Inst. 80.
(6) Year book. 18Edward in, 25. 17Am. 21. 39 Au. 47. Dyer. 815. Roll. Rep. 287.
(c) The opinion of Lord Keeper North, in 1682 Vera. 131; Equ. Cas. abr. 129) that no such writ of
-error lay, and that an injunction might issue against it, seems not to hare been well considered.
('/) Tue council of conscience, instituted by John III, King of Portugal, to review the sentence of all
4nferior courts, and moderate them by equity (Mod. Un. Hist, xxii, 237),seems rather to have been a court
of appeal.
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familiar to the Romans: (e) the jus prcetorium, or discretion of the praetor,,
being distinct from the leges, or standing laws, (f) but the power of both
centred in one and the same magistrate, who was equally intrusted to pro
nounce the rule of law, and to apply it to particular cases, by the principles of
equity. With us, too, the aula regia, which was the supreme court of judi
cature, undoubtedly administered equal justice, according to the rules of both
or either, as the case might chance to require; and, when that was broken to
pieces, the idea of a court of equity, as distinguished from a court of law, did
not subsist in the original plan of partition.
For, though equity is mentioned
by Bracton (g) as a thing contrasted to strict law, yet neither in that writer,
nor in Glanvil or Fleta, nor yet in Britton (composed under the auspices and
in the name of Edward I, and '''treating particularly of courts and their
r#-0-i
several jurisdictions),
is there a syllable to be found relating to the *■ *
equitable jurisdiction of the court of chancery. It seems, therefore, probable
that, when the courts of law, proceeding merely upon the ground of the king's
original writs, and confining themselves strictly to that bottom, gave a harsh
or imperfect judgment, the application for redress used to be to the king in
person, assisted by his privy council (from whence, also, arose the jurisdiction,
of the court of requests, (A) which was virtually abolished by the statute 16
Car. I, c. 10) ; and they were wont to refer the matter either to the chancellor
and a select committee,
or by degrees to the chancellor only, who mitigated
the severity or supplied the defects of the judgments pronounced in the courts
of law, upon weighing the circumstances of the case. This was the custom,
not only among our Saxon ancestors, before the institution of the aula regia,
but also after its dissolution, in the reign of King Edward
(&) and,
perhaps, during its continuance, in that of Henry II.
In these early times, the chief judicial employment of the chancellor must
have been in devising new writs, directed to the courts of common law, to give
remedy in cases where none was before administered. And to quicken the
diligence of the olerks in the chancery, who were too much attached to ancient,
" when
13 Edw.
c. 24, that,
provided by statute, Westm.
precedents,
soever from thenceforth in one case
writ shall be found in the chancery, and
in
like case, falling under the same right and requiring like remedy,
*no precedent of
writ can be produced, the clerks in chancery shall r*fiii
-»
shall be
new one; and,
they cannot agree,
agree in forming
writ shall be framed by consent of
adjourned to the next parliament, where
the learned in the law,
lest
happen for the future that the court of our(m)
lord the king be deficient in doing justice to the suitors." And this accounts
for the very great variety of writs of trespass on the case to be met with in
the register; whereby the suitor had ready relief, according to the exigency of
his business, and adapted to the specialty, reason and equity of his very case.
little accuracy in the clerks of the chancery, and.
(») Which provision (with
little liberality in the judges, by extending, rather than narrowing, the
remedial effects of the writ), might have effectually answered all the purpose*

i

I.

;

2.

]

3.

3,

;

7,

I

2,

I,

(e) Thus, too, the parliament of Paris, tbe court of session In Scotland, and every other jurisdiction in
Europe, of which we have any tolerable account, found all their decisions as well upon principles of
325,830,princ of equity, 44.)
equity as those of positive law. (Lord Kalms, hlstor, law tracts,
(/) Thus Cicero: 'Vom Mis promissis, non essestandum, quis non vtdet, qua coactus quit metu et
deceptus dolo promiserltt qua quidem plerumque jure pratorto liberantur, nonnulla legibus." Offlc.
c. Sol. 28.
to)
(n) The matters cognizable In this court, Immediately before Its dissolution, were "almost all suits, that
by colour of equity, or supplication made to the prince, might be brought before him; but originally and
properly all poor men's suits, which were made to his majesty by supplication and upon which they
were entitled to have right, without payment of any money for the same." (Smith's Commonwealth, b.
o. 7.)
(0 Nemo ad regem appellet pro aliqua lite, nisi jus domi consequi non possit. Si jus nimis teverum
tit. alleviatio deinde quaratur apud regem. LL. Edg. e.
(k) Lambard, Archeion. 69.
(() Joannes Sarisburiensis (who died A. D. 1182,28Hen. IT), speaking of tbe chancellor's office In the
verses prefixed to his polycraticon, has these lines:
Hie est, qui lege* regni cancellat iniquat
Et manaata
anaata pu principle aqua factt.
ei
of writs, in cases before unprovided for, are given by this
(nt) A great variety of uew precedents
atute of Westm.
(») Lamb. Archeion. 61.
(n)
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a court of equity; (o) except that of obtaining a discovery by the oath of
the defendant
But when, about the end of the reign of King Edward HI, uses of lands
were introduced, (p) and though totally discountenanced by the courts of com
mon law, were considered as fiduciary deposits and binding in conscience by
the clergy, the separate jurisdiction of the chancery as a court of equity began
to be established; (q) and John Waltham, who was bishop of Salisbury and
chancellor to King Richard II, by a strained interpretation of the aboye men
tioned statute of Westm. 2, devised the writ of subpoena, returnable in the
court of chancery only, to make the feoffee to uses accountable to his cestuy
que use: which process was afterwards extended to other matters wholly
determinable at the common law, upon false and fictitious suggestions; for
which, therefore, the chancellor himself
directed
by statute 17 Rio. II, c.
t0 giye damages t0 tne party unjustly aggrieved.
But as the *clergy,
f*52l
-'so early as the reign of King Stephen, had attempted to turn their
ecclesiastical courts into courts of equity, by entertaining suits pro lossione
fidei, as
spiritual offence against conscience, in case of non-payment of debts
or any breach of oivil contracts: (r) till checked by the constitutions of
which declared that, "placita de debitis, quae fide interposita deClarendon,
bentur, vel absque interpositione fidei, sint injustitia regis:" therefore probably
the ecclesiastical chancellors, who then held the seal, were remiss in abridging
their own new acquired jurisdiction; especially as the spiritual courts con
tinued
to grasp at the same authority as before in suits pro kesione fidei, so
late as the fifteenth century, (w) till finally prohibited by the unanimous con
currence of all the judges. However,
appears from parliament rolls, (to)
that, in the reigns of Henry IV and V, the commons were repeatedly urgent to
have the writ of subpozna entirely suppressed, as being
novelty devised by
the subtlety of Chancellor Waltham, against the form of the common law;
whereby no plea could be determined, unless by examination and oath of the
parties, according to the form of the law civil, and the law of holy church, in
subversion of the common law. But though Henry IV, being then hardly
warm in his throne, gave
palliating answer to their petitions, and actually
passed the statute
Henry IV, c. 23, whereby judgments at law are declared
irrevocable unless by attaint or writ of error, yet his son put
negative at
once upon their whole application: and in Edward IV's time, the process by
bill and subpozna was become the daily praotice of the court, (x)
*But this did not extend very far: for in the ancient treatise, entitled
r* -.
diversite des courtes, (y) supposed to be written very early in the six
teenth century, we have catalogue of the matters of conscience then cogniz
No
able by subpoena in chancery, which fall within
very narrow compass.
regular judicial system at that time prevailed in the court; but the suitor when
he thought himself aggrieved, found
desultory and uncertain remedy, accord
ing to the private opinion of the chancellor, who was generally an ecclesiastic,
or sometimes (though rarely)
statesman:
no lawyer having sat in the court
of chancery from the times of the chief justices Thorpe and Knyvet, succes
sively chancellors to King Edward IH, in 1872 and 1373, (z) to the promotion

I.
2,
t.
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" Le sub(o) This was the opinion of Fairfax, a very learned Judge In the time of Edward the Fourth.
poena (gays be) tie serroit my cy soventement use come est ore, $i nous attendomus tiels actions sur
et
d'
outer
(Yearbook,
SI
de
ceo
court,
courts."
Edw.
IV.
jurisdiction
et
mainteinomus
le
les cases
28.)
(g) Spelm. Gloss. 106. Lev. 242.
(p) See book II, ch. 80.
p. 861,note.
(r) Lord Lyttelt. Hfn. n, b.
(J) 10Hen. II, 0. 15. Speed. 458.
In Hen. Ill, suits in court christian pro Icesione fidei upon temporal contracts were adjudged to be
contrary to law. (Fitzn. Abr.
Prohibition. 15.) But In the statute or writ of circumspccte agatis, sup
Pryn. Rec. 386) Edw. II, suits pro loesione
but more probably
posed by some to have issued 18Edw.
courts; according to some ancient copies (Berthelet stat, antiq.
all
wed
to
the
ecclesiastical
were
fidei
Pryn. Rec. 836), and the common English translation of that statute, though in
London 1531,90
2), and in the Cotton MS. (Claud. D. 2), that clause is omitted.
Lyndewode's copy (Prov.
Hen. IV. 10. 11Hen. IV. 88. 38 Hen. VI, 29. 20 Edw. IV, 10.
(u) Yearbook,
78and 110. Hen. V, No. 46, cited In Prynne's abr. of Cotton's records,
IV,
Nos.
Purl.
Hen.
(u>)Rut.
410,4«J. 424.548. Inst. 83.
Roll. Abr. H70,371,372.
IV,
33
14
No.
Purl.
iw.
Rot.
(not 14Edw. HI, as cited Roll. Abr. 870,Sec).
(2)
(jl) Tit. Chancery, fol. 2U6. Rasteli's edit. A. D. 1534.
(*) Spelm. Oloss. UL Dudg. cftron. Ser. 56.
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of Sir Thomas Moore by King Henry VIII, in 1530. After whioh the great
seal was indiscriminately committed to the custody of lawyers, or courtiers, (a)
or churchmen, (b) according as the convenience of the times and the disposi
tion of the prince required, till Sergeant Puckering was made lord keeper
in 1592; from which time to the present the court of chancery has always been
filled by a lawyer, excepting the interval from 1621 to 1625, when the seal was
intrusted to Dr. Williams, then dean of Westminster, but afterwards bishop
of Lincoln; who had been chaplain to Lord Ellesmere, when chancellor, (c)
In the time of Lord Ellesmere (A. D. 1616) arose that notable dispute
between the courts of law and equity, set on foot by Sir Edward Coke, then
ohief justice of the court of king's bench; whether a court of equity could give
relief after or against a judgment at the common law? This contest was so
warmly carried on, that indictments were preferred against the suitors, the
solicitors, the counsel, and even a master in chancery, for having incurred a
praemunire, by questioning in a court of equity a judgment in the court of
king's bench, obtained by gross fraud and imposition, (d) This matter being
brought before the king, was by him referred *to his learned counsel r^..-,
for their advice and opinion: who reported so strongly in favour of the *• J
courts of equity, (e) that his majesty gave judgment in their behalf; but not
contented with the irrefragable reasons and precedents produced by his coun
sel (for the chief justice was clearly in the wrong), he chose rather to decide
the question by referring it to the plenitude of his royal prerogative. (/)
Sir
Edward Coke submitted to the decision, {g) and thereby made atonement for
his error: but this struggle, together with the business of commendams (in
which he acted a very noble part), (A) and his controlling the commissioners
were the open and avowed causes, (A) first of his suspension and
of sewers,
soon after of his removal, from his office.
Lord Bacon, who succeeded Lord Ellesmere, reduced the practice of the
more regular system; but did not sit long enough to effect any
court into
considerable revolution in the science itself: and few of his decrees whioh have
His successors, in the
reached us are of any great consequence to posterity.
did little to improve upon his plan and even after the
reign of Charles
restoration the seal was committed to the earl of Clarendon, who had with
drawn from practice as lawyer near twenty years; and afterwards to the earl
of Shaftesbury, who (though
lawyer by education) had never practised at
all. Sir Heneage Finch, who succeeded in 1673, *and became after- r«cKfil
wards earl of Nottingham, was
person of the greatest abilities and >most uncorrupted integrity; a thorough master and zealous defender of the
laws and constitution of his country; and endued with
pervading genius,
that enabled him to discover and to pursue the true spirit or justice, notwith
standing the embarrassments raised by the narrow and technical notions which
then prevailed in the courts of law, and the imperfect ideas of redress whioh
The reason and necessities of mankind
had possessed the courts of equity.
arising from the great change in property by the extension of trade and the

6.

it

)

(1

it

1

e)

(6) Qoodrick, Gardiner, and Heath,
a) Wriothesly, St. John, and Hatton.
Biog. Brit. 4278.
(d) Bacon's Works, IV. 611,618,632.
(«} Whitelocke of pari. U. 880. Chan. Rep. Append. 11.
(/) "For that appertalneth to our princely office only to judge over all Judges, and to discern and
determine such differences as at any time may and shall arise between our several courts, touching their
jurisdictions, and the same to "settle and determine, as we in our princely wisdom shall find to stand most
with our honour/' &c.
Chanc. Rep. append. 26.)
(g) See the entry in the council book, 28 July, 1616. (BlogT. Brit. 1390
(A) In a cause of the bishop of Winchester, touching a commendam. King James, conceiving that the
matter affected his prerogative, sent letters to the judges not to proceed In
till himself had been first
consulted. The twelve Judges joined in a memorial to his majesty, declaring that their compliance would
be contrary to their oaths and the law; but upon being brought before the king and council, they all
retracted and promised obedience In every such case for the future, except Sir Edward Coke, who said,
" that when the case happened, he would do his duty." (Biogr. Brit.
1388.)
(i) See that article in chap.
(«•)See Lord Ellesmere's speech to Sir Henry Montague, the new chief justice, IS Nov. 1616. (Moore's
reports, 828.) Though Sir Edward might probably have retained his seat, if, during his supension, he
would have complimented Lord Viiliers (the new favorite), with the disposal of the most lucrative office
In his court. (Biogr. Brit. 1391.)
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abolition of military tenures, co-operated in establishing his plan, and enabled
him in the coarse of nine years to build a system of jurisprudence and juris
diction upon wide and rational foundations; which have also been extended
and improved by many great men, who have since presided in chancery.
And
from that time to this the power and business of the court have increased to
an amazing degree.
From this court of equity in chancery, as from the other superior courts, an
But there are these differences between
appeal lies to the house of peers.
appeals from a court of equity, and writs of error from a court of law: 1.
That the former may be brought upon any interlocutory matter, the latter
upon nothing but only a definitive judgment: 2. That on writs of error the
house of lords pronounces
the judgment, on appeals it gives direction to the
court below to rectify its own decree.
IX. The next court that shall mention is one that hath no original juris
diction, but is only a court of appeal, to correct the errors of other jurisdic
tions. This is the court of exchequer chamber; which was first erected by
statute 81 Edw. Ill, c. 12, to determine causes by writs of error from the
And to that end it consists of
common law side of the court of exchequer.
the lord chancellor and lord treasurer, taking unto them the justices of the
In imitation of which a second court of
king's bench and common pleas.
chamber was erected by statute 27 Eliz., ch. 8, consisting of the
exchequer
justices of the common pleas, and the barons of the exchequer, before whom
WT'ts °^ error may be brought to reverse judgments *in certain
r*5fl1J
L
suits (<*) originally begun in the court of king's bench.
Into the court
also of exchequer chamber (which then consists of all the judges of the three
superior courts, and now and then the lord chancellor also), are sometime*
adjourned from the other courts such causes as the judges upon argument find
to be of great weight and difficulty, before any judgment is given upon them
in the court below, (m)
From all the branches of this court of exchequer chamber, a writ of error
lies to
X. The house of peers, which is the supreme court of judicature in the
kingdom, having at present no original jurisdiction over causes, but only upon
appeals and writs of error, to rectify any injustice or mistake of the law, com
mitted by the courts below. To this authority this august tribunal succeeded
of course upon the dissolution of the aula regia. For, as the barons of parlia
ment were constituent members of that court ; and the rest of its jurisdiction
was dealt out to other tribunals, over which the great officers who accompanied
those barons were respectively delegated to preside; it followed, that the right
of receiving appeals, and superintending all other jurisdictions, still remained
in the residue of that noble assembly, from which every other great court was
derived. They are therefore in all causes the last resort, from whose judg
ment no farther appeal is permitted; but every subordinate tribunal must con
form to their determinations ; the law reposing an entire confidence in the
honour and conscience of the noble persons who compose this important as
sembly, that (if possible) they will make themselves masters of those questions
upon which they undertake to decide, and in all dubious cases refer themselves
to the opinions of the judges, who are summoned by writ to advise them; since
upon their decision all property must finally depend. (5)
(2) See chap. 25, p. 411.
(m) 4 Inst. lit. 2 Bulst. 146.

I

(6) In practice the
" law
lords," as they

house of lords, when sitting to hear appeals, is composed only of the
are called; that is, the peers who at the time hold judicial positions or
who have heretofore held such positions.
Every peer indeed has the right to be present
and participate, but it is a right which is not, and could not often with propriety be. as
serted, since few except the Taw lords have any such training as would fit them for the
duties to be performed. A quorum of peers must be present, but three is a quorum of the?
house of peers, and two besides the chancellor would be sufficient to constitute this court.
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Hitherto may also be referred the tribunal established by statute 14 Edw.
c. 5, consisting (though now out of use) of one prelate, two earls, and two
barons who are to be chosen at every new parliament, to hear complaints of
grievances and delays of justice in the king's courts, and (with the advice of
the chancellor, treasurer and justices of both benches) to give directions for
-.
remedying these inconveniences in the courts below. This committee r
J
seems to have been established, lest there should be a defect of justice >■
for want of a supreme court of appeal during any long intermission or recess
of parliament; for the statute farther directs, that if the difficulty be so great,
that it may not well be determined without assent of parliament, it shall be
brought by the said prelate, earls and barons, unto the next parliament, who
shall finally determine the same.
XL Before conclude this chapter, must also mention an eleventh species
of courts, of general jurisdiction and use, which are derived out of, and act as
mean the courts of assize and nisi
collateral auxiliaries to, the foregoing ;
prius.
These are composed of two or more commissioners, who are twice in every
year sent by the king's special commission all round the kingdom except Lon
don and Middlesex, where courts of nisi prius are holden in and after every
term, before the chief or other judge of the several superior courts; and except
the four northern counties, where the assizes are holden only once a year), (6)
to try by a jury of the respective counties the truth of such matters of fact
These judges of
as are then under dispnte in the courts of Westminster-hall.
assize came into use in the room of the ancient justices in eyre, justiciarii tn
itinere : who were regularly established, if not first appointed, by the parlia
ment of Northampton, A. D. 1176, 22 Hen. H, (n) with a delegated power
from the king's great court, or aula rcyia, being looked upon as members
thereof ; and they afterwards made their circuit round the kingdom onoe in
seven years for the purpose of trying causes. (0)
They were afterwards
directed by magna carta, c. 12, to be sent into every county once a year, to
take (or receive the verdict of the jurors or recognitors in certain actions,
then called) recognitions or assizes; the most difficult of which they are
directed to adjourn into the court of common pleas to be there determined.
The itinerant justices were sometimes mere justices of assize or of dower, or
of gaol-delivery, and the like; and *they had sometimes a more general r*-fti
■•
commission to determine all manner of causes, being constituted justiciarii ad omnia placita : (p) but the present justices of assize and nisi prius
are more immediately derived from the statute Westm. 2, 13 Edw. I, c. 30,
which directs them to be assigned out of the king's sworn justices, associating
to themselves one or two discreet knights of each county. By statute 27
Edw. I, c. 4, (explained by 12 Edw. H, c. 3,) assizes and inquests were allowed
to be taken before any one justice of the court in which the plea was brought;
associating to him one knight or other approved man of the county. And,
lastly, by statute 14 Edw. Ill, c. 16, inquests of nisi prius may be taken be
fore any justice of either bench (though the plea be not depending in his own
court), or before the chief baron of the exchequer, if he be a man of the law;
or otherwise before the justices of assize, so that one of such justices be a
judge of the king's bench or common pleas, or the king's Serjeant sworn.

Ill,

I

I

I

(n) Seld. Jan. I. 2, 1 B. Spelm. Cod. 829.
(o) Co. Litt, 293. Anno, 1281,jutticiarii itinerant?* venrrunt npxui Wigorniam in octavi* S. Jokanni*
baptintce;— et totut comitatus ecu admittere recusavit. quod septem anni nondum erant elapsi, postquam
jutticiarii ibidem ultimo sederunt. (Annal. Eccl. Wigorn. in Whart. Angl. taer. i, 495.)
(p) Bract. I. 8. tr.l. c

It

Formerly it was not necessary that the three be law lords, and if two chanced to be lay
members, and the decree under review was one made by the chancellor himself, his own
But now three lords of ap
vote would affirm it, as the lay members would take no part.
peal are required to be present in hearing every case. For the law as to this see note 1, p. 80.
(6) But now the assizes are held here twice a year.
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They usually make their circuits in the respective vacations after Hilary and
Trinity terms; assizes being allowed to be taken in the holy time of Lent by
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consent of the bishops at the king's request, as expressed in statute Westm. 1,
And it was also usual during the times of popery, for the
3 Edw. 1, c. 51.
prelates to grant annual licenses to the justices of assize to administer oaths
in holy times: for oaths being of a sacred nature, the logic of those (deluded)
The pru
ages concluded that they must be of ecclesiastical cognizanoe.
(q)
dent jealousy of our ancestors ordained (r) that no man of law should be
judge of assize in his own county, wherein he was born or doth inhabit; and
which has carried this prin
a similar prohibition is found in the civil law,
equivalent to the crime of sacrilege, for a man to be
ciple so far that
governor of the province in which he was born, or has any civil connexion,
The judges upon their circuits now sit by virtue of five several authorities.
2. A commission of oyer and terminer.
3.
The commission of thepeace.
A commission of general gaol-delivery. The consideration of all which belongs
ProPerly **° *ne subsequent book of these Commentaries. But the
r*fifll
*■
A commission of assize, directed to the justices
fourth commission
and Serjeants therein named, to take (together with their associates) assizes in
to take the verdict of
the several counties; that
pecular species of jury,
called an assize, and summoned for the trial of /an<&<2 disputes, of which here
after. The other authority is, 5. That of nisi prius, which
consequence
of the commission of assize, (u) being annexed to the office of those justices
13 Edw.
c. 30, and
by the statute of Westm.
empowers them to try all
[U38tions of fact issuing out of the courts at Westminster, that are then ripe
or trial by jury. These by the course of the courts (w) are usually appointed
to be tried at Westminster in some Easter or Michaelmas term, by
jury re
turned from the county wherein the cause of action arises; but with this pro
viso, nisi prius, unless before the day prefixed the judges of assize come into
This they are sure to do in the vacations preceding
the county in question.
each Easter and Michaelmas term, which saves much expense and trouble.
These commissions are constantly accompanied by writs of association, in
and II, before mentioned; whereby
pursuance of the statutes of Edward
certain persons (usually the clerk of assize and his subordinate officers) are
directed to associate themselves with the justices and Serjeants, and they are
required to admit the said persons into their society, in order to take the
sufficient supply of commissioners may never be wanting.
assizes, Ac; that
But, to prevent the delay of justice by the absence of any of them, there
also issued of course
writ of si non omnes; directing that
all cannot be
justice or
present, any two of them
Serjeant being one) may proceed to
execute the commission.
These are the several courts of common law and equity, which are of public
and general jurisdiction throughout the kingdom.
And, upon the whole, we
cannot but admire the wise economy and admirable provision of our ancestors,
in settling the distribution of justice in method so well calculated for cheap
ness, expedition, and ease.
By the constitution which they established, all
trivial debts, and injuries of small consequence, were to be recovered or re-

a

benefit of the whole kingdom.
Crimes and misdemeanors were to be exam
ined in
court by themselves; and matters of the revenue in another distinct
Now indeed, for the ease of the subject and greater dispatch of
jurisdiction.
causes, methods have been found to open all the three superior courts for the
redress of private wrongs; which have remedied many inconveniences, and
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<q)Instances hereof may be met with in the appendix to Spelman's original of the terms, and In Mr.
Parker's Antiquities, 209.
SS Hen. VIII, o. 34.
O,
Rlc. II, o.
(r) Stat. Edw. Ill, c.
S,
(J) */.
(t) C.
(u) balk. 404.
(it) See ch. 23,p. XX
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yet preserved the forms and boundaries handed down to as from high anti
If facts are disputed, they are sent down to be tried in the country
quity.
by the neighbors; but the law, arising upon those facts, is determined by the
judges above: and, if they are mistaken in point of law, there remain in both
If the
cases two successive courts of appeal, to rectify such their mistakes.
rigour of general rules does in any case bear hard upon individuals, courts of
equity are open to supply the defects, but not sap the fundamentals, of the
law. Lastly, there presides over all one great court of appeal, which is the
last resort in matters both of law and equity; and which will therefore take
care to preserve an uniformity and equilibrium among all the inferior juris
dictions: a court composed of prelates selected for their piety, and of nobles
advanced to that honour for their personal merit, or deriving both honour and
merit from an illustrious train of ancestors; who are formed by their education,
interested by their property, and bound upon their conscience and honour, to
This is a faithful sketch of the English
be skilled in the laws of the country.
juridical constitution, as designed by the masterly hands of our forefathers, of
which the great original lines are still strong and visible; and if any of its
minuter strokes are by the length of time at all obscured or decayed, they may
still be with ease restored to their pristine vigour; and that not so much by
fanciful alterations and wild experiments (so frequent in this fertile age), as
by closely adhering to the wisdom of the ancient plan, concerted by Alfred
and perfected by Edward I, and by attending to the spirit, without neglecting
the forms, of their excellent and venerable institutions. (7)
The courts of the United States consist of the following:
The senate as a courtof impeachment
The supreme court
The circuit courts.
4 The district courts.
5. The court of claims.
6. The supreme court of the District of Columbia.
7. The territorial courts.
The court of impeachment derives its authority from article 1, section 8 of the constitu
tion, and is sufficiently spoken of elsewhere.
The judicial power generally is conferred by
article 8, section 3.
other
The supreme court has original jurisdiction of all cases affecting ambassadors,
public ministers and consuls, and of those to which a state shall be a party. It also has
appellate jurisdiction from the circuit court in civil cases, where the matter in dispute
exceeds $2000, and from the highest state court of each state, in any case where has been
drawn in question the validity of a treaty, or of a statute of, or an authority exercised
under, the United States, and the decision of the state court has been against its validity;
also where has been drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised
under, any state, on the ground of its being repugnant to the constitution, laws or treaties
of the United States, and the decision of the state court has been in favor of such state
law or authority; also where the decision of the state court has been against a right claimed
under any clause of the constitution of the United States, or under any treaty or statute of
or commission held under the United States; it has also appellate jurisdiction from the ter
ritorial courts where the amount in dispute exceeds (1000, except from Washington terri
tory, where it must exceed $3000; and from the supreme court of the District of Columbia
and from the court of claims, where the amount in controversy exceeds $3000; and in any
other case where the judgment or decree may present a constitutional question or furnish a
precedent for a class of cases, the United States may appeal without regard to the amount
in controversy.
The United States circuit courts have original Jurisdiction, concurrently with the state
courts. of all civil suits, at common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds
$500, and the United Slates is a plaintiff, or an alien is a party, or where the suit is between
They have exclu
a citizen of the state in which it is brought and a citizen of another state.
sive jurisdiction of all crimes and offences cognizable under the authority of the United
States, except where specially otherwise provided; and concurrent jurisdiction with the
Under the patent laws they
district courts of the crimes and offences cognizable therein.
They have also appellate jurisdiction
have jurisdiction in equity to restrain infringements.
from the district courts where the matter in dispute exceeds $50.
The district courts have jurisdiction exclusively of the state courts, and concurrently with
the circuit courts, of all crimes and offences cognizable under the authority of the United
(7)
1.
2.
8.

35

Ecclesiastical Courts.

61

[Book

ILL

CHAPTER V.

OF COURTS ECCLESIASTICAL,
MARITIME.

MILITARY AND

Besides the several courts which were treated of in the preceding chapter
and in which all injuries are redressed, that fall under 'the cognizance of the
common law of England, or that spirit of equity which ought to bo its con
stant attendant, there still remain some other courts of a jurisdiction equally
pnblic and general; which take cognizance of other species of injuries, of an
ecclesiastical, military and maritime nature; and therefore are properly dis
tinguished by the title of ecclesiastical courts, courts military, and courts
maritime.
L Before descend to consider particular ecclesiastical courts, must first
of all in general premise, that, in the time of our Saxon ancestors, there was
no sort of distinction between the lay and the ecclesiastical jurisdiction: the
county court was as much a spiritual as a temporal tribunal; the rights of the
church were ascertained and asserted at the same time, and by the same
judges, as the rights of the laity. For this purpose the bishop of the diocese^
and the alderman, or, in his absence, the sheriff of the county, used to sit to
gether in the county court, and had there the cognizance of all causes, as well
ecclesiastical as civil: a superior deference being paid to the bishop's opinion
in spiritual matters, and to that of the lay judges in temporal, (a) This

I

I

(a) Celeberrimo huic conventui episcopua et aldermannua interzunto ; quorum alter jura divina, alter
humana populum edoceto. L. L. Eadgar. c. 5.
States, committed within their several districts or upon the high seas, where the punish
ment is not capital. They have also exclusive cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction, including seizures under the laws of impost, navigation or trade
of the United States; and of all seizures on land or water under the laws of the United
They have
States, and of all suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred under those laws.
also jurisdiction concurrently with the state courts and circuit courts, of all cases where an
alien sues for a tort, done in violation of the law of nations or of a treaty of the United
States; also of all suits at common law where the United States or any officer thereof, under
the authority of an act of congress, may sue; also exclusive of tiie state courts of all suits
These courts also have jurisdic
against consuls or vice-consuls except for capital offences.
tion in bankruptcy cases.
as
are
The territorial courts possess such powers
specially conferred upon them by the
acts providing for their creation.
The supreme court of the District of Columbia is a court of general jurisdiction in law
and equity: any one of its judges may hold a district court with the powers of the other
district courts; and may also hold a criminal court for the trial of all crimes and offences
arising within the district. From the special terms held by one judge appeals may be
taken to the general term held by all or a quorum of all.
The court of claims has authority to hear and determine all claims founded upon any
law of congress or regulation of the executive department, or upon auy contract, express or
implied, with the government of the United States, and all claims which may be referred
to it by congress; also all set-offs, counter claims, claims for damages liquidated or unliqui
on the part of the government,
dated, or other demands whatsoever
against any person
making claim against the government in said court.
The supreme court consists of one chief justice and eight associate justices, appointed by
the president, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, during good behavior.
There are nine judicial circuits, for each of which a circuit judge is appointed in like
The circuit courts are held by one justice of the supreme
manner and with the like tenure.
court and the circuit judge, or by the latter and the district judge, or may be held by any
Where two sit together and disagree in opinion, the point
one of the three sitting alone.
of disagreement is certified to the supreme court for its decision.
Each district
There is one district court for each state, and in some states, two or more.
has a district judge appointed in the same manner and for the same term as the justices of
the supreme court. The supreme court of the District of Columbia consists of four jus
The territorial judges hold their
tices, and the court of claims of five, with the like tenure.
offices only during the pleasure of the president
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union of power was very advantageous to them both; the presence of the
*bishop added weight and reverence to the sheriff's proceedings; and r*fln-i
J
the authority of the sheriff was equally useful to the bishop, by enforce- *ing obedience to his decrees in such refractory offenders, as would otherwise
have despised the thunder of mere ecclesiastical censures.
Bnt so moderate and rational a plan was wholly inconsistent with those
views of ambition that were then forming by the court of Rome. It soon
became an established maxim in the papal system of policy, that all ecclesiasti
cal persons, and all ecclesiastical causes, should be solely and entirely subject
to ecclesiastical jurisdiction only: which jurisdiction was supposed to be
lodged, in the first place and immediately, in the pope, by divine indefeasible
right and investiture from Christ himself; and derived from the pope to all
inferior tribunals. Hence the canon law lays it down as a rule, that "sacer"
dotes a regibu3 honorandi sunt, non judicandi :
(b) and places an empha
tic reliance on a fabulous tale which it tells of the emperor Cons tan tine; that,
when some petitions were brought to him, imploring the aid of his authority
against certain of his bishops, accused of oppression and injustice, he caused
(says the holy canon) the petitions to be burnt in their presence, dismissing
them with this valediction: "tie et inter vos causas vestras discutite, quia dignum. non est ut nos judicemus Deos." (e)
It was not, however, till after the Norman conquest that this doctrine was
received in England; when William I (whose title was warmly espoused by
the monasteries, which he liberally endowed, and by the foreign clergy whom
he brought over in shoals from France and Italy, and planted in the best pre
ferments of the English church), was at length prevailed upon to establish
this fatal encroachment, and separate the ecclesiastical court from the civil:
whether actuated by principles of bigotry, or by those of a more refined poli
cy, in order to discountenance the laws of King Edward, abounding with the
r„..,
spirit of Saxon liberty, is not altogether *certain. But the latter, if
*■
not the cause, was undoubtedly the consequence, of this separation:
for the Saxon laws were soon overborne by the Norman justiciaries, when the
county court fell into disregard by the bishop's withdrawing his presence, in
obedience to the charter of the conqueror;
which prohibited any spiritual
cause from being tried in the secular courts, and commanded the suitors to
appear before the bishop only, whose decisions were directed to conform to the
canon law.(e)
King Henry the First, at his accession, among other restorations of the laws
of King Edward the Confessor, revived this of the union of the civil and
ecclesiastical courts.(^)
Which was, according to Sir Edward Coke, (*g) after
the great heat of the conquest was past, only
restitution of the ancient law
of England. This, however, was ill-relished by the popish clergy, who, under
the guidance of that arrogant prelate, Archbishop Anselm, very early disap
measure that put them on
level with the profane laity, and sub
proved of
jected spiritual men and causes to the inspection of the secular magistrates:
and, therefore, in their synod at Westminster,
Hen.
they ordained that no
bishop should attend the discussion of temporal causes; (A) which soon dis
solved this newly affected union. And when, upon the death of King Henry
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(c) Ibid.
24.
Inst. 259. Wllk. LL. Angl. Sax. 292.
(d) Hale Hurt. C. L. 103. Sefden, in Eadm.
(<)Nullus episcopal vel archidiaconus de legibus episcopolibus amplius in hundred placita teneant
nec causam, quas ad regimen animarum pertinet, ad judicium secularium hominum adducant: ted
quicunque secundum episcopates leges, de quacunque causa vel culpa interpellatus fuerit, ad locum,
quern ad hoc episcopus elegerit et nominaverit. veniat; ibique de causa vel culpa sua respondeat; et non
secundum hundred. Bedsecundum canones et episcopates leges, rectum Deo et episcopo suo faciat.
ad comitatus et hundreda, stent fecerint tempore
(/) Volo et protcipio, ut omnes de comitatu eant
in Spelm. cod. vet legum. 805.) And what is here obscurely hinted at, is
regis Ed'cardi.
(Cart. Hen.
fully explained by his code of laws extant in the red book of the exchequer, though in general but of
doubtful authority. (Cap. 8.) Qeneralia comitatuum placita certis locis et vicious teneantur. Intersint
autem episcopi, comites. die.; et agantur primo debita veros christianitatis jura, secundo regis placita,
postremo causaesingulorum dignis satisfactionibusexpleantur.
(p) Inst. 70.
Spelm. Cod. 80L
(A) Nt episcopi sacularium placitorum offlcium suscipiant.
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^1Ta^t **^e usurper Stephen was brought in and supported by the
clergy, we find one article of the oath which they imposed upon him
was, that ecclesiastical persons and ecclesiastical causes should be subject only
And as
was about that time that the contest
to the bishop's jurisdiction,
and emulation began between the laws of England and those of Rome, (k) the
temporal courts adhering to the former, and the spiritual adopting the latter
as their rule of proceeding, this widened the breach between them, and made
coalition afterwards impracticable; which probably would else have been
effected at the general reformation of the church.
In briefly recounting the various species of ecclesiastical courts, or, as they
shall begin with the
are often styled, courts christian (curia christianitatis)
lowest, and so ascend gradually to the supreme court of appeal.
1. The archdeacon's
court
the most inferior oourt in the whole ecclesiasti
cal polity.
It
held, in the archdeacon's absence, before
judge appointed
sometimes in concur
by himself, and called his official; and its jurisdiction
rence with, sometimes in exclusion of, the bishop's court of the diocese. From
hence, however, by statute 24 Hen. VIII, c. 12, an appeal lies to that of the
bishop.
held in their several
2. The consistory court of every diocesan
bishop
cathedrals, for the trial of all ecclesiastical causes arising within their respect
ive dioceses.
The bishop's chancellor, or his commissary,
the judge; and
from his sentence an appeal lies, by virtue of the same statute, to the arch
bishop of each province respectively.
3. The court of arches
court of appeal belonging to the archbishop of
called *the dean of the arches, beCanterbury; whereof the judge
r*«5l
cause he anciently held his court in the church of Saint Mary
bow
(sancta Maria de arcubus), though all the principal spiritual courts are now
bolden at doctors' commons.
His proper jurisdiction
only over the thirteen
peculiar parishes belonging to the archbishop in London; but the office of dean
of the arches having been for long time united with that of the archbishop's
principal official, he now, in right of the last mentioned office (as doth also the
official principal of the archbishop of York), receives and determines appeals
from the sentences of all inferior ecclesiastical courts within the province.
to court of
And from him an appeal lies to the king in chancery (that
delegates appointed under the king's great seal) by statute 25 Hen. VIII, c.
19, as supreme head of the English church, in the place of the bishop of Rome,
who formerly exercised this jurisdiction; which circumstance alone will fur
nish the reason why the popish clergy were so anxious to separate the spiritual
court from the temporal.
4. The court of peculiars
branch of and annexed to the court of
arches.
It has
jurisdiction over all those parishes dispersed through the
province of Canterbury in the midst of other dioceses, which are exempt from
the ordinary's jurisdiction, and subject to the metropolitan only. All ecclesi
astical causes arising within these peculiar or exempt jurisdictions, are, origi
nally cognizable by this court; from which an appeal lay formerly to the
P°Pe> kut now kv tne *statute 25 Hen. VIII, c. 19, to the king in chan-
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5. The prerogative oourt
established for the trial of all testamentarj
causes, where the deceased hath left bona notabilia within two different dio
ceses.
In which case the probate of wills belongs, as we have formerly seen,
And
(m) to the archbishop of the province, by way of special prerogative.
all causes relating to the wills, administrations, or legacies of such persons
are, originally, cognizable herein, before a judge appointed by the arch
bishop, called the judge of the prerogative court; from whom an appeal
i

(Q

8pelm. Cod. 810.
further particulars, see Burn's
(I) Tor fui
Oughton'n ordo judiciorum.
(m) book II, ch. 3-2.
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lies by statute 25 Hen. VIII, e. 19, to the king in chancery, instead of the
pope, as formerly.
1 pass by such ecclesiastical courts as have only what is called a voluntary,
and not a contentious, jurisdiction; which are merely concerned in doing or
selling what no one opposes, and which keep an open office for that purpose
(as granting dispensations, licenses, faculties, and other remnants of the papal
extortions), but do not concern themselves with administering redress to any
injury; and shall proceed to,
6. The great court of appeal in all ecclesiastical causes, viz. : the court of
delegates, judices delegati, appointed by the king's commission under his great
seal, and issuing out of chancery, to represent his royal person, and hear all
appeals to him made by virtue of the before-mentioned statute of Henry VIII.
This commission is frequently filled with lords, spiritual and temporal, and
always with judges of the courts at Westminster, and doctors of the civil
law. Appeals to Rome were always looked upon by the English nation, even
in the times of popery, with an evil eye; as being contrary to the liberty of
the subject, the honour of the crown, and the independence of the whole
realm; and were first introduced in very turbulent times, in the sixteenth year
of King Stephen (A. D. 1151), at the same period (Sir Henry Spelman ob
served) that the civil and canon laws were first imported into England, (n)
But, in a few years after, to obviate this growing practice, the constitutions
made at Clarendon, 11 Hen. II, on account of the disturbances raised by Arch
bishop Becket, and other zealots of the holy see, expressly declare, (o) that
appeals in causes ecclesiastical ought to lie, from the archdeacon to the dio
cesan; from the diocesan to the archbishop of the province; and from the
archbishop to the king; and are not to proceed any farther without special
But the unhappy advantage that was given in the
license from the crown.
reigns of King John, and his son Henry the Third, to the encroaching
*power of the pope, who was ever vigilant to improve all opportunities r*a/*-i
of extending his jurisdiction hither, at length riveted the custom of ap- >• J
pealing to Rome in causes ecclesiastical so strongly that it never could be
thoroughly broken off, till the grand rupture happened in the reign of Hanry
the Eighth; when all the jurisdiction usurped by the pope in matters ecclesi
astical was restored to the crown, to which it originally belonged: so that the
statute 25 Hen. Vni, was but declaratory of the ancient law of the realm, (p)
But in case the king himself be party in any of these suits, the appeal does
not then lie to him in chancery, which would be absurd; but, by the statute 24
Henry VIII, c. 12, to all the bishops of the realm, assembled in the upper
house of convocation.
1. A commission of review is a commission sometimes
granted, in extraor
dinary cases, to revise the sentence of the court of delegates; when it is appre
This commission the king
hended they have been led into a material error.
may grant, although the statutes 24 and 25 Hen. VIII, before cited, declares
the sentence of the delegates definitive: because the pope as supreme head by
the canon law, used to grant such commission of review; and such authority as
the pope heretofore exerted is now annexed to the crown (q) by statutes 26
Hen VIII, c. 1, and 1 Eliz. c. 1. But it is not matter of right, which the sub
ject may demand, exdebito justitice : but merely a matter of favour, and which,
therefore, is often denied.
These are now the principal courts of ecclesiastical jurisdiction : none of
which are allowed to be courts of record; no more than was another much
more formidable jurisdiction, but now deservedly annihilated, viz.: the court
This court was erected
of the king's high commission in causes ecclesiastical.
and united to the regal power (r) by virtue of the statute 1 Eliz. o. 1, instead
of a larger jurisdiction which had before been exercised under the pope's
(n) Cod. vet. leg. SIS.
fa) Ibid.

(o) Chap. 8.
(r) 4 lost. 324.

(p) 4 Inst. 341.
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autQority- I* was intended *to vindicate the dignity and peace of the
r*«Bl
L
-I church, by reforming, ordering, and correcting the ecclesiastical state and
persoi.8, and all manner of errors, heresies, schisms, abuses, offences, contempts,
and enormities. Under the shelter of which very general words, means were
found in that and the two succeeding reigns, to vest in the high commissioners
extraordinary and almost despotic powers, of fining and imprisoning; which
they exerted much beyond the degree of the offence itself, and frequently over
offences by no means of spiritual cognizance.
For these reasons this court was
justly abolished by statute 16 Car. L, c. 11. And the weak and illegal attempt
that was made to revive
during the reign of King James the Second, served
only to hasten that infatuated prince's ruin.
II. Next, as to the courts military. The only court of this kind known to,
and established by, the permanent laws of the land,
the court of chivalry,
formerly held before the lord high constable and earl marshal of England
jointly, but since the attainder of Stafford, duke of Buckingham, under Hen.
Vm, and the consequent extinguishment of the office of lord high constable,
hath usually, with respect to civil matters, been held before the earl marshal
hath cognizance of contracts
only. («) This court, by statute 13 Ric. II, c.
and other matters touching deeds of arms and war, as well out of the realm as
within it. And from its sentences an appeal lies immediately to the king in
This court was in great reputation in the times of pure chivalry,
person,
and afterwards during our connexions with the continent, by the territories
which our princes held in France: but
now grown almost entirely out of use,
on account of the feebleness of its jurisdiction, and want of power to enforce
its judgments; as
court of record.(w)
can neither fine nor imprison, not being
HI. The maritime courts, or such as have power and jurisdiction to determine all maritime injuries, arising upon the *seas, or in parts out of reach
of the common law, are only the court of admiralty, and its courts of
The court of admiralty
held before the lord high admiral of Eng
appeal.
land, or his deputy, who
called the judge of the court. According to Sir
was first of all erected by King Edward
Henry Spelman, (w) and Lambard (x)
the Third. Its proceedings are according to the method of the civil law, like
those of the ecclesiastical courts; upon which account
usually held at the
same place with the superior ecolesiastical courts, at doctors' commons in Lon
It no court of record, any more than the spiritual courts. From the
don.
sentences of the admiralty judge an appeal always lay, in ordinary course, to
the king in chancery, as may be collected from the statute 25 Hen. VIII, c. 19,
which directs the appeal from the archbishop's courts to be determined by
" like as in case of appeal from the
persons named in the king's commission,
But this
also expressly declared by statute
Eliz. c
admiral-court."
which enacts, that upon appeal made to the chancery, the sentence definitive
of the delegates appointed by commission shall be final.
Appeals from the vice-admiralty courts in America, and our other planta
tions and settlements, may be brought before the courts of admiralty in Eng
land, as being
branch of the admiral's jurisdiction, though they may also be
brought before the king in council. But in case of prize vessels, taken in time
of war, in any part of the world, and condemned in any courts of admiralty or
vice-admiralty as lawful prize,' the appeal lies to certain commissioners of
appeals consisting chiefly of the privy council, and not to judges delegates.
And this by virtue of divers treaties with foreign nations; by which particular
courts are established in all the maritime countries of Europe for the decision
of this question, whether lawful prize or not: for this being question between
subjects of different states,
belongs entirely to the law of nations, and not
to the municipal laws of either country to determine it. The original court to
wnicn this question
the court of adm ralty;
'"permitted in England
r*70l
and the court of appeal is in effect the king's privy council, the members
is
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which are, in consequence of treaties, commissioned under the great seal for
In 1748, for the more speedy determination of appeals, the
this purpose.
judges of the courts of Westminster-hall, though not privy counsellors, were
added to the commission then in being. But doubts being conceived concern
ing the validity of that commission, on account of such addition, the same was
confirmed by statute 22 Geo. II, c. 3, with a proviso, that no sentence given
under it should be valid, unless a majority of the commissioners present were
But this did not,
apprehend, extend to any
actually privy counsellors.
future commissions: and such an addition became indeed totally unnecessary
in the course of the war which commenced in 1750; since during the whole of
that war, the commission of appeals was regularly attended and all its decisions
conducted by a judge (1) whose masterly acquaintance with the law of nations
was known and revered by every state in Europe, (y)

•of

I

CHAPTER VI.

OF COURTS OF A SPECIAL JURISDICTION.
In

the two preceding chapters we have considered the several courts, whose
are so contrived that some or
other of them may administer redress to every possible injury that can arise
in the kingdom at large.
There yet remain certain others, whose jurisdiction
is private and special, confined to particular spots, or instituted only to redress
particular injuries. These are:
1. The forest courts, instituted for the government of the king's forests, in
different parts of the kingdom, and for the punishment of all injuries done to
the king's deer or venison, to the vert or greensward, and to the covert in
which such deer are lodged. These are the courts of attachments, of regard,
of svoeinmote and of justice-seat.
The court of attachments, wood-mote, or
forty days court, is to be held before the verderors of the forest onoe in every
forty days; (a) and is instituted to inquire into all offenders against vert ana
venison; (6) who may be attached by their bodies, if taken with the mainour
(or mainoeuvre, a manu), that is, in the very act of killing venison, or stealing
wood, or preparing so to do, or by fresh and immediate pursuit after the act
And in this forty
is done; (c) else they must be attached by their goods.
days court the foresters or keepers are to bring in their attachments,
*or presentments de viridi et venatione ; and the verderors are to re- r*72i
*
ceive the same, and to enroll them, and to certify them under their *■
seals to the court of justice-seat, or sweinmote: (<J) for this court can only in
2. The court of regard or survey of
quire of, but not convict offenders.
dogs, is to be holden every third year, for the la wing or ezpeditation of mastiffs,

jurisdiction is publio and general; and which

(y) See the sentiments of the president Montesquieu, and M. Vattel (a subject of the king of Prussia.)
on the answer transmitted by the English court to his Prussian majesty's Exposition des motifs, <tc./A.
D. 1753. (Montesquieu's letters, 6 Mar. 1753. Vattel'a droit de gens, I. 2, c. 7, %84.)
(ft) 4 Inst. 889.
(e) Carth. 79.
(a) Carl, de forest. 9 Ben. 10,0.8.
(d) Cart, de forest, c. 16.
(1) Lord Mansfield is the judge here referred to.
The national equity and admiralty courts of the United States are mentioned in the note
to page 60. The several states have no admiralty courts, and some of them have no separate
courts of equity, but equitable remedies are administered in the courts of law. Cognizance
of probate cases is in the state governments exclusively, and courts of probate jurisdiction
exist in all the states under different names and with more or less extensive powers.
In
some states they have complete jurisdiction of all questions of administration and distribu
tion, to the exclusion of the courts of chancery; and in some, also, the equity jurisdiction
in the case of infants is transferred, with more or less modification, to these courts.
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It was intended *to vindicate the dignity and peace of the
church, by reforming, ordering, and correcting the ecclesiastical state and
persors, and all manner of errors, heresies, schisms, abuses, offences, contempts,
and enormities. Under the shelter of which very general words, means were
found in that and the two succeeding reigns, to vest in the high commissioners
extraordinary and almost despotic powers, of fining and imprisoning; which
they exerted much beyond the degree of the offence itself, and frequently over
offencas by no means of spiritual cognizance.
For these reasons this court wag
justly abolished by statute 16 Car. % o. 11. And the weak and illegal attempt
that was made to revive
during the reign of King James the Second, served
only to hasten that infatuated prince's ruin.
II. Next, as to the courts military. The only court of this kind known to,
and established by, the permanent laws of the land,
the court of chivalry,
formerly held before the lord high constable and earl marshal of England
jointly, but since the attainder of Stafford, duke of Buckingham, under Hen.
Vm, and the consequent extinguishment of the office of lord high constable,
hath usually, with respect to civil matters, been held before the earl marshal
hath cognizance of contracts
only. (*) This court, by statute 13 Ric. II, c.
and other matters touching deeds of arms and war, as well out of the realm as
within it. And from its sentences an appeal lies immediately to the king in
This court was in great reputation in the times of pure chivalry,
person,
and afterwards during our connexions with the continent, by the territories
which our princes held in France: but
now grown almost entirely out of use,
on account of the feebleness of its jurisdiction, and want of power to enforce
itsJudgments; as
can neither fine nor imprison, not being court of record, (u)
III. The maritime courts, or such as have power and jurisdiction to determine all maritime injuries, arising upon the *seas, or in parts out of reaoh
r*6Q-i
of the common law, are only the court of admiralty, and its courts of
The court of admiralty
held before the lord high admiral of Eng
appeal.
land, or his deputy, who
called the judge of the court. According to Sir
was first of all erected by King Edward
Henry Spelman, (to) and Lambard (a;)
the Third. Its proceedings are according to the method of .the civil law, like
those of the ecclesiastical courts; upon which account
usually held at the
tame place with the superior ecclesiastical courts, at doctors' commons in Lon
don.
It no court of record, any more than the spiritual courts. From the
sentences of the admiralty judge an appeal always lay, in ordinary course, to
the king in chancery, as may be collected from the statute 25 Hen. VIH, c. 19,
which directs the appeal from the archbishop's courts to be determined by
" like as in case of appeal from the
persons named in the king's commission,
But this
also expressly declared by statute
Eliz. c.
admiral-court."
which enacts, that upon appeal made to the chancery, the sentence definitive
of the delegates appointed by commission shall be final.
Appeals from the vice-admiralty courts in America, and our other planta
tions and settlements, may be brought before the courts of admiralty in Eng
land, as being
branch of the admiral's jurisdiction, though they may also be
brought before the king in council. But in oase of prize vessels, taken in time
of war, in any part of the world, and condemned in any courts of admiralty or
vice-admiralty as lawful prize, the appeal lies to certain commissioners of
appeals consisting chiefly of the privy council, and not to judges delegates.
And this by virtue of divers treaties with foreign nations; by which particular
courts are established in all the maritime countries of Europe for the decision
of this question, whether lawful prize or not: for this being question between
subjects of different states,
belongs entirely to the law of nations, and not
to the municipal laws of either country to determine it. The original court to
wu*cn this question
the court of adm ralty;
^permitted in England
l"*701
and the court of appeal is in effect the king's privy council, the members
is
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are, in consequence of treaties, commissioned under the great seal for
this purpose.
In 1748, for the more speedy determination of appeals, the
judges of the courts of Westminster-hall, though not privy counsellors, were
But doubts being conceived concern
added to the commission then in being.
ing the validity of that commission, on account of such addition, the same was
confirmed by statute 22 Geo. II, o. 3, with a proviso, that no sentence given
under it should be valid, unless a majority of the commissioners present were
extend to any
But this did not,
apprehend,
■actually privy counsellors.
future commissions: and such an addition became indeed totally unnecessary
in the course of the war which commenced in 1756; since during the whole of
that war, the commission of appeals was regularly attended and all its decisions
-conducted by a judge (1) whose masterly acquaintance with the law of nations
was known and revered by every state in Europe, (y)

of which

I

CHAPTER VI.

OF COURTS OF A SPECIAL JURISDICTION.
In

the two preceding chapters we have considered the several courts, whose
are so contrived that some or
other of them may administer redress to every possible injury that can arise
in the kingdom at large.
There yet remain certain others, whose jurisdiction
is private and special, oonfined to particular spots, or instituted only to redress
These are:
particular injuries.
1. The forest oourts, instituted for the government of the king's forests, in
different parts of the kingdom, and for the punishment of all injuries done to
the king's deer or venison, to the vert or greensward, and to the covert in
which such deer are lodged. These are the courts of attachments, of regard,
of stoeinmote and of justice-seat.
The court of attachments, wood-mote, or
forty days court, is to be held before the verderors of the forest once in every
forty days; (a) and is instituted to inquire into all offenders against vert and
venison; (b) who may be attached by their bodies, if taken with the mainour
in the very act of killing venison, or stealing
(or mainoeuvre, a manu), that
wood, or preparing so to do, or by fresh and immediate pursuit after the act
is done; (c) else they must be attached by their goods.
And in this forty
days court the foresters or keepers are to bring in their attachments,
*or presentments de viridi et venatione; and the verderors are to receive the same, and to enroll them, and to certify them under their
seals to the court of justice-seat, or sweinmote: (d) for this court can only inuire of, but not convict offenders.
2. The court of reqard or survey of
to be holden every third year, for the lawing or expeditation of mastiffs,
ogs,
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jurisdiction is publio and general; and which
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(y) See the sentiments of the president Montesquieu, and M. Vattel (a subject of the king of Prussia,)
on the answer transmitted by the English court to his Prussian majesty's Exposition den motifs, t£c.t A*
£.1753. (Montesquieu's letters, Mar. 1768. Vattel
droit de gens,
c.
§84.)
Hen. 10,0.8.
(b) lmu
(o) Cart, de forest.
(c) Carth. 78.
Cart,
forest,
de
c 16.
(d)

is

is

is

the judge here referred to.
(1) Lord Mansfield
The national equity and admiralty courts of the United States are mentioned in the note
to page 60. The several states have no admiralty courts, and some of them have no separate
courts of equity, but equitable remedies are administered in the courts of law.
Cognizance
of probate cases
in the state governments exclusively, and courts of probate jurisdiction
exist in all the states under different names and with more or less extensive powers.
In
some states they have complete jurisdiction of all questions of administration and distribu
tion, to the exclusion of the courts of chancery; and in some, also, the equity jurisdiction
in the case of infants
transferred, with more or less modification, to these courts.
6
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which is done by cutting off the claws and ball (or pelote) of the fore-feet, to
prevent them from running after deer, (e) No other dogs but mastiffs are to
be thus lawed or expeditated, for none other were permitted to be kept within
the precincts of the forest; it being supposed that the keeping of these, and
these only, was necessary for the defense of a man's house.
3. The court
of sweinmote is to be holden before the verderors, as judges, by the steward of
the sweinmote, thrice in every year, (g) the sweins or freeholders within the
forest composing the jury. The principal jurisdiction of this court
first, to
inquire into the oppression and grievances committed by the officers of the
forest; " de super-oneratione forestariorum, et aliorum ministrorum forestce;
et de eorum oppressionibus populo regis illatis
and, secondly, to receive and
try presentments certified from the court of attachments against offences in
vert and venison. (A) And this court may not only inquire but convict also,
^which conviction shall be certified to the court of justice-seat under the seals
of the jury; for this court cannot proceed to judgment, (t) But the principal
court
4. The court of justice-seat,
held before the chief justice in
which
eyre, or chief itinerant judge, capitalis justitiarius in itinere, or his deputy; to
hear and determine all trespasses within the forest, and all claims of fran
chises, liberties and privileges, and all pleas and causes whatsoever therein
arising, (k) It may also proceed to try presentments in the inferior courts of
the forest, and to give judgment upon conviction of the sweinmote.
And the
chief justice may therefore, after presentment made, or indictment found, but
issue his warrant to the officers of the forest to apprer*»a-\ *not before,
hend the offenders.
It may be held every third year; and forty days'
notice ought to be given of its sitting.
This court may fine and imprison for
offences within the forest, (m)
court of record: and therefore
being
writ of error lies from hence to the court of king's bench, to rectify and re
dress any mal-administrations of justice; (n) or the chief justice in eyre may
adjourn any matter of law into the court of king's bench, (o) These justices
in eyre were instituted by King Henry II, A. D. 1184; {p) and their courts
were formerly very regularly held; but the last court of justice-seat of any
note was that holden in the reign of Charles
before the earl of Holland; the
After the
rigorous proceedings at which are reported by Sir William Jones.
restoration another was held, pro forma only, before the earl of Oxford; (q)
but since the rera of the revolution in 1688, the forest laws have fallen into
total disuse, to the great advantage of the subject.
II. A second species of restricted courts that of commissioners of sewers.
commission under
(l) This a temporary tribunal, erected by virtue of
the great seal; which formerly used to be granted pro re nata at the pleasure
of the crown, (r) but now at the discretion and nomination of the lord chancel
lor, lord treasurer, and chief justices, pursuant to the statute 23 Hen. VIII, c.
6. Their jurisdiction
to overlook the repairs of sea banks and sea walls;
and the cleansing of rivers, public streams, ditches, and other conduits, where
confined to such county or particular dis
by any waters are carried off; and
trict as the commission shall expressly name. The commissioners are court of
record, and may fine and imprison for contempt; («)and in the execution of their
duty may proceed by jury, or upon their own view, and may take order for the
r** .-i removal of any annoyances, or the *safeguard and conservation of the
sewers within their commission, either according to the laws and customs
of Romney-marsh,
or otherwise at their own discretion. They may also assess
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(I)

I,

Ingt. 808.
(O) Cart, do foreet. c.
(e) Cart, deforest, a.
c.
Inst 288.
</i) Stat. 34 Edw.
(k) Inst. 291.
Stat. Edw. HI, c.
Rie. II, c.
(n) Ibid. 297.
(m) Inst. 313.
{o) Ibid. 295.
<f>)Hoveden.
(o) North's Life of Lord Guilford, 46.
<«)Sid. 148.
(r) F. N. B. 113.
m Romney-marsb.in the county of Kent, a tract containing 24,000aores,
governed by certain ancient
and equitable laws of sewers, composed by Henry de Bathe, a venerable judge in the reign of King
Hi-ury the Third; from which laws all commissioners of sewers in England may receive light and direc
tion.
Inst. 276.)
(1) The law regarding these commissioners
42

has since been materially altered.

Chap. 6.]

Court of Policies of Assurance.

74

such rates, or scots, upon the owners of lands within their district, as they
shall judge necessary; and, if any person refuses to pay them, the commission
ers may levy the same by distress of his goods and chattels; or they may, by
statute 23 Hen. VIII, c. 5, sell his freehold lands (and by the 1 Ann. c. 10, his
But their conduct
copyhold also), in order to pay such scots or assessments.
is under the control of the court of king's bench, which will prevent or pun
ish any illegal or tyrannical proceedings. («) And yet, in the reign of King
James
(8 November, 1616), the privy council took upon them to order, that
no action or complaint should be prosecuted against the commissioners, unless
before that board; and committed several to prison who had brought such ac
tions at common law, till they should release the same: and one of the reasons
for discharging Sir Edward Coke from his office of lord chief justice was for
The pretence for which arbitrary
countenancing those legal proceedings, (v)
measures was no other than the tyrant's plea, (w) of the necessity of unlimited
powers in works of evident utility to the public, "the supreme reason above
all reasons, which is the salvation of the king's lands and people." But now
it is clearly held, that this (as well as all other inferior jurisdictions) is subject
to the discretionary coercion of his majesty's court of king's bench, (x)
III. The court of policies of assurance, when subsisting, is erected in pur
suance of the statute 43 Eliz. c. 12, which recites the immemorial usage of
policies of assurance, "by means whereof it cometh to pass, upon the loss or
perishing *of any ship, there followeth not the undoing of any man, but r**.-!
the loss lighteth rather easily upon many than heavy upon few, and ra- *■ •*
ther upon them that adventure not, than upon those that do adventirre; where
by all merchants, especially those of the younger sort, are allured to venture
more willingly and more freely: and that heretofore such assurers had used to
stand so justly and precisely upon their credits, as few or no controversies had
arisen thereupon; and if any had grown, the same had from time to time been
ended and ordered by certain grave and discreet merchants appointed by the lord
mayor of the city of London; as men, by reason of their experience, fittest to un
derstand and speedily decide those causes;" but that of late years divers persons
had withdrawn themselves from that course of arbitration, and had driven the
assured to bring separate actions at law against each assurer : it therefore
enables the lord chancellor yearly to grant a standing commission to the judge
of the admiralty, the recorder of London, two doctors of the civil law, two
common lawyers, and eight merchants; any three of which, one being a civilian
or a barrister, are thereby, and by the statute 13 and 14 Car. II, c. 23, em
powered to determine in a summary way all causes concerning policies of
assurance in London, with an appeal (by way of bill) to the court of chancery.
But the jurisdiction being somewhat defective, as extending only to London,
and to no other assurances but those on merchandize, (y) and to suits brought
by the assured only, and not by the insurers, (z) no such commission has of
late years issued : but insurance causes are now usually determined by the
verdict of a jury of merchants, and the opinion of the judges in case of any
legal doubts ; whereby the decision is more speedy, satisfactory, and final,
though it is to be wished that some of the parliamentary powers invested in
these commissioners,
especially for the examination of witnesses, either beyond
the seas or speedily going out of the kingdom, (a) could at present be adopted
by the courts of Westminster-hall, without requiring the consent of parties. (2)
,
*IV. The court of marshalsea, and the palace-court at Westminster, p
*
confounded
The
are
courts,
distinct
two
together.
frequently
though
former was originally holden before the steward and marshal of the king's-

I

(to) Milt parad. lost, iv. 89S.
(t>)Moor, 885,823. See page 55.
(u) Gro. Jac. 836.
(X) 1 Vent. 66. Salic. 146.
II, c. 23, Si 3 and 4.
14Car.
1
13and
Stat
396.
(a)
U) Show.
(]/) StyL 166.
(2) The courts at Westminster have now the power of ordering the examination of
who are abroad.
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(«)

house, and was instituted to administer justice between the king's domestio
•servants, that they might not be drawn into other courts, and thereby the king
It was formerly held in, though not a part of, the aula
lose their service, (b)
regis; (c) and, when that was subdivided, remained a distinct jurisdiction:
holding plea of all trepasses committed within the verge of the oourt, where
■only one of the parties is in the king's domestic service (in which case the in
quest shall be taken by a jury of the country^, and of all debts, contracts, and
covenants, where both of the contracting parties belong to the royal household;
-and then the inquest shall be composed of men of the household only, (d ) By
the statute of IS Rio. H, St. 1, c. 3, (in affirmance of the common law),
the
verge of the court in this respect extends for twelve miles round the king's
And, as this tribunal was never subject to the juris
place of residence.
diction of the chief justiciary, no writ of error lay from
court of
(though
record) to the king's bench, out only to parliament, (g) till the statutes of
Edw.
c.
and 18 Edw. HI, st.
c.
which allowed such writ of error
But this court being ambulatory, and obliged
before the king in his place.
to follow the king in all his progresses so that, by the removal of the house
hold, actions were frequently discontinued, (h) and doubts having arisen as to
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the extent of its jurisdiction, (i) King Charles
in the sixth year of his reign,
new court of record, called the curia palatii or
by his letters patent, erected
palace-court, to be held before the steward of the household and knight-mar-I shal, and the steward of the court, *or his deputy; with jurisdiction
to hold plea of all manner of personal actions whatsoever, which shall
arise between any parties within twelve miles of his majesty's palace at White
hall, (k) The court
now held once a week, together with the ancient court
•of marshalsea, in the borough of Southwark
and
writ of error lies from
But
the cause
of any considerable
thence to the court of king's bench.
usually removed on its first commencement,
together with
•consequence,
the custody of the defendant, either into the king's bench or common pleas,
writ of habeas corpus cum causa
and the inferior business of the court
by
hath of late years been much reduced, by the new courts of conscience erected
in the environs of London; in consideration of which the four counsel belong
ing to these courts had salaries granted them for their lives by the statute 23

II,

c. 21.

V. A fifth

species of private courts of a limited, though extensive jurisdic
are those of the principality of Wales; which, upon its thorough reduc
tion, and the settling of its polity in the reign of Henry the Eighth, (I) were
erected all over the country; principally by the statute 34 and 35 Hen. VIH,
■c. 26, though much had before been done, and the way prepared by the statute
of Wales, 12 Edw.
and other statutes.
By the statute of Henry the Eighth
before-mentioned, courts-baron, hundred, and county courts are there estab
lished as in England.
A session also to be held twice in every year in each
•county, by judges (m) appointed by the king, to be called the great sessions of
the several counties in Wales: in Which all pleas of real and personal aotions
shall be held, with the same form of process and in as ample manner as in the
•court of common pleas at Westminister: (n) and writs of error shall lie from
judgments therein
being a court of record) to the court of king's bench at
Westminster.
But the ordinary original writs of process of the king's courts
at Westminster do not run into the principality of Wales: (o) though
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{
4.

(1)
11

I,

1

I.
3. 2,

e.
(ft) Bulstr. £11.
(e) Flet
c.
10Edw. III. st.
Stat. Edw. m, o.
e.
id) Artie, tup. cart. 28 Edw.
(«) Inst. 548.
(/) By the ancient Saxon constitution, the pax regia, or privilege o( the king's palace, extended from
tils palace pate to the distance of three miles, three furlongs, three acres, nine feet, nine palms, and nint
barley-corns; as appears from a fragment of the text as Rojfensit, cited In Dr. Hicke's ditsertat. epistot. 114.
(i) Bulslr. 203.
(0) Bulstr. 211. 10Kep. 69. (ft) F. N. B. 241. Inst. 548.
Sid. 180. Salk. 439.
S<*e
Book
Stat.
18Eliz.
c.
introduc.
(!)
(m)
Eliz. a 20.
Qeo. L
(») See, for farther regulations of the practice of these courts, stat. Eliz. c. 25.
«. 25,t6.
Geo. II. c. 14. 13Geo. m, c. 51.
(o) Boa Bap. 141.
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(p) as do also all prerogative writs, as writs r*>7Q-»
■*
of certiorari, quo minus, mandamus, and the like, (q)
And even in
canses between subject and subject, to prevent injustice through family fac
tions or prejudices, it is held lawful
causes of freehold at least, and
isusual in all others) to bring an action m the English courts, and try the same
in the next English county adjoining to that part of Wales where the cause
laid. But, on the other hand to prevent
arises, (r) and wherein the venue
enacted by statute 13 Geo. HI, c. 51, that in
trifling and frivolous suits,
personal actions, tried in any English county, where the cause of action arose,,
and the defendant resides in Wales,
the plaintiff shall not recover
verdict
for ten pounds, he shall be nonsuited and pay the defendant's costs, unless be
certified by the judge that the freehold or title came principally in question,
or that the cause was proper to be tried in such English county. And
any
resident in.
transitory action, the cause whereof arose and the defendant
Wales, shall be brought in any English county, and the plaintiff shall not re
cover a verdict for ten pounds, the plaintiff shall be nonsuited, and shall pay
the defendant's costs, deducting thereout the sum recovered by the verdict. (3)
another special juris
VL The court of the duchy chamber of Lancaster
diction, held before the chancellor of the duchy or his deputy, concerning all
matter of equity relating to lands holden of the king in the right of the duchy
of Lancaster;
which
thing very distinct from the county palatine
(which hath also its separate chancery, for sealing of writs, and the like), (£).
and comprises much territory which lies at
vast distance from it; as par
The
ticularly
very large district surrounded by the city of Westminster.
proceedings in this court are the same as on the equity side in the courts of ex
seems not to be
court of record; and in
chequer and chancery; (u) so that
deed
has been holden that those courts have
concurrent jurisdiction with
the duchy court, and may take cognizance of the same causes, (u)
*VII. Another species of private courts, which are of limited local r*7ft>
<■
jurisdiction, and have at the same time an exclusive cognizance of pleas,
in matters both of law and equity, (w>) are those which appertain to the coun
ties palatine of Chester, Lancaster, and Durham, and the royal franchise of
Ely. (a;) (4) In all these, as in the principality of Wales, the king's ordinary
writs, issuing under the great seal out of chancery, do not run; that
they
For as originally all Jura regalia were granted to the lords,
are of no force.
of these counties palatine, they had of course the sole administration of jus
It
tice, by their own judges, appointed by themselves and not by the crown.
would therefore be incongruous for the king to send his writ to direct thejudge of another's court in what manner to administer justice between the
suitors. But when the privileges of these counties palatine and franchise*
were abridged by statute 27 Henry VIII, c. 24,
was also enacted that all
writs and process should be made in the king's name, but should be teste'd orwitnessed in the name of the owner of the franchise. Wherefore all writs,
■whereon actions are founded, and which have current authority here, must beunder the seal of the respective franchises; the two former of which are now
united to the crown, and the two latter under the government of their several
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Bulstr. 158. Saund. 193. Raym. 806.
(j>)
(o) Cro. Jao. 484.
Lev. 24.
(t) Hob. 77.
(t) Ventr. 267.
(r) Vauzh. 413. Hard. 66.
(e) Chan. Rep. 55. Toth. 14S. Hardr. 171.
In trod.
4.
(is) lost 213,218. Finch. R. 452.
(as)See Book

8

2,

§

5

§

1

Wm. IV, c.
(3) These distinctions are now abolished, and by statutes 11 Geo. IV, and
Vic, c. 11, the administration of justice in Wales is in,
Vic., c. 33,
70,
14,
and
every respect rendered uniform with that of England, and the writs of the superior courts

of common law run into that principality.

7

7

7

1

6

7

(6

and
(4) The counties palatine of Lancaster and Durham are now united to the crown
Wm. IV. a 19); while that of Chester has been by statutes 11 Geo. IV, and
Wm. IV.
c 70, abolished, and that of Ely by statutes and Wm. IV, c. 87, and Wm. IV., sit
Vic, c. 63, also extinguished.
45

CoUBTS

79

Sl'KCIAL JlUIsUICTIOX.

OF

[Book

III.

(e)

a

a

I

a

if

J

*■

(t^

L

is

a

I,

a

I,

is

a

*-

(z)

(y)

And the judges of assize, who sit therein, sit by virtue of a special
bishops.
commission from the owners of the several franchises, and under the seal
thereof; and not by the usual commission under the great seal of England.
Hither also may be referred the courts of the cinque ports, or'five most im
portant havens, as they formerly were esteemed in the kingdom, viz.: Dover,
Sandwich, Romney, Hastings, and Hythe; to which Winchelsea and Rye have
been since added; which have also similar franchises in many respects
with
the counties palatine, and particularly an exclusive jurisdiction (before the
mayor and jurats of the ports), in which exclusive jurisdiction the king's
ordinary writ does not run. A writ of error lies from the mayor and jurats of
each port to the lord warden of the cinque ports, in his oourt of Shepway/ and
^rom tne court of Shepway to the king's *bench.
So likewise a writ
r*80l
of error lies from all the other jurisdictions to the same supreme court
of judicature, (a) as an ensign of superiority reserved to the crown at the origional creation of the franchises. And all prerogative writs (as those of
habeas corpus, prohibition, certiorari and mandamus) may issue for the same
reason to all these exempt jurisdictions; (b) because the privilege, that the
king's writ runs not, must be intended between party and party, for there can
be no such privilege against the king, (c)
VIH The stannary courts in Devonshire and Cornwall, for the administra
tion of justice among the tinners therein, are also courts of record, but of the
same private and exclusive nature.
They are held before the lord warden and
his substitutes, in virtue of privilege granted to the workers in the tin mines
there, to sue and be sued only in their own courts, that they may not be drawn
from their business, which
highly profitable to the public, by attending their
law-suits in other courts, (d) The privileges of the tinners are confirmed by
a charter, 33 Edw.
and fully expounded by
50 Edw.
private statute,
in, which has since been explained by public act, 16 Car.
o. 15.
What
relates to our present purpose
only this: that all tinners and labourers in and
about the stannaries shall, during the time of their working therein bona fide,
be privileged from suits in other courts, and be only impleaded in the stannary
No writ of
court in all matters, excepting pleas of land, life, and member.
error lies from hence to any court in Westminster-hall; as was agreed by all
But an appeal lies from the steward of the court
the judges (f) in 4. Jac.
to the under-warden; and from him to the lord-warden; and thence to the
council of the prince of Wales, as duke of Cornwall, (g) when he hath
Envy
And from thence the appeal lies to
ad livery or investiture of the same, (h)
the king himself, in the last resort,
,
*IX. The several courts within the city of London, (J) and other
r„
cities, boroughs, and corporations throughout the kingdom, held by
prescription, charter, or act of parliament, are also of the same private and
limited species. It would exceed the design and compass of our present inquiries,
were to enter into
particular detail of these, and to examine the nature
It may in general be sufficient to say,
and extent of their several jurisdictions.
that they arose originally from the favour of the crown to those particular dis
tricts, wnerein we find them erected, upon the same principle that hundredcourts, and the like, were established; for the convenience of the inhabitants,
that they may prosecute their suits and receive justice at home: that, for the
most part, the courts at Westminster-hall have concurrent jurisdiction with
these, or else
superintendency over them, (k) and are bound by the statute 19

s

U)

8

(fl

4

4

4.

t.

4

I.

t.

11

bank le roy.
Sid. 856.
(y) Sl<
Sid. 168.
(*) Jenk. 71. Dyversyte da eourta.
error, 74, 101. Davis. 62.
Inst. 38,214,218.
•o. Abr.
(6) Sid. 92.
(e) Cro. Jac. MS.
(O) Bro.
Inst.
232.
See
this
at
length
in
282.
Inst.
231.
Inst
In
(e)
(/)
Id)
Doddridge, Hist, of Cornw. D4.
Ibid. 230.
(a) Bulstr. 183.
The chief of those In London are the sheriff's courts, holden before their steward or Judge: from
3h a writ of error lies to the court of hustings, before the mayor, recorder and sheriffs; and from
commission, who used to sit in the church of St. Martin le
thence to Justices appointed by the king
grand. (P. N. B. 32.) And from the judgment of those justices a writ of error lies immediately to the
house of lords.
(Ac)9alk. Hi, 283.
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Geo. Ill, c. 70, to give assistance to such of them as are courts of record, by
issuing writs of execution, where the person or effects of the defendant are not
within the inferior jurisdiction: and that the proceedings in these special courts
ought to be according to the course of the common law, unless otherwise
ordered by parliament; for though the king may erect new courts, yet he oannot alter the established course of law.
But there one species of courts, constituted by act of parliament, in the city
of London, and other trading and populous districts, which in their proceed
more
ings so vary from the course of the common law, that they may deserve
mean the courts of requests, or courts of conscience,
particular consideration.
for the recovery of small debts.
The first of these was established in London,
so early as the reign of Henry the Eighth, by an act of their common council;
which however was certainly insufficient for that purpose and illegal, till con
firmed by statute Jao.
c. 15, which has since been explained and amended
this: two aldermen, and four
by statute 14 Geo. II, o. 10. The constitution
commoners, sit twice a week to hear all causes of debt not exceeding the
""value of forty shillings; which they examine in
summary way, by r*82i
the oath of the parties or other witnesses, and make such order therein
as
consonant to equity and good conscience.
The time and expense of
obtaining this summary redress are very inconsiderable, which make
great
benefit to trade; and thereupon divers trading towns and other districts nave
obtained acts of parliament, for establishing in them courts of conscience upon
nearly the same plan as that in the city of London.
The anxious desire that has been shown to obtain these several acts, proves
clearly that the nation in general
truly sensible of the great inconvenience
arising from the disuse of the ancient county and hundred courts; wherein
causes of this small value were always formerly decided, with very little
trouble and expense to the parties.
But
to be feared that the general
remedy which of late hath been principally applied to this inconvenience (the
erecting these new jurisdictions) may itself be attended in time with very ill
as the method of proceeding therein
consequences:
entirely in derogation of
the common law; as their large discretionary powers create
petty tyranny
in set of standing commissioners; and as the disuse of the trial by jury may
tend to estrange the minds of the people from that valuable prerogative of
Englishmen, which has already been more than sufficiently excluded in many
instances.
How much rather
to be wished that the proceedings in the
county and hundred courts could again be revived, without burdening the free
holders with too frequent and tedious attendances; and at the same time re
moving the delays that have insensibly crept into their proceedings, and the
power that either party has of transferring at pleasure their suits to the courts
at Westminster!
And we may with satisfaction observe, that this experiment
has been actually tried, and has succeeded,
in the populous county of
For by statute 23
Middlesex; which might serve as an example for others.
Geo. II, o. 33,
That
enacted,
special county court should be held at
least once
month in every hundred of the county of *Middlesex, by r*ftqi
the county clerk.
That twelve freeholders of that hundred, qualified
to serve on juries, and struck by the sheriff, shall be summoned to appear at
suoh court by rotation; so as none shall be summoned oftener than once
year.
3. That in all causes not exceeding
the value of forty shillings, the county
clerk and twelve suitors shall proceed in summary way, examining the parties
and witnesses on oath, without the formal process anciently used: and shall
make such order therein as they shall judge agreeable to conscience.
4. That
no plaints shall be removed out of this court, by any process whatsover; but
the determination herein shall be final. 5. That
any action be brought in any
of the superior courts against
debt or
person resident in Middlesex, for
contract, upon the trial whereof the jury shall find less than 40s. damages, the
plaintiff shall recover no costs, but shall pay the defendant double costs; unless
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upon some special circumstances, to be certified by the judge who tried it. 6.
Lastly, a table of very moderate fees is prescribed and set down in the act;,
This is a plan
which are not to be exceeded upon any account whatsoever.
entirely agreeable to the constitution and genius of the nation, and at the same
time to give honest creditors an opportunity of recovering small sums; which
now they are frequently deterred from by the expense of a suit at law: a plan
which, one would think, wants only to be generally known in order to its uni
versal reception.
must not passX. There is yet another species of private courts, which
over in silence, viz. : the chancellors' courts in the two universities of England.
Which two learned bodies enjoy the sole jurisdiction, in exclusion of the king'scourts, over all civil actions and suits whatsoever, when a scholar or privileged
person is one of the parties; excepting in such cases where the right of free
hold is concerned.
And these, by the university charter, they are at liberty to
try and determine, either according to the common law of the land, or accord
ing to their own local customs, at their discretion; which has generally led
^em to carry on their process in a *course much conformed to the civil
r*R4.1
L
* law, for reasons sufficiently explained in a former book.
These privileges were granted, that students might not be distracted from
their studies by legal process from the distant courts, and other forensic avo
cations. And privileges of this kind are of a very high antiquity, being gen
erally enjoyed by all foreign universities as well as our own, in consequence
But
apprehend) of constitution of the emperor Frederick, A. D. 1158. (m)
as to England in particular, the oldest charter that have seen, containing this
grant to the university of Oxford, was 28 Hen. III. A. D. 1244. And the same
were confirmed and enlarged by almost every succeeding prince,
Srivileges
own to King Henry the Eighth; in the fourteenth year of whose reign, the
largest and most extensive charter of all was granted. One similar to which
was afterwards granted to Cambridge, in the third year of Queen Elizabeth.
But yet, notwithstanding these charters, the privileges granted therein, of
proceeding in course different from the law of the land, were of so high a
nature that they were held to be invalid; for though the king might erect new
There
courts, yet he could not alter the course of law by his letters patent.
fore, in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, an act of parliament was obtained, («>
confirming all the charters of the two universities, and those of 14 Hen.
Which blessed act, as Sir Edward Coke entitles
and Eliz. by name.
(o)
established this high privilege without any doubt or opposition: (p) or, as Sir
Matthew Hale, (q) very fully expresses the sense of the common law and the
operation of the act of parliament, "although King Henry the Eighth, 14
liberal charter, to proceed according toA. R. sui, granted to the university
course much conformed to the civil law,
the use of the university, viz. by
yet that charter had not been sufficient to have warranted such proceedings
Eliz. *an
without the help of an act of parliament. And, therefore, in
p
and
act passed, whereby that charter was in effect enacted
thereby
kind of civil law procedure, even in matters that
that at this dav they have
of common law cognizance, where either of the parties
are of themselves
privileged."
exercised at Oxford in the
This privilege, so far as
relates to civil causes,
the vice-chancellor, his deputy or
chancellor's court the judge of which
assessor.
From his sentence an appeal lies to delegates appointed by the con
gregation; from thence to other delegates of the house of convocation; and if
final, at least by the statutes of
they all three concur in the same sentence
But,
there be
the university, (r) according to the rule of the civil law.
any discordance or variation in any of the three sentences, an appeal lies in
a
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So

the last resort to judges delegates appointed by the crown under the great seal
in chancery. (5)
have now gone through the several species of private, or special courts, of
the greatest note in the kingdom, instituted for the local redress of private
wrongs; and must in the close of all, make one general observation from Sir
Edward Coke:
that these particular jurisdictions, derogating from the gen
eral jurisdiction of the courts of common law, are ever strictly restrained, and
cannot be extended farther than the express letter of their privileges will most
explicitly warrant.
(t)

I

CHAPTER VII.

OF THE COGNIZANCE OF PRIVATE WRONGS.
is,

1.

;

introd.

(6) See as to the privilege of the University of Oxford, Matter of the Chancellor, &c.,
Q. B., 952.
49
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We are now to proceed to the cognizance of private wrongs that
to
consider in which of the vast variety of courts, mentioned in the three pre
man's person or
ceding chapters, every possible injury that can be offered to
certain of meeting with redress.
property
The authority of the several courts of private and special jurisdiction, or of
what wrongs such courts have cognizance, was necessarily remarked as those
respective tribunals were enumerated; and therefore need not be here again
repeated; which will confine our present inquiry to the cognizance of civil
And the order
injuries in the several courts of public or general jurisdiction.
in which
shall pursue this inquiry, will be by showing
What actions
may be brought or what injuries remedied, in the ecclesiastical courts. 2.
What in the military. 3. What in the maritime. And, 4. What in the courts
of common law.
And, with regard to the three first of these particulars,
must beg leave not
so much to consider what hath at any time been claimed or pretended to belong
to their jurisdiction, by the officers and judges of those respective courts; but
what the common law allows and permits to be so. For these eccentrical
tribunals (which are principally guided by the rules of the imperial and canon
laws), as they subsist and are *admitted in England, not by any right r *g,_
of their own, (a) but upon bare sufferance and toleration from the
municipal laws, must have recourse to the laws of that country wherein they
extends, or what
are thus adopted, to be informed how far their jurisdiction
causes are permitted, and what forbidden, to be discussed or drawn in question
before them. It matters not, therefore, what the pandects of Justinian, or the
decretals of Gregory, have ordained. They are here of no more intrinsic
authority than the laws of Solon and Lycurgus: curious perhaps for their anti
quity, respectable for their equity, and frequently of admirable use in illus
at all material in what light other nations
trating
point of history. Nor
Every nation must and will abide
may consider this matter of jurisdiction.
by its own municipal laws; which various accidents conspire to render differ
We permit some kinds of suits to be
ent in almost every country in Europe.
of ecclesiastical cognizance, which other nations have referred entirely to the
temporal courts as concerning wills and successions to intestate's chattels
and perhaps we may, in our turn, prohibit them from interfering in some con
troversies, which on the continent may be looked upon as merely spiritual.
In short the common law of England
the one uniform rule to determine the
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jurisdiction of oar courts : and, if any tribunals whatsoever attempt to exceed
the limits so prescribed them, the king's courts of common law may and do
prohibit them; and in some cases punish their judges, (6)
Having premised this general caution, I proceed now to consider,
L The wrongs or injuries cognizable by the ecclesiastical courts.
mean
such as are offered to private persons or individuals; which are cognizable by
the ecclesiastical court, not for reformation of the offender himself or party
injuring (pro salute animal, as is the case with immoralities in general when
unconnected with private injurier), but for the sake of the party injured, to
make him a satisfaction and redress for *the damage which he has susp
-J
-I
tained. And these I shall reduce under three general heads; of causes
pecuniary, causes matrimonial, and causes testamentary.
1. Pecuniary causes, cognizable in the ecclesiastical courts are such as arise
either from the withholding ecclesiastical dues, or the doing or neglecting
some act relating to the church, whereby some damage accrues to the plaintiff;
towards obtaining a satisfaction for which he is permitted institute a suit in
the spiritual court. (1)
The principal of these is the subtraction or withholding of tithes from the
parson or vicar, whether the former be a clergyman or a lay appropriator. (c)
But herein a distinction must be taken : for the ecclesiastical courts have no
jurisdiction to try the right of tithes unless between spiritual persons; (d)
but in ordinary cases, between spiritual men and lay men, are only to compel
the payment of them, when the right is not disputed, (e)
By the statute or
rather writ (f) of circumspecte agatis (g) it is declared that the court christian
shall not be prohibited from holding plea, " si rector petat versus parochianos
so that if any dispute arises
oblationes et decimas debitas et consuetas
whether such tithes be due and accustomed, this cannot be determined in the
ecclesiastical court, but before the king's courts of the common law; as such
question affects the temporal inheritance, and the determination most bind the
real property.
But where the right does not come into question, but only the
fact, whether or no the tithes allowed to be due are really subtracted or with
drawn, this is a transient personal injury, for which the remedy may properly
be had in the spiritual court; viz.: the recovery of the tithes, or their equiva
lent. By statute 2 and 3 Edw. VI, c. 13, it is enacted that if any person shall
carry off his predial tithes fviz. : of corn, hay, or the like), before the tenth
*'8 ^u'v set ^ort'1» or agreement is made with the proprietor, or
T*80l' Part
shall willingly withdraw his tithes of the same, or shall stop or hinder
the proprietor of the tithes or his deputy from viewing or carrying them away;
such offender shall pay double the value of the tithes, with costs to be
recovered before the ecclesiastical judge, according to the king's ecclesiastical
laws.
By a former clause of the same statute, the treble value of the tithes,
so subtracted or withheld, may be sued for in the temporal courts, which is
For one
equivalent to the double value to be sued for in the ecclesiastical.
may sue for and recover in the ecclesiastical courts the tithes themselves, or a
for them, by the ancient law; to which the suit for the double
recompense
But as no suit lay in the temporal courts
value is superadded by the statute.
for the subtraction of tithes themselves, therefore the statute gave a treble
forfeiture, if sued for there; in order to make the course of justice uniform
by giving the same reparation in one court as in the other. (h) However it

I

L

c. 8.
(c) Stat 82Hen. Vm, a 7.
lu) Hal. Hilt. 0.
(e) 8 Inst. 884,489,490.
(d) 2 Roll A.br. 8)9,810. Bro. Abr. t. jurisdiction, SO.
(?) 18Edw. I. st. 4, or rather 9 Edw. IX
(/) See Ba. rmgton, 183. 8 Pryn. Bee. 836.
(A) 8 Inat SGu.
(1) This jurisdiction became unimportant under the operation of statute 6 and 7 Wm. IV.
c. 71, and subsequent
statutes for the commutation of tithes.
And the statute 81 and
32 Vic, c. 109, takes away wholly the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts to compel the
payment of church rates.
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now seldom happens that tithes are sued for at all in the spiritual court; for
if the defendant pleads any custom, modus, composition, or other matter
whereby the right of tithing is called in question; this takes it out of the juris
diction of the ecclesiastical judges; for the law will not suffer the existence
of such a right to be decided by the sentence of any single, much less an
But a more summary
ecclesiastical, judge; without the verdict of a jury.
method than either of recovering small tithes under the value of 40«., is given
by statute 7 and 8 Wm. Ill, c. 6, by complaint to two justices of the peace;
and, by another statute of the same year, o. 34, the same remedy is extended
to all tithes withheld by Quakers under the value of ten pounds.
Another pecuniary injury, cognizable in the spiritual courts, is the non-pay
ment of other ecclesiastical
dues to the clergy: as pensions, mortuaries, com
positions, offerings and whatsoever falls under the denomination of surplicefees, for marriages or other ministerial offices of the church: all which injuries
are redressed by a deoree for their actual 'payment.
Besides which, all r*n0i
\
offerings, oblations and obventions not exceeding the value of 40s. may
be recovered in a summary way before two justices of the peace,
But
care must be taken that these are real and not imaginary dues; for
they be
contrary to the common law, prohibition will issue out of the temporal courts
As where fee was demanded by the
to stop all suits concerning them.
minister of the parish for the baptism of a child, which was administered in
another place; (k) this, however, authorized by the canon,
contrary to com
due to the minister even for per
mon right: for or common right, no fee
can only be supported by
forming such branches of his duty, and
special
but no custom can support the demand of
fee without perform
custom;
ing them at all.
For fees also, settled and acknowledged to be due to the officers of the eccle
the right of the fees
siastical courts, suit will lie therein; but not
at
must be decided by the common law. (m) It
all disputable; for then
also
curate be licensed, and his salary appointed by the bishop, and
said, that
court
he be not paid, the curate has
remedy in the ecclesiastical
(n) but,
he be not licensed, or hath no such salary appointed, or hath made
special
agreement with the rector, he must sue for a satisfaction at common law; (o)
to
either by proving such special agreement, or else by leaving
jury to
in consideration of what he
quantum meruit, that
give damages upon
reasonably deserved in proportion to the service performed.
Under this head of pecuniary injuries may also be reduced the several mat
ters of spoliation, dilapidations, and neglect of repairing the church and things
satisfaction may be sued for in the ecclesias
thereunto belonging; for which
tical court.
an injury done by one clerk or incumbent to another, in taking
Spoliation
the fruits of his benefice without any *right thereunto, but under pre- r*al
decree to account for the profits so *•
tended title. It is remedied by
taken. This injury, when the Jus patronatus or right of advowson doth not
a patron first pre
come in debate,
cognizable m the spiritual court: as
instituted and inducted thereto; and then, upon
sents A to a benefice, who
to the same living, and he
vacancy, the same patron presents
pretence of
Now,
also obtains institution and induction.
the fact of the vacancy be
kept out of the profits of the living, which
disputed, then that clerk who
ever
be, may sue the other in the spiritual court for spoliation, or taking the
shall there be tried, whether the living were or
And
profits of his benefice.
were not vacant: upon which the validity of the second clerk's pretensions
the right of patronage comes at all into dispute, as
must depend. jp) But
one patron presented A, and another patron presented
there the ecclesiastical

I.

Ventr. 188.

(n)

1

8.

8

1

(0

7

(*) Balk. 882.
(0 Stat. and W. Ill c.
Ibid., 834. Lord Raym. 450, 1BS8. Fits. 68.
(m)
TO.
(p)
N.
B.
88.
Freem.
P.
(o)

Burn. eooL taw, 138.
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court hath no cognizance, provided the tithes sued for amount to a fourth
part of the value of the living, but may be prohibited at the instance of thepatron by the king's writ of indicavit. (q) So also if a clerk, without any
colour of title, ejects another from his parsonage, this injury must be redressed
in the temporal courts: for it depends upon no question determinable by tho
spiritual law (as plurality of benefices or no plurality, vacancy or no vacancy),
but is merely a civil injury.
For dilapidations, which are a kind of ecclesiastical waste, either volun
tary, by pulling down; or permissive, by suffering the chancel, parsonagehouse and other buildings thereunto belonging to decay; an action also lies,
either in the spiritual court by the canon law, or in the courts of common law;,
(r) (2) and it may be brought by the successor against the predecessor if liv
ing, or, if dead, then against his executors. It is also said to be good cause of
deprivation, if the bishop, parson, vicar or other ecclesiastical person dilapi
dates the buildings, or cuts down, timber growing on the patrimony of
*t*16 CDarcn> unless for necessary repairs:
and that
writ of prohiT*92l
bition will also lie against him in the courts of common law.
By
Btatute 13 Eliz. c. 10,
any spiritual person makes over or alienates his goods
•with intent to defeat his successors of their remedy for dilapidations, the suc
cessor shall have such remedy against the alienee, in the ecclesiastical court,
he were the executor of his predecessor.
as
And by statute 14 Eliz. c. 11,
all money recovered for dilapidations shall within two years be employed upon
the buildings, in respect whereof
was recovered,
on penalty of forfeiting
double the value to the crown.
As to the neglect of reparations of the church, church-yard and the like, the
spiritual court has undoubted cognizance thereof ;(w) and suit may be brought
therein for non-payment of rate made by the church-wardens for that pur
pose.^) And these are the principal pecuniary injuries, which are cognizable,
or for which suits may be instituted in ecclesiastical courts.
2. Matrimonial causes, or injuries respecting the rights of marriage, are an
much more undisturbed, branch of the ecclesiastical jurisdiction.
other, and
we consider marriages in the light of mere civil contracts, they do
Though,
not seem to be properly of spiritual cognizance. (v) But the Romanists having
very early converted this contract into
holy sacramental ordinance, the
church of course took
under her protection, upon the division, of the two
soon became an
And, in the hands of such able politicians,
jurisdictions.
engine of great importance to the papal scheme of an universal monarchy over
Christendom.
The numberless
canonical impediments that were invented,
and occasionally dispensed with, by the holy see, not only enriched the coffers
of the church, but gave
vast ascendant over princes of all denominations;
whose marriages were sanctified or reprobated, their issue legitimated or bastard
ized, and the succession to their thrones established or rendered precarious,
*to the humor or interest of the reigning pontiff; besides
r*9<?1 accor<iing
thousand nice and difficult scruples, with which the clergy of those ages
puzzled the understandings and loaded the consciences of the inferior orders
of the laity; and which could only be unravelled and removed by these their
Yet, abstracted from this universal influence, which affords
spiritual guides.
so good
reason for their conduct, one might otherwise be led to wonder, that
the same authority, which enjoined the strictest celibacy to the priesthood,
should think them the proper judges in causes between man and wife. These
8

5.

1

2.

9

4

1

8

I.

Edw. n, c.
st. Artie, cleri.
F. N. B. 45.
(o) CiTcumtpecte agatis; 13Edw.
Lev. 268. (») Roll. Rep. 86. 11Rep. 98 Oodb. 259. (() Bulstr. 158.
(r) Cart. 224.
Rep. 66.
(u) Circumtpecte agatis.
(v) Warb. alliance, 173.

Roll. Rep. 835.

J.

0.

is

2

(2) The usual and more effectual remedy is, in the courts of common law, by action on.
the case.
See Railcliffe v. D'Oyly,
T. R. 630.
now given.
See Rex v. Mila(3) A summary remedy before two justices of the peace
row,
M. and S., 248; Richards v. Dyke, 11 Law
Rep. (N. S.)CJ. B.( 275.
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causes, indeed, partly from the nature of the injuries complained of, and partly
from the clerioal method of treating them,(u>) soon became too gross for the
And causes matrimonial are now so peculiarly ec
modesty of a lay tribunal.
clesiastical, that the temporal courts will never interfere in controversies of
this kind, unless in some particular cases. As if the spiritual court do proceed
to call a marriage 'in question after the death of either of the parties; this the
-courts of common law will prohibit, because it tends to bastardize and disin
herit the issue; who cannot so well defend the marriage, as the parties them
selves, when both of them living, might have done, (a;)
is

1.

is,

Of matrimonial causes, one of the first and principal
Causa jactitationia
matrimonii; when one of the parties boasts or gives out that he or she
mar
a

ried to the other, whereby common reputation of their matrimony may ensue.
the party injured may libel the other in the spiritual court;
and, unless the defendant undertakes and makes out
proof of the aotual mar
the only
riage, he or she
enjoined perpetual silence upon that head; which
remedy the ecclesiastical courts can give for this injury. 2. Another species of
matrimonial causes was, when party contracted to another brought
suit in
the ecclesiastical court to compel
celebration of the marriage in pursuance of
such contract; but this branch of causes
now cut off entirely by the act for
preventing clandestine marriages, 26 Geo. II, *c. 33, which enaots, that r*94i
for the future no suit shall be had in any ecclesiastical court, to compel
celebration of marriage in facie ecclesice, for or beoause of any contract of mat
also another
3. The suit for restitution of conjugal rights
rimony whatsoever.
brought whenever either the husband
species of matrimonial causes: which
or wife
guilty of the injury of subtraction, or lives separate from the other
without any sufficient reason; in which case the ecclesiastical jurisdiction will
either party be weak enough to
compel them to come together again,
desire
4. JDivorces also, of which,
contrary to the inclination of the other.
and their several distinctions, we treated at large in
former book, (y) are
-causes thoroughly matrimonial, and cognizable by the ecclesiastical judge.
If becomes improper, through some supervenient cause arising expost facto,
that the parties should live together any longer; as through intolerable
cruelty, adultery,
perpetual disease, and the like; this unfitness or inability
for the marriage state may be looked upon as an injury to the suffering party:
and for this the ecclesiastical law administers the remedy of separation, or
divorce a mensa et thoro.
But
the cause existed previous to the marriage,
and was such
one as rendered the marriage unlawful ab initio, as consan
guinity, corporal imbecility, or the like; in this case the law looks upon the
marriage to have been always null and void, being contracted in fraudem
legis, and decrees not only
separation from bed and board, but a vinculo
matrimonii itself. 5. The last species of matrimonial causes
consequence
drawn from one of the species or divorce, that a mensa et thoro; which
the
suit for alimony,
term which signifies maintenance:
which suit the wife, in
case of separation, may have against her husband,
he neglects or refuses to
make her an allowance suitable to their station in life.
This
an injury to
the wife, and the court christian will redress
competent
by assigning her
and compelling the husband by ecclesiastical censures to pay it.
maintenance,
But no alimony will be assigned in case of
divorce for adultery on her part;
for as that amounts to forfeiture of her *dower after his death,
r*95-i
also
sufficient reason why she should not be
partaker of his estate
when living.
3. Testamentary causes are the only remaining species belonging to the ec-clesiastical
mere temporal
jurisdiction; which, as they are certainly of
nature (z) may seem at first view
little oddly ranked among matters of
forAnd, indeed, (as was in some degree observed in
spiritual cognizance.
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On this ground

I,

Some of the impureat books, that are extant in any language are those written by the popish
«lergy on the subjects of matrimony and divorce.
(x) Inst. 614.
ch. 15.
(V) Book
(*) Warburt. aUiance. 173.
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(I)

raer book) (a) they were originally cognizable in the king's courts of common
law, viz., the county courts; (b) and afterwards transferred to the jurisdiction
of the ohurch, by the favour of the crown, as a natural consequence of grant
ing to the bishops the administration of intestates' effects.
This spiritual jurisdiction of testamentary causes is a peculiar constitution
of this island; for in almost all other (even in popish) countries all matters
testamentary are under the jurisdiction of the civil magistrate. And that this
privilege is enjoyed by the clergy in England, not as a matter of ecclesiastical
right, but by the special favour and indulgence of the municipal law, and as it
should seem by some publio act of the great council, is freely acknowledged
by Lindewode, the ablest canonist of the- fifteenth century. Testamentary
Ancauses, he observes, belong to the ecclesiastical courts "de consuetudine
glioe, et super consensu regio et suorum procerum in talibus ab antique- concesso." (c) The same was, about a century before, very openly professed in a
canon of Archbishop Stratford, viz.: that the administration of intestates'
goods was " ab olim" granted to the ordinary, "consensu regio et magnatum
regni Anglim. (d) The constitutions of Cardinal Othobon also testify, that
this provision "olim a praUatis cum approbatione regis et baronum dicitur emAnd Archbishop Parker,^) in Queen Elizabeth's time, affirms in
anasse."(e)
express words, that originally in matters testamentary, "non uttam habebant
episcopi authoritatem, praUer earn quam a rege acceptam refer ebant. Jus testamenta probandi non *habebant: administrationis potestatem cuique del~*Bfll
J legare non poterant."
At what period of time the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of testaments and in
testacies began in England, is not ascertained by any ancient writer: and Lin
dewode (ff) veryfairly confesses, " cujus regis temporibus hoc ordinatum sit,
non reperio."
We find it indeed frequently asserted in our common law books,
that it is but of late years that the church hath had the probate of wills, (A)
But this must only be understood to mean that it hath not always had this pre
rogative: for certainly it is of very high antiquity. Lindewode, we have seen,
declares that it was " ab antiquo , Stratford, in the reign of King Edward HI,
mentions it as an "ab olim ordinatum /" and Cardinal Othobon, in the 52 Hen.
m, speaks of it as an ancient tradition. Bracton holds it for clear law in the
same reign of Henry III, that matters testamentary belonged to the spiritual
court, (i) And yet earlier, the disposition of intestates' goods "per visum
ecclesias" was one of the articles confirmed to the prelates by King John's
magna carta. (J) Matthew Paris also informs us that King Richard I ordained
in Normandy " quod distributio rerum qua) in testamento relinquuntur autoritate
ecclesias fiet.n
And even this ordinance, of King Richard, was only an intro
duction of the same law into his ducal dominions, which before prevailed in
this kingdom: for in the reign of his father, Henry II, Glanvil is express, that
" si quis aliquid dixerit contra testamentum, placitum Mud in curia christianitatis audiri debet et terminari." (k) And the Scots book, called regiam mqjestatem, agrees verbatim with Glanvil in this point.
It appears that the foreign clergy were pretty early ambitious of this branch
°^ Power> DU' their attempts to assume *it on the continent were effectT*971
ually curbed by the edict of the Emperor Justin, (m) which restrained
the insinuation or probate of testaments (as formerly) to the office of the
for which the emperor subjoins this reason " Absurdum elmagister census
enim clericis est, immo etiam opprobriosum, si peritos se velint ostendere disBut afterwards, by the canon law, (n)
was
ceptationum esse forensium."
allowed that the bishop might compel, by ecclesiastical censures, the perform
ance of
And, therefore, as that was considered as a.
bequest to pious uses.
f.
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eause quae secundum canones et episcopates leges ad regimen animarum pertinuit, it fell within the jurisdiction of the spiritual courts hy the express words
of the charter of King William I, which separated those courts from the

temporal. And afterwards, when King Henry I, by his coronation-charter,
directed that the goods of an intestate should be divided for the good of his
soul, (o) this made all intestacies immediately spiritual causes, as much as a
This, therefore, we may probably con
legaoy to pious uses had been before.
jecture, was the sera referred to by Stratford and Othobon, when the king, by
the advice of the prelates, and with the consent of his barons, invested the
And, accordingly, in King Stephen's charter it is
church with this privilege.
provided that the goods of an intestate ecclesiastic shall be distributed pro
salute animal ejus, ecclesim consilio ; (p) which latter words are equivalent to
per visum ecclesim, in the great charter of King John, before mentioned. And
the Danes and Swedes (who received the rudiments of Christianity and ecclesi
astical discipline from England about the beginning of the twelfth century),
have thence also adopted the spiritual cognizance of intestacies, testaments,
and legacies,

(q)

This jurisdiction,

we have seen, is principally exercised with us in the con
,
sistory courts of every diocesan *bishop, and in the prerogative court r
J
of the metropolitan, originally; and ifll the arches court and court of *■
It is divisible into three branches; the probate
delegates, by way of appeal.
of wills, the granting of administrations, and the suing for legacies.
The two
former of which, when no opposition is made, are granted merely ex officio et
debito justitia}, and are then the object of what is called the voluntary, and
But when a caveat is entered against proving
not the contentious jurisdiction.
the will or granting administration, and a suit thereupon follows to determine
either the validity of the testament, or who hath a right to administer; this
claim and obstruction by the adverse party are an injury to the party entitled,
and as such are remedied by the sentence of the spiritual court, either by
Subtraction, the with
establishing the will or granting the administration.
holding or detaining of legacies, is also still more apparently injurious, by de
priving the legatees of that right with which the laws of the land and the will
of the deceased have invested them; and, therefore, as a consequential part of
testamentary jurisdiction, the spiritual court administers redress herein, by
But in this last case the courts of
compelling the executor to pay them.
equity exercise a concurrent jurisdiction with the ecclesiastical courts, as in
cident to some other species of relief prayed by the complainant; as to compel
the executor to account for the testator's effects, or assent to the legacy, or
For, as it is beneath the dignity of the king's courts to be merely
the like.
ancillary to other inferior jurisdictions, the cause, when once brought there,
receives there also its full determination.
These are the principal injuries for which the party grieved either must, or
entirely dismiss
may, seek his remedy in the spiritual courts. But before
this head, it may not be improper to add a short word concerning the method
af proceeding in these tribunals, with regard to the redress of injuries.
It must (in the first place) be acknowledged, to the honour of the spiritual
•ourts, that though they continue to this *day to decide many questions r*fifl-i
which are properly of temporal cognizance, yet justice is in general so *■ J
ably and impartially administered in those tribunals (especially of the superior
kind), and the boundaries of their power are now so well known and estab
lished, that no material inconvenience at present arises from this jurisdiction
And should an alteration be attempted,
still continuing in the ancient channel.
great oonfusion would probably arise, in overturning long-established forms,

I

(o) Si quia boronwn seu hominum meorum —pecvniam euam non dederit vel dart dispomerit, uxor
«•»□,sive liberi, ant parenteg et legitimi hominei ejus, earn pro anima ejus dividant, ricut eit melius
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and new-modelling a course of proceedings that has now prevailed

for

III.

seven

centuries.
The establishment of the civil law process in all the ecclesiastical courts was
indeed a masterpiece of papal discernment, as it made a coalition impracticable
between them and the national tribunals, without manifest inconvenience and
hazard.
And this consideration had undoubtedly its weight in causing this
measure to be adopted, though many other causes concurred.
The time when
the pandects of Justinian were discovered afresh, and rescued from the dust
of antiquity, the eagerness with which they were studied by the popish
ecclesiastics, and the consequent dissensions between the clergy and the laity
shall only now re
of England, have formerly (r) been spoken to at large.
mark upon those collections, that their being written in the Latin tongue, and
referring so much to the will of the prince and his delegated officers of justice,
them to the court of Rome, exclusive of their in
sufficiently recommended
trinsic merit. To keep the laity in the darkest ignorance, and to monopolize
the little science, which then existed, entirely among the monkish clergy, were
And, as the bishops of Rome affected
deep-rooted principles of papal policy.
in all points to mimic the imperial grandeur, as the spiritual prerogatives were
moulded on the pattern of the temporal, so the canon law process was formed
on the model of the civil law: the prelates embracing with the utmost ardor a
method of judicial proceedings which was carried on in a language unknown
to the bulk of the people, whioh banished the intervention of a jury (that bulwark °^ *Gotnlc liberty), and which placed an arbitrary power of der*100l-I
cision in the breast of a single man.
The proceedings in the ecclesiastical courts are therefore regulated according
to the practice of the civil and canon laws; or rather according to a mixture or
both, corrected and new-modelled by their own particular usages, and the
interposition of the courts of common law. For, if the proceedings in the
spiritual court be ever so regularly consonant to the rules of the Roman law,
yet if they be manifestly repugnant to the fundamental maxims of the muni
cipal laws, (to which upon principles of sound policy the ecclesiastical process
ought in every state to conform («) as if they require two witnesses to prove a
fact, where one will suffice at common law); in such cases a prohibition will
be awarded against them,
But under these restrictions, their ordinary
course of proceeding
first by citation, to call the party injuring before
them
Then, by libel, libellus,
little book, or by articles drawn out in
formal allegation, to set forth the complainant's ground of complaint. To
this succeeds the defendant's answer upon oath, when
he denies or extenu
ates the charge, they proceed to proofs by witnesses examined,
and their de
an officer of the court.
If the defendant
positions taken down in writing,
has any circumstances to offer in his defence, he must also propound them in
what
called his defensive allegation, to which he
entitled in his turn to the
plaintiff's answer upon oath, and may from thence proceed to proofs as well
as his antagonist.
The canonical doctrine of purgation, whereby the parties
were obliged to answer upon oath to any matter, however criminal, that might
be objected against them (though long ago overruled in the court of chancery,
the genius of the English law having broken through the bondage imposed on
by its clerical chancellors, and asserted the doctrines of judicial as well as
civil liberty), continued to the middle of the last century to be upheld by the
spiritual courts; when the legislature was obliged to interpose, to teach them
'esson °f similar moderation.
By the *statute of 13 Car. II, c. 12,
r*1011a
*
shall not be lawful for any bishop or ecclesiastical
enacted, that
judge, to tender or administer to any person whatsoever, the oath usually
called the oath ex officio, or any other oath whereby he may be compelled to
confess, accuse, or purge himself of any criminal matter or thing, whereby ho
may be liable to any censure or punishment. When all the pleadings and
(») Warb. alliance, 178.
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proofs are concluded, they are referred to the consideration, not of a jury, but
of a single judge; who takes information by hearing advocates on both sides,
and thereupon forms his interlocutory decree or definitive sentence at his own
discretion: from which there generally lies an appeal, in the several stages
mentioned in a former chapter; (w) though if the same be not appealed from
in fifteen days, it is final, by the statute 25 Hen. VIII, c. 19.
But the point in which these jurisdictions are the most defective, is that of
enforcing their sentences when pronounced; for which they have no other
which is described (») to be twofold;
process but that of excommunication;
the less, and the greater excommunication. The less is an ecclesiastical censure,
excluding the party from the participation of the sacraments: the greater pro
ceeds farther, and excludes him not only from these, but also from the com
pany of all christians. But, if the judge or any spiritual court excommuni
cates a man for a cause of which he hath not the legal cognizance,
the party
may have an action against him at common law, and he is also liable to be in
dicted at the suit of the king, (w)
considered in
serious light,
Heavy as the penalty of excommunication
there are, notwithstanding, many obstinate or profligate men, who would des
pise the brutum fulmen of mere ecclesiastical censures, especially when pro
nounced by petty surrogate in the country, for railing or contumelious words,
for non-payment of fees, or costs, or for other trivial causes. The common
law therefore compassionately steps in to *the aid of the ecclesiastical i-*..
jurisdiction, and' kindly lends supporting hand to an otherwise totterImitating herein the policy of our British ancestors, among
ing authority.
whom, according to Caesar, (a;) whoever were interdicted by the Druids from
their sacrifices, " in numero impiorum ac sceleratorum habentur ab iis omnes
decedunt, aditum eorum sermonemque defugiunt, ne quid ex contagione incommodi accipiant: neque iis petentibus jus redditur, neque honos ullus communiAnd so with us by the common law an excommunicated person
catur."
required to be done by one that
probus et
disabled to do any act that
He cannot serve upon juries, cannot be witness in any court,
legalis homo.
the worst of all, cannot bring an action, either real or per
and, which
Nor
this the whole: for
sonal, to recover lands or money due to him. (y)
if, within forty days after the sentence has been published in the church, the
offender does not submit and abide by the sentence of the spiritual court, the
bishop may certify such contempt to the king in chancery. Upon which there
writ to the sheriff of the county, called, from the bishop's certifi
issues out
writ de excommunicato capiendo;
or from its effect
cate,
significavit
and the sheriff shall thereupon take the offender, and imprison him in the
reconciled to the church, and such reconciliation certified
county goal, till he
by the bishop; upon which another writ de excommunicato deliberando, issues
out of chancery to deliver and release him. (2) This process seems founded
on the charter of separation (so often referred to) of William the Conqueror.
" Si aliquis per superbiam elatus adjustitiam episcopalem venire noluerit, excommunicetur et, si opus fuerit, ad hoc vindicandum fortitudo etjustitia regis
And in case of subtraction of tithes,
more
sine vicecomitis adhibealur."
given by the statutes of 27 Hen. VIII, c. 20,
summary and expeditious assistance
which enact, that upon complaint of any contempt or mis
and 32 Hen. Vlll, c.
behaviour to the ecclesiastical judge by the defendant in any suit for tithes, any
privy consellor, or any *two justices of the peace (or, in case of dis- r*10oi
obedience to definitive sentence, any two justices of the peace), may
commit the party to prison without bail or mainprize, till he enters into
recognizance with sufficient sureties to give due obedience to the process and
These timely aids, which the common and statute laws
sentence of the court.
have lent to the ecclesiastical jurisdiction, may serve to refute that groundless
201.

(c) F. N. B. 82.
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notion which some are too apt to entertain, that the courts of Westminsterhall are at open variance with those at doctors' commons.
It is true that they
are sometimes obliged to use a parental authority, in correcting the excesses of
these inferior courts, and keeping them within their legal bounds; but, on the
other hand, they afford them a parental assistance in repressing the insolence
of contumacious delinquents, and rescuing their jurisdiction from that con
tempt, which for want of sufficient compulsive powers would otherwise be sure
to attend it.
II. am next to consider the injuries cognizable in the court military, or
The jurisdiction of which is declared by statute 13 Rio. TL,
court of chivalry.
c. 2, to be this: "that it hath cognizance of contracts touching deeds of arms
or of war, out of the realm, and also of things which touch war within the
realm, which cannot be determined or discussed by the common law; together
with other usages and customs to the same matters appertaining."
So that
wherever the common law can give redress, this court hath no jurisdiction,
which has thrown it entirely out of use as to the matter of contracts, all such
being usually cognizable in the courts of Westminster-hall, if not directly, at
least by fiction of law; as if a contract be made at Gibraltar, the plaintiff may
of
suppose it made at Northampton: for the locality, or place of making
no consequence with regard to the validity of the contract.
The words, " other usages and customs," support the claim of this court,
To give relief to such of the nobility and gentry as think themselves
aggrieved in matters of honour; and 2. To keep up the distinction of degrees
follows, that the civil jurisdiction of this
Whence
r*!04l an(^ ^u^ity
court of chivalry
principally in two points; the redressing injuries
of honour, and correcting encroachments in matters of coat-armour, prece
dency, and other distinctions of families.
to give satisfaction to all such as are aggrieved
As court of honour,
nature so nice and delicate, that its wrongs and injuries
that point;
point of
escape the notice of the common law, and yet are fit to be redressed some
man a coward, or giving him the lie;
Such, for instance, as calling
where.
for which, as they are productive of no immediate damage to his person or
property, no action will lie in the courts at Westminster: and yet they are
such injuries as will prompt every man of spirit to demand some honourable
amends, which by the ancient law of the land were appointed to be given in
the court of chivalry, (a) But modern resolutions have determined, that how
much soever such
jurisdiction may be expedient, yet no action for words
hath always been most clearly holden,
will at present lie therein. (6) And
(c) that as this court cannot meddle with anything determinable by the com
therefore can give no pecuniary satisfaction or damages, inasmuch
mon law,
ever of common law cognizance.
as the quantity and determination thereof
And, therefore, this court of chivalry can at most only order reparation in
point of honour; as, to compel the defendant mendacium sibi ipsi imponere,
or to take the lie that he has given upon himself, or to make such other sub
mission as the laws of honour may require, (d) Neither can this court, as to
the point of reparation in honour, hold plea of any such word or thing, wherein
relievable
the courts of common law. As
the party
a man gives
another a blow, or calls . him thief or murderer; for in both these cases the
common law has pointed out his proper remedy by action.
t0 tne otner P0int of its civil jurisdiction, the redressing of
*l05l
and usurpations in matters of heraldry and coatencroachments
the business of this court, according to Sir Matthew Hale, to ad
armour,
just the right of armorial ensigns, bearings, crests, supporters, pennons, Ac.
and also rights of plaoe or precedence, where the king's patent or act of paris
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(o) Tear-book, 87 Hen. VI, SI. Seidell of duels, o. 10. Hal. Hist. C. L. 87.
S»lk. 888. Mod. 188. Hawk. P. 0. c.
<c)Hal. Hut. C. L. 87.
RolL Abr. 128.
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The proceedings in this court are by petition, in a summary way ; and the

trial not by a jury of twelve men, but by witnesses, or by combat, (e) But
as it cannot imprison, not being a court of record, and as by the resolutions of
the superior courts it is now confined to so narrow and restrained a jurisdiction,
it has fallen into contempt and disuse. The marshalling of coat-armour, which

was formerly the pride and study of all the best families in the -kingdom is
now greatly disregarded; and has fallen into the hands of certain officers and
attendants upon this court, called heralds, who consider it only as a matter of
lucre, and not of justice: whereby such falsity and confusion have crept into
their records (which ought to be the standing evidence of families, descents,
and coat-armour), that though formerly some credit has been paid to their tes
timony, now even their common seal will not be received as evidence in any
court of justice in the kingdom,
But their original visitation books, com
)
piled when progresses were solemnly and regularly made into every part of
the kingdom, to inquire into the state of families, and to register such mar
riages and descents as were verified to them upon oath, are allowed to be good
evidence of pedigrees, (g) And it is much to be wished that this practice of
visitation at certain periods were revived; for the failure of inquisitions post
mortem, by the abolition of military tenures, combined with the negligence of
the heralds in omitting their usual progresses, has rendered the proof of a
modern descent *for the recovery of an estate, or succession to a title of r*10(i-»
*
This will be indeed *honour, more difficult than that of an ancient.
remedied for the future, with respect to claims of peerage, by a late standing,
order (A) of the house of lords; directing the heralds to take exact accounts,
and preserve regular entries of all peers and peeresses of England, and their
and that an exact pedigree of each peer and his family
respective descendants;
shall, on the day of his first admission, be delivered to the house by garter,
the principal king-at-arms.
But the general inconvenience, affecting more
private successions, still continues without a remedy.
IIL Injuries cognizable by the courts maritime, or admiralty courts, are the
next object of our inquiries. These courts have jurisdiction and power to try
and determine all maritime causes; or such injuries, which, though they are in
their nature of common law cognizanoe, yet being committed on the high seas,
out of the reach of our ordinary courts of justice, are therefore to be remedied
in a peculiar court of their own. All admiralty causes must be therefore
causes arising wholly upon the sea, and not within the precincts of any county.
For the statute 13 Ric. II, c.
directs that the admiral and his deputy
shall not meddle with any thing, but only things done upon the sea; and the
statute 15 Ric. II, c.
declares that the court of the admiral hath no manner
of cognizance of any contract, or of any other thing, done within the body of
any county, either by land or by water; nor of any wreck of the sea: for that
wreck, (j) But
must be cast on land before
becomes
otherwise of
things flotsam, jetsam, and ligan • for over them the admiral hath jurisdiction,
as they are in and upon the sea. (k)
If part of any contract, or other cause of
action, doth arise upon the sea, and part upon the land, the common law ex
cludes the admiralty court from its jurisdiction; for, part belonging properly
is

it

a

it

3,

5,

(»)

(f

are one proper object of the admiralty jurisdiction, even though the contract
them be made upon land; (wi) yet, in general,
there be a contract made
in England, and to be executed upon the seas, as
charter-party or covenant.

1

(o) Comb., 68.
(S) Rep., 106.
5

Roll. Abr.. 888. Jon., 284.
(J) See boo kl, ch.
8.

if)

(0 Co. UtU, 360. Hob. 7».
<■») Ventr., 146.

2

it) Co. Litt. 261.

S

a

if

for

(ft) 11 Mar, 178T.
(I) CorUtt., 261.
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(t)

(«)

a ship shall sail to Jamaica, or shall be in such a latitude by such a day;
or a contract made upon the sea to be performed in England, as a bond made
on shipboard to pay money in London or the like; these kinds of mixed con
tracts belong not to the admiralty jurisdiction, but to the courts of common
law. (n) And indeed it hath been farther holden, that the admiralty court
cannot hold plea of any contract under seal, (o) (4)
And also, as the courts of common law have obtained a concurrent jurisdic
tion with the court of chivalry with regard to foreign contracts, by supposing
them made in England; so it is no uncommon
thing for a plaintiff to feign
that a contract, really made at sea was made at the royal exchange, or other
inland place, in order to draw the cognizance of the suit from the courts of
admiralty to those of Westminster-hall, (p) This the civilians exclaim against
loudly, as inequitable and absurd; and Sir Thomas Ridley (q) hath very
gravely proved it to be impossible for the ship in which such cause of action
But our lawyers justify
arises to be really at the royal exchange in CornhilL
this fiction, by alleging (as before) that the locality of such contracts is not at
all essential to the merits of them; and that learned civilian himself seems to
have forgotten how much such fictions are adopted and encouraged in the
Roman law; that a son killed in battle is supposed to live forever for the
benefit of his parents; (r) and that by the fiction of postliminium and the lex
Cornelia, captives, when freed from bondage, were held to have never been
and such as died in captivity were supposed to have died in their
prisoners,
own country,
* Where the admiral's court hath not original jurisdiction of the
r*i
cause, though there should arise in
question that
proper for the
cognizance of that court, yet that doth not alter nor take away the exolusive
hath jurisdiction
jurisdiction of the common law. (u) And so vice versa,
hath also jurisdiction of all consequential questions, though
of the original,
Wherefore, among other reasons,
properly determinable at common law. (w)
rock in the sea may be brought
a suit for beaconage of beacon standing on
in the court of admiralty, the admiral having an original jurisdiction over
beacons, (w)
In case of prizes also in time of war, between our own nation
and another, or between two other nations, (5) which are taken at sea, and
brought into our ports, the courts of admiralty have an undisturbed and ex
olusive jurisdiction to determine the same according to the law of nations, (se)
(6)
1,

1,
S
3.

3,

L., 35.
(o) Hob.. 218.
View of the civil law.V
p.
tit. 85.
(r) Inst.
<t>Ft. 49, 15, 18.
(u) Comb. 488.
Hard., 188.
(to) Sid., 158.
(z) Show., 838. Comb. 44
2

1

8%
6.

4

(n) Hob. 18. HaL Htot. 0.
Inst., 184.
(p)
(a)
(«) Ft. 49, 15,12,
Lev., 85.
(t>)18Rep., 58.
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in the district courts of
(4) In the United States the admiralty and prize jurisdiction
very full and complete in civil cases. See Kent, 853, tt seq.
the United States, and
Parsons on Maritime Law. Late decisions of the supreme court
Conklin's Treatise, part
of the United States seem to give these courts substantially the same jurisdiction in respect
to the great interior lakes which they possess in respect to the ocean.
conferred
only such as by acts of congress
The criminal jurisdiction of these courts
Dall., 426: U.
Wheat., 336; U.
v. Bevans,
v. Wiltupon them; U. 8. v. McGill,
Wheat., 76; Tyler v. People,
Mich., 320. These acts, however, are designed to
berger,
confer jurisdiction of all cases properly cognizable in admiralty.
The validity of maritime captures must be determined
not accurate.
(5) This remark
in court of the captor's government, sitting either in his own country or in that of its
Law,
c.
part
§§13-16; Halleck Int. Law, 749, and authorities
ally. Wheat. Ink
Kent, 103.
cited;
(0) Mr. Justice Coleridge calls attention to the fact that the author takes no notice of
what
very material, that there are, in fact, two courts: the admiralty court, or, more
properly, the instance court, of which he has hitherto been speaking, and the prize court.
Both these courts have, indeed, the same judge, but in the former he sits bv virtue of
commission under the great seal, which enumerates the objects of his jurisdiction, but
commission
specifies nothing relative to prize; while in the latter he sits by virtue of
which issues in every war, under the great seal of the lord high admiral, requiring th»
60
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The proceedings of the courts of admiralty hear much resemblance to thosoof the civil law, but are not entirely founded thereon; and they likewise adopt
and make use of other laws, as occasion requires; such as the Rhodian laws
and the laws of Oleron. (y)
For the law of England, as has frequently been
observed, doth not acknowledge or pay any deference to the civil law con
sidered as such; but merely permits its use in such cases where it judged its
determinations equitable, and therefore blends
in the present instance, with
other marine laws: the whole being corrected, altered and amended by acts of
parliament and common usage; so that out of this composition
body of juris
extracted, which owes its authority only to its reception here by
prudence
consent of the crown and people.
The first process in these courts
fre
quently by arrest of the defendant's person: (z) and they also take recogni
zance or stipulations of certain fidejussors in the nature of bail, (a) and in case
of default may *imprison both them and their principal, (b) They may
r*lnQ-i
also fine and imprison for
contempt in the face of the court, (c) And
all this
supported by immemorial usage, grounded on the necessity of sup
jurisdiction so extensive; (d) though opposite to the usual doctrine*
porting
of the common law; these being no courts of record, because in general their
much conformed to that of the civil law. (e)
process
IV. am next to consider such injuries as are cognizable by the courts of
the common law.
And herein shall for the present only remark, that all
possible injuries whatsoever, that do not fall within the exclusive cognizance
of either the ecclesiastical,
military, or maritime tribunals, are for that very
reason within the cognizance of the common law courts of justice.
For
a
settled and invariable principle in the laws of England, that every right when
withheld must have
The defi
remedy, and every injury its proper redress.
nition and explication of these numerous injuries and their respective legal
But be
remedies, will employ our attention for many subsequent chapters.
fore we conclude the present,
shall just mention two species of injuries, which
will properly fall now within our immediate consideration: and which are,
either when justice
delayed by an inferior court that has proper cognizance
of the cause; or, when such inferior court takes upon itself to examine
cause
and decide the merits without
legal authority.
remedied either
The first of these injuries, refusal or neglect of justice,
writ of procedendo, or of mandamus. A writ of procedendo ad judicium
by
issues out of the court of chancery, where judges of any subordinate court do
delay the parties; for that they will not give judgment, either on the one side
writ of procedendo
or on the other, when they ought so to do. In this case
shall be awarded, commanding them in the king's name to proceed to judg
ment; but without specifying any particular judgment, for that (if errroneous)
may *be set aside in the course of appeal, or by writ of error or false rsjiol
judgment: and upon farther neglect or refusal, the judges of the inferior court may be punished for their contempt, by writ of attachment, return
able in the king's bench or common pleas. (_/")
in general,
command issuing in the king's name
A writ of mandamus
from the court of king's bench, and directed to any person, corporation, or
t.

1

1

i

L

1

1

(») Clerke prax. cur. adm. §13.
(v) Hale, Hist. G. L. 88. Co. Litt. 11.
11. Roll. Abr. 681. Raym. 78. Lord Raym. JS288.
(6) BoU. Abr. 581. Godb. 193, 28a
(o) Ibid,
error, 177.
Ventr.
Keb.
858.
(/) F. N. B. 153,154,240.
(e) Bro. Abr.
(c)
(d)

1,

is

2,

8

7

4

8

court of admiralty, and the lieutenant and judge of the same court, "to proceed upon all
and all manner of captures, seizures, prizes ana reprisals of all ships and goods that are or
shall be taken," &c.
and Vic, c. 65, the court of admiralty has jurisdiction of questions
Now by statute
of booty at war, and by statute 18 and 14 Vic, cc 26 and 27, jurisdiction of questions re
and 12 and
and
Vic. c.
And bv statute
lating to the attack and capture of pirates.
18 Vic, c. 96, offenses committed within the jurisdiction of the admiralty might be tried
in the ordinary criminal courts; but the independent criminal jurisdiction of the highSee ante, nole
p. 80.
now taken away.
court of admiralty
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inferior court of judicature within the king's dominions, requiring them to do
particular thing therein specified, which appertains to their office and
duty, and which the court of king's bench has previously determined, or at
least supposes, to be consonant to right and justice.
It is a high prerogative
writ, of a most extensively remedial nature; and may be issued in some cases
where the injured party has also another more tedious method of redress, as in
the case of admission or restitution to an office: (7) but it issues in all cases
where the party hath a right to have any thing done, and hath no other spe
cific means of compelling its performance. A mandamus therefore lies
to compel the admission or restoration of the party applying to any office or
franchise of a public nature, whether spiritual or temporal; to academical de
grees; to the use of a meeting-house, &c. : it lies for the production, inspec
tion, or delivery of publio books and papers; for the surrender of the regalia
of a corporation; to oblige bodies corporate to affix their common seal; to
compel the holding of a court; and for an infinite number of other purposes,
which it is impossible to recite minutely.
But at present we are more particu
larly to remark, that it issues to the judges of any inferior court, commanding
them to do justice according to the powers of their office, whenever the same
is delayed.
For it is the peculiar business of the court of king's bench to
superintend all inferior tribunals, and therein to enforce the due exercise of
those judicial or ministerial powers, with which the crown or legislature have
invested them: and this not only by restraining their excesses, but also by
A
<lu'°kening '"their negligenoe, and obviating their denial of justice.
r*Ull
*■
■*mandamus may therefore be had to the courts of the city of London, to
enter up judgment; (g) to the spiritual courts to grant an administration, to
swear a church-warden, and the like.
This writ is grounded on a suggestion,
by the oath of the party injured, of his own right, and the denial of justice
below; whereupon, in order more fully to satisfy the court that there is a
(il) Raym. tli.
some

(7) The writ of mandamus is only issued where there is a clear legal right, and the party
has no other adequate remedy.
Shipley v. The Bank, 10 Johns., 484; People v. Stevens, 5 Hill,
616; People v. Judges of Oneida C. P., 21 Wend., 20; People v. Supervisors, 11 N. Y., 663;
People v. Judges of Branch CO., 1 Doug. Mich., 819; St. Luke's Church v. Slack, 7
Cush., 226; James v. Commissioners, 18 Penn. St., 72. The court will exercise a discretion
in awarding or refusing it. Weber v. Zimmerman, 23 Md. , 45 ; Ex parte Stickney, 40 Ala. ,
160.
Its office is to compel the performance of a ministerial act, but not to control the exercise
of judicial discretion. Ferris v. Munn, 2 N. J., 161 ; Lamar v. Marshall, 21 Ala., 772;
People v. Auditor General, 8 Mich., 427; Ex parte Davenport, 6 Pet., 661.
It cannot command an act to be done which, without the writ, the officer or court would
have no power to perform.
Johnson v. Lucas, 11 Humph., 306; State v. Judge, Sua., IS
Ala., 740.
It may compel an inferior court to take action, but cannot require it to come to any par
ticular conclusion. Chase v. Blackstone Canal Co., 10 Pick., 244; People v. Inspectors,
Ac., 4 Mich., 187; IT. S. v. Lawrence, 8 DalL. 42; Hoyt ex parte, 13 Pet., 279; El kins v.
Athearn, 2 Denio, 191; State v. La Fayette County Court, 41 Mo., 222. But where an infe
rior court takes unauthorized action it may be compelled by this writ to vacate it if the
Exports Bradstreet, 7 Pet., 634; People v. Judges, Ac., 1
party has no other remedy.
Cow., 676; Ten Eyck v. Farlee, 1 Harr., 269; People v. Judges, &c, 1 Doug. Mich., 484.
Though generally used to enforce the performance of public duties, it may also be re
sorted to for the enforcement of private rights when withheld by public or corporate offi
People v. Walker, 9 Mich., 828; Case v. Wresler, 4 Ohio St., 561; Nourse v. Mercers.
riam, 8 Cush., 11; Helm v. Swiggett, 12Ind., 194
But in the case of neglected public
duties, a private citizen will not generally be permitted to move for this writ; the attorney
general is the proper relator.
Sanger v. County Cm'rs, 25 Me., 291; Heff ner v. Common
wealth, 28 Penn. St., 108; Hamilton v. State, 8 Ind., 452; People v. Regents of University,
4 Mich. 98.
The supreme court of the United States issues this writ in cases falling within the federal
jurisdiction, and the supreme court of each state also issues it in proper cases. And in
some of the states inferior courts are allowed to issue the writ.
A peremptory mandamus
is not often issued in the first instance, but the case is heard on an alternative writ, or on
an order to show cause, and the peremptory writ is awarded, if at all, as the final result
62
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probable ground for such interposition, a rule is made (except in some general
cases, where the probable ground is manifest) directing the party complained
of to show cause why a writ of mandamus should not issue: and, if he shows
no sufficient cause, the writ itself is issued, at first in the alternative, either to
do thus, or signify some reason to the contrary; to which a return, or answer,
And, if the interior judge, or other person to
must be made at a certain day.
whom the writ is directed, returns or signifies an insufficient reason, then there
issues in the second place a peremptory mandamus, to do the thing absolutely;
to which no other return will be admitted, but a certificate of perfect obe
dience and due execution of the writ.
If the inferior judge or other person
makes no return, or fails in his respect and obedience, he is punishable for his
But, if he, at the first, returns a sufficient cause,
contempt by attachment.
although it should be false in fact, the court of king's bench will not try the
truth of the fact upon affidavits; but will for the present believe him, and
But then the party injured may have
proceed no farther on the mandamus.
an action against him for his false return, and (if found to be false by the
jury) shall recover damages equivalent to the injuries sustained; together with
a peremptory mandamus to the defendant to do his duty.
Thus much for the

injury of neglect or refusal of justice.
2. The other injury, which is that of encroachment of jurisdiction, or call
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ing one coram non judioe, to answer in a court that has no legal cognizance
of the cause, is also a grievance, for which the common law has provided a
remedy by the writ of prohibition.
*A prohibition is a writ issuing properly only out of the court of r*112-i
*
king's bench, being the king's prerogative writ; but, for the further- *■
ance of justice, it may now also be had in some cases out of the court of chan
or exchequer, (k) (8) directed to the judge and
cery, (A) common pleas,
parties of a suit in any inferior court, commanding them to cease from the
prosecution thereof, upon suggestion, that either the cause originally, or some
collateral matter arising therein, does not belong to that jurisdiction, but to
the cognizance of some other court.
This writ may issue either to inferior
courts of common law; as, to the courts of the counties palatine or princi
pality of Wales,
they hold plea of land or other matters not lying within
their respective franchises;
to the county-courts or courts-baron, where they
attempt to hold plea of any matter of the value of forty shillings: (m) or
may be directed to the courts christian, the university courts, the court of
chivalry, or the court of admiralty, where they concern themselves with any
matter not within their jurisdiction; as
the first should attempt to try the
custom pleaded, or the latter
contract made or to be executed
validity of
within this kingdom.
Or, if, in handling of matters clearly within their cog
the bounds prescribed to them by the laws of
nizance, they transgress
England; as where they require two witnesses to prove the payment of a
release of tithes, (n) or the like; in snch cases also
legacy,
prohibition will
For, as the fact of signing
be awarded.
release, or of actual payment,
not properly a spiritual question, but only allowed to be decided in those
courts, because incident or accessory to some original question clearly within
their jurisdiction;
ought, therefore, where the two laws differ, to be decided
not according to the spiritual, but the temporal law; else the same question

»

Hob., 15.
(fc) Palmer, 523.
(n) Cro. Eliz. 666. Hob. 188.

(ft Lord Raym., 1408.

.

1

P. Wins. 4T».
(m) Finch, L. 461.

A)

,

S. S.

C

4

5 1

it

by

the supreme court to the United States dis
may be issued
(8) In the United States
And in the
trict courts when proceeding as courts of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.
several states, the supreme court of the state may issue the writ in proper cases.
Sea
Mill, 55;
C, 12 Am. Dec 596; Appo v. People, 20 N. Y.,
State v. Commissioners,
581; Arnold v. Shields,
Dana, 18;
30 Am. Dec, 669; People v. Wayne Circuit
Court, 11 Mich., 393; State v. Nathan,
Rich., 618; Mayo v. James, 12 Grot., 17; State v.
Clark. County Court, 41 Mo., 44.
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(o) F. N. B. 40.
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might be determined different ways, according to the court in which the suit
is depending: an impropriety, which no wise government can or ought to enAnd if either
r*ll"?1J ^ure> *an<l which is therefore a ground of prohibition.
the judge or the party shall proceed after such prohibition, an attach
ment may be had against them, to punish them for the contempt, at the dis
cretion of the court that awarded it; (o) and an action will lie against them,
to repair the party injured in damages.
So long as the idea continued among the clergy, that the ecclesiastical state
was wholly independent of the civil, great struggles were constantly main
tained between the temporal courts and the spiritual, concerning the writ of
prohibition and the proper object of it; even from the time of the constitu
tions of Clarendon, made in opposition to the claims of Archbishop Becket,
in 10 Hen. II, to the exhibition of certain articles, of complaint to the king by
Archbishop Bancroft, in 3 Jac. I, on behalf of the ecclesiastical courts: from
which, and from the answers to them signed by all the judges of Westminsterhall, (p) much may be collected concerning the reasons of granting and
A short summary of the latter is
methods of proceeding upon prohibitions.
The party aggrieved in the court below applies to the superior
as follows:
court, setting forth in a suggestion upon record the nature and cause of his
complaint, in being drawn ad aliud examen, by a jurisdiction or manner of
process disallowed by the laws of the kingdom: upon which, if the matter
alleged appears to the court to be sufficient, the writ of prohibition imme
diately issues; commanding the judge not to hold, and the party not to pro
secute the plea.
But sometimes the point may be too nice and doubtful to be
decided merely upon a motion: and then for the more solemn determination of
the question, the party applying for the prohibition is directed by the court
to prosecute an action, by filing
to declare in prohibition; that
declaration
not traversable) (y)
against the other, upon a supposition or fiction (which
that he has proceeded in the suit below, notwithstanding the writ of prohibi
tion. And
upon demurrer and argument, the court shall finally be of the
tnat tne matter suggested
good and sufficient ground of *proT*l 14 °Pm'on>
hibition in point of law, then judgment with nominal damages shall be
given for the party complaining, and the defendant, and also the inferior court,
the
shall be prohibited from proceeding any farther. On the other hand,
no competent ground for restraining the inferior
superior court shall think
jurisdiction, then judgment shall be given against him who applied for the
writ of consultation shall be awarded;
prohibition in the court above, and
so called, because, upon deliberation and consultation had, the judges find the
prohibition to be ill-founded, and therefore by this writ they return the cause
to its original jurisdiction, to be there determined, in the inferior court. And,
not absolutely final and con
even in ordinary cases, the writ of prohibition
clusive. For though the ground be
proper one in point of law, for granting
be afterwards falsified, the
the fact that gave rise to
the prohibition, yet
If, for instance,
custom
cause shall be remanded to the prior jurisdiction.
be pleaded in the spiritual court; a prohibition ought to go, because that court
the fact of such
custom be brought to
has no authority to try it: but'
writ of consultation will be granted.
competent trial, and be there found false,
For this purpose the party prohibited may appear to the prohibition, and take
declaration (which must always pursue the suggestion), and so plead to issue
upon it; denying the contempt and traversing the custom upon which the pro
that issue be found for the defendant, he shall
hibition was grounded; and
writ of consultation. The writ of consultation may also be, and
then have
frequently, granted by the court without any action brought; when, after
prohibition issued, upon more mature consideration the court are of opinion
not
that the matter suggested
good and sufficient ground to stop the pro
Thus careful has the law been, in compelling the inferior
ceedings below.
q) Barn. Not. 4to, 148.
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courts to do ample and speedy justice; in preventing them from transgressing
their due hounds; and in allowing them the undisturbed cognizance of such
causes as by right, founded on the usage of the kingdom or act of parliament,
do properly belong to their jurisdiction.

CHAPTER YIJI.

OF WRONGS AND THEIR REMEDIES, RESPECTING
THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS.
The former chapters of this part of our Commentaries having been em
ployed in describing the several methods of redressing private wrongs, either
by the mere act of the parties, or the mere operation of law; and in treating
or the nature and several species of courts; together with the cognizance of
wrongs or injuries by private or special tribunals, and the public ecclesiastical,
come now to consider
military, and maritime jurisdictions of this kingdom;
at large, and in a more particular manner, the respective remedies in the pub
lic and general courts of common law, for injuries or private wrongs of any
denomination whatsoever, not exclusively appropriated to any of the former
tribunals.
And herein shall, first, define the several injuries cognizable by
the courts of common law, with the respective remedies applicable to each par
ticular injury; and shall, secondly, describe the method of pursuing and obtain
ing these remedies in the several courts.
First, then, as to the several injuries cognizable by the courts of common
law, with the respective remedies applicable to each particular injury. And, in
treating of these, I shall at present confine myself to such wrongs as may be
committed in the mutual intercourse between subject and subject; which the
king, as the fountain of justice, is officially bound to redress in the ordinary
forms of law: reserving suoh *injuries or encroachments as may occur r*iig-|
J
between the crown and the subject, to be distinctly considered
here- *•
after, as the remedy in such cases is generally of a peculiar and eccentrical
nature.
Now, since all wrong may be considered as merely a privation of right, the
plain, natural remedy for every species of wrong is the being put in possession
of that right, whereof the party injured is deprived. This may either be
effected by a specific delivery or restoration of the subject-matter in dispute
to the legal owner; as when lands or personal chattels are unjustly withheld or
invaded: or, where that is not a possible, or at least not an adequate remedy,
by making the sufferer a pecuniary satisfaction in damages; as in case of
assault, breach of contract, &c. : to which damages the party injured has ac
quired an incomplete or inchoate right, the instant he receives the injury; (a)
though such right be not fully ascertained till they are assessed by the inter
vention of the law. The instruments whereby this remedy is obtained (which
are sometimes considered in the light of the remedy itself) are a diversity of
suits and actions, which are defined by the Mirror (b) to be "the lawful
demand of one's right: or, as Bracton and Fleta express
in the words of
Justinian, (c) jus prosequendi in judicio quod alicui debetur.
The Romans introduced, pretty early, set forms for actions and suits in their
law, after the example of the Greeks; and made
rule that eaoh injury
should be redressed by its proper remedy only. " Actiones" say the pandects,
" eompositce sunt, quibtcs inter se homines disceptarent: quas actiones nepopu-

I

(c) Init.

4,
t,
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lus promt vettet instittteret, certas solennesque esse voluerunt." (d) The forma
of these actions were originally preserved in the books of the pontifical col
lege, as choice and inestimable secrets; till one Cneius Flavius, the secretary of
The
Appius Claudius, stole a copy and published them to the people.
*concealment waa ridiculous: but the establishment of some standard
r*ll?l was
undoubtedly necessary to fix the true state of a question of right;
lest in
long and arbitrary process
might be shifted continually, and be at
length no longer discernible. Or, as Cicero expresses
(f) "sunt jura, sunt
formulae de omnibus rebus constitutor, ne quis aut in genere injuria!, aut in ra
tions actionis, errare possit. Mepressm enim sunt ex uniusoujusque damno,
dolore, incommodo, calamitate, injuria, publico! a prcetore formula!, ad quae
privata lis accommodatur. And in the same manner our Bracton, speaking of
the original writs upon which all our actions are founded, declares them to be
fixed and immutable, unless by authority of parliament, (g) And all the
modern legislatures of Europe have found
expedient, from the same reasons,
to fall into the same or
With us in England the several
similar method.
suits, or remedial instruments of justice, are from the subject of them distin
guished into three kinds; actions personal, real and mixed. (1)
Personal actions are such whereby a man claims debt or personal duty, or
man claims
satisfaction in
damages in lieu thereof: and likewise, whereby
The former are said
damages for some injury done to his person or property.
to be founded on contracts, the latter upon torts or wrongs: and they are the
same which the civil law calls " actiones in personam, qum adversus eum intenduntur, qui ex contractu vel delicto obligatus est aliquid dare vel conce
des." (h) Of the former nature are all actions upon debt or promises; of
the latter all actions for trespasses, nuisances, assaults, defamatory words, and
the like.
Real actions (or, as they are called in the Mirror,
feudal actions), which
concern real property only, are such whereby the plaintiff, here called the de
mandant, claims title to have any lands or tenements, rents, commons, or
ot^er hereditaments, in fee-simple, fee-tail, or for term of life.
By
P1181
*■
these actions formerly all disputes concerning real estates were de
cided: but they are now pretty generally laid' aside in practice, upon account
of the great nicety required in their management; and the inconvenient length
of their process:
much more expeditious method of trying titles being since
introduced by other actions personal and mixed.
Mixed actions are suits partaking of the nature of the other two, wherein
some real property
demanded, and also personal damages for
wrong sus
tained. As, for instance, an action of waste, which
brought by him who
hath the inheritance, in remainder or reversion, against the tenant for life, who
hath committed waste therein, to recover not only the land wasted, which
would make
real action; but also treble damages, in pursuance of
merely
the statute of Gloucester, (k) which
personal recompense; and so both
mixed action.
being joined together, denominate
Under these three heads may every species of remedy by suit or action in the
courts of common law be comprised
But in order effectually to apply the
first necessary to ascertain the complaint.
remedy,
proceed, therefore,
now to enumerate the several kinds, and to inquire into the respective natures
of all private wrongs, or civil injuries which may be offered to the rights of

L

•

8.
t
«.

4,
8,

8,

(

a

1.
1,

%

1,
8.
8,
$
8.

e. 41.
(«) Cie. pro iiuroma. 11,de orat.
(/) Pro. Qu. Rotcio,
(d) Ff.
(g) Sunt quasdam 'brevia formata tuner certis caeibue de curtu, et de communi consilio totius regni approbata et coucetta, quas guidem nultatenut mutari poterint absque consensu et voluntate eorum. L.
de exceplionibut, c 17. 18.
IS.
0. 15.
ih) Inst.
(*) Edw.
tf) 0.

a

66

4

3

and Win. IV. cc. 27, 86, except
(1) All real and mixed actions were abolished by statute
actions for dower, quart impedit and ejectment, and
new proceeding in ejectment was
substituted for that form of action by the common law procedure act of 1852.
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either a man's person or his property; recounting at the same time the respect
ive remedies which are furnished by the law for every infraction of right.
Bat must first beg leave to premise, that all civil injuries are of two kinds, the
one without force or violence, as slander or breach of contract; the other,
coupled with force and violence, as batteries or false imprisonment. (J) Which
latter species savour something of the criminal kind, being always attended
with some violation of the peace; for which, in strictness of law, a fine ought
to be paid to the king, as *well as a private satisfaction to the party r*iip/i
•*
injured, (m) And this distinction of private wrongs, into injuries with *■
and without force, we shall find to run through all the variety of which we are
shall follow the same method that
now to treat.
In considering of which,
was pursued with regard to the distribution of rights: for as these are nothing
else but an infringement or breach of those rights, which we have before laid
down and explained, it will follow that this negative system of wrongs must
correspond and tally with the former positive system of rights. As, therefore,
we divided (n) all rights into those of persons and those of things, so we must
make the same general distribution of injuries into such as affect the rights of
persons, and such as affect the rights of property.
The rights of persons, we may remember, were distributed into absolute and
relative: absolute, which were such as appertained and belonged to private
men, considered merely as individuals, or single persons: and relative, which
were incident to them as members of society, and connected to each other by
various ties and relations. And the absolute rights of each individual were de
fined to be the right of personal security, the right of personal liberty, and the
right of private property, so that the wrongs or injuries affecting them must
consequently be of a corresponding nature.
I. As to injuries which affect the personal security of individuals, they are
either injuries against their lives, their limbs, their bodies, their health, or
their reputations.
With regard to the first subdivision, or injuries affecting the life of
1.
man, they do not fall under our present contemplation ; being one of the most
atrocious species of crimes, the subject of the next book of our Commentaries.

I

I

<2)

*2, 3. The two next species of injuries, affecting the limbs or bodies r*iorn
*
of individuals,
shall consider in one and the same view. And these *■

I

(0 Finch, L. 184.

(m) Finch, L. 198. Jenk. Cent. 185.

(») See book I, ch. 1.

(2) That no civil action will lie at the common law for causing the death of a human
Co., 1 Cush.,
28 N. Y., 465; Carey v. Berkshire
being, see Wbitford v. Panama
Co., 14 B.
475; Ohio and M.
Co. v. Tindall, 18 Ind., 366; Eden v. L. and F.
Monr., 204. But where death does not at once ensue, a person entitled to the services of the
person injured may recover for the loss accruing between the injury and the death, and
this recovery will not be barred by the death.
Long v. Morrison, 14 Ind., 595; Hyatt v.
Adams, 16 Mich., 180.
And now, by statute 9 and 10 Vic. c. 93, whenever the death of a person shall be caused
by such wrongful act, neglect or default, as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled
the party injured to maintain an action for damages,
the person who would have been
liable to such action may be sued by the executor or administrator, for the benefit of the
wife, husband, parent, or child of the person deceased.
The damages awarded are appor
tioned among the persons for whose benefit the action is brought, as the jury may direct.
See Read v. Great Eastern
Similar statutes have been passed in the United States.
Co., L. R., 3 Q. B., 555; Carey v. Berkshire R. R. Co., 1 Cush., 479; Soule v. New York,
Co., 23 N. Y. 485; Georgia,
Ac., R. R. Co., 24 Conn., 575; Whitford v. Panama R.
Co., 20 La. An., 25;
Ac., Co. v. Wynn. 42 Geo.. 881; Prank v. New Orleans, <fcc.,
Co., 86 Iowa, 458 ; 8teel v. Kurtz, 28 Ohio St., 191; Ala
"Walters v. Chicago, &c..
bama, &c.,
Co. v. Packer, 9 Bush,
Co. v. Waller, 48 Ala., 459; Covington St.
455; 8. C, 15 Am. Rep., 725; Mathews v. Warner, 29 Gratt., 670; 8. C, 26 Am. Rep.,
896.
The English doctrine that the civil remedy for an injury by a felony is suspended until
the criminal remedy has been pursued
is generally held inapplicable in the United States,
See
■wherethe duty of prosecuting for public offenses is devolved upon a public officer.
i collected, 1 Bish. Cr. L., § 829, et »eq.
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III.

1. By threats and menaces of bodily hurt, through fear of
A menace alone, without a consequent
•which a man's business is interrupted.
the wrong, there must
inconvenience, makes not the injury: but to complete
' ' ""
'
''
•' • • •
be both of them together.
to be recovered by action <
though not an absolute violence,
to beat another, without touching him: as if one lifts up his cane, or his fist
in a threatening manner at another; or strikes at him, but misses him; this isdescribes to be "an unlawful setting upon
an assault, insidtus, which Finch
(^)
one's person."
This also is an inchoate violence, amounting considerably
higher than bare threats; and, therefore, though no actual suffering is proved,
yet the party injured may have redress by action of trespass vi et armis ;
for the injury.
wherein he shall recover damages as a compensation
3. By
The least touching of
battery ; which is the unlawful beating of another.
another's person wilfully, or in anger, is a battery; for the law cannot draw
the line between different degrees of violence, and therefore totally prohibit*
the first and lowest stage of it; every man's person being sacred, aud no other
in any the slightest manner.
And, there
having a right to meddle with
fore, upon similar principle the Cornelian law de injuriis prohibited pulsa
tion as well as verberation
distinguishing verberation, which was accom
But
panied with pain, from pulsation, which was attended with none,

;

a

it,

may be committed,

(r)

I

if

if

a

battery is, in some cases, justifiable or lawful; as where one who hath author
parent, or master, gives moderate correction to his child, his scholar, or
ity,
his apprentice.
one strikes me
So also on the principle of self-defence: for
sued
first, or even only assaults me,
may strike in my own defense; and,
^or
was the plaintiffs *own
mav P^ea^ son assau^ demesne, or that
211
original assault that occasioned it. So likewise in defence of my goods
or possession,
man endeavors to deprive me of them,
may justify laying
hands upon him to prevent him; and in case he persists with violence,
may
Thus, too, in the exercise of an office, as that
proceed to beat him away.
man may lay hands upon another to turn him
of churchwarden or beadle,
And,
out of church, and prevent his disturbing the congregation,
sued
for this or the like battery, he may set forth the whole case, and plead that
he laid hands upon him gently, moUiter manus imposuit, for this purpose.
On
defined to be the unlawful
account of these causes of justification, battery
as for assault, by action of tres
beating of another; for which the remedy
4. By wound
pass vi et armis: wherein the jury will give adequate damages.
ing which consists in giving another some dangerous hurt, and
only an
an injury still more
aggravated species of battery. 5. By mayhem; which
member
atrocious, and consists in violently depriving another of the use of
battery, attended with this aggra
proper for his defence in fight. This
forever disabled from
vating circumstance, that thereby the party injured
defence against future external injuries, as he otherwise
making so good
might have done.
Among these defensive members are reckoned not only
fore tooth, (w) and also some others.
arms and legs, but
finger, an eye, and
no mayhem
(«) But the loss of one of the jaw teeth, the ear, or the nose,
at common law; as they can be of no use in fighting.
The same remedial ac
tion of trespass vi et armis lies also to recover damages for this injury, an in
jury which (when wilful) no motive can justify, but necessary self-preserva
tion. If the ear be cut off, treble damages are given by statute 37 Hen. VIII,
c.
not mayhem at common law. And here
must observe,
though this
that for these four last injuries, assault, battery, wounding, and mayhem, an
indictment may be brought as well as an action; and frequently both are ac
cordingly prosecuted; the one at the suit of the crown for the crime against
7

6.

(»)

1

$)
1

08

Ed. IV, 24.
(p) Regist 104. 27Am. 11.
(r) Tt. 47, 10,
(u) Finch. L. 804.
(1) Sid. 801.
1

L

808.
(o) Pinch,
(a) Finch. L. 203.
Finch L. 203.

I

is

6,

is

a

a

a

is

is
a

a

is

/

is

is,

is

if

(t)

a («)

I

a

I

if

'

it

Pi

Hawk. P. C.

lit

Chap.

Injuries Affecting Health.

8.]

121

J

is
a
a

it

a

if

a

is

a

is

is

is

a

is it

a

a

2,

is

*•

is

is

is

a

is

(2)

the public; the *other at the suit of the party injured, to make him &r*ioQi
-I
reparation in damages.
4. Injuries
affecting a man's health are where, by any unwholesome
practices of another, a man sustains any apparent damage in his vigor or con
As by selling him bad provisions or wine; (to) by the exercise of a
stitution.
noisome trade, which infects the air in his neighborhood; (a;) or by the neglect
or unskilful management of his physican, surgeon, or apothecary. (3) For it
hath been solemnly resolved, (y) that mala praxis is a great misdemeanor and
offence at common law, whether it be for curiosity and experiment or by neg
lect; because it breaks the trust which the party had placed in his physician,
and tends to the patient's destruction. Thus, also, in the civil law,
neglect
or want of skill in physicians or surgeons, "culpa) adnumerantur, veluti si medicus curationem dereliquerit, male quempiam secuerit, aut perperam ei medicamentum dederit." These are wrongs or injuries unaccompanied
by force, for
a remedy in damages by
which there
special action of trespass upon the
an universal
■case. This action of trespass, or transgression, on the case,
remedy, given for all personal wrongs and injuries without force; so called be
cause the plaintiff's whole case or cause of complaint
set forth at length in
For though in general there are methods prescribed, and
the original writ, (a)
forms of actions previously settled, for redressing those wrongs, which most
immediately prejudicial or in
■usually occur, and in which the very act itself
jurious to the plaintiff's person or property, as battery, non-payment of debts,
detaining one's goods, or the like, yet where *any special consequential r*ioQi
damage arises, which could not be foreseen and provided for in the ordinallowed, both by common law and
ary course of justice, the party injured
c. 24, to bring
the Statute of Westm.
special action on his own case, by a
writ formed according to the peculiar circumstances of his own particular
For wherever the common law gives right or prohibits an in
grievance, (b)
also gives a remedy by action; (c) and, therefore, wherever
new in
jury,
new method of remedy must be pursued, (d) And
done,
settled
jury
distinction, (e) that where an act
done which is in itself an immediate injury
to another's person or property, there the remedy
usually by an action of
no act done, but only
culpable omis
trespass vi et armis; but where there
not immediately injuiious, but only by consequence
sion; or where the act
and collaterally; there no action of trespass vi et armis will lie, but an action
-on the special case, for the damages consequent on such omission or act. (4)
man's reputation or good name are, first, by
5. Lastly: injuries affecting
malicious, scandalous and slanderous words, tending to his damage and deroga
man maliciously and falsely utter any slander or false tale of
tion. As
another; which may either endanger him in law, by impeaching him of some

6

1

l

1

9

4,
S,
6,
7.

Rep. 62. Hutt. 185.
(to) RolL Abr. 90.
(*)
(v) Lord Baym. 214.
(z) Inst.
" Bex vicecomiii
ealutem. Si A. feceritte aecurem de clamore suo proaeqwndo, tunc
(o) For example:
pone per vadium et talvot plegioe B. quod sit corem juttitiarii* nostris apud Westmonasterium in octabit
sanrfi Michaelis. oetensuru* quare cum idem B. ad dextrum oculum ipsius A. cnsualiter lazsum bene et
competenter curandum apud 8. pro quadem pecuniae gumma prce manibus solut a assumpsiaset. idem B.
t-uram warn circa oculum prasdictum tarn nealigenter et improvide apposuit, quod idem A. defectu
iptius B. visum oculi prcedicti totaliter amitit, ad damnum iptius A. viginti librarum, ut dicit. Et
&c. BegMr. Brev.
abeat ibi nomina plegiorum et hoc breve. Teste meipto apudweetmonatterium,"
106.
Mod. 64.
(b) See page 62.
(c) Salic 20.
(d) Cro. Jac. 478.
(e) 11Mod. 180. Lord Raym. 1402. Stra. 686.
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9

8.

2

9

8

1

9

a

patient:
physician for the negligent or unskillful treatment of
(8) A* to the liability of
I., 243; Walkerv. Goodman
Conn., 209, Holmes v. Peck,
See Landon
Humphrey,
21 Ala., 647; Hathom v. Richmond, 48 Vt, 557, Craig v. Chambers, 17 Ohio St., 253; Patten v
Wiggin, 51 Me., 594;Utley v. Burns, 70111., 162; Hichcock v. Burgett, 38 Mich.. 601;
Gambert v. Hart, 44 Cal., 542; Heath v. Glison,
Ore., 64; Bradstreet v. Everson, 72 Penn
St., 124; Branner v. Stormont
Kan., 51; Smothers v. Hanks, 84 Iowa, 286.
Bl. Rep., 892; also, Ricker
Squib case, Scott v. Shepherd,
(4) See the celebrated
Freeman, 50 N. H., 420
C, Am. Rep., 267; Percival v. Hickey, 18 Johns., 257; 8. 0..
Am. Dec, 210.
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heinous crime, as to say that a man hath poisoned another, or is perjured; (f)
or which may exclude him from society, as to charge him with having any infectiouH disease; or which may impair or hurt his trade or livelihood, as to call a
tradesman a bankrupt, a physician a quack, or a lawyer a knave, (g) (5) Words
spoken in derogation of a peer, a judge, or other great officer of the realm,
which are called scandalum magnatum, are held to be still more heinous: (A)
and though they be such as would not be actionable in the case of a common
person, yet, when spoken in disgrace of such high and respectable characters,
r*i(UlJ *ney amount to an atrocious injury; *which is redressed by an action
as well on behalf of
on the case, founded on many ancient statutes;
the crown, to inflict the punishment of imprisonment on the slanderer, as on
behalf of the party, to recover damages for the injury sustained. (6) Words also
magistrate, or person in
public trust, are reputed
tending to scandalize
more highly injurious than when spoken of
said, that
private man. (k) It
formerly no actions were brought for words, unless the slander was such as (if
But too great encourage
true) would endanger the life of the object of it.
now held
ment being given by this lenity to false and malicious slanderers,
that, for scandalous words of the several species before mentioned (that may
endanger man by subjecting him to the penalties of the law, may exclude
him from society, may impair his trade, or may affect peer of the realm,
magistrate, or one in public trust), an action on the case may be had, without
proving any particular damage to have happened, but merely upon the proba
But with regard to words that do not thus
might happen.
bility that
apparently, and upon the face of them, import such defamation as will of
course be injurious,
necessary that the plaintiff should aver some particu
called laying his action with
per
lar damage to have happened; which
bastard, he cannot for this bring
As
clergyman
say that such
quod.
an action against me, unless he can show some special loss by it; in which
bastard, per quad
case he may bring his action against me, for saying he was
living, (m) In like manner, to slander
he lost the presentation to such
true, would
another man's title, by spreading such injurious reports as,
deprive him of his estate (as to call the issue in tail, or one who hath land by
actionable, provided any special damage accrues to the
bastard),
descent,
he loses an opportunity of selling the land, (n)
But
proprietor thereby; as
mere scurrility, or opprobrious words, which neither in themselves import, nor
are in fact attended with, any injurious effects, will not support an action. So
*man
p^.o.-i scandals, which concern matters merely spiritual, as to call
heretic or adulterer, are cognizable only in the ecclesiastical court; (o)
foundation for per quod.
unless any temporal damage ensues, which may be
productive
Words of heat and passion, as to call man rogue and rascal,
of no ill consequence, and not of any of the 'dangerous species before men
friendly manner, as
tioned, are not actionable: neither are words spoken in
by way of advice, admonition, or concern, without any tincture or circum
stance of ill-will: for, in both these cases, they are not maliciously spoken,
which
part of the definition of slander, (p) (7) Neither (as was formerly

(/)
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1

1

1

8.

2S

L

8

1.

1

Finch, L. 185.
(h) Ventr. 80.
(?) Ibid. 186.
IS Rio. H, o. 11.
Bio. O. o.
o. 84.
Edw.
<i) Westm.
Raym.
Rep. 17.
Vent.
38.
Lev. 24a
1369.
Lord
(m)
(0
(fc)
Freem. 277.
(o) Noy 64.
(n) Cro. Jao. 218. Cro. Ellz. 197.
(;>)Finch, L. 186. LeT. 82. Cro. Jao. 91.
4

,

6

1

9

7

is

5

Am. Dec, 837; Pollard v. Lyon, 95 U. S.,
Johns. 188; 8.C.,
(5) See Brooker v. Coffin,
225.
now obsolete.
(6) This action
(7) The defendant in an action for slander may give in evidence under the general issue,
in mitigation of damages, any such facts as, without showing the truth of the charge, tend
Wagner
to show that defendant believed it. and thus to rebut the presumption of malice.
QUI, 206; Scott v. McKinnish, 15 Ala., 662; Bisbey v. Shaw, 12 N. Y.,
v. Holbrunner,
Mich., 853; Chapman v. Calder, 14
B. Monr., 166; Faxr v. Basco,
67; Hart v. Reed,
Port., 90; Blickenstaff v. Perrin, 27 Ind., 527.
Penn. St., 865; Kennedy v. Dear,
70

Injuries to Reputation.

Chap. 8.]

125

;

is

*

it

it

J 8)

is

a

is

it

*■

is

it,

a

a

is

;

(t)

is

is

it

if

it,

hinted) (q) are any reflecting words made use of in legal proceedings, and
pertinent to the cause in hand, a sufficient cause of action for slander, (r)
Also if the defendant be able to justify, and prove the words to be true, no
action will lie, (s) even though special damage hath ensued: for then it is no
As if I can prove the tradesman a bankrupt, the physi
slander or false tale.
cian a quack, the lawyer a knave, and the divine a heretic, this will destroy
their respective actions: for though there may be damage sufficient accruing
from
the fact be true,
damnum absque injuria and where there
yet,
And this
no injury, the law gives no remedy.
agreeable to the reasoning
of the civil law;
"Mim qui nocentem infamat, non est mquum et bonum ob
delict a enim nocentium nota esse oportet et expedit."
earn rem condemnari
A second way of affecting man's reputation by printed or written libels,
pictures, signs, and the like; which set him in an odious or ridiculous («) light,
and thereby diminish his reputation.
With regard to libels in general, there
are, as in many other cases, two remedies: one .by indictment, and another by
action.
The former for the public offence; for every libel has
tendency to
the breach of the peace, by provoking the person libeled to break
which
the same (in point of law) whether *the matter contained be r„ . „„■.
offence
true or false; and therefore the defendant, on an indictment for publishnot allowed to allege the truth of
libel,
ing
by way of justification.^)
to repair the party in
But in the remedy by action on the case, which
am ages for the injury done him, the defendant may, as for words spoken,
justify the truth of the facts and show that the plaintiff has received no injury
at all. (as) What was said with regard to words spoken, will also hold in every
particular with regard to libels by writing or printing, and the civil actions
seems necessary also to
consequent thereupon: but as to signs or pictures,
show, by proper innuendos and averments of the defendant's meaning, the im
port and application of the scandal, and that some special damage has followed;
cannot appear, that such libel by picture was understood to be
(9) otherwise
2

Bap. 13.
(v>) Rep. 125.

4

(«)

5

(r) Dyer, 285. Cro. Joe. SO.
(u) Show. 814. 11Mod. 99.

(«) Page 29.
(t) Ff. 47, 10,18.

(x) Hob. 263. 11 Hod. 99.
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Vic, c. 96, the defendant in any indictment or information
and
(8) But now by statute
was for the public
for libel may plead tbe truth of the matters charged, and also that
benefli that the same should be published; and this plea,
sustained, constitutes
good
defense, but
not sustained, the court may, in pronouncing sentence, consider whether
was
the guilt of tbe defendant
aggravated or mitigated by the plea.
In the United States, by constitutional or statutory provisions, the truth
made
defense
with good motives and for justifiable ends.
prosecution,
published
to criminal
authorize
an
action
of
tort
for
In
to
malicious
prosecution,
there must be
general,
(9)
A suit or prosecution must have been
concurrence of the following circumstances:
The motive in instituting
instituted without any probable cause therefor;
must have
The prosecution must have terminated in the acquittal or discharge of
been malicious;
" that there be such state of facts as
the accused.
To probable cause
necessary
man of ordinary caution and prudence to believe and entertain an honest and
would lead
Bacon v. Towne,
CubU., 217, 288.
See
strong suspicion that the person
guilty."
Broad v. Ham,
R. L, 860; Fagnan v. Knox, 66
Bing. (N. C), 722; Mowry v. Whipple,
N. Y., 525; Driggs v. Burton, 44 Vt., 124; Bank of British N. A. v. Strong,
App. Cas.
Priv. Coun., 807; 16 Moak, 24. In suits for malicious prosecution the burden of showing
on the plaintiff and proof of malice will not establish it.
want of probuble cause
Heyne
v. Blair, 62 N. Y.. 19; Skidmore v. Bricker, 77 111., 164; Cloon v. Gerry, 13 Gray, 201. But
malice may be inferred from the want of probable cause, though the inference
not nec
Dietz v. Langfitt, 63 Penn. St., 234; Flickinger v. Wagner, 46 Md., 580.
essary one.
In few cases an action for the malicious institution of proceedings not criminal in their
One of these
the case of
malicious attempt to procure an adjudication
nature will lie.
in bankruptcy without cause, or an adjudication of insanity in order to put the party under
guardianship. Lockenour v. Sides, 57 Ind. 360. The case of malicious arrest in an un
malicious attachment of property, in such a suit would seem
founded civil suit, or of
Dill.,
equally to support this action. Collins v. Hayte, 50 111., 837; Preston v. Cooper,
Hawks, 545;
C, 14 Am.
689; Woods v. Finnell, 18 Bush, 628; Williams v. Hunter,
Dec., 597.
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levelled at the plaintiff, or that it was attended

with any actionable conse

quences.
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Pinch, L. 305.
B. 118.
(a) Carth. 421. Lord Raym. 253.
<b)10Mod. 219,220. Stra. 691.
689.
(«) 8tat. 13Geo. m, 0. 78.
(d) Ibid. 62,691.
*>Car. n, c.
Mod. 95.
Sal k. 78.
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(z)

A third way of destroying or injuring a man's reputation is by preferring
malicious indictments or prosecutions against him; which, under the mask
of justice and public spirit, are sometimes made the engines of private spite
and enmity.
For this, however, the law has given a very adequate remedy in
damages, either by an action of conspiracy, (y) which cannot be brought but
against two at the least; or, which is the more usual way, by a special action
In order to carry on the
on the case for a false and malicious prosecntion.
former (which gives
recompense for the danger to which the party has been
necessary that the plaintiff should obtain
exposed)
copy of the record of
usual to deny
his indictment and acquittal; but, in prosecutions for felony, it
a copy of the indictment, where there
any, the least, probable cause to
For
found such prosecution upon, (a)
would be
very great discourage
ment to the public justice of the kingdom,
who had
tolerable
prosecutors,
ground of suspicion, were liable to be sued at law whenever their indictments
*But an action on the case for
malicious prosecution
tDi8carr'e(lT*1271
may be founded upon an indictment, whereon no acquittal can be had;
as
be rejected by the grand jury, or be coram nonjudice, or be insufficiently
not the danger of the plaintiff, but the scandal, vexation,
drawn. For
founded. (Jj) However, any probable
and expense, upon which this action
cause for preferring
sufficient to justify the defendant.
II. We are next to consider the violation of the right of personal liberty.
This
effected by the injury of false imprisonment, for which the law has
not only decreed
punishment, as heinous public crime, but has also given
private reparation to the party; as well by removing the actual confinement
for the present, as, after it
over, by subjecting the wrong-doer to a civil
action, on account of the damage sustained by the loss of time and liberty.
To constitute the injury of false imprisonment there are two points requisite:
and 2. The unlawfulness of such detention.
1. The detention of the person:
an imprisonment, whether
com
be in
Every confinement of the person
mon prison, or in
private house, or in the stocks, or even by forcibly de
taining one in the public streets, (c) Unlawful, or false, imprisonment con
sists in such confinement or detention without sufficient authority;
which
authority may arise either from some process from the courts of justice, or
from some warrant from
legal officer having power to commit, under his
hand and seal, and expressing the cause of such commitment; (d) or from some
other special cause warranted, for the necessity of the thing, either by common
law, or act of parliament; such as the arresting of felon by private person
without warrant, the impressing of mariners for the public service, or the
False
apprehending of waggoners for misbehaviour in the public highways,
lawful warrant or process at an
imprisonment also may arise by executing
*unlawful time, as on
Sunday; (f) for the statute hath declared,
[*128] that such service or process shall be void.
the injury.
Let
(10) This
us next see the remedy: which
of two sorts; the one removing the injury,
the other making satisfaction for it.
The means of removing the actual injury of false imprisonment are four
fold.
By writ of mainprize. 2. By writ of de odio et atia. 3. By writ
de homine replegiando.
4. By writ of habeas corpus.
writ directed to the sheriff (either
The writ of mainprize, manucaptio,
bailable offence, and bail hath
generally, when any man
imprisoned for
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(10) The statute excepts cases of treason, felony and breach of the peace, in which the
allowed upon Sunday.
axecution of
lawful warrant or process
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or cause of commitment is not
properly bailable below), commanding him to take sureties for the prisoner's
Main
appearance, usually called mainpernors, and to set him at large, (g)
pernors differ from bail, in that a man's bail may imprison or surrender him
up before the stipulated day of appearance; mainpernors can do neither, but
are barely sureties for his appearance at the day: bail are only sureties, that
the party be answerable for the special matter tor which they stipulate; main
pernors are bound to produce him to answer all charges whatsoever. (A)
2. The writ de odio et atia was anciently used to be directed to the sheriff,
commanding him to inquire whether a prisoner charged with murder was com
mitted upon just cause of suspicion, or merely propter odium et atiam, for
hatred and ill-will; and if upon the inquisition due cause of suspicion did not
appear, then there issued another writ for the sheriff to admit him to bail.
This writ, according to Bracton,
ought not to be denied to any man,
being expressly ordered to be made out gratis, without any denial, by magna
13 Edw.
c. 29.
But the statute *of r *12n-i
carta, c. 26, and statute West.
in the case of killing by misEdw.
c.
restrained
Gloucester,
abolished
in all
adventure or self-defence, and the statute 28 Edw. Ill, c.
cases whatsoever: but as the statute 42 Edw. Ill, c.
repealed all statutes
of opinion
then in being, contrary to the great charter, Sir Edward Coke
{k) that the writ de odio et atia was thereby revived.
man out of prison or
3. The writ de homine replegiando (J) lies to replevy
■out of the custody of any private person (in the same manner that chattels
taken in distress may be replevied, of which in the next chapter), upon giving
security to the sheriff that the man shall be forthcoming to answer any charge
And
the person be conveyed out of the sheriff's jurisdiction,
against him.
the sheriff may return that he
eloigned, elongatus; upon which
process
issues (called
capias in withernam) to imprison the defendant himself, with
out bail or mainprize, (wi) till he produces the party. But this writ guarded
not an effectual remedy in numerous
with so many exceptions, (n), that
The incapacity therefore
concerned.
instances, especially where the crown
of these three remedies to give complete relief in every case hath almost
entirely antiquated them; and hath caused
general recourse to be had, in
behalf of persons aggrieved by illegal imprisonment, to
4. The writ of habeas corpus, the most celebrated writ in the English law.
Of this there are various kinds made use of by the courts at Westminster, for
removing prisoners from one court into another for the more easy administra
man hath
the habeas corpus ad respondendum, when
tion of justice. Such
confined by the process of some inferior
a cause of action against one who
court; in order to remove the prisoner, and charge him with this new action in
that ad satisfaciendum, when
the court above, (o) Such
prisoner hath
desirous p.,.-,
*had judgment against him in an action, and the plaintiff
to bring him up to some superior court to charge him with process
of execution, (p) Such also are those ad prosequendum, testificandum, deliber
andum, &c, which issue when
prisoner, in order to
necessary to remove
prosecute or bear testimony in any court, or to be tried in the proper jurisdic
tion wherein the fact was committed. Such
lastly, the common writ ad fac
iendum et recipiendum which issues out of any of the courts of Westminstersued in some inferior jurisdiction, and
desirous to re
hall, when person
move the action into the superior court; commanding the inferior judges to
produce the body of the .defendant, together with the day and cause of his
frequently denominated an habeas
caption and detainer (whence the writ
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been refused; or specially, when the offence
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Vol.

2
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2

4

8,

1

F. N. B. 250. HaL P. 0. 141. Coke on Ball and Malnp. oh. 10.
Coke on Bail and Mainp. cb. 3.
Inst 179.
tr. 2,0.8.
(k) Inst. 43,65,315.
(<) L,
, F. N. B. «.
(m) Raym. 474.
,n) Niti captut eit per tpeciale proxeplum nottram. vel capitalie justitlarii nostrl, vel pro mart*
hominie, vel pro foreita nostra, vet pro aliquo alio retto, quart secundum consuetudinem Anglia non
eit replegiabilie. Begittr. 77.
Lilly Prac. Beg.
(p)
(o) Mod. 196.
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to do and receive whatsoever the king's court shall consider
in that behalf. This is a writ grantable of common right, without any motion
in courtly) and it instantly supersedes all proceedings in the court below. But
in order to prevent the surreptitious discharge of prisoners, it is ordered by
statute 1 and 2 P. and M. c. 13, that no habeas corpus shall issue to remove any
prisoner out of any gaol, unless signed by some judge of the court out of
which it is awarded. And to avoid vexatious delays by removal of frivolons
causes, it is enacted by statute 21 Jao. I, c. 23, that, where the judge of an in
ferior court of record is a barrister of three years' standing, no cause shall be
removed from thence by habeas corpus or other writ, after issue or demurrer
deliberately joined: that no cause, if once remanded to the inferior court by
writ of procedendo or otherwise, shall ever afterwards be again removed; and
that no cause shall be removed at all, if the debt or damages laid in the dec
laration do not amount to the sum of five pounds.
But an expedient (r) hav
ing been found out to elude the latter branch of the statute, by procuring a
nominal plaintiff to bring another action for five pounds or upwards (and then
by the course of the court, the habeas corpus removed both actions together),
'* *s tnere^ore enacted by statute 12 Geo. I, c. 29, that the inferior *court
T*1311
*■
J may proceed in such actions as are under the value of five pounds,
notwithstanding other actions may be brought against the same defend
ant to a greater amount.
And by statute 19 Geo. Ill, c. 70, no cause,
under the value of ten pounds, shall be removed by habeas corpus, or otherwise,
into any superior court, unless the defendant so removing the same, shall give
special bail for payment of the debt and costs.
But the great and efficacious writ, in all manner of illegal confinement, is
that of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum; directed to the person detaining an
other, and commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner, with the day
and cause of his caption and detention, ad faciendum, subjiciendum, et recipi
endum, to do, submit to, and receive whatsoever the judge or court awarding
such writ shall consider in that behalf,
This
a high prerogative writ, and
therefore by the common law issuing out of the court of king's bench not only
in term-time, but also during the vacation,
(11) by fiat from the chief jus
tice or any other of the judges, and running into all parts of the king's domin
at all times entitled to have an account, why the liberty of
ions; for the king
any of his subjects restrained, (u) wherever that restraint may be inflicted. If
issues in vacation,
usually returnable before the judge himself who awarded
and he proceeds by himself thereon; (v) unless the term should intervene
and then
the party were privileged,
may be returned in court, (to) Indeed,
in the courts of common pleas and exchequer, as being (or supposed to be) an offi
cer or suitor of the court, an habeas corpus ad subjiciendum might also 1»y com
the cause of imprison
mon law have been awarded from thence; (sb) and,
ment were palpably illegal, they might have discharged him: (y) but,
he
were committed for any criminal matter, they could only have remanded him,
or taken bail for his appearance in the court of king's bench (z) which occa
sioned the common pleas for some time to discountenance such applications.
8mce the *mention of the king's bench and common pleas, as cor*ll2l■•
c. 10,
ordinate in this jurisdiction, by statute 16 Car.
hath been
holden, that every subject of the kingdom
equally entitled to the benefit of
the common law writ, in either of those courts, at his option. (a) It hath
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(11) Watson's Case.

9

u

2

2

2

4

2

I

(f)

2

(a) Mod. 80S.
(•) St. Trials, Till. 142.
(r) Bohun, Instit. Legal. 85, edit. 1708.
The pluriet habeas corpus directed to Berwick In 43 El iz. (cited Burr. 856),was teste'd die Jovis prox*
post quinden' Snncti Martini. It appears, by referring to the dominical letter of that Tear, that this
quindena (Not. 25) happened that year on a Saturday. The Thursday after was therefore the 30thof Nov
ember—two days after the expiration of the term.
(«) Cro. Jac. 513.
(t>)Burr. 608.
(to) bid. 4«0,542.608.
Inst. 290.
Hal. P. C. 144. Ventr. 24.
(y) Vaugh. 155.
(*) IriBt. 55.
(*) Carter, 221. Jon. 18.
(o) Mod. 188. Wood's Case, C. B. HOL 11Geo. m.

Ad. and E., 781.
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also been said, and by very respectable autborities,(5) that the like habeas cor
pus may issue out of the court of chancery in vacation; but upon the famous
application to Lord Nottingham by Jenks, notwithstanding the most diligent
■earches, no precedent could be found where the chancellor had issued such a
writ in vacation, (c) and therefore his lordship refused it.
In the king's bench and common pleas it is necessary to apply for it by mo
tion to the court, (d) as in the case of all other prerogative writs (certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, &c), which do not issue as of mere course, without
showing some probable cause why the extraordinary power of the crown is
For, as was argued by Lord Chief Justice
called in to the party's assistance.
"
Yaughan, (e) it is granted on motion, because it cannot be had of course; and
therefore, no necessity to grant it; for the court ought to be satisfied
there
And this seems the
that the party hath
probable cause to be delivered."
directed
more reasonable, because (when once granted) the person to whom
can return no satisfactory excuse for not bringing up the body of the prisoner.
issued of mere course, without showing to the court or judge
(f) So that
traitor or felon under sentence of
some reasonable ground for awarding
wife, child,
relation, or
soldier or mariner in the king's service,
death,
tem
domestic, confined for insanity, or other prudential reasons, might obtain
porary enlargement by suing out an habeas corpus, though sure to be remanded
And, therefore, Sir Edward Coke, when
as soon as brought up to the court.
to deny an habeas corpus to one con
chief justice, did not scruple, in 13 Jac.
fined by the court of admiralty for piracy; there appearing, upon his own
On the other hand,
showing, sufficient grounds to *confine him.(^)
r*133-i■*
a probable ground be shown, that the party
imprisoned without just
cause, (h) and therefore hath
right to be delivered, the writ of habeas corpus
then
writ of right, which " may not be denied, but ought to be granted tocommitted, or detained in prison, or otherwise restrained,
every man that
be by the command of the king, the privy council, or any other."(i)
though
In former part of these Commentaries (k) we expatiated at large on the
personal liberty of the subject. This was shown to be a natural inherent right,,
which could not be surrendered or forfeited unless by the commission of some
great and atrocious crime, and which ought not to be abridged in any case
without the special permission of law. A doctrine coeval with the first rudi
ments of the English constitution, and handed down to us, from our Saxon
ancestors, notwithstanding all their struggles with the Danes, and the violence
of the Norman conquest: asserted afterwards and confirmed by the conqueror
little impaired by the
himself and his descendants; and though sometimes
ferocity of the times, and the occasional despotism of jealous or usurping
princes, yet established on the firmest basis by the provisions of magna carta
and
long succession of statutes enacted under Edward III. To assert an
inconsistent with every
absolute exemption from imprisonment in all cases,
idea of law and political society; and in the end would destroy all civil liberty,
by rendering its protection impossible: but the glory of the English law con
sists in clearly defining the times, the causes, and the extent, when, wherefore,,
This
and to what degree the imprisonment of the subject may be lawful.
which induces the absolute necessity of expressing upon every commitment
made: that the court upon an habeas corpus may
the reason for which
examine into its validity; and according to the circumstances of the case may
discharge, admit to bail, or remand the prisoner.
the court of king's bench, r,...-.
*And yet early in the reign of Charles
relying on some arbitrary precedents (and those perhaps misunderthat they oould not upon an habeas corpus either bail or
stood), determined
deliver
prisoner, though committed without any cause assigned, in case he
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(6) Inst. 182, Hal. P. 0. 147.
(c) Lord Nott. MSa Rep. July, 1678.
(d) Mod. 3u6. Lev.
(/) Cro. Jac. 644.
(e) Bushel's Case, Jon. 13.
RolL
Bep.
138.
Bulstr.
27.
Sue
also
(a)
(A) Inst. 615.
Apr. 1828.
ch.
(0 Com. Jour.
(*) Book
(Z) State Tr. tU. 136.
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committed by the special command of the king, or by the lords of the
This drew on a parliamentary inquiry, and produced the peti
tion of right, 3 Car. I, which recites this illegal judgment, and enacts that no
But when in the fol
freeman hereafter shall be so imprisoned or detained.
lowing year, Mr. Selden and others were committed by the lords of the coun■cil, in pursuance of his majesty's special command, under a general charge of
'"notable contempts and stirring up sedition against the king and govern
ment," the judges delayed for two terms (including also the long vacation) to
And when at length
■deliver an opinion how far such a charge was bailable.
they agreed that it was, they however annexed a condition of finding sureties
for the good behaviour, which still protracted their imprisonment, the chief
justice, Sir Nicholas Hyde, at the same time declaring, (m) that " if they were
again remanded for that cause, perhaps the court would not afterwards grant
an habeas corpus, being already made acquainted with the cause of the im
But this was heard with indignation and astonishment by every
prisonment."
lawyer present: according to Mr. Selden's own (n) account of the matter,
whose resentment was not cooled at the distance of four-and-twenty years.
These pitiful evasions gave rise to the statute 16 Car. I, c. 10, § 8, whereby
it is enacted, that if any person be committed by the king himself in person,
of the members thereof, he shall
r*lli>1J or kv n'8 privy council, or by any
»•
have granted unto him, without any delay upon any pretence whatso
ever, a writ of habeas corpus, upon demand or motion made to the court of
king's bench or common pleas ; who shall thereupon, within three court days
after the return is made, examine and determine the legality of such commit
ment, and do what to justice shall appertain, in delivering, bailing, or remand
ing such prisoner. Yet still in the case of Jenks, before alluded to, (o) who
in 1676 was committed by the king in council for a turbulent speech at Guild
hall, (p) new shifts and devices were made use of to prevent his enlargement
by law, the chief justice (as well as the chancellor) declining to award a writ
of habeas cot-pus ad subjiciendum, in vacation, though at last he thought
proper to award the usual writs ad deliberandum, Ac., whereby the prisoner
Other abuses had also crept into daily
was discharged at the Old Bailey.
practice, which had in some measure defeated the benefit of this great consti
The party imprisoning was at liberty to delay his obedience
tutional remedy.
to the first writ, and might wait till a second and a third, called an alias and
a pluries, were issued, before he produced the party; and many other vexa
tious shifts were practiced to detain state-prisoners in custody. But whoever
will attentively consider the English history, may observe, that the flagrant
abuse of any power, by the crown or its ministers, has always been productive
of a struggle; which either discovers the exercise of that power to be contrary
to law, or (if legal) restrains it for the future. This was the case in the pres
The oppression
of an obscure individual gave birth to the
ent instance.
famous habeas corpus act, 31 Car. II, c. 2, which is frequently considered as
another magna carta (q) of the kingdom; and by consequence and analogy
has also in subsequent times reduced the general method of proceeding on
these writs (though not within the reach of that statute, but issuing merely at
the common law) to the true standard of law and liberty. (12)
■was

privy council.

(m) "State Tr. Til. 240.
(n) Etiam judicum tune primarius, nisi Mud faceremus. rescripti illius forensls, qui libertatis per
sonalis omnimodce vindex legitimus est fere solus, vsum omnimodum palam pronuntiavit
(sui semper
similis) nobis perpetuo in posterum dencgandum. Quod ut odiosissimum juris prodigium, scientiortous
hie universis censitum,"
(Vindic. Mar. claus. edit. A. D. 1653.)
(p) State Tr. vU. 471.
(a) See book 1, ch. 1.
(o) Page 132.
(12) Mr. Hallam (Const. Hist. ch. xiii), gives a different account of the passlngof the
habent corpus act, and shows that the case of Jenks had very little to do with it.
The act
means for enforcing those
•conferred no new rights, but only furnished more complete
which existed before.
Hal lam's Const. Hist. ch. xiii; Beeching's Case, 4 B. and C, 186;
Matter of Jackson, 15 Mich., 417.
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*The statute itself enacts, 1. That on complaint and request in writ'
ing by or on behalf of any person committed and charged with any *■
crime, (unless committed for treason or felony expressed in the warrant; or as
accessory, or on suspicion of being accessory, before the fact, to any petittreason or felony: or any suspicion of such petit-treason or felony, plainly
expressed in the warrant; or unless he is convicted or charged in execution by
legal process), the lord chancellor or any of the twelve judges, in vacation,,
upon viewing a copy of the warrant, or affidavit that a copy is denied, shall
(unless the party has neglected for two terms to apply to any court for hisenlargement) award a habeas corpus for such prisoner, returnable immediately
before himself or any other of the judges; and upon the return made shall
discharge the party, if bailable, upon giving security to appear and answer to
2.
That such writs shall be
the accusation in the proper court of judicature.
indorsed, as granted in pursuance of this act, and signed by the person award
3. That the writ shall be returned and the prisoner brought up,
ing them.
within a limited time according to the distance, not exceeding in any case
4. That officers and keepers neglecting to make due returns,
or
twenty days.
not delivering to the prisoner or his agent within six hours after demand a
copy of the warrant of commitment, or shifting the custody of a prisoner from
one to another, without sufficient reason or authority (specified in the ant),
shall for the first offence forfeit 100/., and for the second offence 200/., to the
5. That no person once de
party grieved^and be disabled to hold his office.
livered by habeas corpus, shall be recommitted for the same offence, on penalty
of 500/. 6. That every person committed for treason or felony shall, if he re
quires it the first week of the next term, or the first day of the next session of
oyer and terminer, be indicted in that term or session, or else admitted to bail:
unless the king's witnesses cannot be produced at that time: and if acquitted,
or if not indicted and tried in the second term, or session, he shall be dis
charged from his imprisonment for such imputed offence: but that no person,
after the assizes shall be *open for the county in which he is detained, r*, 01,-1
J
shall be removed by habeas corpus, till after the assizes are ended; but *•
1. That any such prisoner
shall be left to the justice of the judges of assize.
may move for and obtain his habeas corpus, as well out of the chancery or ex
chequer, as out of the king's bench or common pleas; and the lord chancellor
or judges denying the same, on sight of the warrant, or oath that the same is
8. That this
refused, forfeit severally to the party grieved the sum of 500/.
writ of habeas corpus shall run into the counties palatine, cinque ports, and
other privileged places, and the islands of Jersey and Guernsey. 9. That no
inhabitant of England (except persons contracting, or convicts praying to be
transported; or, having committed some capital offence in the place to which
they are sent), shall be sent prisoner to Scotland, Ireland, Jersey, Guernsey, or
any places beyond the seas, within or without the king's dominions; on pain
that the party committing, his advisers, aiders, and assistants, shall forfeit to
the party aggrieved a sum not less than 500/., to be recovered with treble
costs ; shall be disabled to bear any office of trust or profit ; shall incur the
penalties of praemunire ; and shall be incapable of the king's pardon.
This is the substance of that great and important statute : which extends
(we may observe) only to the case of commitments for such criminal charge,
as can produce no inconvenience to public justice by a temporary enlargement
of the prisoner : all other cases of unjust imprisonment being left to the habeas
corpus at common law. But even upon writs at the common law it is now
expected by the court, agreeable to ancient precedents (r) and the spirit of
the act of parliament, that the writ should be immediately obeyed, without
waiting for any alias or pluries ; otherwise an attachment will issue. By
which admirable regulations, judicial as well as parliamentary, the remedy is
now complete for removing the injury of unjust and illegal confinement.
A.
(r) Burr. 833.
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(a)

remedy the more necessary, because the oppression does not always arise from
r*nal-I *ne 'H-nature> Dut sometimes from the mere inattention of 'government.
*For it frequently happens in foreign countries (and has happened in
of the statute), that persons appre
England during temporary suspensions
hended upon suspicion have suffered
long imprisonment, merely because
they were forgotten. (13)
The satisfactory remedy for this injury of false imprisonment
by an
action of trespass vi et armis, usually called an action of false imprisonment:
with
which
charge of
generally, and almost unavoidably, accompanied
assault and battery also: and therein the party shall recover damages for the
as for all other injuries com
injury he has received; and also the defendant
mitted with force, or vi et armis, liable to pay fine to the king for the viola
tion of the public peace.
III. With regard to the third absolute right of individuals, or that of private
when acquired,
strictly
personal
property, though the enjoyment of
right, yet as its nature and original, and the means of its acquisition or loss,
fell more directly under our second general division, of the rights of things
and as, of course, the wrongs that affect these rights must be referred to the
conceive
corresponding division in the present book of our commentaries;
will be more oommodious and easy to consider together, rather than in a
separate view, the injuries that may be offered to the enjoyment, as well as to
the rights of property. And therefore shall here conclude the head of in
juries affecting the absolute rights of individuals.
We are next to contemplate those which affect their relative rights or such
as are incident to persons considered as members of society, and connected to
each other by various ties and relations; and, in particular, such injuries as
may be done to persons under the four following relations, husband and wife,
parent and child, guardian and ward, master and servant.
I"jllr'es that may be offered to person, considered as husband,
r»|«ol
man's wife; adul
are principally three: abduction, or taking away
tery, or criminal conversation with her; and beating or otherwise abusing her.
As to the first sort, abduction, or taking her away, this may either be by
fraud and persuasion, or open violence: though the law in both cases supposes
force and constraint, the wife having no power to consent; and therefore gives
remedy by writ of ravishment, or action of trespass vi et armis, de uxore
This action layat the common law; and thereby the hus
rapta et abducta.
band shall recover, not the possession (v) of his wife, bu.t damages for taking
her away: and by statute Westm.
Edw.
c. 13, the offender shall also be
last 4K
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left to
general rule the protection of personal liberty In the United States
(13) As
state jurisdictions, and the highest court in each state, and the Judges thereof, and gen
erally some other courts and judicial officers, are empowered to issue the writ of haoea*
But the supreme court of the United States and the circuit and
eorpm for that purpose.
district courts, as well as their respective justices and judges, have also by statute the
authority to issue the writ in certain cases. But in no case does the writ extend to
in custody under or by color of the authority of the
prisoner in jail unless where he
in custody for an
committed
for trial before some court thereof, or
United Slates, or
in pursuance of
law of the United States, or of an order, process
act dono or omitted
in custody in violation of the constitution or of
or decree of court or judge thereof, or
a law or treaty of the United States; or, being
subject or citizen of
foreign state and
therein,
in custody for an act done or omitted under any alleged right, title,
domiciled
authority, privilege, protection or exemption claimed under the commission or order or
sanction of any foreign state, or under color thereof, the validity or effect whereof depends
upon the law of nations; or unless
necessary to bring the prisoner into court to testify.
exclusive, see Tarble's Case, 13 Wall.,
As to when the jurisdiction of the federal courts
81)7. The federal supreme court may also issue the writ in the exercise of its appellate
writ of habeas corpus will
jurisdiction.
But the curt in reviewing
criminal case on
Ex parte Rowland, 104 U. 8.,
inquire only into the jurisdiction of the court that sentenced.
804; Kx parte Carll, 106 U. S., 621.
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imprisoned two years, and be fined at the pleasure of the king. Both the king
and the husband may therefore have this action; (to) and the husband is also
entitled to recover damages in an action on the case against such as persuade
and entice the wife to live separate from him without a sufficient cause, (x)
The old law was so strict in this point, that if one's wife missed her way upon
the road, it was not lawful for another man to take her into his house unless
she was benighted and in danger of being lost or drowned: (y) but a stranger
might carry her behind him on horseback to market to a justice of the peace
for a warrant against her husband, or to the spiritual court to sue for a di
vorce,
2. Adultery, or criminal conversation with a man's wife, though it
(z)
as
public crime, left by our laws to the coercion of the spiritual courts;
yet, considered as civil injury (and surely there can be no greater), the law
gives a satisfaction to the husband for
by action of trespass vi et armis
against the adulterer, wherein the damages recovered are usually very large
and exemplary. (14)
But these are properly increased and diminished by circurastanoes; (a) as the rank and fortune of the plaintiff and defendant; the
relation or 'connexion between them; the seduction or otherwise of
the wife, founded on her previous behaviour and character, and the
husband's obligation by settlement or otherwise to provide for those children,
which he cannot but suspect to be spurious. In this case, and upon indict
ments for polygamy,
marriage in fact must be proved; though generally, in
other cases, reputation and cohabitation are sufficient evidence of marriage. (6)
that of beating man's wife, or otherwise ill-using her;
3. The third injury
for which,
be
common assault, battery, or imprisonment, the law gives
the usual remedy to recover damages, by action of trespass vi et armis, which
must be brought in the names of the husband and wife jointly: but
the
beating or other maltreatment be very enormous, so that thereby the husband
deprived for any time of the company and assistance of his wife, the law
then gives him
separate remedy by an action of trespass in nature of an ac
tion upon the case for this ill-usage, per quod consortium amisit; in which he
shall recover satisfaction in damages, (c)
II. Injuries that may be offered to person considered in the relation of a
parent (15) were likewise of two kinds:
Abduction, or taking his children
(u>)Ibid.
(*) Law of nUt prlut, 78.
tretpau, 213.
(«) Bro. Abr. 807,440.
(») Bro. Abr.
Burr. 2057.
(c) Cro. Jac 501,538.
•

\b)

t.

(a) Law of nitivriut, 28.
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(14) Trespass on the case may be brought at the election of the husband.
(15) The American authorities follow the English in holding that, in an action for
necessary to declare upon an injury to the plain
debauching the plaintiff's daughter,
tiff in the relation of master and servant, and to give some evidence from which
loss of
Lee v. Hodges, 13 Qrat., 726; McDaniel v. Edwards,
Ired., 408.
service may be implied.
If, therefore, the daughter at the time of the seduction was actually in the service of another
as his indentured apprentice or otherwise, the parent cannot maintain this action: South v.
Watts, 474; Dain v. Wyckoff,
Denniston,
N. Y., 191; Parker v. Meek,
Sneed, 29;
unless the daughter was under age, and was absent from home at the time with the consent
Martin v. Payne,
of the parent, and with the right on his part to recall her at anv time.
0.,
Johns., 887
Wend., 459
Am. Doc, 288; Clark v. Fitch,
0., 20 Am. Dec, 689;
Y.,
Blackf.,
343; Boyd v. Byrd,
118; Bolton v. Miller,
Mulvehall v. Millward, 11 N.
C, 11 Am. Dec, 568. Or unless she was in
and R., 86;
Ind., 262; Hornketh v. Barr,
defendant,
who
had
with
the
her
the
fraudulent purpose of seduc
the service of
employed
Dain v. Wyckoff, 18 N. Y., 45. It is no importance that the daughter
tion.
over twentyresides
with
her
father:
v.
Md., 211 Vossel v. Cole,
she
Kelley
one
actually
Donnelly,
also not living with her father when the seduction
10 Mo. 634; but if, being over age, she
takes place, he cannot bring the suit, notwithstanding she returns to his house before her
Nickleson v. Btryker, 10 Johns., 115. The recovery
therefore nominally
confinement.
but proof of the slightest loss
sufficient: Kendrick v. Mcbased upon loss of services;
loss of services will be presumed
the plaintiff had
right to
Crary, 11 Oa., 603; and
111., 583; and the jury may give substantial damages to
require them: Anderson v. Ryan,
compensate for the parent's anxiety and sense of disgrace: Kendrick v. McCrary, 11 Ga.,
603; Travis v. Barger, 24 Barb., 614; Dain v. Wyckoff,
N. Y., 191; thoughthese alona
will not support the action.
See Knight v. Wilcox, 14 N. Y., 418.
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away; and, 2. Marrying his son and heir without the father's consent, where
by during the continuance of the military tenures he lost the value of his mar
riage. But this last injury is now ceased, together with the right upon which
it was grounded; for, the father being no longer entitled to the value of themarriage, the marrying his heir does him no sort of injury for which a civil
action will lie. As to the other, of abduction, or taking away the children
from the father, that is also a matter of doubt whether it be a civil injury or no;
for, before the abolition of the tenure in chivalry, it was equally a doubt whether
an action would lie for taking and carrying away any other child besides the
heir; some holding that it would not, upon the supposition that the only
ground or cause of action was losing the value of the heir's marriage; and
others holding that an action would lie for taking away any of the children,
for that the parent hath an interest in them all, to provide for their education.
(d) If, therefore, before the abolition of these tenures it was an injury to the
^atner t0 take *awav tDe re8t °f n's children, as well as his heir (as I
T*1411J
am inclined to think it was), it still remains an injury, and is remedi
able by writ of ravishment, or action of trespass vi et armis, de filio, vel filia,
rapto vel abducto; (e) in the same manner as the husband may have
on
account of the abduction of his wife.
III. Of similar nature to the last the relation of guardian and ward, and
the like actions mutatis mutandis, as are given to fathers, the guardian alsohas for recovery of damages, when his ward
stolen or ravished away from
now totally abolished, which
him.(y) And though guardianship in chivalry
was the only beneficial kind of guardianship to the guardian, yet the guardian
in socage was always (g) and
still entitled to an action of ravishment,
his
ward or pupil be taken from him: but then he must account to his pupil for
the damages which he so recovers. (A)
And, as guardian in socage was also
entitled at common law to writ of right of ward, de custodia terra} et hatredi#y
in order to recover the possession and custody of the infant,
so
apprehend
that he
still entitled to sue out this antiquated writ. But
more speedy
and summary method of redressing all complaints relative to wards and guar
dians hath of late obtained by an application to the court of chancery; which
the supreme guardian, and has the superintendent jurisdiction of all the
infants in the kingdom. And
expressly provided by statute 12 Car. II, c.
24, that testamentary guardians may maintain an action of ravishment or tres
pass, for recovery of any of their wards, and also for damages to be applied
to the use and benefit of the infants, (k)
IV. To the relation between master and servant, and the rights accruing
therefrom, there are two species of injuries incident. The one is, retaining a
man's hired servant before his time
expired; the other
beating or confining
D'm m 8U°k
manner tuat ne
not a°le t0 perform his work. As *to
T*142l
the first, the retaining another person's servant during the time he has
(e) F. N. B. 90
(f) Ibid. 189.
(i) P. Wma. 108.

(B) Ibid.

2

(<i)Cro. Eliz. 77a
(0 F. N. B. 189.

(A) Hale od F. N. B. rs9.
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Thus
will be seen that the action nominally for one thing, and the recovery in fact
for another; and the anomaly
so great that
has often been made the subject of com
The New York cases upon this subject are particularly instructive.
ment by courts.
C, 20 Am. Dec, 639; with Bartley v.
Fitch,
Wend.,
459;
Compare especially Clark v.
N. Y., 38. The legislation of several of the states has relieved the law of
Richtmyer,

it
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some odium by authorizing suit to be brought in these cases by the father, mother, or someother person for the benefit of the woman, and without averment or proof of loss of ser
vice.
It follows, from what above stated, that any one who at the time holds the legal rela
tion of master to the person seduced — whether parent, guardian or employer — or with whom
she lives, and for whom she performs services, whether for compensation agreed upon or
not, may maintain the action.
has been held that the woman mayUnder
somewhat peculiar statute in Michigan
institute the suit in her own name.
Watson v. Watson, 49 Mich., 640.
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master; this, as it is ungentlemanlike, so it is also
master has hy his contract purchased for a valuable
consideration the service of his domestics for a limited time; the inveigling or
hiring his Servant, which induces a breach of this contract, is therefore an
injury to the master; and for that injury the law has given him a remedy by a
special action on the case; and he may also have an action against the servant
But,
for the non-performance of his agreement.
the new master was not
apprised of the former contract, no action lies against Aim, (m) unless he
refuses to restore the servant upon demand.
The other point of injury,
that
man's servant, which depends upon the
of beating, confining, or disabling
same principle as the last; viz.: the property which the master has by his con
In this case, besides the remedy of
tract acquired in the labor of the servant.
an action of battery or imprisonment, which the servant himself as an indivi
dual may have against the agressor, the master also, as recompense for his
in which he
immediate loss, may maintain an action of trespass vi et armis
must allege and prove the special damage he has sustained by the beating of
his servant, per quod servitium amisit Jn) and then the jury will make him a
proportionable pecuniary satisfaction. A similar practice to which, we find
also to have obtained among the Athenians; where masters were entitled to an
action against such as beat or ill-treated their servants, (o)
We may observe that in these relative injuries, notice
only taken of the
wrong done to the superior of the parties related, by the breach and dissolu
tion of either the relation itself, or at least the advantages accruing therefrom:
while the loss of the inferior by such injuries
totally unregarded. One rea
son for which may be this: that the inferior hath no kind of property in the
held to
company, care, or assistance of the superior, as the *superior
have in those of the inferior; and therefore the inferior can suffer no
The wife cannot recover damages for beating her husband, for
loss or injury.
The child
she hath no separate interest in anything during her coverture.
hath no property in his father or guardian as they have in him, for the sake
the hus
of giving him education and nurture. Yet the wife or the child,
band or parent be slain, have
peculiar species of criminal prosecution allowed
civil satisfaction; which
called an appeal, (16) and
them, in the nature of
And so the servant, whose master
which will be considered in the next book.
He had no prop
is disabled, does not thereby lose his maintenance or wages.
he receives his part of the stipulated contract, he
erty in his master; and
therefore entitled to no action, for any battery or
suffers no injury, and
imprisonment which such master may happen to endure.
his present
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(m) Ibid. 168. Winch. 51.

(16)

This proceeding

Vol. IL— 11

(n)

Bep. 118. 10Bep. ISO.

(o) Pott Antlq. b.

has been abolished by statute.
81

1,

(1) F. N. B. 187.
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In the preceding chapter we considered the wrongs or injuries that affected
the rights of persons, either considered as individuals, or as related to each
other; and are at present to enter upon the discussion of such injuries as affect
the rights of property, together with the remedies which the law has given to
repair or redress them.
c.
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And here again we must follow our former division (a) of property into
personal and real; personal, which consists in goods, money, and all other
movable chattels, and things thereunto incident; a property which may attend
a man's person wherever he goes, and from thence receives its denomination:
and real property which consists of such things as are permanent, fixed, and
immovable; as lands, tenements, and hereditaments of all kinds, which are
not annexed to the person, nor can be moved from the place in which they
subsist.

First then we are to consider the injuries that may be offered to the rights
of personal property; and, of these, first, the rights of personal property in
possession, and then those that are in action only, (b)
I. i'he rights of personal property in possession, are liable to two species of
injuries: the amotion or deprivation of that possession; and the abuse or dam
The
age of the chattels, while the possession oontinues in the legal owner.
former or deprivation of possession is also divisible into two branches; the
unjust and unlawful taking them away; and the unjust detaining them, though
the original taking might be lawful.
The right of property in all
^■no- ^ra* °f an unlawful taking.
r*l 4.51*
external things being solely acquired by occupancy, as has been for
merly stated, and preserved and transferred by grants, deeds, and wills, which
are a continuation of that occupancy; it follows, as a necessary consequence,
that when once have gained a rightful possession of any goods or chattels,
either by a just occupancy or by a legal transfer, whoever, either by fraud or
force, dispossesses me of them, is guilty of a transgression against the law of
For there must be an
society, which is a kind of secondary law of nature.
end of all social commerce between man and man, unless private possession
be secured from unjust invasions: and if an acquisition of goods by either
force or fraud were allowed to be a sufficient title, all property would soon be
confined to the most strong, or the most cunning; and the weak and simpleminded part of mankind (which is by far the most numerous division) could
never be secure of their possessions.
The wrongful taking of goods being thus most clearly an injury, the next
consideration
what remedy the law of England has given for it. And this
is, in the first place, the restitution of the goods themselves so wrongfully
taken, with damages for the loss sustained by such unjust invasion; which is
effected by action of replevin, (1) an institution whioh the Mirror (c) ascribes
This obtains only in one
to Glanvil, chief justice to King Henry the Seoond.
instance of an unlawful taking, that of
wrongful distress: and this, and the
shall presently say more) are almost the only ac
action of detinue (of whioh
tions in which the actual specific possession of the identical personal chattel
restored to the proper owner. For things personal are looked upon by the
nature so transitory and perishable, that
law as of
for the most part im
possible either to ascertain their identity, or to restore them in the same con
And since
dition as when they came to the hands of the wrongful possessor.
(o) JUd. 25.

(e) 0.

«,
S
«.

it

i.

a

(a) See book H, chap.

is

is

I

a

is,

I

a

is

if

it

if

a

if

is

if

it

if

is

a

a

is
a

is

the universal remedy in the United States where chattels have been
(1) Replevin
wrongfully taken or are wrongfully detained from the plaint iff, and he seeks to recover
It
them in tpecie instead of satisfaction in damages.
statutory action, and the statutes
are considerably variant
The plaintiff must have either general or special property in
the chattels.
Speaking generally we may say that the plaintiff
required to show his
right by affidavit when he sues out the writ; that the officer seizes the property,
to be
found, and delivers
to the plaintiff, on receiving bond with sureties for its return in case
the action
not sustained; that
the plaintiff recovers in such cases, he takes judgment
defeated, the defendant takes
for any damages he may have proved, while
the plaintiff
judgment either for return of the property, or for its value, together with such damages
a9 he may have shown.
But
the officer does not find the property, so that
may be de
livered to the plaintiff, the case nevertheless proceeds to judgment, and
the plaintiff re
covers, he may, at his option, have the proper writ for its delivery in execution.
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a maxim that " lex neminem cogit ad vana, seu impossibilia," it therefore
•contents itself in general with restoring, not the thing itself, but ar»ijg-i
*
pecuniary equivalent to the party injured; by giving him a satisfaction'in damages.
But in the case of a distress, the goods are from the first taking
in the custody of the law, and not merely in that of the distrainor; and there
fore they may not only be identified, but also restored to their first possessor,
without any material change in their condition. And being thus in the cus
tody of the law, the taking them back by force is looked upon as an atrooious
injury, and denominated a rescous, for which the distrainor has a remedy in
damages, either by writ of rescous, (d) in case they were going to the pound, or
in case they were actually im
by writ de parco fracto, or pound-breach,
He may also, at his option, bring an action on the case for this in
pounded.
jury: and shall therein, the distress were taken for rent, recover treble dam
likewise applied to the foroible delivery of a
term rescous
agesdefendant, when arrested, from the officer who
carrying him to prison. In
similar remedy by action on the oase,
which circumstances the plaintiff has
or of rescous: (g) (2) or, if the sheriff makes
return of such rescous to the
court out of which the prooess issued, the rescuer will be punished by attach
ment,
(h)
An action of replevin, the regular way of contesting the validity of the
distress taken wrongfully and without
said, upon
founded,
transaction,
or thing taken in distress,
sufficient cause: being redelivery of the pledge,
to the owner; upon his giving security to try the right of the distress, and
to restore
the right be adjudged against him, (j) after which the dis
trainor may keep
till tender made of sufficient amends; but must then re
deliver
to the owner, (k) And formerly, when the party distrained upon
intended to dispute the right of the distress, he had no other process by the
old common law than by writ of replevin, replegiari facias
which issued
out of chancery, commanding the sheriff to deliver the distress to the owner,
and *afterwards to do justice in respect of the matter in dispute in hisr*.
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own county court. But this being
tedious method of proceeding,
the beasts or other goods were long detained from the owner, to his great loss
and damage, (m) For which reason the statute of Marlbridge (n) directs that
(without suing a writ out of the chancery) the sheriff immediately, upon plaint
to him made, shall proceed to replevy the goods.
And, for the greater ease of
the parties,
farther provided by statute
P. and M. c. 12, that the sheriff
shall make at least four deputies in each county, for the sole purpose of making
replevins. Upon application, therefore, either to the sheriff or one of his said
to be given, in pursuance of the statute of Westm.
18
deputies, security
That the party replevying will pursue his action against the
Edw.
c. 2.
distrainor, for which purpose he puts in plegios de prosequendo, or pledges to
That
the right be determined against him, he will return
prosecute; and,
the distress again; for which purpose he
also bound to find plegios de retorno
habendo.
Besides these pledges, the sufficiency of which
discretionary and
at the peril of the sheriff, the statute 11 Geo. H, o. 10, requires that the officer
distress for rent, shall take a bond with two sureties
granting
replevin on
in sum of double the value of the goods distrained, conditioned to prosecute
the suit with effect and without delay, and for return of the goods; which
bond shall be assigned to the avowant or person making cognizance, on request
made to the officer; and,
forfeited, may be sued in the name of the assignee.
And certainly as the end of all distresses
only to compel the party distrained
upon to satisfy the debt or duty owing from him, this end
as well answered

(2) The action of rescous
the case.

has fallen into disuse,

and

B.

2

1,

(/) Stat W. 4 M. Seas. o.
(j) Co. Lltt. 145.
(il See page 18.
Inst. 1311.
(n) 63Ben. Ill, c. 21.
is

(e) Ibid. 100.
(ft) Cro. Jac. 419. Salic 586.
(m)
(() F. N. B. 68.

it

Mod. 811.
Rep. 147.

2

) I )
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usual now to bring an action on
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by snch sufficient sureties as by retaining the very distress, which might fre
quently occasion great inconvenience to the owner; and that the law never
wantonly inflicts. The sheriff, on receiving such security, is immediately, by
his officers, to cause the chattels taken in distress to be restored into the pos
session of the party distrained upon: unless the distrainor claims a property in
the goods so taken.
For if, by this method of distress, the distrainor
*bappens to come again into possession of his own property in goods
r*l4Rl
L
J which before he had lost, the law allows him to keep them, without any
reference to the manner by which he thus has regained possession ; being a kind
of personal remitter, (o) If, therefore, the distrainor claims any such property,
the party replevying must sue out a writ de proprietate probanda, in which the
sheriff is to try, by an inquest, in whom the property previous to the distress
subsisted, (p)
And if it be found to be in the distrainor, the sheriff can pro
ceed no farther; but must return the claim of property to the court of king's
bench or common pleas, to be there farther prosecuted, if thought advisable,
and there finally determined, (q)
But if no claim of property be put in, or if (upon trial) the sheriff's inquest
determines it against the distrainor; then the sheriff is to replevy the good*
(making use of even force, if the distrainor makes resistance), (r) in case the
goods be found within his county. But if the distress be carried out of the
county, or concealed, then the sheriff may return that the goods, or beasts, are
eloigned, elongata, carried to a distance, to places to him unknown; and there
upon the party replevying shall have a writ of capiat in withernam, in vetito
a term which signifies a second or recip
(or more properly, repetito) namio
rocal distress, («) in lieu of the first which was eloigned. It is therefore a
command to the sheriff to take other goods of the distrainor, in lieu of the
So that
distress formerly taken, and eloigned or withheld from the owner,
there
now distress against distress; one being taken to answer the other, by
way of reprisal, (w) and as
punishment for the illegal behaviour of the orig
inal distrainor.
For which reason goods taken in withernam cannot be
forthcoming. («)
replevied till the original distress
*But in common cases, the goods are delivered back to the party
T*i4.al
then bound to bring his action of replevin; which
replevying, who
may. (to)'
may be prosecuted in the county court, be the distress of what value
to the superior courts of king's bench or com
But either party may remove
mon pleas, by writ of recordari or pone; (as) the plaintiff at pleasure, the defend
in the course of proceeding any right
ant upon reasonable cause*; (y) and also
of freehold comes in question, the sheriff can proceed no farther; (z) so that
usual to carry
up in the first instance to the courts of Westminster-hall.
now
Upon this action brought, and declaration delivered, the distrainor, who
that
the defendant, makes avowry
he avows taking the distress in his own.
as for rent
right, or the right of his wife; (a) and sets forth the reason of
he justifies in another's right,
arrere, damage done, or other cause: or else,
said to make cognizance
as his bailiff or servant, he
that
he acknowledge*
the taking, but insists that such taking was legal, as he acted by the command
of one who had
right to distrain; and on the truth and legal merits of this
determined. If
be determined for the
avowry or cognizance the cause
plaintiff, viz.: that the distress was wrongfully taken; he has already got his
goods back into his own possession, and shall keep them, and moreover recover
is,
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is
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;
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is
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if
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it
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is

a

is

(t)
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2

2
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2

in

I.
1,

I

3,

(p) Finch. L. SIS.
(a) Co. Lltt 145. Finch, L. 450.
fr) Inst IBS.
(o) 8ee page it.
Inst. 141. Hickes's Thciaur. 164.
c. 10.
(») Smith's Commonw. b.
(0 F. N. B. 69,73.
(«) In the old northern languages the word withernam Is used as equivalent to repritals. iStiernhook,
de jure Sueon.
c. 10.)
(t>)Raym. 475. The substance of this rule composed the terms of that famous question, with which Sir
Thomas Moore (when a student on his travels) Is said to have puzzled a pragmatical professor In the uni
versity of Bruges in Flanders; who gave a universal challenge to dispute with any person in science; in
utrum averia carucce,
omni tcibiti, el de quolibet ente. Upon which Mr. Moore sent him this question,
capta in vetito namio tint irreplegioilia^" whether beasts of the plough, taken
withernam, are incap
able of being replevied. (Hoddesd. c. 6.)
(y) F. N. B. 69, 70.
(s) Finch, L. S17.
(w) lust. 13D.
(*) Ibid. 23.
(a) Saund. 186,
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But if the defendant prevails, by the default or nonsuit of the
(6)
plaintiff, then he shall have a writ de retorno habendo, whereby the goods or
chattels (which were distrained and then replevied) are returned again into his
-custody; to be sold, or otherwise disposed of, as if no replevin had been made.
And at the common law, the plaintiff might have brought another replevin,
and so in infinitum to the intolerable vexation of the defendant. Wherefore
the statute *of Westm. 2, c. 2, restrains the plaintiff, when nonsuited,
r*1B0-iJ
from suing out any fresh replevin; but allows him a judicial writ,
a
second
out
of
and
called
writ
of
record,
the
in
deliverance,
issuing
original
order to have the same distress again delivered to him, on giving the like security
as before. And, if the plaintiff be a second time nonsuit, or if the defendant has
judgment upon verdict or demurrer in the first replevin, he shall have a writ
of return irreplevisable ; after which no writ of second deliverance shall be
allowed,
But in case of distress for rent arrere, the writ of second deliv
erance
in effect (d) taken away by statute 17 Car. II, o.
which direots
the plaintiff be nonsuit before issue joined, then upon suggestion
that,
made on the record in nature of an avowry or cognizance; or
judgment be
given against him on demurrer, then, without any such suggestion, the defend
ant may have
writ to inquire into the value of the distress by jury, and
less than the arrear of rent; or,
shall recover the amount of
in damages,
the
more, then so much as shall be equal to such arrear, with costs; or,
nonsuit be after issue joined, or
a verdict be against the plaintiff, then the
jury impannelled to try the cause shall assess such arrears for the defendant:
and
(in any of these cases) the distress be insufficient to answer the arrears
distrained for, the defendant may take
farther distress or distresses,
But
former
man distrains again
otherwise,
for
distress,
pending
replevin
for the same rent or service, then the party
not driven to his action of
writ of recaption (f) and recover damages for the
replevin, but shall have
defendant the redistrainor's contempt of the process of the law.
In like manner, other remedies for other unlawful takings of man's goods
consist only in recovering
man takes the
satisfaction in damages.
As
law
goods of another out of his actual or virtual possession, without having
ful title so to do,
an injury; which, though
doth not amount to felony
unless
be done animo furandi,
nevertheless
transgression, for which an
action of trespass vi et armis *will lie; wherein the plaintiff shall not r*iKil
*•
recover the thing itself, but only damages for the loss of it. (3) Or,
committed without force, the party may, at his choice, have another remedy
in damages by action of trover and conversion, of which
shall presently say
a

if
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(c)

damages.

more.

Inst. 840.
(d)
(/) F. N. B. 71.

1

(c)

S

7.

(b) F. N. B. 60.
(e) Stat 17Car. H, c.

Ventr. 64.
(s) F. N. B. 89.

8

is

I

if

2. Deprivation of possession may also be by an unjust detainer of another's
As
distrain another's cattle
goods, though the original taking was lawful.
and before they are impounded he tenders me sufficient
damage-feasant,
detain
amends; now, though the original taking was lawful, my subsequent
ment of them after tender of amends
wrongful, and he shall have an action
of replevin against me to recover them: (g) in which he shall recover damages
only for the detention and not for the caption, because the original taking was
Hep. 147.

1

8

is

§

2

a

a

the taking must have been
(8) To entitle one to maintain trespass de bonis asporiatit
wrongful and against the will of the plaintiff, but need not have been with actual force.
Oibba v. Chase, 10 Mass., 125. If the plaintiff delivers the property to defendant under
fraudulent purchase, he cannot, on discovery of the fraud, bring trespass.
McCarty v.
Vickery, 12 Johns., 848. And see Prince v. Puckett, 12 Ala., 832. But an officer who has
rightfully taken possession of property by virtue of process may sometimes render himself
trespasser ab initio, through abuse of his authority by any act of unlawful force.
See
Greenl. Ev.,
615. And the same
true of any person who abuses an authority the law
confers upon him. Six Carpenters' Case,
Co., 146; S. C,
Smith Lead. Cas., 216.
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U) Co. Entr. 170.Cro. Jac. 882.

(0 Co. Lit*. 286.
(I) Balk. 864.
book U, oh. and 28.

(n) 10Rep. 56.

1

I,

(ft) F. N. B. 188.
(fc) Co. Litt. 295.
ch.
(m) See book
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is

is

is

if
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(f)

1.

lawful.
Or, if lend a man a horse, and he afterwards refuses to restore it,
this injury consists in the detaining, and not in the original taking, and the
regular method for me to recover possession is by action of detinue. (A) In
this action of detinue it is necessary to ascertain the thing detained, in such
manner as that it may be specifically known and recovered.
Therefore it can
not be brought for money, corn, or the like; for that cannot be known from
other money or corn; unless it be in a bag or sack, for then it may be distinguishably marked. In order, therefore, to ground an action of detinue,
which is only for the detaining, these points are necessary:
That the de
fendant came lawfully into possession of the goods, as either by delivery to
him, or finding them; 2. That the plaintiff have
property; 3. That the
goods themselves be of some value; and, 4. That they be ascertained in point
of identity.
Upon this the jury,
they find for the plaintiff, assess the
respective values of the several parcels detained, and also damages for the
detention. And the judgment
conditional; that the plaintiff recover the
said goods, or (if they cannot be had) their respective values, and also the
one disadvantage which
But there
damages for detaining them. (J) (4)
herein permitted to wage his
attends this action; viz.: that the defendant
^aw' *^a* *8» *° *el0ulpate himself by oath, (k) and thereby defeat the
T*l
*■ B2l*
grounded on the confidence
plaintiff of his remedy: which privilege
originally reposed in the bailee by the bailor, in the borrower by the lender,
and the like; from whence arose
strong presumptive evidence, that in the
plaintiff's own opinion the defendant was worthy of credit. But for this rea
son the action itself
of late much disused, and has given place to the action
of trover. (5)
This aotion of trover (6) and conversion was in its original an action of tres
pass upon the case, for recovery of damages against such person as had found
another's goods, and refused to deliver them on demand, but converted them to
his own use; from which finding and converting
called an action of trover
and conversion.
The freedom of this action from wager of law, and the less
so considerable
gave
degree of certainty requisite in describing the goods,
an advantage over the action of detinue, that by
fiction of law actions of
trover were at length permitted to be brought against any man who had in hia
possession, by any means whatsoever, the personal goods of another, and sold
them or used them without the consent of the owner, or refused to deliver them
when demanded.
The injury lies in the conversion: for any man may take the
he finds them but no finder
allowed to acgoods of another into possession,
property therein, unless the owner be forever unknown: (m) and there?[uire
ore he must not convert them to his own use, which the law presumes him to
he refuses to restore them to the owner: for which reason such refusal alone
do,
prima facie, sufficient evidence of
conversion. (n) The fact of the find
therefore now totally immaterial: for the plaintiff needs only
ing, or trover,
to suggest (as words of form) that he lost such goods, and that the defendant

4

9

2

86

;

,

5

is

8

is

a

if

the plaintiff recovered, and the subject of the suit possessed
(4) In an action of detinue,
recovery of the damages might not be an adequate remedy, the
peculiar value so that
court of equity sometimes interfered to compel specific delivery;. but this
now unneces
sary, as the courts of common law possess the same power under the common law proce
dure act of 1854.
and
Win. IV, c. 42, s. 13, and since then,
(5) Wager of law was abolished by statute
For curious his
said to be brought more frequently than formerly.
the action of detinue
torical information regarding Wager of Law, see Superstition and Force, by H. C. Lea.
H. and N. 296 Pillott v.
(6) As to the meaning of conversion, see Burrough.es v. Bayne,
Wilkinson,
H. and C., 72; Thompson v. Currier, 24 N. H., 237; Adams v. McGlinchy, 6fc
Me., 533; Ireland v. Horseman, 65 Mo., 51; Laverty v. Snethen, 68 N. Y., 522; Haas v.
Damon,
Iowa, 589; Dudley v. Abner, 52 Ala., 572; Eslow v. Mitchell, 26 Mich., 600;
Millar v. Allen, 10 R. L, 49.
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found them: and if he proves that the goods are his property, and that the
But a conversion must
defendant had them in his possession, it is sufficient.
be fully proved: and then in this action the plaintiff shall recover damages,
equal to the value of the thing converted, but not the thing itself: which noth
ing will recover but an action of detinue or replevin.
*As to the damage that may be offered to things personal, while in
[-♦2531*
the possession of the owner, as hunting a man's deer, shooting his dogs, *poisoning his cattle, or in anywise taking from the value of any of his chattels,
or making them in a worse condition than before, these are injuries too obvious
to need explication.
have only therefore to mention the remedies given by
the law to redress them, which are in two shapes; by action of trespass vi et
armis, where the act is in itself immediately injurious to another's property,
and therefore necessarily accompanied with some degree of force; and by
special action on the case, where the act is in itself indifferent, and the injury
only consequential, and therefore arising without any breach of the peace. In
both of which suits the plaintiff shall recover damages, in proportion to the
injury which he proves that his property has sustained. And it is not material
whether the damage be done by the defendant himself, or his servants by hia
direction; for the action will lie against the master as well as the servant. (0)
And, if a man keeps a dog or other brute animal, used to do mischief, as by
worrying sheep, or the like, the owner must answer for the consequences, if he
knows of such evil habit, (p) (7)
II. Hitherto of injuries affecting the right of things personal, in possession.
We are next to consider those which regard things in action only; or such
rights as are founded on, and arise from, contracts/ the nature and several
divisions of which were explained in the preceding volume, (q) The violation,
or non-performance, of these contracts might be extended into as great a vari
shall now con
ety of wrongs, as the rights which we then considered; but
sider them in a more comprehensive view, by here making only a twofold
division of contracts; viz., contracts express, and contracts implied; and point
ing out the injuries that arise from the violation of eaoh, with their respective

I

I

remedies.

Express contracts include

three
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distinct
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covenants,
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-I

is

a

a

a

if

a

is

I

a

I

a

is

I

a

if
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is,
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(s)

(r)

is

is

a

a

a

a

is,
a

sum of money due by certain
•l. The legal acceptation of debt
r*iJU-i
and express agreement:
bond for
determinate sum; bill or *■
as, by
on
where
the
or
rent
reserved
lease;
note;
special bargain;
quantity
fixed and specific, and does not depend upon any subsequent valuation to settle
an injury, for which the proper remedy
it. The non-payment of these
by
action of debt,
to compel the performance of the contraot and recover the
This
the shortest and surest remedy; particularly
specifical sum due.
where the debt arises upon
specialty, that
upon a deed or instrument
man
certain price for a
under seal. So also,
verbally agree to pay
certain parcel of goods, and fail in the performance, an action of debt lies
also
determinate contract: but
against me; for this
agree for no settled
am not liable to an action of debt, but
special action on the case,
price,
according to the nature of my contract. And indeed actions of debt are now
seldom brought but upon special contracts under seal; wherein the sum due
clearly and precisely expressed: for, in case of such an action upon
simple
(p) Cro. Car. 254,487.
(«) See Appendix, No. Ill,

{
1.

(o) Noy's Max. c. 44.
(r) F. N. B. 119.

(o) See book n, ch. 80.

;

1

7

4

1

8.

C, N. T.,
C. &P., 118; VanLeuven v. Lyke, 4Denlo, 127;
(7) See Brown v. Giles,
Cow., 351; 8. C, 15 Am. Dec, 883; Durden v. Barnett,
B15; Hinckley v. Emerson,
Ala., 169; Keightlinger v. Eejan, 65 111., 235 8. 0., 75 111., 141; Karr v. Parks, 44 Cal., 46;
Campbell v. Brown, 19 Pcnn. St., 859; Murray v. Young, 12 Bush., 837; Marsh v. Jones,
21Vt.,878; Cockerham v. Nixan, 11 Ired., 269; Howes v. McNamara, 106 Mass., 281;
Arnold v. Norton, 25 Conn., 92; Meredith v. Reed, 26 Ind., 384.
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(t)

contract, the plaintiff labours under two difficulties. First, the defendant has
here the same advantage as in an action of detinue, that of waging his law, or
Secondly, in an
purging himself of the debt by oath, if he thinks proper,
action of debt the plaintiff must prove the whole debt he claims, or recover
one single cause of action, fixed and deter
nothing at all. For the debt
the proof varies from the claim, cannot be
mined; and which, therefore,
If,
looked upon as the same contract whereof the performance
sued for.
am not at liberty to prove
therefore, bring an action of debt for 30/.,
debt of 20/. and recover a verdict thereon; (u) any more than
bring an
action of detinue for horse,
can thereby recover an ox.
For
fail in the
proof of that contract, which my action or complaint has alleged to be specific,
But in an action on the case, on what
called an
express, and determinate.
indebitatus assumpsit, which
not brought to compel
specific performance
oontracti Du* *° recover damages for its *non-performance, the
T*lB5l °^
implied assumpsit, and consequently the damages for the breach of
are in their nature indeterminate; and will therefore adapt and proportion
themselves to the truth of the case which shall be proved, without being con
fined to the precise demand stated in the declaration. For
any debt be
proved, however less than the sum demanded, the law will raise
promise
pro tanto, and the damages will of course be proportioned to the actual debt.
So that may declare that the defendant, being indebted to me in 30/. under
took or promised to pay
but failed; and lay my damages arising from such
failure at what sum
please; and the jury will, according to the nature of my
proof, allow me either the whole in damages, or any infoior sum. And even
in actions of debt, where the contract
the defendant
proved or admitted,
can show that he has discharged any part of it, the plaintiff shall recover the
residue,

(w)
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The form of the writ of debt
sometimes in the debet and detinet, and
sometimes in the detinet only: that is, the writ states, either that the defendant
owes and unjustly detains the debt or thing in question, or only that he un
brought in the debet as well as detinet, when sued by
justly detains it. It
one of the original contracting parties who personally gave the credit, against
the other who personally incurred the debt, or against his heirs,
they are
bound to the payment; as by the obligee against the obligor, the landlord
be brought by or against an executor for
against the tenant, &c. But,
debt due to or from the testator, this not being his own debt, shall be sued for
in the detinet only, (w) So also
the action be for goods, for corn, or horse,
sum of money, for
the writ shall be in the detinet only; for nothing but
which
properly
(or my ancestors in my name) have personally contracted,
considered as my debt. And indeed writ of debt in the detinet only, for goods
and chattels,
neither more nor less than mere writ of detinue; and
fol
lowed by the very same judgment, (a;)
2. A covenant also contained in a deed, to do
direct act or to omit one,
civil
another species of express contracts, the violation or breach of which
As'if man covenants to be at York by such a day, or not to exercise
injury.
'"trade in
not at Tork at the time appointed,
particular place, and
P^e-_„i
or carries on his trade in the place forbidden, these are direct breaches
of his covenant; and may be perhaps greatly to the disadvantage and loss of
writ of covenant; (y) which
the covenantee.
The remedy for this
by
directs the sheriff to command the defendant generally to keep his covenant
with the plaintiff (without specifying the nature of the covenant), or show
he continues refractory, or the covenant
good cause to the contrary; and
cannot now be specifically performed, then the subse
already so broken that
quent proceedings set forth with precision the covenant, the breach and the loss
which has happened thereby; whereupon the jury will give damages in pro1

Show. 215.
Rep. St
(«) Bro. Ley gager, 93. Dyer, 219. Roll. Abr. 70S.
(y) F. N. B. 14ft.
ROLL Rep. 857. Salk. 884.
Or) Rast. Entr. 174.
(a F. N. B. lit.
88
S

14

(t)
(v)
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(e)

There is one species of covenant of a different nature from the rest; and that
is a covenant real, to convey or dispose of lands, which seems, to be partly of
a personal and partly of a real nature, (z) For this the remedy is by a speoial
writ of covenant, for a specific performance of the contract concerning certain
It therefore direots the sheriff to
lands particularly described in the writ.
command the defendant, here called the deforciant, to keep the covenant made
between the plaintiff and him concerning the identical lands in question; and
upon this process it is that fines of land are usually levied at common law, (a)
the plaintiff or person to whom the fine is levied, bringing a writ of covenant,
in which he suggests some agreement to have been made Detween him and the
deforciant, touching those particular lands, for the completion of which he
brings this action. And for the end of this supposed difference, the fine, or
Jinalis concordia is made, whereby the deforciant (now called the cognizor) ac
knowledges the tenements to be the right of the plaintiff, now called the
And, moreover, as leases for years were formerly considered only
cognizee.
as contracts (b) or covenants for the enjoyment of rents and profits, and not
as the conveyance *of any real interest in the land, the ancient remedy r«]g»-i
*
for the lessee, if ejected, was by a writ of covenant against the lessor, *•
to recover the term (if in being) and damages in case the ouster was com
mitted by the lessor himself: or if the term was expired, or the ouster was
committed by a stranger, claiming by an elder title, then to reoover damages
only, (c)
No person could at oommon law take advantage of any covenant or condi
tion, except such as were parties or privies thereto; and, of course, no grantee
or assignee of any reversion or rent. To remedy which, and more effectually
to secure to the king's grantees the spoils of the monasteries then newly dis
solved, the statute 32 Hen. VIII, c. 34, gives the assignee of a reversion (after
notice of such assignment) (d) the same remedies against the particular ten
ant, by entry or action, for waste or other forfeitures, non-payment of rent,
and non-performance of conditions, covenants and agreements, as the assignor
himself might have had; and makes him equally liable, on the other hand, for
acts agreed to be performed by the assignor, except in the case of warranty.
3. A promise is in the nature of a verbal covenant, and wants nothing but
the solemnity of writing and sealing to make it absolutely the same. If,
therefore, it be to do any explicit act, it is an express oontract, as much as any
covenant; and the breaoh of it is an equal injury.
The remedy, indeed, is not
exactly the same: since, instead of an action of covenant, there only lies an
action upon the case, for what is called the assumpsit or undertaking of the
defendant; the failure of performing which is the wrong or injury done to the
As, if a
plaintiff, the damages whereof a jury are to estimate and settle.
builder promises, undertakes, or assumes to Caius, that he will build and cover
his house within a time limited, and fails to do it; Caius has an action on the
case against the builder, for this breach of his express promise, undertaking, or
assumpsit; and shall recover a pecuniary satisfaction for the injury sustained
by such delay. So also in the case before-mentioned, of a debt by simple con
tract if the debtor promises to pay it and does not, this breach of promise en
titles the creditor to his action on the case, instead of being driven to an action
Thus likewise
of debt,
promissory note, or note of hand not under seal, to
an express assumpsit
and the payee at common
pay money at day certain,
law, or, by custom and act of parliament, the indorsee (/), may recover the value
of the note in damages,
remains unpaid.
Some agreements, indeed, though
never so expressly made, are deemed of so important
nature, that they ought
not to rest in verbal promise only, which cannot be proved but by the memory
4

t.

Vol. H—

(a) See book n, oh. 21.
F. N. B. 143.
(d) Co. LIU. 218.
<J) See book II, ch. 80.
12

(*) Ibid.
Moor. 878. Cro. Jso. 470.
9.

(e)

(«) Hal. on F. N. B. 148.
Bro. Abr.
covenant, 83.
(«) Bep. »4.
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To prevent which
(whioh sometimes will induce the perjury) of witnesses.
the statute of frauds and perjuries, 29 Gar. II, c. 3, enacts, that in the five
*f °H°w'ng cases no verbal promise shall be sufficient to ground an action
r*lB8l
L
J upon, but at the least some note or memorandum of it shall be made
1. Where an
in writing, and signed by the party to be charged therewith:
executor or administrator promises to answer damages out of his own estate.
2. Where a man undertakes to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of
another. 3. Where any agreement is made upon consideration of marriage.
4. Where any contract or sale is made of lands, tenements, or hereditaments,
or any interest therein. 5. And lastly, where there is any agreement that is
not to be performed within a year from the making thereof. In all these
cases a mere verbal assumpsit is void. (8)
From these express contracts the transition is easy to those that are only im
plied by law. Which are such as reason and justice dictate, and which there
fore the law presumes that every man has contracted to perform; and upon this
makes him answerable to such persons as suffer by his non-perPresumption
ormance.
Of this nature are, first, such as are necessarily implied by the fundamental
constitution of government, to which every man is a contracting party. And
thus it is that every person is bound and hath virtually agreed to pay such
particular sums of money as are charged on him by the sentence, or assessed by
the interpretation of the law. For it is a part of the original oontract, entered
into by all mankind who partake the benefits of society, to submit in all points
to the municipal constitutions and local ordinances of that state, of which each
Whatever, therefore, the laws order any one to pay,
individual is a member.
that becomes instantly a debt, which he hath before-hand contracted to dis
And this implied agreement it is, that gives the plaintiff a right to
charge.
institute a seoond action, founded merely on the general contract, in order to
recover such damages, or sum of money, as are assessed by the jury and ad
judged by the court to be due from the defendant to the plaintiff in any form
So that if he hath once obtained a judgment against another for a
er action.
certain sum> an<l neglects to take out execution ^thereupon, he may
r*iKOl
*■
J afterwards bring an action of debt upon this judgment,^) and shall
not be put upon the proof of the original cause of action; but upon showing
the judgment once obtained, still in full force, and yet unsatisfied, the law
immediately implies, that by the original contract of society the defendant
hath contracted a debt, and is bound to pay it. This method seems to have
been invented, when real actions were more in use than at present, and dam
ages were permitted to be recovered thereon; in order to have the benefit of a
writ of capias to take the defendant's body in execution for those damages,
which process was allowable in an action of debt (in consequence of the statute
Wherefore, since the disuse of
25 Edw. Ill, c. 17), but not in an action real.
those real actions, actions of debt upon judgments in personal suits have been
pretty much discountenanced by the courts, as being generally vexatious and
oppressive by harassing the defendant with the costs of two actions instead of
one.
On the same principle it is (of an implied original contract to submit to the
rules of the community whereof we are members), that a forfeiture imposed
by the by-laws and private ordinances of a corporation upon any that belong
to the body, or an amercement set in a court-leet or court-baron upon any of
to) Rol. Abr. 600.601.
(8) The substance of the statute of frauds and perjuries has been re-enacted in the several
American states, and the decisions under it have been too numerous to admit of their being
The reader must therefore be referred to the
analyzed or even mentioned by name here.
several treatises on contracts for such explanation and application of the statute as have
jbeen made by the courts, and to the works on equity jurisprudence for such relief as equity
can afford when contracts which should be in writing are allowed to rest in oral i
90
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the suitors to the court (for otherwise it will not be binding), (A) immediately
create a debt in the eye of the law: and such forfeiture or amercement, if
for which
unpaid, work an injury to the party or parties entitled to receive
the remedy
by action of debt.(i)
*The same reason may with equal justice be applied to all penal
r*lfl0-i
forfeiture is in- '-•■l0WJ
statutes, that is, such acts of parliament whereby
flicted for transgressing the provisions therein enacted.
The party offendinghere bound by the fundamental contract of society to obey the directions 01
the legislature, and pay the forfeiture incurred to such persons as the law re
either to the party aggrieved,
quires. The usual application of this forfeiture
or else to any of the king's subjects in general.
Of the same sort
the for
feiture inflicted by the statute of Winchester (k) (explained and enforced by
several subsequent statutes)
man
robbed,
upon the hundred wherein
which
meant to oblige the hundredors to make hue and cry after the felon;
for
But otherwise the party robbed
they take him they stand excused.
entitled to prosecute them by special action on the case for damages equiva
lent to his loss. And of the same nature
the action given by statute Geo.
o. 22, commonly called the black act, against the inhabitants of any hun
dred, in order to make satisfaction in damages to all persons who have suffered
by the offences enumerated and made felony by that act. But more usually
these forfeitures created by statute are given at large to any common inform
er; or, in other words, to any such person or persons as will sue for the same:
and hence such actions are called popular actions, because they are given to
the people in general, (m) Sometimes one part
given to the king, to the
poor, or to some public use, and the other part to the informer or prosecutor:
and then the suit
called qui tarn action, because
brought by a person
" qui tarn pro domino rege, 3bo.,quam prose ipso in hoc parte sequitur." If the
king, therefore, himself commences this suit, he shall have the whole forfeiture, (n)
But
any one hath begun qui tarn, or popular action, no other person can
bar
pursue it: and the verdict passed upon the defendant in the first suit
to all others, and conclusive even to the king himself. This has frequently
suit, in order to
occasioned offenders to procure their own friends to begin
in some measure pre
forestal, and prevent other actions: which practice
vented by statute made in the reign of
very sharp-sighted prince in penal
Hen. VII, c. 20, which enacts that no recovery, otherwise than by ver
laws,
bar to any other
dict, obtained by collusion in an action popular, shall be
action prosecuted bona fide. A provision that seems borrowed from *the r^...-,
•■
rule of the Roman law, that
person was acquitted of any accusation, merely by the prevarication of the accuser,
new prosecution might be
commenced against him. (o)
A second class of implied contracts are such as do not arise from the express
determination of any court, or the positive direction of any statute; but from
natural reason and the just construction of law. Which class extends to all
presumptive undertakings or assumpsits; which though never perhaps actually
made, yet constantly arise from this general implication ana intendment of
the courts of judicature that every man hath engaged to perform what his
Thus,
duty or justice requires.
If employ person to transact any business for me, or perform any work,,
the law implies that undertook or assumed to pay him so much as his labour
And
deserved.
remedy for thisneglect to make him amends, he has
injury by bringing his action on the case upon this implied assumpsit; wherein
he
at liberty to suggest that
promised to pay him so much as he reasonably
deserved, and then to av^r that his trouble was really worth such
particular
But this valuation of his
sum, whioh the defendant has omitted to pay.
sum
trouble
submitted to the determination of jury; who will assess such

Injuries to Personal Property".

161

IIL

[Book

This is oalled an assumpsit on a
damages as they think he really merited.
quantum meruit.
2. There is also an implied assumpsit on a quantum valebat, which is very
similar to the former, being only where one takes up goods or wares of a
There the law concludes
tradesman, without expressly agreeing for the price.
that* both parties did intentionally agree, that the real value of the goods
should be paid; and an action on the case may be brought accordingly, if the
vendee refuses to pay that value.
*3, ^ tnird species of implied assumpsits is when one has had and
r*i«2l
*•
* received money belonging to another, without any valuable considera
tion given on the receiver's part: for the law construes this to be money had
and received for the use of the owner only; and implies that the person so
receiving promised and undertook to account for it to the true proprietor.
an action on the case lies against him for the
And if he unjustly detains
breach of such implied promise and undertaking; and he will be made to repay
the owner in damages, equivalent to what he has detained in violation of such
This
his promise.
very extensive and beneficial remedy, applicable to
almost every case where the defendant has received money which ex mquo et
bono he ought to refund. It lies for money paid by mistake, or on consider
ation whioh happens to fail, or through imposition, extortion, or oppression, or
taken of the plaintiff's situation. (»)
where any undue advantage
4. Where
person has laid out and expended his own money for the use of
another, at his request, the law implies
promise of repayment, and an aotion
will lie on this assumpsit.
stated account between two merchants, or other
5. Likewise, fifthly, upon
persons, the law implies that he against whom the balance appears has engaged
to pay
to the other; though there be not any actual promise.
And from this
frequent for actions on the case to be brought, declaring that
implication
the plaintiff and defendant had settled their accounts together, insimul computassent (which gives name to this species of assumpsit), and that the defendant
engaged to pay the plaintiff the balance, but has since neglected to do it. But
no account has been made up, then the legal remedy
writ
by bringing
■of account, de computo ;(r) commanding the defendant to render
just account
to the plaintiff, *or show the court good cause to the contrary. In this
r*16o-i
action
the plaintiff succeeds, there are two judgments
the first is,
that the defendant do account (quod computet) before auditors appointed by
the court; and, when such account
finished, then the second judgment
found in arrear.
that he do pay the plaintiff so much as he
This action by
the old common law, (s) lay only against the parties themselves, and not their
executors, because matters of account rested solely on their own knowledge.
But this defect, after many fruitless attempts in parliament, was at last
remedied by statute Ann. c. 16, which gives an action of account against the
■executors
and administrators. (9) But, however,
found by experience
that the most ready and effectual way to settle these matters of account
by
bill in court of equity, where
discovery may be had on the defendant's
■oath, without relying merely on the evidence which the plaintiff may be able
man to bring in and
to produce. Wherefore actions of account to compel
settle his accounts, are now very seldom used; though when an account
once
more common than an action upon the implied assumpsit to
stated, nothing
pay the balance.
{
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(a) Carth. 446. SKeb.W.

((<) Burr. 1012.
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(») Co. Lltt. 90.
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and
Wm. IV, c. 42, an action may be maintained by or against
(9) And by statute
the personal representatives of any person deceased, for any wrong committed by or against
him, in respect of property, real or personal, within six calendar months before such per
against such representatives are made payable in
son's death, and any damages recovered
the regular order of administration.
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a. The last class of contracts, implied by reason and construction of lawv
arises upon this supposition, that every one who undertakes any office, employ
ment, trust or duty, contracts with those who employ or entrust him, to per
And, if by his want of either of
form it with integrity, diligence, and skill.
those qualities any injury accrues to individuals, they have therefor their
remedy in damages by a special action on the case. A few instances will fully
If an officer of the public is guilty of neglect of duty,
illustrate this matter.
the sheriff
as,
of non-feasance or of misfeasance;
or a palpable breach of
false return
he wilfully makes
writ sent to him, or
does not execute
thereof; in both these cases the party aggrieved shall have an action on the
the sheriff or gaoler suffers
case, for damages to be assessed by
jury.(£)
taken upon mesne process, (that *is, during the pend- r*-jfl>-i
prisoner, who
*■
liable to an action on the ease, (w) But
ency of suit) to escape, he
debtor to escape, who issheriff permits
after judgment,
gaoler or
certain sum; the debt immediately becomes his own,
charged in execution for
sum liquidated and ascer
and he
compellable by action of debt, being for
tained, to satisfy the creditor his whole demand: which doctrine
grounded
13 Edw.
o. 11, and
Rio. II,
(to) on the equity of the statutes of Westm.
An advocate or attorney that betray the cause of their client, or being
o. 12.
retained, neglect to appear at the trial, by which the cause miscarries, are
liable to an action on the case, for reparation to their injured client (a:) (10)
common inn-keeper, to
There
also in law always an implied contract with
common carrier, or bargemaster, to
secure his guest's goods in his inn; with
common farrier, that he shoes
be answerable for the goods he carries; with
horse well, without laming him; with
common tailor, or other workman,
that he performs his business in workmanlike manner; in which,
they fail,
an action on the case lies to recover damages for such breach of their general
But
undertaking, (y)
employ person to transact any of these concerns,
whose common profession and business
not, the law implies no such general
undertaking, but, in order to charge him with damages, a special agreement is
an inn-keeper,
or other victualler, hangs out
required. Also,
sign and
an implied engagement to entertain all per
opens his house for travellers,
sons who travel that way; and upon this universal assumpsit an action on the
he without good reason refuses tocase will lie against him for damages,
traveller. (z) If any one cheats me with false cards or dice, or by
admit
false weights and measures, or by selling me one commodity for another, an
action on the case also lies against him for damages, upon the contract which
fair and honest, (a)
the law always implies, that every transaction
In contracts likewise for sales,
constantly understood that the seller un
he sells
his own; and
dertakes that the ^commodity
proves r#1fiei
■*
otherwise, an action on the case lies against him, to exact damages for
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no implied undertaking on the part of an attorney, solicitor, or counsellor,
(10) There
that the business he takes charge of shall be successful, or that his advice shall always be
ordinary skill, diligence and care in the
sound and reliable. What he is responsible for
exercise of his profession, having reference to the nature of the business he undertakes to
R. L| 242; Miller v. Wilson, 24 Penn. St., 114; Cox v. Sullivan,
do: Holmes v. Peck,
Ga., 144; Clussman v. Merkel,
Bosw., 402; Walker v. Goodman, 21 Ala., 641; and for
any failure to exercise these, an action on the case may be maintained by his client against
him. For the rules of fairness and good faith which the law requires to be observed in
this relation, and the skill required, see Leighton v. Sargent, 27 N. H., 460; Howard v.
Grover, 28 Me., 97; Holmes v. Peck,
R. L, 243; Hallam v. Means, 82 111.,879; Long v.
Morrison, 14 Ind., 695; Craig v. Chambers, 17 Ohio St., 253; Heath v. Glisan,
Ore., 64.
which are very broad, and embrace cases almost infinite ia.
(11) Upon these subjects,
variety, the reader will of course consult the elementary treatises on bailments, earners,
contracts,

&c
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this deceit.
In contracts for provisions, it is always implied that they are
Also if he,
wholesome; and if they be not, the same remedy may be had.
that selleth any thing, doth npon the sale warrant it to be good, the law
annexes a tacit contract to his warranty, that if it be not so, he shall make
compensation to the buyer; else it is an injury to good faith, for which an
action on the case will lie to recover damages, (b) The warranty must be
upon the sale ; for if it be made after, and not at the time of the sale, it is avoid
warranty: (c) for it is then made without any consideration; neither does the
Also the warranty
buyer then take the goods upon the credit of the vendor.
can only reach to things in being at the time of the warranty made, and not to
things in futuro : as, that a horse is sound at the buying of him, not that he
toill be sound two years hence.
But if the vendor knew the goods to be un
sound, and hath used any art to disguise them, (d) or if they are in any shape
different from what he represents them to be to the buyer, this artifice shall be
equivalent to an express warranty, and the vendor is answerable for their
A general warranty will not extend to guard against defects that
goodness.
are plainly and obviously the object of one's senses, as if a horse be warranted
perfect, and wants either a tail or an ear, unless the buyer in this case be blind.
But if cloth is warranted to be of such a length, when it is not, there an action
on the case lies for damages; for that cannot be discerned by sight, but only
by a collateral proof, the measuring it. (e) Also if a horse is warranted sound,
and he wants the sight of an eye, though this seems to be the object of one's
tenses, yet as the discernment of such defects is frequently matter of skill, it
hath been held that an action on the case lieth to recover damages for this
imposition, (f)
Besides the special action on the case, there is also a peculiar remedy, enti
re
flfllJ ^e<^ an ac^on °f deceit, (ff) to give damages *in some particular cases
*■
of fraud, (12) and principally where one man does any thing in the
name of another, by which he is deceived or injured; (h) as if one brings an
action in another's name, and then suffers a nonsuit, whereby the plaintiff be
comes liable to costs: or where one obtains or suffers a fraudulent recovery of
As
lands, tenements, or chattels, to the prejudice of him that hath right.
when by collusion the attorney of the tenant makes default in a real action, or
where the sheriff returns that the tenant was summoned when he was not so, and
in either case he loses the land, the writ of deceit lies against the demandant, and
also the attorney or the sheriff and his officers; to annul the former proceed
It also lies in the cases of warranty before
ings, and recover back the land,
mentioned, and other personal injuries committed contrary to good faith and
But an action on the case, for damages, in the nature of
writ
honesty, (k)
of deceit, is more usually brought upon these occasions.
And indeed
the only (tn) remedy for
lord of
manor, in or out ot ancient demesne, to
reverse
fine or recovery had in the king's courts of lands lying within his
jurisdiction; which would otherwise be thereby turned into frank fee. And
this may be brought by the lord against the parties and cestuy que use of such
fine or recovery; and thereby he shall obtain judgment, not only for damages
(which are usually remitted), but also to recover his oourt, and jurisdiction
over the lands, and to annul the former proceedings, (n)
Thus much for the non-performance of contracts express or implied; which
includes every possible injury to what
by far the most considerable species
of personal property, vie that which consists in action merely, and not in pos
session.
Which finishes our inquiries into such wrongs as may be offered to
personal property, with their several remedies by suit or action.
h)

5.

is

(13) This particular action
94
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2

0>)F. N. B. 04.
(c) Finch, L. 18t.
to) F. N. B. 88.
(h) Law of n(ti prim, 80.
(e) Finch, L. 180.
<d) Roll. Rep.
(/) Balk, tit
Booth, real actions, SSI. Rast. Entr. 821,222. See page 405.
B. 98.
(JrtF. N.B.
Ley.
Le 415. Lntw. 711,749.
(n) Rast. Entr. 100,6.
(i) Booth, 863. Co. Entr.
(m) LeT. 418.

abolished; an action on the case being now the substitute
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CHAPTER X.

OF INJURIES TO REAL PROPERTY; AND FIRST OF
DISPOSSESSION, OR OUSTER OF THE FREEHOLD.

I

comb now to oonsider such injuries as affect that species of property whioh
the laws of England have denominated real; as being of a more substantial and
permanent nature than those transitory rights of which personal chattels are
the object.
Real injuries, then, or injuries affecting real rights, are principally six; 1.
Ouster; 2. Trespass; 3. Nuisance; 4. Waste; 5. Subtraction; 6. Disturbance.
Ouster, or dispossession, is a wrong or injury that carries with it the amotion
of possession: for thereby the wrong-doer gets into the actual occupation of
the land or hereditament, and obliges him that hath a right to seek his legal
remedy, in order to gain possession, and damages for the injuries sustained.
And such ouster, or dispossession, may either be of the freehold, or of chattels
1.
real.
Ouster of the freehold is effected by one of the followingmethods:
Abatement; 2. Intrusion; 3. Disseisin; 4. Discontinuance; 5. Deforcement.
All of whioh in their order, and afterwards their respective remedies, will be
considered in the present chapter.
is where a person dies seized of an inheritance,
1. And first, an abatemant
and before the heir or devisee enters, a stranger *who has no right
r*lfl8-iJ
makes entry, and gets possession of the freehold: this entry of him is *•
called an abatement, and he himself is denominated an abator, (a) It is to be
of abating which is derived from the French,
observed that this expression,
and signifies to quash, beat down, or destroy, is used by our law in three senses.
The first, which seems to be the primitive sense, is that of abating or beating
down a nuisance, of which we spoke in the beginning of this book; (b) and in
a like sense it is used in statute Westm. 1, 3 Edw. 1, o. 17; where mention is
made of abating a castle or fortress; in which case it clearly signifies to pull
it down, and level it with the ground. The second signification of abatement
is that of abating a writ or action, of which we shall say more hereafter: here
it is taken figuratively, and signifies the overthrow or defeating of such writ, by
some fatal exception to it. The last species of abatement is that we have now
before ns; which is also a figurative expression to denote that the rightful pos
session or freehold of the heir or devisee is overthrown by the rude interven
tion of a stranger.
The abatement of a freehold is somewhat similar to an immediate occupancy
in a state of nature, whioh is effected by taking possession of the land the same
instant that the prior occupant, by his death, relinquishes it. But this, however agreeable to natural justice, considering man merely as an individual, is
diametrically opposite to the law of society, and particularly the law of England;
which for the preservation of public peace, hath prohibited, as far as possible,
all acquisitions by mere occupancy: and hath direoted that lands, on the death
of the present possessor, should immediately vest either in some person, ex
pressly named and appointed by the deceased, as his devisee; or, on default
of such appointment, in such of his next relations as the law hath selected and
pointed out as his natural representative or heir. Every entry, therefore, of a
mere stranger by way of intervention between the ancestor and heir, or per
son next entitled, which keeps the heir or devisee out of possession, is one of
the highest injuries to the right of real property.
ft) finch,

l.

its.

(6) Fag* 5.
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*2- ^e 8econ<* spec'es o£ injury by ouster, or amotion of possession
from the freehold, is by intrusion: which is the entry of a stranger, after
a particular estate of freehold is determined, before him in remainder or rever
sion.
And it happens where a tenant for term of life dieth seized of certain
lands and tenements, and a stranger entereth thereon, after such death of the
tenant, and before any entry of him in remainder or reversion, (c) This entry
ltd interposition of the stranger differ from an abatement in this; that an
abatement is always to the prejudice of the heir, or immediate devisee; an in
trusion is always to the prejudice of him in remainder or reversion. For ex
ample; if A dies seized of lands in fee-simple, and before the entry of B
his heir C enters thereon, this is an abatement; but if A be tenant for life,
with remainder to B in fee-simple, and after the death of A, C enters, this isan intrusion.
Also if A be tenant for life on lease from B, or his ancestors,
or be tenant by the curtesy, or in dower, the reversion being vested in B; and
after the death of A, C enters and keeps B out of possession, this is likewisean intrusion.
So that an intrusion is always immediately consequent upon the
determination of a particular estate; an abatement is always consequent upon
the descent or devise of an estate in fee-simple.
And in either case the injury
is equally great to him whose possession is defeated by this unlawful occu
pancy.
3. The third species of injury by ouster, or privation of the freehold, is by
disseisin. Disseisin is a wrongful putting out of him that is seized of the
freehold, (d) The two former
species of injury were by a wrongful entry
where the possession was vacant; but this is an attack upon him who is in ac
tual possession, and turning him out of it. Those were an ouster from a free
hold in law; this is an ouster from a freehold in deed.
Disseisin may ber*lfo1J entecte<i either in corporeal inheritances, *or incorporeal. Disseisin of
things corporeal, as of houses, lands, <fco., must be by entry and actual
of the freehold; (e) as if a man enters either by force or fraud
dispossession
into the house of another, and turns, or at least keeps, him or his servants out
of possession.
Disseisin of incorporeal hereditaments cannot be an actual dis
possession: for the subject itself is neither capable of actual bodily possession
or dispossession; but it depends on their respective natures, and various kinds;
being in general nothing more than a disturbance of the owner in the means
of coming at, or enjoying them. With regard to freehold rent in particular,
mentioned five methods of working a disseisin
our ancient law books
thereof: 1. By enclosure ; where the tenant so encloseth the house or land,
that the lord cannot come to distrain thereon, or demand it: 2. By forestaUer,
or lying in wait; when the tenant besetteth the way with force and arms, or
by menaces of bodily hurt affrights the lessor from coming: 3. By rescous;
that is, either by violently retaking a distress taken, or by preventing the lord
with force and arms from taking any at all: 4. By replevin; when the tenant
replevies the distress at such time when his rent is really due: 5. By denial;
which is when the rent being lawfully demanded is not paid. All, or any of
amount to a disseisin of rent; that
these circumstances,
they wrongfully
the owner out of the only possession, of which the subject-matter
capaBut all these disseisins of hereditaments incor
le, namely, the receipt of it.
for the
poreal are only so at the election and choice of the party injured;
sake of more easily trying the right, he
pleased to suppose himself disseised.
he cannot be compul
[<f) -Otherwise, as there can be no actual dispossession,
sively disseised of any incorporeal hereditament.
And so too, even in corporeal hereditaments, man may frequently suppose
not so in fact, for the sake of entitling him
himself to be disseised, when he
self to the more easy and commodious remedy of an assize of novel disseisin
(which will be explained in the sequel of this chapter), instead of being
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•driven to the more tedious process of a writ of entry. (A) The truer*.,-,!
J
seems to be that of dispossessing the
tenant, and substituting oneself to be the tenant of the lord in his stead; in
order to which in the times of pure feudal tenure the consent or connivance of
the lord, who upon every descent or alienation personally gave, and who there
fore alone could change, the seisin or investiture, seems to have been con
sidered as necessary.
But when in process of time the feudal form of aliena
tions wore off, and the lord was no longer the instrument of giving actual
seisin, it is probable that the lord's acceptance of rent or service, from him
who had dispossessed another, might constitute a complete disseisin.
After
wards, no regard was had to the lord's concurrence, but the dispossessor him
self was considered as the sole disseisor: and this wrong was then allowed to
be remedied by entry only, without any form of law, as against the disseisor
himself; but required a legal process against his heir or alienee.
And when
the remedy by assize was introduced under Henry II, to redress such disseisins
as had been committed within a few years next preceding, the facility of that
remedy induced others, who were wrongfully kept out of the freehold, to feign
or allow themselves to be disseised, merely for the sake of the remedy.
These three species of injury, abatement, intrusion and disseisin, are such
wherein the entry of the tenant ab initio, as well as the continuance of his
But the two remaining species are where
possession afterwards, is unlawful.
the entry of the tenant was at first lawful, but the wrong consists in the de
taining of possession afterwards.
4. Such
which happens when he
fourthly, the injury of discontinuance
who hath an estate-tail, maketh
larger estate of the land than by law he
entitled to do:
in which case the estate
good, so far as his power extends
who made
but no farther. As
tenant in tail makes
feoffment in feesimple, or for the life of the feoffee, or in tail; all *which are beyond
n^^l*
his power to make, for that by the common law extends no farther than *■
to make
lease for his own life; in such case the entry of the feoffee
lawful
he retains the possession after the death
during the life of the feoffor; but
of the feoffor,
an injury, which
termed
discontinuance: the ancient
legal estate, which ought to have survived to the heir in tail, being gone; or
while discontinued. For, in this case, on the
at least suspended, and for
death of the alienors, neither the heir in tail, nor they in remainder or rever
sion expectant on the determination of the estate-tail, (1) can enter on and
Also, by the common law, the alienation of
possess the lands so alienated.
discontinuance of
husband who was seized in the right of his wife, worked
the wife's estate: till the statute 32 Hen. VIII, c. 28 provided, that no act by
the husband alone shall work a discontinuance of, or prejudice, the inheritance
or freehold of the wife; but that, after his death, she or her heirs may enter
an alienation was made by
solo
on the lands in question. Formerly, also,
bishop or dean, without oonsent of the chapter, this was a
corporation, as
discontinuance, (j) But this
now quite antiquated by the disabling statutes
of Eliz. c. 19, and 13 Eliz. o. 10, which declare all such alienations absolutely
void ab initio, and, therefore, at present no discontinuance can be thereby
a
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injury of compulsive disseisin

occasioned.

(2)

The fifth and last species of injuries by ouster or privation of the free
hold, where the entry of the present tenant or possessor was originally lawful,
now become unlawful,
that by deforcement.
This, in
but his detainer
Burr. 110.
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no longer the law. See statute
c. 106,
(2) And a discontinuance in any case would now appear to be impossible, since the stat
feoffment made after
utes mentioned in the last note, the second of which declares that
tortious operation, so as to create an estate by wrong.
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its most extensive sense, is nomen generalissimum; a much larger and more
comprehensive expression than any of the former: it then signifying the hold
ing of any lands or tenements to which another person hath a right, (k) So
that this includes as well an abatement, an intrusion, a disseisin, or a discon
tinuance, as any other species of wrong whatsoever, whereby he that hath right
But as contradistinguished from the
to the freehold is kept out of possession.
former> it ls on^7 8Ucn a detainer of the *freehold, from him that hath
r*i7°.l
' J
L
the right of property, but never had any possession under that right, as
falls within none of the injuries which we have before explained. As in case
where a lord has a seigniory, and lands escheat to him propter defectum sangui
nis, but the seisin of the lands is withheld from him; here the injury is not
abatement, for the right vests not in the lord as heir or devisee; nor is it intru
sion, for it vests not in him who hath the remainder or reversion; nor is it
disseisin, for the lord was never seised; nor does it at all bear the nature of any
species of discontinuance ; but, being neither of these four, it is therefore a
If man marries woman, and during the coverture seised
deforcement.
of lands, and alienes, and dies;
disseised, and dies; or dies in possession;
and the alienee, disseisor, or heir, enters on the tenements and doth not assign
the widow her dower; this
also a deforcement to the widow, by withhold
In like manner,
man lease lands
ing lands to which she hath
right, (m)
to another for term of years, or for the life of
third person, and the term
and the
expires by surrender, efflux of time, or death of the cesttiy que vie
lessee or any stranger, who was at the expiration of the term in possession,
holds over, and refuses to deliver the possession to him in remainder or rever
deforcement, (n)
Deforcements may also arise upon
likewise
sion, this
man by deed,
the breach of
woman gives lands to
condition in law: as
to the intent that he marry her, and he will not when thereunto required, but
continues to hold the lands: this
such a fraud on the man's part that the law
will not allow
to devest the woman's right of possession; though, his entry
does devest the actual possession, and thereby becomes
de
being lawful,
forcement, (o) Deforcements may also be grounded on the disability of the
an infant do make an alienation of his lands, and the
party deforced: as
alienee enters and keeps possession; now, as the alienation
voidable, this
possession as against the infant (or, in case of his decease, as against his heir)
deforcement, (p) The same
is after avoidance wrongful, and, therefore,
one of non-sane memory alienes his lands or tene*when
happens,
r*i74.1
ments, and the alienee enters and holds possession; this may also be
deforcement, (q) Another species of deforcement
where two persons have
the same title to land, and one of them enters and keeps possession against the
other: as where the ancestor dies seised of an estate in fee-simple, which
descends to two sisters as coparceners, and one of them enters before the other,
and will not suffer her sister to enter and enjoy her moiety; this
also a de
forcement, (r) Deforcement may also be grounded on the non-performance
of covenant real: as
man, seised of lands, covenants to convey them to
another, and neglects or refuses so to do, but continues possession against him;
this possession, being wrongful,
deforcement:
whence, in levying
fine
of lands, the person against whom the fictitious action
brought upon
sup
called the deforciant. (3) And, lastly, by way of
posed breach of covenant,
freehold office
man by any means out of
construed to
analogy, keeping
be
deforcement; though, being an incorporeal hereditament, the deforciant
has no corporeal possession.
So that whatever injury (withholding the posses-
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it

-I

*■

|

{

I

%
S

{

5.

a

is

a

is

it a

it

a

a

is

it

a

a

is

a

a

it

if

is

:

is

if if

is

it

if

it

*■

a

is

a

(t)

is

is,

prised under this of deforcement.
The several species and degrees of injury by ouster being thus ascertained
and defined, the next consideration is the remedy; which
universally, the
restitution or delivery of possession to the right owner: and, in some cases,
damages also for the unjust amotion. The methods whereby these remedies,
or either of them, may be obtained, are various.
1. The first
that extrajudicial and summary one, which we slightly
of entry by the legal owner,
touohed in the first chapter of the present book,
when another person, who hath no right, hath previously taken possession of
lands or tenements.
In this case the party entitled may make
formal, but
peaceable, entry thereon, declaring that thereby he takes possession; which
notorious act of ownership
feudal investiture by the lord:
equivalent to
in the same county, deolaring
r*i 751
(u) or he may enter on any *part of
to be in the name of the whole: (») but
lies in different counties
he must make different entries; for the notoriety of such entry or claim to the
not any notoriety to the pares or
pares or freeholders of Westmoreland,
freeholders of Sussex.
Also
there be two disseisors, the party disseised must
make his entry on both; or
one disseisor has conveyed the lands with livery
to two distinct feoffees, entry must be made on both
(w) for as their seisin
If the olaimant be
distinct, so also must be the act which devests that seisin.
deterred from entering by menaces or bodily fear, he may make claim, as near
to the estate as he oan, with the like forms and solemnities: which claim
in
force for only
be repeated once in
year and
day. (x) And this claim,
the space of every year and day (which
called continual claim), has the
same effect with, and in all respects amounts to,
legal entry, (y) Such an
entry gives man seisin, (z) or puts into immediate possession him that hath
right of entry on the estate, and thereby makes him oomplete owner, and
from himself by either descent or purchase. (4)
capable of oonveying
This remedy by entry takes plaoe in three only of the five species of ouster,
viz.: abatement, intrusion, and disseisin; (a) for, as in these the original entry
of the wrongdoer was unlawful, they may therefore be remedied by the mere
But, upon the discontinuance or deforcement,
entry of him who hath right.
the owner of the estate cannot enter, but
driven to his action: for herein the
original entry being lawful, and thereby an apparent right of possession being
gained, the law will not suffer that right to be overthrown by the mere act or
man may enter (b) on his tenant by sufferance:
entry of the claimant. Yet
for such tenant hath no freehold, but only
bare possession; which may be
defeated, like
the
tenancy at will, by the mere entry of the owner. But
more expedient to suppose or admit (c) such tenant to have
owner thinks
tortious freehold, he
then remediable by writ of entry, ad r«M*Bi
♦gained
terminum qui prceteriit. (5)
On the other hand, in case of abatement, intrusion, or disseisin, where entries
are generally lawful, this right of entry may be tolled, that
taken away by
descent.
Descents, which take away entries, (d) (6) are when anyone, seized
by any means whatsoever of the inheritance of corporeal hereditament, dies;
whereby the same descends to his heir: in this case, however feeble the right
of the ancestor might be, the entry of any other person who claims title to the
M Utt. 417.
(t) See pace
(to) Co. Utt 85*
(u) See book n, oh. 14,p. 809.
418,428.
(() Co. Lltt 15.
(•) Lit! 422.
dr) Ibid.
(a) Ibid. 887,888.
888-418.
(e) Oo. Lltt 87.
(4) 8ee book II, p. 150.
(d) Utt.
4

3

and Wm. IV, c. 27, a. 10, no person shall be deemed to have been
(4) Now by statute
in possession of any land within the meaning of that act, merely by reason of having made
an entry thereon; and by section 11 no continual or other claim upon or near any land shall
preserve any right of making an entry.
(6) The statute above mentioned abolishes this proceeding.
(6) This and the two following paragraphs are not applicable to the present state of the
law.
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(e)

freehold is taken away; and he cannot recover possession against the heir by
this summary method, but is driven to his action to gain a legal seisin of the
And this, first, because the heir comes to the estate by act of law, and
estate.
not by his own act; the law therefore protects his title, and will not suffer hia
to be devested, till the claimant hath proved a better right.
possession
Secondly, because the heir may not suddenly know the true state of his title;
and therefore the law, which is ever indulgent to heirs, takes away the entry
of such claimant as neglected to enter on the ancestor who was well able to
defend his title; and leaves the claimant only the remedy of an action against
the heir,
Thirdly, this was admirably adapted to the military spirit of the
feudal tenures, and tended to make the feudatory bold in war; since his chil
dren could not, by any mere entry of another, be dispossessed of the lands
And, lastly,
whereof he died seized.
agreeable to the dictates of reason
and the general principles of law.
For in every complete title (/) to lands, there are two things necessary; the
expressed
possession or seisin, and the right or property therein: (g) or, as
the possession be severed
in Fleta, juris et seisince conjunctio. (A) Now
A has the jus proprietatis, and by some unlawful means
from the property,
has gained possession of the lands, this
an injury to A; for which the law
remedy> by putting *him in possession, but does
by different
£*ves
r*177l
*means, according to the circumstances of the case.
Thus, as B, wha
was himself the wrongdoer, and hath obtained the possession by either fraud
or force, hath only bare or naked possession, without any shadow of right; A,
therefore, who hath both the right of property and the right of possession, may
B,
put an end to his title at once, by the summary method of entry. But,
the wrongdoer, dies seised of the lands, then B's heir advances one step farther
bare possession, but also an apparent
towards a good title: he hath not only
For the law presumes that the posses
jus possessionis, or right of possession.
transmitted from the ancestor to the heir,
sion which
rightful possession
not allowed
until the contrary be shewn; and therefore the mere entry of A
driven to his. action at law to remove the
to evict the heir of B; but A
possession of the heir, though his entry alone would have dispossesed the an

is

it

cestor.
So that in general
appears, that no man can recover possession by mere
Yet this rule hath some ex
entry on lands, which another hath by descent.
ceptions (i) wherein those reasons cease, upon which the general doctrine
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the claimant were under any legal disabilities, during
grounded; especially
the life of the ancestor, either of infanoy, coverture, imprisonment, insanity, or
no neglect or laches in the
being out of the realm: in all which cases there
And
claimant, and therefore no descent shall bar, or take away his entry. (&)
still farther narrowed by the
this title of taking away entries by descent,
Statute 32 Hen. VIH, o. 33, which enacts that
any person disseises or turns
another out of possession, no descent to the heir of the disseisor shall take away
the entry of him that has right to the land, unless the disseisor had peaceable
But the statute extendeth not to
possession five years next after the disseisin.
because such a.
any feoffee or donee of the disseisor, mediate or immediate:
one by the genuine feudal constitutions always came into the tenure solemnly
*an^ w'1^ tne l01"^'8 concurrence, by actual delivery of seisin, that is,
r*i'7ftl
On the other hand,
enacted by the
open and public investiture.
o. 16, that no entry shall be made by any man
statute ot limitations, 21 Jao.
And
upon lands, unless within twenty years after his right shall accrue.
and
Ann. c. 16, no entry shall be of force to satisfy the said
by statute
fine levied of lands, unless an action be
statute of limitations, or to avoid
thereupon commenced within one year after, and prosecuted with effect.
1
5.

8.

1

o

8,

c 18.
(g) Mirror, .2. 97.
(fc) L.
en. the principles of which are well explained'

8,

(/) 8ee book n, ch. 18.
Uf Co. Lltt. 237.
(0 See thu particular cases mentioned by Littleton, b.
In OiibtrVs lavs of tenure*.
(I) Ibid. 251
(k) Co. Litt. 248.
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Upon an ouster, by the discontinuance of tenant in tail, we have said that
no remedy by mere entry is allowed; but that, when tenant in tail aliens the
lands entailed, this takes away the entry of the issue in tail, and drives him to
his action at law to recover the possession. (w») For, as in the former cases,
the law will not suppose, without proof, that the ancestor of him in possession,
acquired the estate by wrong; and therefore, after five years peaceable posses
sion, and a descent cast, will not suffer the possession of the heir to be dis
turbed by mere entry without action; so here the law 'will not suppose the discontinuor to have aliened the estate without power so to do, and therefore
leaves the heir in tail to his action at law, and permits not his entry to be law
ful. Besides, the alienee, who came into possession by a lawful conveyance,
which was at least good for the life of the alienor, hath not only a bare pos
which is not allowed to be
session, but also an apparent right of possession;
devested by the mere entry of the claimant, but continues in force till a better
right be shown, and recognized by a legal determination. And something also,
perhaps, in framing this rule of law, may be allowed to the inclination of the
courts of justice, to go as far as they could in making estates-tail alienable,
by declaring such alienations to be voidable only, and not absolutely void.
In case of deforcement, also, where the deforciant had originally a lawful
possession of the land, but now detains it wrongfully, he still continues to have
the presumptive prima *facie evidence of right; that
possession
r*ii*g-|
Which possession shall not be overturned by the
lawfully gained.
mere entry of another; but only by the demandant's
better right
showing
in
course of law.
This remedy by entry must be pursued according to statute Ric. II, st.
c.
in peaceable and easy manner; and not with foroe or strong hand. For,
if one turns or keeps another out ofpossession forcibly, this
an injury of
both
civil and criminal nature.
The civil
remedied by immediate resti
tution; which puts the ancient possessor in statu quo; the criminal injury, or
wrong, by breach of the king's peace,
punished by fine to the king,
Hen. VI, c.
fublio
'or, by the statute
upon complaint made to any justice of the
forcible entry, with strong hand, on lands or tenements; or
for
peace, of
cible detainer after
peaceable entry; he shall try the truth of the complaint
by jury, and, upon force found, shall restore the possession to the party so put
out; and in such case, or
any alienation be made to defraud the possessor of
his right (which
likewise declared to be absolutely void), the offender shall
forfeit, for the force found, treble damages to the party grieved, and make fine
and ransom to the king.
But this does not extend to such as endeavour to
keep possession manu forti, after three years' peaceable enjoyment of either
themselves, their ancestors, or those under whom they claim; by
subsequent
clause of the same statute, enforced by statute 31 Eliz. o. 11.
IL Thus far of remedies, where the tenant or occupier of the land hath
mere possession, and no apparent shadow of right.
Next follow
gained only
another class, which are in use where the title of the tenant or occupier
advanced one step nearer to perfection; so that he hath in him not only
bare
bare entry, but also an apparent
possession, which may be destroyed by
right of possession, which cannot be removed but by orderly course of law;
in the process of which
must be shown, that though he hath at present pos
session, and, therefore, hath *the presumptive right, yet there
right
snl
*■
of possession, superior to his, residing in him who brings the action.
These remedies are either by writ of entry, or an assize; (7) which are ac
tions merely possessory; serving only to regain that possession, whereof the
demandant (that
he who sues for the land) or his ancestors have been unjustly
deprived by the tenant or possessor of the freehold, or those under whom he

and
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(7) These writs were abolished
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They deoide nothing with respect to the right of property; only restor
ing the demandant to that state or situation in which he was (or by law ought
to have been) before the dispossession committed. But this without any preju
dice to the right of ownership: for, if the dispossessor has any legal claim, he
may afterwards exert
notwithstanding
recovery against him in these pos
sessory actions.
Only the law will not suffer him to be his own judge, and
either take or maintain possession of the lands, until he hath recovered them
by legal means: (n) rather presuming the right to have accompanied the
ancient seisin, than to reside in one who has no such evidence in his favour.
1. The first of these possessory remedies
that
by writ of entry; which
which disproves the title of the tenant or possessor, by showing the unlawful
means by which he entered or continues possession, (o) The writ
directed to
the sheriff, requiring him to "command the tenant of the land that he render
(in Latin, praecipe quod reddat) to the demandant the land in question, which
he claims to be his right and inheritance; and into which, as he saith, the said
tenant had not entry but by (or after)
disseisin, intrusion, or the like, made
to the said demandant, within the time limited by law for such actions; or that
upon refusal he do appear in court on such
day, to show wherefore he hath
not done it."(jt>) This
the original process, the praecipe upon which all the
rest of the suit
required,
appears that the tenant
grounded: wherein
e'tner to deliver 'seisin of the lands, or to show cause why he will not.
r*1811
This cause may be either denial of the fact of having entered by or
under such means as are suggested, or justification of his entry by reason of
title in himself or in those under whom he makes olaim: whereupon the pos
session of the land
awarded to him who produces the clearest right to pos
sess it.
In our ancient books we find frequent mention of the degrees within which
writs of entry are brought. If they be brought against the party himself that
did the wrong, then they only charge the tenant himself with the injury; "non
habuit ingressum nisi per intrusionem quam ipse fecit." But
the intruder,
disseisor, or the like, has made any alienation of the land to
third person,
or
has descended
to his heir, that circumstance must be alleged in the
writ, for the action must always be brought against the tenant of the land;
and the defect of his possessory title, whether arising from his own wrong
or that of those under whom he claims, must be set forth. One suoh alien
ation or descent makes the first
called the per, because
degree, whioh
then the form of
writ of entry is this that the tenant had not entry, but
de
by the original wrong-doer, who alienated the land, or from whom
scended to him: "non habuit ingressum, nisi per Oulielmum, qui se in Mud tntrusit, et Mud tenenti dimisit." (r) A second alienation or descent makes an
other degree, called the per and cui; because the form of
writ of entry,
in that case,
that the tenant had not entry, but by or under a prior
alienee, to whom the intruder demised it; non habuit ingressum nisi per
Hicardum, cui Gulielmus Mud dimisit qui se in Mud intrusit."
These
thus state the original wrong, and the title of the tenant who
degrees
claims under such wrong.
more than two degrees (that
two alien
ations or descents) were past, there lay no writ of entry at the common law.
as
was Prov'ded, f°r tQe *quietness of men's inheritances, that
*182l ^or'
«■
-"no one, even though he had the true right of possession, should enter
upon him who had the apparent right by descent or otherwise, but he was
driven to his writ of entry to gain possession; so, after more than two descents
or two conveyances were passed, the demandant, even though he had the right
both of possession and property, was not allowed this possessory action; but waa
driven to his writ of rig/U,
long and final remedy, to punish his negleot in
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(p) See book II, Append. No. V.
24.
(o) Finch, L. Ml.
(n) Mir. e.
(?) Pinch, L. 262. Booth, indeed (of real actions, 172),makes the first degree to consist In the"
wrong done, the second In the per, and the third In the per and cui. But the difference Is
<•)Much, L, 268. F. N. R, 208,204,
(r) Booth, 181.
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not sooner putting in his claim, while the degrees subsisted, and for the ending
•f suits, and quieting all controversies,
But by the statute of Marlbridge,
hi Hen. Ill, c. 30,
was provided, that when the number of alienations or'
new writ should be allowed withouti
descents exceeded the usual degrees,
new writ has been framed,
any mention of degrees at all. And, accordingly,
called
writ of entry in the post, which only alleges the injury of the wrong
doer, without deducing all the intermediate title from him to the tenant;
in this manner: that the tenant had not entry unless after, or subse
stating
quent to, the ouster or injury done by the original dispossessor; "non habuit
ingressum nisi post intrusionem quam Gulielmus in illud fecit;" and rightly
the original title was wrongful, all claims derived from
concluding, that,
thence must participate of the same wrong.
Upon the latter of these writs
(the writ of entry sur disseisin in the post) that the form of our common
recoveries of landed estates (w)
usually grounded; which, we may remem
ber, were observed in the preceding volume («) to be fictitious actions brought
against the tenant of the freehold (usually called the tenant to the praecipe, or
writ of entry), in which, by collusion, the demandant recovers the land.
This remedial instrument, or writ of entry,
applicable to all the cases of
ouster before-mentioned, except that of discontinuance by tenant in tail, and
some peculiar species of deforcements.
Such
that of deforcement of dower,
by not assigning any dower to the widow within the time limited by
*law; for which she has her remedy by writ of dower, unde nihil habet. r m. R„,
*
But
she be deforced of part only of her dower,' she cannot <■
(w)
then say that nihil habet; and, therefore, she may have recourse to another
more general remedy, extending
action, by writ of right of dower; which
either to part or the whole; and
(with regard to her claim) of the same
nature as the grand writ of right, whereof we shall presently speak,
with
the heir (being
regard to claims in fee-simple, (x) (8) On the other hand,
within age), or his guardian, assign her more than she ought to have, they
writ of admeasurement of dower, (y) But, in general,
may be remedied by
the writ of entry
the universal remedy to recover possession, when wrong
fully withheld from the owner. It were, therefore, endless to recount all the
several divisions of writs of entry, whioh the different circumstances of the
may require, and which are furnished by the laws of
respective demandants
England: (2) being plainly and clearly chalked out in that most ancient and
highly venerable collection of legal forms, the registrum omnium brevium, or
register of such writs as are suable out of the king's courts, upon which Fitzcomment; and in which every man who
herbert's natura brevium
*is injured will be sure to find method of relief exactly adapted to
*1(U-i
his own case, described in the compass of few lines, and yet without
the omission of any material circumstance. So that the wise and equitable
13 Edw.
0. 24, for framing new writs
provision of the statute Westm.
almost rendered useless by the very great perfection of the
when wanted,
I,

8.

I,

/

2.

(

7.

Lai,

(8) Both these writs were abolished by the common law procedure act, 1860, and
of summons from the common pleas substituted.
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8,
1
4.

7.

2.

I.
4,

2.

2

(t>)Book IL ch. 81.
(u) See book n. Append. No. V.
(u>)P. N. B. 147.
(0 Inat. 158.
18Ed.
a
(x) Ibid. 18.
(v) F. N. B. 148. Finch, L. 814. Stat Westm.
Britton, a 114.foL 884. The most usual were,
The writs of entry
tr.
c.
(*) See Bracton,
rar disseisin, and of intrusion, (F. N. B. 191,303)which are brought to remedy either of those species of
bid, 192, 202)which
ouster.
The writs of dum fuit infra a&latem, and dumfuit non compos mentis,
lie for a person of full age, or one who hath recovered his understanding, after having (when under age
The writs of cui in vita, and cui ante dior insane) aliened his lands; or for the heirs of such alienor,
vortium, (Ibid. 193, 204)for a woman, when a widow or divorced, whoso husband during the coverture
The
{cui in vita sua, vel cui ante divortium, ipsa contradicere non potuit) hath aliened her estate.
writ ad communem legem, (Ibid. 207)for the reversioner after the alienation and death of the particular
bid. 205,206)which lay not ad comtenant for life.
The writs in vasu proviso and in consimili casu,
munem legem, but are given by stat. Qloc
Edw.
and Westm.
18Edw.
c. 24, for the rever
sioner after the alienation, but during the life, of the tenant In dower or other tenant for life.
The
writ ad terminum qui prceteriit,
bid. 201) for the reversioner, when the possession Is withheld by the
lessee or a stranger after the determination of a lease for years.
The writ causa matrimonii pralocutt
Ibid. 205)for a woman who giveth land to a man in fee or for life, to the intent that he may marry her,
and he doth not. And the like in case of other deforcements.
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And, indeed, know not whether it is a greater credit to our
ancient forma.
laws to have such a provision contained in them, or not to have occasion, or at
least very rarely, to use it.
In the times of our Saxon ancestors, the right of possession seems only t»
have been recoverable by writ of entry, (a) which was then usually brought
in the county oourt.
And it is to be observed, that the proceedings in these
actions were not then so tedious when the courts were held, and process issued
from and was returnable therein at the end of every three weeks, as they be
came after the conquest, when all causes were drawn into the king's courts,
and process issued only from term to term: which was found exceedingly
And hence, a new
dilatory, being at least four times as slow as the other.
remedy was invented in many cases to do justice to the people, and to deter
mine the possession in the proper counties, and yet by the king's judges. This
was the remedy by assise, which is called by statute Westm. 2, 13 Edw. L o.
24, festinum remedium, in comparison with that by a writ of entry; it not ad
mitting of many dilatory pleas and proceedings, to which other real actions
are subject, (b)
2. The writ of assize is said to have been invented by Glanvil, chief justice
to Henry the Second; (c) and, if so, it seems to owe its introduction to the
parliament held at Northampton, in the twenty-second year of that prince's
reign; when justices in eyre were appointed to go round the kingdom in order
to take these assizes: and the assizes themselves (particularly those of mort
cTancestor and novel disseisin) were clearly pointed out and described, (d)
r*. RR-|' As a writ of entry *is a real action (9) which disproves the title of the
L
tenant by showing the unlawful commencement of his possession ; so an
assize is a real action, which proves the title of the demandant merely by
and these two remedies are in all
showing his, or his ancestor's, possession;
other respects so totally alike, that
bar
judgment or recovery in one
man's possession
once established by
against tne other; so that, when
can never be disturbed by the same an
either of these possessory actions,
The word assize
derived by Sir Edward
tagonist in any other of them.
Coke (/) from the Latin assideo, to sit together: and
signifies, originally,
the jury who try the cause, and sit together for that purpose.
By figure it
now made to signify the oourt or jurisdiction, which summons this jury to
and hence the
commission of assize, or ad assisas capiendas
gether by
judicial assemblies held by the king's commission in every county, as well to
take these writs of assize, as to try causes at nisi prius, are termed in common
By another somewhat similar figure, the name of assize
speech the assizes.
also applied to this action, for recovering possession of lands; for the reason,
saith Littleton, (g) why such writs at the beginning were called assizes, was,
for that in these writs the sheriff
ordered to summon
jury, or assize;
which
not expressed in any other original writ. (A)
This remedy, by writ of assize,
only applicable to two species of injury
by ouster, viz. abatement, and a recent or novel disseisin. If the abatement
happened upon the death of the demandant's father or mother, brother or sister,
uncle or aunt, nephew or niece, the remedy
by an assize of mort cTancestor,
or the death of one's ancestor.
This writ directs the sheriff to summon jury
or assize, who shall view the land in question, and recognize whether such an
cestor was seized thereof on the day of his death, and whether the demandant
be the next heir:
soon after which the judges came down by the king's
25.
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8i dominus feodi net/at hceredibus defunct saisinam ejusdem feodi, juttitiarii domini regis
(d)
faciant inde fieri, recognitionem per xii legates homines, quntem saisinam dej undue inde habuit. die
vivus
et tnortuus; et sicut recognitum fuerit, iia hceredibus ejus restttuant.
10. Juetitiarii
fu.it
Sua
ommi regis faciant fieri recognitionem de dissaisinis factis super assisam. a tempore quo dominus res
venit in Angliam proxime post pacem factam inter ipsum et regem fUium suum. (Spelm. Cod. 830.)
(<)F. N. B. 195. Finch. L. 280.
(e) Finch, L. 884.
(/) Inst. 153. (o) *S4. ft) Co. Litt. 159.
(9) Writs of assize and entry are now abolished.
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commission to take the recognition of assize: when, if "these points are
r*io.-|'
found in the affirmative, the law immediately transfers the possession *•
from the tenant to the demandant.
If the abatement happened on the death
of one's grandfather or grandmother, then an assize of mort d'ancestor no
longer lies, bat a writ of ayle or de avo: if on the death of the great-grand
father or great-grandmother, then a writ of besayle, or de proavo : but if it
monnts one degree higher, to the tresayle, or grandfather's grandfather, or if
the abatement happened upon the death of any collateral relation, other than
those before-mentioned, the writ is called a writ of corinage, or de consanAnd the same point shall be inquired of in all these actions
ffuineo. (k) (10)
ancestrel, as in an assize of mort d 'ancestor ; they being of the very same
nature:
though they differ in this point of form, that these ancestrel writs
title in the demandant (viz.:
(like all other writs of praecipe) expressly assert
the seisin of the anoestor at his death and his own right of inheritance), the
assize asserts nothing directly, but only prays an inquiry whether those points
be so. (to)
There
also another ancestrel writ, denominated
nuper obiit,
to establish an equal division of the land in question, where, on the death of
an ancestor, who has several heirs, one enters and holds the others out of pos
session,
But
man
not allowed to have any of these actions ancestrel
(n)
for an abatement consequent on the death of any collateral relation, beyond
the fourth degree; (o) though in the lineal ascent he may prooeed ad infini
tum, (p) For there must be some boundary; else the privilege would be
universal, which
absurd; and therefore the law pays no regard to the pos
session of
collateral ancestor, who was no nearer than the fifth degree.
It was always held to be law, (q) that where lands were divisible in man's
last will by the custom of the place, there an assize of mort d'ancestor did not
lie. For, where lands were so divisible, the right of possession could never
be determined by
process, which inquired only of these two points, the seisin
of the ancestor, and the heirship of the demandant.
And hence
may be rea
sonable to conclude, that when the "statute of wills, 32 Hen. VHI, o.
r*1Rin*
made all socage lands divisible, an assize of mort d'ancestor no longer >■
could be brought of lands held in socage; (r) and that now, since the statute
12 Car. II, c. 24 (whioh converts all tenures,
few only excepted, into free
and common socage), no assize of mort d'ancestor can be brought of any lands
in the kingdom, but that, in case of abatements, recourse must be properly
had to the writs of entry.
an action of the same nature with
An assize of novel (or recent) disseisin
the assize of mort d'ancestor before-mentioned, in that herein the demandant's
differs considerably in other points; particu
But
possession mast be shown.
larly in that recites a complaint by the demandant of the disseisin committed
in terms of direct averment; whereupon the sheriff
commanded to reseize
the land and all the chattels thereon, and keep the same in his custody till the
arrival of the justices of assize (which in fact hath been usually omitted); (<)
and in the mean time to summon a jury to view the premises, and make recog
nition of the assize before the justices,
At which time the tenant may
And
plead either the general issues nul tort, nul disseisin, or any special plea.
upon the general issue, the recognitors find an actual seisin in the demand
ant, and his subsequent disseisin by the present tenant; he shall have judg
ment to recover his seisin, and damages for the injuries sustained: being the
only case in which damages were recoverable in any possessory action at the
common law; (u) the tenant being in all other cases allowed to retain the inter
mediate profits of the land, to enable him to perform the feudal services.
But

the writs mentioned were

Vol.

11—14

2

I,

abolished by statute

1

and
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All

8

(10)

g
7.

4,
1,

I.
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2.

13 Edw.
c 20.
(0 Stat Westm.
(m) Inst 820.
(It) Finch. L. 266,2«7.
(p) Fiti. Abr. tit coBinage, 15.
(o) Hale on F. N. B. 221.
(») F. N. B. 107. Finch, L. 203.
de assit. mortii antecetsorit, c. 13, 3. F. N. B. 106.
See
Leon.
267.
la) Brae ton.
(r)
10.
(*) Booth, 211. Bract.
(t) F. N. B. 177.
(u) Bract. 187. Stat. Marlbr. a M.

Wm.
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costs and damages were annexed to many other possessory actions by the stat
utes of Marlberge, 52 Hen.
c. 16, and of Gloucester, 6 Edw. I, o. 1.
And
*t0 Prevent frequent and vexatious disseisins, it is enacted by the statute
P*l
fifil
L
J of Merton, 20 Hen. Ill, c. 3, that if a person disseised recover seisin of
the land again by assize of novel disseisin, and be again disseised of the same
tenements by the same disseisor, he shall have a writ of re-disseisin; and if
he recover therein, the re-disseisor shall be imprisoned; and by the statute of
Marlberge, 52 Hen. ni, c. 8, shall also pay a fine to the king: to which the stat
ute Westm. 2, 13 Edw. I, c. 26, hath superadded double damages to the party
aggrieved. In like manner, by the same statute of Merton, when any lands or
tenements
are recovered by assize of mort oVancestor, or other jury, or any
judgment of the court, if the party be afterwards disseised by the same person
against whom judgment was obtained, he shall have a writ of post-disseisin
against him; which subjects the post-disseisor to the same penalties as a re-dis
seisor.
The reason of all which, as given by Sir Edward Coke, (to) is because
such proceeding is a contempt of the king's courts, and in despite of the law;
" talis qui ita convictus fuerit, duplU
or, as Bracton more fully expresses
(x)
citer delinquit contra regem: quia facit disseisinam et roberiam contra pacem
suarn; et etiam ausu temerario irrita facit ea, quae in curia domini regis rite
acta sunt
et propter duplex delictum merito sustinere
debet pcenam dupli;
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In all these possessory actions there
time of limitation settled, beyond
which no man shall avail himself of the possession of himself or his ancestors,
or take advantage of the wrongful possession of his adversary. For,
he be
negligent for long and unreasonable time, the law refuses afterwards to lend
him any assistance, to recover the possession merely, both to punish his neg
lect (nam leges vigilantibus, non dormientibus, subveniunt), and also because
length of time pro
presumed that the supposed wrongdoer has in such
cured
legal title, otherwise he would sooner have been sued. This time of
and Westm.
limitation by the statute of Merton, 20 Hen. HI, c.
Edw.
c. 39, was successively dated from particular aeras, viz. from the return of King
r*iRQl J°nn from Ireland, and from the coronation, &c, of King Henry *the
Third.
But this date of limitation continued so long unaltered, that
became indeed no limitation at all;
being above three hundred years from
Henry the Third's coronation to the year 1640, when the present statute of lim
This, instead of limiting actions from the date of par
itations (y) was made.
ticular event, as before, which in process of years grew absurd, took another
and more direct course, which might endure forever: by limiting a certain
period, as fifty years for lands, and the like period (z) for customary and pre
no time of limitation upon rente
scriptive rents, suits and services (for there
created by deed, or reserved on
particular estate), (a) and enacting that no
person should bring any possessory aotion, to recover possession thereof merely
upon the seisin, or dispossession of his ancestors, beyond such certain period.
But this does not extend to services, which by common possibility may
(11)
not happen to become due more than once in the lord's or tenant's life; as
fealty, and the like.(6) And all writs, grounded upon the possession of the
demandant himself, are directed to be sued out within thirty years after the dis
be of an older date,
can with no propriety be
seisin complained of for
fresh, recent, or novel disseisin; which name Sir Edward Coke informs
called
2.

8

it

2

1.

2

4,

(y) 88 Hen. vm, c.
fart L.
e. 49.
tr.
(w) Inst. 88.84.
(*) So Berthelet's original edition of the statute, A. D. 1B40;and Cay'B, Pickering's, and Ruffhead's edi
tions, examined with the record. Rastell's and other intermediate editions, which Sir Edward Coke
only forty years for rents. Sua.
Inst. 95) and other subsequent writers have followed, make
(6) Co. Litt. 116.
(a) Rep. 65.
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no longer the law; actions for the recovery of land or rent must now b«
(11) This
Statute
and
Wm. IV, c. 27, s.
brought within twenty years after the right accrues.
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ns was originally given to this proceeding, because the disseisin mnst have been
since the last eyre or circuit or the justices, which happened once in seven
And we may observe, (d) that the
years, otherwise the action was gone, (c)
limitation prescribed by Henry the Second at the first institution of the assize
of novel disseisin was from his own return into England, after the peace made
between him and the young king, his son; which was but the year before. (12)
"What has been here observed may throw some light on the doctrine of re
mitter, which we spoke of in the second ""chapter of this book; and r*i90-i*
which we may remember was where one who hath right to lands, but is *•
out of possession, hath afterwards the freehold cast upon him by some subse
quent defective title, and enters by virtue of that title. In this case the law
remits him to his ancient and more certain right, and by an equitable fiction
supposes him to have gained possession in consequence, and by virtue thereof:
and this, because he cannot possibly obtain judgment at law to be restored to
his prior right, since he is himself the tenant of the land, and therefore hath
nobody against whom to bring his action. This determination of the law
might seem superfluous to a hasty observer; who perhaps would imagine, that
since the tenant hath now both the right and also the possession, it little sig
nifies by what means such possession shall be said to be gained.
But the wis
dom of our ancient law determined nothing in vain.
As the tenant's posses
sion was gained by a defeotive title, it was liable to be overturned by showing
that defeot, in a writ of entry; and then he must have been driven to his writ
of right, to recover his just inheritance; which would have been doubly hard,
because during the time he was himself tenant, he could not establish his prior
title by any possessory action. The law therefore remits him to his prior title,
or pats him m the same condition as if he had recovered the land by writ of
entry. Without the remitter, he would have had jus, et seisinam separate; a
good right, but a bad possession; now, by the remitter, he hath the most per
fect of all titles, juris et seisinm conjunctionem.
HI. By these several possessory remedies the right of possession may be
restored to him that is unjustly deprived thereof. But the right of possession
(though it carries with it a strong presumption) is not always conclusive evi
dence of the right of property, whioh may still subsist in another man.
For,
as *one man may have the possession, and another the right of posses- r
*iai-i
■»
sion, which is recovered by these possessory actions; so one man may *■
have the right of possession, and so not be liable to eviction by any possessory
action, and another may have the right of property, which cannot be otherwise
asserted than by the great and final remedy of a writ of right, or such corres
pondent writs as are in the nature of a writ of right. (13)
This happens principally in four cases: 1. Upon discontinuance by the alien
ation of tenant in tail: whereby he who had the right of possession hath trans
ferred it to the alienee; and therefore his issue, or those in remainder or rever
sion, shall not be allowed to recover by virtue of that possession, whioh the
tenant hath so voluntarily transferred.
2, 3. In case of judgment given against
either party, whether by his own default, or upon trial of the merits, in any
possessory action; for such judgment, if obtained by him who hath not the true
ownership, is held to be a species of deforcement; which, however, binds the
right of possession, and suffers it not to be ever again disputed, unless the right
of property be also proved.
In case the demandant, who claims the right is
barred from these possessory actions by length of time and the statute of limi
tations before-mentioned: for an undisturbed possession for fifty years ought
not to be devested by any thing, but a very clear proof of the absolute right
(o) 1 Inst. 158. Booth, 810.

(ft) See page 184.

(12) For the present limitations to actions, see note 1, book 2, p. 264.
which is founded upon a right of possession,
(18) Now that the action of ejectment,
the only mode of recovering land, this distinction is in effect destroyed.
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property. In these four cases the law applies the remedial instrument of
either the writ of right itself, or such other writs as are said to be of the same
nature.
1. And first, upon an alienation by tenant in tail, whereby the estate-tail is
discontinued, and the remainder or reversion is by failure of the particular
•estate displaced, and turned into a mere right, the remedy is by action of formedon (secundum formam doni), which is in the nature of a writ of right, («) and
is the highest action that tenant in tail can have, (f) For he cannot have an
Absolute writ of right, which is confined only to such as claim in fee-simple:
and for that reason this writ of formedon was granted him by the statute de
^°w** or *Westm. 2, 13 Edw. I, c. 1, which is therefore emphatically
f*192l
*•
■! called h is writ of right,
(g) This writ is distinguished into three species:
a formedon in the descender, in the remainder, and in the reverter.
A writ of
formedon in the descender heth, where a gift in tail is made, and the tenant in
tail alienes the lands entailed, or is disseised of them, and dies; in this case
the heir in tail shall have this writ of formedon in the descender, to recover
these lands so given in tail against him who is then the actual tenant of the
freehold, (h) In which action the demandant is bound to state the manner
and form of the gift in tail, and to prove himself heir secundum formam doni.
A formedon in the remainder lieth, where a man giveth lands to another for
life or in tail, with remainder to a third person in tail or in fee, and he who
hath the particular estate dieth without issue inheritable, and a stranger in
trudes upon him in remainder and keeps him out of possession,
In this
•case the remainder-man shall have his writ of formedon
in the remainder,
wherein the whole form of the gift
stated, and the happening of the event
This writ not given in express words
upon which the remainder depended.
founded upon the equity of the statute, and
by the statute de donis but
upon this maxim in law, that,
any one hath right to the land, he ought also
to have an action to recover it. A formedon in the reverter lieth, where there
gift in tail, and afterwards by the death of the donee or his heirs without
issue of his body the reversion falls in upon the donor, his heirs or assigns: in
such case the reversioner shall have this writ to recover the lands, wherein he
-shall suggest the gift, his own title to the reversion minutely derived from
the donor, and the failure of issue upon which his reversion takes place, (k)
This lay at common law, before the statute de donis,
the donee aliened be
fore he had performed the condition of the gift, by having issue, and after
wards died without any.
The time of limitation in formedon by statute
^ *^ac' °*
*8 twenty years; within *which space of time after his
f*193l
title accrues, the demandant must bring his action, or else he
forever
barred.
2. In the second case;
the owners of
particular estate, as for life, in
•dower, by the curtesy, or in fee-tail, are barred of the right of possession by
in
recovery had against them through their default or non-appearance
pos
sessory action, they were absolutely without any remedy at the common law:
as
writ of right does not lie for any but such as claim to be tenants of the
Therefore the statute Westm.
13 Edw.
o.
fee-simple.
gives new writ
for such persons, after their lands have been so recovered against them by de
fault, called
writ of right, bo
quod ei deforeeat/ which, though not strictly
far partakes of the nature of one, as that
will restore the right to him who
has been thus unwarily deforced by his own default, (m)
But, in case the
recovery were not had by his own default, but upon defence in the inferior
action, this still remains final with regard to these particular
possessory
estates, as at the common law: and hence
that a common recovery (on
writ of entry in the post) had, not by default of the tenant himself, but (after
his defence made and voucher of
third person to warranty) by default of
«uch vouchee,
now the usual bar to cut off an estate-tail, (n)
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3, 4. Thirdly, in case the right of possession he haired hy a recovery upon the.
merits in a possessory action, or lastly by the statute of limitations, a claimant
Ln fee-simple may have a mere writ 0/ right; which is in its nature the highest
writ in the law, (o) and lieth only of an estate in fee-simple, and not for him
This writ lies concurrently with all other real actions*
who hath a less estate.
in which an estate of fee-simple may be recovered: and it also lies after them,
being as it were an appeal to the mere right, when judgment hath been had asto the possession in an inferior possessory *action. (pj But though a r*ioAi
*
writ or right may be brought, where the demandant is entitled to the
possession, yet it rarely is advisable to be brought in such cases ; as a more
expeditious and easy remedy is had, without meddling with the property, by
proving the demandant's own, or his ancestor's, possession, and their illegal
But, in case the right of possession
ouster, in one of the possessory actions.
be lost by length of time, or by judgment against the true owner in one of
these inferior suits, there is no other choice: this is then the only remedy that
can be had; and it is of so forcible a nature, that it overcomes all obstacles, and
clears all objections that may have arisen to cloud and obscure the title. And,,
after issue once joined in a writ of right, the judgment is absolutely final; so
that a recovery had in this action may be pleaded in bar of any other claim or

demand, (q)
The pure, proper, or mere writ of right lies only, we have said, to recover
lands in fee-simple, unjustly withheld from the true proprietor.
But there are
also some other writs which are said to be in the nature of a writ of right,
because their process and proceedings do mostly (though not entirely) agree
with the writ of right: but in some of them the fee-simple is not demanded;
and in others not land, but some incorporeal hereditament.
Some of these
have been already mentioned, as the writ of right of dower, of formedon, &c,
and the others will hereafter be taken notice of under their proper divisions.
Nor is the mere writ of right alone, or always, applicable to every case of a.
claim of lands in fee-simple: for if the lord's tenant in fee-simple dies without
heir whereby an escheat accrues, the lord shall have a writ of escheat, (r) which,
is in the nature of a writ of right.
And
one of two or more coparceners
deforces the other, by usurping the sole possession, the party aggrieved shall
have
writ of right, de rationabili parte,
which may be grounded on the
♦seisin of the ancestor at any time during his life; whereas, in
nuper r«t10K-i,
obiit (which
possessory remedy) (m) he must be seized at the time
of his death.
But, waiving these and other minute distinctions, let us now re
turn to the general writ of right.
This writ ought to be first brought in the court-baron (w) of the lord, of
whom the lands are holden; and then
he holds no
open or patent: but
court, or hath waived his right, remisit curiam suam,
may be brought in
the king's courts by writ of praecipe originally;
writ of
(a:) and then
right close; (y) being directed to the sheriff and not the lord, (a) Also when
one of the king's immediate tenants in capite
deforced, his writ of right
called
writ of prmcipe in capite (the improper use of which, as well as of the
former praecipe quia dominus remisit curiam, so as to oust the lord of his juris
restrained by magna carta), (a) and being directed to the sheriff,
diction,
and originally returnable in the king's courts,
also
writ of right close, (b)
There
likewise
little writ of right close, secundum consuetudinem manerii,.
which lies for the king's tenants in ancient demesne, (c) and others of similar
nature, (d) to try the right of their lands and tenements in the court of the
lord exclusively,
But the writ of right patent itself may also at any time
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court, by writ of tolt, (f) and from thence into
the king's courts by writ of pone (g) or recordari facias, at the suggestion of
either party that there is a delay or defect of justice. (A)
the demandant must allege some seisin of
In the progress of this action,
the lands and tenements in himself, or else in some person under whom he
an<^ ^en derive the right *from the person so seised to himself;
r*196l c^a™8>
to which the tenant may answer by denying the demandant's right,
and averring that he has more right to hold the lands than the demandant has
to demand them: and this right of the tenant being shown,
then puts the
he fails, or
the tenant
demandant upon the proof of his title: in which,
hath shown
better, the demandant and his heirs are perpetually barred of
their claim; but
he can make
appear that his right is superior to the
tenant's, he shall recover the land against the tenant and his heirs forever.
But even this writ of right, however superior to any other, cannot be sued out
at any distance of time.
For by the ancient law no seisin could be alleged by the demandant, but
from the time of Henry the First; (k) by the statute of Merton, 20 Hen. HI,
Ed
from the time of Henry the Second; by the statute of Westm.
a
ward
c. 89, from the time of Richard the First; and now, by statute 32
seisin in writ of right shall be within sixty years.
So that
Henry VLU, c.
the possession of lands in fee-simple uninterruptedly, for threescore years,
at present
sufficient title against all the world; and cannot be impeached by
any dormant claim whatsoever.
have now gone through the several species of injury by ouster and dis
In consider
possession of the freehold, with the remedies applicable to each.
have been unavoidably led to touch upon muoh obsolete and
ing which
abstruse learning, as
lies intermixed with, and alone can explain the reason of,
those parts of the law which are now more generally in use.
For, without
impossible to form any clear
contemplating the whole fabric together,
idea of the meaning and connection of those disjointed parts which still form
considerable branch of the modern law; such as the doctrine of entries and
remitter, the levying of fines, and the suffering of common recoveries.
Neither
have selected in this chapter
indeed
any considerable part of that, which
r*i971* from among the venerable monuments of our ancestors, so '"absolutely
antiquated as to be out of force, though the whole
certainly out of
use: there being but very few instances for more than
century past of proseouting any real action for land by writ of entry, assize, formedon, writ of
right, or otherwise. The forms are indeed preserved in the practice of com
mon recoveries; but they are forms and nothing else; for which the very
clerks that pass them are seldom capable to assign the reason.
But the title
of lands
now usually tried in actions of ejectment or trespass
of which in
the following chapters. (14)
is

flk) P. H. B.
Co. Litt 114.

8,
4.

(g) Ibid. 18.
e.
(k) Olanr.
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I, I,
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be removed into the county

is

are now almost universally abolished or
(14) Real and mixed actions, except ejectment,
become obsolete In the United States, and ejectment
the usual remedy to try title to
The proceedings
lands.
in that action have also by statute been divested of all useless
forms and made perfectly simple
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XI.

CHAPTER

OF DISPOSSESSION, OR OUSTER OF CHATTELS REAL.
Having in the preceding chapter considered with some attention the several
of injury by dispossession or ouster of the freehold, together with the

species

regular and well-connected scheme of remedies by actions real, which are given
to the subject by the common law, either to recover the possession only, or else
to recover at once the possession, and also to establish the right of property;
there marked out leads me next to consider injuries by
the method which
ouster of chattels real; that
by amoving the possession of the tenant from an
or
estate by statute-merchant, statute-staple, recognizance in the nature of
elegit; or from an estate for years.
Ouster, or amotion of possession, from estates held by statute, recogni
zance, or elegit,
only liable to happen by species of disseisin, or turning out
determined by raising the sum for
of the legal proprietor, before his estate
which
And for such ouster, though the estate be
given him in pledge.
chattel interest, the owner shall have the same remedy as for an in
merely
freehold; viz., by assize of novel disseisin. (a)(1) But this depends
jury to
upon the several statutes, which *create these respective interests,(6) r*jgg-i
and which expressly provide and allow this remedy in case of disposthat Sir Edward Coke observes, (c) that
session.
Upon which account
these tenants are said to hold their estates ut liberuin tenementum, until their
debts are paid: because by the statutes they shall have an assize, as tenants of
free
the freehold shall have; and in that respect they have the similitude of
hold, (d)
II. As for ouster, or amotion of possession from an estate for years; this
like kind of disseisin, ejection, or turning out, of the tenant
happens only by
from the occupation of the land during the continuance of his term. For this
injury the law has provided him with two remedies, according to the circum
stances and situation of the wrongdoer: the writ of ejectione firmai; whioh lies
against any one, the lessor, reversioner, remainder-man, or any stranger who
himself the wrongdoer and has committed the injury complained of: and the
writ of quare ejecit infra terminum; which lies not against the wrongdoer or
ejector himself, but his feoffee or other person claiming under him. These
are mixed actions, somewhat between real and personal; for therein are two
things recovered, as well restitution of the term of years, as damages for the
ouster or wrong.
A writ then of ejectione firmce, or action of trespass in ejectment, lieth
where lands or tenements are let for
term of years; and afterwards the lessor,
reversioner, remainder-man, or any stranger, doth eject or oust the lessee of his
In this case he shall have his writ of ejection to call the defendant to
term.(e)
answer for entering on the lands so demised to the plaintiff for
term that is
And by this writ the plaintiff shall re
not yet expired, and ejecting him.(/)
with damages.
cover back his term, or the remainder of
•Since the disuse of real aotions, this mixed proceeding
become the
r*onn1
common method of trying the title to lands or tenements.
It may not
therefore be improper to delineate, with some degree of minuteness, its history,
the manner of its prooess, and the principles whereon
grounded.
We have before seen, (g) that the writ of covenant, for breach of the conis a
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tract contained in the lease for years, was anciently the only specific remedy
for recovering against the lessor a term from which he had ejected his lessee,,
But if the lessee was ejected by a
together with damages for the ouster.
stranger, claiming under a title superior (A) to that of the lessor, or by a gran
tee of the reversion (who might at any time by a common recovery have
destroyed the term),
though the lessee might still maintain an action of
covenant against the lessor, for non-performance of his contract or lease, yet
If the ouster was commit
he could not by any means recover the term itself.
ted by
mere stranger, without any title to the land, the lessor might indeed
real action recover possession of the freehold, but the lessee had no other
by
remedy against the ejector but in damages, by a writ of ejectione JirmcB, for
the trespass committed in ejecting him from his farm. (A) But afterwards,
when the courts of equity began to oblige the ejector to make
specifio resti
tution of the land to the party immediately injured, the courts of law also
adopted the same method of doing complete justice; and, in the prosecution of
a writ of ejeotment,
introduced
species of remedy not warranted by theWT1t nor prayed by the declaration (which are *calculated for
or'ginal
r*2ml
damages merely, and are silent as to any restitution), viz. a judgment
This method
to recover the term, and
writ of possession thereupon.
seems to have been settled as early as the reign of Edward IV; (rnj though
hath been said (») to have first begun under Henry VII, because it probably
was then first applied to its present principal use, that of trying the title to theland. (2)
The better to apprehend the contrivance, whereby this end
effected, we
must recollect that the remedy by ejectment
in its original, an action
lease for years, to repair the injury done him by
brought by one who hath
In order therefore to convert
into
method of trying titles
dispossession.
to the freehold,
first necessary that the claimant do take possession of
the lands, to empower him to constitute
lessee for years, that may be capable
of receiving this injury of dispossession.
For would be an offence, called in
our law maintenance (of which in the next book), to convey a title to another,
was doubted
not in possession of the land; and indeed
when the grantor
at first, whether this occasional possession, taken merely for the purpose of
conveying the title, excused the lessor from the legal guilt of maintenance, (o)
When, therefore,
person, who hath right of entry into lands, determines to
acquire that possession, which
wrongfully withheld by the present tenant,
he makes (as by the law he may)
formal entry on the premises; and being so
in the possession of the soil, he there, upon the land, seals and delivers
lease
for years to some third person or lessee: and, having thus given him entry,
leaves him in possession of the premises.
This lessee
to stay upon the land,
till the prior tenant, or he who had the previous possession, enters thereon
afresh and ousts him; or till some other person (either by accident or by
and turns him *out or
r*202l a£>reement beforehand) comes upon the land,
entitled to his action of eject
ejects him. For this injury the lessee
was that ousted
ment against the tenant, or his casual ejector, whichever
But where this action
him, to recover back his term and damages.
brought

1,
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against such a casual ejector as is before mentioned, and not against the very
tenant in possession, the court will not suffer the tenant to lose his possession
without any opportunity to defend it. Wherefore it is a standing rule, that
no plaintiff shall proceed in ejectment to recover lands against a casual ejector,
without notice given to the tenant in possession (if any there be), and making
him a defendant if he pleases.
And, in order to maintain the action, the
plaintiff must, in case or any defence, make out four points before the court;
viz., title, lease, entry, and ouster.
First, he must show a good title in his
lessor, which brings the matter of right entirely before the court, then, that
the lessor, being seized and possessed by virtue of such title, did make him the
lease for the present term; thirdly, that he, the lessee or plaintiff, did enter or
take possession in consequence of such lease; and then, lastly, that the defend
ant ousted or ejected him.
Whereupon he shall have judgment to recover his
term and damages; and shall, in consequence, have a writ of possession, which
the sheriff is to execute by delivering him the undisturbed and peaceable pos
session of his term.
This is the regular method of bringing an action of ejectment, in which the
title of the lessor comes collaterally and incidentally before the court, in order
This method must be
to show the injury done to the lessee by this ouster.
still continued in due form and strictness, save only as to the notice to the
tenant, whenever the possession is vacant, or there is no actual occupant of
the premises; and also in some other cases. But, as much trouble and for
mality were found to attend the aotual making of the lease, entry, and ouster, a
new and more easy method of trying titles by writ of ejectment, where there
is any actual tenant or occupier of the premises in dispute, was invented some
what more than a century ago, by the lord chief justice Rolle, (p) who then
■at in the court of upper bench; go called during the exile of King Charles the
This new method entirely depends upon a string of legal r^onQi
♦Second.
■*
fictions ; no actual lease is made, no actual entry by the plaintiff, no
but
all
are
defendant;
the
for
the
ideal,
sole
ouster
by
merely
actual
purpose
of trying the title. To this end, in the proceedings (q) a lease for a term of
years is stated to have been made, by him who claims' title, to the plaintiff
who brings the action, as by John Rogers to Richard Smith, which plaintiff
ought to be some real person, and not merely an ideal fictitious one who hath
no existence, as is frequently though unwarrantably practised ; (r) it is also
stated that Smith, the lessee, entered ; and that the defendant William Stiles,
who is called the casual ejector, ousted him; for which ouster he brings this
action. As soon as this action is brought, and the complaint fully stated in
the declaration, («) Stiles, the casual ejector, or defendant, sends a written
notice to the tenant in possession of the lands, as George Saunders, informing
him of the action brought by Richard Smith, and transmitting him a copy of
the declaration; withal assuring him that he, Stiles the defendant, has no title
at all to the premises, and shall make no defence; and therefore advising the
tenant to appear in court and defend his own title : otherwise he, the casual
ejector, will suffer judgment to be had against him; and thereby the actual
On receipt
tenant, Saunders, will inevitably be turned out of possession.
the tenant in possession does not within
limited
of this friendly caution,
defendant in the stead of Stiles, he
time apply to the court to be admitted
supposed to have no right at all; and upon judgment being had against Stiles
the casual ejector, Saunders the real tenant will be turned out of possession
by the sheriff.
defendant,
the tenant in possession applies to be made
allowed
But,
rule of court
to
at
him upon this condition; that he enter into
confess,
(w)
the trial of the cause, three of the four requisites for the maintenance of the
plaintiff's action; viz.: the lease of Rogers, the lessor, the entry of Smith,
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*l^e plaint'ff> an<^ h*8 ouster by Saunders
himself, now made the
defendant instead of Stiles : which requisites being wholly fictitious
should the defendant put the plaintiff to prove them, he must of course be
nonsuited for want of evidence ; but by such stipulated confession of least,
entry, and ouster, the trial will now stand upon the merits of the title only.
This done, the declaration is altered by inserting the name of George Saunders
instead of William Stiles, and the cause goes down to trial under the name of
Smith, (the plaintiff), on the demise of Rogers, (the lessor), against Saunders,
the new defendant. And therein the lessor of the plaintiff is bound to make
out a clear title, otherwise his fictitious lessee cannot obtain judgment to have
But, if the lessor
possession of the land for the term supposed to be granted.
makes out his title in a satisfactory manner, then judgment and a writ of pos
session shall go for Richard Smith, the nominal plaintiff, who by this trial has
Yet, to prevent fraud
proved the right of John Rogers, his supposed lessor.
ulent recoveries of the possession, by collusion with the tenant of the land, all
tenants are obliged by statute 11 Geo. II, c. 19, on pain of forfeiting three
years' rent, to give notice to their landlords, when served with any declaration
in ejectment: and any landlord may by leave of the court be made a co-defend
ant to the action, in case the tenant himself appears to it; or, if he makes de
fault, though judgment must be then signed against the casual ejector, yet
execution shall be stayed, in case the landlord applies to be made a defendant,
and enters into the common rule; a right, which indeed the landlord had long
before the provision of this statute; (w) in like manner as (previous to the
statute of Westm. 2, o. 3) if in a real action the tenant of the freehold made
default, the remainder-man or reversioner had a right to come in and defend
the possession ; lest, if judgment were had against the tenant, the estate of
those behind should be turned to a naked right, (to)
But, if the new defend
ants, whether landlord, or tenant, or both, after entering into the common
rule, fail to appear on the trial, and to confess lease, entry, and ouster, the
plaintiff, Smith, must indeed be there nonsuited, for want of proving those
requisites; but judgment will in the end be entered against the casual ejector
Stiles; for the condition on which Saunders, or his landlord, was admitted a
defendant is broken, and, therefore, the plaintiff is put again in the '"same
r*2n<il
L
J situation as if he never had appeared at all; the consequence of which
(we have seen) would have been, that judgment would have been entered for
the plaintiff, and the sheriff, by virtue of a writ for that purpose, would have
turned out Saunders, and delivered possession to Smith. The same process,
therefore, as would have been had, provided no conditional rule had been ever
made, must now be pursued as soon as the condition is broken. (3)
The damages recovered in these actions, though formerly their only intent,
are now usually (since the title has been considered as the principal question)

[*204l'
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(w) StyL Prao. Beg. 108,111,865. 7 Mod. 70. Salic 257. Burr. 1801.

(to) Bracton,

l B. tr. 4. a 10,« 14.

(8) The proceeding! for the recovery of land are now in England as simple as in any
other case.
In the United States ejectment is now generally commenced by filing declaration or com
plaint against the party in possession, setting forth, in general terms, that the plaintiff is
entitled to the possession of the premises, describing the same, and that he claims the same
In fee-simple (or otherwise, as the case may be), and that the defendant unlawfully with
holds the same. A copy of this declaration or complaint is served on the defendant, and
unless he pleads or answers to it within the time prescribed by statute or rule of court,
judgment may pass against him by default. In some states parties not in possession, but
and in others,
who claim rights in the premises, are allowed to be made co-defendants,
ejectment may be brought to try conflicting rights when the premises are not occupied at
all. In general, means are prescribed by which the defeated party in the action can have
If the plaintiff succeeds, he is allowed to have damages assessed
a second trial as of right.
by a proceeding in the same suit.
And in many of the states statutes will be found allowing the defendant, who has been
in possession claiming title, to recover of the successful plaintiff the value of his improve
" in
certain classes of cases.
ments or "betterments
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very small and inadequate; amounting commonly to one shilling, or some
In order, therefore, to complete the remedy, when the pos
other trivial sum.
an action of
session has been long detained from him that had the right to
recovery in ejectment, to recover the mesne profits
trespass also lies, after
has wrongfully reoeived.
Which action may
■which the tenant in possession
be brought in the name of either the nominal plaintiff in the ejectment, or his
lessor, against the tenant in possession: whether he be made party to the eject
ment, or suffers judgment to go by default, (a;) In this case the judgment in
conclusive evidence against the defendant, for all profits which
ejectment
have accrued since the date of the demise stated in the former declaration of
the plaintiff sues for any antecedent profits, the defendant
the plaintiff; but
new defense.
may make
Such
the modern way of obliquely bringing in question the title to lands
method which
in this collateral manner;
and tenements, in order to try
founded on the same
now universally adopted in almost every case. It
principle as the ancient writs of assize, being calculated to try the mere pos
sessory title to an estate; and hath succeeded to those real actions, as being
infinitely more convenient for attaining the end of justice; because the form
of the proceeding being entirely fictitious,
wholly in the power of the
court to direct the application of that fiction, so as to prevent fraud and
chicane, and eviscerate the very truth of the title. The writ of ejectment and
its nominal parties (as was resolved by all the *judges) (y) are "judi-p+2fl ,
cially to be considered as the fictitious form of an action, really brought *■
by the lessor of the plaintiff against the tenant in possession: invented, under
the control and power of the oourt, for the advancement of justice in many re
spects; and to force the parties to go to trial on the merits, without being en
tangled in the nicety of pleadings on either side."
not an adequate means to try the title of all
Bat
writ of ejectment
estates; for on those things whereon an entry cannot in fact be made, no entry
shall be supposed by any fiction of the parties. Therefore an ejectment will
common, or other incorporeal hereditament:
not lie of an advowson, rent,
(z) except for tithes in the hands of lay appropriators, by the express purview
of statute 32 Hen. Viil, o.
which doctrine hath since been extended by
lie in such oases,
analogy to tithes in the hands of the clergy: (a) nor will
taken away by descent, discontinu
where the entry of him that hath right
ance, twenty years' dispossession, or otherwise.
This action of ejectment is, however, rendered
very easy and expeditious
Geo. II, o. 28,
remedy to landlords whose tenants are in arrear, by statute
which enacts that every landlord, who hath by his lease
right of re-entry in
case of non-payment of rent, when half
due, and no sufficient
year's rent
distress
to be had, may serve
declaration in ejectment on his tenant, or fix
the same upon some notorious part of the premises, which shall be valid, with
out any formal re-entry or previous demand of rent. And recovery in such
ejectment shall be final and conclusive, both in law and equity, unless the rent
and all costs be paid or tendered within six calendar months afterwards.
2. The writ or quart ejecit infra terminum lieth, by the anoient law, where
the wrongdoer or ejector
not himself in *posses8ion of the lands, but r*nnt/-\
another who olaims under him. As where
man leaseth lands to another for years, and, after, the lessor or reversioner entereth, and maketh
feoffment in fee, or for life, of the same lands to
stranger: now the lessee
cannot bring
writ of ejections firmm or ejectment against the feoffee: be
cause he did not eject him, but the reversioner; neither can he have any suoh
action to recover his term against the reversioner, who did oust him; because
he
not now in possession.
And upon that account this writ was devised,
case where no adequate
o. 24, as in
upon the equity of the statute Westm.
(») Browol. 129. Cro. Car. 498. Stra. 84.
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remedy was already provided, (b) And the action is brought against the
feoffee for deforcing, or keeping out, the original lessee, during the continu
ance of his term; and herein, as in the ejectment, the plaintiff shall recover so
much of the term as remains; and also shall have actual damages for that por
tion of
whereof he has been unjustly deprived. But since the introduction
of fictitious ousters, whereby the title may be tried against any tenant in pos
session (by what means soever he acquired it), and the subsequent recovery of
damages by action of trespass for mesne profits, this action is fallen into dis
use. (4)

CHAPTER XII.
OF TREPASS.
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(4) It was abolished by statute
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In the two preceding chapters we have considered such injuries to real prop
Those which re
erty, as consisted in an ouster, or amotion of the possession.
main to be discussed are such as may be offered to man's real property with
out any amotion from it.
The second species, therefore, of real injuries, or wrongs that affect man's
that of trespass.
lands, tenements, or hereditaments,
Trespass in its largest
and most extensive sense, signifies any transgression or offence against the law
relates to
of nature, of society, or of the country in which we live whether
man's person, or his property.
Therefore beating another
trespass; for
which (as we have formerly seen) an action of trespass vi et armis in assault
man's goods are respectively tres
and battery will lie; taking or detaining
passes; for which an action of trespass vi et armis, or on the case in trover and
conversion,
given by the law: so also non-performance of promises or under
trespass, upon which an action of trespass on the case
assumpsit
takings
grounded: ana in general, any misfeasance, or act of one man whereby an
other
injuriously treated or damnified,
transgression or trespass in its
largest sense; for which we have already seen (a) that whenever the act itself
directly and immediately injurious to the person or property of another
*an<^ therefore necessarily accompanied
with some force, an action of
l"*209l
the injury
only consequential,
trespass vi et armis will lie; but,
special action of trespass on the case may be brought.
But
the limited and confined sense in which we are at present to consider
lawful
signifies no more than an entry on another man's ground without
authority, and doing some damage, however inconsiderable, to his real property.
For the right of meum and tuum, or property in lands, being once established,
follows as a necessary consequence, that this right must be exclusive; that is,
that the owner may retain to himself the sole use and occupation of his soil;
con
every entry therefore thereon, without the owner's leave, and especially
The Roman laws
trespass or transgression.
trary to his express order,
direct prohibition necessary, in order to constitute this
seem to have made
injury; "qui alienum fundum ingreditur, potest a domino, si prmviderit, proAioeri ne ingrediatur." (6) But the law of England, justly considering that
much inconvenience may happen to the owner, before he has an opportunity to
forbid the entry, has carried the point much farther, and has treated every en
try upon another's lands (unless by the owner's leave, or in some very particular
«,
(b) Zmt
(a) See page 133.
(6) F. N. B. 188.
Wm.

IV,

c. 27, s. 86.
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injury or wrong, for satisfaction of which an action of trespass
but determines the quantum of that satisfaction, by considering how
far the offence was wilful or inadvertent, and by estimating the value of the
actual damage sustained.
Every unwarrantable entry on another's soil the law entitles a trespass by
breaking his close : the words of the writ of trespass commanding the defend
ant to show cause quare clausum querentis /regit. For every man's land is,
in the eye of the law, enclosed and set apart from his neighbor's: and that
■either by a visible and material fence, as one field is divided from another by a
hedge; or by an ideal, invisible boundary *existing only in the contem- r*9lni'
plation of law, as when one man's land adjoins to another's in the same ■■
field.
And every such entry or breach of a man's close carries necessarily
along with it some damage or other; for, if no other special loss can be assigned,
yet still the words of the writ itself specify one general damage, viz. : the tread
ing down and bruising his herbage,
One must have
property (either absolute or temporary) in the soil, and
actual possession by entry, to be able to maintain an action of trespass; or, at
least,
lease and possession of the vesture
requisite that the party have
and herbage of the land. (d)(1)
meadow be divided annually among
Thus,
the parishioners by lot, then after each person's several portion
allotted, they
may be respectively capable of maintaining an action for the breach of their
for they have an exclusive interest and freehold therein for
-several closes:
the time. But before entry and actual possession, one cannot maintain an
And therefore an
action of trespass, though he hath the freehold in law.^)
dis
heir, before entry, cannot have this action against an abator; though
seisee might have
against the disseisor, for the injury done by the disseisin
itself, at which time the plaintiff was seised of the land: but he cannot have
for any act done after the disseisin, until he hath gained possession by re-entry,
and then he may well maintain
for the intermediate damage done; for after
kind oi jus postliminii, supposes the freehold to have
his re-entry the law, by
all along continued in him. (g) Neither, by the common law, in case of an in
trusion or deforcement, could the party kept out of possession sue the wrong
doer by a mode of redress which was calculated merely for injuries committed
against the land while in the possession of the owner. But now by the statute
husband seized jur*
Anne, o. 18,
guardian or trustee for any infant,
uxoris, or
person having any estate or interest determinable upon a life or
lives, shall, after the *determination of their respective interests, hold r*oiii
over and continue in the possession of lands or tenements, without
the consent of the person entitled thereto, they are adjudged to be trespassers;
and any reversioner or remainder-man expectant on any life-estate, may once
in every year, by motion to the court of chancery, procure the cestuy que via
to be produced by the tenant to the land, or may enter thereon in case of hii
And by the statutes of Geo. II, c. 28, and 11 Geo.
refusal or wilful neglect.
II, c. 19, in case, after the determination of any term for life, lives, or years,
cases),

as an

a

a

(d) Dyer, S85.
(s) 11Rep.
6.

2

(c) F. N. B. 87. 8a
(J) Roll. Abr. S68.
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Mather v. Ministers, &c.
(1) To entitle one to maintain trespass he must have possession:
8. and R., 509; Wheeler v. Hotchkiss, 10 Conn., 225; unless the lands are wild or vacant,
in which case the party having title has sufficient constructive possession for the purposes
Vt., 485; Van Rensselaer v. Van Rensselaer,
of this suit Goodrich v. Hathaway,
Y., 528. In other cases
Johns., 377. See Gardner v. Hart,
not necessary for the
plaintiff to show title; but every unwarrantable entry upon a peaceable possession
tres
pass.
Palmer v. Aldridge, 16 Barb., 181; Wells v. Howell, 19 Johns., 385; Brown v. McCloud.,
Head, 280. And one who uses the highway for purposes other than those for
liable in trespass to the owner of the fee. Avery v.
which the public easement exists,
Maxwell,
N. H., 36; Mayhew v. Norton, 17 Pick., 357; Adams v. Rivers, 11 Barb., 89a
tenant, he, and not the lessor, must bring trespass against
lands are occupied by
Johns., 512.
Campbell v. Arnold,
•tranger for unlawful disturbance of the possession.
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any person shall wilfully hold over the same, the lessor or reversioner is en
titled to recover by action of debt, either at the rate of doable the annual value
of the premises, in case he himself hath demanded and given notice in writing
to the tenant to deliver the possession, or else double the usual rent, in case
the notice of quitting proceeds from the tenant himself, having power to deter
mine his lease, and he afterwards neglects to carry that notice into due execu
tion.
A man is answerable for not only his own trespass, but that of his cattle
also: for, if by his negligent keeping they stray upon the land of another, (and
much more if he permits, or drives them on,) and they there tread down his
neighbor's herbage, and spoil his corn or his trees, this is a trespass for which
the owner must answer in damages, and the law gives the party injured a
double remedy in this case; by permitting him to distrain the cattle thus damor doing damage, till the owner shall make him satisfaction: or
age-feasant,
else by leaving him to the common remedy in foro contentioso,
by action.
And the action that lies in either of these cases of trespass committed upon
another's land, either by a man himself or his cattle, is the action of trespass
vi etarmis; whereby a man is called upon to answer, quare viet armis clauswn
ipsius A apud B /regit, et blada ipsius A ad valentiam centum solidorum
ibidem nuper erescentia cum quibusdam averiis depastus fuit, conculcavit, et
consumpsit, &o. : (h) for the law always couples the idea of force with that of
intrusion upon the property of another.
And herein, if any unwarrantable act
°^
defendant or h'8 beasts in coming upon the land be proved, it
T *2121
J is an act of trespass for which the plaintiff must recover some dam
L
ages; such, however, as the jury shall think proper to assess.
In trespass of a permanent nature, where the injury is continually renewed,
(as by spoiling or consuming the herbage with the defendant's cattle), the
declaration may allege the injury to have been committed by continuation
from one given day to another (which is called laying the action with a continuando), and the plaintiff shall not be compelled to bring separate actions
for every day's separate offence.(t) But where the trespass is by one or several
acts, each of which terminates in itself, and being once done cannot be done
again, it cannot be laid with a continuando; yet if there be repeated acts of
trespass committed, (as cntting down a certain number of trees), they may be
laid to be done, not continually, but at divers days and times within a given
period, (k) (2)
In some cases trespass is justifiable; or rather entry on another's land or
house shall not in those cases be accounted trespass: as if a man comes thither
to demand or pay money, there payable; or to execute, in a legal manner, the
Also a man may justify entering into an inn or publio
process of the law.
house, without the leave of the owner first specially asked ; because when a man
professes the keeping such inn or publio house, he thereby gives a general
license to any person to enter his doors.
So a landlord may justify entering to
distrain for rent; a commoner to attend his cattle, commoning on another's
land; and a reversioner, to see if any waste be committed on the estate; for the
Also hath been said, that by the common
apparent necessity of the thing.
law and custom of England, the poor are allowed to enter and glean upon
anotner'8 ground after the harvest, without *being guilty of trespass:
r*213l
(m) whioh humane provision seems borrowed from the Mosaical law.
In like manner the common law warrants the hunting of ravenous
(n) (3)

1

(2) The latter mode prevails in modern practice.
H. BL,
(8) It was decided in Stell v. Houghton,
another did not exist at the common law.
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(h) Rejtstr. 94,
(0 Roll. Abr. 648. Lord Raym. 240.
Ik) Salk. 638,639. Lord Kayra. 823. Mod. 152.
(I) Rep. 146.
(m) Glib. Et. 258. TrlalB per pait, ch. 16,p. 438.
and o. 23, y. 22. Deut. c 24, v. 19,&c.
in) Levtt. c 19,v.
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beasts of prey, as badgers and foxes, in another man's land; because the destroy
ing such creatures is said to be profitable to the public, (o) (4) But in cases
himself, or makes an ill use of the authority with
where a man misdemeans
which the law intrusts him, he shall be accounted a trespasser ab initio : (p)
as if one comes into a tavern and will not go out in a reasonable time, but
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tarries there all night contrary to the inclinations of the owner; this wrongful
act shall affect and have relation back even to his first entry, and make
the whole a trespass, (g)
But a bare nonfeasance, as not paying for the wine
for this is only a breach of con
he calls for, will not make him a trespasser:
tract, for which the taverner shall have an action of debt or assumpsit against
him. (r) So if a landlord distrained for rent, and wilfully killed the distress,
this by the common law made him a trespasser ab initio : («) and so indeed
would any other irregularity have done, till the statute 11 Geo. II, o. 19, which
enacts, that no subsequent irregularity of the landlord shall make his first
entry a trespass; but the party injured shall have a special action of trespass
or on the case, for the real specific injury sustained, unless tender of amends
hath been made.
But, still, if a reversioner, who enters on pretence of seeing
waste, breaks the house, or stays there all night; or if the commoner who
comes to tend his cattle, cuts down a tree; in these and similar cases, the law
judges that he entered for this unlawful purpose, and therefore, as the act
which demonstrates such his purpose is a trespass, he shall be esteemed a
So also in the case of hunting the fox or the badger,
trespasser ab initio,
for
a man cannot justify breaking the soil, and digging him out of his earth
though *the law warrants the hunting of such noxious animals for the r*2i4l
held (u) that such things must be done in an
public good, yet
an ordinary course to kill
ordinary and usual manner therefore, as there
them, viz., by hunting, the court held that the digging for them was unlawful.
A man may also justify in an action of trespass, on account of the freehold
and right of entry being in himself; and this defence brings the title of the
This
estate in question.
therefore one of the ways devised, since the disuse
not so usual as that
of real actions, to try the property of estates; though
by ejectment, because that, being now mixed action, not only gives damages
for the ejection, but also possession of the land; whereas in trespass, which
merely
personal suit, the right can be only ascertained, but no possession
delivered; nothing being recovered but damages for the wrong committed.
In order to prevent trifling and vexatious actions of trespass, as well as other
and 22 and
personal actions,
(inter alia) enacted by statutes 43 Eliz. c.
136, that where the jury, who try an action of trespass, give
23 Car. II, c.
less damages than forty shillings, the plaintiff shall be allowed no more costs
than damages, unless the judge shall certify under his hand that the freehold
But this rule now admits of two
or title of the land came chiefly in question.
One
by
exceptions more, which have been made by subsequent statutes.
and
Wm. Ill, c. 11, which enacts, that in all actions of trespass,
statute
be so
shall appear that the trespass was wilful and malicious, and
wherein
Every trespass
certified by the judge, the plaintiff shall recover full costs.
especially forewarned not to
teilful, where the defendant has notice, and
malicious, though the damage may not
come on the land as every trespass
amount to forty shillings, where the intent of the defendant plainly appears to
Rep. 147.

(3

(4) The law was otherwise declared by Lord Ellenborough in Earl of Essex v. Capel
public
1881), with the qualification, however, that there may be such
nuisance by a noxious animal as may justify the running him to his earth. In the case of
clear that one cannot justify going upon the
animals chased for sport or game, merely,
lands of another in pursuit without his license. Sutton v. Moody, 1L. Raym., 251; Deane
Taunt, 534; Hume v. Oldacre, Stark., 351.
▼. Clayton,
is

1
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*° ^arass an<^ distress the plaintiff.
The other exception is by
r*9isl
*■
J statute 4 and 5 W. and M. c. 23, which gives full costs against any inferior

tradesman,
apprentice, or other dissolute person, who is convicted of a tres
Upon this
pass in hawking, hunting, fishing, or fowling, upon another's land.
statute it has been adjudged, that if a person be an inferior tradesman, aa a
clothier for instance, it matters not what qualification he may have in point of
estate ; but, if he be guilty of such trespass, he shall be liable to pay full
costs. (u>) (5)

CHAPTER XIIL

OF NUISANCE.
A thibd

species of real injuries to a man's lands and tenements, is by nui
Nuisance, nocumentum, or annoyance, signifies any thing that worketh
And nuisances are of two kinds : public or
hurt, inconvenience or damage.
common nuisances, which affect the public, and are an annoyance to all the
king's subjects; for which reason we must refer them to the class of public
and private nuisances, which are the ob
wrongs, or crimes and misdemeanors:
jects of our present consideration, and may be defined, anything done to the
hurt or annoyance of the lands, tenements, or hereditaments of another, (a)
We will therefore, first, mark out the several kinds of nuisances, and then their
respective remedies.
L In discussing the several kinds of nuisances, we will consider first, such
nuisances as may affect a man's corporeal hereditaments, and then those that
may damage such as are incorporeal.
a man builds a house so close to
1. First, as to corporeal inheritances.
mine that his roof overhangs my roof, and throws the water off his roof upon
Likewise to erect a
mine, this is a nuisance for which an action will lie. (b)
so near to mine, that it obstructs my ancient
house or other building
*lights and windows, is a nuisance of a similar nature, (c) But in this
r*9i
nJ latter
L
case it is necessary that the windows be ancient; that
have
no injury
subsisted there
long time without interruption; otherwise there
For he hath as much right to build
done.
new edifice upon his ground as
have upon mine; since every man may erect what he pleases upon the up
right or perpendicular of his own soil, so as not to prejudice what has long
was my folly to build so near another's ground.
been enjoyed by another and
person keeps his hogs, or other noisome animals, so near the
(d) (1) Also
house of another, that the stench of them incommodes him and makes the air
unwholesome, (2) this
an injurious nuisance, as
tends to deprive him of
A like injury
the use and benefit of his house,
one's neighbor sets up
sance.

it

(o) Finch, L. 188.
(e) Rep. 68.

(6) F. N. 6. 184.

(c)

Rep. 68.
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(w) Lord Raym. 148.
(d) Cro. Eliz. 118. Balk. 459.
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now repealed. The statutes previously men
and
W. and M. c. 23,
(5) The statute
tioned are also now repealed, and new provisions substituted.
land
of another
of
and
air
over
the
not recognized in the United
light
(1) The easement
See Mahan v. Brown, 13 Wend., 261
C, 28
States as arising by prescriptive enjoyment
Am. Dec, 461; Parker v. Foote, 19 Wend., 809; Rogers v. Sawin, 10 Gray, 376; Randall
111 Mass., 114; Jenks v. Williams, 115 Mass., 217; Ward v. Neal, 87 Ala.,
v. Sanderson,
Powell v. Sims,
W. Va.,
500; Keiper v. Klein, 51 Ind., 316; Cherry v. Stein, 11 Md.,
Quest v. Reynolds, 68 111., 478; S. 0., 18 Am. Rep., 570. See also the note to Story v.
Am. Dec, 49. Such an easement may of course be created by grant.
Odin,
Seats v.
Hugo, 115 Mass., 204.
Lee,
Sandf., 281; Cropsey v. Murphy,
(2) See Rex v. White, Burr., 833; Howard v.
Hilt., 126; Whalen v. Keith, 85 Mo., 87.
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and exeroises any offensive trade; as a tanner's, a tallow-chandler's, or the like;
for though these are lawful and necessary trades, yet they should be exercised
in remote places; for the^rule, is "sic utere tuo ut alienum non lasdas:" this
So that the nuisances which affect
therefore is an aotionable nuisance,
(3)
a man's dwelling may be reduced to these three: 1. Overhanging it; which is
also a species of trespass, for cujus est solum ejus est usque ad caelum : 2. Stop
ping ancient lights; and, 3. Corrupting the air with noisome smells: for light
and air are two indispensable requisites to every dwelling. (4) But depriving
one of a mere matter of pleasure, as of a fine prospect by building a wall, or
the like: this, as it abridges nothing really convenient or necessary, is no injury
to the sufferer, and is therefore not an aotionable nuisance, (g)
As to nuisance to one's lands: if one erects a smelting-house for lead so
near the land of another, that the vapour and smoke kill nis corn and grass,
and damage his oattle therein, this is held to be a nuisance, (h) And by con
sequence it follows, that if one does any other act, in itself lawful, which yet
being done in that place necessarily tends to the damage of another's property,
it is a nuisance: for it is incumbent on *him to find some other place r*oio-|
*
to do that act, where it will be less offensive.
So also, if my neigh- *•
ditch,
a
and
is
bour ought to scour
does not, whereby my land
overflowed, this
is an actionable nuisance,
a nuisance to stop or
With regard to other corporeal hereditaments;
divert water that uses to run to another's meadow (5) or mill; (k) to corrupt
or poison
water-course, by erecting
dye-house or lime-pit for the use of
or in short to do any act therein that
trade, in the upper part of the stream
in its consequences must necessarily tend to the prejudice of one's neighbour.
So closely does the law of England enforce that excellent rule of gospel moral
ity, of " doing to others as we would they should do unto ourselves."
2. As to incorporeal hereditaments, the law carries itself with the same
have
equity. If
way, annexed to my estate, aoross another's land, and he
obstructs me in the use of it, either by totally stopping
or putting logs
across
or ploughing over
nuisance: for in the first case cannot
cannot enjoy
so oommodiously as
enjoy my right at all, and in the latter
am entitled to hold
fair or market, and another per
ought, (m) Also,
son sets up
fair or market so near mine that he does me prejudice,
nuisance to the freehold which
have in my market or fair, (n)
But in order
to make this out to be nuisance,
That my market or fair
necessary,
be the elder, otherwise the nuisance lies at my own door.
2. That the market
be erected within the third part of twenty miles from mine.
For Sir Matthew
Hale (o) construes the dieta, or reasonable day's journey mentioned by Bracton, (p) to be twenty miles; as indeed
usually understood, not only in our
own law, (q) but also in the civil (r) from which we probably borrowed it. So
that
the new market be not within seven miles of the old one,
no
held reasonable that every man should have
"'nuisance: for
mar- r*gi ol
ket within one-third of
day's journey from his own home; that the
day being divided into three parts, he may spend one part in going, another
is
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Ired, 244; Peck v. Elder,
Paige, 575; Dargan v. Waddill.
(8) See Catlin v. Valentine,
Ind., 494; Ashbrook v. Commonwealth,
Sandf., 126; Hackney v. State,
Bush, 139;
Ottawa Gas Light Co. v. Thompson. 39 111., 598.
Or corrupting the water which
used for
(4) See Smith v. McConathy, 11 Mo., 517.
Lewis v. Stein, 16 Ala., 314. And noises on adjoining prem
ordinary family purposes.
ises may constitute such an impediment to the enjoyment of one's property as to entitle
Denio, 811; Sparhawk v. Union, etc.,
him to treat them as a nuisance. Fish v. Dodge,
R R, Co., 54 Penn. St., 401. Or dog which comes upon one's premises, and barks or
howls about them by day or night. Brill v. Flagler, 23 Wend., 354
(5) See Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Penn. St, 528; Earl v. DeHart, 12 K. J. Eq., 280.
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in returning, and the third in transacting his necessary business there. If such
market or fair be on the same day with mine, it is prima facie a nuisance to
but the law will intend
mine, and there needs no proof of
to be so; but
if be on any other day, may be nuisance; though whether
is so or
to the jury.
not, cannot be intended or presumed, but must make proof of
erected on
river, so near another ancient ferry as to draw away
ferry
its custom,
nuisance to the owner of the old one.
For where there
bound to keep
ferry by prescription, the owner
always in repair and readi
ness for the ease of all the king's subjects; otherwise he may be grievously
amerced:
would be therefore extremely hard
new ferry were suf
fered to share his profits, which does not also share his burthen. But where
the reason ceases, the law also ceases with it; therefore
no nuisance to erect
mill so near mine, as to draw away the custom, unless the miller also inter
nuisance to set up any trade, or
school, in
cepts the water. Neither
neighbourhood or rivalship with another: for by such emulation the public are
like to be gainers; and,
the new mill or school occasion
damage to the old
damnum absque injuria,
one,
II. Let us next attend to the remedies, which the law has given for this
And here
must premise that the law gives no private
injury of nuisance.
remedy for any thing but a private wrong. Therefore no action lies for a
public or common nuisance, but an indictment only: because, the damage being
common to all the king's subjects, no one can assign his particular proportion
of it; or
he could,
would be extremely hard,
every subject in the king
dom were allowed to harass the offender with separate actions.
For this
reason, no person natural or corporate, can have an action for
public nuisr
or punish it; but only the king in his public 'capacity of supreme
*2of)l ance>
of the kingdom, (w)
Yet this rule
governor, and pater-familias
admits of one exception; where
private person suffers some extraordinary
public nuisance; in which
damage, beyond the rest of the king's subjects, by
case he shall have
ditch
private satisfaction by action. As
by means of
common nuisance,
a man or his horse
dug across the public way, which
suffer any injury by falling therein; there for this particular damage, which
not oommon to others, the party shall have his action, (to) (6) Also
man
hath abated, or removed, nuisance which offended him (as we may remember
was stated in the first chapter of this book, that the party injured hath
entitled to no action, (x)
For he had choice of
right to do), in this case he
two remedies; either without suit, by abating
himself, by his own mere act
and authority; or by suit, in which he may both recover damages, and remove
by the aid of the law; but, having made his election of one remedy, he
totally precluded from the other.
The remedies by suit are,
By action on the case for damages; in which
the party injured shall only recover
satisfaction for the injuries sustained;
Indeed every continuance of
but oannot thereby remove the nuisance.
nui
held to be fresh one; («/) and therefore
sance
fresh action will lie, and
very exemplary damages will probably be given, if, after one verdict against
him, the defendant has the hardiness to continue it. Yet the founders of the
law of England did not rely upon probabilities merely, in order to give relief to
the injured.
They have therefore provided two other actions; the assize of

9;

3

is

4

7

Is

a

it

case of public nuisance,
(6) To entitle one to maintain an action for private damages in
not sufficient that he be incommoded in the same manner as the rest of the public, but he
Pierce v. Dart, Cow.,
must sustain some private and peculiar injury and specific damage.
Wend.,
609; Lansing v. Smith,
8. C, 21 Am. Dec. 89; Brown v. Perkins, 12 Gray, 89;
But several persons may
Oerish v. Brown, 51 Me., 256; Houch v. Wachter, 34 Md., 265.
have an action for injuries which each suffers in respect to his own rights, where sucb
additional to the general inconvenience of the public. Scott v. Bay,
Md., 431.
injury
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nuisance, and the writ of quod permittat prostemere : which not only give the
plaintiff satisfaction for his injury past, but also strike at the root and remove
the cause itself, the nuisance that occasioned the injury.
These two actions,
however, can only be brought by the tenant of the freehold; so that a lessee
for years is confined to his action upon the case,
(7)
writ: wherein
stated that the rtooii
*2. An assize of nuisance
party injured complains of some particular fact done, ad nocumentum
liber tenementi sui, and therefore commanding the sheriff to summon an assize,
that
jury, and view the premises, and have them at the next commission
of assizes, that justice may be done therein: (a) and,
the assize
found for
the plaintiff, he shall have judgment of two things:
To have the nuisance
abated; and, 2. To recover damages, (b) Formerly an assize of nuisance only
lay against the very wrongdoer himself, who levied or did the nuisance; and
did not lie against any person to whom he had alienated the tenements, where
on the nuisance was situated. This was the immediate reason for making
that equitable provision in statute West.
13 Edw.
c. 24, for granting a
similar writ, in cam consimili, where no former precedent was to be found.
The statute enacts that de cmtero non recedant querentes a curia domini regis,
pro eo quod tenementum transfertur de uno in alium; and then gives the form
of a new writ in this case: which only differs from the old one in this, that,
where the assize
brought against the very person only who levied the nui
said "quod A (the wrongdoer) injuste levavit tale nocumentum
sance,
but, where the lands are aliened to another person, the complaint
against
both; "quod A (the wrongdoer) et J5 (the alienee) levaverunt." (c) For every
fresh nuisance; and therefore the com
continuation, as was before said,
as well grounded against the alienee who continues
as against the
plaint
alienor who first levied it.
3. Before this statute, the party injured, upon any alienation of the land
wherein the nuisance was set up, was driven to his quod permittat prostemere,
in the nature of
writ of right, and therefore subject to greater de
which
writ commanding the defendant to permit the plaintiff to
lays, (d) This
abate, quod permittat prostemere, the nuisance complained of; *and r*oooi
unless he so permits, to summon him to appear in court, and show cause
And this writ lies as well for the alienee of the party first
why he will not.
injured, as against the alienee of the party first injuring; as hath been deter
all the judges, (f) And the plaintiff shall have judgment herein to
mined
abate the nuisance, and to recover damages against the defendant.
Both these actions, of assize of nuisance, and of quod permittat prostemere,
are now out of use, and have given way to the action on the case; in which, as
was before observed, no judgment can be had to abate the nuisance, but only
not necessary that the freehold
to recover damages. (8) Yet, as therein
should be in the plaintiff and defendant respectively, as
must be in these
maintainable by one that hath possession only, against
real actions, but it
another that hath like possession, the process
therefore easier: and the effect
man has
will be much the same, unless
very obstinate as well as an illnatured neighbour: who had rather continue to pay damages than remove hia
Rep. 100,101.
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and
Win. IV, c. 27.
(7) Both are now abolished by statute
In the United 8tates the remedy to recover damages for private injury by either public
or private nuisance,
by action on the case. The preventive remedy,
by writ of injunc
Sum., 189; Walker v.
tion from the courts of equity. Webb. v. Portland Manuf. Co.,
Wis., 284. A party does not bar himself of an action for damages by abat
Shepardson.
Cow., 609; Gleason v. Gary,
Conn., 418.
Pierce v. Dart,
ing the nuisance.
reversioner where the nuisance affects injuriously
(8) This action may be brought by
Peaked,
his reversionary interest Jackson v.
M. and 8., 284; Alston v. Scales,
Bing.,.
Lev., 209; Tucker v. Newman, 11 Ad. and EL, 40.
Biddlesford v. Onslow,
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For in such a case, recourse must at last be had to the old and sure
remedies, which will effectually conquer the defendant's perverseness, by send
ing the sheriff with the posse comitatus, or power of the county, to level

nuisance.

it

CHAPTER XIV.

OF WASTE.
Thb fourth species of injury, that may be offered to one's real property is
What shall be called waste
by waste, ol destruction in lands and tenements.
was considered at large in a former book, (a) as it was a means of forfeiture,

I shall therefore here
and thereby of transferring the property of real estates.
only beg leave to remind the student, that waste is a spoil and destruction of
the estate, either in houses, woods, or lands; by demolishing not the temporary
profits only, but the very substance of the thing, thereby rendering it wild and
desolate; which the common law expresses very significantly by the word vastum: and that this vastum, or waste, is either voluntary, or permissive; the
one by an actual and designed demolition of the lands, woods, and houses; the
other arising from mere negligence, and want of sufficient care in reparations,
fences, and the like.
So, that my only business is at present to show to whom
this waste is an injury; and, of course, who is entitled to any, and what,
remedy by action.
L The persons who may be injured by waste, are such as have some interest
in the estate wasted; for if a man be the absolute tenant in fee-simple, (1)
without any incumbrance or charge on the premises, he may commit whatever
waste Qi8 *owa indiscretion may prompt him to, without being im*■T*<224.1
*
And, though his heir is
peachable or accountable for it to any one.
sure to be the sufferer, yet nemo est hceres vivenlis ; no man is certain of suc
ceeding him, as well on account of the uncertainty which shall die first, as also
because he has it in his power to constitute what heir he pleases, according to
the civil law notion of an hceres natus and an hceres actus: or, in the more
accurate phraseology of our English law, he may alien or devise his estate to
whomever he thinks proper, and by such alienation or devise may disinherit
his heir at law. Into whose hands soever therefore the estate wasted comes,
after a tenant in fee-simple, though the waste is undoubtedly damnum, it is
damnum absque injuria.

f

(a) See book It, ch. 18.

(1) Waste differs from trespass in this, that the wrong-doer is the person actuallyor con
structively in possession, while trespass is an injury to the possession itself. Waste is
either voluntary or permissive.
Voluntary waste is an injury to the inheritance, resulting
from some positive wrongful act of the party in possession; permissive waste is an injury
inheritance,
to the
resulting from the neglect of some duty of the possessor to protect it.
See a learned discussion of the general subject in Duvall v. Waters, 1 Bland Ch., 569; 8. C,
18 Am. Dec, 350. The most common illustration of voluntary waste in England is that
of cutting timber for other than the ordinary use and enjoyment of the premises; and in
that country, where the policy is to preserve timber as much as possible, a very strict rule
But in the timbered portions of America the
is laid down respecting this species of waste.
old rule is much relaxed.
See Parkins v. Coxe, 2 Hayw., 339; Ward v. Sheppard. 2 Hayw.,
283: 8. C, 2 Am. Dec, 625; Findlay v. Smith. 6 Munf., 134; S. C, 8 Am. Dec, 733;
Jackson v. Brownson, 7 Johns., 227; 8. C. 5 Am. Dec, 258; Hastings v. Crunkleton, 8
Yeates. 261; Shine v. Wilcox, 1 Dev. & Bat. Eq., 631 ; Crockett v. Crockett, 2 Ohio St.,
180; Owen v. Hyde, 6 Yerg., 384 ; 8. O, 27 Am Dec, 467. The circumstances of the
Johnson v.
country will have much to do in determining what is and what is not waste.
Johnson, 2 Hill Ch (8. O). 277; 8. C. 29 Am. Dec, 72; Stout v. Dunning, 72 Ind., 848.
This is especially so as to the method of cultivating land. It was decided in an early case
124
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One species of interest, which is injured by waste, is that of a person whohas a right of common in the place wasted; especially if it he common of
estovers, or a right of cutting and carrying away wood for house-bote, ploughHere, if the owner of the wood demolishes the whole wood, and
bote, &c.
thereby destroys all possibility of taking estovers, this is an injury to the com
moner, amounting to no less than a disseisin of his common of estovers, if he
chooses so to consider it; for which he has his remedy to recover possession
and damages by assize, if entitled to a freehold in such common; but if he has
only a chattel interest, then he can only recover damages by an action on the
case for this waste and destruction of the woods, out of which his estoverswere to issue, (b)
But the most usual and important interest, that is hurt by this commission,

of waste, is that of him who hath the remainder or reversion of the inherit
ance, after a particular estate for life or years in being. Here, if the particu
lar tenant (be it the tenant in dower or by curtesy, who was answerable for
waste at the common law, (c) or the lessee for life or years, *who was r«oo5>'
first made liable by the statutes of Marlbridge, (d) and of Gloucester), *■
manifest
(e) if the particular tenant, say, commits or suffers any waste, it is a
injury to him that has the inheritance, as it tends to mangle and dismember it
of its most desirable incidents and ornaments, among which timber and housesTo him therefore in remainder or
may justly be reckoned the principal.
reversion, to whom the inheritance appertains in expectancy, (f) the law hath
given an adequate remedy. For he, who hath the remainder for life only, is
not entitled to sue for waste; since his interest may never perhaps come into
Yet a parson, vicar, arch
possession, and then he hath suffered no injury.
deacon, prebendary, and the like, who are seized in right of their churches of
any remainder or reversion, may have an action of waste; for they, in many
cases, have for the benefit of the church and of the successors a fee-simplequalified; and yet, as they are not seized in their own right, the writ of waste
shall not say, ad exhcBredationem ipsius, as for other tenants in fee-simple; but
ecclesiw, in whose right the fee-simple is holden. (g)
ad exhmredationem
H. The redress for this injury of waste is of two kinds; preventive, and cor
rective: the former of which is by writ of estrepement, the latter by that of

I

waste. (2)

I. Estrepement is an old French word, signifying the same as waste or extir
pation: and the writ of estrepement lay at the common law, after judgment
obtained in any action real, (h) and before possession was delivered by the sher(c) 2 Inst. 299.
(d) 58Hen. m, o. S3.
(e) I Edw. I, a 6.
(MF.N.B.69. g Rep. 112.
If)

Co. Liu. 53.

(0) Ibid. £41.

(A) S Inst. 328.

that it would be waste for a tenant to depart in his cultivation from the established rotation,
of crops: Wilds v. Layton, 1 Del. Ch., 226; 8. C, 12 Am. Dec, 91; but this would hardly
See Richards v. Torbert, 3 Houst., 172; Pynchon v. Stearns, 11
be followed now as law.
Met, 804; 8. C, 45 Am Dec., 207. The tenant may work mines as usual, but he must
Gaines v. Mining Co., 82 N. J. Eg., 86; Ward v. Mining Co., 47
not open new mines.
Mich., 67; Franklin Coal Co. v. McMillan, 49 Md., 529. He may make slight changes in.
Winship v. Pitts, 3 Paige,
buildings and in their use, but not those of a radical character.
272.
259; Huntley v. Russell, 13 Q. B., 572.
See Clemence v. Steere, 1 R
Permissive waste consists in suffering that to take place to the injury of the inheritance
For ordinary wear and decay, not hastened by neg
which ordinary care would prevent
lect, and for accidental injuries by fire and otherwise, the tenant is not liable; but he
should exercise reasonable diligence for the preservation of buildings, not only as against
Attersoll v Stevens, 1 Taunt., 183; Cook v. Chamthe elements, but as against trespassers
plain, etc., Co., 1 Denio, 91; White v. Wagner, 4 H. & J., 873; S. C, 7 Am. Dec, 674
Any one may maintain an action on the case for waste who can show that he has an
VanPelt v. McGraw, 4N Y.,
interest in the inheritance which is injuriously affected.
4 R. L, 539; Phoenix v.
110; Byrom v Chapin, 118 Mass., 308; Waterman v. Matteson,
Clark, 6 N. J. Eg., 447. But one having only a contingent interest in remainder could not
have such an action.
Cannon v. Barry, 59 Miss., 289.
The remedy to recover damages is by action on
(2) Both these writs are now abolished.
the case, and to recover possession is by ejectment.

I,
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stop any waste which the vanquished party might be tempted to commit
in lands, which were determined to be no longer his.
But as in some cases the
demandant may be justly apprehensive,
that the tenant may make waste or
estrepement pending the suit, well knowing the weakness of his title, therefore
the statute of Gloucester
gave another writ of estrepement pendente placito,
the sheriff firmly *to inhibit the tenant "ne faciat
as turn
commanding
r*22«l
*■
vel estrepementum pendente placito dicto indiscusso. (k) And, by virtue
of either of these writs the sheriff may resist them that do, or offer to do, waste;
and
otherwise he cannot prevent them, he may lawfully imprison the was
warrant to others to imprison them; or,
ters, or make
necessity require, he
So odious in the sight of the
may take the posse comitatus to his assistance.
law
waste and destruction.
In suing out these two writs this difference
was formerly observed; that in actions merely possessory, where no damages
writ of estrepement might be had at any time pendente lite, nay
are recovered,
even at the time of suing out the original writ, or first process: but in an action
where damages were recovered, the demandant could only have a writ of
he was apprehensive of waste after verdict had; (m) for, with
estrepement,
was presumed the jury
regard to waste done before the verdict was given,
would consider that in assessing the quantum of damages.
But now
seems
to be held, by an equitable construction of the statute of Gloucester, and in
advancement of the remedy, that
writ of estrepement, to prevent waste, may
be had in every stage, as well of such actions wherein damages are recovered
as of those wherein only possession
had of the lands; for perad venture, saith
the law, the tenant may not be of ability to satisfy the demandant his full dam
And therefore now, in an action of waste itself, to recover the place
ages, (n)
wasted and also damages,
writ of estrepement will lie, as well before as after
For the plaintiff cannot recover damages for more waste than
judgment.
he at liberty to assign or give in
contained in his original complaint; neither
evidence any waste made after the suing out of the writ; it
therefore reason
able that he should have this writ of preventive justice, since he
in his pres
ent suit debarred of any farther remedial (o) If writ of estrepement, forbid
ding waste, be directed and delivered to the tenant himself, as
may be, and
he afterwards proceeds to commit waste, an action may be carried on upon the
*f°un(iation of this writ; wherein the only plea of the tenant can be,
f*2271
*non fecit vastum contra prohibitionem; and,
be found
upon verdict
that he did, the plaintiff may recover costs and damages, (p) or the party may
after the writ
proceed to punish the defendant for the contempt: for,
directed and delivered to the tenant or his servants, they proceed to commit
waste, the court will imprison them for this contempt of the writ. (3)
But not
be directed to the sheriff, for then
incumbent upon him to prevent
so,
the estrepement absolutely, even by raising the posse comitatus,
can be
done no other way.
Besides this preventive redress at common law, the courts of equity, upon
bill exhibited therein, complaining of waste and destruction, will grant an in
junction in order to stay waste, until the defendant shall have put in his an
swer, and the court shall thereupon make further order. Which
now be
come the most usual way of preventing waste.
also an action, partly founded upon the common
8. A writ of waste (3)
law, and partly upon the statute of Gloucester; (r) and may be brought by
a

5.

I,

»

ffc) Eegtatr. 77.
(I) Inst. 829.
(m) F. N. B. 60, 81.
Bop. 116.
(p) Moor. 100.
(j) Hob. 85.
(r) Edw.
6

5

I,

6

a 18.
(0 Edw.
(a)
(n) Ibid. 61.

a

a

it

was abolished, had almost entirely fallen into disuse, having
(8) This writ, before
given way to the more simple proceeding by special action on the case. And this action
writ of waste might formerly have been
may be brought not only in those cases in which
party in
maintained. But also in any other case where by the wrongful act or default of
possession an injury occurs to the rights of one entitled to succeed him in the possession.
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(t)

him who hath the immediate estate of inheritance in reversion or remainder,
against the tenant for life, tenant in dower, tenant by the curtesy, or tenant
This action is also maintainable in pursuance of statute («) Westm.
for years.
2, by one tenant in common of the inheritance against another, who makes
The equity of whioh statute extends
waste in the estate holden in common.
to joint-tenants, but not to coparceners; because by the old law coparceners
might make partition, whenever either of them thought proper, and thereby
prevent future waste, but tenants in common and joint tenants could not; and
therefore the statute gave them this remedy, compelling the defendant either to
make partition, and take the place wasted to his own share, or to give security
But these tenants in common and jointnot to commit any farther waste.
tenants are *not liable to the penalties of the statute of Gloucester,
r*2oQi
whioh extends only to such as have life estates, and do waste to the
however
must
be
consider
of
the
inheritance.
The
waste
something
prejudice
amount only to twelve pence, or some such petty sum, the plain
able; for
tiff shall not recover in an action of waste: nam de minimis non curat lex.(u)
is
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mixed action; partly real, so far as recovers land;
This action of waste
For
and partly personal, so far as
recovers damages.
brought for both
those purposes
the waste be proved, the plaintiff shall recover the
and,
thing or place wasted, and also treble damages by the statute of Gloucester.
The writ of waste calls upon the tenant to appear and show cause why he hath
to
committed waste and destruction in the place named, ad exhwredationem,
the disinherison of the plaintiff, (to) And
the defendant makes default, or
does not appear at the day assigned him, then the sheriff
to take with him
a jury of twelve men, and go in person to the place alleged to be wasted, and
there inquire of the waste done, and the damages; and make a return or report
founded, (x) For
of the same to the court, upon which report the judgment
the law will not suffer so heavy
judgment, as the forfeiture and treble dam
mere default, without full assurance that the fact
ages, to be passed upon
stated in the writ.
But
the defendant appears to the
according as
writ, &na afterwards suffers jugdment to go against him by default, or upon a
nihil dicil (when he makes no answer, puts in no plea, in defence), this amounts
to confession of the waste; since having once appeared, he cannot now pre
tend ignorance of the charge.
Now, therefore, the sheriff shall not go to the
place to inquire of the fact, whether any waste has, or has not been commit
ted
for this
already ascertained by the silent confession of the defendant
but he shall only, as in defaults upon other actions, make inquiry of the quan
tum of damages, (y) The defendant, on the trial, may give in evidence any
thing that proves there was no waste committed, as that the destruction hap
pened by lightning, tempest, the king's enemies, or other inevitable aooident.
But
no defence to say, that
stranger did the waste, for against him
(z)
the plaintiff hath no remedy: though the defendant
entitled to sue such
stranger in an action of trespass vi et armis, and shall recover the damages he
has suffered in consequence of such unlawful act. (a) (5)

A

(t) Inst. 403,404.
(u) Finch, L. 89.
(x) Poph. 84.
(if) Cro. Eliz. 18,890.
(a) Law of niti print, 180.
3

I,

a 28.
(») 18Edw.
(to) F. N. B. M.
(*) Co. Litt. 58.

is

a

7

2

6

a

a

is

a

is

2

S

,

a

a

purchaser at judicial sale, where the defendant had
right of redemption, may main
tain this action, after his title becomes absolute, against one who had previously, but after
the sale, committed waste on the premises.
Thomas v. Crofut, 14 N. Y. 474; Stout v.
Keyes,
Doug. Mich., 184.
Generally the smallness
(4) See this maxim illustrated in Broom's Legal Maxims, 106.
of injury will not preclude the maintenance of an action: Pindar v. Wadsworth,
East,
164; but the difficulty in drawing
what
precise line between
and what
not waste in
all cases,
sufficient reason for taking no notice of slight injuries.
vested interest in reversion, may maintain
special action on the
(5) But one having
case against
stranger who commits waste to the injury of the inheritance.
Randall v.
Conn., 828; Elliot v. Smith,
Cleveland,
X. H., 430; Chase v. Hazleton,
X. H., 171;
127
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When the waste and damages are thus ascertained, either by confession,
verdict, or inquiry of the sheriff, judgment is given in pursuance of the statute
of Gloucester, c. 5, that the plaintiff shall recover the place wasted; for which
he has immediately a writ of seisin, provided the particular estate be still subDe expired, *there can be no forfeiture of the land),
8*8t'n£ (f°r> if
T*229l
L
-I and also that the
plaintiff shall recover treble the damages assessed by
the jury, which he must obtain in the same manner as all other damages, in
actions personal and mixed, are obtained, whether the particular estate be ex
pired, or still in being.

CHAPTER XV.

OF SUBTRACTION.
Subtraction, which is the fifth species of injuries affecting a man's real
property, happens when any person who owes any suit, duty, custom, or service
to another, withdraws or neglects to perform it. It differs from a disseisin, in
that this is committed without any denial of the right, consisting merely in
non-performance; that strikes at the very title of the party injured, and
amounts to an ouster or actual dispossession.
Subtraction, however, being
clearly an injury, is remediable by due oourse of law; but the remedy differs
according to the nature of the services, whether they be due by virtue of any
tenure, or by custom only.
L Fealty, suit of court, and rent, are duties and services usually issuing and
arising ratione tenures, being the conditions upon which the ancient lords
granted out their lands to their feudatories; whereby it was stipulated that they
and their heirs should take the oath of fealty or fidelity to their lord, which
was the feudal bond, or commune vinculum, between lord and tenant; that they
should do suit, or duly attend and follow the lord's courts, and there from time
to time give their assistance, by serving on juries, either to deoide the property
of their neighbours in the court-baron, or correct their misdemeanors
in the
court-leet; and, lastly, that they should yield to the lord certain annual stated
returns, in military attendance, in provisions, in arms, in matters of ornament
or pleasure> in mstio employments or *prsedial labours, or (which is
T*231 1
L
-I instar
omnium) in money, which will provide all the rest; all which
are comprised under the one general name of reditus, return, or rent. And the
subtraction or non-observance
of any of these conditions, by neglecting to
swear fealty, to do suit of court, or to render the rent or service reserved, h>
an injury to the freehold of the lord, by diminishing and depreciating the
value of his seigniory.
The general remedy for all these is by distress ; and it is the only remedy
at the common law for the first two of them.
The nature of distresses, their
incidents and consequences, we have before more than once explained: (a) it
may here suffice to remember, that they are a taking of beasts, or other per
sonal property, by way of pledge to enforce the performance of something
due from the party distrained upon.
And for the most part it is provided
that distresses be reasonable and moderate; but in the case of distress for
immoderate, or too
fealty or suit of court, no distress can be unreasonable,
large: (b) for this is the only remedy to which the party aggrieved is entitled,
(a) See pages 8, 148.

(6) Finch, L. 285.

Ripka v. Sergeant, 7 W. and 8., 1. The tenant may also sue for the injury to his possession.
Or the landlord may hold the tenant responsible for the injury by the stranger. Fay
Id.
T. Brewer, 3 Pick., 203- Threatened waste may be restrained by injunction.
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(c)

and therefore, it ought to be such as is sufficiently complilsory ; and be it of
what value it will, there is no harm done, especially as it cannot be sold or
A
made away with, but must be restored immediately on satisfaction made.
distress of this nature, that has no bounds with regard to its quantity, and
may be repeated from time to time, until the stubbornness of the party is con
quered, is called a distress infinite ; which is also used for some other purposes,
as in summoning jurors, and the like.
Other remedies for subtraction of rents or services are, 1. By action of debt,
for the breach of this express contract, of which enough has been formerly said.
This is the most usual remedy, when recourse is had to any action at all for the
recovery of pecuniary rents, to which species of render almost all free services
are now reduced, since the abolition of the military tenures.
But for a free
hold rent, reserved on *a lease for life, &c, no action of debt lay by the p *o<joi
■*
common law, during the continuance of the freehold out of which it
for the law would not suffer real injury to be remedied by an action
issued;
Ann. c. 14, and
that was merely personal. However, by the statutes
Geo.
Ill, o. 17, actions of debt may now be brought at any time to recover such free
hold rents.
2. An assize of mort d? ancestor or novel disseisin will lie of rents
as well as of lands; (d)
the lord, for the sake of trying the possessory right,
will make
his election to suppose himself ousted or disseised thereof. This
now seldom heard of and all other real actions to recover rent, being in the
nature of writs of right, and therefore more dilatory in their progress, are en
tirely disused, though not formally abolished bylaw. (1) Of this species how
ever is, 3. The writ de consuetudinibus et servitiis, which lies for the lord
against his tenant, who withholds from him the rents and services due by cus
tom, or tenure, for his land, (e) This compels a specific payment or perform
ance of the rent or service; and there are also others, whereby the lord shall
As, 4. The writ of cessa
recover the land itself in lieu of the duty withheld.
Edward
c.
and of Westm.
vit, which lies by the statutes of Gloucester,
man who holds lands of
lord by rent or
13 Edw.
cc. 21 and 41, when
other services, neglects or ceases to perform his services for two years to
on condition of per
gether; or where
religious house hath lands given
forming some certain spiritual service, as reading prayers or giving alms, and
the cesser or neglect have continued
neglects it; in either of which cases,
for two years, the lord or donor and his heirs shall have
writ of cessavit to *
recover the land itself, eo quod tenens in faciendis servitiis per biennium jam
cessavit,
In like manner, by the civil law,
tenant who held lands
upon payment of rent or services, or "jure emphyteutico" neglected to pay or
perform them per totum triennium, he might be ejected from such emphyteutic
lands, {g)
But by the statute of Gloucester, the cessavit does not lie for lands
let upon fee-farm rents, unless they have lain fresh and uncultivated for two
years, and there be *not sufficient distress upon the premises; or unless r*oooT
the tenant hath so enclosed the land that the lord cannot come upon
to distrain. (A) For the law prefers the simple and ordinary remedies, by distress or by the actions just now mentioned, to this extraordinary one of for
feiture for cessavit: and therefore the same statute of Gloucester has pro
vided farther, that, upon tender of arrears and damages before judgment, and
iving security for the future performance of the services, the process shall
>e at an end, and the tenant shall retain his land; to which the statute of
conforms so far as may stand with convenience and reason of law.
Westm
Geo. II, o. 28 (whioh permits
easy to observe, that the statute (k)
(i) It
landlords, who have a right of re-entry for non-payment for rent, to serve an
no suffidue, and there
ejectment on their tenants, when half
year's rent
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Finch, L. 870,271.
(m) Feud.
F. N. B. 10.
(o) 0. 10.
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(I)

a

a

a

a
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§

is,

oient distress on the premises), is in some measare copied from the anoient
writ of cessavit: especially as it may be satisfied and put an end to in a similar
manner, by tender of the rent and costs within six months after. And the
same remedy
in substance, adopted by statute 11 Geo. II, o. 19,
16, which
enacts that, where any tenant at rack-rent shall be one year's rent in arrear,
and shall desert the demised premises, leaving the same uncultivated or unoc
cupied, so that no sufficient distress can be had: two justices of the peace
(after notice affixed on the premises for fourteen days without effect) may
give the landlord possession thereof, and thenceforth the lease shall be void.
6. There
also another very effectual remedy, which takes place when the
tenant, upon
writ of assize for rent, or on
replevin, disowns or disclaims
his tenure, whereby the lord loses his verdict: in which case the lord may have
writ of right, sur disclaimer, grounded on this denial of tenure; and shall,
upon proof of the tenure, recover back the land itself so holden, as punish
This piece of retaliating
ment to the tenant for such his false disclaimer.
himself
justice, whereby the tenant who endeavours to defraud his lord
deprived of the estate, as
evidently proceeds upon feudal principles,
'8 ezPressiy t° be met with in the feudal constitutions: (m)
r*o<ui *80
" vasaUus, qui abnerjavit
feudum ejusve conditionem, exspoliabitur."
And, as on the one hand the ancient law provided these several remedies to
obviate the knavery and punish the ingratitude of the tenant, so on the other
hand
was equally careful to redress the oppression of the lord; by furnish
The writ of ne injitste vexes
an ancient writ founded on
ing
(n) which
that chapter (o) of magna carta which prohibits distresses for greater services
than are really due to the lord; being itself of the prohibitory kind, and yet
in the nature of writ of right, (p) It lies where the tenant in fee-simple and
his ancestors have held of the lord
certain services; and the lord hath ob
tained seisin of more or greater services, by the inadvertent payment or per
formance of them by the tenant himself. Here the tenant cannot in an avowry
avoid the lord's possessory right, because of the seisin given by his own hand;
but
driven to this writ, to devest the lord's possession, and establish the
mere right of property, by ascertaining the services, and reducing them to
their proper standard. But this writ does not lie for tenant in tail; for he
may avoid such seisin of the lord, obtained from the payment of his ancestors,
vby plea to an avowry in replevin. (q) 2. The writ of mesne, de medio; which
also in the nature of
writ of right, (V) and lies, when upon
subinfeudation
the mesne, or middle lord,
suffers his under-tenant or tenant paravail, to be
distrained upon by the lord paramount, for the rent due to him from the mesne
lord,
And in such case the tenant shall have judgment to be quitted (or
he makes default therein, or does not
indemnified) by the mesne lord: and
appear originally to the tenant's writ, he shall be forejudged of his raesnalty,
and the tenant shall hold immediately of the lord paramount himself, (u) (2)

4

if
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and Wm IV,
(2) The several writs here mentioned were formally abolished by statute
e. 27. They were before not the usual remedies for these wrongs.
An action on the case
might have been maintained by the tenant at the common law against the landlord for dis
729, et seq. and
training for more rent than was due: Taylor Land, and Ten.,
the tenant
through any error or mistake paid to the landlord more than was due, he might recover
back in an action for money had and received to his use, as paid without consideration. For
the general principle in these cases, see Union Bank v. Bank of U. 8.,
Mass., 74; Bank of
Mich., 325. And
Commerce v. Union Bank,
N. Y., 230; Little v. Derby,
an under
distrained upon, or
tenant
compelled in order to protect his own interest to pay rent to
landlord,
he is. entitled to treat the payment as one made to the use of the mesne
the original
tenant, and may deduct
from his own rent, or recover
back from the mesne tenant
was
owing to him. As to the obligation of the mesne tenant to indemnify the un
nothing
Land,
Ten.,
der-tenant generally, see Taylor
and
738.
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*IL Thus far of the remedies for subtraction of rents or other ser- r*23Rl'
rices due by tenure. There are also other services due by ancient cue- *■
torn and prescription only.
Such is that of doing suit to another's mill: where
the persons, resident in a particular place, by usage time out of mind, have
to grind their corn at a certain mill; and afterwards any of
been accustomed
them go to another mill, and withdraw their suit (their secta a eequendo) from
the ancient mill. This is not only a damage, but an injury to the owner; be
cause this prescription might have a very reasonable foundation; viz.: upon the
erection of such mill by the ancestors of the owner for the convenience of the
inhabitants, on condition, that when erected, they should all grind their corn
there only. And for this injury the owner shall have a writ de secta ad molendinum, (to) commanding the defendant to do his suit at that mill, quam ad Ulud facere debet, ei solet, or show good cause to the contrary: in which action
the validity of the prescription may be tried, and if it be found for the owner, he
shall recover damages against the defendant, (x) In like manner and for like
reasons, the register (y) will inform us, that a man may have a writ of secta
ad fumum, secta ad torrale, et ad omnia alia hujusmodi; for suit due to his
fumum, his public oven or bake-house; or to his torrale, his kiln, or malt-house;
when a person's ancestors have erected a convenience of that sort for the bene,
fit of the neighborhood, upon an agreement (proved by immemorial custom)
that all the inhabitants should use and resort to it when erected.
But besides
these special remedies for subtractions, to compel the specific performance of
the service due by custom; an action on the case will also lie for all of them, to
And thus much for the injury of sabrepair the party injured in damages.
traction.

CHAPTER XVI.

OF DISTURBANCE.
Tin sixth and last species of real injuries is that of disturbance; which is
usually a wrong done to some incorporeal hereditament, by hindering or dis
shall
quieting the owners in their regular and lawful enjoyment of it. (a)
consider five sorts of this injury, viz.: 1. Disturbance of franchises. 2. Dis
8. Disturbance of ways.
4. Disturbance of tenures.
turbance of common.
6.
Disturbance of patronage.
I. Disturbance of franchises happens when a man has the franchise of hold
ing a court-leet, of keeping a fair or market, of free-warren, of taking toll, of
seizing waifs or estrays, or, (in short) any other species of franchise whatso
ever; and he is disturbed or incommoded in the lawful exercise thereof. As if
another by distress, menaces, or persuasions prevails upon the suitors not to
appear at my court; or obstructs the passage to my fair or market; or hunts
in my free-warren; or refuses to pay me the accustomed toll; or hinders me
from seizing the waif or estray, whereby it escapes or is carried out of my lib
erty; in every oase of this kind, all which it is impossible here to recite or sug
gest, there is an injury done to the legal owner; his property is damnified; and
To remedy which,
the profits arising from such his franchise are diminished.
as the law has given no other writ, he is *therefore entitled to sue for
r*2Q«7i '
damages by a special action on the case : or, in case of toll may take a *■
distress if he pleases, (b)
lh The disturbance of common comes next to be considered: where any
act is done, by which the right of another to his common is inoommoded or

I

(te) F. N. B. 183.
(o) Finch, L. 187.

(*) Co. Entr. ML
(b) Cro.

mil

(g) FoL 153.
558.
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This may happen, in the first place, where one who hath no right
common, puts his cattle into the land; and thereby robs the cattle of the
commoners of their respective shares of the pasture.
Or if one, who hath a
right of common, puts in cattle which are not commonable, as hogs and goats;,
which amounts to the same inconvenience. But the lord of the soil may (by
custom or prescription, but not without) put a stranger's cattle into the com
mon; (c) and also by a like prescription for common appurtenant, cattle that
are not commonable
may be put into the common, (d) The lord also of the
soil may justify making burrows therein, and putting in rabbits, so as they da
not increase to so large a number as totally to destroy the common,
But
diminished.

of

(e)

a

it,

is

is

L

-I

a

(/)

in general, in case the beasts of a stranger, or the uncommonable cattle of a
commoner, be found upon the -land, the lord or any of the commoners may dis
train them damage-feasant:
(f) or the commoner may bring an action on the
case to recover damages, provided the injury done be anything considerable:
bo that he may lay his action with a per quod, or allege
that thereby he was
But for a trivial trespass the commoner has no
deprived of his common.
action: but the lord of the soil only, for the entry and trespass com
mitted, (g)
Another disturbance of common is by surcharging it; or putting more cattle
therein than the pasture and herbage will sustain, or the party hath a right to
do.
In this case he that surcharges does an injury to the rest of the owners,
by depriving them of their respective portions, or at least Contracting
r*238l
»■
J them into a smaller compass. This injury by surcharging can, properly
speaking, only happen, where the common is appendant or appurtenant, (A)
and of course limitable by law; or where, when in gross, it is expressly limited
and certain; for where a man hath common in gross, sans nombre, or without
stint, he cannot be a surcharges
However, even where a man is said to have
common without stint, still there must be left sufficient for the lord's own
beasts; (i) for the law will not suppose that, at the original grant of the com
mon, the lord meant to exclude himself.
The usual remedies for surcharging the common, are either by distraining somany of the beasts as are above the number allowed, or else by an action of
trespass, both which may be had by the lord: or lastly, by a special action on
the case for damages; in which any commoner may be plaintiff, (j) But the
ancient and most effectual method of proceeding is by a writ of admeasurement
of pasture. This lies either where a common appurtenant or in gross is certain
as to number, or where a man has common
appendant or appurtenant to his
In either
land, the quantity of which common has never yet been ascertained.
of these cases, as well the lord, as any of the commoners, is entitled to this
writ of admeasurement;
which is one of those writs that are called vicontiel,
(k) being directed to the sheriff, (vicecomiti,) and not to be returned to any
superior court, till finally executed by him. It recites a complaint that the
defendant hath surcharged, superoneravit, the common: and therefore com
mands the sheriff to admeasure and apportion it; that the defendant may not
have more than belongs to him, and that the plaintiff may have his rightful
And upon this suit all the commoners shall be admeasured, as well
share.
those who have not, as those who have surcharged the common; as well the
The execution of this writ must be by
jury
plaintiff as the defendant.
r*2iol °^ *we^ve men, who are upon their *oaths to ascertain, under the superintendence of the sheriff, what and how many cattle each commoner is
entitled to feed.
And the rule for this admeasurement
generally understood
to be, that the commoner shall not turn more cattle upon the common, than
are sufficient to manure and stock the land to which his right of common
such cattle only as are levant and
annexed: or, as our ancient law expressed
eouchant upon his tenement; (m) which being
thing uncertain before ad mea2

0)

1

8.

1

9

Rep. 112.
(d) Co. Lit*. 128.
(e) Cro. Eliz. 876. Cro. Jac. 185. Lutw. 108. (/)
(c) Roll. Abr. 896.
Roll. Abr. 399.
(i)
(fc) See book IL ch.
to) Ibid.
Freem. 278.
(m) Bro. Abr. tit. prncription, 28
(fc) Inst. 369. Finch, L. 814. (I) F. N. B. 128.
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flurement, has frequently, though erroneously, occasioned this unmeasured
without stint, or sans nombre; (») a
ri^ht of common to be called a common
thing which, though possible in law, (o) does in fact very rarely exist.
If, after the admeasurement has thus ascertained the right, the same defend
ant surcharges the common again, the plaintiff may have a writ of second sur
charge, de secunda superoneratione, which is given by the statute Westm. 2, 13
Edw. I, o. 8, and thereby the sheriff is directed to inquire by a jury, whether
the defendant has in fact again surcharged the common contrary to the tenor
and if he has, he shall then forfeit to the king the
•of the last admeasurement:
supernumerary cattle put in, and also shall pay damages to the plaintiff, (p)
This process seems highly equitable: for the first offence is held to be commit
ted through mere inadvertence, and therefore there are no damages or forfeit
ure on the first writ, which was only to ascertain the right which was dis
puted: but the second offence is a wilful contempt and injustice; and there
fore punished very properly with not only damages, but also forfeiture.
And
•herein the right, being once settled, is never again disputed; but only the fact
is tried, whether there be any second surcharge or no: which gives this
neglected proceeding a great advantage over the modern method, by action on
the case, wherein the quantum of common belonging to the defendant must
■be proved upon every fresh trial, for every repeated offence.
*There is yet another disturbance of common, when the owner of the
r*2Aol
that the
land, or other person, so encloses or otherwise obstructs
commoner
precluded from enjoying the benefit to which he
by law enti
tled.
This may be done, either by erecting fences, or by driving the cattle off
the land, or by ploughing up the soil of the common, (a)
Or may be done
with rabbits in such quantities
by erecting a warren therein, and stocking
that they devour the whole herbage, and thereby destroy the common.
For in
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(1) These real actions having been abolished by statute
the case
now the only remedy.
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if
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(s)

a

if

edy by action against the owner, (r) This kind of disturbance does indeed
amount to disseisin, and
the commoner chooses to consider
in that light,
the law has given him an assize of novel-disseisin, against the lord, to recover
the possession of his common,
Or
has given
writ of quod permittat,
dis
against any stranger, as well as the owner of the land, in case of such
turbance to the plaintiff as amounts to
total deprivation of his common;
whereby the defendant shall be compelled to permit the plaintiff to enjoy his
common as he ought,
the commoner does not choose to bring a
But
real action to recover seisin, or to try the right, he may, (which
the easier
and more usual way) bring an action on the case for his damages, instead of
an assize or quod permittat. (w) (1)
There are cases, indeed, in which the lord may enclose and abridge the com
mon: for which, as they are no injury to any one, so no one
entitled to any
that
remedy. For
provided by the statute of Merton, 20 Hen. HI, c.
the lord may approve, that
enclose and convert to the uses of husbandry
melioration or approvement,) any waste grounds, woods, or pas
(which
tures, in which his tenants have common appendant to their estates; provided
he leaves *sufficient common to his tenants, according to the proportion
r#9
of their land. And this
would be very
extremely reasonable; for
hard
the lord, whose ancestors granted out these estates to .which the com
mons are appendant, should be precluded from making what advantage he can
■of the rest of his manor; provided such advantage and improvement be no way
13 Edw.
c. 46,
derogatory from the former grants. The statute Westm.
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extends this liberty of approving, in like manner, against all others that have
common appurtenant, or in gross, as well as against the tenants of the lord,
who have their common appendant; and farther enacts, that no assize of
novel-disseisin, for common, shall lie against a lord for erecting on the common
any windmill, sheep-house, or other necessary buildings therein specified:
which, Sir Edward Coke says, (to) are only put as examples; and that any other
necessary improvements may be made by the lord, though in reality they
And,
abridge the common, and make it less sufficient for the commoners.
lastly, by statutes 29 Geo. II, c. 30, and SI Geo. II, c. 41, it is particularly
enacted, that any lords of wastes and commons, with the consent of the major
part, in number and value, of the commoners, may enclose any part thereof,
tor the growth of timber and underwood. (2)
III. The third species of disturbance, that of ways, is very similar in its
nature to the last: it principally happening when a person, who hath a right to
a way over another's grounds, by grant or prescription, is obstructed by enclos
ures, or other obstacles, or by ploughing across it; by which means he cannot
enjoy his right of way, or, at least, not in so commodious a manner as he might
If this be a way annexed to his estate, and the obstruction is made
have done.
by the tenant of the land, this brings it to another species of injury; for it is
then a nuisance, for which an assize will lie, as mentioned in a former chapter.
But if the right of way, thus obstructed by the tenant, be only in gross
(sb)
with any lands or
(that is annexed to a man's person and unconnected
*teneraent8) or if the obstruction of a way belonging to an house or
T *242l
J land is made by a stranger, it is then in either case merely a disturb
*■
ance: for the obstruction of a way in gross is no detriment to any lands or
tenements, and therefore does not fall under the legal notion of a nuisance,
which must be laid, ad nocumentum liberi tenements; (y) and the obstruction
of it by a stranger can never tend to put the right of way in dispute: the
remedy, therefore, for these disturbances is not by assize or any real action,
but by the universal remedy of action on the case to recover damages,
IV. The fourth species of disturbance
that of disturbance of tenure, or
breaking that connexion which subsists between the lord and his tenant, and
to which the law pays so high
will not suffer
to be wan
regard, that
To have an estate well tenanted
third person.
tonly dissolved by the act of
an advantage that every landlord must be very sensible of; and, therefore,
the driving away of tenant from off his estate
an injury of no small conse
So that
there be
tenant at will of any lands or tenements, and a
quence.
stranger, either by menaces and threats, or by unlawful distresses, or by fraud
and circumvention, or other means, contrives to drive him away, or inveigle
him to leave his tenancy, this the law very justly construes to be
wrong and
injury to the lord, (a) and gives him
reparation in damages against the
offender by
special action on the case.
Y. The fifth and last species of disturbance, but by far the most consider
that of disturbance of patronage,' which
an hindrance or obstruc
able,
tion of patron to present his clerk to benefice.
This injury was distinguished at common law from another species of injury
called usurpation; which
an absolute ouster or dispossession of the patron,
and happens when
clerk, and he
stranger, that hath no right, presenteth
In which case of usurpation,
thereupon ^admitted and instituted,
r*24<3l
*the patron lost by the common law not only his turn of presenting
pro hoc vice, but also the absolute and perpetual inheritance of the advowson,
(y) F. N. B. 1S3.
(u>) Inst. 47S.
(*) Hale on F. N. B. 185. Lntw. Ill, 11»
(<e)O. 18, p. »8.
Roll. Abr. 108.
(a) Hal. AnaL o. 40.
(4) Co. Litt 877.
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Geo. IV, c 28;
and
(2) The statute last mentioned was amended by statutes
Wm. IV, c. 115; and
and Vic, c. 81; under which, lords of wastes and commons, with
the consent of two-thirds in number and value of the commoners, may enclose any part
thereof for the growth of timber and underwood.
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that he could not present again upon the next avoidance, unless in the
meantime he recovered his right hy a real action, viz. : a writ of right of advow
son. (c)
The reason given for his losing the present turn, and not ejecting the
usurper's clerk, was that the final intent of the law in creating this species of
property being to have a fit person to celebrate divine service, it preferred the
peace of the church (provided a clerk were once admitted and instituted) to
the right of any patron whatever. And the patron also lost the inheritance of
his advowson, unless he recovered it in a writ of right, because by such usurpa
tion he was put out of possession of his advowson, as much as when by actual
entry and ouster he is disseised of lands or houses; since the only possession,
of which an advowson is capable, is by actual presentation and admission of
one's clerk.
As, therefore, when the clerk was once instituted (except in the
case of the king, where he must also be inducted) (d) the church became abso
lutely full; so the usurper by such plenarty, arising from his own presentation,
became in fact seized of the advowson: which seisin it was impossible for the
true patron to remove by any possessory action, or other means, during the
plenarty or fullness of the church: and when it became void afresh, he could
not then present, since another had the right of possession.
The only remedy,
therefore, which the patron had left, was to try the mere right in a writ of
right of advowson; which is a peculiar writ of right, framed for this special
purpose, but in every other respect corresponding with other writs of right:
and
a man recovered therein, he regained the possession of his advowson,
and was entitled to present at the next avoidance.(y)
But in order to such
recovery he must allege
presentation in himself or some of his ancestors,
which proves him or them to have been once in possession: for, as a grant of
the advowson, during the fullness of the church, conveys *no manner
r
-*
of possession for the present, therefore a purchaser, until he hath preThus
sented, hath no actual seisin whereon to ground a writ of right, (g)
stood the common law.
But, bishops in ancient times, either by carelessness or collusion, frequently
instituting clerks upon the presentation of usurpers, and thereby defrauding
the real patrons of their right of possession,
was in substance enacted by
statute Westm.
13 Edw.
c.
that
possessory action be brought
within six months after the avoidanoe, the patron shall (notwithstanding such
usurpation and institution) recover that very presentation; whioh gives back
to him the seisin of the advowson. Yet still,
the true patron omitted to
bring his action within six months, the seisin was gained by the usurper, and
the patron, to recover
was driven to the long and hazardous process of
writ of right. To remedy which
was farther enacted by statute
Ann. o.
18, that no usurpation shall displace the estate or interest of the patron, or
turn
to a mere right; but that the true patron may present upon the next
no such usurpation had happened.
So that the title of usur
avoidance, as
now much narrowed, and the law stands upon this reasonable foun
pation
dation: that
do not pursue my
stranger usurps my presentation, and
right within six months, shall lose that turn without remedy, for the peace
of the ohurch, and as a punishment for my own negligence; but that turn
the only one
shall lose thereby. Usurpation now gains no right to the usur
per, with regard to any future avoidance, but only to the present vacancy:
cannot indeed be remedied after six months are past; but, during those six
months,
only a species of disturbance.
Disturbers of a right of advowson may, therefore, be these three persons:
the pseudo-patron, his clerk, and the ordinary: the pretended patron,
pre
litigious
senting to church to which he has no right, and thereby making
or disputable; the clerk, by demanding or obtaining institution *which
*045l
tends to and promotes the same inconvenience; and the ordinary, by
refusing to admit the real patron's clerk, or admitting the clerk of the prer
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These disturbances are vexatious and injurious to him who hath the

right: and, therefore, if he be not wanting to himself, the law (besides the
writ of right of advowson, which is a iinal and conclusive remedy) hath given
him two inferior possessory actions for his relief: an assize of darrein present

(i)

ment, and a writ of quare impedit; in which the patron is always the plaintiff,
and not the clerk. For the law supposes the injury to be offered to him only,
by obstructing or refusing the admission of his nominee; and not to the clerk,
who hath no right in him till institution, and of course can suffer no injury.
1. An assize of darrein presentment, or last presentation, lies when a man, or
his ancestors, under whom he claims, have presented a clerk to a benefice, who
is instituted; and afterwards upon the next avoidance a stranger presents a
clerk, and thereby disturbs him that is the real patron. In which case the
patron shall have this writ (h) directed to the sheriff to summon an assize or
jury, to inquire who was the last patron that presented to the church now
vacant, of which the plaintiff complains that he is deforced by the defendant:
and, according as the assize determines that question, a writ shall issue to the
bishop; to institute the clerk of that patron, in whose favour the determination
is made, and also to give damages, in pursuance of statute Westm. 2, 13 Edw.
I, o. 5. This question, it is to be observed, was before the statute 7 Ann. be
fore mentioned, entirely conclusive, as between the patron and his heirs and a
stranger: for, till then, the full possession of the advowson was in him who pre
sented last and his heirs: unless, since that presentation, the clerk had been
evioted within six months, or the rightful patron had recovered the advowson in.
a writ of right; which is a title superior to all others.
But that statute having
given a right to any person to bring a quare impedit, and to recover (if his title
^e S00^) notwithstanding the last presentation, by whomsoever *made;
r*24-fl1
L
assizes of darrein presentment, now not being in any wise conclusive,
have been totally disused, as indeed they began to be before; a quare impedit
being a more general, and therefore a more usual action. For the assize of dar
rein presentment lies only where a man has an advowson by descent from his
but the writ of quare impedit is equally remedial whether a man
ancestors;
claims title by descent or by purchase,
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2.
proceed therefore, secondly, to inquire into the nature (k) of writ of
quare impedit, now the only action used in case of the disturbance of patron
age: and shall first premise the usual proceedings previous to the bringing of
the writ. (3)
bound to present
Upon the vacancy of
living, the patron, we know,
within six calendar months,
otherwise
will lapse to the bishop. But the
bound to admit and insti
presentation be made within that time, the bishop
tute the clerk,
found sufficient; (m) unless the church be full, or there be
notice of any litigation.
For
usual for each
any opposition be intended,
party to enter caveat with the bishop, to prevent his institution of his antag
onist's clerk. An institution after
void by the ecclesiasti
caveat entered
cal law; (n) but this the temporal courts pay no regard to, and look upon
caveat as
mere nullity. (o)
But
two presentations be offered to the bishop
then said to become litigious; and,
upon the same avoidance, the church
nothing farther be done, the bishop may suspend the admission of either, and
suffer lapse to incur. Yet
the patron or clerk on either side request him
to award jus patronatus, he
bound to do it. A jus patronatus
com
mission from the bishop, directed usually to his chancellor and others of com
petent learning: who are to summon
jury of six clergymen and six laymen,
t0
the *rightful patron;(p) and
va^° ana" examine who
npon
'n(}u^re
r*2471
*■
such inquiry made and certificate thereof returned by the commission1

is

(8) This writ
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now abolished.

(0 See book n, e. 18.
(f>) Bum, 18,17.
1

6

(k) See Boswell's Case, Rep. 48.
(<) lost. 855.
(o) Bolt Rep. 191.
(n) Burn, 307.
2
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(*) F. N. B. 81.
ch.
(m) See book
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ers, he admits and institutes the clerk of that patron whom they return as the
true one, the bishop secures himself at all events from being a disturber, what
ever proceedings may be had afterwards in the temporal courts.
The clerk refused by the bishop may also have a remedy against him in the
spiritual court, denominated a duplex querela: (q) which is a complaint in the
nature of an appeal from the ordinary to his next immediate superior; as from
a bishop to the archbishop, or from an archbishop to the delegates; and if the
superior court adjudges the cause of refusal to be insufficient, it will grant in
stitution to the appellant.
Thus far matters may go on in the mere ecclesiastical course; but in contested
presentations they seldom go so far; for, upon the first delay or refusal of the
bishop to admit his clerk, the patron usually brings his writ of quare impedit
against the bishop, for the temporal injury done to his property, in disturbing
him in the presentation.
And, if the delay arises from the bishop alone, as
upon pretence of incapacity, or the like, then he only is named in the writ;
but if there be another presentation set up, then the pretended patron and his
•clerk are also joined in the action; or it may be brought against the patron
and clerk, leaving out the bishop; or against the patron only. But it is most
advisable to bring it against all three: for if the bishop be left out, and the
suit be not determined till the six months are past, the bishop is entitled to
present by lapse; for he is not party to the suit; (r) but, if he be named, no
lapse can possibly accrue till the right is determined. If the patron be left
out, and the writ be brought only against the bishop and the clerk, the suit is
for the right of the patron
of no effect, and the writ shall abate:
the
the *clerk be left out, and has rtnjo-i
principal question in the cause,
received institution before action brought (as
sometimes the case),
the patron by this suit may recover his right of patronage, but not the present
turn; for he cannot have judgment to remove the clerk, unless he be made
defendant, and party to the suit, to hear what he oan allege against it. For
is the safer way to insert all three in the writ.
which reason,
The writ of quare impedit (u) commands the disturbers, the bishop, the
proper person
pseudo-patron and his clerk, to permit the plaintiff to present
vacant church, which per
(without specifying the particular clerk), to such
tains to his patronage; and which the defendants, as he alleges, do obstruct;
and unless they so do, then that they appear in court to show the reason why

a

(4) Abolished by statute

Vol. IL— 18

and

4

(f)7Bep. 88.
(•) Hob. 816.
(y) F. N. B. 48.
3

(r) Oro. Jac. 98.
(z) Sid. 93.
2

Iqtlbid. 118.
Ibid. 87.
<u>)
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they hinder him.
the plaintiff suspects
Immediately on the suing out of the quare impedit,
that the bishop will admit the defendant's or any other clerk, pending the suit,
ne admittas; (to) which recites the
he may have a prohibitory writ, called
contention begun in the king's courts, and forbids the bishop to admit any
clerk whatsoever till such contention be determined. And
the bishop doth,
after the receipt of this writ, admit any person, even though the patron right
may have been found in jure patronatus, then the plaintiff, after he has ob
tained judgment in the quare impedit, may remove the incumbent,
the clerk
of
stranger, by writ of scire facias
special action
(x) and shall have
against the bishop, called quare incumbravit; (4) to recover the presentation,
and also satisfaction in damages for the injury done him by incumbering the
clerk, pending the suit, and after the ne admittas received, (y)
church with
But if the bishop has incumbered the church by instituting the clerk, before
the ne admittas issued, no quare incumbravit lies: for the bishop hath no legal
served upon *him.
The patron
notice, till the writ of ne admittas
r*24a-i
therefore left to his quare impedit merely; which, as was before obas well upon
recent usurpaserved, now lies (since the statute of Westm.

IV,

(u) F. N. B. 88.

c. 27.
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In the proceedings upon a quare impedit, the plaintiff must set out his title
at length, and prove at least one presentation in himself, his ancestors, or those
under whom he claims; for he must recover by the strength of his own right,
and not by the weakness of the defendant's:
and he must also show
dis
turbance before the action brought, (a) Upon this the bishop and the clerk
usually disclaim all title: save only, the one as ordinary, to admit and insti
tute; and the other as presentee of the patron, who
left to defend his own
And upon failure of the plaintiff in making out his own title, the de
right.
fendant
put upon the proof of his, in order to obtain judgment for himself,
needful. But
the right be found for the plaintiff, on the trial, three far
ther points are also to be inquired:
If the church be full, and,
full, then
of whose presentation: for
be of the defendant's presentation, then the
clerk
removable by writ brought in due time.
Of what value the living
2.
is: and this in order to assess the damages which are directed to be given by
the statute of Westm. 2. 3. In case of plenarty upon an usurpation, whether
six calendar (b) months have passed between the avoidance and the time of
bringing the action: for then it would not be within the statute, which per
mits an usurpation to be devested by
quare impedit, brought infra tempus
semestre.
So that plenarty
still sufficient bar in an action of quare impedit,
was universally by
brought above six months after the vacancy happens; as
the common law, however early the action was commenced.
If be found that the plaintiff hath the right, and hath commenced his
f*250l ac*'on *n due *ime> then he shall have *judgment to recover the prethe church be full by institution of any clerk, to
sentation; and,
remove him: unless
were filled pendente lite by lapse to the ordinary, he not
being party to the suit: in which case the plaintiff loses his presentation pro
hac vice, but shall recover two years' full value of the church from the defend
satisfaction for the turn lost by his disturbance;
ant, the pretended patron, as
or in case of insolvency, the defendant shall be imprisoned for two years,
But
the church remains still void at the end of the suit, then whichever
found to belong to, whether plaintiff or defendant,
party the presentation
writ directed to the bishop ad admiltendum clericum, (d) reciting
shall have
the judgment of the court, and ordering him to admit and institute the clerk
of the prevailing party; and,
upon this order he does not admit him, the
writ of quare non admisit, (e) and recover
patron may sue the bishop in
ample satisfaction in damages.
Besides these possessory actions there may be also had (as hath before been
writ of right of advowson, (5) which resembles other
incidentally mentioned)
writs of right: the only distinguishing advantage now attending
being, that
more conclusive than
quare impedit; since to an action or quare impedit
writ of right may be pleaded in bar.
a recovery had in
no limitation with regard to the time within which any actions
There
touching advowsons are to be brought; at least none later than the times of
Mar. st.
the statute of limi
o.
Richard
and Henry III: for by statute
declared not to extend to any writ of right of
tations, 82 Hen. VIII, c.
advowson, quare impedit, or assize of darrein presentment or jus patronatus.
And this upon very good reason: because
may very easily happen that the
title to an advowson may not come in question, nor the right have opportunity
the longest period of limitation
to be tried, within sixty years; which
For Sir Edward Coke (f) tells us, that
assigned by the statute of Henry VIH.
, there was a parson of one of his *churches, that had been incumbent
,„
there above fifty years; nor are instances wanting wherein two succesIS Edw.
J.
o.
(6) Inat. 881.
(c) Stat. Westm.
(*) Vaueh.
(o) Hob. 199.
F, M B. 38.
(/) Imt. 115.
(«) Ibid. 47.
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sive incumbents have continued for upwards of a hundred years, (g) Had,
therefore, the last of these incumbents been the clerk of a usurper, or had he
been presented by lapse, it would have been necessary and unavoidable for the
patron, in case of a dispute, to have recurred back above a century; in order
to have shown a clear title and seisin by presentation and admission of the
prior incumbent. Bat though, for these reasons, a limitation is highly im
proper with respect only to the length of time; yet, as the title of advowson
is, for want of some limitation, rendered more precarious than that of any other
hereditament (especially since the statute of Queen Anne hath allowed posses
sory actions to be brought upon any prior presentation, however distant), it
might not perhaps be amiss if a limitation were established with respect to the
number of avoidances; or, rather, if a limitation were compounded of the length
of time and the number of avoidances together; for instance, if no seisin were
admitted to be alleged in any of these writs of patronage, after sixty years and
three avoidances were past. (6)
In a writ of quare impedit, which is almost the only real action that remains
in common use, and also in the assize of darrein presentment, and writ of
right, the patron only, and not the clerk, is allowed to sue the disturber.
But, by virtue of several acts of parliament, (A) there is one species of presen
tations, in which a remedy, to be sued in the temporal courts, is put into the
hands of the clerks presented, as well as of the owners of the advowson.
mean the presentation to such benefices as belong to Roman Catholic patrons;
which, according to their several counties, are vested in and secured to the
two universities of this kingdom. And particularly by the statute of 12 Ann.
st. 2, c. 14, s. 4, a new method of proceeding is provided, viz.: that, besides
the writs of quare impedit, which the universities, as patrons, are entitled to
bring, they, or their clerks, may be at liberty to file a bill *in equity r*ofioi
->
against any person presenting to such livings, and disturbing their L
'
right of patronage, or his cestuy que trust, or any other person whom they
have cause to suspect; in order to compel a discovery of any secret trusts for
the benefit of papists, in evasion of those laws whereby this right of advow
son is vested in those learned bodies; and also (by the statute 11 Geo. II, c.
17) to compel a discovery whether any grant or conveyance, said to be made
of such advowson, were made bona fide to a Protestant purchaser, for the
benefit of Protestants, and for a full consideration; without which requisites,
every such grant and conveyance of any advowson or avoidance is absolutely
null and void. This is a particular law, and calculated for a particular pur
pose: but in no instance but this does the common law permit the clerk him
self to interfere in recovering a presentation of which he is afterwards to have
the advantage.
For, besides that he has (as was before observed) no temporal
right in him till after institution and induction; and, as he therefore can suffer
no wrong, is consequently entitled to no remedy; this exclusion of the clerk
from being plaintiff seems also to arise from the very great honour and regard
which the law pays to his sacred function.
For it looks upon the cure of souls
as too arduous and important a task to be eagerly sought for by any serious
clergyman; and, therefore, will not permit him to contend openly at law for
a charge and trust which it presumes he undertakes with diffidence.
But when the clerk is in full possession of the benefice, the law gives him
the same possessory remedies to recover his glebe, his rents, his tithes, and
other ecclesiastical dues, by writ of entry, assize, ejectment, debt, or trespass
(as the case may happen), which it furnishes to the owners of lay property.

I

(g) Two successive incumbents of the rectory of Ctaelsfleld-cum-Farn borough, In Kant, continued on*
hundred and one years, of whom the former was admitted In 1650,the latter in 1700,and died in 1751.
(A) Stat 3 Jac. £ c. 5. 1 W. and M. c. 26. 18Anne, st 2, c. 14. 11Geo. II, 0. 17.
(6) The statute 6 and 7 Vic, c. 64, applies the same period of limitations to a quare im.
petUt or any other action or suit to enforce a right in a bishop as patron to oollate to or bostow any ecclesiastical benefice.
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Yet he shall not have a writ of right, nor such other similar writs as are
grounded upon the mere right; because he hath not in him the entire fee and
writ of juris utrum,
but he
entitled to special remedy called
right;
whi°h
sometimes styled the parson's writ of right, (k) *being the
r*253l
*■
This lies for aparson or
highest writ which he can have.
(7)
prebendary at common law, and for vicar by statute 14 Edw. Ill, c. 17, and
is in the nature of an assize, to inquire whether the tenements in question are
frankalmoign belonging to the church of the demandant, or else the lay fee of
the tenant, (m) And thereby the demandant may recover lands and tene
ments belonging to the church, which were alienated by the predeoessor;
or
of which he was disseised; or which were recovered against him by verdict,
confession, or default, without praying in aid of the patron and ordinary; or
on which any person has intruded since the predecessor's death, (n) But
since the restraining statute of 13 Eliz. c. 10, whereby the alienation of the
de
predecessor, or
recovery suffered by him of the lands of the church,
clared to be absolutely void, this remedy
of very little use, unless where the
parson himself has been deforced for more than twenty years; (o) for the suc
cessor, at any competent time after his accession to the benefice, may enter,
or bring an ejectment.

CHAPTER XVII.

OF INJURIES PROCEEDING FROM, OR AFFECTING, THE
CROWN.
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Having in the nine preceding chapters considered the injuries, or private
one subject to another, all of which are redressed
wrongs, that may be offered
by the command and authority of the king, signified by his original writs re
turnable in the several courts of justioe, which thence derive
jurisdiction of
proceed now to inquire into the
examining and determining the complaint;
mode of redressing those injuries to which the crown itself
party: which
the aggressor, and which, therefore, can
injuries are either where the crown
not, without
solecism, admit of the same kind of remedy; (a) or else
the
sufferer, and which then are usually remedied by peculiar forms of process ap
propriated to the royal prerogative. In treating, therefore, of these, we will
consider, first, the manner of redressing those wrongs or injuries which
sub
ject may suffer from the crown, and then of redressing those which the crown
subject.
may receive from
That the king can do no wrong,
necessary and fundamental principle
of the English constitution: meaning only, as has formerly been observed, (b)
that in the first place, whatever may be amiss in the conduct of public affairs
la not *cnargeahlo personally on the king; nor
he, but his ministers,
T*255l*
accountable for
to the people: and, secondly, that the prerogative of
the crown extends not to do any injury: for being created for the benefit of
the people,
cannot be exerted to their prejudice, (c) Whenever therefore
happens, that, by misinformation, or inadvertence, the crown hath been induoed
to invade the private rights of any of its subjects, though no action will lie
against the sovereign, (<2) (for who shall command the king
(e) yet the law
hath furnished the subjeot with
decent and respectful mode of removing that
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IV,

c. 27.
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(7) Abolished by statute

3

2.

(I) F. N. B. 48.
(k) Booth. 221.
(0 F. N. B. 49.
(m) Registrar. 82.
(o) Booth, 221.
(nl F. N. B. 48. 49.
Bro.
Abr.
petition,
Book
oh.
pp. 243-244.
tit.
tit.
prerogative,
12:
(4)
(a)
(«) Finch, L. 88.
(c) Plowd. 487.
(d) Jenkins, 78.
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invasion, by informing the king of the true state of the matter in dispute: and,
as it presumes that to know of any injury and to redress it are inseparable in
the royal breast, it then issues as of course, in the king's own name, his orders
to his judges to do justice to the party aggrieved. (1)
The distance between the sovereign and his subjects is such, that it rarely
can happen that any personal injury can immediately and directly proceed from
the prince to any private man; and, as it can so seldom happen, the law in de
cency supposes that it never will or can happen at all; because it feels itself in
capable of furnishing any adequate remedy, without infringing the dignity and
destroying the sovereignty of the royal person, by setting up some superior
The inconveniency therefore of
power with authority to call him to account.
a mischief that is barely possible, is (as Mr. Locke has observed)
well re
compensed by the peace of the publio and security of the government, in the
But in
person of the chief magistrate being set out of the reach of coercion.
juries to the rights of property can scarcely be committed by the crown with
out the intervention of its officers; for whom the law in matters of right enter
tains no respect or delicacy, but furnishes various methods of detecting the
errors or misconduct of those agents, by whom the king has been deceived,
and induced to do a temporary injustice. (2)
*The common law methods of obtaining possession or restitution r*os«i
*
from the crown, of either real or personal property, are, 1. By petition *•
de droit, or petition of right: which is said to owe its original to King Edward
the First, (ff) 2. By monstrans de droit, manifestation or plea of right: both
of which may be preferred or prosecuted either in the chancery or exchequer.
The former is of use, where the king is in full possession of any heredita
(h)
ments or chattels, and the petitioner suggests such a right as controverts the
title of the crown, grounded on faots disclosed in the petition itself; in which
case he must be careful to state truly the whole title of the crown, otherwise
the petition shall abate
and then, upon this answer being endorsed or un
derwritten by the king, soil droit fait alpartie (let right be done to the party),
(J) a commission shall issue to inquire of the truth of this suggestion: («) after
Fit*. Abr. tit error,
(g) Bro. Abr. tit. prerogative,
(/) On Gort. p.A 206.
Finch, L. 2S6.
(j) Stat. Tr. vll, lit
(A) Sldn. BOB.
(k) Skin. 608. feast. Entr. 461.
8.
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(1) The maxim that the king can do no wrong, has no place in American constitu
tional law. No officer or dignitary
so high as to be above the law, and no individ
If citizen
ual
so low as not to be entitled to its protection.
injured in his rightsthe
by the act of an officer of the government, he has his remedy, as he would have had
had
If the act which constitutes the injury would
proceeded from any other person.
injury
in
in
the
also.
If
citizen,
be
crime
would be crime
officer
however the wrong
private
the chief executive officer of the nation or state, and constitutes as such a depart
doer
not
conduct
in
ment of the government, he
be
tried
for
criminal
the
to
ordinary courts,
but upon impeachment before the high court created by the constitution for the purpose.
The punishment,
he
found guilty, may extend in some cases to removal from office.
The state itself, which
the sovereign people in corporate organization, can no more
Indeed as the state must
wrong an individual with impunity than can any private person.
its acts are wrongful, every one engaged in them
wrong-doer, and the
act by agents,
The state itself, however, is
state may be ignored and its agents held to accountability.
not suable except with its own consent; ante, Book
being inconsistent with
p. 248, n.
its sovereignty that
should be brought against its will into courts which arc created
and exist only at its pleasure.
The state may also, when providing for its own needs under
the right of eminent domain, and taking for the purpose the property of individuals, give
all necessary protection to its agents, and turn the owner over to such remedy — provided it.
be adequate — as its laws shall provide. Compare Hooker v. New Haven, &c, Co., 14 Conn.,
Mich., 496. If in any case the remedy
146; 8. C, 86 Am. Dec., 477, with People v. Green,
which the state gives against itself
presumed an appeal to the legislature
inadequate,
will result in suitable redress of the grievance.
How.
See United States v. McLemore,
286; Hill v. United States,
How., 886.
The proceedings on behalf of
subject to obtain redress from the crown are simplified
and made more effective by statute 23 and 24 Vic. c. 84, which gives the party trial in the
roper court of law or equity, upon an issue made up substantially as in suit between inividuals.
(2) See the Bankers' Case, and notes thereto, Broom. Const. Law, 285.
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(I)

the return of which the king's attorney is at liberty to plead in bar; and the
merits shall be determined upon issue or demurrer, as in suits between subject
and subject. Thus, if a disseisor of lands, which are holden of the crown, dies
seized without an heir, whereby the king is prima facie entitled to the lands,
and the possession is cast on him either by inquest of office, or by act of law
without any office found; now the disseissee shall have remedy by petition of
right, suggesting the title of the crown, and his own superior right before the
But where the right of the party, as well as the right of
disseisin made.
the crown, appears upon' record, there the party shall have monstrans de droit
which
putting in claim of right grounded on facts already acknowledged
and established, and praying the judgment of the court, whether upon those
facts the king or the subject hath the right.
in the case before supposed,
As
the whole special matter
found by an inquest of office (as well the disseisin,
as the dying without an heir"), the party grieved shall have monstrans de droit
a^
common law. (m)
But as this seldom happens, and the "remedy
r*257
*•
by petition was extremely tedious and expensive, that by monstrans
was much enlarged and rendered almost universal by several statutes, particu
and
Edw. VI, o.
which also allow inquisi
larly 36 Edw. Ill, c. 13, and
tions of office to be traversed or denied, wherever the right of subject
con
cerned, except in
very few cases, (n) These proceedings are had in the
petty-bag office in the court of chancery: and,
upon either of them the right
be determined against the crown, the judgment
quod manus domini regis
amoveantur et possessio restituatur petenti, salvo jure domini regis; (o) which
last clause
always added to judgments against the king, (jp) to whom no
laches
ever imputed, and whose right (till some late statutes) (q) was never
defeated by any limitation or length of time.
And by such judgment the
crown
instantly out of possession; (r) so that there needs not the indecent
interposition of his own officers to transfer the seisin from the king to the party
aggrieved.
II. The methods of redressing such injuries as the crown may receive from
the subject are,
By such usual common law actions, as are consistent with the royal pre
As therefore the king, by reason of his legal ubiquity
rogative and dignity.
cannot be disseised or dispossessed of any real property which
once vested
in him, he can maintain no action which supposes
dispossession of the plain
tiff such as an assize or an ejectment:
but he may bring
quare impedit,
which always supposes the complainant to be seized or possessed of the
advowson: and he may prosecute this writ, like every other by him brought,
as well in the king's bench (w) as the common pleas, or in whatever court
he pleases.
So, too, he may bring an action of trespass for taking away his
goods; but such actions are not usual (though in strictness maintainable) for
It
breaking his close, or other injury done upon his soil or possession, (to)
wou^ De equally tedious *and difficult to run through every minute disT*258l
tinction that might be gleaned from our ancient books with regard to
this matter; nor
in any degree necessary, as much easier and more effectual
remedies are usually obtained by such prerogative modes of process, as are
peculiarly confined to the crown.
Such
an inquiry made
that of inquisition or inquest of office: which
by the king's officer, his sheriff, coroner, or escheator, virtute officii, or by writ
to them sent for that purpose, or by commissioners specially appointed, con
cerning any matter that entitles the king to the possession of lands or tene
ments, goods or chattels, (z) This
done i>y jury of no determinate number;
As, to inquire, whether the king's tenant
being either twelve, or less, or more.
for life died seized, whereby the reversion accrues to the king; whether A, who
4

4.

4

»

4

tat.

2

(o) Inst. COS.Rant Entr. 4C1.
(m) Rep. 85. (n) Skin. 508
Geo. llLc. 18.
(r) Finch. L. 459.
(t) F. N. B. 82.
(u) Dyverti/te del courtet, c bank le rot.
Hen. lV,
(c) Finch, L. 323,824,825.
(w) Bro. Abr. tit. prerog. 110. F. N. B. 90. Year-book,
142
(0 Bro. Abr. tit. petition. SO. Rep. 58.
(p) Finch, L. Wi.
(q) 21Jao.

u) Bro. Abr. tit. prerogative, 89.
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held immediately of the crown, died without heirs; in which case the lands
belong to the king by escheat: whether B be attainted of treason; whereby his
estate is forfeited to the crown : whether C, who has purchased lands, be an
alien; which is another cause of forfeiture: whether D be an idiot a nativitate;
and therefore, together with his lands, appertains to the custody of the king ;
and other questions of like import, concerning both the circumstances of the
These inquests of office were
tenant, and the value or identity of the lands.
more frequently in practice than at present, during the continuance of the
military tenures amongst us: when, upon the death of every one of the king's
tenants, an inquest of office was held, called an inquisitio post mortem, to in
quire of what lands he died seized, who was his heir, and of what age, in order
to entitle the king to his marriage, wardship, relief, primer-seisin, or other
To superintend
advantages, as the circumstances of the case might turn out.
and regulate these inquiries, the court of wards and liveries were instituted,
by statute 32 Hen. VIII, o. 46, which was abolished at the restoration of King
Charles the Second, together with the oppressive tenures upon which it was
founded.
♦With regard to other matters, the inquests of office still remain in r*oi>al
*
force, and are taken upon proper occasions; being extended not only *•
to lands, but also to goods and chattels personal, as in the case of wreck,
For
treasure-trove, and the like; and especially as to forfeitures for offences.
every jury which tries a man for treason or felony, every coroner's inquest
that sits upon a felo de se, or one killed by chance-medley, is not only with
regard to chattels, but also as to real interests, in all respects an inquest of
office: and if they find the treason or felony, or even the flight of the party
accused
(though innocent), the king is thereupon, by virtue of this office
found, entitled to have his forfeitures; and also, in the case of chance-medley,
he or bis grantees are entitled to such things by way of deodand, as have
moved to the death of the party.
These inquests of office were devised by law, as an authentic means to give
the king his right by solemn matter of record; without which he in general
For it is a part of the liberties
can neither take nor part from any thing, (y)
of England, and greatly for the safety of the subject, that the king may not
enter upon or seize any man's possessions upon bare surmises without the in
It however particularly enacted by the statute 33
tervention of a jury,
Hen. VHI, o. 20, that, in case of attainder for high treason, the king shall
have the forfeiture instantly, without any inquisition of office. And, as the
king hath (in general) no title at all to any property of this sort before office
was enacted, that all let
found, therefore by the statute 18 Hen. VI, c.
ters patent or grants of lands and tenements before office found, or returned
into the exchequer, shall be void. And by the bill of rights at the revolution,
declared, that all grants and promises of fines and
c.
W. and M. st.
forfeitures of particular persons before conviction (which
here the inquest
of office) are illegal and void; which indeed was the law of the land in the
reign of Edward the Third, (a)
* With
an office be found for the king,
regard to real property,
r*ofini
formal enputs him in immediate possession, without the trouble of
try, provided
subject in the like case would have had
right to enter; and
the king shall receive all the mesne or intermediate profits from the time that
his title accrued. (J) As, on the other hand, by the articuli super cartas, (c)
the king's escheator or sheriff seize lands into the king's hand without cause,
npon taking them out of the king's hand again, the party shall have the mesne
profits restored to him.
In order to avoid the possession of the crown, acquired by the finding of
such office, the subject may not only have his petition of right, which discloses
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(e)

new facts not found by the office, and his monstrans de droit, which relies on
the facts as found: but also he may (for the most part) traverse or deny the
matter of fact itself, and put it in a course of trial by the common law process
of the court of chancery: yet still, in some special cases, he hath no remedy
left but a mere petition of right, (d) These traverses, as well as the monstrans de droit, were greatly enlarged and regulated for the benefit of the sub
And in the traverses
ject, by the statutes before mentioned, and others,
thus given by statute, which came in the place of the old petition of right,
the party traversing
considered as the plaintiff;
and must therefore
make out his own title, as well as impeach that of the crown, and then shall
have judgment quod manus domini regis amoveantur, &c.
3. Where the crown hath unadvisedly granted any thing by letters patent,
which ought not to be granted, (g) or where the patentee hath done an act
forfeiture of *the grant, (A) the remedy to repeal
tnat amount9 to
r*26H
the patent
This may be
by writ of scire facias in chancery,
brought either on the part of the king in order to resume the thing granted;
bound of right to permit
the grant be injurious to subject, the king
or,
him (upon his petition) to use his royal name for repealing the patent in
scire facias, (k) And so also,
upon office untruly found for the king, he
grieved thereby, and traverses the
grants the land over to another, he who
office itself,
entitled before issue joined to scire facias against the paten
tee, in order to avoid the grant.
(3)
on behalf of the crown, filed in the exchequer by the
4. An information
method of suit for recovering money or other
king's attorney-general,
chattels, or for obtaining satisfaction in damages for any personal wrong (m)
committed in the lands or other possessions of the crown. It differs from an
information filed in the court of king's bench, of which we shall treat in the
instituted to redress
next book; in that this
private wrong, by which the
calculated to punish some public
affected; that
property of the crown
grounded on no writ
wrong or heinous misdemeanor in the defendant. It
under seal, but merely on the intimation of the king's officer, the attorney"
"
general, who gives the court to understand and be informed of the matter
in question: upon which the party
put to answer, and trial
had, as in suits
The most usual informations are those of intru
between subject and subject.
sion and debt: intrusion, for any trespass committed on the lands of the
crown, (n) as by entering thereon without title, holding over after
lease
determined, taking the profits, cutting down timber, or the like; and debt, upon
any contract for moneys due to the king, or for any forfeiture due to the
This
crown upon the breach of
most commonly used to
penal statute.
recover forfeitures occasioned by transgressing those laws which are enacted
^or tne e8taD'i8bment *and support of the revenue; others, which rer*262l
gard mere matters of police and public convenience, being usually left
to be enforced by common informers, in the qui tarn informations or actions,
of which we have formerly spoken, (o) But after the attorney-general has
informed upon the breach of
penal law, no other information can be re
ceived, (p)
There
also an information in rem, when any goods are supposed
to become the property of the crown, and no man appears to claim them, or
to dispute the title of the king. As anciently in the case of treasure-trove,
wrecks, waifs, and estrays, seized by the king's officer for his use. Upon suoh
(i)
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((f) Finch, L. 824.
and Edw. VI, c.
(e) Stat. 31 Edw. m, o. IS. 38E1w. Ill, c. 13.
(/) Law of Nisi Prlus, 21 215.
Inst. 88.
(p) See book n, c 21.
(0 Lev. 220.
(*) Ventr. 344.
(n) Dy«r, 198.
Leon. 48.Savi]. 49.
Bro. Abr. tit. tcirt facial, 6«, 189.
(n) Cro. Jac. 212.
(m) Moor. 875.
(p) Bardr. SOL
(o) See page 162.
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resorted to in the United States
the writ gener
still retained, and
(3) This remedy
See in general Tidd. Pr., 1090,
ally issuing from the highest court of law in the state.
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seizure, an information was usually filed in the king's exchequer, and there
upon a proclamation was made for the owner (if any) to come in and claim
the effects; and at the same time there issued a commission of appraisement to*
value the goods in the officer's hands; after the return of which, and a second
proclamation had, if no claimant appeared, the goods were supposed derelict,
and condemned to the use of the crown, (q) And, when, in later times, for
feitures of the goods themselves, as well as personal penalties on the parties,
were inflicted by act of parliament for transgressions against the laws of the
customs and excise, the same process was adopted in order to secure such for
feited goods for the public use, though the offender himself had escaped the
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reach of justice.
5. A writ of quo warranto is in the nature of >a writ of right for the king,
against him who claims or usurps any office, franchise, or liberty, to inquire
by what authority he supports his claim, in order to determine the right, (r)
It lies also in case of non-user or long neglect of a franchise, or misuser or
abuse of it; being a writ commanding the defendant to show by what war
rant he exercises such a franchise, having never had any grant of
or having
forfeited
by neglect or abuse. This was originally returnable before the
king's justices at Westminster; («) but afterwards only *before the r*on<>i
Edw.
justices in eyre, by virtue of the statutes of quo warranto,
but since those justices have given place to the
c.
and 18 Edw.
st.
king's temporary commissioners of assize, the judges on the several circuits,
this branch of the statutes hath lost its effect; (w) and writs of quo warranto
(if brought at all) must now be prosecuted and determined before the king's
And in case of judgment for the defendant, he shall
at Westminster.
i'ustices
lave an allowance of his franchise; but in case of judgment for the king, for
entitled to no such franchise, or hath disused or abused
that the party
the
franchise
either seized into the king's hands, to be granted out again to
be not such
franchise as may subsist in
whomever he shall please; or,
the hands of the crown, there
merely judgment of ouster, to turn out the
party who usurped it. (to)
writ of quo warranto (being in the nature of
The judgment on
writ of
final and conclusive, even against the crown. (») Which, together
right)
with the length of its process, probably occasioned that disuse into which
more modern method of prosecution, by infor
now fallen, and introduced
mation filed in the court of king's bench by the attorney-general, in the nature
of
writ of quo warranto; wherein the process
speedier, and the judgment
This
criminal method of prosecution, as
not quite so decisive.
properly
fine for the usurpation of the franchise, as to
well to punish the usurper by
for the crown but hath long been applied to the mere
oust him, or seize
purposes of trying the civil right, seizing the franchise or ousting the wrong
ful possessor; the fine being nominal only.
During the violent proceedings that took place in the latter end of the reign
of King Charles the Second,
was, among other things, thought expedient to
new-model most of the corporation-towns in the kingdom; for which purpose
many of those *bodies were persuaded to surrender their charters, and r *nRA-i
informations in the nature of quo warranto were brought against
real, forfeiture of their franchises by
others, upon
supposed, or frequently
neglect or abuse of them. And the consequence was, that the liberties of most
of them were seized into the hands of the king, who granted them fresh char
ters with such alterations as were thought expedient; and, during their state
of anarchy, the crown named all their magistrates. This exertion of power,
was for the most part strictly legal, gave a
though perhaps in summo jure
great and just alarm; the new-modelling of all corporations being very large
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stride towards establishing arbitrary power; and, therefore, it was thought
necessary, at the revolution, to bridle this branch of the prerogative, at least
so far as regarded the metropolis, by statute 2 W. and M. c. 8, which enacts
that the franchises of the city of London shall never hereafter be seized or
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forejudged for any forfeiture or misdemeanor whatsoever.
This proceeding
however, now applied to the decision of corporation dis
putes between party and party, without any intervention of the prerogative,
Ann. o. 20, which permits an information, in nature
by virtue of the statute
quo warranto, to be brought with leave of the court, at the relation of any
then styled the relator), against
person desiring to prosecute the same (who
anv person usurping, intruding into, or unlawfully holding any franchise or
office in any city, borough, or town corporate; provides for its speedy deter
the defendant be convicted, judgment of ouster
mination; and directs that,
(as well as
fine) may be given against him, and that the relator shall pay or
receive costs according to the event of the suit. (4)
also made by the same satute,
The writ of mandamus (y)
Ann. c. 20,
a most full and effectual remedy, in the first place, for refusal of admission
where person
entitled to an office or place in any such corporation
and,
f°r wrongful removal, when
legally possessed.
person
r*265l 8econ(^y>
"These are injuries, for which, though redress for the party interested
may be had by assize, or other means, yet as the franchises concern the public,
and may affect the administration of justice, this prerogative writ also issues
from the court of king's bench
commanding, upon good cause shown to the
And the
court, the party complaining to be admitted or restored to his office.
return be immediately made to the first writ of manda
statute requires, that
mus which return may be pleaded to or traversed by the prosecutor, and his
antagonist may reply, take issue, or demur, and the same proceedings may be
an action on the case had been brought, for making
false return
had, as
and, after judgment obtained for the prosecutor, he shall have
peremptory
writ of mandamus to compel his admission or restitution; which latter (in case
effected by
writ of restitution, (z) So that now the writ of
of an action)
in the nature of an action where
mandamus, in cases within this statute,
be
upon the party applying and succeeding may be entitled to costs, in case
the franchise of
citizen, burgess, or freeman; (a) and also, in general,
writ
of error may be had thereupon, (b)
This writ of mandamus may also be issued, in pursuance of the statute 11
in case within the regular time no election shall be made of the
Geo.
o.
mayor or other chief officer of any city, borough, or town corporate, or (being
shall afterwards become void
requiring the electors to proceed to
made)
election, and proper courts to be held for admitting and swearing in the magis
trates so respectively chosen. (5)
We have now gone through the whole circle of civil injuries and the redress
which the laws of England have anxiously provided for each. In which the
student cannot but observe that the main difficulty which attends their discus
sion arises from their great variety, which
apt at our first acquaintance to
(a) Stat. 13Geo. D3,

(l) 11Rep. 79.

a SL

(*)

1

(y) See page 110.

P. Wnu. SSI.

In

8,

a

is

(4)

the United States the proceeding to try an alleged usurpation of an office or fran
quo toarranlo, or some statutory substitute to
by an information in the nature of
which the same principles are applicable. The books of practice in the several states will
In Howell's State Trials,
Bee also High on Extraordinary Remedies.
give the proceedings.
vol.
p. 1039, et seq., will be found the proceedings in the quo warranto cases against the
city of London and other corporations in the time of Charles II, which are referred to in
chise

is
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the text.
common remedy where
party
(5) In the United States the writ of mandamus
withheld from him, and for the deprivation of
entitled to some specific right which
which no other appropriate and adequate remedy exists. Mr. High in his treatise on Extra
ordinary Remedies deals with this subject, and collects the authorities.
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breed a confusion of ideas, and a kind of distraction in the memory: a difficulty
not a little increased *by the very immethodical arrangement in which r *2flfi-i
*
they are delivered to us by our ancient writers, and the numerous
terms of art in which the language of our ancestors has obscured them.
Terms of art there will unavoidably be in all sciences; the easy conception and
thorough comprehension of which must depend upon the frequent and familiar
use; and the more subdivided any branch of the science is, the more terms
must be used to express the nature of these subdivisions, and mark out with
But trust that this
sufficient precision the ideas they are meant to convey.
difficulty, however great it may appear at first view, will shrink to nothing
upon a nearer and more frequent approach; and, indeed, be rather advantageous
than of any disservice, by imprinting on the student's mind a clear and distinct
notion of the nature of these several remedies.
arises
And, such as it
principally from the excellence of our English laws; which adapt their redress
exactly to the circumstances of the injury, and do not furnish one and the
same action for different wrongs, which are impossible to be brought within
one and the same description; whereby every man knows what satisfaction he
entitled to expect from the courts of justice, and as little as possible.
left
in the breast of the judges, whom the law appoints to administer, and not to
And may venture to affirm that there
prescribe, the remedy.
hardly
possible injury, that can be offered either to the person or property of another,
for which the party injured may not find
remedial writ, conceived in such
terms as are properly and singularly adapted to his own particular grievance.
In the several personal actions which we have cursorily explained, as debt,
trespass, detinue, action on the case, and the like,
easy to observe how
plain, perspicuous and simple the remedy is, as chalked out by the ancient
common law. In the methods prescribed for the recovery of landed and other
more intricate, the feudal, or rather Nor
permanent property, as the right
man remedy, by real actions,
somewhat more complex and difficult, and at
tended with some delays.
And since, in order to obviate those difficulties,
and retrench those *delays, we have permitted the rights of real prop*2ai»-i
*
erty to be drawn into question in mixed or personal suits, we are (it
must be owned) obliged to have recourse to such arbitrary fictions and expe
dients, that, unless we had developed their principles, and traced out their pro
gress and history, our present system of remedial jurisprudence (in respect
of landed property) would appear the most intricate and unnatural that ever
was adopted by
free and enlightened people.
But this intricacy of our legal process will be found, when attentively consid
ered, to be one of those troublesome, but not dangerous evils, which have their
root in the frame of our constitution, and which, therefore, can never be cured,
without hazarding every thing that
dear to us. In absolute governments,
when new arrangements of property and
gradual change of manners have
destroyed the original ideas on which the laws were devised and established,
the prince by his edict may promulge
new code, more suited to the present
But when laws are to be framed by popular assemblies, even
emergencies.
of the representative kind,
task to begin the work of
too herculean
legislation afresh, and extract a new system from the discordant opinions of
more than five hundred counsellors. A single legislator, or an enterprising
Solon or Lycurgus,
Justinian or
Frederick, may at any time
sovereign,
form
concise, and perhaps an uniform, plan of justice: and evil betide that
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But who, that
presumptuous subject who questions its wisdom or utility.
acquainted with the difficulty of new-modelling any branch of our statute laws
ever
though relating but to roads or to parish settlements), will conceive
easible to alter any fundamental point of the common law, with all its appen
When, there
and set up another rule in its stead
dages and consequents,
fore, by the gradual influence of foreign trade and domestio tranquility, the
spirit of our military tenures began to decay, and at length the whoie struoture
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removed, the judges quickly perceived that the forms and delays of the
old feudal actions (guarded with their several outworks of essoins, vouchers,
aid-prayers, and a hundred other formidable intrenchments) were ill-suited to
*more simple and commercial mode of property which succeeded
r*2flRl
*■
the former, and required a more speedy decision of right, to facilitate
Tet they wisely avoided soliciting any great legis
exchange and alienation.
lative revolution in the old established forms, which might have been pro
ductive of consequences more numerous and extensive than the most penetra
ting genius could foresee; but left them as they were to languish in obscurity
and oblivion, and endeavoured,
by a series of minute contrivances, to accom
modate such personal actions as were then in use to all the most useful purpo
ses of remedial justice: and where,
through the dread of innovation, they
hesitated at going so far as perhaps their good sense would have prompted
them, they left an opening for the more liberal and enterprising judges, who
have sat in our courts of equity, to show them their error by supplying the
And, since the new expedients have been
omissions of the courts of law.
refined by the practice of more than a century, and are sufficiently known and
understood, they in general answer the purpose of doing speedy and substan
tial justice, much better than could now be effected by any great fundamental
alterations. The only difficulty that attends them arises from their fictions
and circuities; but, when once we have discovered the proper clue, that laby
rinth is easily pervaded.
Our system of remedial law resembles an old Gothic
castle, erected in the days of chivalry, but fitted up for a modern inhabitant.
The moated ramparts, the embattled towers, and the trophied halls, are mag
nificent and venerable, but useless, and therefore neglected. The inferior
now accommodated to daily use, are cheerful and commodious,
apartments,
though their approaches may be winding and difficult.
In this part of our disquisitions,
however thought it my duty to unfold,
as far as intelligibly I could, the nature of these real actions, as well as of per
sonal remedies.
And this not only because they are still in force, still the law
of the land, though obsolete and disused; and may, perhaps, in their turn, be
hereafter, with some necessary corrections, called out again into common use;
" whoever
^ut a's0 because, as a sensible *writer has well observed, (c)
r*269i*
considers how great a coherence there is between the several parts of
the law, and how much the reason of one case opens and depends upon that of
another, will, presume, be far from thinking any of the old learning useless,
which will so much conduce to the perfect understanding of the modern."
should have done great injustice to the founders of our legal
And, besides,
constitution, had
led the student to imagine that the remedial instruments of
our law were originally contrived in so complicated a form as we now present
them to his view: had I, for instance, entirely passed over the direct and ob
vious remedies by assizes and writs of entry, and only laid before him the
modern method of prosecuting a writ of ejectment.
■was

I

I
I

I

(c) Hawk
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CHAPTER XYIII.

OF THE PURSUIT OF REMEDIES BY ACTION; AND
FIRST, OF THE ORIGINAL WRIT.
Having, under the head of redress by suit in courts, pointed out in the
preceding pages, in the first place, the nature and several species of courts of
justice, wherein remedies are administered for all sorts of private wrongs; and,
in the second place, shown to which of these courts in particular application
must be made for redress, according to the distinction of injuries, or, in other
words, what wrongs are cognizable by one court, and what by another;
pro
ceeded, under the title of injuries cognizable by the courts of common law, to
define and explain the specifical remedies by action, provided for every possible
•degree of wrong or injury; as well such remedies as are dormant and out of use,
as those which are in every day's practice, apprehending that the reason of the
one could never be clearly comprehended without some acquaintance
with the
other: and
am now, in the last place, to examine the manner in which these
several remedies are pursued and applied, by action in the courts of common
law; to which shall afterwards subjoin a brief account of the proceedings in
the courts of equity.
*In treating of remedies by action at common law shall confine r*o>n i
J
myself to the modern method of practice in our courts of judicature. ■■
For, though thought it necessary to throw out a few observations on the
nature of real actions, however at present disused, in order to demonstrate the
-coherence and uniformity of our legal constitution, and that there was no in
jury so obstinate and inveterate, but which might in the end be eradicated by
some or other of those remedial writs; yet it would be too irksome a task to
perplex both my readers and myself with explaining all the rules of proceed
ing in those obsolete actions, which are frequently mere positive establish
ments, the forma et figurajudicii, and conduce very little to illustrate the reason
and fundamental grounds of the law.
Wherever I apprehend they may at all
<jonduce to this end,
shall endeavour to hint at them incidentally.
What, therefore, the student may expect in this and the succeeding chapters,
is an account of the method of proceeding in and prosecuting a suit upon any
of the personal writs we have before spoken of, in the court of common
pleas at Westminster, that being the court originally constituted for the prose
It is true that the court of king's bench and ex
cution of all civil actions.
chequer, in order, without intrenching upon ancient forms, to extend their
remedial influence to the necessities of modern times, have now obtained a
concurrent jurisdiction and cognizance of very many civil suits: but, as causes
are therein conducted by much the same advocates and attorneys, and the
several courts and their judges have an entire communication with each other,
the methods and forms of proceeding are in all material respects the same in
So that, in giving an abstract or history (a) of the progress of a
all of them.
suit through the court of common pleas, we *shall at the same time r*0^g ••
-I
give a general account of the proceedings of the other two courts; *•

I

I

I

I

I

I

(a) In deducing this history the student must not expect authorities to be constantly cited, as practical
knowledge is not so much to be learned from any books of law as from experience and attendance on the
books of entries, ancient and modern, which are transcripts of proceedings that have been had in some
particular actions. A book or two of technical learning will also be found very convenient, from which a
man of liberal education and tolerable understanding may glean pro re nata as much as is sufficient for
his purpose. These books of practice, as they are called, are all pretty much on a level in point of comand solid instruction, so that that which bears the latest edition is usually the best. But Gilbert's
gisition
istory and Practice of the Court of Common Pleas Is a book of a very different stamp; and though (like
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no longer in use; a simpler proceeding by summons from the court in
to be brought having been substituted.
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taking notice, however, of any considerable difference in the local practice of
And the same abstract will, moreover, afford us some general idea of
each.
the conduct of a cause in the inferior courts of common law, those in cities
and boroughs, or in the court-baron, or hundred, or county court; all which
conform (as near as may be) to the example of the superior tribunals to which
their causes may probably be, in some stage or other, removed.
The most natural and perspicuous way of considering the subject before us
will be (I apprehend) to pursue it in the order and method wherein the pro
ceedings themselves follow each other: rather than to distract and subdivide
it by any more logical analysis.
The general,therefore,and orderly parts of a
suit are these: 1. The original writ: 2. The process: 3. The pleadings: 4. The
issue or demurrer: 5. The trial: 6. The judgment and its incidents: 1. The
proceedings in nature of appeals: 8. The execution.
First, then, of the original, or original writ; (1) which is the beginning or
foundation of the suit. When a person hath received an injury, and thinks it
he
to consider with himself,
worth his while to demand a satisfaction for
or ta^e a<^v'ce> what redress the law has given for that injury; *and
r*278l
to make application or suit to the crown, the fountain of
thereupon,
all justice, for that particular specific remedy which he
determined or ad
vised to pursue.
As, for money due on bond, an action of debt; for goods
detained without force, an action of detinue or trover; or,
taken with force,
an action of trespass vi et armis; or to try the title of lands,
writ of entry
or action of trespass in ejectment; or for any consequential injury received,
to sue out, or purchase by paying
special action on the case. To this end he
the stated fees, an original, or original writ, from the court of chancery, which
the qfficina JustitioB, the shop or mint of justice, wherein all the king's writs
are framed.
It
mandatory letter from the king in parchment, sealed with
his great seal, (6) and directed to the sheriff of the county wherein the injury
committed or supposed so to be, requiring him to command the wrongdoer,
or party accused, either to do justice to the complainant, or else to appear in
court, and answer the accusation against him. Whatever the sheriff does in
pursuance of this writ, he must return or certify tb the court of common pleas,
the foundation of the jurisdiction of
together with the writ itself: which
that court, being the king's warrant for the judges to proceed to the determi
nation of the cause. For
was
maxim introduced by the Normans, that
there should be no proceeding in common pleas before the king's justices with
out his original writ; because they held
unfit that those justices, being only
the substitutes of the crown, should take cognizance of any thing but what
However, in small actions
below the value of forty shillings, which are brought in the court-baron or
county court, no royal writ
necessary; but the foundation of such suits con
tinues to be (as in the times of the Saxons) not by original writ, but by plaint;
by private memorial tendered in open court to the judge, where
(d) that
in the party injured sets forth his cause of action; and the judge
bound of
r •o*4,i common right to administer justice therein, without any special * man* date from the king.
Now, indeed, even the royal writs are held to be
demandable of common right, on paying the usual fees; for any delay in the
granting them, or setting an unusual or exorbitant price upon them, would be
a breach of magna carta, c. 29, "nuUivendemus, nulli negabimus, aut differemus,
justitiam vel rectum."
Original writs are either optional or peremptory; or, in the language of our
The praecipe
lawyers, they are either &pra)cipe, or si te fecerit securum.
in the alternative, commanding the defendant to do the thing required, or
show the reason wherefore he hath not done it. (/) The use of this writ
o. 84. (d) MIrr. c
(ft) Finch L. 237. (e) Flet.
(e) Finch, L. 257. (/) Append. No. m,
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where something certain is demanded by the plaintiff, which it is incumbent
on the defendant himself to perform; as, to restore the possession of land, to
pay a certain liquidated debt, to perform a specific covenant, to render an
account, and the like: in all which cases the writ is drawn up in the form of
prcecipe or command, to do thus, or show cause to the contrary; giving the
defendant his choice, to redress the injury, or stand the suit. The other species
of original writs is called a si te feceril securum, from the words of the writ ;
which directs the sheriff to cause the defendant to appear in court, without any
option given him, provided the plaintiff gives the sheriff security effectually to
This writ is in use, where nothing is specifically de
prosecute his claim, (g)
manded, but only a satisfaction in general: to obtain which and minister com
Such are
plete redress, the intervention of some judicature is necessary.
writs of trespass, or on the case, wherein no debt or other specific thing is sued
for in certain, but only damages to be assessed by a jury. For this end the
defendant is immediately called upon to appear in court, provided the plaintiff
gives good security of prosecuting his claim. Both species of writs are tested,
or witnessed in the king's own name; "witness ourself at Westminster," or
wherever the chancery may be held.
*The security here spoken of, to be given by the plaintiff for pror*2*5i*
secuting his claim, is common to both writs, though it gives denomi- *•
nation only to the latter. The whole of it is at present become a mere matter
of form; and John Doe and Richard Roe are always returned as the standing
The ancient use of them was to answer for the
pledges for this purpose.
plaintiff, who in case he brought an action without cause, or failed in the pro
secution of it when brought, was liable to an amercement from the crown for
raising a false accusation; and so the form of the judgment still \s.{h) In like
manner, as by the Gothic constitutions no person was permitted to lay a com
" nisi sub scriptura out specificatione trium testium,
plaint against another,
quod actionem vellet persequi;" (t) and as by the laws of Sancho I, king of
Portugal, damages were given against a plaintiff who prosecuted a groundless

is it

it

it,
is

action, (k)
The day on which the defendant is ordered to appear in court, and on which
called
the sheriff is to bring in the writ and report how far he has obeyed
the return of the writ:
being then returned by him to the king's justices at
Westminster.
And
always made returnable at the distance of at least
fifteen days from the date or teste, that the defendant may have time to come
np to Westminster, even from the most remote parts of the kingdom; and upon
some day in one of the four terms in which the court sits for the dispatch of
business.
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These terms are supposed
Mr. Selden
to have been instituted by Wil
liam the Conqueror: but Sir Henry Spelman hath clearly and learnedly shown,
that they were gradually formed from the canonical constitutions of the church;
being indeed no other than those leisure seasons of the year, which were not
occupied by the great festivals or fasts, or which were not liable to the general
avocations of rural business.
♦Throughout all Christendom, in very early times, the whole year r*o7Ai
was one continual term for hearing and deciding causes.
For the
Christian magistrates, to distinguish themselves from the heathens, who were
extremely superstitious in the observation of their dies fasti et nefasti, went
into
contrary extreme, and administered justice upon all days alike. Till at
length the church interposed and exempted certain holy seasons from being
the tumult of forensic litigations.
As, particularly, the time of
profaned
Advent and Christmas, which gave rise to the winter vacation; the time of
Lent and Easter, which created that in the spring; the time of Pentecost,
which produced the third and the long vacation, between midsummer and
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All Sundays
Michaelmas, which was allowed for the hay-time and harvest.
also, and some particular festivals, as the days of the Purification, Ascension,
and some others, were included in the same prohibition: which was established
D. 517, and was fortified by an imperial constitu
by a canon of the church,
tion of the younger Theodosius, comprised in the Theodosian code, (m)
Afterwards, when our own legal constitution came to be settled, the com
mencement and duration of our law terms were appointed with an eye to those
canonical prohibitions; and it was ordered by the laws of King Edward the
Confessor,(«) that from Advent to the octave of the Epiphany, from septuagesima to the octave of Easter, from the Ascension to the octave of Pentecost, and
from three in the afternoon of all Saturdays till Monday morning, the
And
peace of God and the holy church be kept throughout all the kingdom.
so extravagant was afterwards the regard that was paid to these holy times,
that though the author of the Mirror (o) mentions only one vacation of any
considerable length, containing the months of August and September, yet
Britton is express, (/>) that in the reign of King Edward the First no secular
cou^ °e held, nor any man sworn on the *evangelists, (q) in the
r*2l7Y
1 P^ea
L
J times of Advent, Lent, Pentecost, harvest, and vintage, the days of the
great litanies, and all solemn festivals. But he adds, that the bishops did
nevertheless
grant dispensations (of which many are preserved in Rymer's
feodera), (r) that assizes and juries might be taken in some of these holy sea
And soon afterwards a general dispensation was established by statute
sons.
Westm. 1, 3 Edw. I, c. 51, which declares, that "by the assent of all the pre
lates, assizes of novel disseisin, mort d'ancestor, and darrein presentment, shall
be taken in Advent, septuagesima, and Lent; and that at the special request of
the king to the bishops."
The portions of time, that were not included within
these prohibited seasons, fell naturally into a fourfold division, and, from some
festival day that immediately preceded their commencement, were denominated
the terms of St. Hilary, of Easter, of the Holy Trinity, and of St. Michael:
which terms have been since regulated and abbreviated by several acts of par
liament; particularly Trinity term by statute 32 Hen. Vlil, c. 21, and Michael
mas term by statute 16 Car. I, c. 6, and again by statute 24 Geo. II, c. 48.
There are in each of these terms stated days called days in bank, dies in
banco: that
days of appearance in the court of common bench.
They are
generally at the distance of about week from each other, and have reference
to some festival of the church. On some one of these days in bank all original
writs must be made returnable; and therefore they are generally called the
returns of that term: whereof every term has more or less, said by the Mirror
to have been originally fixed by King Alfred, but certainly settled as early
as the statute of 51 Hen. IH, st. 2.
But though many of the return days are
fixed upon Sundays, yet the court never sits to receive these returns till the
and therefore no proceedings can be held, or judgment can
Monday after:
be given, or supposed to be given, on the Sunday, (w)
*The ni"8t return in every term
properly speaking, the first day in
T*278l
that term: as, for instance, the octave of St. Hilary, or the eighth day
inclusive after the feast of that saint: which falling on the thirteenth of Januthe twentieth of Janu
uary, the octave therefore or first day of Hilary term
ary. And thereon the court sits to take essoigns, or excuses, for such as do not
appear according to the summons of the writ: wherefore this
usually called
the essoign day of the term.
But on every return-day in the term, the person
summoned
has three days of grace, beyond the day named in the writ, in
he appears on the fourth day inclusive,
which to make his appearance; and
sufficient.
For our sturdy ancestors held
beneath the
quarto die post,
condition of a freeman to appear, or to do any other act, at the precise time
it
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appointed. The fendal law therefore always allowed three distinct days of
citation, before the defendant was adjudged contumacious for not appearing;
the German custom, of which Tacitus thus
(w) preserving in this respect
" itlud ex libertate vitium, quod non simul nec jussi conveniunt; sed
speaks: (w)
And a similar in
et alter et tertius dies cunctatione co-euntium absumitur."
dulgence prevailed in the Gothic constitution: "Mud enim Titmice libertatis
indicium, concessa totiea impunitas non parendi ; nec enim trinis Judicii concessibuspcenam perdUce causes contumax meruit." (x) Therefore, at the begin*
ning of each term, the court does not usually (y) sit for dispatch of busi
ness till the fourth or appearance day, as in Hilary term on the twenty-third
of January; and in Trinity term, by statute 32 Hen. VIII, c. 21, not till the
fifth day, the fourth happening on the great popish festival of Corpus Christi;
(z) which days are therefore called and set down in the almanacks as the first
days of the term, and the court also sits till the quarto die post or appearance
day of the last return, which is therefore the end of each term. (2)

CHAPTER XIX.
OF PROCESS.
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Thb next step for carrying on the suit, after suing out the original, is called
the process ; being the means of compelling the defendant to appear in court.
This is sometimes called original process, being founded upon the original
writ; and also to distinguish it from mesne or intermediate process, which
issues, pending the suit, upon some collateral interlocutory matter; as to sum
Mesne process is also sometimes put
mon juries, witnesses, and the like, (a)
in contradistinction to final process, or process of execution ; and then it signi
fies all such process as intervenes between the beginning and end of a suit.
the method taken by the law to
But process, as we are now to consider
by
compel
compliance with the original writ, of which the primary step
given upon all real proxipes,
giving the party notice to obey it. This notice
and also upon all personal writs for injuries not against the peace, by sum
mons
which
warning to appear in court at the return of the original
writ, given to the defendant by two of the sheriff's messengers called summoners, either in person or left at his house or land: (b) in like manner as in the
civil law the first process
by personal citation, in jus vocando. (c) This
white stick or
given, in real actions, by erecting
warning on the land
wand on the defendant's grounds, (d) (which stick or wand among the north
and by statute 31
called the baculus *nunciatorius)
ern nations
r*28o
the notice must also be proclaimed on some Sunday before
Eliz. o.
the door of the parish church.
If the defendant disobeys this verbal monition, the next process
by writ
of attachment or pone, so called from the words of the writ, (f) "pone per
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(z) Stiernhook de jure Qoth.
(v) Feud.
(ji) See Bulstr. 35.
(z) See Spelman, on the Terms, ch. 17. Note, that if the feast of St. John the Baptist, or midsummerday, falls on the morrow of Corpus Christi day, (as
did A. D. 1614,1698,and 1709,and will again A. D.
1791.)Trinity full term then commences, and the courts sit on that day, though in other years it is no
1724,when
midsummer-day
1702,
fell upon what was regularly the last
1713and
juridical day. Yet, in
was regarded like
Sunday, and the term was pro
day of the term, the courts did not then sit, but
of
Rot.
Bumb.
longed to the twenty-flfth
June.
C. B.
176.
(c) F/.
(4) Ibid. 344,352.
(d) Dalt. of Sher. c. 81.
(a) Finch. L. 438.
a.
(e) Stiernh. dejure Sueon.
(/) Appendix, No. HI,
much- simplified.
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vadium et salvos plegios, put by gage and safe pledges A B the defendant,"
Ac. This is a writ not issuing out of chancery, but out of the court of common
of the defendant at the return of
pleas, being grounded on the non-appearance
the original writ; and thereby the sheriff is commanded to attach him, by
certain of his goods, which he shall forfeit
he doth not
taking gage, that
appear; (g) or by making him find safe pleges or sureties who shall be amerced
also the first and immediate process,
in case of his non-appearance. (A) This
without any previous summons, upon actions of trespass vi et armis, or for
other injuries, which though not forcible are yet trespasses against the peace,
as deceit and conspiracy
more
(i) where the violence of the wrong requires
speedy remedy, and therefore the original writ commands the defendant to be
at once attached, without any precedent warning. (J) (1)
If after attachment, the defendant neglects to appear, he not only forfeits
this security, but
moreover to be farther compelled by writ of distringas, (k)
or distress infinite/ which
subsequent process issuing from the court of
common pleas, commanding the sheriff to distrain the defendant from time to
time, and continually afterwards, by taking his goods and the profits of his
lands, which are called issues, and which by the common law he forfeits to the
he doth not appear. ^1) But now the issues may be sold,
the court
king
shall so direct, in order to defray the reasonable costs of the plaintiff, (m) (2)
^n ^e *manner by the civil law,
the defendant absconds, so that the
r*2Ri
citation
of no effect, " mittitur adversarius in possessionem bonorum
ejus, (n)

(I)

3$
2.

%
4,
8.

)

(
1.

a

9.

2,

I,

a

a

a

if

it

if

And here by the common, as well as the civil law, the process ended in case
of injuries without force: the defendant,
he had any substance, being gradu
all by repeated distresses, till he rendered obedience to the
ally stripped of
he had no substance, the law held him incapable of making
king's writ; and,
And,
satisfaction, and therefore looked upon all farther process as nugatory.
besides, upon feudal principles, the person of
feudatory was not liable to be
attached for injuries merely civil, lest thereby his lord should be deprived of his
But, in cases of injury accompanied with force, the law, to
personal services.
punish the breach of the peace, and prevent its disturbance for the future, pro
vided also
process against the defendant's person in case he neglected to ap
pear upon the former process of attachment, or had no substance whereby to
be attached; subjecting bis body to imprisonment by the writ of capias ad re
But this immunity of the defendant's person, in case of
spondendum, (o)
peaceable though fraudulent injuries, producing great contempt of the law in
indigent wrongdoers,
capias was also allowed to arrest the person, in actions
of account, though no breach, of the peace be suggested, by the statutes of
13 Edw.
c. 11, in actions of
Marlbridge, 52 Hen. Ill, c. 23, and Westm.
debt and detinue, by statute 25 Edw. Ill, c. 17, and in all actions on the case,
Before which last statute a practice had been
by statute 19 Hen. VH, c.
introduced of commencing the suit by bringing an original writ of trespass
quare clausum /regit, for breaking the plaintiff's close vi et armis: which by
the old common law subjected the defendant's person to be arrested by writ
of capias: and then afterwards, by connivance of the court, the plaintiff might
This practice (through
proceed to prosecute for any other less forcible injury.
custom rather than necessity, and for saving some trouble and expense, in
special original ^adapted to the particular injury) still con
8u'nS out
[*282] tinues in almost all cases, except in actions of debt; though now, by
(ft) Dalt. of Sher. c 83.
to) Finch. L. 848. Lord Raym. 878.
(0 Finch, L. 808.851
Finch. I* 352.
O' Appendix, No. II,
(k) Appendix, No. Ill,
(m) Stat. 10Geo. Ill, c BO.
(n) Ff.
(o) Rep. 12.
is

now abolished, and the proceedings simplified.
(1) The original writ
by the common law Procedure
(2) Distringas and outlawry proceedings were abolished
Act of 1852. If, after due effort, the defendant cannot be found, the court may order his
appearance to be entered, and the case will proceed against him.
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virtue of the statutes above cited and others, a capias might be had upcm al
most every species of complaint.
If therefore the defendant being summoned or attached makes default, and
neglects to appear; or if the sheriff returns a nihil, or that the defendant hath
nothing whereby he may be summoned, attached, or distrained ; the capias now
usually issues: (p) being a writ commanding the sheriff to take the body of
the defendant if he may be found in his bailiwick or county, and him safely to
keep, so that he may have him in court on the day of the return, to answer to
the plaintiff of a plea of debt or trespass, &c, as the case may be. This writ,
and all other subsequent to the original writ, not issuing out of chancery, but
from the court into which the original was returnable, and being grounded on
what has passed in that court in consequence of the sheriff's return, are called
Judicial, not original writs; they issue under the private seal of that court,
and not under the great seal of England; and are tested, not in the king's name,
but in that of the chief (or, if there be no chief, of the senior) justice only.
And these several writs, being grounded on the sheriff's return, must respect
ively bear date the same day on which the writ immediately preceding was
ret nrned.
This is the regular and ordinary method of process. But it is now usual in
practice to sue out the capias in the first instance, upon a supposed return of
the sheriff; especially if it be suspected that the defendant, upon notice to the
action, will abscond; and afterwards a fictitious original is drawn up, if the
party is called upon so to do, with a proper return thereupon, in order to give
When this capias is delivered to the
the proceedings a colour of regularity.
sheriff, he by his under-sheriff grants a warrant to his inferior officers or bail
iffs, to execute it on the defendant. And, if the sheriff of Oxfordshire (in
which county the injury is supposed to be committed and the action is laid)
cannot find the defendant in his jurisdiction, *he returns that he is not r*oo<j i
-•
found, non est inventus, in his bailiwick: whereupon another writ issues,
called a testatum capias,{q) directed to the sheriff of the county where the de
fendant is supposed to reside, as of Berkshire, reciting the former writ, and
that it is testified, testatum est, that the defendant lurks or wanders in his bail
iwick, wherefore he is commanded to take him, as in the former capias.
But
here, also, when the action is brought in one county, and the defendant lives
in another, it is usual, for saving trouble, time and expense, to make out a tes
tatum caputs at the first; supposing not only an original, but also a former
capias, to have been granted which in fact never was. And this fiction being
beneficial to all parties, is readily acquiesced in and is now becoming the set
tled practice; being one among many instances to illustrate that maxim of law,

juris consistit 03guitas.(3)
where a defendant absconds, and the plaintiff would proceed to an out
lawry against him, an original writ must then be sued out regularly, and after
that a capias. And if the sheriff cannot find the defendant upon the first writ
of capias, and returns a non est inventus, there issues out an alias writ, and
after that apluries, to the same effect as the former: (r) only after these words
" we command you," this clause is inserted, " as we have formerly" or, " as we
have often commanded you:" — "sicut alias," or "sicui pluries proxipimus." And,
if a non est inventus is returned upon] all of them, then a writ of exigent or
whioh requires the sheriff to cause the defend
exigi facias may be sued out,
ant to be proclaimed, required, or exacted, in five county courts successively,
to render himself; and
he does, then to take him as in
capias: but
he
does not appear, and
returned quinto exactus, he shall then be outlawed by
the coroners of the county.
Also by statutes Hen. VIII, o.
and 31 Eliz.
that in fictione

(r) Ibid.

if

(.i) Ibid.

(8) Arrest upon mesne process has been almost entirely abolished by statute
110, and later statutes.
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whether the defendant dwells within the same or another county than that
wnerein
shall issue out
exigent is sued out, *a writ ofproclamationif)
f* *284 1-'at
the same time with the exigent, commanding the sheriff of the county,
wherein the defendant dwells, to make three proclamations thereof in places
the most notorious, and most likely to come to his knowledge, a month before
the outlawry shall take place.
Such outlawry is putting a man out of protec
tion of the law so that he is incapable to bring an action for redress of in
juries; and it is also attended with a forfeiture of all one's goods and chattels
to the king. And therefore, till sometime after the conquest, no man could
be outlawed but for felony; but in Bracton's time, and somewhat earlier, pro
cess of outlawry was ordained' %o lie in all actions for trespasses vi et armis.{u)
And since his days, by a variety of statutes (the same which allow the writ of
capias before mentioned), process of outlawry doth lie in divers actions that
are merely civil, provided they be commenced by original and not by bill. (»)
If after outlawry the defendant appears publicly, he may be arrested by a writ
of capias utlagatum,{w) and committed till the outlawry be reversed.
Which
reversal may be had by the defendant's appearing personally in court or by at
torney, (z) (though in the king's bench he could not appear by attorney,
(y) till permitted by statute 4 and 5 W. and M., c. 18); and any plausible
cause, however slight, will in general be sufficient to reverse
being con
sidered only as
But then the defendant
process to compel an appearance.
must pay full costs, and put the plaintiff in the same condition, as
he had
appeared before the writ of exigi facias was awarded.
In the king's bench
isuch
the first process in the court of common pleas.
they may also (and frequently do) proceed in certain causes, particularly in
actions of ejectment and trespass,
original writ, with attachment and capias
thereon; (z) returnable, not at Westminster, where the common pleas are now
fixed, in consequence of magna carta, but "ubicunque fuerimus in Anglia,"
, wheresoever the king shall then be in *England; the king's bench being
r*2
removable into any part of England at the pleasure and discretion of the
without any or
crown. But the more usual method of proceeding therein
bill of Middlesex: and
peculiar species of process entitled
iginal, but by
sate in
therefore so entitled, because the court now sits in that cpunty; for
bill of Kent, (a) For though, -as the justices of this
would then be
Kent,
court have, by its fundamental constitution, power to determine all offences and
needed no original
trespasses, by the common law and custom of the realm,(6)
in the county
writ from the crown to give
cognizanoe of any misdemeanor
immedi
resides; yet, as by this court's coming into any county,
wherein
ately superseded the ordinary administration of justice by the general commis
sions of eyre and of oyer and terminer, (c)
process of its own became neces
sate, to bring in such persons as were accused
sary within the county where
of committing any forcible injury. The bill of Middlesex (<£) (which was
formerly always founded on plaint of trespass quare clansum fregit, entered
kind of capias, directed to the sheriff of
on the records of the court)
that county, and commanding him to take the defendant, and have him before
our lord the king at Westminster on
day prefixed, to answer to the plaintiff
that gives the court
For this accusation of trespass
of plea of trespass.
of king's bench jurisdiction in other civil causes, as was formerly" observed;
taken into custody of the marshal, or prisonsince when once the defendant
keeper of this court, for the supposed trespass, he being then a prisoner of this
court, may here be prosecuted for any other species of injury. Yet, in order to
not necessary that the defendant be actually the
found this jurisdiction,
is,
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(») Sid. 159.
(«) Co. Litt. 128.
If) Appendix No. III.
(x) Roll. Rep. 490.Regul. C. B., A. D. 1654,c 18.
(w) Appendix. No. m.
(V, Cro. Jac 616. Salk. 496.
(«) Appendix, No. II,
(a) Thus, when the court sate at Oxford by reason of the plague, Mich. 1065,the process was by bill of
Trye's Jus. Filizar. 101.
Oxfordshire.
(6) Bro. Abr. tit. Oyer and Terminer,
Jut Filitar.
(e) Trye
(J) Appon lix. No III,
(c) Bro. Abr. tit. Jurisdiction, 66. Inst. 87.
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marshal's prisoner; for, as soon as he appears, or puts in bail, to the *pror*2fi8-i
*
cess, he is deemed by so doing to be in such custody of the marshal, as •■
will give the court a jurisdiction to proceed.
And, upon these accounts,
in the bill or process a complaint or trespass is always suggested, whatever
else may be the real cause of action.
This bill of Middlesex must be served
on the defendant by the sheriff, if he finds him in that county; but, if he re
turns " non est inventus," then there issues out a writ of latitat, (g) to the
sheriff of another county, as Berks; which is similar to the testatum capias in
the common pleas, and redites the bill of Middlesex and the proceedings there
on, and that it is testified that the defendant " latitat et discurrit," lurks and
wanders about in Berks; and therefore commands the sheriff to take him, and
have his body in court on the day of the return.'
But, as in the common pleas,
the testatum capias may be sued out upon only a supposed, and not an actual,
preceding capias ; so in the king's bench a latitat is usually sued out upon only
a supposed, and not an actual, bill of Middlesex.
So that, in fact, a latitat may
be called the fir^t process in the court of king's bench, as the testatum capias
is in the common pleas.
Yet, as in the common pleas, if the defendant lives
in the county wherein the action is laid, a common capias suffices; so in the
king's bench, likewise, if he lives in Middlesex, the process must still be by bill

(/)

of Middlesex only.
In the exchequer

the first process is by writ of quo minus, in order to give
In which writ (h)
the court a jurisdiction over pleas between party and party.
the plaintiff is alleged to be the king's farmer or debtor, and that the defend
ant hath done him the injury complained of; quo minus sufficiens existit, by
which he is the less able to pay the king his rent, or debt.
And upon this the
defendant may be arrested as upon a capias from the common pleas.
Thus differently do the three courts set out at first, in the commencement of
a suit, in order to entitle the two courts of king's bench and exchequer to hold
plea in causes between subject and subject, which by the original constitution
of Westminster-hall they were not empowered to do. Afterwards, when .the
cause is once drawn into the respective courts, the method of pursuing it is
*If the sheriff has found the r*287-i
retty much the same in all of them.
*
efendant upon any of the former writs, the capias, latitat, <fcc, he was h

anciently obliged to take him into custody, in order to produce him in court
upon tbe return, however small and minute the cause of action might be. For,
not having obeyed the original summons, he had shown a contempt of the
But when the summons fell
. court, and was no longer to be trusted at large.
into disuse, and the capias became in fact the first process, it was thought hard
to imprison a man for a contempt which was only supposed: and therefore in.
common cases by the gradual indulgence of the courts (at length authorized by
statute 12 Geo. I, o. 29, which was amended by 5 Geo. II, c. 27, made perpetual
by 21 Geo. II, c. 3, and extended to all inferior courts by 19 Geo. Ill, c. 70),
the sheriff or proper officer can now only personally serve the defendant with
the copy of the writ or process, and with notice in writing to appear by his
attorney in court to defend this action; which in effect reduces it to a mere
summons.
And if the defendant thinks proper to appear upon this notice, his
is
recorded, and he puts in sureties for his future attendance and
appearance
obedience; which sureties are called common bail, being the same two imagin
ary persons that were pledges for the plaintiff's prosecution, John Doe and
Richard Hoe. Or, if the defendant does not appear upon the return of the
writ, or within four (or, in some cases, eight) days after, the plaintiff may
enter an appearance for him, as if he had really appeared; and may file com
mon bail in the defendant's name, and proceed thereupon as if the defendant
had done it himself.
But if the plaintiff will make affidavit, or assert upon oath, that the cause
of action amounts to ten pounds or upwards, then he may arrest the defendant

(/) 4 bat

7S.

ig) Appendix, No. IH, | 8.

(h)

I bid. | 4.
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and make him pat in substantial sureties for his appearance, called special baik
In order to which, it is required by statute 13 Car. II, st. 2, o. 2, that the true
cause of action should be expressed in the body of the writ or process: else no
security oan be taken in a greater sum than 40/. This statute (without any
such intention in the makers) bad like to have ousted the king's bench of
*a'^ 'ts prediction over Clvll injuries without force; for, as the bill of
l"*28Sl
*■
* Middlesex was framed only for actions of trespass, a defendant could
not be arrested and held to bail thereupon for breaches of civil contracts. But
to remedy this inconvenience, the officers of the king's bench devised a method
of adding what is called a clause of ac etiam to the usual complaint of trespass:
the bill of Middlesex commanding the defendant to be brought in to answer
the plaintiff of a plea of trespass, and also to a bill of debt : (»') the complaint
of trespass giving cognizance to the court, and that of debt authorizing the
In imitation of which, Lord Chief Justice North a few years after
arrest.
wards, in order to save the suitors of his court the trouble and expense of
suing out special originals, directed that in the common pleas, besides the usual
complaint of breaking the plaintiff's close, a clause of ac etiam might be also
added to the writ of capias, containing the true cause of action; as, "that the
said Charles the defendant may answer to the plaintiff of a plea of trespass in
breaking his close: and also, ac etiam, may answer him, according to the cus
tom of the court, in a certain plea of trespass upou the case, upon promises, to
the value of twenty pounds," &c. {J) The sum sworn to by the plaintiff is
marked upon the back of the writ; and the sheriff, or his officer the bailiff,
then obliged actually to arrest or take into custody the body of the defend
ant, and, having so done, to return the writ with a cepi corpus endorsed
thereon.
An arrest must be by corporal seizing or touching the defendant's body;
after which the bailiff may justify breaking open the house in which he is (4)
to take him; otherwise he has no such power; but must watch his opportunity
to arrest him For every man's house is looked upon by the law to be his
castle of defence and asylum, wherein he should suffer no violence. (5) Which
(A Tire's Jus. Fillxar, 103. Appendix, No. HI, %8.
(j) Lilly's Pract. Reg. tit. ac etiam. North's life of Lord Guilford, W.
mended to the Btudent/s perusal.

This work Is strongly recom

(4) An arrest may be made without touching the person, as if a bailiff comes into a room
Per Hardand tells a person he arrests him, and locks the door; this is a sufficient arrest.
wicke, C. J., in Williams v. Jones, Cas. Temp. Hardw., 298. To constitute an arrest it is
is
within
the
of
the
officer
submits
to
and
the officer.
power
enough if the person
Mowry
one on horseback or in a
v. Chase, 100 Mass., 79; Emery v. Chesley, 18 N. H., 198.
him,
who
has
for
who
follows
a
bailiff
and
tells
the
process
so
person
without
coach
merely
Harmer v. Battyn, Bull.,
touching him, it is an arrest; otherwise, if the person rides away.
N.P., 62. Mere words do not make an arrest, unless the person submits himself, or there is
in the officer to take immediate possession of the person.
Emery v. Chesley, 18
An
r. H.( 198; Jenner v. Sparks, 6 Mod., 173. See Grainger v. Hill, 4 Bing, N. C, 212.
Sower
officer effects the arrest of a person whom he has authority to arrest, by laying his hand
upon him for the purpose of arresting him, though he may not succeed in stopping or
holding him. Whithead v. Keyes, 3 Allen, 495.
(5) A man's house is a sanctuary for himself, not for a stranger who may fly to it. A
sheriff may break it open to arrest such stranger after requesting admittance and being re
fused.
Bemayne's Case, 5 Coke, 91. But he docs so at his peril, if the person he seeks is not
Note to Bemayne's Case in Smith Lea. Cos., vol. I, p. 228. A permanent
in the house.
boarder is so far a member of the household that the officer cannot force an entrance into
a man is once arrested and
Oystcad v. Shed, 13 Mass., 520.
the house to arrest him.
escapes, the officer may break into his house to retake him. Jenner v. Sparks, 6 Mod., 173;
the outer door is open an
Allen v. Martin, 10 Wend., 300; S. C, 25 Am. Dec, 564.
Where the ordinary entrance was by a back
officer may enter and force an inner door.
passage, and the officer came in through the open back door and burst open inner doors
Hubbard v. Mack, 17
which were neither fastened nor locked, he was held justified.
Johns., 127. See Ratcliffe v. Burton, 3 B. and P., 223. So, where one let his house to
lodgers, but kept one room for himself, an officer, finding the outer door open, broke open
an inner door leading to the room of a lodger, to arrest the latter, it was held no trespass,
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principle is carried so far in the civil law that for the most part not so much
as a common citation or summons, much less an arrest, can be executed upon a
man within his own walls, (k)
Peers of the realm, members *of par- r*op,o,i
J
iiaraent, and corporations are privileged from arrests; and of course *■
from outlawries.
And against them the process to enforce an appearance
must be by summons and distress infinite, (m) instead of
capias. Also clerks,
Attorneys, and all other persons attending the courts of justice (for attorneys,
being officers of the court, are always supposed to be there attending), are not
liable to be arrested by the ordinary process of the court, but must be sued by
bill (called usually
bill of privilege) as being personally present in court,
divine service, and not merely staying in the
Clergymen
performing
(n)
church with
fraudulent design, are for the time privileged from arrests, by
statutes 50 Edw. Ill, c.
and
Ric. II, c. 10, as likewise members of convo
cation actually attending thereon, by statute
Hen. VI, c.
Suitors, wit
nesses, and other persons, necessarily attending any courts of record upon
business, are not to be arrested during their actual attendance, which includes
their necessary coming and returning. (6) And no arrest can be made in
the king's presence, nor within the verge of his royal palace, (o) nor in any
The king hath moreover
place where the king's justices are actually sitting.
special prerogative (which indeed
very seldom exerted,) (p) that he may

(1

18-81.
(I) Whitelock of Pari. 206,207.
(k) Ft.
(m) See page 280.
in) Bro. Abr. tit. bills, 29. 12Mod. 168.
extends, by stat. 28 Hen. Vm, c. 12,from
IV
of
the
Set?book
276.
The
verge
palace
of
Westminster
(o)
ingCCross to Westminister nail.
Charing
(p) Sir Edward Coke informs us
Inst. 131)that herein "he could say nothing of his own experience:
for albeit Queen Elizabeth maintained many wars, yet she granted few or no protections: and her
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Johns., 862; Lee v. Gansel,
on the ground that the
Cowp.,
Williams v. Spencer,
door wns not an outer door as to the lodger.
(G) The law of arrest has been greatly modified in England by the statutes abolishing
few specified cases, and also in the United
arrest and imprisonment for debt except in
But as arrests in
Slates by constitutional and statutory provisions for the same purpose.
lew of the cases in which an
civil suits are still allowed in some cases, we refer here to
exemption from arrest, on general principles, can still be claimed. Thus, ambassador*
to
accredited
foreign country, and their servants, while passing through the country to
Novello v. Toogood,
B. and C., 654; Holbrook
enter upon their duties, are privileged
Sandf., 619; members of congress and of state legislatures, while in attendance
v. Henderson,
reasonable
upon the body to which they belong, or upon any of its committees, and for
ch.
members of stale
time before and after to go and return: Cush. Leg. Assem., part
Martin,
Dall.,
electors,
Bolton v.
296;
conventions:
attending an election, or awaiting the
Conn., 537; parties and attorneys, while
Swift v. Chamberlain,
counting of the votes:
attending court during the trial or hearing of the causes in which they are interested or
employed, and while waiting for the same to be reached on the docket: Clark v. Grant,
Rich., 194; Wilson v.
Wend., 257; McNiel's Case,
Mass., 245; Vincent v. Watson,
Nettleton, 12 111., 61; witnesses, in attendance on court or other judicial or legislative
Johns., 538; Exports Edme, 9S. and R, 147; San ford
Bours v. Tuckerman,
tribunal:
Harr., 517; Norris v. Beach,
Cow., 881 In re Dickenson,
Johns., 294; Cush.
v. Chase,
997; jurors, attending court in the performance of their duties:
Brooks v.
Leg. Assem.
Rimmer v. Green,
H. and McH., 295; bail, attending to justify:
M. and 8.,
Chcslcy,
638; bankrupts and insolvents duly discharged,
as to all the demands covered by the dis
M. and 8., 595; Chaffee v. Jones, 19 Pick., 260. And in all
charge: Wilson v. Kemp,
given by the law for the purpose of attendance at some
these cases where the privilege
covers the stay and a reasonable
time for going
special character,
particular place in
Randall v. Qurney,
B. and A., 252; Childerston v. Barrett, 11 East, 439;
and returning:
the party goes out of his way on other business he loses
Clark v. Grant, Wend., 257; but
his privilege. Chaffee v. Jones, 19 Pick., 2(i0.
The privilege will not prevent the service of process which only requires common bail
Wend., 292; Catlett v. Morton,
Brev., 167; Hopkins v. Coburn,
Hunter v. Cleveland,
Lilt., 122; Le Grand v. Bedinger, T. B., Monr., 540; nor the service of common sum
taken.
Case v. Rorabacker. 15 Mich., 537.
The
mons or declaration, on which no bail
to the
privilege, but the party entitled must bring
courts do not ex officio take notice of
will be waived. Prentis v. Common'
atlention of the court by plea or proper motion, or
Rand., 697; 8. C., 16 Am. Dec, 782.
wealth,
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by his writ of protection privilege a defendant from all personal, and many
real, suits for one year at a time, and no longer; in respect of his being en
gaged in his service out of the realm, (q) And the king also by the common
law might take his debtor into his protection, so that no one might sue or
arrest him till the king's debts were paid: (r) but by the statute 25 Ed w. Ill,
st. 6, c. 19, notwithstanding such protection, another creditor may proceed to
jadgnient against *him, with a stay of execution, till the king's debt
I *2Q0l
L
J be paid ; unless such creditor will undertake for the king's debt, and
And lastly, by statute 29 Car. II, c.
then he shall have execution for both.
7, no arrest can be made, nor process served, upon a Sunday, except for trea
son, felony, or breach of the peace.
When the defendant is regularly arrested, he must either go to prison, for
safe custody: or put in special bail to the sheriff. (7)
For the intent of the
arrest being only to compel an appearance in court at the return of the writ,that purpose is equally answered, whether the sheriff detains his person, or
takes sufficient security for his appearance, called bail (from the French word
bailler, to deliver), because the defendant is bailed, or delivered to his sureties,
upon their giving security for his appearance: and is supposed to continue in
their friendly custody instead of going to gaol.
The method of putting in
bail to the sheriff is by entering into a bond or obligation, with one or more
sureties, (not fictitious persons, as in the former case of common bail, but real,
substantial, responsible bondsmen), to insure the defendant's appearance at the
return of the writ; which obligation is called the bail bond.
(8) The sheriff,
he pleases, may let the defendant go without any sureties; but that
at his
own peril: for, after once taking him, the sheriff
bound to keep him safely,
so as to be forthcoming in court
otherwise an action lies against him for an
But on the other hand, he
obliged, by statute 23 Hen. VI, c. 10, to
escape.
take (if
sufficient bail-bond: and by statute 12 Geo.
be tendered)
o. 29,
the sheriff shall take bail for no other sum than such as
sworn to by the
plaintiff, and endorsed on the back of the writ.
Upon the return of the writ, or within four days after, the defendant must
effected by
appear according to the exigency of the writ. This appearance
putting in and justifying bail to the action; which
commonly called putting
aoovethis be no* done, and the bail that were taken Dy *the
r*29ll 'n
sheriff below are responsible persons, the plaintiff may take an assign
ment from the sheriff of the bail-bond (under the statute and Ann. c. 16),
and bring an action thereupon against the sheriff's bail. But
the bail, so
acoepted by the sheriff, be insolvent persons, the plaintiff may proceed against
the sheriff himself, by calling upon him, first, to return the writ (if not already
the sheriff
done), and afterwards to bring in the body of the defendant. And
does not then cause sufficient bail to be put in and perfected above, he will
himself be responsible to the plaintiff.
The bail above, or bail to the action, must be put in either in open court, or
before one of the judges thereof; or else, in the country, before
commissioner
which
appointed for that purpose by virtue of the statute W. and M. c.
must be transmitted to the court. These bail, who must at least be two in
in court or before the judge or com
number, must enter into
recognizance
sum equal (or in some cases double) to that which the plaintiff
missioner, in
hath sworn to; whereby they do jointly and severally undertake, that
the

if 5

4,

(t)

(fl) Sin oh. L. 451

a

if

a

a

4

a

if

4

J

"

Lev. 832.

(r) F. N. B. 28. Co. Lltt. ISt

(f) Appendix, No. m, {.&

(t) Ibid.

t

a

a

deposit of money instead of bail. See Tidd
(7) The statute 43 Geo. Ill, c. 46, allowed
Prao. 8th ed., 226.
(8) The bond must be made to the sheriff by his official title, by the person arrested with
sureties.
Dalton Sheriffs, p. 859. If statute prescribes the requisites of the bond
I>roper
must be strictly followed by the sheriff, but the plaintiff may take such security from th«
Decker v. Judson, 16 N. Y., 439.
defendant as he sees fit.
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defendant be condemned in the action he shall pay the costs and condemna
tion, or render himself a prisoner, or that they will pay it for him : whioh
recognizance is transmitted to the court in a slip of parchment entitled a baii
And, if excepted to, the bail must be perfected, that
piece. («)
they must
justify themselves in court, or before the commissioner in the country, by
swearing themselves housekeepers, and each of them to be worth the full sum
for which they are bail, after payment of all their debts. This answers vo
some measure to the stipulatio or satisdatio of the Roman laws (») which
mutually given by each litigant party to the other: by the plaintiff, that he
will prosecute his suit, and pay the costs
he loses his cause; in like manner
as our law still requires nominal pledges of prosecution from the plaintiff
by
the defendant, that he shall continue in court, and abide the sentence of the
judge, much like our special bail: but with this difference, that the fide-jussoret
were there absolutely bound judicatum solvere, to see the costs and condemna
tion *paid at all events
whereas our special bail may be discharged,
r*oQ9V
by surrendering the defendant into custody, within the time allowed
warrant to appre
by law; for which purpose they are at all times entitled to
hend him. (w) (9)
Special bail
required (as of oonrsa) only cpon actions of debt, or aotion»
on the case in trover or for money due, where the plaintiff can swear that the
cause of action amounts to ten pounds: but in aotions where the damages are
precarious, being to be assessed ad libitum by jury, as in actions for words,
plaintiff to swear to the
very seldom possible for
ejectment, or trespass,
amount of his cause of action; and therefore no special bail
taken thereon,
unless by
judge's order or the particular directions of the court, in some
peculiar species of injuries, as in cases of mayhem or atrocious battery; or
upon such special circumstances as make
absolutely necessary that the
defendant should be kept within the reach of justice. Also in actions against
heirs, executors, and administrators, for debts of the deceased, special bail
not so properly against them in person, as
not demandable for the action
But special bail
against the effects of the deceased in their possession.
required even of them, in actions for a devastavit, or wasting the goods of the
deceased; tbat wrong being of their own committing.
Thus much for process,' which
only meant to bring the defendant into
court, in order to contest the suit, and abide the determination of the law.
When he appears either in person as
prisoner, or out upon bail, then follow
the pleadings between the parties, which we shall consider at large in the next
(to) Show. SOS.

«

8,

If.

&

4,1.11,

t

(v) Inst.

I

in,

I.

No.

|

(«) Appendix,

S.

chapter.
Hod. SSL

Vol. II— 21

7

4

7

8

if

2

8

(9) The bail are the keepers of their principal, and they may arrest him on the bail piece
wherever they can find him, even though not within the jurisdiction of the court in which
Conn., 84; Harp v. Osgood,
bail was taken. Anon. Show., 214; Parker v. Bidwell,
Hill, 216. And this right they may exercise by agent as well as in person: Nicolls v. IngerConn., 84; and they may break doors,
Johns., 146; Parker v. Bidwell,
•oll,
necessary,
Conn., 166; Nicolls v. Ingersoll,
Johns., 145. But
Read v. Case,
to make the arrest.
before breaking doors, admittance should in general be demanded.
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OF PLEADING.
Pleadings

are the mutual altercations between the plaintiff and defendant;
are set down and delivered into the proper office in writing,
though formerly they were usually put in by their counsel ore tenw, or viva
voce, in court, and then minuted down by the chief clerks, or prothonotaries;
whence in our old law French the pleadings are frequently denominated the
■which at present

parol. (1)
The first of these is the declaration, narratio, or count, anoiently called the
tale ; (a) in which the plaintiff sets forth his cause of oomplaint at length,
being indeed only an amplification or exposition of the original writ upon
which his action is founded, with the additional circumstances of time and
But we may remember, (b)
place, when and where the injury was committed.
that in the king's bench, when the defendant is brought into court by bill of
Middlesex, upon a supposed trespass, in order to give the court a jurisdiction,
the plaintiff may declare in whatever action, or charge him with whatever
injury, he thinks proper; unless he has held him to bail by a special ac etiam,
which the plaintiff is then bound to pursue.
And so also, in order to have the
benefit of a capias to secure the defendant's person, it was the ancient practice,
anc* *B therefore st.ill warrantable in the common
*pleas, to sue out a
l"*294l
-I writ of
trespass quare clausvm /regit, for breaking the plaintiff's close:
and when the defendant is once brought in upon this writ, the plaintiff declares
in whatever action the nature of his true injury may require; as in an action
(a) Appendix, No. n, 1 2; No. m, | S.

(6) See pages 285,288.

(1) "Pleading is practically nothing more than affirming or denying, in a formal and orderly
manner, those facts which constitute the ground of the plaintiff s demand and of the de
fendant's defence.
Pleading, therefore, consists merely in alleging matter of fact, or in
denying what is alleged as such by the adverse party." Gould PL, Chap. I, § 8. "It is one
of the first principles of pleading, that there is only occasion to state facts, which must be
done for the purpose of informing the court, whose duty it is to declare the law arising upon
those facts, and of apprising the opposite party of what is meant to be proved in order to
give him an opportunity to answer or traverse ft." Buller J., Dougl., 1S9. But it is not nec
essary in pleading to state what is merely matter of evidence, nor what the court takes
notice of ex officio, nor what would come more properly from the other side; nor is it nec
essary to allege circumstances necessarily implied, nor to allege what the law will presume.
Stephen PI., 842-355. Only facts which are necessary and relevant should be stated. While
irrelevant matter is simply rejected as superfluous, the pleader, by too minute detail in stat
ing necessary matter will increase the difficulty of proving his case, and the danger of failing
in it. Steph. PI., 424.
The requisite facts must be stated intelligibly and consistently.
The pleading must not
be ambiguous in meaning,
and the - position taken must be stated in absolute form and
not left to be collected from inference or argument.
The pleading must not be in the alter
native, and must be positive, not by way of recital, must set forth matters according to
their legal effect, must be framed agreeably to approved precedents.
If facts stated in
pleadings admit of two meanings, that is taken which is unfavorable to the pleader. Stephen
PI., 377-893. But the last statement must be received with the qualification that the lan
guage of the pleading is to have a reasonable intendment and construction, and where an
expression is capable of different meanings, that is to be taken which will support the plead
I Chitty PI., p. 238. In general whatever is alleged in pleading must be alleged with
ing.
certainty, that is, with clearness, distinctness and particularity; but a general mode of
pleading is often allowed, to avoid great prolixity, or where the allegation on the other side
must reduce the matter to certainty.
Less particularity is required when the facts lie more
in the knowledge of the opposite party than of the party pleading; so in the statement of
matters merely of inducement or aggravation.
For a discussion of
Stephen PL, 335-374.
the different degrees of certainty required in different kinds of pleading, see Gould's Plead
ings,

§

51, et teq.
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as bound himself to declare accordingly.
Sression:
In local actions, where possession of land is to be recovered, or damages for
an actual trespass, or for waste, &c, affecting land, the plaintiff must lay his
declaration or declare his injury to have happened in the very county and
really did happen; (3) but in transitory actions, for injuries that
place that
might have happened anywhere, as debt, detinue, slander, and the like, the
plaintiff may declare in what county he pleases, and then the trial must be had in
laid. Though,
the defendant will
that county in which the declaration
make affidavit that the cause of action,
any, arose not in that but in another
the vicinia,
county, the court will direct change of the venue, or visne (that
declared to be done), and will oblige
or neighbourhood, in which the injury
the plaintiff to declare in the other county; unless he will undertake to give
and
material evidence in the first. For the statutes Ric II, o.
Hen. IV,
o. 18, having ordered all writs to be laid in their proper counties, this, as the
required, and not to
judges conceived, empowered them to change the venue,
insist rigidly on abating the writ: which practice began in the reign of James
the First, (d) And this power
discretionally exercised, so as to prevent,
»

(e) Ventr. 259.
(d) Raatall, tit. Dttte, 184,b.
Beg. (edit. 1557)331.

Fits. Abr. tit. Brief*,

18. Salic. 87a Tiye'a

Jiu.

FiliM. 231. BtyL Pract.
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an ancient, reasonable and sound principle of the common law that the declara
(8) It
tion should be conformable to the writ, and in the language of Lord Coke must not be
either "narrower or broader." Co. Lit. 803a. At the earliest period of written pleadings
of which we have clear and distinct traces, either in the books of precedents or reports, the
recital of
declaration, when the action was commenced by original writ, contained
at
If, therefore, an objectionable variance existed between the writ and tbe declaration,
large.
appeared in the face of the latter, and the defendant availed himself of
by demurrer,
Com. Dig., tit.
plea in abatement, motion in arrest of judgment or upon writ of error.
Reader, c. 13;
Wils., 203. Such continued the form of pleading until, in the year
1654,
rule was made in the court of common pleas, in order to dispense in most cases with
the useless repetition of the writ, that the nature only of the action should be stated.
After
the adoption of this rule
was held that the only mode whereby the defendant could avail
himself of
variance between the writ and the count was by praying oyer of the writ,
Balk., 658,
whereby the writ as well as the declaration would be placed on the record.
701
Wils.. 85, 293. Oyer of the writ continued to be granted in the court of king's bench
until the case of Boats v. Edwards, in the year 1779, Doug., 227, when Lord Mansfield,
delivering the opinion of that court, said the practice was used for delay, and from thence
Since that
forth plaintiffs might proceed as though demand of oyer had not been made.
time oyer of the writ tor tbe purpose of setting aside the proceedings has been uniformly
defendant may avail himself of variance
refused in both courts, and in those cases where
between the writ and the declaration, he
permitted to do so by motion to set aside the
Arrowsraith,
N. J., 284. If, however, the defect
Bank v.
proceedings for irregularity.
in the writ appears on the face of the declaration, the objection may be taken by plea in
B. and P., 645.
abatement.
Murray v. Hubbart,
As no demand of oyer
allowed,
held that no objection can be raised to
variance
between tbe writ and declaration: Cronly v. Brown, 12 Wend., 271; except where the de
Townsend,
Wend.,
has
been
McParlan
v.
17
fendant
arrested and held to bail.
440.
After demand of oyer the objection was raised either by plea in abatement or special
has been held that the variance
demurrer. Newlin v. Palmer, 11 S. and R, 88; though
Wheat, 45; Chirac v. Reinicker, 11
was only pleadable in abatement Duval v. Craig,
Wheat., 280. It has been suggested that under the practice in most of our states of issuing
the original, not out of chancery, but from the court in which the pleadings are filed, there
no need of craving oyer, but that the variance may be reached by special demurrer.
See
McCord, 138.
Young v. Grey,
As to the general requisites of the declaration in regard to the names, number and char
acter of the parties, see
Chitty Pleading, 244 et itq.
(3) Trespass for injury to real estate, and perhaps actions on covenants which run with
the land, are local.
Sumner v. Finegan, 15 Mass., 280. Where the action of covenant
founded on privity of contract between the parties, their executors or administrators,
founded on the privity of
transitory and may be sued as transitory action; but when
estate, the action is then local and must be sued in the county where the land lies. Lienow
v. Ellis,
Mass., 831; White v. Sanborn,
N. H., 220.
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Therefore, the court will not change
and not to cause, a defect of justice.
the venue to any of the four northern counties, previous to the spring circuit;
because there the assizes are holden only once a year, at the time of the sum
mer circuit.
And it will sometimes remove the venue from the proper juris
diction (especially of a narrow and limited kind), upon a suggestion, duly
supported, that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had therein,
-,
*It generally usual, in actions upon the case, to set forth several
[-*-_
cases by different counts in the same declaration; so that,
the plain
tiff fails in the proof of one, he may succeed in another. (4) As, in an action
on the case upon an assumpsit for goods sold and delivered, the plaintiff usually
settled and agreed price between him and the
counts or declares, first, upon
defendant; as that they bargained for twenty pounds: and lest he should fail
quantum valebant; that the de
iin the proof of this, he counts likewise upon
fendant bought other goods, and agreed to pay him so much as they were
reasonably worth; and then avers that they were worth other twenty pounds;
and so on in three or four different shapes; (5) and at last concludes with de
claring, that the defendant had refused to fulfil any of these agreements,
And if he proves the case laid in
value.
endamaged to such
whereby he
any one of his counts, though he fails in the rest, he shall recover proportionable
This declaration always concludes with these words: "And there
damages.
upon he brings suit," &c, inde producit sectam," &c. (6) By whioh words,
suit or secta (a sequendo), were anciently understood the witnesses or followers
of the plaintiff, (f) For in former times, the law would not put the defendant
to the trouble of answering the charge, till the plaintiff had made out at least
But the actual production of the suit, the secta, or fol
probable case, (g)
now antiquated, and hath been totally disused, at least ever since the
lowers,
still continues.
reign of Edward the Third, though the form of
At the end of the declaration are added also the plaintiff's common pledges
of prosecution, John Doe and Richard Roe, (7) which as we before observed,
(h) are now mere names of form; though formerly they were of use to answer
to the king for the amercement of the plaintiff, in case he were nonsuited,
For, if
barred of his action, or had a verdict or judgment against him.
the plaintiff neglects to deliver
declaration for two terms after the defendant
guilty of other delays or defaults against the rules of law in any
appears, or
adjudged not to follow or pursue
r*2flfll SUDse<luen'' *stage of the action, he
nonsuit or non prosehis remedy as he ought to do, and thereupon
B,
Geo. in, B.
Stra. 874,Mylock v. Baladine. Trin.

p. 487.
> (7) This form was not essential,
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general rule,
(4) But several counts for the same cause of action are not now allowed, as
Reg. Gen., Trin. T., 1853.
and the court, on motion, may order them stricken out.
formal,
for
the
same
must
than
evidence
would
support
be more
merely
(5) The difference
Tidd Pract. ,c. 16. It
ruleeach count, the court may expunge all but one as superfluous.
that several counts may be joined in the same declaration for different causes of action, provid
ed they are of the same nature. Thus, in actions upon contract the plaintiff may join as many
different counts as he has causes of action in account; so likewise in assumpsit, or in cove
In like manner in actions for wrongs independently
nant, debt, annuity, or teire facias.
of contract, the plaintiff may join as many different counts as he has causes of action in
case, or in detinue, replevin, trespass or trover, and he may join trespass and battery of
servant per quod servilium amisit, or trespass and rescue. In general, counts in actions upon
contract cannot be joined with counts for wrongs independently of contract, nor can counts
But debt and detinue
in any one species of these actions be joined with counts in another.
Tidd Pr., 12, 13, and case and trover may
both are founded on contract.
can be joined
Chitty PL, p. 201 and notes.
be joined.
said that the conclu
against an officer of the court or attorney
(o) When the action
Chitty PL
sion should be "and therefore he prays relief, &c., unde petit remedium."

now obsolete.

Pleadings in Suits at Law.

Chap. 20.]

296

if

is is

it

is

a

it,

I

is,

is

(i)

gutter, is entered; and he is said to be nonpros'd. (8) And for thus deserting
his complaint, after making a false claim or complaint {pro falso clamor esuo), \
he shall not only pay costs to the defendant, but is liable to be amerced to the
king. A retraxit differs from a nonsuit, in that the one is negative, and the
other positive : the nonsuit is a mere default and neglect of the plaintiff, and there
fore he is allowed to begin his suit again, upon payment of costs; but a retraxit
is an open and voluntary renunciation of his suit in court, and by this he for
ever loses his action.
A discontinuance is somewhat similar to a nonsuit; for
when a plaintiff leaves a chasm in the proceedings of his cause, as by not con
tinuing the process regularly from day to day, and time to time, as he ought
to do, the suit is discontinued, and the defendant is no longer bound to attend:
but the plaintiff must begin again, by suing out a new original, usually paying
costs to his antagonist.
Anciently, by the demise of the king, all suits de
pending in his courts were at once discontinued, and the plaintiff was obliged
to renew the process by suing out a fresh writ from the successor; the virtue
•of the former writ being totally gone, and the defendant no longer bound to
attend in consequence thereof: but, to prevent the expense as well as delay
attending this rule of law, the statute 1 Edw. VI, c. 7, enacts, that by the
death of the king no action shall be discontinued; but all proceedings
shall
stand good as if the same king had been living.
When the plaintiff hath stated his case in the declaration, it is incumbent on
the defendant within a reasonable time to make his defence, and to put in a
plea; else the plaintiff will at once recover judgment by default, or nihil dicit
of the defendant.
Defence, in its true legal sense, signifies not a justification, protection, or
guard, which is now its popular signification; but merely an opposing or denial
(from the French verb defender) of the truth or validity of the complaint. It
is the contestatio
litis of the civilians: a general assertion that the plaintiff
hath no ground of action, which assertion is afterwards extended *and poo?!
*
maintained in his plea.
For it would be ridiculous to suppose that *■
the defendant comes and defends (or, in the vulgar acceptation, justifies) the
force and injury, in one line, and pleads that he is not guilty of the trespass
And therefore, in actions of dower, where the
complained of, in the next.
demandant doth not count of any injury done, but merely demands her endow
ment, (k) and in assizes of land, where also there is no injury alleged, but
merely a question of right stated for the determination of the recognitors or
In writs of entry, (m) where no injury
jury, the tenant makes no defence,
stated in the count, but merely the right of the demandant and the defective
title of the tenant, the tenant comes and defends or denies his right^'wa suum; that
understand
though with small grammatical inaccuracy), the right
(as
■of the demandant, the only one expressly mentioned in the pleadings, or else
denies his own right to be such, as
suggested by the count of the demand
And in writs of right, (n) the tenant always comes and defends the right
ant.
of the demandant and his seisin, jus pratdicti S. et seisinam ipsius (6) (or else
the seisin of his ancestor, upon whioh he counts, as the case may be), and the
demandant may reply, that the tenant unjustly defends his, the demandant's,
extremely clear,
right, and the seisin on which he counts. (jt>) All which
we understand by defence an opposition or denial, but
otherwise inexplic
ably difficult, (q)

1

I

I,

{
&.

1
8.

(m) Book IL Appendix, No. V,
(h) Hartal, Ent. 884. (J) Booth of Real Actions, 118.
(p) Nov. NaT. 880,edit. 1884.
(n) Appendix, No.
(o) Co. Entr. 184
this,
says
Actions,
94,
112), could never yet And; so little did he
The
true
reason
of
Booth
Real
(on
(o)
understand of principles

•eelTiddPr.,

8

a

is

is

not regarded as out of court till
entered up, the plaintiff
(8) Unless this judgment
a year from the return day of the writ, and may deliver declaration within that time.
B. and Aid., 271. As to other practice in entering judgment of rum pros,
Cooper v. Nias,
468-9.
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The courts were formerly very nice and curious with respect to the nature of
the defence, so that if no defence was made, though a sufficient plea was pleaded,
the plaintiff should recover judgment: (r) and therefore the book entitled
novae narrationes or the new talys,
at the end of almost every count, narratio, or tale, subjoins such defence as
proper for the defendant to make. For
a general defence or denial was not prudent in every situation, since thereby
the propriety of the writ, the competency of the plaintiff, and the cognizance
°^
court were allowed. By defending the force and injury, *the
T*29fil
defendant waived all pleas of misnomer;
by defending the dam
ages, all exceptions to the person of the plaintiff; and by defending either the
one or the other when and where
should behove him, he acknowledged the
But of late years these niceties have been very
jurisdiction of court, (u)
insisted
deservedly discountenanced: (w) though they still seem to be law,
on. (as)

(e)

is

if

a

a

is

if

is

L

-I

a

if

(c)

it

if

is
a a

it

;

a

is

is

a

if

is

a is

if

is

:

a

if

Before defence made,
at all, cognizance of the suit must be claimed or de
manded; when any person or body corporate hath the franchise, not only of
holding pleas within
particular limited jurisdiction, but also of the cognizance
of pleas and that, either without any words exclusive of other courts, which
.entitles the lord of the franchise, whenever any suit that belongs to his juris
diction
commenced in the courts at Westminster, to demand the cognizance
thereof: or with such exclusive words, which also entitles the defendant to
plead to the jurisdiction of the court, (y) Upon this claim of cognizance,
allowed, all proceedings shall cease in the superior court, and the plaintiff
left at liberty to pursue his remedy in the special jurisdiction.
As, when
scholar, or other privileged person, of the universities of Oxford or Cambridge,
impleaded in the courts at Westminster, for any cause of action what
In these cases, by the
soever, unless upon a question of freehold, (z)
charters of those learned bodies, confirmed by act of parliament, the chancellor
or vice-chancellor may put in
claim of cognizance; which,
made in due
time and form, and with due proof of the facts alleged,
regularly allowed
made (b) or
by the courts, (a) It must be demanded before full defence
imparlance prayed for these are submission to the jurisdiction of the superior
court, and the delay
laches in the lord of the franchise: and
will not be
occasions
allowed,
failure of justice,
or
an action be brought against
the person himself, who claims the franchise, unless he hath also
power in
such case of making another judge. (<?) (9)
*^f ter defence made, the defendant must put in his plea. But, before
1*2991
he defends,
the suit
commenced by capias or latitat, without any
or licentia loquendi;
entitled to demand one imparlance,
special original, he
and may, before he pleads, have more time granted by consent of the court; to
see
he can end the matter amicably without farther suit, by talking with the
plaintiff:
practice which
principle of
(/") supposed to have arisen from
il

il

8

2

(5)
2

:

il

:

;

1.

1.

(«)

p. 857.
Edit. 1534.
(r) Co. Litt. 127.
if) Theloal. dig.
14. c.
(u) En la defence sont Hj choses entendantz per tant quil defende tort et force, home doyt entendre
quil ee excuse de tort a luy eurmye per counte. et fait eepartie al pie et per tant quit defende lee dam
ages, affirm le partie able destre respondu et per tant quil defende ou et quant
accepts
devera.
la voiar de court de conustre ou trier lour pie. Mod. tenend. cur. 406,edit. 15&». See also Co. Litt. 127.
Raym.
(u» Salk. 217. Lord Raym. 288.
Garth.
230.
Lord
217.
(x)
hi) Lord Raym. 838. 10Mod. 128.
(z) See page 83.
(a) Hardr. 605.
Rast. Entr. 128,4c.
(c) Ventr. 883.
(d) Hob. 87. Year-book, M. Hen. VL 20. In this latter case the chancellor of Oxford claimed cogniz
ance of an action of trespass brought against himself, which was disallowed, because he should not be
judge In his own cause:— The argument used by Serjeant Rolfe on behalf of the cognizance is curious and
worth transcribing: —Jeo bous dirai un fable. En ascun temps fuit un pane, ef avoil fait un grand
-. .
. .
..
...

"ettisdi

.

.........

■

"

1
8.

convenient que un home soit juge demene.
(e) Appendix, No. m,
(/) GUb. Hist. Com. PL 85.
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a

is

a

is

if

that no one be judge of his own cause, yet
(9) While the rule generally
party agree
to refer
controversy to the decision of an interested party, he
bound by such decision.
Ranger v. Railway Co.,
H. L. Cas., 72; Monongahela, etc., Oo. v. Fenton,
Watts and
8., 205.
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(t)

is

is,
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is
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"
religion, in obedience to that precept of the gospel,
agree with thine adver
And it may be ob
art
in
him."
whilst
thou
the
with
way
(g)
sary quickly,
served that this gospel precept has a plain reference to the Roman law of the
twelve tables, which expressly directed the plaintiff and defendant to make
np the matter, while they were in the way, or going to the praetor, — in via,
There are also many other previous steps which may
rem uti pacunt orato.
He may, in real actions,
be taken by a defendant before he puts in his plea.
demand a view of the thing in question, in order to ascertain its identity and
other circumstances.
He may crave oyer (h) of the writ, or of the bond, or
read to
to hear
other specialty upon which the action is brought: that
him; the generality of defendants in the times of ancient simplicity being sup
entered verbatim
themselves, whereupon the whole
posed incapable to read
upon the record, and the defendant may take advantage of any condition or
other part of
not stated in the plaintiff's declaration. (10) *In real
r*3ool
actions also the tenant may pray in aid, or call for assistance of another,
to help him to plead, because of the feebleness or imbecility of his own estate.
Thus tenant lor life may pray in aid of him that hath the inheritance in
remainder or reversion; and an incumbent may pray in aid of the patron and
that they shall be joined in the action, and help to defend
ordinary: that
the title.
the calling in of some person to answer the action,
Voucher also
that hath warranted the title to the tenant or defendant. This we still make
which are grounded on
use of in the form of common recoveries
writ of
species of action that we may remember relies chiefly on the weak
entry;
ness of the tenant's title, who therefore vouches another person to warrant it.
If the vouchee appears, he made defendant instead of the voucher: but,
he afterward makes default, recovery shall be had against the original defend
ant; and he shall recover over an equivalent in value against the deficient
In assizes, indeed, where the principal question
vouchee.
whether the de
mandant or his ancestors were or were not in possession till the ouster hap
little (if at all) discussed, there no voucher
pened, and the title of the tenant
is allowed; but the tenant may bring
writ of warrantia chartm against the
warrantor, to compel him to assist him with
good plea or defence, or else to
render damages and the value of the land,
recovered against the tenant. (J)
In many real actions also, (k) brought by or against an infant under the age
of twenty-one years, and also in actions of debt brought against him, as heir
to any deceased ancestor, either party may suggest the nonage of the infant,
and pray that the proceedings may be deferred till his full age; or (in our legal
phrase) that the infant may have his age, and that the parol may demur, (11)
that is, that the pleadings may be stayed: and then they shall not proceed till
his full age, unless
be apparent that he cannot be prejudiced thereby.
Edw.
c. 46, and of Gloucester,
But, by the statutes of Westm.
Edw.
c.
in writs of entry sur disseisin in some particular cases, and in actions
auncestral brought by ''an infant, the parol shall not demur: otherwise r*anl-i
he might be deforced of his whole property, and even want of maintenance till he came of age.
So likewise in
writ of dower the heir shall not
have his age; for
necessary that the widow's claim be immediately deter
mined, else she may want
Nor shall an infant
present subsistence, (m)
in
quare impedit, (n) since the law holds
patron have
necessary and
expedient that the church be immediately filled.
When these proceedings are over, the defendant must then put in his excuse
or plea. Pleas are of two sorts; dilatory pleas, and pleas to the action. Dilatory
(p) Matt t. 25.
(ft) Appendix, No. nx
(i)F. N. a ISA.
(») Book II, Appendix, No. V,
(n) Ibid. 138.

Roll. Abr. 137.

1

1

2

See note
As to the practice
supra.
(10) Oyer of the original writ cannot dow be had.
Tidd Pr., 586; Chitty PI., 429, and notes.
on demand of oyer where allowed, see
against
(11) But now the parol may not demur in actions, suits or other proceedings

in/ants.
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pleas are such as tend merely to delay or put off the suit, by questioning the
propriety of the remedy, rather than by denying the injury; pleas to the action
The former cannot be pleaded
are such as dispute the very cause of suit.
after a general imparlance, which is an acknowledgment of the propriety of
the action.
For imparlances are either general, of which we have before
spoken, and which are granted of course; or special, with a saving of all ex
ceptions to the writ or count, which may be granted by the prothonotary; or
they may be still more special, with a saving of all exceptions whatsoever
which are granted at the discretion of the court, (o)
1. Dilatory pleas are, 1. To the jurisdiction of the court: alleging, that it
ought not to hold plea of this injury, it arising in Wales or beyond lea; or
because the land in question is of ancient demesne, and ought only to be de
manded in the lord's court, &c.
2. The disability, of the plaintiff, by reason
whereof he is incapable to commence or continue the suit; as, that he is an
alien enemy, outlawed, excommunicated, attainted of treason or felony, under
a praemunire, not inrerum natura (being only a fictitious person), an infant, a

feme-covert, or a monk professed. (12) 3. In abatement, which abatement is
e^tner °f tne *writ or the count, for some defect in one of them; as by
T *S02l
*■
* misnaming the defendant, which is called a misnomer; giving him a
wrong addition, as esquire instead of knight; or other want of form in any
material respect. (13) Or, it may be, that the plaintiff is dead; for the death
of either party is at once an abatement of the suit. (14)
And in actions merely
personal, arising ex delicto, for wrongs actually done or committed by the de
fendant, as trespass, battery, and slander, the rule is that actio personalis moritur cum persona; (p) and it never shall be revived either by or against the
executors or other representatives.
For neither the executors of the plaintiff
have received, nor those of the defendant have committed, in their own per
But in actions arising ex
sonal capacity, any manner of wrong or injury. (15)
(o) ;tt Mod. 529.

( p) 4 Inst. 815.

They are not fa
(12) In dilatory pleas the greatest precision and certainty are required.
vored, and the least defect is fatal.
Gould. Pleading, ch. V, sec. 66. Abatement of a writ
or plaint is when for any default the defendant prays that the writ or plaint do abate, that
is, cease against him for that time.
Com. Dig., Abatement B. The plea in abatement
should tend to show not that the plaintiff can never maintain any action, but that he can
Elarav.
not maintain that particular action; it should give the plaintiff a better writ.
Stevens, 4 T. R., 224; Steel v. Farrel, 14 S. and R., 879; Steph. PI., 49. As to what mat
ters may be pleaded either in bar or abatement, see Bac. Abr. Abatement, N.
if a married wo
Beside the pleas to inability mentioned
in the text, the defendant,
man may plead her coverture in abatement if sued alone when the husband should be joined;
namely, for a liability on contract accruing before coverture, or for a tort committed be
fore or after marriage.
1 Chit. PI., 449.
the liability on contract accrued after marriage,
the coverture must be pleaded in bar.
Steel v. Farrel, 14 S and R., 379. But the marriage
of a feme sole pending suit against her cannot be pleaded.
Crockett v. Ross, 5 Me., 443.
(13) Pleas in abatement of the writ are now obsolete in the English practice.
of the deceased party may con
(14) By the procedure act of 1852 the legal representative
tinue the suit after suggesting the death of record j so may a surviving plaintiff in a proper case.
The action
The pendency of another action may be cause for the abatement of a suit.
must have been previously commenced and be still pendingbetween the same parties for
the same cause of action.
Buffum v. Tilton, 17 Pick., 510; Humphries v. Dawson, 88 Ala.
199; ProBser v. Chapman, 29 Conn., 515; Adams v. Gardiner, 13 B. Monr., 197. The proceed
ings must be substantially identical. A suit in personam at common law will not be abated
Granger v. Circuit Judge, 27 Mich.,
by the pendency of a prior suit in rem in admiralty.
406. The fir*, action must be in a court of competent
jurisdiction: Rood v. Eslava, 17
Ala. , 430 ; and must be capable of an effectual result.
Quinebaug Bank v. Tarbox, 20 Coon. ,
the cause is pending in a foreign country or another state, the second suit will not
.510.
be abated.
Humphries v. Dawson, 38 Ala., 199; Long v. Marsh, 2 Cliff., 811. See Earl v.
Raymond, 4 McLean, 233.
(15) By statute 3 and 4 Wm. IV, this has been changed, so that under certain circumstances
or administrator of a deceased person may, within a given time after the
the executor
death, bring an action for trespass to the real property of the deceased, and a like action
for trespass committed by the deceased
may be maintained against such representative
within a limited time before his death.

If

If
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by breach of promise and the like, where the right descends to the
representatives of the plaintiff, and those of the defendant b«ve assets to an
swer the demand, though the suits shall abate by the death of the parties, yet
they may be revived against or by the executors: (q) being indeed rather
actions against the property than the person, in which the executors have now
the same interest that their testator had before.
These pleas to the jurisdiction, to the disability, or in abatement, were for
merly very often used as mere dilatory pleas, without any foundation of truth,
and calculated only for delay; but now by statute 4 and 5 Ann. c. 16, no dila
tory plea is to be admitted, without affidavit made of the truth thereof, or
some probable matter shown to the court to induce them to believe it true.
And with respect to the pleas themselves, it is a rule, that no exception shall
be admitted against a declaration or writ, unless the defendant will in the same
show him how
plea give the plaintiff a better; (r) that
might be amended,
that there may not be two objections upon the same account.
Neither, by
statute
and
Wm. Ill, c. 31, shall any plea in abatement be admitted in any
-suit for partition of lands; nor shall the same be abated by reason of the death
of any tenant.
•All pleas to the jurisdiction conclude to the cognizance of the court: r*qflqi
praying "judgment, whether the court will have further cognizance of
the suit;" pleas to the disability conclude to the person; by praying "judg
the said A, the plaintiff, ought to be answered;" and pleas in abate
ment,
ment (when the suit
by original) conclude to the writ or declaration; by
praying "judgment of the writ, or declaration, and that the same may be
the action be by bill, the
quashed," cassetur, made void or abated; but,
plea must pray "judgment of the bill," and not of the declaration; the bill
being here the original, and the declaration only
copy of the bill.
When these dilatory pleas are allowed, the cause is either dismissed from
that jurisdiction; or the plaintiff
stayed till his disability be removed; or he
obliged to sue out new writ, by leave obtained from the court: (s) or to
amend and new frame his declaration.
But when on the other hand they are
overruled as frivolous, the defendant has judgment of respondeat ouster, or to
answer over in some better manner.
It then incumbent on him to plead.
2. A plea to the action,' that is, to answer to the merits of the complaint.
This
done by confessing or denying it.
A confession of the whole complaint not very usual, for then the defend
ant would probably end the matter sooner; or not plead at all, but suffer judg
ment to go by default. Yet sometimes, after tender and refusal of
debt, if
the creditor harasses his debtor with an action,
then becomes necessary for
the defendant to acknowledge the debt, and plead the tender; adding, that he
has always been ready, tout temps prist, and
still ready, uncore prist, to dis
tender by the debtor and refusal by the creditor, will in all
charge it: for
cases discharge the costs
but not the debt itself; though in some particular
•cases the creditor will totally lose his money, (u) (16)
*But frequently
.
the defendant confesses one part of the complaint (by cognovit actioit

a

*■

„

(r) Brownl. 189.
(9)
„ March. 14.
838. Co. Litt. 209.
u) Lilt.
%

(«) Co. Entr. 271.

1

(t)

*

(t)

a

is

it

a

is

is

is

a

is

is

a

if

is

if

'

9

8

is,

-contractu,

Ventr. M.

is

a

Vol. IL—22

is

a

is

it

is

a

a

2

it

a

is

is

is

is

a

is

in the nature of
debt,
(16) A tender may be made in all cases where the demand
either certain or
capable of being made certain by mere computa
where the sum due
for unliquidated damages, the amount of which
tion; but
not allowed where the action
by the discretion of
jury: Green v. Shurtliff, 19 Vt., 592; Dearie v.
is to be determined
seems by the latter case that
tender
Barrett,
A. and E., 82; though
allowed to be
quantum meruit.
count on
pleaded to
" In actions of debt or assumpsit, the principle of the plea of tender * * *
that the
defendant has been always ready (toiyours prist) to perform entirely the contract on which the
as far as he was able by tendering the requisite
founded, and that he did perform
action
himsulf precluded
complete performance by refusing to receive
money, and the plaintiff
" As in ordinary cases the debt
*
*
*
*
not discharged by tender and refusal.
it."
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tiem in respect thereof), and traverses or denies the rest: in order to avoid the
expense of carrying that part to a formal trial, which he has no ground to

A species of this sort of confession is the payment of money into
litigate.
court: (v) which is for the most part necessary upon pleading a tender, and is
itself a kind of tender to the plaintiff; hy paying into the hands of the proper
officer of the court as much as the defendant acknowledges to be due, together
with the costs hitherto incurred, in order to prevent the expense of any farther
(v) 8tyl. Pract. Reg. (edit 1657)301. 2 Keb. MB.

Balk. 686.

it,

is is

6

5

is

it
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, is

.

8

is

is
a

it,
it

the plea must not only go on to allege that the defendant is still ready (uncorc prist), but
must be accompanied by a profert in curia of the money tendered.
If the defendant can
maintain this plea, although he will not thereby bar the debt, for that would be inconsistent
with the uncore prist and profert in curia, yet he will answer the action in the sense that ha
will recover judgment for his costs of defense against the plaintiff." Dixon v. Clark, 5
C. B., 863. The plea of tender admits tlie cause of action: Bennett v. Francis, 2 B. and
P., 550; Cox v. Brain, 8 Taunt., 95; but if the tender is proved, and the money is brought
into court, it stops interest on the amount due, and plaintiff loses costs. Cornell v. Green,
10 8. and R, 14; Hunter v. Le Oonte, 6 Cow., 728: Raymond v. Bearnard, 12 Johns..
274. - A tender does not extinguish the debt, but bars the claim to damages, interest and
costs.
Curtiss v. Greenbanks, 24 Vt, 536; which see for the rule as to the effect of a ten
An absolute tender and refusal will operate to discharge a mortgage lien,
der of chattels.
though not to cancel the debt; and this, too, though the tender be not kept good: Potts v.
Plaisted, 30 Mich., 149; Kortright v. Cady, 21 N. Y., 848 ; 8ager v. Tupper, 85 Mich., 184;
under the circumstances, the lien will
but if the refusal be not absolute nor unreasonable
Waldron v. Murphy, 40 Mich., 668.
not be discharged.
But, besides, the averment of readiness to perform, the plea should aver an actual per
formance of the entire contract on the part of the defendant as far as the plaintiff would
allow. If the money is to be paid on a future day certain, the plea must allege a tender on the
A plea defective in this respect cannot be remedied by resorting to the previous
very day.
averment of toujours prist, and a plea by the maker of a note of a tender after the day the
note falls due is bad, though it be made before action and includes interest up to the date
Dixon v. Clark, 5 C. B., 363. That the tender must be made on the exact
of the tender.
day when the debt falls due, and that, at common law, tender after that day and before
action is bad, see also Hume v. Peploe, 8 East, 168; Poole v. Turnbridge, 2 M. and W.,
223; Dewey v. Humphrey, 5 Pick., 187; City Bank v. Cutter, 3 Pick., 414.
The tender
As to what is a
may be made up to the uttermost convenient time of the proper day.
reasonable
time of the day for this purpose, see Startup v. McDonald, 6 M. and G., 593.
Unless some place is fixed by the contract for the payment of the debt, the debtor must
seek his creditor wherever he may be within the state, in order to make a tender.
King v.
Finch, 60 Ind., 420; Luttell v. Nichols, Hardin, 66.
A tender may be made by an agent: Read v. Goldring, 2 M. and 8. , 86 ; not by a stranger —
Mahler v Newbaur, 82 Cal., 168.
one who has no authority or interest in the matter.
Tender may be made to an authorized agent of the creditor, as well as to the creditor in
Kirton v. Braithwaite, 1 M. and W., 310; King v. Finch,'
person, not to a mere servant.
60 Ind., 420; Thurber v. Jewett, 8 Mich., 295.
Where several persons have a joint demand
against a debtor, he may, by offering the money to one of them, make a good tender to all.
Douglas v. Patrick, ST. R, 688; Beebe v. Knapp. 28 Mich., 53.
The whole amount due must be tendered: Read v. Goldring, 2 M. and 8., 86; at the peril
of the person tendering.
Boyden v. Moore, 6 Mass., 365. Tender of less than the amount
due, though made in good faitb and under misapprehension of the amount due, is not suffi
cient.
Helphrey v. Railroad Co., 29 Iowa, 480. The plea of tender must allege the tender
of the whole sum due on the contract, for a tender of a part of it only is no averment that
the defendant performed the whole contract as far as the plaintiff would allow.
Dixon v.
Clark, 5 C. B., 863. A man may tender too much, though a tender of too little is bad.
Stra.,
916.
If one tenders more than the amount he admits to be
Astley v. Reynolds, 2
due, and the creditor does not object on the ground that he has no change, but because the
small,
amount is too
or some other collateral reason, it is a good tender.
Cadman v. Lub
bock, 5 D. and R, 289; Patterson v. Cox, 25 Ind., 261. But if a larger sum than is admitted
to be due is tendered and change demanded, it is not a good tender if objected to, because
Robinson v. Cooke, 6 Taunt., 386.
of the need of making change.
There must be an actual offer of the money or a dispensation of the offer by the creditor.
If the debtor has it ready and offers to pay it, and the creditor dispense with the produc
tion of it or do anything which is equivalent to
Thomas v. Evans,
good tender.
Me., 107. It ought to appear that the money
10 East, 101 Brown v. Gilmore,
at hand
and
capable of immediate delivery.
Glasscott v. Day,
Esp., 48; Breed v. Hurd,
Pick. 856. The production of the money and actual offer of
to the creditor
dispensed
the party
with,
and
but
about to produce
ready and willing to pay
prevented
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proceedings. This may be done upon what is called a motion ; which is an
occasional application to the court by the parties or their counsel, in order to
obtain some rule or order of court, which becomes necessary in the progress of
a cause; and it is usually grounded upon an affidavit (the perfect tense of the
verb affido), being a voluntary oath before some judge or officer of the court,
to evince the truth of certain facts, upon which the motion is grounded: though
If after
no such affidavit is necessary for payment of money into court. (17)
the money paid in the plaintiff proceeds in his suit, it is at his own peril: for,
if he does not prove more due than is so paid into court, he shall be nonsuited
and pay the defendant costs; but he shall still have the money so paid in, for
that the defendant has acknowledged to be his due. (18) In the French law
the rule of practice is grounded upon principles somewhat similar to this; for
there, if a person be sued for more than he owes, yet he loses his cause if he
from so doing by a declaration on the part of the creditor that he will not or cannot receive
it Hazard v. Loring, 10 Cush., 267. Tender is a production and manual offer of the
Held, that it was no tender when a
money, and requires that it should be counted down.
person had money in his pocket and said it was ready, unless the creditor dispensed with
its production. Bakeman v. Pooler, 15 Wend., 637.
The money must be lawful money of the place where it is tendered.
Wade's Case, 5
Rep., 114; Bankv Howard, 13 Mass., 235; Waldron v. Murphy, 40 Mich., 668. But a
tender in money which is not a legal tender is good if the creditor places his refusal to re
ceive the money on other grounds, or makes no objection on that express ground. Curtisa
v. Greenbanks, 24 Vt., 536. And see Beebe v. Knapp, 28 Mich., 53.
A tender must in general be unconditional. Cothran v. Scanlon, 84 Ga., 555. At any
Bevans v.
rate the condition must not be one on which the debtor has no right to insist.
Rees, 6 M. and W., 306; Brink v. Freoff, 40 Mich., 610. It is not in the nature of a ten
conditions,
terms
or
but
to
the
sum
tendered as an
qualifications,
pay
der to make
simply
admitted debt. Hence a demand of a receipt in full on a tender vitiates the tender. Wood
v. Hitchcock, 20 Wend., 47; Glasscott v. Day, 5 Esp., 48; Thayer v. Brackett, 12 Mass.,
So an offer to pay by a mortgagor conditioned upon the execution of a release, which
450.
Loring v.
the creditor was under no legal obligation to execute, is not a good tender.
Cooke, 8 Pick., 48. But if the condition be one on which, by the terms of the contract,
the debtor has a right to insist, and to which the creditor has no right to object, insisting
upon the performance of such a condition does not vitiate the tender. Wheelock v. Tanner,
A tender upon condition that negotiable commercial paper shall be given
89 N. Y., 481.
up is good, "because such paper might be put in circulation after payment and innocent
parties become liable; not so, however, with non-commercial paper; after payment by the
maker it becomes harmless as against him wherever it may go." Story v. Erewson, 55
Ind., 897. One may make a tender and add that it is done under protest.
This creates no
condition and avoids admitting the justice of the claim. Scott v. Ry. Co., L. R., 1 C. P.,
596.

A tender must be kept good, that is, the person tendering must be ready at all times to
Curtiss v. Greenbanks, 24 Vt., 536. The
pay the debt in current money when requested.
tender should be followed by bringing the money into court. Clark v. Mullenix, 11 Ind.,
"
With respect to the averment of toujour) prut, if
;682; Webster v. Pierce, 35 111., 15S.
Therefore, if he can show that
the plaintiff can falsify it, he avoids the plea altogether.
: an entire performance of the contract was demanded and refused at any time when by the
terms of it he had a right to make such a demand, he will avoid the plea." Dixon v. Clark,
5C. B.. 365.
(17) By the common law procedure act of 1852, the defendant in any action, except for
assault, battery, false imprisonment, libel, slander, malicious arrest, malicious prosecution,
or debauching the plaintiff's daughter or servant, may pay into court, by leave of the court
The Btatutes 9 and 10 Vic, c. 93,
or a judge, a sum of money by way of compensation.
and 27 and 28 Vic., c. 95, extend the right to actions for compensation to the family of a
person killed by accident, and under statute 6 and 7 Vic., c. 96, a plea of apology and pay
ment into court is allowed in certain actions for libel.
(18) Money may be paid into court in cases where a tender might have been effectually
made, and thereupon the defendant may have so much of the plaintiff's demand struck out
of the declaration; and if the plaintiff does not accept the money, he proceeds at his peril.
Hallet v. East India Co., 2 Burr., 1120. The plaintiff may in any event have the amount
Elliot v. Callon, 2
which is paid in, as the defendant acknowledges that so much is due.
Balk., 597. The defendant is bound by the payment, and though demanded wrongfully, he
cannot recover it back. Vaughan v. Barnes, 2 B. and P., 892; Malcolm v. FuQarton, a
T.

R,

645.
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not tender so much as he really does owe. (to)
To this head may also be
referred the practice of what is called a set-off: whereby the defendant ac
knowledges the justice of the plaintiff's demand on the one hand; but on the
other sets up a demand of his own, to counterbalance that of the plaintiff, either
in the whole or in part : as if the plaintiff sues for ten pounds due on a note
-of hand, the defendant may set off nine pounds due to himself for merchandise
sold to the plaintiff, and in case he pleads such set-off, must pay the remaining
^a^ance into court.
This answers *very nearly to the compensatio or
f*305l
L
■*
stoppage, of the civil law, (x) and depends on the statutes 2 Geo. IT, o.
22, and 8 Geo. II, c. 24, which enact, that where there are mutual debts be
tween the plaintiff and defendant, one debt may be set against the other, and
either pleaded in bar or given in evidence upon the general issue at the trial;
which shall operate as payment and extinguish so much of the plaintiff's
■doth

demand.

(19)

(w) Sp.

U

b. », o. 4.

(x) Tf. 16,2, 1.

(19) To be the subject of set-off, the claims must be mutual debts for the recovery of
which indebitatus assumpsit or debt would lie.
Howlet v. Strickland, Cowp. 60; Austin
v. Feland, 8 Mo., 809; Jones v. Blair, 57 Ala., 457. A set-off is allowed only when the
suit is based on a demand which could itself be used as a set-off.
Downer v. Eggleston,
15 Wend., 51. If the claim is one arising from a tort there can be no set-off.
Sapsford v.
Fletcher, 4 T. R, 511; Canal Co. v. Buckley, 7 T. R, 36; Hall's Appeal, 40 Pa. St, 40ft;
Pulliamv. Owen, 25 Ala., 492; Schweizer v. Weiker, 6 Rich., 159; Mitchell v. Gibbea, 2
Bay, 351. One tort cannot be set off against another at common law. Hart v. Davis, 21
Tex. , 411. Even if a statute allows such set-off, a claim arising from tort cannot be set off
against one arising ex contractu.
Smith v. Printup, 59 Ga., 610; Zeigelmueller v. Seamer,
63 Ind., 488; Indianapolis, etc., R R Co. v. Ballard, 22 Ind., 448; Dean v. Allen, 8 Johns.,
891.
Judgments may be the subject of set-off.
Thus aJudgment for costs may set off
against a subsequent judgment for damages.
Dennie v. Elliott, 2 H. Bl., 587. Where the
demands have passed into judgments and each party has an execution in his own right
against another, the judgments are mutual debts.
It Is not necessary to notice the grounds
of action on which the judgment is founded. Shapley v. Bellows, 4 N. BL, 347. See
Hutch ins v. Riddle, 12 N. H., 464.
Set-off is wholly inapplicable in actions for unliquidated damages.
Unless the claim de
clared on is capable of being ascertained by calculation and is thus the subject of set-off
itself, no set-off can be pleaded.
Wend.,
839; Hutchinson v.
Osborn v. Etheridge, 13
Reid, 8 Camp., 319; State v. Welsted, 6 Halst., 897; Smith v. Warner, 16 Mich., 390; Hardcastle v. Netherwood, 5 B. and Aid., 93. A claim arising simply from tort, or one foriunliquidated damages cannot be used as a set-off.
Hopkins v. Magquire, 85 Me., 78; Homas
v. McDonnell, 3 McLean, 381; Grimes v. Reese, 30 Ga., 330.
To be effectual as a set-off
the demand must be a valid subsisting claim not barred by the statute of limitations when
the suit is begun.
Lee v. Lee, 81 Ga., 28; Williams v. Gilchrist, 3 Bibb., 49; Taylor v.
<Jould, 57 Pa. St., 157; Mandigo v. Mandigo, 26 Mich., 849; Chappie v. Duraton, 1 Cr.
and J. , 1.
There musj; be mutuality and reciprocity in the rights set off, and the demands on the one
side and on the other must be in the same right.
Gibbs v. Cunningham, 4 Md., ch. 322;
Kinne v. New Haven, 32 Conn., 210. No other demands can be set off than such as are
mutual, that is, between the same parties in the same right. In the application of this rule
in some cases the real and not the merely nominal parties plaintiff and defendant are re
Goodwin v. Richardson, 44 N. H., 125. The debtor on one side must be the
garded.
same as the creditor on the other, either as the nominal or real party in interest.
Hendricks
v. Toole, 29 Mich., 840. If executors sue for a debt arising after the death of their testator,
the defendant cannot set off a debt due from the testator.
Shi pman v. Thompson, Willes,
103; Shawv. Gookin, 7 N. H, 16; Dale v. Cooke, 4 Johns. Ch. 11, Fry v. Evans, 8 Wend.,
If executors sue on a claim due their testator in his lifetime, the defendant cannot
530.
set off claims against the plaintiffs accruing since the death.
Houston v. Robertson, 4
Camp., 342. Where an administrator as such sued for a debt due after the death of the
intestate, it was held that the defendant could not set-off a debt due him from the intestate
while alive, as it was necessary that the debts should have originally existed between the
two living parties.
Watts v. Rees, 9 Exch., 696; 11 Exch., 410. But to an action by an
administrator on a claim arising during the intestate's life, the defendant was allowed to
as set-off a payment by himself of a bond on which he was surety for the intestate,
glead
ucher v. Dorsheimer, 7 S. and R, 9. In general it is not allowed to set off against an
individual debt a demand arising to a person in a representative
capacity, or vice versa.
Snow v. Conant, 8 Vt., 801; Stickney v. Clement, 7 Gray, 170; Thomas v. Hopper, 5 Ala.,
442; Crabtree v. Cleatt, 22 Ala., 181. So where an administrator sues in his own right, the
172
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Pleas that totally deny the cause of complaint, are either the general issue,
or a special plea, in bar.
thwarts, and denies
1. The general issue, or general plea, is what traverses,
at once the whole declaration; without offering any special matter whereby to
As in trespass, either in vi et armis or on the case, non cvdpabUis,
evade it.
not guilty; (y) in debt upon contract, nihil debet, he owes nothing; in debt on
(V) Appendix, No. II. § 4.

defendant cannot set off a debt due him from the intestate in his life-time. Grew r. Bur.
ditt, 9 Pick., 265; Wolfsberger v. Bucher, 10 S. and R, 10.
In an action against two jointly, the individual claim of one defendant against the plain
Woods v. Carlisle, 6 N.
tiff cannot be set off unless the other defendant is a mere surety.
H., 27; Ross v. Knight, 4 N. H., 286; Banks v. Pike, 15 Me., 268. In general joint de
mands cannot be set off against several demands, nor separate debts against joint debts.
Howe v. Sheppard, 2 Sumn. , 409; Jackson v. Robinson, 8 Mason, 138; Bebb v. Saunders,
8 Bibb, 86; Millburn v. Guyther, 8 Gill, 92; Heckenkemper v. Dingwehrs, 32 111., 538;
Sager v. Tupper, 38 Mich., 258. So in a suit for an individual debt, the defendant cannot
McDowell v.
set off a claim against a firm of which the plaintiff was formerly a member.
Tyson, 14 S. and R, 800; Wilson v. Keedy. 8 GUI, 195; Warren v. Wells, 1 Met., 80.
Against a claim by partners jointly the defendant cannot set off a debt due him from one
of the firm individually, nor in a suit against one partner individually, can a claim against
Ross v. Pearson, 21 Ala., 473; Jones v. Blair,
the plaintiff owned by the firm be set off.
57

Ala.,

A

457.

surviving partner to whom all right of action survives can set off a debt to him indi
vidually in an action brought against him as such surviving partner for the recovery of a
Johnson v. Kaiser, 40 N. J. , 286. A debt due from the
debt due from the partnership.
plaintiff as surviving partner to the defendant can be set off by the latter against a demand
French v. Andrade, 6 T. R, 582. So a debt due
which the plaintiff has as an individual.
the defendant as surviving partner may be set off against a demand upon him in his own
right Stipper v. Stidstone, 5 T. R., 493.
If goods are bought from an agent known to be such, in an action by the principal for
the price a debt due defendant from the agent cannot be set off.
Browne v. Robinson, 2
Caines Cas., 341. So if an agent be appointed to collect a debt, the debtor cannot set
Wilson v. Codman,
off against the debt due the principal a debt due him from the agent.
8 Cranch, 193. Where a principal permits an agent to sell as apparent principal, and after
wards intervenes, the buyer is entitled to be placed in the same position at the time of the
disclosure of the real principal as if the agent had been the real contracting party, and is
entitled to the same defense.
In such case the defendant may Bet off a claim against the
Isberg v. Bowden, 8 Exch., 852; George v. Claggett, 7 T. R, 859; Carr v. Hinchagent.
Uff,

4B. andC.,

547.

That in an action by a trustee a debt due the defendant from the cestui que trust may be
set off, see Sheldon v. Kendall, 7 Cush., 217; Campbell v. Hamilton, 4 Wash. C. C, 92;
Goodwin v. Richardson, 44 N. H., 125; contra Wheeler v. Raymond, 5 Cow., 281.
The claim to be set off must have been a subsisting right of action in the defendant, a
debt due and demandable,
when the suit was brought. The debt must have arisen before
the action: it is not enough if before plea pleaded merely.
Evans v. Prosser, 8 T. R., 186;
Richards v. James, 2 Exch., 471; Morrison v. Moreland, 15 S. and R., 61; Carpenter v.
Butterfield, 3 Johns. Cas., 145; Bank v. Chapman, 1U Johns., 322; Hardy v. Coons. 21 N.
H., 356; Martin v. Kunzinueller, 87 N. Y., 396; Houghton v. Houghton, 87 Me., 72;
Henry v. Butler, 82 Conn., 140.
By many of the state statutes if the set-off prove greater than the plaintiff's claim, the de
fendant may have judgment for the balance.
Good v. Good, 9 Watts, 667. Under the
Hennell v. Fairlamb, 8 Esp., 104
These state
English statutes this could not be done.
statutes, though based on the English enactments
vary from one another, and should be
referred to to determine the right to set off in any particular state, and the proper method
of pleading it.
Recoupment. — Wherever by a contract mutual duties and obligations are laid upon two
parties, and one sues for a breach by the other, the defendant may meet the demand by a
counter-claim for a breach of duty by the plaintiff.
This is called recoupment.
2 Pars,
It differs from set-off, in that the damages recouped must grow out of a
on Con. 247.
breach of the same contract on which suit is brought: Batterman v. Pierce, 3 Hill, 171;
Stow v. Tarwood, 14 Dl., 424; also in that the damages may be unliquidated, and the de
fense may be made in cases of tort, provided the tort springs from the violation of con
tract. Stow v. Yarwood. supra.
If the defendant's damages exceed the claim established by the plaintiff, the action will
Britton v.
thereby be defeated, but the defendant cannot have judgment for the excess.
Turner, 0 N. H., 481; Ward v. Fellers, 8 Mich., 281.
178
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he
est /actum, it is not his deed; on an assumpsit, non assumpsit,
made no such promise.
Or in real actions, nul tort, no wrong done; nul dis
that the tenant
seisin, no disseisin; and in a writ of right, the mise or issue
has more right to hold than the demandant has to demand.
These pleas are
called the general issue, because by importing an absolute and general denial
of what
alleged in the declaration, they amount at once to an issue: by
which we mean a fact affirmed on one side and denied on the other.
Formerly the general issue was seldom pleaded, except when the party meant
wholly to deny the charge alleged against him. But when he meant to dis
was always usual to set forth the par
tinguish away or palliate the charge,
ticular facts in what
called
special plea; which was originally intended to
apprise the court and the adverse party of the nature and circumstances of the
And
an invariable
defence, and to keep the law and the fact distinct.
rule, that every defence which cannot be thus specially pleaded, may be given
in evidence upon the general issue at the trial. But the science *of
*308i
special pleading having been frequently perverted to the purposes of
chicane and delay, the courts have of late in some instances, and the legislature
in many more, permitted the general issue to be pleaded, which leaves every
thing open, the fact, the law, and the equity of the case; and have allowed
And though
should seem
special matter to be given in evidence at the trial.
as
much confusion and uncertainty would follow from so great relaxation
of the strictness anciently observed, yet experience has shown
to be other
wise; especially with the aid of a new trial, in case either party be unfairly
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surprised by the other.
2. Special pleas, in bar of the plaintiff's demand, are very various, according
to the circumstances of the defendant's case. As, in real actions,
general
Or,
release or
fine, both of which may destroy and bar the plaintiff's title.
in personal actions, an accord, arbitration, conditions performed, nonage of the
defendant, or some other fact which precludes the plaintiff from his action,
A justification
likewise
special plea in bar; as in actions of assault and
was the plaintiffs own original assault; in
battery, son assault demesne, that
trespass, that the defendant did the thing complained of in right of some office
which warranted him so to do; or, in an action of slander, that the plaintiff
really as bad man as the defendant said he was.
man may plead the statutes of limitation (a) in bar; (20) or the time
Also,
(r) Appendix No. in,
(a) See pages 188,196.
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(20) It has generally been held that the statute of limitations bars the remedy only, not
Met., 19; Elkins v.
Eiggins v. Scott, B. and Ad., 413; Eastman v. Foster,
the right.
Ga., 826; Wood v. Augustine, 61 Mo., 46; Kellar v. Sinton, 14 B. Mon., 807;
Edwards,
Birnie v. Main, 29 Ark., 591; Richmond v. Aiken, 25 Vt, 824; Hough v. Bailey, 82
Conn., 288; Knox v. Qalligan, 21 Wis., 470; Ohio, &c., Co. v. Winn,
Md. Ch., 258; Boist
v. Corey, 15 N. Y., 505; Crooker v. Holmes, 65 Me., 195; Fisher v. Mossman, 11 Ohio St,
But in some states the opposite doctrine prevails. Ross v. Mitchell, 28 Tex., 150;
42.
Neb., 460; Newman v. De Lorimer, 19 Iowa, 248; Hagan v. Parsons,
Peters v. Dunnells,
Kan., 884 So under the later English statutes
67 111.. 170; Chick v. Willetts,
has been
held that the right was barred.
Dru. and W., 289; De Beau voir v.
Society v. Richards,
Owen, 5Exch., 166.
The statute begins to run when the party has
complete present right of action on which
Pick., 488; Railroad Co. v. Parks, 33 Ark., 131;
he may sue at once.
Little v. Blunt,
B., 519. In contract
Wittcrsheim v. Countess, &c., H. BL 631; Hemp v. Garland
the time runs from the time when the contract was broken, though no special damage
first felt.
immediately results; not from the time when the damage
Battley v.
B. and Aid., 288; Bonesteel v. Van Etteu, 20 Hun, 468. So in tort for
Faulkner.
in professional employments,
the time runs from the
incompetency or carelessness
time when the service was performed. Troup v. Smith, 20 Johns., 83. In equity,
however, in the case of fraud, the statute
hold to run only from the discovery of the
Eq.
fraud. Hovenden v. Lord Annesley, Seh. and Lef., 634; Todd v. Rafferty, 30 N.
Where one collects money for another which he
254.
bound to pay over at once, the
tut lite runs from the time he collects it. Cagwin v. Ball,
III. App., 70. So where surety
claims contribution from co-surety for payment on behalf of the principal, the statute
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limited by certain acts of parliament, beyond which no plaintiff can lay his
cause of action. This, by the statute of 32 Hen. VIII, c. 2, in a writ of right,
is sixty years: in assizes, writs of entry, or other possessory actions real, of the
seisin of one's ancestors, in lands; and either of their seisin, or one's own, in
rents, suits and services, fifty years: and in actions real for lands grounded

by

is

is

a

a

by

a

a

7

v."

begins to run against his claim from the time of payment, as he then acquired a right of
action. Singleton v. Townsend, 45 Mo., 879. The statute runs in the case of a voidable
contract from the time when one party terminates it: Collins v. Thayer, 74 111., 188;
against a claim for money paid as usurious interest from the time when paid: Stephens v.
Monongahela Bank, 88 Penn. St., 157; against a claim where a demand is necessary, im
mediately after such demand: Topham t. Braddock, 1 Taunt, 571; Stafford v. Richardson,
15 Wend., 302; Little v. Blunt, 9 Pick, 488; against a claim payable so many days after
Wolfe v. Whiteman, 4 Harr.,
sight or demand, not till the expiration of the given days.
But against a promissory note payable on demand,
246; McDonnell v. Bank, 20 Ala., 818.
Norton v. Ellam. 2 M. and W., 461; Presthe statute runs from the delivery of the note.
brey v. Williams. 15 Mass., 193; Litttle v. Blunt, 9 Pick., 488. Where one agrees to pay
whenever his circumstances would enable him to do so, and he might be called upon for
that purpose, held that the creditor had a complete right of action when the debtor became
able to pay, not merely when he discovered the fact, and that the fact of bringing an action
Waters v. Earl of Thanet, 2 Q. B., 757. So in case of
would be a sufficient demand.
conversion the statute runs from the time of the converting, not from the time when the
injured party learned of it Granger v. George, 5 B. and 0., 149. If goods delivered to a
carrier are destroyed, the statute runs from date of destruction, not from date of delivery.
Merchants, etc., Co. v. Topping, 89 111., 65. In computing the time, the day on which the
cause of action accrued is excluded, according to the weight of authority. See cases collected
and discussed in Warren v. Slade, 23 Mich., 1.
To put the statute in motion there must be some one in being capable of being sued:
Davis v. Gair, 6 N. Y., 124; Wenman v. Mohawk Ins. Co., 13 Wend., 207; and some one
capable of suing, so that the statute does not run against the estate of a deceased person for
a debt coming due after death till an administrator is appointed. Murray v. East India
If, when the right of action accrues,
Co. , 5 B. and Aid. , 204 ; Bucklin v. Ford, 5 Barb. , 393.
one is disabled from suing, as from infancy or coverture, the statute does not run till the
Demarest v. Wynkoop, 3 Johns. Ch., 129.
Cumulative disabilities
disability is removed.
If a female is an infant when a right of action accrues, and marries be
are not regarded.
fore her majority, she must bring her action within the time limited after the removal of this
disability of infancy. This begins to run as soon she attains her majority without regard
Demarest v. Wynkoop, 3 Johns. Ch., 129; Fritz
to the subsequent disability of coverture.
v. Joiner, 54 111.. 101; Keil v. Healey, 84 111., 104; Mercer v. Selden, 1 How., 37; Cozzcns
So where a married woman, to whom a right of action has
v. Farnam, 30 Ohio St., 491.
accrued, dies leaving a surviving husband, her heirs have the same time in which to sue
after the termination of the husband's tenancy by the, curtesy as the wife would have had
after the husband's death if she had survived him, and this, though the heirs may be under
a disability when tenancy by the curtesy ceases.
Henry v. Carson, 59 Pa. St., 297. A
wife who joins her husband in a mortgage is not protected by her coverture from the
Hanford v. Fitch, 41 Conn.,
ordinary effect of the adverse possession of the mortgagee.
487. If in a joint action some plaintiffs can avoid the plea of the statute by showing a dis
ability, but all can not, the action is barred, since if the statute once runs against one of two
Marsteller v. McClean. 7 Cranch, 156.
joint parties it operates as a bar to a loint action.
By the old English statutes repealed by 19 and 20 Vict., c. 97, s. 10, and by most of the
American statutes, if either party is absent from the country or state when the right of
action accrues, the statute does not begin to run till he returns.
This applies to foreigners
or persons permanently residing beyond the jurisdiction, as well as to residents temporarily
absent.
Such persons, if creditors, have the statutory time after coming to the country or
state, in which to begin an action, and if they are debtors, their debt is not barred till six
Strithorst v. Graeme, 2 W. Bl., 723; Williams v. Jones, 8 Wils
years after such arrival.
145; Lafond v. Ruddock, 13 C. B., 818; Fowler v. Hunt, 10 Johns., 404; Dwight
Clark,
Mass., 515; Goetz v. Voelinger, 99 Mass,, 504. Where
New York citizen sued
in Vermont another New York citizen temporarily in Vermont, for
debt barred
the
New York statute, held the case was within the foregoing principle, and that the plaintiff
Graves v. Weeks, 19 Vt., 178. Where
might recover.
person did business in New York,
but lived in New Jersey, going back and forth every day, so that the time actually spent
by him in New York was less than six years, held that the New York statute of limitation
did not run in his favor so far as to bar
debt contracted more than seven years before
action. Bennett v. Cook, 48 N. Y., 537. There has been much discussion as to what re
sufficient to set the statute in motion. It
now settled
the weight of authority
turn
that "a return in order to cause the time limited for bringing suit, to commence and keep
running during his stay, must be shown by the debtor either to have been actually known to
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upon one's own seisin
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or possession, such possession must have been within
statute 1 Mar. st. 2, c. 6, this limitation does not extend to
any 8U'' ^or a<lvowsons, upon reasons given in a *former chapter. (6)
But by the statute 21 Jac. I, c. 2, a time of limitation was extended to

years.

By

(6) See page 980.
the creditor, and to have been so long continued and under such circumstances after such
knowledge, as to have enabled the creditor by reasonable diligence to have subjected him to
the jurisdiction of the proper state court; or else to have been so notorious and protracted,
and so identified with some locality, as to show that the creditor might with reasonable
diligence have learned of the debtor's return or non-absence; and by the like diligence after
such fact could have been learned, might have subjected him to the jurisdiction as before
stated." Campbell v. White, 22 Mich., 178; Hacker v. Everett, 57 Me., 548; Milton v.
Babson, 6 Allen, 822; Hill v. Bellows, 15 Vt., 727; Whitton v. Wass, 109 Mass., 40; Fowler
v. Hunt., 10 Johns., 464; White v. Bailey, 8 Mass., 271.
Successive absences may be de
ducted from the time limited for bringing suit, and successive visits to the state may be
reckoned as time when the statute is running.
Campbell v. White, 22 Mich., 178; Cole v.
Jessup, 10 N. Y., 96; Rogers v. Hatch, 44 Cal., 280. In such case after deducting the
aggregate of all absences the time spent in the state must be that prescribed by the statute
Conrad v. Nail, 24 Mich., 275.
the statute once begins to run there
to bar an action.
is no deduction for absence which does not amount to a change of domicile.
Whitton v.
Wass, 109 Mass., 40. In cases other than those of absence, if the statute once begins to
run, nothing stops it. Hogan v. Kurtz, 94 U. 8., 773; Young v. Mackall, 4 Md., 862; Peck
v. Randall, 1 Johns., 165; Pendergrast v. Foley, 8 Ga., 1.
the statute begins to run in the
lifetime of an intestate, in the absence of statutory provision it does not cease to run after
the death and before an administrator is appointed.
Sanford v. San ford 62 N. Y., 553;
and see RufI v. Bull, 7 Harr. and J., 14.
16,
"all actions of account or upon the case other than account as
By statute 21 Jac. I, c.
concerning the trade of merchandise between merchant and merchant, their factors or ser
vants," were to be brought within six years from the time the cause of action accrued.
In
England this exception in favor of merchants is held to extend only to actions of account or on
W.,
v.
&
769;
but
for
not
8
M.
the
American
authorities
accounting.
Inglis
the case
Haigh,
allow the privilege as well in actions of assumpsit as of account or case. Mandeville v Wil
Marsh., 541; McLellan v. Croften, 6 Me., 307.
son, 5 Cranch, 15; Dyott v. Letcher 6
The account must be current and mutual, must concern the trade of merchandise between
merchant and merchant, not between merchant and customer.
Spring v Gray, 6 Pet 151 ;
Coster v. Murray, 5 Johns. Ch., 522; Blair v. Drew, 6 N. H., 235. But the action of account
Eq., 254. To constitute a mutual
Todd v. Rafferty 30 N.
may be between partners.
"
Credit must have been
account there must have been a ' 'mutual or alternate course of deal.
given by each party to the other, founded on some indebtedness, or there must have been an
It is not enough if all the credit items are on one
agreement for a set-off of mutual debts.
side. Kimball v. Kimball, 16 Mich., 211.
By statute 19 and 20 Vict., c. 97. s. 9, this privilege in relation to merchants' accounts is
abolished, and actions on them must be brought as in other cases.
a right of action is barred, there must he one of three things to take the case out of
Either there must be an acknowledg nent of the debt from which a promise to
the statute.
pay is to be implied; or, second, there must be an unconditional promise to pay the debt;
or, thirdly, there must be a conditional promise to pay the debt and evidence that the con
, 6 Ch. App. , 822 ; Skeet v. Lindsay,
dition has been performed. In re River Steamer Co. , L.
the bar is sought to be removed by proof of a new promise, the
L. R., 2 Exch. Div., 814.
promise as anew cause of action ought to be proved in a clear and explicit manner, and be in
its terms unequivocal and determinate, and if any conditions are annexed, they ought to bethere be no express promise, but a promise is to be raised by
shown to be performed."
implication of law from the acknowledgment of the party, the acknowledgment ought to con
tain an unqualified and direct admission of a previous subsisting debt, which the party is liable
and willing to pay."
accompanying circumstances repel the presumption of a promise, or
the expressions are vague, the acknowledgment will not suffice to remove the bar. Bell v.
Morrison, 1 Pet., 851.
the acknowledgment does not specify the amount admitted to be
due, it must refer to something by which that amount can be definitely ascertained.
Miller
In the same line are, Hart v. Prendergast 14 M. & W., 741;
v. Baschore, 88 Pa. St., 856.
Chambers v. Rubey, 47 Mo., 99, Simonton v. Clark, 65 N. C, 625; McClelland v. West, 59
Pa. St., 487; Carroll v. Forsyth, 69 111., 127; Wetzell v. Bussard, 11 Wheat, 809; Carruth
v. Paige, 22 Vt., 179; Stafford v. Richardson, 15 Wend., 302; Barnard v. Bartholomew, 22
Pick., 291; Bangs v. Hall, 2 Pick., 868, where many old English cases contra are cited and
cannot pay the debt at present, but
disapproved. But see Hall v. Bryan, 50 Md., 194.
will pay it as soon as can," is not such apromise as to raise the bar without proof of abil
ity. Tanner v. Smart, 6 B.
603.
Where one says in effect "make out an account
fully and I will pay if correct," this would raise the bar, as acknowledging that some debt
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the case of the king, viz., sixty years precedent to 19 Feb. 1623; (c) but, this
becoming ineffectual by efflux of time, the same date of limitation was fixed
by statute 9 Geo. Ill, c. 16, to commence and be reckoned backwards, from
the time of bringing any suit or other process, to recover the thing in ques(c) 8 Inst. 189.

I

is due.
Bidwell v. Mason, 2H. & N., 806. "I know I owe the money, but will not pay it."
does not raise the bar, as the acknowledgment is coupled with a refusal inconsistent with
A'Court v. Cross, 3 BiDg., 329. Where an account forms one
the inference of a promise.
continuous demand running through many years without rests, a new promise may be ap
Leckmere v. Fletcher, 1
plied to the whole account including items barred by the statute.
(Jr. &M., 623.
In the case of mutual current accounts "every new item and credit given by one party
to the other is an admission that there is some unsettled account between them, the amount
of which is to be ascertained," and such admission is equivalent to a new promise to pay
Catling v. Skoulding, 6 T.
the balance due, and is enough to remove the bar of the statute.
R, 189; Kimball v. Brown, 7 Wend., 325; Hodge v. Manley, 25 Vt., 210; Todd v. Rafferty,
30 N. J. Eq., 254. The weight of American authority supports this position,
But in New
Hampshire the .contrary has been held, and it is said that one item in an account has no
Blair v. Drew, 6 N. H., 235. Since
power thus to draw after it others which are barred.
the passage of Lord Tenterden's act, 9 Geo. IV, c. 14, s. 1, the acknowledgment or promise
must be in writing, signed by the party to be charged, and under that it is now held in Eng
land, that the doctrine laid down in Catling v. Skoulding, supra, is obsolete.
Williams v.
Griffiths, 2 C. M. & R., 45. Similar provisions are in some of the American statutes.
The
promise or acknowledgment should be to the creditor or some one authorized to act for
him, to some one with a legal or equitable right to the claim, not to a third party. Parker v.
Shuford, 76 N. C, 219; Ringo v. Brooks, 26 Ark. 540; Keener v. Crull, 19 111., 189; McGrew v. Forsyth, 80 111.,596; McKinney v. Snyder 78 Pa. St., 497; Niblock v. Goodman, 67
Ind., 174; contra, Whitney v. Bigelow, 4 Pick., 110; Soulden v. Van Rensselaer, 9 Wend.,
Payment by an assignee in insolvency on his assign
£93; Palmer v. Butler, 86 Iowa, 576.
Roscoe v. Hale, 7 Gray, 274.
or's debt cannot beevidence of a new promise by the assignor.
So a promise by an administrator to pay a debt of his intestate, whether barred in the life
time of his intestate ornot. will not remove the bar.
Seig v. Accord, 21 Grat, 365; Thomp
son v. Peter, 12 Wheat., 565; Huntington v. Bobbitt, 46 Miss., 528, and cases cited.
But if
Tullock v. Dunn, Ry. and Moo., 416;
such promise be express, it has been held sufficient.
Johnson v. Beardsley, 15 Johns., 8; Shreeve v. Joyce, 86 N. J., 44.
A part payment of a debt, that is, the payment on account of a larger sum, amounts to
a new promise to pay what remains due if there be no act or declaration accompanying
Whipple v. Stevens, 22 N. H,, 219; Sigourthe payment inconsistent with such promise.
ney v. Downy, 14 Pick., 387; Waters v. Tompkins, 2 Cr., M. & R., 723. The mere fact
The surrounding circumstances must fairly warrant the in
of a payment is not enough.
Wainman v. Kynman, 1 Exch., 118; Locke v. Wilson, 10 Heisk.,
ference of a promise.
There must be something to raise a presumption that the payment was on account
441.
The principle of taking the debt out of the statute is that
of the very claim in question.
by part payment the party paying intended to acknowledge and admit the greater debt to
Wilder,
13
Wall.,
254; Arnold v. Downing, 11 Barb., 554; Butler v.
U. S. v.
be due.
Price, 110 Mass., 97. Payment of certain specified items in an account is not enough; " it
must be on general account and with a view to affect the general balance." Hodge v.
Manley, 25 Vt, 210. The payment may be by note as well as in cash.
Turney v. Dodwell, 8 Ellis & B., 136; Block v. Dorman, 51 Mo., 81; Ilsley v. Jewett, 2 Met., 168.
When a third person's note was given as collateral security for a mutual account, any sum
collected on the note to apply on account, or apart payment on the note turned over by the
Whipple v. Blackington, 97 Mass. ,
debtor to the creditor, acts as payment on account.
While the delivery of such a note by the debtor to a creditor operates to suspend the
476.
running of the statute, whether the note is eventually paid or not, still the payment of such
note at maturity by the maker to the creditor will not operate as a payment by the de*btor.
The statute begins to run from the time the note is transferred. Smith v. Ryan, 66 N. Y.,
Lord Tenterden's act does not change the effect of part payment, since such payment
352.
is not a mere acknowledgment in words, but is coupled with a fact. Waters v. Tompkins,
2 Cr., M. & R, 723; but the fact of payment must be proved otherwise than by mere oral
admission. Bagley v. Ashton, 12 A. & E., 493. Payment by an assignee does not imply
Davies v. Edwards, 7 Exch., 22; Reed v. John
any promise or raise the bar of the statute.
son, 1 R I., 81. Nor does payment by a married woman on her husband's note without
Butler v. Price, 110 Mass. 97.
his authority remove the bar as to him.
In
The law is not settled as to the effect of payment by one of several joint debtors.
England it was decided that such a payment would take the claim out of the statute as to
The same doctrine prevails in some of the United States, but in others it
his co-debtors.
has full power to bind the other parties.
is strenuously denied, unless the person paying
"
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tion; bo that possession for sixty years is now a bar even against the preroga
tive, in derogation of the ancient maxim "nullum tempos occurrit regi."
I5y
another statute, 21 Jao. I, c. 16, twenty years is the time of limitation in any
writ of formedon; and by a consequence, twenty years is also the limitation in
every action of ejectment, for no ejectment can be brought unless where the
lessor of the plaintiff is entitled to enter on the lands, (<?) and by statute 2 1
Jac. I, c. 16, no entry can be made by any man, unless within twenty years after
his right shall accrue. (21) Also, all actions of trespass (quare clausum /regit,
or otherwise), detinue, trover, replevin, account, and case (except upon accohnts
between merchants), debt on simple contract, or for arrears of rent, are limited
by the statute last mentioned to six years after the cause of action commenced:
and actions of assault, menace, battery, mayhem, and imprisonment, must be
brought within four years, and actions for words within two years after the
injury committed. (22) And by statute 31 Eliz. o. 5, all suits, indictments,
and informations upon any penal statutes, where any forfeiture is to the crown
alone, shall be sued within two years; and where the forfeiture is to a subject,
or to the crown and a subject, within one year after the offence committed, (23)
unless where any other time is specially limited by the statute.
Lastly, by
statute 10 & 11 Wm. Ill, c. 14, no writ of error, scire facias, or other suit, shall
be brought to reverse any judgment, fine, or recovery, for error, unless it be prose
cuted within twenty years. (24) The use of these statutes of limitation is to
preserve the peace of the kingdom, and to prevent those innumerable perjuries
which might ensue if a man were allowed to bring an action for any injury
committed at any distance of time. Upon both these accounts the law
*theref°re holds, that " interest reipublicat ut sit finis liliumf and
T *i08l
L
*
upon the same principle the Athenian laws in general prohibited all
(d) See page 206.

is

4

8

a

2

it,

See the various authorities collected in Parsons on Contracts, vol. Ill, p. 80, note, 5th ed.,
and Blowers v. Blackburn, 21 La. Ann., 127; Hance v. Hair, 25 Ohio St., 349; Clark v.
Burn, 86 Penn. St., 502; Lazarus v. Fuller, 89 Penn. St., 831; Smith v. Ryan, 66 N. T.,
852; Mainzinger v. Mohn, 41 Mich., 685, which deny the English doctrine.
By statute 19
and 20 Vict., c. 97, s. 14, no such payment now avails to take the case out of the statute
So by Lord Tenterden's act, and by many similar American
as against the other debtors.
statutes, it is provided that a new promise by one of several joint debtors shall not affect
the rights of the others.
For a full discussion of the defense of the statute of limitations, see Angell on Limita
tions; Parsons on Contracts, 6th ed., vol. Ill, p. 61, et seq.
Although the general rule is that statutes of limitation do not run against the state (see
Book I, p. 247, note), yet when the state resorts to equity for relief, it must come on the
same conditions with other suitors, and a stale claim by the state may be rejected for that
United States v. Beebee, 17 Cent
reason as it might be when presented by an individual.
L. Jour., 77; McCrary, circuit judge.
(21) Some important modifications of the statutes limiting the time for the commence
ment of suit, were made by statutes 3 and 4 Wm. IV, cc. 27, 42. Actions for the recovery
of lands or rents are required by these statutes to be brought within twenty years, with a
saving of cases of persons under disability, who are allowed ten years after the disability
ceases, but not to exceed forty years in all. Personal actions generally are required to be
brought within six years after the right accrues, but suits in trespass, for assault and bat
tery, must be brought within four years, and suits for verbal slander within two years.
Actions upon specialty may be brought at any time within twenty years.
Actions against
justices, constables, etc., for anything done in the execution of their office, must be brought
within six calendar months.
The statute 9 Geo. IV. c. 14, above referred to, commonly called Lord Tenterden's act,
As to the de
has been re-enacted in its main features in many of the American states.
Pars, on
see
fense of the statute generally, and what is sufficient to take a case out of
Cont. 341, et teq., and Angell on Limitations.
(22) In this, as well as in the subsequent statutes, there was saving in the case of per
sons under disability.
(23) Penal actions at the suit of the party aggrieved must now be brought within two
and
Statute
Wm. IV, c 42.
years after the wrong done.
now limited to six years, by the Common Law Pro
(24) The time for bringing error
cedure Act, 1852.
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(e)

actions where the injury was committed Jive years before the complaint was
If, therefore, in any suit, the injury or cause of action happened
earlier than the period expressly limited by law, the defendant may plead the
statutes of limitations in bar; as upon an assumpsit, or promise to pay money
he
to the plaintiff, the defendant may plead non assumpsit infra sex annos
an effectual bar to the com
made no such promise within six years; which
plaint. (25)
man
An estoppel
likewise
special plea in bar; which happens where
hath done some act, or executed some deed, which estops or precludes him
tenant for years (who hath
from averring any thing to the contrary. As
no freehold) levies
fine to another person.
void as to
Though this
shall work as an estoppel to the cognizor; for
he after
strangers, yet
wards brings an action to recover these lands, and his fine
pleaded against
him, he shall thereby be estopped from saying that he had no freehold at the
time, and therefore was incapable of levying it.
The conditions and qualities of
plea (which, as well as the doctrine of
estoppels, will also hold equally, mutatis mutandis, with regard to other parts
be single and containing only one matter; for
of pleading), are,
That
Ann. c. 16,
man, with
duplicity begets confusion. But by statute and
leave of the court, may plead two or more distinct matters or single pleas; as,
in an action of assault and battery, these three, not guilty, son assault demesne,
and the statute of limitations.
be direct and positive, and not
2. That
have convenient certainty of time, place, and per
argumentative. 8. That
sons.
4. That
answer the plaintiff's allegations in every material point. 5.
That
be so pleaded as to be capable of trial. (26)
•Special pleas are usually in the affirmative, sometimes in the nega*30Bt
tive; but they always advance some new fact not mentioned in the *■
declaration; and then they must be averred to be true in the common form —
" and this he
This
not necessary in pleas of the general
ready to verify."
total denial of the facts before advanced by
issue; those always containing
the other party, and therefore putting him upon the proof of them.
It
rule in pleading, that no man be allowed to plead specially such a plea
as amounts only to the general issue, or
total denial of the charge; but in
such case he shall be driven to plead the general issue in terms, whereby the
the defendant, in an assize or action
whole question
referred to a jury. But
of trespass, be desirous to refer the validity of his title to the court rather
than the jury, he may state his title specially, and at the same time give colour
to the plaintiff, or suppose him to have an appearance or colour of title, bad
indeed in point of law, but of which the jury are not competent judges.
As
his own true title be, that he claims by feoffment, with livery from A, by
force of which he entered on the lands in question, he cannot plead this by
itself, as
amounts to no more than the general issue, nul tort, nul disseisin,
in assize, or not guilty in an action of trespass.
But he may allege this spe
cially, provided he goes farther and says, that the- plaintiff claiming by colour
of prior deed of feoffment without livery, entered; upon whom he entered;
and may then refer himself to the judgment of the court which of these two
titles
the best in point of law.
(27)
thus put in,
When the plea of the defendant
does not amount to an
issue or total contradiction of the declaration, but only evades
the plaintiff
may plead again, and reply to the defendant's plea; either traversing it; that
made,

c. 63.

1,

a

a

a

a

new promise or unqualified acknowledgment of liability will keep alive a de
(25) That
mand from the date of such promise or acknowledgment for the full period allowed by the
claim, see note 20, ntpra.
statute in which to bring suit on
full discussion of the requisites of
plea in bar in the various forms of action,
(20) For
tee Cuitty on Pleading, vol.
p. 470.
(27) This method of pleading has been rendered unnecessary by statute.
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in an action of debt upon bond the defendant
totally denying it; as,
P,ea<^8 solvit ad diem, that he paid the money when *due; here the
plaintiff in his replication may totally traverse this plea, by denying
that the defendant paid it; or, he may allege new matter in contradiction to
the defendant's plea; as when the defendant pleads no award made, the plain
tiff may reply and set forth an actual award, and assign
breach; (g) or the
replication may confess and avoid the plea, by some new matter or distinction
consistent with the plaintiff's former declaration; as, in an action for trespass
the defendant shows
title to
seised,
ing upon land whereof the plaintiff
the land by descent, and that therefore he had
right to enter, and gives
colour to the plaintiff, the plaintiff may either traverse and totally deny tb&
fact of the descent; or he may confess and avoid
by replying, that true
that such descent happened, but that since the descent the defendant him
self demised the lands to the plaintiff for term of life. (28) To the replica
The
tion the defendant may rejoin, or put in an answer called a rejoinder.
sur-rejoinder upon which the defend
plaintiff may answer the rejoinder by
ant may rebut; and the plaintiff answer him by sur-rebutter.
Which pleas,
replications, rejoinders, sur-rejoinders, rebutters, and sur-rebutters, answer to
the exceptio, replicatio, duplicatio, triplicatio, and quadruplicate of the Roman
laws. (A)
The whole of this process
denominated the pleading; in the several stages
of which
must be carefully observed, not to depart or vary from the title or
For this (which
called
defence, which the party has once insisted on.
Therefore the
departure in pleading) might occasion endless altercation.
replication must support the declaration, and the rejoinder must support the
plea, without departing out of it. As in the case of pleading no award made,
in consequence of
bond of arbitration, to which the plaintiff replies, setting
forth an actual award; now the defendant cannot rejoin that he hath performed
this award, for such rejoinder would be an entire departure from his original
plea, which alleged that no such award was made; therefore he has now nor
other *choice, but to traverse the fact of the replication, or else to dem-j-i-n
mur upon the law of it.
Yet in many actions the plaintiff, who has alleged in his declaration
gen
eral wrong, may in his replication, after an evasive plea by the defendant, re
more particular certainty, by assigning the injury
duce that general wrong to
afresh with all its specific circumstances in such manner as clearly to ascertain
new
called
and identify
consistently with his general complaint; which
breach of his
As
the plaintiff in trespass declares on
or novel assignment.
said
close in D; and the defendant pleads that the place where the injury
a certain close of pasture in D, which descended to him
to have happened,
from
his father, and so
his own freehold; the plaintiff may reply and
assign another close in D, specifying the abbuttals and boundaries, as the real
place of the injury,
It hath previously been observed (A) that duplicity in pleading must be
avoided.
Every plea mnst be simple, entire, connected, and confined to one
must never be entangled with
single point:
variety of distinct, independ
ent answers to the same matter; which must require as many different replies
multitude of issues upon one and the same dispute. For this
and introduce
would often embarrass the jury, and sometimes the court itself, and at all
Tet
events would greatly enhance the expense of the parties.
frequently
manner as to avoid any implied admission of
expedient to plead in such
fact, which cannot with propriety or safety be positively affirmed or denied.
Appendix, No. Ill,
tr.
14. Bract.
e.
(h) Inst.
a

Bro. Abr. tit. trespass, 206,284.
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(28) The replication should answer the plea, should follow and be consistent with the
declaration, should be certain, not double nor argumentative.
Like
replication
plea,
bad in part
Com. Dig. Pleader (E).
wholly bad.
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And this may be done by what is called a protestation ; whereby the party
interposes an oblique allegation or denial of some fact, protesting (by the
gerund protestando) that such a matter does or does not exist: and at the
same time avoiding a direct affirmation or denial.
Sir Edward Coke hath de
fined
protestation (in the pithy dialect of that age) to be "an exolusion of
conclusion."
*For the use of
is, to save the party from being con- (-♦qiov
eluded with respect to some fact or circumstance, which cannot be
directly affirmed or denied without falling into duplicity of pleading; and
which yet,
he did not thus enter his protest, he might be deemed to have
tacitly waived or admitted. Thus, while tenure in villenage subsisted,
a
villein had brought an action against his lord, and the lord was inclined to try
the merits of the demand, and at the same time to prevent any conclusion
against himself that he had(waived his seigniory; he could not in this case both
plead affirmatively that the plaintiff was his villein, and also take issue upon
the demand; for then his plea would have been double, as the former alone
would have been
good bar to the action: but he might have alleged the vil
leinage of the plaintiff, by way of protestation, and then have denied the de
mand.
By this means the future vassalage of the plaintiff was saved to the
defendant, in case the issue was found in his (the defendant's) favor: (m) for
the protestation prevented that conclusion, which would otherwise have re
sulted from the rest of his defence, that he had enfranchised the plaintiff; (n)
since no villein could maintain
civil action against his lord. So also
de
fendant, by way of inducement to the point of his defence, alleges (among
other matters)
particular mode of seisin or tenure, which the plaintiff,
unwilling to admit, and yet desires to take issue on the principal point of the
defence, he must deny the seisin or tenure
way of protestation, and then
an award be set forth by the
traverse the defensive matter.
So, lastly,
breach in one part of
plaintiff, and he can assign
(viz., the non-payment
of
sum of money), and yet
afraid to admit the performance of the rest of
lest some
the award, or to aver in general non-performance of any part of
thing should appear to have been performed: he may save to himself any ad
vantage he might hereafter make of the general non-performance, by alleging
that by protestation; and plead only the non-payment of the money, (o) (29)
*In any stage of the pleadings, when either side advances or affirms r*o13T
to be true; "and this
any new matter, he usually (as was said) avers
On the other hand, when either side traverses or denies
he
ready to verify."
the facts pleaded by his antagonist, he usually tenders an issue, as
called;
the language of which
different according to the party by whom the issue
the traverse or denial comes from the defendant, the issue
tendered; for
tendered in this manner, " and of this he puts himself upon the country,"
the tra
thereby submitting himself to the judgment of his peers: (p) but
verse lies upon the plaintiff, he tenders the issue, or prays the judgment of the
peers against the defendant in another form; thus: "and this he prays may
be inquired of by the oountry."
But
either side (as, for instance, the defendant) pleads
special negative
plea; not traversing or denying anything that was before alleged, but disclos
on
bond, conditioned to
ing some new negative matter; as, where the suit
perform an award, and the defendant pleads, negatively, that no award was
does not yet appear
made, he tenders no issue upon this plea; because
whether the fact will be disputed, the plaintiff not having yet asserted the
-existence of any award; but when the plaintiff replies, and sets forth an actual
p. M.

is

(29) By the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, and the Supreme Court of Judicature Act,
now very
1878, and the rules of practice adopted under them, the English practice
greatly changed and simplified.
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specific award, if then the defendant traverses the replication, and denies the
making of any such award, he then, and not hefore, tenders an issue to the
For when in the course of pleading they come to a point which is
plaintiff.
affirmed on one side, and denied on the other, they are then said to be at issue;
all their debates being at last contracted into a single point, which must now
be determined either in favor of the plaintiff or of the defendant.
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(c) Ibid. No. II,

(6) Ibid.
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(a) Appendix, No. HI.
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Issub, exitus, being the end of all the pleadings, is the fourth part or stage
of an action, and is either upon matter of law, or matter of fact.
An issue upon matter of law is called a demurrer; and it confesses the facts
to be true, as stated by the opposite party; but denies that, by the law arising
upon those facts, any injury is done to the plaintiff, or that the defendant has
made out a legitimate excuse; according to the party which first demurs, demoratur, rests or abides upon the point in question.
As, if the matter of the
plaintiffs complaint or declaration be insufficient in law, as by not assigning
on
any sufficient trespass, then the defendant demurs to the declaration;
the other hand, the defendant's excuse or plea be invalid, as
he pleads that
he committed the trespass by authority from
stranger, without making out
the stranger's right; here the plaintiff may demur in law to the plea; and so
on in every other part of the proceedings, where either side perceives any ma
terial objection in point of law, upon which he may rest his case.
The form of such demurrer
by averring the declaration or plea, the replicat'on or rejoinder, to be insufficient *in law to maintain the action or
r*<nfil
the defence; and therefore praying judgment for want of sufficient
matter alleged, (a) Sometimes demurrers are merely for want of sufficient
form in the writ or declaration. But in case of exceptions to the form or
manner of pleading, the party demurring must, by statutes 27 Eliz. o.
and
and Ann. c. 16, set forth the causes of his demurrer, or wherein he appre
hends the deficiency to consist. (1)
And upon either
general, or such
spe
cial demurrer, the opposite party must aver
to be sufficient, which
called
ajoinder in demurrer, (b) and then the parties are at issue in point of law.
Which issue in law, or demurrer, the judges of the court before which the ac
tion
brought must determine.
An issue of fact
where the fact only, and not the law,
disputed. And
when he that denies or traverses the fact pleaded by his antagonist has ten
dered the issue, thus: "and this he prays may be inquired of by the country;"
or, "and of this he pats himself upon the country;"
may immediately.be
doth the like."
Which done,
subjoined by the other party, " and the said A
the issue
said to be joined, both parties having agreed to rest the fate of
the cause upon the truth of the fact in question, (c) And this issue of fact
4.
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if

a

is

a

;
a

it

is

is

used where the objection
to the substance of the adversary's
general demurrer
to the form merely.
The former
special demurrer where
couched in
of
terms;
the
latter
points
out
the
points
objection. Stephen PI., 140,
special
general
The Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, put an end to special demurrers in England, sub
stituting for them
controlling power, vested in the court or
judge, to amend or strike
out pleadings on the application of the opposite party,
they were so framed as to preju
dice, embarrass, or delay the fair trial of the action and as to needless and fictitious aver
ments, the act swept them away altogether.
182
(1)

pleading
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must, generally speaking, be determined, not by the judges of the court, bnt
by some other method; the principal of which methods is that by the country,

Which establishment of
by jury.
in some measure
different tribunals for determining these different issues
agreeable to the course of justice in the Roman republic, where the judices
ordinarii determined only questions of fact, but questions of law were referred
to the decisions of the centumviri. (d)
But here
will be proper to observe, that during the whole of these pro
in obedience to the
ceedings, from the time of the defendant's appearance
king's writ,
necessary *that both the parties be kept or continued rt... -•
*
in court from day to day, till the final determination of the suit. For
the court can determine nothing, unless in the presence of both the parties, in
person or by their attorneys, or upon default of one of them, after his original
Therefore,
appearance and a time prefixed for his appearance in court again.
either party neglects to put in his declaration,
in the course of pleading,
plea, replication, rejoinder, and the like, within the times allotted by the
the omission be his,
said to be
standing rules of the court, the plaintiff,
■nonsuit, or not to follow and pursue his complaint, and shall lose the benefit
of his writ: or,
the negligence be on the side of the defendant, judgment
may be had against him, for such his default. And, after issue or demurrer
con
day
joined, as well as in some of the previous stages of proceeding,
tinually given, and entered upon the record, for the parties to appear on from
time to time, as the exigence of the case may require. The giving of this day
called the continuance, because thereby the proceedings are continued with
out interruption from one adjournment to another.
If these continuances are
omitted, the cause
discharged
thereby discontinued, and the defendant
sine die, without
day, for this turn: for by his appearance in court he has
obeyed the command of the king's writ: and, unless he be adjourned over to
no longer bound to attend upon that summons; but he must
day certain, he
be warned afresh and the whole must begin de novo. (2)
Now
may sometimes happen, that after the defendant has pleaded, nay
even after issue or demurrer joined, there may have ari»en some new matter,
which
proper for the defendant to plead; as that the plaintiff, being a
feme sole,
since married, or that she has given the defendant
release, and
the like: here,
the defendant takes advantage of this new matter, as early
as he possibly can, viz.
at the day given for his next appearance, he
per
mitted to plead
in what
called
plea of puis darrein continuance, or
since the last adjournment. (3)
For
would be unjust to exclude him
*from the benefit of this new defense, which
was not in his power to
r*o1i7-i
make when he pleaded the former.
But
dangerous to rely on such
confesses the matter which was be
plea, without due consideration; for
fore in dispute between the parties, (e) And
not allowed to be put in,
any continuance has intervened between the arising of this fresh matter and
the pleading of it: for then the defendant
guilty of neglect, or laches, and
Also
not allowed
supposed to rely on the merits of his former plea.
after a demurrer is determined, or verdict given; because then relief may be
had in another way, namely, by writ of audita querela, of which hereafter.
a
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per pais, (in Latin per patriam), that

(«) Cro. BUs. 49.

otherwise now.

I,

a

it

is

if

a

8

6

Taunt., 333; Bartlett
plea must be verified by affidavit: Prince v. Nicholson,
v. Leighton,
C. & P., 408. By 15 and 16 Vict., c. 76, s. 69, the plea must be accompanied
by an affidavit that the matter arose within eight days before plea, unless the court shall
otherwise direct. Such pleas may be in abatement or in bar, and, after plea in bar, a
plea puis darrein continuance in abatement may be pleaded; but
judgment
against the
defendant, on such plea,
is final. Such plea in bar waives all former pleas.
Chitty
PL,
659; and see Stephen PL, 63-66: Gould PI., ch. vi.
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(fc) Ibid, xxlx, 835.
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Appendix. No. n, 4;
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Un. Hist, xx, ill.
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if

(i)

these pleas puis darrein continuance, when brought to a demurrer in law
or issue of fact, shall be determined in like manner as other pleas.
We have said, that demurrers, or questions concerning the sufficiency of the
matters alleged in the pleadings, are to be determined by the judges of the
court, upon solemn argument by counsel on both sides, and to that end a de
murrer-book is made up, containing all the proceedings at length, which are
afterwards entered on record; and copies thereof, called paper-books, are de
livered to the judges to peruse.
The record (f) is a history of the most
material proceedings in the cause entered on a parchment roll, and continued
down to the present time; in which must be stated the original writ and sum
mons, all the pleadings, the declaration, view or oyer prayed, the imparlances,
and whatever farther proceedings
plea, replication, rejoinder, continuances,
have been had; all entered verbatim on the roll, and also the issue or demurrer,
and joinder therein.
These were formerly all written, as indeed all publio proceedings were, in
Norman or law- French, (4) and even the arguments of the counsel and decisions
of the court were in the same barbarous dialect. An evident and shameful
Da<^Se>it must be owned, of tyranny and foreign servitude ; being *introT*3
*■ 1 8 1
J duced under the auspices of William the Norman, and his sons: where
by the ironical observation of the Roman satirist came to be literally verified,
that " Gallia causidicos docuit facunda Britannos." (g) This continued till
the reign of Edward III; who, having employed his arms successfully in sub
duing the crown of France, thought it unbeseeming the dignity of the victon
to use any longer the language of a vanquished country. By a statute, there
fore, passed in the thirty-sixth year of his reign, (h) it was enacted, that for
the future all pleas should be pleaded, shown, defended, answered, debated,
and judged in the English tongue; but be entered and enrolled in Latin. In
like manner as Don Alonso X, King of Castile (the great-grandfather of our
Edward III), obliged his subjects to use the Castilian tongue in all legal pro
and as, in 1286, the German language was established in the couxte
ceedings;
of the empire, (k) And perhaps
our legislature had then directed that the
writs themselves, whjph are mandates from the king to his subjects to perform
certain acts, or to appear at certain places, should have been framed in the
had not been
English language, according to the rule of our ancient law,
very improper. But the record or enrollment of those writs and the proceed
ings thereon, which was calculated for the benefit of posterity, was more ser
viceable (because more durable) in dead and immutable language than in any
flux or living one. The practisers, however, being used to the Norman
language, and therefore imagining they could express their thoughts more
aptly and more concisely in that than in any other, still continued to take their
notes in law-French; and, of course, when those notes came to be published,
under the denomination of reports, they were printed in that barbarous dialect;
which, joined to the additional terrors of Gothic black letter, has occasioned
many student to throw away his Plowden and Littleton, without venturing
to attack a page of them.
And yet in reality, upon
nearer acquaintance,
they would have found nothing very formidable in the language; which differs
m lt6 grammar *and orthography as much from the modern French,
*319l
as the diction of Chaucer and Gower does from that of Addison and
Pope. Besides, as the English and Norman languages were concurrently used
by our ancestors for several centuries together, the two idioms have naturally
assimilated, and mutually borrowed from each other: for which reason the
so very much the same, that
grammatical construction of each
apprehend
an Englishman (with
week's preparation) would understand the laws of

contends that the record was from the earliest times in Latin.

PL, Appendix, xxii.
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Normandy, collected in their grand coustumier, as well, if not better, than a
Frenchman bred within the walls of Paris.
The Latin, which succeeded the French for the entry and enrollment of
pleas, and which continued in use for four centuries, answers so nearly to the
English (oftentimes word for word) that it is not at all surprising it should
generally be imagined to be totally fabricated at home, with little more art or
trouble, than by adding Roman terminations to English words. Whereas in
reality it is a very universal dialect, spread throughout all Europe at the irrup
tion of the northern nations, and particularly accommodated and moulded to
answer all the purposes of the lawyers with a peculiar exactness and precision.
This is principally owing to the simplicity, or (if the reader pleases) the pov
erty and baldness of its texture, calculated to express the ideas of mankind
just as they arise in the human mind, without any rhetorical flourishes, or per
plexed ornaments of style; for it may be observed that those laws and ordin
ances, of public as well as private communities, are generally the most easily
unders tood, where strength and perspicuity, not harmony or elegance of exThese northern
pressio n, have been principally consulted in compiling them.
nations, or rather their legislators, though they resolved to make use of the
Latin tongue in promulging their laws, as being more durable and more gen
erally known to their conquered subjects than their own Teutonic dialects, yet
(either through choice or necessity) have frequently intermixed therein some
words of a Gothic original, which
more or less, the case in every country
*of Europe, and, therefore, not to be imputed as any peculiar blemish *a2ol
in our English legal Latinity. (m) The truth
what
generally denominated law-Latin
in reality
mere technical language, calculated for
eternal duration, and easy to be apprehended both in present and future times;
and on those accounts best- suited to preserve those memorials which are in
tended for perpetual rules of action. The rude pyramids of Egypt have en
dured from the earliest ages, while the more modern and more elegant
structures of Attica, Rome, and Palmyra, have sunk beneath the stroke of
time.
As to the objection of locking up the law in strange and unknown tongue,
of little weight with regard to records which few have occasion to read
this
And, besides,
but such as do, or ought to, understand the rudiments of Latin.
it may be observed of the law-Latin, as the very ingenious Sir John Davies (n)
observes of the law-French, " that
so very easy to be learned, that the
meanest wit that ever came to the study of the law doth come to understand
almost perfectly in ten days without
reader."
It true, indeed, that the many terms of art, with which the law abounds,
are sufficiently harsh when latinized (yet not more so than those of other
" to some gram
sciences), and may, as Mr. Selden observes, (o) give offence
marians of squeamish stomachs, who would rather choose to live in ignorance
of things the most useful and important, than to have their delicate ears
wounded by the use of word unknown to Cicero, Sallust, or the other writera
of the Augustan age." Yet this
no more than must unavoidably happen
when things of modern use, of which the Romans had no idea, and conse
quently no phrases to express *them, come to be delivered in the Latin r*o2n
tongue. It would puzzle the most classical scholar to find an appellation, in his pure latinity, for
record, or deed of feoffment;
constable,
is therefore to be imputed as much to necessity, as ignorance, that they were
styled in our forensic dialect constabtUariii8,recordum, and feoff amentum. Thus,
defend not the ridicul
again, another uncouth word of our ancient laws, (for
ous barbarisms sometimes introduced by the ignorance of modem practisers),

S

6,
1

1,

,

;

If

any one eoes out of nil own
(m) The following sentence, "Si quia ad battalia eurte rua exierit.
court to fight," &c may raise a smile in the student as a flaming modern Anglicism but he may meet
with it, among others of the same stamp. In the laws of the Burgundiani on the continent, before the
end of the fifth century. Add.
c.
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edict. Constantinop.
(<) Ibid. 88. c. 11.
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(u) Ibid. 78,c.
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the substantive murdrum, or the verb murdrare, however harsh and nnolassical
it may seem, was necessarily framed to express a particular offence; since no
other word in being, occidere, interficere, necare, or the like, was sufficient to
express the intention of the criminal, or quo animo the act was perpetrated;
and therefore by no means came up to the notion of murder at present enter
tained by our law, viz.: a killing with malice aforethought.
A similar necessity to this produced a similar effect at Byzantium, when the
Roman laws were turned into Greek for the use of the oriental empire: for,
without any regard to Attic elegance, the lawyers of the imperial courts made
no scruple to translate fidei commissarios, <pidei'xof*fuo~o~apiovi;(p)
cubiculum,
naid a-cpa /xikiai; (r) repudium, pettovXOvfiovxXewv; (q) f&ium-familias,
diov;
reverentia et obsequium, pevepevcompromissum, xo^npoixiaaov
Tia fcai ofiaexoviov; («) and the like. They studied more the exact and pre
cise import of the words than the neatness and delicacy of their cadence.
And my academical readers will excuse me for suggesting, that the terms of
the law are not more numerous, more uncouth, or more difficult to be explained
teacher, than those of logic, physics, and the whole circle of Aristotle's
by
philosophy, nay even of the politer arts of architecture and its kindred studies,
or the science of rhetorio itself. Sir Thomas Moore's famous legal question
nothing more difficult than the '''definition which in
(w) contains in
r*q2o
his time the philosophers currently gave of their materia prima, the
groundwork of all natural knowledge; that
"neque quid, neque quantum,
or its subsequent
neque quale, neque aliquid eorum quibus ens determinatur
explanation by Adrian Heereboord, who assures us (x) that " materia prima
non est corpus, neque per formam corporeitatis, neque per simplicem essentiam:
est tamen ens, et quidem substantia, licet incompleta, habetque actum ex se entitativum, et simul est potentia subjectiva." The law, therefore, with regard to
its technical phrases, stands upon the same footing with other studies, and
requests only the same indulgence.
This technical Latin continued in use from the time of its first introduction
till the subversion of our ancient constitution under Cromwell; when among
many other innovations in the law, some for the better and some for the worse,
But at the
the language of our records was altered and turned into English.
restoration of King Charles, this novelty was no longer countenanced; the
practisers finding
very difficult to express themselves so concisely or signifi
continued without
And thus
cantly in any other language but the Latin.
was again thought
any sensible inconvenience till about the year 730, when
was
proper that the proceedings at law should be done into English, and
accordingly so ordered by statute Geo. II, c. 26. This provision was made,
according to the preamble of the statute, that the common people might have
knowledge and understanding of what was alleged or done for and against
them in the process and pleadings, the judgment and entries in
cause.
fear, not been answered
Which purpose has,
being apt to suspect that
the people are now, after many years' experience, altogether as ignorant in
matters of law as before. On the other hand, these inconveniences have
already arisen from the alteration; that now many clerks and attorneys are
hardly able to read, much less to understand, record even of so modern date
has much enhanced the expense of
as the reign of George the First. And
for
since the practisers are confined (for the
proceedings;
leSal
r*32ll
sake of the stamp duties, which are thereby considerably increased) to
write only a stated number of words in sheet; (5) and as the English language,
much more verbose than the Latin;
through the multitude of its particles,

The stamp duties are now regulated by 33 and M
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it follows that

the number of sheets must be very much augmented by the
(y) The translation also of technical phrases, and the names of writs
and other process, were found to be so very ridiculous (a writ of nisiprius, quare
impedit, fieri facias, habeas corpus, and the rest, not being capable of an Eng
lish dress with any degree of seriousness) that in two years' time it was found
necessary to make a new act, 6 Geo. II, c. 14; which allows all technical
words to continue in the nsual language, and has thereby almost defeated
every beneficial purpose of the former statute.
What is said of the alteration of language by the statute 4 Oeo. II, o. 26,
will hold equally strong with respect to the prohibition of using the ancient
immutable court hand in writing the records or other legal proceedings; where
by the reading of any record that is fifty years old is now become the object
of science, and calls for the help of an antiquarian. But that branch of it,
which forbids the use of abbreviations, seems to be of more solid advantage,
in delivering such proceedings from obscurity: according to the precept of
Justinian; (z) "neper scripturam aliqua fiat in posterum dubitatio, jubemus
non per siglorum captiones et compendiosa enigmata ejusdem codicis textum
conscribi, sed per literarum consequenliam
explanari concedimus." But to
return to our demurrer.
When the substance of the record is completed, and copies are delivered to
the judgeB, the matter of law upon which the demurrer is grounded is upon
solemn argument determined by the court, and not by any trial by jury; and
^judgment is thereupon accordingly given. As in an action of trespass, r*S2 j-i
if the defendant in his plea confesses the fact, but justifies it causa *■ '
venationis, for that he was hunting; and to this the plaintiff demurs, that is,
he admits the truth of the plea, but denies the justification to be legal: now,
on arguing this demurrer, if the court be of opinion, that a man may not
justify trespass in hunting, they will give judgment for the plaintiff; if they
think that he may, then judgment is given for the defendant. Thus is an issue
in law, or demurrer, disposed of.
An issue of fact takes up more form and preparation to settle it; for here
the truth of the matters alleged must be solemnly examined and established
by proper evidence in the ohannel prescribed by law. To which examination
of facts, the name of trial is usually confined, which will be treated of at large
- in the two succeeding chapters.
change,

CHAPTER XXIL

OF THE SEVERAL SPECIES OF TRIAL.
The uncertainty of legal proceedings

is a notion so generally adopted, and
standing theme of wit and good humour, that he who
should attempt to refute it would* be looked upon as a man who was either
incapable of discernment himself, or else meant to impose upon others. Yet it
may not be amiss, before we enter upon the several modes whereby certainty
is meant to be obtained in our courts of justice, to inquire a little wherein this
uncertainty, so frequently complained of, consists; and to what causes it owes
its original.
It hath sometimes been said to owe its original to the number of our mu
nicipal constitutions, and the multitude of our judicial decisions; (a) which
has bo long been the

"secundum formam ttatuti," are now converted Into seven, "ao(l/t For instance, these three words,
"
enrdincr to the form of the statute
digest.
concep.
De
(zl
§13.
(a) See the preface to Sir John Daviee's Reports, wherein many of the following topics are discussed
Bore at large.
187

The Modes of Trial.

325
it

[Book

III.

of rules that militate and thwart with each
sentiments or caprice of successive legislatures and judges have
The fact of multiplicity is allowed; and that thereby the
happened to vary.
researches of the student are rendered more difficult and laborious; but that,
with proper industry, the result of those inquiries will be doubt and indecision,
is a consequence that cannot be admitted. People are apt to be angry at the
want of simplicity in our laws: they mistake variety for confusion, and comcases for contradictory.
They bring us the examples of arbiT*326lJ P^cate(^
*■
trary governments, of Denmark, Muscovy, and Prussia; of wild and
uncultivated nations, the savages of Africa and America; or of narrow domes
tic republics, in ancient Greece and modern Switzerland; and unreasonably
require the same paucity of laws, the same conciseness of practice, in a nation
of freemen, a polite and commerical people, and a populous extent of terri
tory.
In an arbitrary despotic government, where the lands are at the disposal of
the prince, the rules of succession, or the mode of enjoyment, must depend up
on his will and pleasure.
Hence there can be but few legal determinations re
lating to the property, the descent, or the conveyance of real estates; and the
same holds in a stronger degree with regard to goods and chattels, and the
contracts relating thereto. Under a tyrannical sway trade must be continually
in jeopardy, and of consequence can never be extensive: this therefore puts an
end to the necessity of an infinite number of rules, which the English merchant
daily recurs to for adjusting commercial differences.
Marriages are there usually
contracted with slaves; or at least women are treated as such: no laws can be
therefore expected to regulate the rights of dower, jointures, and marriage set
tlements.
Few also are the persons who can claim the privileges of any laws;
the bulk of those nations, viz., the commonalty, boors, or peasants, being merely
villeins and bondmen.
Those are therefore left to the private coercion of their
lords, are esteemed (in the contemplation of these boasted legislators) incapable
of either right or injury, and of consequence are entitled to no redress.
We
may see, in these arbitrary states, how large a field of legal contests is already
rooted up and destroyed.
Again; were we a poor and naked people, as the savages of America are,
strangers to science, to commerce, and the arts as well of convenience as of
luxury, we might perhaps be content, as some of them are said to be, to refer
all disputes to the next man we met upon the road, and so put a short end
*to everv controversy. For in a state of nature there is no room for
F*3271
municipal laws; and the nearer any nation approaches to that state the
fewer they will have occasion for. When the people of Rome were little better
than sturdy shepherds or herdsmen, all their laws were contained in ten or
twelve tables; but as luxury, politeness, and dominion increased, the civil law
increased in the same proportion; and swelled to that amazing bulk which it
now occupies, though successively pruned and retrenched by the emperors
Theodosius and Justinian.
In like manner we may lastly observe, that, in petty states and narrow terri
tories, much fewer laws will suffice than in large ones, because there are fewer
The regulations of a private family
objects upon which the laws can operate.
are short and well known; those of a prince's household are necessarily more
various and diffuse.
The causes therefore of the multiplicity of the English laws are, the extent
of the country which they govern; the commerce and refinement of its in
habitants; but, above all, the liberty and property of the subject. These will
naturally produce an infinite fund of disputes, which must be terminated in a
judicial way; and it is essential to a free people, that these determinations be
published and adhered to; that their property may be as certain and fixed as
the very constitution of their state.
For though in many other countries
«very thing is left in the breast of the judge to determine, yet with us he is
-occasion,

other,

is alleged, abundance

as the
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only to declare and pronounce, not to make or new-model, the law. Hence a
multitude of decisions, or cases adjudged, will arise; for seldom will it happen
that any one rule will exactly suit with many cases. And in proportion as the
decisions of courts of judicature are multiplied, the law will be loaded with
decrees, that may sometimes (though rarely) interfere with each other: either
because succeeding judges may not be apprized of the prior adjudication; or
because they may think differently from their predecessors;
or because the
same arguments did not occur formerly as at *present; or, in fine, be- r*qnHi
cause of the natural imbecility and imperfection that attends all human
But wherever this happens to be the case in any material point,
proceedings.
the legislature is ready, and from time to time, both may, and frequently does,
intervene to remove the doubt; and, upon due deliberation had, determines by
a declaratory statute how the law shall be held for the future.
Whatever instances, therefore, of contradiction or uncertainty may have
been gleaned from our records, or reports, must be imputed to the defects of
human laws in general, and are not owing to any particular ill construction of
the English system.
Indeed, the reverse is most strictly true. The English
law is less embarrassed with inconsistent resolutions and doubtful questions,
than any other known system of the same extent and the same duration.
may instance in the civil law; the text whereof, as collected by Justinian and
his agents, is extremely voluminous and diffuse; but the idle comments, ob
scure glosses, and jarring interpretations grafted thereupon, by the learned
jurists, are literally without number. And these glosses, which are mere pri
vate opinions of scholastic doctors (and not like our books of reports, judicial
determinations of the court), are all of authority sufficient to be vouched and
relied on: which must needs breed great distraction and confusion in their
tribunals.
The same may be said of the canon law; though the text thereof
is not of half the antiquity with the common laws of England; and though the
liable to be perplexed with
the more
more ancient any system of laws
When, therefore,
the multitude of judicial decrees.
body of laws, of so
in general so clear and perspicuous,
argues
high antiquity as the English,
deep wisdom and foresight in such as laid the foundations, and great care and
circumspection in such as have built the superstructure.
But
not
will be asked) the multitude of law-suits, which we daily see
and experience, an argument against the clearness and certainty of the law
,
itself
By no means: for *among the various disputes and controver- r
sies which are daily to be met with in the course of legal proceedings,
obvious to observe how very few arise from obscurity in the rules or
it
maxims of law. An action shall seldom be heard of, to determine question
of inheritance, unless the fact of the descent be controverted. But the dubi
ous points which are usually agitated in our courts, arise chiefly from the diffi
of ascertaining the intentions of individuals, in their solemn
culty there
It
dispositions of property; in their contracts, conveyances, and testaments.
an object, indeed, of the utmost importance in this free and commercial
country, to lay as few restraints as possible upon the transfer of possessions
from hand to hand, or their various designations marked out by the prudence,
convenience, necessities, or even by the caprice, of their owners: yet to inves
frequently matter of difficulty, among
tigate the intention of the owner
various obscurity.
or wills of
The law
heaps of entangled conveyances
rarely hesitates in declaring its own meaning; but the judges are frequently
Thus the powers, the interest, the
puzzled to find out the meaning of others.
tenant for life, and
tenant in tail, are
privileges, and the properties of
will
clearly distinguished and precisely settled by law: but what words in
shall constitute this or that estate, has occasionally been disputed for more
than two centuries past, and will continue to be disputed as long as the care
lessness, the ignorance, or singularity of testators shall continue to clotha.
their intentions in dark or new-fangled expressions.
(it
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Bat, notwithstanding so vast an accession of legal controversies, arising
from so fertile a fund as the ignorance and wilfulness of individuals, these will
bear no comparison in point of number to those which are founded upon the
dishonesty, and disingenuity of the parties: by either their suggesting com
plaints that are false in fact, and thereupon bringing groundless actions; or by
their denying such facts as are true, in setting up unwarrantable defences.
Ee
facto oritur jus: if therefore the fact be perverted or misrepresented, the law
f *330l wn*cn &Tl^ee from thence will unavoidably be unjust or partial. *And,
*•
■'in order to prevent this, it is necessary to set right the fact, and estab
lish the truth contended for, by appealing to some mode of probation or trial,
which the law of the country has ordained for a criterion of truth and false
hood.

These modes of probation or trial form in every civilized country the great
object of judicial decisions. And experience will abundantly show, that above
a hundred of our law-suits arise from disputed facts, for one where the law is
doubted of. About twenty days in the year are sufficient in Westminster-hall
to settle (upon solemn argument) every demurrer, or other special point of law
that arises throughout the nation: but two months are annually spent in decid
ing the truth of facts, before six distinct tribunals, in the several circuits of
England: exolusive of Middlesex and London, which afford a supply of causes
much more than equivalent to any two of the largest circuits.
Trial, then, is the examination of the matter of fact in issue: of which there
are many different species, according to the difference of the subject, or thing
to be tried: of all which we will take a cursory view in this and the subse
quent chapter. For the law of England so industriously endeavours to in
vestigate truth at any rate, that it will not confine itself to one, or to a few,
manners of trial; but varies its examination of facts according to the nature
of the facts themselves: this being the one invariable principle pursued, that
as well the best method of trial, as the best evidence upon that trial which the
nature of the case affords, and no other, shall be admitted in the English
courts of justice.
The species of trials in civil cases are seven.
By record; by inspection, or
examination; by certificate; by witnesses; by wager of battel; by wager of
law; and by jury.
L First then of the trial by record. This is only used in one particular intnat *8 where a matter of record *is pleaded in any action,
8tance:
r*83l1
J as a fine, a judgment or the like ; and the opposite party pleads,
*■
"nul tiel record" that there is no such matter of record existing: upon this,
" and this he prays may be
issue is tendered and joined in the following form,
inquired of by the record, and the other doth the like;" and hereupon the party
pleading the record has a day given him to bring it in, and proclamation is
made in court for him to "bring forth the record by him in pleading alleged,
or else he shall be condemned;" and, on his failure, his antagonist shall have
The trial, therefore, of this issue is merely by the rec
judgment to recover.
ord ; for, as Sir Edward Coke (b) observes, a record or enrolment is a monu
ment of so high a nature, and importeth in itself such absolute verity, that if
it be pleaded that there is no such record, it shall not receive any trial by wit
Thus, titles of nobility, aa
ness, jury, or otherwise, but only by itself.
whether earl or no earl, baron or no baron, shall be tried by the king's writ or
patent only, which is matter of record, (c) Also in case of an alien, whether
alien friend or enemy, shall be tried by the league or treaty between his sover
eign and ours; for every league or treaty is of record, {d) And also, whether
a manor be to be held in ancient demesne or not, shall be tried by the record
of domesday in the king's exchequer.
II. Trial by inspection, or examination, is when, for the greater expedition
of a cause, in some point or issue, being either the principal question or arising
(b) 1 Inst. 117,280.
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collaterally out of it, but being evidently the object of sense, the judges of the
court, upon the testimony of their own senses, shall decide the point in dispute.
For where the affirmative or negative of a question is matter of such obvious
determination, it is not thought necessary to summon a jury to decide it; who
are properly called in to inform the conscience of the court in respect of dubi- <
ous facts: and therefore when the fact, from its nature, must be evident to the'
court either from ocular demonstration or other irrefragable proof, there the
law departs *from its usual resort, the verdict of twelve men, and relies rt..„i
*
As in case of a suit to reverse a *•
on the judgment of the court alone.
fine for non-age of the cognizor, or to set aside a statute or recognizance
entered into by an infant; here, and in other cases of the like sort, a writ shall
issue to the sheriff; (e) commanding him that he constrain the said party to
appear, that it may be ascertained by the view of his body by the king's jus
tices, whether he be of full age or not; "ut per aspectum corporis sui constare
poterit jusliciariis nostris, si prwdictus A sit plenm mt at is necne." (f) If,
however, the court has, upon inspection, any doubt of the age of the party (as
may frequently be the case), it may proceed to take proofs of the fact; and, par
ticularly, may examine the infant himself upon an oath of voir dire,veritatem
dicere, that is, to make true answer to such questions as the court shall
demand of him; or the court may examine his mother, his godfather, or the
like, {ff)
In like manner if a defendant pleads in abatement of the suit that the
plaintiff is dead, and one appears and calls himself the plaintiff, which the
defendant denies: in this case the judges shall determine by inspection and
examination, whether he be the plaintiff or not. (h) Also if a man be found
by a jury an idiot a nativitate, he may come in person into the chancery be
fore the chancellor, or be brought there by his friends, to be inspected and
examined, whether idiot or not: and
upon such view and inquiry,
appears
he
not so, the verdict of the jury, and all the proceedings thereon, are utterly
void and instantly of no effect,
Another instance in which the trial by inspection may be used,
when upon
an appeal of mayhem, the issue joined
be mayhem or no mayhem,
whether
this shall be deoided by the court upon inspection; for which purpose they
may *call in the assistance of surgeons, (j) (1) And, by analogy to
this, in an action of trespass for mayhem, the court (upon view of such
certified by the
mayhem as the plaintiff has laid in his declaration, or which
judges who tried the cause to be the same as was given in evidence to the jury)
may increase the damages at their own discretion; (k) as may also be the case
But then the battery must likewise be
upon view of an atrocious battery.
alleged so certainly in the declaration, that
may appear to be the same with
the battery inspected.
Also to ascertain any circumstances relative to a particular day past,
hath
been tried by an inspection of the almanac by the court.
Thus upon writ
of error from an inferior court, that of Lynn, the error assigned was that the
judgment was given on Sunday,
appearing to be on 26 of February, 26 Eliz.,
and upon inspection of the almanacs or that year,
was found that the 26th
of February in that year actually fell upon Sunday: this was held to be a
sufficient trial, and that
trial by jury was not necessary, although
was an
error in fact; and so the judgment was reversed, (m)
But in all these cases,
the judges,
doubt, may order
to be tried by jury.
they conceive
ILL The trial by certificate
allowed in such cases, where the evidence of
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(/) This question of non-ape was formerly, acoordlng to Glanvtl (l IS, o. 15),tried by a Jury of eight
men, though now
is tried by inspection,
(j) RolL Abr. 578.
(a) KolC Abr. 678.
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the person certifying is the only proper criterion of the point in dispute.
For,,
when the fact in question lies out of the cognizance of the court, the judges
must rely on the solemn averment or information of persons in such a station,
as affords them the most clear and competent knowledge of the truth.
Aft
therefore such evidence (if given to a jury) must have been conclusive, the law,
to save trouble and circuity, permits the fact to be determined upon such cer
tificate merely. Thus, 1. If the issue be whether A was absent with the king
in his army out of the realm in time of war, this shall be tried (n) by the cerof the mareschal of *the king's host in writing under his seal,.
r*<miJ tificate
*■
which shall be sent to the justices. 2. If, in order to avoid an outlaw
ry, or the like, it was alleged that the defendant was in prison, ultra mare, at
Bourdeaux, or in the service of the mayor of Bourdeaux, this should have been
tried by the certificate of the mayor; and the like of the captain of Calais, (o)
But when this was law, (p) those towns were under the dominion of the crown
of England.
And therefore, by a parity of reason, it should now hold that in
similar cases, arising at Jamaica, or Minorca, the trial should be by certificate
from the governor of those islands.
We also find (q) that the certificate of
the queen's messenger, sent to summon home a peeress of the realm, was form
erly held a sufficient trial of the contempt in refusing to obey such summons.
For matters within the realm, the customs of the city of London shall be tried
by the certificate of the mayor and aldermen, certified by the mouth of their
that the custom ought
surmise from the party alleging
recorder; (r) upon
to be thus tried: else
must be tried by the country, (s) As, the custom of
distributing the effects of freemen deceased; of enrolling apprentices; or that
he who
free of one trade may use another;
any of these or other similar
points come in issue. But this rule admits of an exception, where the corpor
ation of London
party, or interested, in the suit; as in an action brought for
a penalty inflicted by the custom; for there the reason of the law will not en
dure so partial
trial; but this custom shall be determined by
jury, and not,
4.
by the mayor and aldermen, certifying by the mouth of their recorder,
In some cases the sheriff of London's certificate shall be the final trial: as
citizen of London or foreigner, (u)
the issue be, whether the defendant be
in case of privilege pleaded to be sued only in the city courts. Of
nature
the trial of the privilege of the university, wben
somewhat similar to which
the chancellor claims cognizance of the cause, because one of the parties
*Pr'v^eSe^ person. In this case, the charters confirmed by act of parliaT*335
ment direct the trial of the question, whether
privileged person oo
no, to be determined by the certificate and notification of the chancellor under
hath also been usual to add an affidavit of the fact: but
the
seal; to which
member of the univer
parties be at issue between themselves, whether A
sity or no, on
plea of privilege, the trial shall be then by jury, and not by
the chancellor's certificate: (v) because the charters direct only that the privil
ege be allowed on the chancellor's certificate, when the claim of cognizance
made by him, and not where the defendant himself pleads his privilege: so
In matters
that this must be left to the ordinary course of determination.
of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, as marriage, and, of course, general bastardy;
and also excommunication and orders, these, and other like matters, shall be
be pleaded in abatement, that the
tried by the bishop's certificate, (w) As
man claims an
excommunicated, and issue
plaintiff
joined thereon; or
estate
bastard or
descent, and the tenant alleges the demandant to be
the issue in
on
writ of dower, the heir pleads no marriage; or
quare impedit be, whether or no the church be full by institution; all these being mat
ters of mere ecclesiastical
cognizance, shall be tried by certificate from the
But in an action on the case for calling
man bastard, the defendordinary.
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ant having pleaded in justification that the plaintiff was really so, this was
directed to he tried by a jury: (x) because, whether the plaintiff be found either
a general or special bastard, the justification will be good; and no question of
special bastardy shall be tried by the bishop's certificate, but by a jury, (y)
For a special bastard is one born before marriage, of parents who afterwards
intermarry: which is bastardy by our law, though not by the ecclesiastical.
It would therefore be improper to refer the trial of that question to the bishop;
,
who, whether the child be born before or after marriage, will be *sure p»
to return or certify him legitimate, (z) Ability of a clerk presented, ■■ '
(a) admission, institution and deprivation of a clerk, shall also be tried by
certificate from the ordinary or metropolitan, because of these he is the mcst
competent judge: (b) but induction shall be tried by a jury, because it is a
matter of public notoriety, (c) and is likewise the corporal investiture of the
temporal profits. Resignation of a benefice may be tried in either way; (d)
but it seems most properly to fall within the bishop's cognizance.
6. The trial
of all customs and practice of the courts shall be by certificate from the proper
officers of those courts respectively; and, what return was made on a writ by
the sheriff or under-sheriff, shall be only tried by his own certificate, (e)
And
thus much for those several issues, or matters of fact, which are proper to be
tried by certificate.
IV. A fourth species of trial is that by witnesses, per testes, without the in
tervention of a jury. (2) This is the only method of trial known to the civil
law; in which the judge is left to form in his own breast his sentence upon the
credit of the witnesses examined: but it is very rarely used in our law, which
Save only that
prefers the trial by jury before it in almost every instance.
when a widow brings a writ of dower, and the tenant pleads that the husband
is not dead; this, being looked upon as a dilatory plea,
in favour of the
widow, and for greater expedition, allowed to be tried by witnesses examined
and so, saith Finch, (f) shall no other case in our law.
before the judges
But Sir Edward Coke (g) mentions some others: as to try whether the tenant
in real action was duly summoned, or the validity of
juror:
challenge to
so that Finch's observation must be confined to the trial of direct and not col
And in every case Sir Edward Coke lays
lateral issues.
down, that the
affirmative must be proved by two witnesses at the least. (3)
of great antiquity, but much dis*V. The next species of trial
r*Q3*-i■*
■■
the parties choose to abide by it; (4)
used; though still in force,
This
battel.
seems
to
have
its
mean the trial
owed
wager of
original to the
military spirit of our ancestors, joined to a superstitious frame of mind;
being in the nature of an appeal to Providence, under an apprehension and
hope (however presumptuous and unwarrantable) that heaven would give the
The decision of suits by this appeal to the;
victory to him who had the right.
God of battles
by some said to have been invented by the Burgundi, one of
true,
the northern or German clans that planted themselves in Gaul. And
in
that the first written injunction of judiciary combats that we meet with
the laws of Gundebald, A. D. 501, which are preserved in the Burgundian
8.

1

9

.

2

2

(u) Dyer, 79.
(z) See Introd. to tbe Great Charter, edit. Oxon. rub anno 1238.
Roll Abr 583.&c.
ch. 11.
(6) Inst. 682. Show. Pari. c. 88.
(d) Roll. Abr. 588.
(/) L. 428.
(e) Rep. 81.
fo) Intt.
2

L

(X) Hob. 179.
<a) See book
(e) Dyer, 228.

it
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optional with the parties in
By th8 rules adopted since the Judicature Act of 1878,
jury, but either party still has a right to demand a jury.
cases to proceed without
One of several defendants cannot have a jury
Bee 8ugg v. Silber,
Q. B. D., 362.
Ch. Div., 235.
without the consent of the rest. Back v. Hay, L. R
suffices to prove
fact by the evidence
(3) In general, except in treason and perjury,
of single credible witness.
&c,
of
as well as wager
battle, were abolished by
(4) Appeals of murder, treason, felony,
" Supersti
846, n. Also,
c. 46. See, as to wager of battle, book IV,
statute 59 Qeo.
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Yet it does not seem to have been merely a local custom of this or that
particular tribe, but to have been the common usage of all those warlike peo
ple from the earliest times, (h) And it may also seem from a passage in Velleius Paterculus,
that the Germans, when first they became known to the
Romans, were wont to decide all combats of right by the sword; for when
Quintilius Varus endeavoured to introduce among them the Roman laws and
method of trial,
was looked upon (says the historian) as
"noviias incog
nitas disciplines, ut solita armis decernijure terminarentur."
And among the
ancient Goths in Sweden we find the practice of judiciary duels established
upon much the same footing as they formerly were in our own country. (J)
This trial was introduced into England among other Norman customs by
William the Conqueror; but was only used in three cases, one military, one
criminal, and the third civil. The first in the court-martial, or court of chiv
of which we shall
alry and honour; (k) the second in appeals of felony,
'n
tne
next
and
the
third
issue
in
*writ of
book;
joined
upon
r*<nRl 6Peak
For in writs
right, the last and most solemn decision of real property.
matter of difficulty,
in
of right the jus proprietatis, which
frequently
question; but other real actions being merely questions of the jus possessionis,
which are usually more plain and obvious, our ancestors did not in them appeal
to the decision of Providence.
Another pretext for allowing
upon these
final writs of right, was also for the sake of such claimants as might have the
true right, but yet, by the death of witnesses, or other defect of evidence, be
unable to prove
to a jury. But the most curious reason of all
given in
the Mirror, (to) that
is allowable upon warrant of the combat between David
for the people of Israel of the one party, and Goliah for the Philistines of the
the other party:
reason which Pope Nicholas
very seriously decides to be
inconclusive, (n)
Of battle therefore on writ of right, (o) we are now to
speak; and although the writ of right itself, and of course this trial thereof,
law at this day,
be at present much disused; yet, as
may be matter of
curiosity at least, to enquire into the forms of this proceeding, as we may
gather them from ancient authors, (p)
The last trial by battle that was waged in the court of common pleas at
Westminster (though there was afterwards (q) one in the court of chivalry in
1631; and another in the county palatine of Murham (r) in 1638) was in the
thirteenth year of Queen Elizabeth, A. D. 1571, as reported by Sir James
Dyer: (a) and was held in Tothill-fields, Westminster, "non sine magna juris
who was himself
consultorum perturbatione" saith Sir Henry Spelman,
The form, as appears from the authors before cited,
witness of the ceremony.
as follows:
writ of right pleads the general issue, viz.: that he
When the tenant in
- hath more right to hold, than the ^demandant hath to recover; and
r,
0flers t0 prove
by the body of his champion, which tender
accepted
by the demandant; the tenant in the first place must produce his champion,
who, by throwing down his glove as gage or pledge, thus wages or stipulates
battel with the champion of the demandant; who, by taking up the gage or
glove stipulates on his part to accept the challenge. The reason why
waged by champions, and not by the parties themselves, in civil actions,
because,
any party to the suit dies, the suit must abate and be at an end for
the present; and therefore no judgment could be given for the lands in ques
either of the parties were slain in battle; (u) and also that no person
tion,
might claim an exemption from this trial, as was allowed in criminal cases,
where the battle was waged in person.
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A piece of ground is then in due time set oat, of sixty feet square, enolosed
with lists, and on one side a court erected for the judges of the court of com
mon pleas, who attend there in their scarlet robes; and also a bar is prepared
for the learned Serjeants at law. When the court sits, which ought to be by
sunrising, proclamation is made for the parties, and their champions; who are
introduced by two knights, and are dressed in a coat of armour, with red san
dals, bare-legged from the knee downwards, bareheaded, and with bare arms
The weapons allowed them are only batons, or staves of an ell
to the elbows.
long, and a four-cornered leather-target; so that death very seldom ensued this
In the court military indeed they fought with sword and lance,
civil combat.
according to Spelman and Rush worth; as likewise in France only villeins
fought with the buckler and baton, gentlemen armed at all points. And upon
this and other circumstances the president Montesquieu (v) hath with great
ingenuity not only deduced the impious custom of private duels upon imagin
ary points of honour, but hath also traced the heroic madness of knightBut to proceed.
erranty, from the same original of judicial combats.
* When the champions, thus armed with batons, arrive within the
r*<u0i
J
lists or place of combat, the champion of the tenant takes his adver- *■
sary by the hand, and makes oath that the tenements in dispute are not the
right of the demandant; and the champion of the demandant, then taking the
other by the hand, swears in the same manner that they are: so that each
or ought to be, thoroughly persuaded of the truth of the cause he
champion
to be taken by
fights for. Next an oath against sorcery and enchantment
both the champions, in this or similar form; "hear this, ye justices, that
have this day neither eat, drank, nor have upon me, neither bone, stone, nor
grass; nor any enchantment, sorcery, or witchcraft, whereby the law of God
So help me God and his
may be abased, or the law of the devil exalted.
saints."
The battle
thus begun, and the combatants are bound to fight till the
stars appear in the evening: and,
the champion of the tenant can defend
himself till the stars appear, the tenant shall prevail in his cause; for
sufficient for him to maintain his ground, and make
drawn battle, he being
victory declares itself for either party, for him
already in possession; but,
judgment finally given. This victory may arise, from the death of either
of the champions: which indeed hath rarely happened; the whole ceremony,
near resemblance to certain rural athletic diver
to say the truth, bearing
Or victory
sions, which are probably derived from this original.
obtained,
either champion proves recreant, that
yields, and pronounces the horrible
word of craven
word of disgrace and obloquy, rather than of any deter
minate meaning. But
horrible word
indeed
to the vanquished cham
punishment to him for forfeiting the land of his principal by
pion: since as
as a recreant, amittere
condemned,
pronouncing that shameful word, he
liberam legem, that
to become infamous, and not to be accounted liber et
legalis homo; being supposed by the event to be proved forsworn, and there
fore never to be put upon jury or admitted as
witness in any cause.
*This
the form of
trial by battle; a trial which the tenant, or r*q
in his election at this day to dedefendant in
writ of right, has
mand and which was the only decision of such writ of right after the conquest,
till Henry the Second, by consent of parliament, introduced the grand assize,
(jo) (5) a peculiar species of trial by jury, in concurrence therewith; giving
the tenant his choice of either the one or the other.
Which example, of dis
countenancing these judicial combats, was imitated about century afterwards
in France, by an edict of Louis the Pious, A. D. 1260, and soon after by the
The establishment of this alternative, Glanvil, chief justice
rest of Europe.
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to Henry the Second, and probably his adviser herein, considers as a most noble
improvement, as in fact it was, of the law. (as)
VX A sixth species of trial is by wager oflaw,(6) vadiatio legis, as the fore
going is called wager of battle, vadiatio duelli: because, as in the former case, the
defendant gave a pledge, gage, or vadium, to try the cause by battle; so here
he was to put in sureties or vadios, that at such a day he will make his law,
that
take the benefit which the law has allowed him. (y) For our ancestors
considered, that there were many cases where an innocent man, of good credit,
might be overborne by multitude of false witnesses; and therefore established
this species of trial, by the oath of the defendant himself, for
he will abso
lutely swear himself not chargeable, and appears to be person of reputation,
he shall go free and forever acquitted of the debt, or other cause of action.
*This method of trial
not only to be found in the codes of almost
*<U2
all the northern nations, that broke in upon the Roman empire, and es
tablished petty kingdoms upon its ruins; (z) but its original may also be traced
man deliver unto his neighbour an ass,
as far back as the Mosaical law.
die, or be hurt, or driven away,
or an ox, or sheep, or any beast to keep; and
no man seeing it; then shall an oath of the Lord be between them both, that
he hath not put his hands unto his neighbour's goods; and the owner of
shall
We shall likewise be able to
accept thereof, and he shall not make good." (a)
manifest resemblance, between this species of trial, and the canonical
discern
purgation of the popish clergy, when accused of any capital crime. The de
fendant or person accused was in both cases to make oath of his own innocence,,
certain number of compurgators, who swore they believed
and to produce
the sacramentum decisionis, or the
his oath.
Somewhat similar also to this
voluntary and decisive oath of the civil law; (b) where one of the parties to
the suit, not being able to prove his charge, offers to refer the decision of the
cause to the oath of his adversary; which the adversary was bound to accept, or
tender the same personal back again; otherwise the whole was taken as con
fessed
him. But though custom somewhat similar to this prevailed form
erly in the city of London, (c) yet in general the English law does not thus,
in the wrong, to the dilemma
like the civil, reduce the defendant, in case he
indeed so tender of permitting the oath
of either confession or perjury: but
allows
to be taken, even upon the defendant's own request, that
only in
has also devised other collateral remedies for
very few cases, and in those
excluded from his wager of law.
the party injured, in which the defendant
~ .„-,
this. He that has waged,
*The manner of waging and making law
or given security, to make his law, brings with him into court eleven of
custom, which we find particularly described so early as in
his neighbours:
the league between Alfred and Guthrun the Dane; (d) for by the old Saxon
constitution every man's credit in courts of law depended upon the opinion
which his neighbours had of his veracity. The defendant, then standing at
admonished by the judges of the nature and danger of a
the end of the bar,
he still persists, he
to repeat this or the like oath:
And
false oath,
"hear this, ye justices, that do not owe unto Richard Jones the sum of ten
pounds, nor any penny thereof, in manner and form as the said Richard hath
declared against me. So help me God." And thereupon his eleven neighbours,

8

and
(6) Wager of law was abolished by statute
in •■Superstition and Force," by H. C. Lea, p. 13.
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(x) Est autem magnd assisa regale quoddam beneflcium, dementia principle, de concilia procerum,
populis indultum; quo ritce hominum, et shit us integritati tarn salubriter consulitur, ut, retinendo quod
quispossidet in libero tenemento soli, duelli casum declinare possint hominet ambiguum. Ac per hoc
eontingit, insperatoe et prosmaturos mortis ultimum evadere sujiplicium, vel saltern perennis infamies
opprobrium illius infestl et inverecundi verbi, quod in ore victi turpiter sonat, consecuiivum. Ex ozquiJus enim, quod post multas et tongas dilationet
taie autem maxima prodita est legalis ista instiiutio.
viz evincitur per duellum, per beneflcium istius constitutionis commodtus et acceleratius expeditur. L.
°"
S8, a 18. Stiernh., dejure Sueon.
I.e.
Feud.
Co. LlttJSS.^
10,S8.
(a^Sp^L.
12.
(6) Cod.
(e) Bro. Abr. tit. ley gager, 77.
(a) Exod. rxil, 10.
WHk. LL.. Angl. Sax.
(e) Salic 688.
(d) Cap.
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compurgators, shall avow upon their oaths, that they believe in their con
sciences that he saith the truth; so that himself must be sworn de fidelitate, and
the eleven de credulitate.
It is held indeed by later authorities, {g) that
fewer than eleven compurgators will do: but Sir Edward Coke is positive that
there must be this number; and his opinion not only seems founded upon bet
ter authority, but also upon better reason: for, as wager of law is equivalent
to a verdict in the defendant's favour, it ought to be established by the same
or equal testimony, namely, by the oath of twelve men. And so indeed Glanvil expresses
and in
when
Henry
(A) "jurabit duodeoima manu
defendant in an action of debt waged his law,
was adjudged by the court
Thus, too, in an author of the age
"quod defendat se duodecimo, manu.1"
of Edward the First, (k) we read, " adjudicabitur reus ad legem suam duodecimomanu."
And the ancient treatise, entitled, Dyversite des courts, expressly con
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firms Sir Edward Coke's opinion. (I)
*It must be however observed, that so long as the custom continued r
of producing the secta, the suit, or witnesses to give probability to the
plaintiff's demand (of which we spoke in former chapter), the defendant was
not put to wage his law unless the secta was first produced, and their testimony
was found consistent. To this purpose speaks magna carta, c. 28.
"Nullum
■baUivus
de ccetero ponat aliquem ad legem manifestam" (that
wager of
wager of law), "simplici loquela sua,"
battel), "nec ad juramentum" (that
(that is, merely by his count or declaration), "sine testibus fidelibus ad hoc inductis." Which Fleta thus explains: (m) "sipetens sectam produxerit, et Con
cordes inveniantur, tunc reus poterit vadiare legem suam contra petentem et
contra sectam suam prolatam; sed si secta variabilis inveniatur, extunc non
true, indeed, that Fleta
tenebitur legem vadiare contra sectam illam." It
•expressly limits the number of compurgators to be only double to that of the
secta produced; "ut si duo9 vel tres testes produxerit ad probandum, opertet
quod defensio fiat per quatuor vel per sex; ita quod pro quolibet teste duos producat juratores, usque ad duodecim; so that, according to this doctrine, the
eleven compurgators were only to be produced, but not all of them sworn, un
less the secta consisted of six.
But though this might possibly be the rule till
the production of the secta was generally disused, since that time the duode
cimo, manus seems to have been generally required,
(n)
In the old Swedish or Gothic constitution, wager of law was not only per
mitted, as
still
in criminal cases, unless the fact be extremely clear against
the prisoner; (o) but was also absolutely required, in many civil cases; which
an author of their own (p) very justly charges as being the source of frequent
This, he tells us, was owing to the popish ecclesiastics, who intro
perjury.
duced this method of purgation from their canon law; and, having sown a
plentiful crop of oaths *in all judicial proceedings, reaped afterwards r
-an ample harvest of perjuries: for perjuries were punished in part by •■
pecuniary fines, payable to the coffers of the ohurch. But with us in England
never required/ and
then only admitted, where an action
wager of law
brought upon such matters as may be supposed to be privately transacted be
tween the parties, and wherein the defendant may be presumed to have made
satisfaction without being able to prove it. Therefore
only in actions of
debt upon simple contract, or for amercement, in actions of detinue, and of ac
count, where the debt may have been paid, the goods restored, or the account
balanced, without any evidence of either;
say,
only in these actions,
that the defendant
admitted to wage his law: (q) so that wager of law lieth
not, when there
any specialty, (as bond or deed), to charge the defendant,
for that would be cancelled,
satisfied; but when the debt groweth by word
(fc) Hengham magna, o. 6.

I.
1,

tit. ley gager,
o.

9.

(o) Mod. Un. HUt. zxxiil, 23.
(9) Co. Litt. 29S.
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only; nor doth it lie in an action of debt, for arrears of an acconnt, settled by
auditors in a former aotion. (r) And by such wager of law (when admitted)
the plaintiff is perpetually barred; for the law, in the simplicity of the ancient
times, presumed that no one would forswear himself for any worldly thing,
Wager of law, however, lieth in a real action, where the tenant alleges he was
not legally summoned to appear, as well as in mere personal contracts.
A man outlawed, attainted for false verdict, or for conspiracy or perjury, or
otherwise become infamous, as by pronouncing the horrible word in a trial by
battle, shall not be permitted to wage his law. Neither shall an infant under
the age of twenty-one, for he cannot be admitted to his oath
and, therefore,
on the other hand, the course of justice shall flow equally, and the defendant,
where an infant
feme-covert, when
plaintiff, shall not wage his law. But
joined with her husband, may be admitted to wage her law, and an alien shall
do
in his own language, (w)
*8 moreover
man
compellable by law to do
ru'e> *hat where
*348l
any thing, whereby he becomes oreditor to another, the defendant in
would be in tbe
that case shall not be permitted to wage his law: for then
power of any bad man to run in debt first, against the inclinations of his
But where the plaintiff hath given
creditor, and afterwards to swear
away.
voluntary credit to the defendant, there he may wage his law; for, by giving
him such credit, the plaintiff has himself borne testimony that he
one whose
that in an action of debt
character may be trusted. Upon this principle
prisoner by
gaoler for his victuals, the defendant shall not wage
against
his law: for the gaoler cannot refuse the prisoner, and ought not to suffer him
But otherwise
for the board or diet of
to perish for want of sustenance.
a man at liberty.
In an action of debt brought by an attorney for his fees,
the defendant cannot wage his law, because the plaintiff
compellable to he
servant be retained according to the statute of
his attorney. And so,
Eliz. o.
which obliges all single persons of a certain age, and not
laborers,
having other visible means of livelihood, to go out to service; in an action of
servant, the master shall not wage his law, be
debt for the wages of such
But
had been otherwise, had
cause the plaintiff was compellable to serve.
the hiring been by special contract, and not according to the statute. (t>)
In no case where contempt, trespass, deceit, or any injury, with force
he permitted to wage his law: (w>) for
alleged against the defendant,
impossible to presume he has satisfied the plaintiff his demand in such cases,
jury. Nor will the
where damages are uncertain and left to be assessed by
law trust the defendant with an oath to discharge himself, where the private
were with
public crime, that of force and violence
coupled as
injury
which would be equivalent to the purgation oath of the civil law, which ours
rejected.

is,

-I

a

it

is

a

is

a

it,

a

LT

*Executors and administrators, when charged for the debt of the
deceased, shall not be admitted to wage their law: (a;) for no man can
safe conscience wage law of another man's contract; that
swear
with
or, at least, that he privately discharged it. Tbe
that he never entered into
reflection on
king also has his prerogative; for, as all wager of law imports
the plaintiff for dishonesty, therefore there shall be no such wager on actions
communicated to
brought by him. (y) And this prerogative extends and
writ of quo minus in the exchequer for
his debtor and accomptant; for, on
not allowed to wage his law. (z)
a debt on simple contract, the defendant
Thus the wager of law was never permitted, but where the defendant bore a
also was confined to such cases where
fair and unreproachable character; and
debt might be supposed to be discharged or satisfaction made in private
without any witnesses to attest it: and many other prudential restrictions
*<u'7l

;r) 10Rep. 108.
!u) Co. tltt. S95.
(x) Finch L. 184.
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«) Co. Lit*. 296.
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But at length it was considered, that (even
accompanied this indulgence.
under all its restrictions) it threw too great a temptation in the way of indi
gent or profligate men; and therefore by degrees new remedies were devised,
and new forms of action were introduced, wherein no defendant is at liberty
to wage his law. So that now no plaintiff need at all apprehend any danger
from the hardiness of his debtor's conscience, unless he voluntarily chooses to
rely on his adversary's veraoity, by bringing an obsolete, instead of a modern
action.
Therefore one shall hardly hear at present of an action of debt
brought upon a simple contract; that being supplied by an action of trespass
on the case for the breach of a promise or assumpsit/ wherein, though the
specific debt cannot be recovered, yet the damages may, equivalent to the spe
cific debt.
And this being an action of trespass, no law can be waged therein.
So instead of an action of detinue to recover the very thing detained, an action
of trespass on the case in trover and conversion *is usually brought; r*o4s-i
*
wherein though the horse or other specific chattel cannot be had, yet *•
the defendant shall pay damages for the conversion equal to the value of the
chattel ; and for this trespass also no wager of law is allowed. In the room
of actions of account, a bill in equity is usually filed; wherein, though the
defendant answers upon his oath, yet such oath is not conclusive to the plain
tiff: but he may prove every article by other evidence, in contradiction to
what the defendant has sworn. So that wager of law is quite out of use,
being avoided by the mode of bringing the action; but still it is not out of
force. And therefore, when a new statute inflicts a penalty, and gives an
action of debt for recovering
usual to add, in which no wager of law
Bhall be allowed: otherwise an hardy delinquent might escape any penalty of
the law,
swearing he had never incurred, or else had discharged it.
These six species of trials, that we have considered in the present chapter,
are only had in certain special and eccentrical cases; where the trial by the
In the
country, per pais, or by jury, would not be so proper or effectual.
next chapter we shall consider at large the nature of that principal criterion of
truth in the law of England.

CHAPTER XXIII.

OF THE TRIAL BY JURY.
The subject of our next inquiries will be
called also the trial per pais, or

been used time out of mind in this

a

the nature and method of the trial
trial that hath
by the country
nation, and seems to have been coeval with
Some authors have endeavoured to trace
the Britons themselves, the first inhabitants
they were in use among the earliest Saxon

:

;

by jury

(a) Dt
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the first civil government thereof.
the original of juries up as high as
of our island but certain
that
colonies, their institution being ascribed by Bishop Nicholson (a) to Woden
that we may find
himself, their great legislator and captain. Hence
traces of juries in the laws of all those nations which adopted the feudal sys
tribunal com
tem, as in Germany, France and Italy; who had all of them
" boni homines," usually the vassals or
posed of twelve good men and true,
tenants of the lord, being the equals or peers of the parties litigant; and, as
the lord's vassals judged each other in the lord's courts, so the king's vassals,
or the lords themselves, judged each other in the king's court. (A) In England
we find actual mention of them so early as the laws of King Ethelred, and that
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(c)

not as a new invention,
Stiernhook ((?) ascribes the invention of the jury,
denominated nembda, to Regner, king of
which in the Teutonic language
Sweden and Denmark, who was cotemporary with our King Egbert.
Just as
we are apt to impute the invention of this, and some *other pieces of
P*„_01
juridical polity, to the superior genius of Alfred the Great; to whom,
on account of his having done much,
usual to attribute every thing; and
as the tradition of ancient Greece placed to the account of their own Hercules
whatever achievement was performed superior to the ordinary prowess of man
kind. Whereas the truth seems to be, that this tribunal was universally estab
lished among all the northern nations, and so interwoven in their very consti
tution, that the earliest accounts of the one give us also some traces of the
Its establishment however and use, in this island, of what date
other. (1)
soever
time greatly impaired and shaken by the introduc
be, though for
tion of the Norman trial by battle, was always so highly esteemed and valued
by the people, that no conquest, no change of government, could ever prevail
more than once insisted on as the principal
to abolish it. In magna carta
bulwark of our liberties; but especially by chapter 29, that no freeman shall
be hurt in either his person or property; "nisi per legale judicium parium
suorum velper legem terra."
A privilege which couched in almost the same
words with that of the emperor Conrad, two hundred years before: (e) "nemo
antecessorum nostrorum
beneficium suumperdat, nisi secundum consuetudinem
et per judicium parium suorum."
And
was ever esteemed, in all countries,
privilege of the highest and most beneficial nature.
But
will not misspend the reader's time in fruitless encomiums on this
method of trial; but shall proceed to the dissection and examination of
in
all its parts, from whence indeed its highest encomium will arise; since, the
sure to be valued. And
more
searched into and understood, the more
this
species of knowledge most absolutely necessary for every gentleman
in the kingdom: as well because he may be frequently called upon to deter
mine in this capacity the rights of others, his fellow-subjects; as because his
own property, his liberty, and his life, depend upon maintaining, in its legal
force, the constitutional trial by jury.
"Trials byjury in civil causes are of two kinds; extraordinary and
r*a«ii
The extraordinary
shall only briefly hint at, and confine
ordinary.
more usual and ordinary.
the main of my observations to that which
The first species of extraordinary trial by jury
that of the grand assize,
which was instituted by King Henry the Second in parliament, as was men
tioned in the preceding chapter, by way of alternative offered to the choice of
the tenant or defendant in
writ of right, instead of the barbarous and
unchristian custom of duelling.
For this purpose
writ de magna assiza
directed to the sheriff, (f) to return four knights, who are to elect
eligenda
and choose twelve others to be joined with them, in the manner mentioned by
Glanvil; {g) who, having probably advised the measure itself,
more than
usually copious in describing it; and these, all together, form the grand assize,
or great jury, which
to try the matter of right, and must now consist of six
teen jurors, (h) (2)
the jury to try an attaint
Another species of extraordinary juries,
which
former jury, for bringing in
false verdict:
process commenced against
(8) of which we shall speak more largely in subsequent chapter. At present
shall only observe, that this jury
to consist of twenty-four of the best men
Leon. 90S.

an account of trial by jury among the northern nations, see History of Trial by
William Forsyth.
As to the method of trial at Athens by dicasteriea faintly
resembling our juries, see Grote, Hist. Greece, vol. v, ch. 46.
abolished.
(2) This mode of trial
Geo. IV, c. 50, s. 60.
(8) Abolished by
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in the county, who are called the grand jury in the attaint, to distinguish
them from the first or petit jury; and these are to hear and try the goodness
of the former verdict.
shall pursue
With regard to the ordinary trial by jury in oivil cases,
that set out with in explaining the nature
the same method in considering
of prosecuting actions in general, viz.: by following the order and course of the
proceedings themselves, as the most clear and perspicuous way of treating it.
*When, therefore, an issue
joined, by these words, "and this the
+ac.n-\
said A prays may be inquired of by the country," or, "and of this he
—
does the like," the court
puts himself upon the country, and the said
awards a writ of venire facias upon the roll or record, commanding the sheriff
"that he cause to come here on such day, twelve free and lawful men, liberos
et legates homines, of the body of his county, by whom the truth of the mat
ter may be better known, and who are neither of kin to the aforesaid A, nor
the aforesaid B, to recognize the truth of the issue between the said parties." (i)
And such writ was accordingly issued to the sheriff.
Thus the cause stands ready for trial at the bar of the court itself for all
trials were there anciently had, in actions which were there first commenced
which then never happened but in matters of weight and consequence, all
trifling suits being ended in the court-baron, hundred, or county courts: and
indeed all causes of great importance or difficulty are still usually retained
But when the
upon motion, to be tried at the bar in the superior courts.
usage began to bring actions of any trifling value in the courts of Westminsterwas found to be an intolerable burthen to compel the parties, witnesses,
ha'l,
and jurors, to come from Westmoreland, perhaps, or Cornwall, to try an
A practice therefore, very early obtained,
action of assault at Westminster.
of continuing the cause from term to term, in the court above, provided the
justices in eyre did not previously come into the county where the cause of
it happened that they arrived there within that inter
action arose; (j) and
val, then the cause was removed from the jurisdiction of the justices at
Westminster to that of the justices in eyre. Afterwards, when the justices in
eyre were superseded by the modern justices of assize (who came twice or
thrice in the year into the several counties, ad capiendas assisas, to take or try
,
writs of assize, of mort d' ancestor, novel disseisin, nuisance, *and the
13 Edw.
c. 30,
like),
power was superadded by statute Westm.
to these justices of assize to try common issues in trespass, and other less
important suits, with direction to return them (when tried) into the court
And as only the trial, and
above, where alone the judgment should be given.
not the determination of the cause, was now intended to be had in the court
below, therefore the clause of nisi prius was left out of the conditional con
tinuances before mentioned, and was directed by the statute to be inserted
" that the sheriff should cause the
in the writs of venire facias/ that
jurors
to come to Westminster (or wherever the king's court should be held) on such
a day in Easter and Michaelmas terms; nisi prius, unless before that day the
justices assigned to take assize shall come into his said county."
By virtue
of which the sheriff returned his jurors to the court of the justices of assize,
which was sure to be held in the vacations before Easter and Michaelmas terms;
and there the trial was had.
An inconvenience attended this provisionjprincipally because, as the sheriff
made no return of the jury to the court at Westminster, the parties were igno
rant who they were till they came upon the trial, and therefore were not ready
with their challenges or exceptions.
For this reason, by the statute 42 Edw.
Ill, o. 11, the method of trials by nisi prius was altered; and was enacted
that no inquests (except of assize and gaol delivery) should be taken by writ
of nisi prius, till after the sheriff had returned the names of the jurors to the
-I
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court above.
So that now in almost every civil cause the clause of nisi print
is left out of the writ of venire facias, which is the sheriff's warrant to warn
the jury: and is inserted in another part of the proceedings, as we shall see
presently.
For now the course is to make the sheriff's venire returnable on the last
return of the same term wherein issue is joined, viz.: Hilary or Trinity terms;
which, from the making up of the issues therein, are usually called issuable
And he returns the names of the jurors in a panel (a little pane,
terms.
This jury *ia
r^.-..-, ' or oblong piece of parchment) annexed to the writ.
l
not summoned, and therefore, not appearing at the day, must un
For which reason a compulsive process is now
avoidably make default.
awarded against the jurors, called in the common pleas a writ of habeas cor
pora juratorum, and in the king's bench a distringas, commanding the
sheriff to have their bodies or to distrain them by their lands and goods,
The entry therefore, on
that they may appear upon the day appointed.
" that the jury
the roll or record
respited, through defect of the
(k)
jurors, till the first day of the next term, then to appear at Westminster;
unless before that time, viz. on Wednesday the 4th of March, the justices of
our lord the king, appointed to take assizes in that county, shall have come to
And thereupon
to the place assigned for holding the assizes."
Oxford, that
the writ commands the sheriff to have their bodies at Westminster on the said
before that time
first day of next term, or before the said justices of assize,
they come to Oxford, viz.: on the 4th of March aforesaid. And, as the judges
are sure to come and open the circuit commissions on the day mentioned in the
writ, the sheriff returns and summons this jury to appear at the assizes, and
had before the justices of assize and nisiprius: among whom
there the trial
are usually two of the judges of the courts of West
(as hath been said)
minster, the whole kingdom being divided into six circuits, (4) for this pur
And thus we may observe that the trial of common issues, at nisiprius,
pose.
collateral incident to the original business of
which was in its original only
now, by the various revolutions of practice, become
the justices of assize,
their principal civil employment: hardly anything remaining in use of the real
assizes but the name.
If the sheriff be not an indifferent person as he be party in the Bait, or
not then
be related either by blood or affinity to either of the parties, he
trusted to return the jury, but the venire shall be directed to the coroners, who
in this, as in many other instances, are the substitutes of the sheriff, to execute
If any exception lies to the
process when he is deemed an improper person.
coroners, the venire shall be directed to two clerks of the court, or two persons
, of the county *named by the court, and sworn, (m) And these two,
r„
who are called elisors, or electors, shall indifferently name the jury, and
final; no challenge being allowed to their array.
their return
Let us now pause awhile, and observe (with Sir Matthew Hale) (n) in these
first preparatory stages of the trial, how admirably this constitution
adapted
and framed for the investigation of truth, beyond any other method of trial in
man of some for
For, first, the person returning the jurors
the world.
tune and consequence; that so he may be not only the less tempted to commit
wilful errors, but likewise be responsible for the faults of either himself or his
also bound by the obligation of an oath faithfully to execute
officers; and he
returned to the
his duty. Next, as to the time of their return: the panel
court upon the original venire, and the jurors are to be summoned and brought
in many weeks afterwards to the trial, whereby the parties may have notice of
the jurors, and of their sufficiency or insufficiency, characters, connections and
(*) Append. No. rj, |4.
(J) See page 68.
(at) Fortesc. de Laud. LL. o. ». Oo.Lttt.US.
(n>Hist. C. L. c. 12.
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relations, that so they may be challenged upon just cause; while at the same
time by means of the compulsory process (of distringas, or habeas corpora) the
cause is not like to be retarded through defect of jurors.
Thirdly, as to the
place of their appearance; which in causes of weight and consequence is at
the bar of the court; but in ordinary cases at the assizes, held in the county
where the cause of action arises, and the witnesses and jurors live: a provision
most excellently calculated for the saving of expense to the parties. For
though the preparation of the causes in point of pleading is transacted at
Westminster, whereby the order and uniformity of proceedings is preserved
throughout the kingdom, and multiplicity of forms is prevented; yet this is
no great charge or trouble, one attorney being able to transact the business of
forty clients. But the troublesome and most expensive attendance is that of
jurors and witnesses at the trial; which, therefore, is brought home to them
in the country where most of them inhabit.
Fourthly, the persons before
*whom they are to appear, and before whom the trial is to be held, are
r*35ai'
the judges of the superior court, if it be a trial at bar; or the judges *■
of assize, delegated from the courts at Westminster by the king, if the trial
be held in the country: persons, whose learning and dignity secure their juris
diction from contempt, and the novelty and very parade of whose appearance
The very point of their being
have no small influence upon the multitude.
strangers in the county is of infinite service, in preventing those factions and
parties which would intrude in every cause of moment, were it tried only be
fore persons resident on the spot, as justices of the peace, and the like. And
the better to remove all suspicion of partiality, it was wisely provided by the
statutes 4 Edw. Ill, c. 2, 8 Ric. II, c. 2, and 33 Hen. VIII, c. 24, that no judge
of assize should hold pleas in any county wherein he was born or inhabits. (5)
And as this constitution prevents party and faction from intermingling in the
trial of right, so it keeps both the rule and the administration of the laws uni
form.
These justices, though thus varied and shifted at every assizes, are all
sworn to the same laws, have had the same education, have pursued the same
studies, converse and consult together, communicate their decisions and resol
utions, and preside in those courts which are mutually connected and their
judgments blended together, as they are interchangeably courts of appeal or
advice to each other.
And hence, their administration of justice and conduct
of trials are consonant and uniform; whereby that confusion and contrariety
are avoided, which would naturally arise from a variety of uncommunicating
judges, or from any provincial establishment. But let us now return to the
assizes.

(6) This

is

a

if

is

a

is

if,

is,

When the general day of trials is fixed, the plaintiff or his attorney must
bring down the record to the assizes, and enter it with the proper officer, in
If it be not so entered, it cannot be
order to its being called on in course.
tried; therefore it is in the plaintiff's breast to delay any trial by not carrying
down the record: unless the defendant, being fearful of such neglect in the
plaintiff, and willing to discharge himself from the action, will himself under
take to bring on *the trial, giving proper notice to the plaintiff. Which r^oKhi
*
>•
proceeding is called the trial by proviso ; by reason of the clause then
inserted in the sheriff's venire, viz., "proviso, provided that if two writs come
to your hands (that
one from the plaintiff and another from the defendant),
you shall execute only one of them." But this practice hath begun to be dis
after issue joined,
used, since the statute 14 Qeo. II, o. 17, which enacts, that
the cause
not carried down to be tried acoording to the course of the court,
the plaintiff shall be esteemed to be nonsuited, and judgment shall be given
for the defendant as in case of nonsuit. In case the plaintiff intends to try
the cause, he
bound to give the defendant (if he lives within forty miles of
he lives at
greater distance, then
London) eight days' notice of trial; and,
no longer the law.
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fourteen days' notice, in order to prevent surprise: and if the plaintiff then
changes his mind, and does not countermand the notice six days before the
trial, he shall be liable to pay costs to the defendant for not proceeding to
The defendant, however, or plain
trial, by the same last-mentioned statute.
tiff, may, upon good cause shown to the court above, as upon absence or sick
ness of a material witness, obtain leave upon motion to defer the trial of the
cause till the next assizes. (6)
But we will now suppose all previous steps to the regularly settled, and the
The record is then handed to the judge, to
cause to be called on in court.
peruse and observe the pleadings, and what issues the parties are to maintain
and prove, while the jury is called and sworn. To this end the sheriff returns
his compulsive process, the writ of habeas corpora, or distringas, with the
panel of jurors annexed, to the judge's officer in court. The jurors contained
in the panel are either special or common jurors.
Special juries were originally
introduced in trials at bar, when the causes were of too great nicety for the
-discussion of ordinary freeholders; or where the sheriff was suspected of par
tiality, though not upon such apparent cause as to warrant an exception to him.
He is in such oases, upon motion in court and a rule granted thereupon, to
attend the prothonotary or other proper officer with his freeholder's book; and
tne °®cer *8 t0 ta^e *indifferently forty-eight of the principal freef*l"8l
•• ° J holders in the
presence of the attorneys on both sides; who are each of
them to strike off twelve, and the remaining twenty-four are returned upon
the panel.
By the statute 3 Geo. II, c. 25, either party is entitled upon motion
to have a special jury struck upon the trial of any issue, as well at the assizes
as at bar; he paying the extraordinary expense, unless the judge will certify
(in pursuance or the statute 24 Geo. II, o. 18) that the oause required such
special jury.
A common jury is one returned by the sheriff according to the directions
of the statute 3 Geo. II, c. 25, which appoints that the sheriff or officer shall
not return a separate panel for every separate cause, as formerly; but one and
the same panel for every cause to be tried at the same assizes, containing not
less than forty-eight, nor more than seventy-two jurors: and that their names,
being written on tickets, shall be put into a box or glass; and when each cause
is called, twelve of these persons, whose names shall be first drawn out of the
box, shall be sworn upon the jury, unless absent, challenged, or excused; or
unless a previous view of the messuages, lands, or place in question, shall have
been thought necessary by the court (o) in which case six or more of the
jurors returned, to be agreed on by the parties, or named by the judge or other
proper officer of the court, shall be appointed by special writ of habeas corpora
or distringas to have the matters in question shown to them by two persons
named in the writ; and then such of the jury as have had the view, or so many
of them as appear, shall be sworn on the inquest previous to any other jurors.
These acts are well calculated to restrain any suspicion of partiality in the
sheriff, or any tampering^ with the jurors when returned.
As the jurors appear, when called, they shall be sworn, unless challenged by
either party. Challenges are of two sorts; challenges to the array, and chal
lenges to the polls.
r,„ fl1'
""Challenges to the array are at once an exception to the whole panel,
*■
in which the jury are arrayed or set in order by the sheriff in his return;
and they may be made upon account of partiality or some default in the sheriff,
(o) Stat. 4 Anne,

a

UL

(6) This statute, so far as relates to Judgment as In case of a nonsuit, is repealed by the
•Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, which however provides a mode in which a plaintiff, who
unreasonably delays his suit, may be forced to proceed to trial, or have Judgment for cost*

•gainst him.
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6,
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(t)

or his under-officer who arrayed the panel. (7) And generally speaking, the
same reasons that, before the awarding the venire, were sufficient to have
directed it to the coroners or elisors, will be also sufficient to quash the array,
when made by a person or officer of whose partiality there is any tolerable
ground of suspicion. Also, though there be no personal objection against the
sheriff, yet if he arrays the panel at the nomination, or under the direotion of
either party, this is good cause of challenge to the array. Formerly, if a lord
of parliament had a cause to be tried, and no knight was returned upon the
jury, it was a cause of challenge to the array: (p) but an unexpected use having
been made of this dormant privilege by a spiritual lord, (q) it was abolished by
statute 24 Geo. II, c. 18. But still, in an attaint, a knight must be returned on
Also, by the policy of the ancient law, the jury was to come de
the jury, (r)
vicineto, from the neighbourhood of the vill or place where the cause of
action was laid in the declaration: and therefore some of the jury were obliged
to be returned from the hundred in which such vill lay; and if none were re
turned, the array might be challenged for defect of hundredors. Thus the
Gothic jury, or nembda, was also collected out of every quarter of the coun
try: "binos, trinos, vel etiam senoa eat singulis territorii quadrantibus." (a)
For living in the neighborhood, they were properly the very oountry, or pais,
to which both parties had appealed; and were supposed to know beforehand
the characters of the parties and witnesses, and therefore they better knew
what credit to give to the facts alleged in evidence.
But this convenience was
overbalanced by another very natural and almost unavoidable inconvenience;
that jurors, coming out of the immediate neighbourhood, would be apt
*to intermix their prejudices and partialities in the trial of right. And r
*oflf)-i
*
this our law was so sensible of, that it for a long time has been grad- *■
of
this
the
number
hundredors
in
the
ually relinquishing
practice;
necessary
whole panel, which, in the reign of Edward TTT) were constantly six,
being
in the time of Fortescue (m) reduced to four. Afterwards, indeed, the statute
35 Hen. VIII, c.
restored the ancient number of six, but that clause was
soon virtually repealed by statute 27 Eliz. c.
which required only two. And
Sir Edward Coke (v) also gives us such variety of circumstances, whereby
the courts permitted this necessary number to be evaded, that
appears they
were heartily tired of it. At length, by statute and
was en
Ann. c.
tirely abolished upon all civil actions, except upon penal statutes; and upon
those, also, by the 24 Geo. II, c. 18, the jury being now only to come de corpore comitatus, from the body of the county at large, and not de vicineto, or
from the particular neighbourhood. The array by the ancient law may also be
an alien be party to the suit, and, upon
rule obtained by his
challenged,
motion to the court for jury de medietate Ungues, such
one be not returned
by the sheriff, pursuant to the statute 28 Edw. Ill, o. 13, enforced by
Hen.
VI, c. 29, which enact, that where either party an alien born, the jury shall
be one-half denizens, and the other aliens (if so many be forthcoming in the
place), for the more impartial trial; a privilege indulged to strangers in no
other country in the world; but which is as ancient with us as the time of
King Ethel red, in whose statute de monticolis Wallice (then aliens to the crown
of England) cap.
ordained, that " duodeni legates homines, quorum sex
Walli et sex Angli erunt, Anglis et Waliis jus dicunto." But where both par

1

&

I.
1,

te) Co. Litt. 188. 8eld. on Baronage, ii. 11.
(a) K. vs. Bishop of Worcester, M. 23(Jeo. II, B. R.
(r) Co. Litt. 158.
c. 4.
0) Stiernhook, de jure Qoth.
(«) QUb. Hist C. P. a
(u) De Laud. LL. c. 28.
lost. 187.
(»)

is

a

9

it
is

it
is

if

the facts are denied the court appoints triers, and if
(7) Upon s challenge to the array,
overruled. If the facts are admit
they pronounce the cause of challenge unfounded,
ted, the court passes upon their sufficiency, and either quashes the panel or overrules the
Johns., 260. In the United States
Gardner v. Turner,
challenge.
believed that an
objection which would be good as challenge to the array,
generally raised by motion to.
quash or set aside the panel.
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(y) L.

0. IB.

1

8,
1,

I. 4.
2,
r.

(u>)Year-book, 21Hen. VI,
18, Decretal.
23,c. 86.
(x) Cod.
(») liut. 158.
(c) Cro. Eliz. 566.
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a

a
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if

(b)

is

a

is

a

is

is

(z)
it a

ties are aliens, no partiality is to be presumed to one more than another; and
therefore it was resolved soon after the statute S Hen. VI, (to) that where the
issue is joined between two aliens (unless the plea be had before the mayor of
the staple, and thereby subject to the restrictions of statute 27 Edw. Ill, st.
And it now might be a question, how
2, c. 8), the jury shall all be denizens.
*stat,ute ^ Geo. II, c. 25
referred to), hath in civil causes
^ar
(before
T *<?flll
*
•■
undesignedly abridged this privilege of foreigners, by the positive di
rections therein given concerning the manner of impanelling jurors, and the
persons to be returned in such panel. So that (unless this statute is to be con
strued by the same equity which the statute 8 Hen. VL o. 29, declared to be
the rule of interpreting the statute 2 Hen. V, st. 2, c. 3, concerning the landed
qualifications of jurors in suits to which aliens were parties) a court might
perhaps hesitate whether it has now a power to direct a panel to be returned
de medietate linguae, and thereby alter the method prescribed for striking a
special jury, or balloting for common jurors. (8)
Challenges to the polls, in capita, are exceptions to particular jurors; and
seem to answer to the recusatio judicis in the civil and canon laws; by the
constitutions of which a judge might be refused upon any suspicion of par
By the laws of England, also, in the times of Bracton (y) and
tiality, (x)
other
Fleta,
judge might be refused for good cause; but now the law
For
held that judges and justices cannot be challenged, (a)
wise, and
the law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in
judge, who
already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly
And should the fact at any time
depends upon that presumption and idea.
prove flagrantly such, as the delicacy of the law will not presume beforehand,
there
no doubt but that such misbehaviour would draw down
heavy cen
accountable for his conduct.
sure from those to whom the judge
But challenges to the polls of the jury (who are judges of fact) are reduced
to four heads by Sir Edward Coke;
propter honoris respectum; propter de
fectum; propter affectum; and propter delictum.
lord of parliament be impanelled on
Propter honoris respectum; as
jury, he may be challenged by either party, or he may challenge himself.
de*2. Propter defectum; as
juryman be an alien born, this
f*ifi9l
*defect of liberty, and
he be
slave or bondman, this
feet of birth;
he cannot be liber et leg alia homo.
Under the word homo, also, though
however excluded, propter defectum
name common to both sexes, the female
sexus: except when widow feigns herself with child, in order to exclude the
next heir, and
suspected to be intended; then upon the
suppositious birth
writ de ventre inspiciendo,
to be impanelled to try the
jury of women
But the principal deficiency
defect
question, whether with child or not.
This depends upon variety
of estate sufficient to qualify him to be
juror.
13 Edw.
c. 38, none shall
of statutes.
And, first, by the statute of West.
pass on juries in assizes within the county, but such as may dispend 20«. by
the year at the least; which
increased to 40s. by the statutes 21 Edw.
st
and
Hen. V, st.
c. 3.
This was doubled by the statute 27 Eliz. c.
which requires in every such case the jurors to have estate of freehold to the
But, the value of money at that time decreas
yearly value of 4/. at the least.
ing very considerably, this qualification was raised by the statute 16 and 17
Car. H, c.
to 20/. per annum, which being only
temporary act, for three
of
years, was suffered to expire without renewal, to the great debasement
was again raised
W. and M. c. 24,
juries. However, by the statute and

d)Lt,oi

87.

(a) Co.

Litt

2W.

a

§

a

is
a

6

is

Geo. IV, c. 50, provision
made for
jury de medietate lingua. In the United
(8) By
States, generally, alienage
ground for excluding juror whatever the citizenship of the
ProSatt on Jury Trial,
parties to the suit.
116.
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to 101. per annum in England, and 6Z. in Wales, of freehold lands or copyhold;
which is the first time that copyholders (as such) were admitted to serve upon
juries in any of the king's courts, though they had before been admitted to
serve in some of the sheriff's courts, by statutes 1 Ric.
c. 4, and 9 Hen.
VII, o. 13. And, lastly, by statute 3 Geo. II, c. 25, any leaseholder for the
term of five hundred years absolute, or for any term determinable upon life or
lives, of the clear yearly value of 20/. per annum over and above the rent re
When the jury is de medietate
served, is qualified to serve upon juries. (9)
Ungues, that is, one moiety of the English tongue or nation, and the other of
any foreign one, no want of lands shall be *cause of challenge to the r*°aoi
-*
alien; for, as he is incapable to hold any, this would totally defeat the

M,
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if
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if

if

a

is

8

if

is

if

a

is

is

(e)

privilege, (d)
3. Jurors may be challenged propter affectum, for suspicion of bias or par
This may be either a principal challenge, or to the favour. A prin
tiality.
cipal challenge is such, where the cause assigned carries with it prima facie
evident marks of suspicion, either of malice or favour: as, that a juror is of
kin to either party within the ninth degree;
that he has been arbitrator on
either side; that he has an interest in the cause; that there
an action
depending between him and the party; that he has taken money for his ver
dict; that he has formerly been
juror in the same cause; that he the party's
master, servant, counsellor, steward, or attorney, or of the same society or cor
true,
poration with him: all these are principal causes of challenge; which,
cannot be overruled, for jurors must be omni exceptione mqjoree.
Challenges
to the favour, are where the party hath no principal challenge: but objects
and the like;
only some probable circumstances of suspicion, as acquaintance
{/) the validity of which must be left to the determination of triors, whose
office
to decide whether the juror be favourable or unfavourable. The
triors, in case the first man called be challenged, are two indifferent persons
named by the court; and
they try one man and find him indifferent, he shall
be worn; and then he and the two triors shall try the next; and when another
found indifferent and sworn, the two triors shall be superseded, and the two
first sworn on the jury shall try the rest, (g) (10)
4. Challenges propter delictum, are for some crime or misdemeanor,
that
affects the juror's credit and renders him infamous.
As for conviction of
treason, felony, perjury, or conspiracy; or
for some infamous offence he
hath received judgment of the pillory, tumbrel, or the like; or to be branded,
he be outlawed or excommunicated, or
*whipt, or stigmatized; or
r*ofi .-i
hath been attainted of false verdict, praemunire, or forgery; or, lastly,
he hath proved recreant when champion in the trial by battle, and thereby
hath lost his liberam legem. A juror may himself be examined on oath of

J,

8

8,

2

S.

Hen. VL c. 29.
(e) Finch, L. 401.
It) Bee Btat. Hen. V, at. c.
(/) In the nembda. or jury of the ancient Goths, three challenges only were allowed to the favour, but
the principal challenges were Indefinite. " Licebat palam excipere, et temper ex probabiU causa tree
Stiernhook,
repuaiare etiam plures ex causa praegnanti et manifesia."
U7) Co. Lilt, IBS.
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(9) la England one must be between 31 and 60 years of age, and must be the owner of
some interest in real estate in the county, or be householder taxed on at least £30 for the
See
Geo.
poor rate, or must occupy house with at least fifteen windows.
c. 50, and
In the United States a juror must usually have the qualifications of
33 and 34 Vict. c. 77.
116.
an elector of the state. Proffatt, Jury Trial,
(10) The whole subject of challenges was very fully considered in the case of Freeman
Denio,
to which the reader
People,
referred.
As to what opinion formed or ex
juror will be sufficient ground for challenge to the favor, see
Burr's Trial,
pressed by
Bodine,
Denio, 807; Commonwealth v.
416; Osiander's Case,
Leigh, 785; People v.
Pick.,
Eames,
496; Smith v.
111., 76; Bradford v. State, 15 Ind., 347; Holt v.
Knapp,
People, 18 Mich., 224; Maddox v. State, 32 Qa., 581.
varies
so much in different states, that the American reader
The practice upon challenges
will expect to consult and be guided by the book of practice in use in his own state.
As t* disqualification from relationship, see Den v. Clark, Coxe, 444; Paddock v. Wells,
Barb. Ch., 831; Hasceig v. Tripp, 20 Mich., 216.
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dire, veritatem dicere, with regard to such causes of challenge as are
not to his dishonor or discredit; but not with regard to any crime, or any
thing which tends to his disgrace or disadvantage, (h)
Besides these challenges, which are exceptions against the fitness of jurors,
and whereby they may be excluded from serving, there are also other causes,
to be made use of by the jurors themselves, which are matter of exemption;
As, by statute West. 2,
whereby their service is excused, and not excluded.
13 Edw. I, c. 38, sick and decrepit persons, persons
not commorant in the
county, and men above seventy years old; and by the statute of 7 and 8 Wm.
HI, c. 32, infants under twenty-one. This exemption is also extended by
divers statutes, customs, and charters, to physicians and other medical persons,
counsel, attorneys, officers of the courts, and the like; all of whom, if impan
elled, must show their special exemption. Clergymen are also usually excused,
out of favour and respect to their function: but, if they are seized of lands and
tenements, they are, in strictness, liable to be impanelled in respect of their
lay-fees, unless they be in the service of the king or some bishop: "in obsequio
domini regis, vel alicujus episcopi."
(11)
If, by means of challenges, or other cause, sufficient number of unexcep
tionable jurors doth not appear at the trial, either party may pray
A
tales.
tales
supply of such men as are summoned upon the first panel, in order to
make up the deficiency. For this purpose,
writ of decern tales, octo tales, and
the like, was used to be issued to the sheriff at common law, and must be still
bo done at
trial at bar,
the jurors make default.
But at the assizes, or
nisi pruts, by virtue of the statute 85 Hen. VIII, c.
and other subsequent
tne judge
at the prayer of either party, to award
empowered,
*8tatutes>
r*365
tales de circumstantibus (j) (12) of persons present in court, to be
joined to the other jurors, to try the cause; who are liable, however, to the
same challenges as the principal jurors.
This
usually done, till the legal
number of twelve be completed; in which patriarchal and apostolical number
Sir Edward Coke (k) hath discovered abundance of mystery.
When a sufficient number of persons impanelled, or tales-men, appear, they
are then separately sworn, well and truly to. try the issue between the parties^
true verdict to give according to the evidence; and hence they are
and
denominated the jury, jurata, and jurors, sc. juratores.
We may hero again observe, and, observing, we cannot but admire, how
scrupulously delicate, and bow impartially just, the law of England approves
tribunal thus excellently contrived for
itself, in the constitution and frame of
In
the test and investigation of truth; which appears, most remarkably.
the avoiding of frauds and secret management, by electing the twelve jurors
In its caution against all partiality and bias,
out of the whole panel by lot.
the officer returning
suspected to
by quashing the whole panel or array,
be other than indifferent; and repelling particular jurors,
probable cause be
shown of malice or favour to either party. The prodigious multitude of ex
ceptions or challenges allowed to jurors, who are the judges of fact, amounts
nearly to the same thing as was practised in the Roman republic, before she
lost her liberty: that the select judges should be appointed by the prsetor, with
is
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(0 F. N. B. 188. Beg. Brev. 179.
(ft) Co. IJtt. IBS, b.
(ft Appendix, No. H,
(*) Inst. 155.
Pausanias relates that at the trial of Mars, for murder, In the court denominated Areopagus from that
Incident, he was acquitted by a jury composed of twelve pagan deities. And Dr. Hlckes, who attributes
the introduction of this number to the Normans, tells us that among the inhabitants of Norway, from
whom the Normans, as well as the Danes, were descended, a great veneration was paid to the number
twelve: "nihil sanctiut, nihil antiquiut fuit; perinde ac si in Ipso hoc numero tecreta qxuadam euet
Diseert. Epittolar, 49. Spelm. Gloss. 829.
religio."

is

(11) Clergymen, Roman Catholic priests, and dissenting ministers, are now excused.
issued for this purpose in the United States, but the court, by
(12) In general, no writ
order, directs the sheriff to summon from the bystanders the necessary number of talesmen
to All the panel.
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the mutual consent of the parties. *0r, as Tally (m) expresses it: r*Q«a-i
" neminem voluerunt majores nostri, non modo de existimatione cujus*
esse
;
nisi
minima,
ia
de
re
inter
sed
ne
judicem
qui
pecuniar
quidem
quam,
adversaria* convenissit."
Indeeed, these selecti judices bore, in many respeots, a remarkable resemb
lance to our juries: for they were first returned by the prator: de decuria sena'toria conscribuntur y then their names were drawn by lot, till a certain number
was completed: inurnam sortito mittuntur, ut de pluribus necessarius Hum
erus confici posset : then the parties were allowed their challenges: post urnam
permittitur accusatori, ac reo, ut ex iUo numero rejiciatU quos putaverint sibi,
out inimicos, aut ex aliqua re incommodos fore: next they struck what we call
a tales ; rejectione celebrata, in eorum locum qui rejecti fuerunt subsortiebatur
praetor alios, quibus ille judicum legitimus numerus compleretur ; lastly, the
judges, like our jury, were sworn; his perfectis, jurabant in leges judices, ut
obstricti religione judicarent. (n)
The jury are now ready to hear the merits; and, to fix their attention the
closer to the facts which they are impanelled and sworn to try, the pleadings
are opened to them by counsel on that side which holds the affirmative of the
qaestion in issue. For the issue is said to lie, and proof is always first required,
upon that side which affirms the matter in question: in which our law agrees
with the civil; (o) "ei incumbit probatio, qui dicit, non qui negat ; cum per
The opening counsel
•rerum naturam factum-negantis probatio nulla sit."
briefly informs them what has been transacted in the court above; the parties,
the nature of the action, the declaration, the plea, replication, and other pro
ceedings, and, lastly, upon what point the issue is joined, which is there set
down to be determined. Instead of which, (p) formerly the whole record and
process of the pleadings was read to *them in English by the court, r^oan-i
and the matter in issue clearly explained to their capacities.
The *■
nature of the case, and the evidence intended to be produced, are next laid
before them by counsel also on the same side: and when their evidence is gone
through, the advocate on the other side opens the adverse case, and supports
it by evidence; and then the party which began is heard by way of reply.
The nature of my present design will not permit me to enter into the num
or
berless niceties and distinctions of what
not, legal evidence to
jury.
shall only, therefore, select
few of the general heads and leading
(q)
maxims, relative to this point, together with some observations on the manner

of giving evidence.
And, first, evidence signifies that which demonstrates,

1.

is

is,

is

is

a

it

is,

makes clear, or ascer
tains the truth of the very fact or point in issue, either on the one side or on
the other; and no evidence ought to be admitted to any other point. There
fore upon an action of debt, when the defendant denies his bond by the plea
of non est factum, and the issue
whether
be the defendant's deed or no;
release of this bond in evidence: for that does not destroy the
he cannot give
bond, and therefore does not prove the issue which he has chosen to rely upon,
viz., that the bond has no existence.
of two kinds, either that which
Again; evidence in the trial by jury
given in proof, or that which the jury may receive by their own private knowl
edge. The former, or proofs (to which in common speech the name of evidence
usually confined), are either written, or parol, that
by word of mouth.
Records; and 2. Ancient deeds of thirty
Written proofs, or evidence, are,

4

4,

it

S,

is

1,
6.

(m) Pro Clumtio, 43.
A learned writer of our own, Dr. Pettlngal, hath shown in an elaborate
(a) Ascon. in Qic Ver.
work (published A. D. 1769)so many resemblances between the imaOroa of the Greeks, the judicet tUcti
of the Romans, and the juries of the English, that he tempted to conclude that the latter are derived
from the former.
18,28.
(p) Fortesc. c. 26.
(o) *Y. 22, 3. Ood.
ig) This U admirably well performed in Lord Chief-baron Gilbert's excellent treatise of evidence,— a
is impossible to abstract or abridge, without losing some beauty and destroying the chain
work which
of the whole, and which hath lately been engrafted into a very useful work, The Introduction to the Law
Of Nisi Prius, to. 1767.
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(•) Salic. 285.

(t) Gall, obtervat.

2,

(r) Law of NU Print 282.

(t)

is

(«)

years standing, which prove themselves; (13) but 3. Modern deeds; and 4.
Otner *writings, must be attested and verified by parol evidence of
r*3B81
* witnesses.
L
And the one general rule that runs through all the doctrine
of trials is this, that the best evidence the nature of the case will admit of
shall always be required, if possible to be had; but if not possible, then tha
For it it be found that
best evidence that can be had shall be allowed. (14)
there is any better evidence existing than is produced, the yery not producing
it is a presumption that it would have detected some falsehood that at present
is concealed.
Thus, in order to prove a lease for years, nothing else shall be
admitted but the very deed of lease itself, if in being; but if that be positively
proved to be burnt or destroyed (not relying on any loose negative, as that it
cannot be found, or the like), then an attested copy may be produced; or parol
evidence be given of its contents.
So, no evidence of a discourse with another
will be admitted, but the man himself must be produced; yet in some cases,
(as in proof of any general customs, or matters or common tradition or repute),
the courts admit of hearsay evidence, or an account of what persons deceased
have declared in their lifetime: but such evidenoe will not be received of any
particular facts. (15) So, too, books of account, or shop-books, are not allowed
of themselves to be given in evidence for the owner; but a servant who made
the entry may have recourse to them to refresh his memory; and, if such
servant (who was accustomed to make those entries) be dead, and his hand be
proved, the book may be read in evidence: (r) for as tradesmen are often
under a necessity of giving oredit without any note or writing, this ia there
fore, when accompanied with such other collateral proofs of fairness and
the best evidence that can then be produced.
However, this
regularity,
not carried so far in England as abroad;
dangerous species of evidenoe
20,23.
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§

§

1
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is
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;

§
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is

§

if

if

§

1
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1

is

is

it
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is
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it
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1

1

it,

is

is

Both must be free from just grounds of sus
(13) Wills in this respect are like deeds.
picion, and come from the proper custody.
It much safer to say in these cases, and much nearer strict accuracy, not that the
from the circumstances: such
deed proves itielf, but that its authenticity may be presumed
and who must be supposed to
as the Ion? acquiescence of parties interested to dispute
But these circum
have satisfied themselves originally that the conveyance was effectual.
See
Greenl. Ev., §§ 21, 142, 145, 570;
Stark.
stances are to be proved like other facts.
Ev., 93, 523, and especially Phil. Ev. by Cowen, Hill and Edwards, vol.
475-480.
evidence,
which,
evidence,
the
best
that
kind
of
under
proof
any pos
(14) Primary
affords the greatest certainty of the fact in question;
illustrated by
sible circumstances,
the case of written documents, the instrument itself being always regarded as the primary
If the execution of an instrument
or best possible evidence of its existence and contents.
the testimony of the subscribing witness,
there
is to be proved, the primary evidence
Until
shown that the production of the primary evidence
out of the party's
be one.
in general admitted. All evidence falling short of this
power, no other proof of the fact
The distinction refers to the "quality and not to the
termed "secondary."
degree
84, and see
Greenl. Ev..
Stark. Ev., 641-649; Reynold's
strength of the proof."
Steph. Ev. ch.
As to whether there are degrees in secondary evidence, see note to Greenl. Ev.,
84.
As defined by Prof.
(15) The term hearsay applies as well to written as to oral evidence.
Greenleaf hearsay "denotes that kind of evidence which does not derive its value solely
from the credit to be given to the witness himself, but rests also, in part, on the veracity
Greenl. Ev.,
99. In general such evidence is
and competency of some other person."
inadmissible, but there are exceptions to the rule excluding it; thus
the fact that the de
the question; expressions of feeling,
the
claration was made and not its truth or falsity
the question; in cases of pedigree, the declarations of relatives;
existence of such feeling
declarations as to public and general rights by parties who had means of knowledge; de
clarations against the interest of the party making them; in cases of murder or manslaughter,
dying declarations as to the cause of death, or circumstances surrounding it, made by the
the injured party when he has given up all hope of recovery; admissions and confessions.
Greenleaf Ev., 156, et seg. Reynolds's Steph. Ev., ch. IV.
See
former trial, where the parties had an opportunity to
Testimony of witness given on
the witness
dead, or
out of the jurisdiction, or insane
examine him, may be received
he has been summoned and
and unable to testify, or
kept away by the adverse party.
163, and cases cited.
Greenl. Ev.,
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where a man's own books of accounts, by a distortion of the civil law (which
seems to have meant the same thing as is practised with us), (u) with the suppletory oath of *the merchant, amount at all times to full proof. (18) r*o»g-i
'
But as this kind of evidence, even thus regulated, would be much too !■
hard upon the buyer at any long distance of time, the statute 7 Jac. I, c. 12 (the
penners of which seem to have imagined that the books of themselves were
evidence at common law), confines this species of proof to such transactions as
have happened within one year before the action brought; unless between
For accounts of so
merchant and merchant in the usual intercourse of trade.
recent a date, if erroneous, may more easily be unravelled and adjusted.
With regard to parol evidence, or witnesses ; it must be first remembered
that there is a process to bring them in by writ of subpoena ad testificandum:
which commands them, laying aside all pretences and excuses, to appear at the
trial on pain of lOOt to be forfeited to the king; to which the statute 5 Eliz.
c. 9, has added a penalty of 10/. to the party aggrieved, and damages equiva
lent to the loss sustained by want of his evidence.
But no witness, unless his
reasonable
expenses be tendered him, is bound to appear at all; nor, if he
appears, is he hound to give evidence till such charges are actually paid him;
except he resides within the bills of mortality, and is summoned to give evi
dence within the same.
This compulsory process, to bring in unwilling wit
nesses, and the additional terrors of an attachment in case of disobedience,
are of excellent use in the thorough investigation of truth: and, upon the same
principle, in the Athenian courts, the witnesses who were summoned to attend
the trial had the choice of three things; either to swear to the truth of
the fact in question, to deny or abjure
or else pay
fine of
thousand

drachmas. (»)

All witnesses, of whatever religion or country, that have the use of their
reason, (17) are to be received and examined, except such as are infamous, or
All others are competent wit
such as are interested in the event of the cause.
nesses; though the jury from other circumstances will judge of their credibli.
7.

1,

4,

it

5.

(») Inttrumenta domestica, seu privata tettatio, ten adnotatio, $i non alii$ quoque admtnieutis adjuvent
ad probationers tola non mifflciunt. Cod. 19,
Nam exemplo perniciosum est, ut ti tcripturce
credutur, qua unutquisque sibi adnotatione propria aebitorem constituit. Ibid. c.
(v) Pott. Antlq. b. o. M.

§

1

1

1

7

1

a

if

a

if

1

1

is

6

8

6

1

2

;

;

if

(16) A party's own books of account may be given in evidence in his own favor to prove
the accounts upon them, after preliminary proof that they were regularly kept as such, and
he kept any, giving suffi
are books of original entries; that the party kept no clerk, or,
cient reason for not producing him that some of the articles charged were actually delivered
and by proving also, from other persons who have dealt with him, that he keeps fair and
But they are not very satisfactory evidence, and wherever from the
honest accounts.
nature of the case there must be witnesses who can give direct testimony concerning the
account, ths party will be required to produce them before giving his books in evidence.
Mass., 217; Thomas v.
See Vosburgh v. Thayer, 12 Johns., 461; Cogswell v. Dolliver,
Vt.,
Nott and McC, 186; Sickles v. Mather, 20 Wend., 78; Burnham v. Adams,
Dyott,
Evans,
Mich.,
Ev.,
v.
476;
Greenl.
118,
and notes.
If anything sus
813; Jackson
court,
when
in
the
books
to
the
be
presented
excluded
they will
Church
picious appears
Whart., 146. There are statutes on this subject in many of the states.
man v. Smith,
usually required to substantiate the charges.
The books can only
The party's own oath
be made evidence of those things which are properly the subject of book account; not of
charges for money loaned, &c. See Bradley v. Goodyear, Day, 106. And upon the whole
subject see Phil. Ev. by Cowen, Hill and Edwards, 870-386.
a party, whose book entries would be admissible when alive and sane, dies or becomes
insane, the books may be admitted in
suit in his behalf by his personal representative or
the latter substantiates them by his oath.
Reynolds' Steph. Ev, p. 62, and cases.
guardian,
supreme superintending Providence
(17) All persona may give evidence who believe in
who rewards and punishes, and who declare that they consider an oath binding on their
Smith Lead.
conscience. See the leading cases of Ormichund v. Barker, Willes, 638; and
Cas., 585. See also Cubbison v. McCreary,
Strob.,
W. and 8., 262; Jones v. Harris,
Swan, 411; Central R R Co. v.
160; Brock v. Milligan, 10 Ohio, 121; Bennett v. State,
Rockafellow, 17 111., 541. Some of the United States forbid witnesses being questioned
concerning their religious belief. See Cooley Const. Lim., 478, note.
211

Teial

370
r*s"70l
L

(18)

by

Jury.

*Infamous persons are such

as

[Book
may be challenged
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jurors*

J propter delictum; and therefore never shall be admitted to give evi
dence to inform that jury, with whom they were too scandalous to associate.
Interested witnesses may be examined upon a voir dire, if suspected of being

secretly concerned in the event; or their interest may be proved in court.
Which last is the only method of supporting an objection to the former class:
for no man is to be examined to prove his own infamy. (19) And no counsel,,
attorney, or other person entrusted with the secrets of the cause by the party
himself shall be compelled, or perhaps allowed, to give evidence of such con
versation or matters of privacy, as came to his knowledge by virtue of such
trust and confidence: (w) (20) but he may be examined as to mere matters of
fact, as the execution of a deed or the like, which might have come to his
knowledge without being intrusted in the cause.
One witness (if credible) is sufficient evidence to a jury of any single fact,
though undoubtedly the concurrence of two or more corroborates the proof.
Yet our law considers that there are many transactions to which only one
person is privy; and therefore does not always demand the testimony of two
" Unius responsio testis omnino non
which the civil law universally requires.
itself
out
of
To
extricate
which absurdity, the modern prac
audiatur." (x)
tice of the civil law courts has plunged itself into another. For, as they do
not allow a less number than two witnesses to be plena probatio, they call the
testimony of one, though never so clear and positive, semi-plena probatio only
To make up, therefore, the necessary
on which no sentence can be founded.
complement of witnesses, when they have one only to a single fact, they
admit the party himself (plaintiff or defendant) to be examined in his own
behalf; and administer to him what is called the suppletory oath; and if his
evidence happens to be in his own favour, this immediately converts the half
proof into a whole one. By this ingenious device, satisfying at once the
(to) Law of Nisi Priiis, 284.

(*) Cod. 4, 20, 9.

Persons who cannot conscientiously take an oath are allowed to make affirmation, and
are under the like penalties with witnesses sworn, in case of false testimony.
The oath is to be administered in such way as the witness deems binding.
the wit
ness is not of the Christian religion, the court will inquire as to the form in which it is ad
ministered in his own country, or among those of his own faith, and will impose it in that
1 Greenl. Ev., § 871.
form."
(18) The interest should be such that the witness "will either gain or lose by the direct
legal operation and effect of the judgment, or that the record will be legal evidence for or
1 Greenl. Ev., § 390. In almost all the states and terri
against him in some other action."
tories of the United States, statutes now allow parties and interested witnesses to be sworn,
Similar statutory provisions also exist in England.
and to testify generally to the merits.
The relation of husband and wife gives rise to certain exceptions, generally found in these
In many of the United States accused parties are made competent but not com
statutes.
pellable to testify in prosecutions against them.
(19) "Witnesses convicted of crimes rendering them infamous (which comprehend treason,
felony, and the crimen falsi) are excluded from giving testimony in the courts of the state
or country in which they were convicted, unless the disability is removed by a reversal of
the judgment or a pardon.
In most of the states, the disqualification of infamy has been
removed by constitutional provisions or by statute, but a conviction may be proved, to affect
the credibility of a witness."
Reynolds. Steph. Ev. p. 152. By 6 and 7 Vict., c. 85, the
English law is substantially the same as in the United States.
Though a witness may in general decline to answer to avoid criminating himself, he may
not do so simply because his answer may render him liable to a civil suit, or show that he
owes a debt.
Reyn. Steph. Ev., p. 164 and cases.
(20) This rule is adopted less from regard for the legal profession than for the real inter
See 1 Greenl. Ev., § 286, et seg.
ests of justice which are fostered thereby.
For an excellent case on this subject, see Whiting v. Barney, 80 N. Y., 830. See, also
People v. Blakely, 4 Park Cr. R., 176; 1 Greenl. Ev., § 237 to 246; 1 Stark. Ev., 40; 1
Phil. Ev. by Cowen, Hill and Edwards, 130, et teg. In several of the United States statutes
have been passed extending similar protection to the communications made to physicians
and clergymen, with a view to obtaining their professional advice or assistance.
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(a) OUb. Evld. 161.
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forms of the Roman law, and acknowledging the superior *reasonable- r*3»ii
-*
ness of the law of England: which permits one witness to be sufficient
where no more are to be had: and, to avoid all temptations of perjury, lays it
down as an invarible rule, that nemo testis esse debet in propria causa. (21)
Positive proof is always required, where from the nature of the case it
But next to positive proof, circum
appears it might possibly have been had.
stantial evidence, or the doctrine of presumptions, must take place; for when
the fact itself cannot be demonstratively evinced, that which comes nearest to
the proof of the fact is the proof of such circumstances as either necessarily,
or usually attend such facts; and these are called presumptions, which are only
to be relied upon till the contrary be actually proved. Stabitur prmumptioni
■donee probetur in contrarium. (y)
Violent presumption is many times equal
to full proof; (z) for there those circumstances appear which necessarily attend
the fact. As if a landlord sues for rent due at Michaelmas, 1754, and the ten
ant cannot prove the payment, but produces an acquittance for rent due at a
subsequent time, in full of all demands, this is a violent presumption of his
having paid the former rent, and is equivalent to full proof; for though the
actual payment is not proved, yet the acquittance in full of all demands is
proved, which could not be without such payment; and it therefore induces so
forcible a presumption, that no proof shall be admitted to the contrary, (a)
(22) Probable presumption, arising from such circumstances as usually attend
in suit for rent due in 1754, the ten
the fact, hath also its due weight: as
ant proves the payment of the rent due in 1755; this will prevail to exonerate
the tenant, (b) unless
be clearly shown that the rent of 1754 was retained
for some special reason, or that there was some fraud or mistake; for otherwise
will be presumed to have been paid before that in 1755, as
most usual
Lltt
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rule apparently somewhat different prevails in a certain class of cases.
(21) In equity
the complainant calls for an answer from the defendant on oath, he thereby makes the
evidence called for by himself,
allowed to
answer evidence in the cause; and as
have the same weight in the case as the testimony of any other witness, and therefore the
decree against an answer
bound to make out his case, cannot have
complainant, who
denying the equity of the bill, unless he overcomes the answer with the testimony of two
witnesses, or at least of one witness and strong supporting circumstances.
Greenl. Ev.,
"Where, however, by statute, the parties in chancery are made competent witnesses
260.
would seem that this rule
substantially done
generally, and may be orally examined,
Green,
away with. Roberts v Miles, 12 Mich., 297. See however Vandegrift v. Herbert.
N. J., 466. In high treason two witnesses are essential in England, and in the United
States by the constitution, art.
Two are also necessary in cases where perjury
the evidence
charged. But in other cases,
competent, the jury must be the judges how
much weight
entitled to.
Phil. Ev.,
Stark Ev., 583.
The former are either conclu
(22) Presumptions may be presumptions of law or of fact.
.ch as the law requires to be
sive or rebuttable.
Conclusive presumptions of law are
made whenever "the facts appear which
assumes as the basis of the inference."
These
to restrict
cannot be overthrown by any contrary proof. The tendency of modern courts
cause has been
the number of these presumptions.
Such
presumption arises when
in another action between the same parties
regularly adjudicated by a competent court,
is proposed to show the first decision erroneous
So there was
conclusive presumption
bond or receipt under seal.
at common law that there was a good consiaeration for
Best
on Ev., Morgan's ed.,
so
far
as
mere
304-306.
A receipt
acknowledgment of pay
ment and delivery
to
or
contradiction
explanation
by parol evidence.
always open
Greenl. Ev.
305. And now by statute in some of the United States,
seal to
bond or
other obligation
only prima facie evidence of consideration, which may be rebutted.
Rebuttable presumptions of law are such as may be overcome by evidence, but without
such evidence prevail; as the innocence or sanity of a person, or the legitimacy of
child
born in wedlock.
Best Ev.,
314.
Presumptions of fact are those drawn from the circumstances of case by means of com
mon human experience.
They are mere arguments from facts in the case, and should have
full discussion of presumptive evidence see
44. For
Greenl. Ev.,
weight as such.
Ch. IV.
Best Ev., Morgan's ed., pt.
Ch. II, and Greenl. Ev., pt.
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to receivefirst the rents of longest standing. Light, or rash, presumptions
have no weight or validity at all. (28)
"The oath administrated to the witness is not only that what he der*a?2l
L
-I
poses shall be true, but that he shall also depose the whole truth: so
that he is not to conceal any part of what he knows, whether interrogated par
And all this evidence 'is to he given in open
ticularly to that point or not.
court, in the presence of the parties, their attorneys, the counsel, and all by
standers, and before the judge and jury; each party having liberty to except to
its competency,
which exceptions are publicly stated and by the judge are
openly and publicly allowed or disallowed, in the face of the country: which
must curb any secret bias or partiality that might arise in his own breast.
And
either in his directions or decisions, he misstates the law by ignorance,
inadvertence or design, the counsel on either side may require him publicly to
seal
bill of exceptions; stating the point wherein he
supposed to err: and
13 Edw.
he refuses
o. 31, or,
thishe
obliged to seal by statute Westm.
so to do, the party may have
compulsory writ against him, (c) commanding
him to seal
he returns, that the fact
the fact alleged be truly stated: and
otherwise, an action will lie against him for
untruly stated, when the case
This bill of exceptions
in the nature of an appeal;
false return.
making
examinable, not in the oourt out of which the reoord issues for the trial at nisi
writ of error, after
prius, but in the next immediate superior court, upon
demurrer to evidence shall be de
judgment given in the court below. But
This happens, where
termined by the court out of which the record
sent.
record or other matter
produced in evidence, concerning the legal conse
doubt in law: in which case the adverse party
quences of which there arises
he please demur to the whole evidence; which admits the truth of every
may
faot that has been alleged, but denies the sufficiency of them all in point of
law to maintain or overthrow the issue; (d) which draws the question of law
from the cognizance of the jury, to be decided (as
ought) by the court. But
neither these demurrers to evidence, nor the bill of exceptions, are at present
80much *m u8e as formerly; since the more frequent extension of the
r*^7<il
new trial, which
now
discretionary powers of the court in granting
nisi
prius
had
the
misdirection
of
the
at
for
judge
commonly
(24).
very
This open examination of witnesses, viva voce, in the presence of all man
than the private
much more conducive to the clearing up of truth
kind,
and secret examination taken down in writing before an officer, or his clerk,
in the ecclesiastical courts, and all others that have borrowed their practice
from the civil law; where
witness may frequently depose that in private,
which he will be ashamed to testify in public and solemn tribunal There
witness speak what he never meant,
an artful or careless scribe may make
here
by dressing up his depositions in his own forms and language; but he
misunderstood, which he can
at liberty to correct and explain his meaning,
once taken.
Besides, the occasional
never do after a written deposition
questions of the judge, the jury, and the counsel, propounded to the witnesses
Rep. 104.
(e) Hale's Hist. 0. L. 254,256,256.
(e) Beg. Br. 183. Inst. 427.
(<J)Co. Litt 72.
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so slight as to have no weight, may be of import
(88) But presumptions in themselves
Best, Ev., Morgan's ed.,
ance in connection with other links in
chain of evidence.
320.
(24) To obviate the hardships which frequently occurred where parties were defeated on
trials at the circuit on account of defects in pleadings not material to the merits of the
case, enlarged powers to permit amendments
at the trial have been granted by several re
the Common Law Procedure act, 1852, and almost
cent English statutes, ana especially
any defect may be amended by leave of the court, where the nature of the action or ground
not changed, and the opposite party not likely to be misled. Amendments
of defense
In the United States
are permitted on such terms as the court thinks proper to impose.
the statutes of amendments are generally very broad and liberal, and permit amendments,
for the furtherance of justice, in any stage of the proceedings, and after Judgment.
(25) Writs of attaint and assize are both abolished.
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will sift out the truth much better than a formal set of interroga
tories previously penned and settled; and the confronting of adverse witnesses
is also another opportunity of obtaining a clear discovery, which can never be
had upon any other method of trial. Nor is the presence of the judge, during
the examination, a matter of small importance: for, besides the respect and
awe with which his presence will naturally inspire the witness, he is able, by
use and experience, to keep the evidence from wandering from the point in
In short, by this method of examination, and this only, the persons
issue.
who are to decide upon the evidence have an opportunity of observing the
quality, age, education, understanding, behaviour, and inclinations of the wit
ness; in which points all persons must appear alike, when their depositions
are reduced to writing, and read to the judge, in the absence of those who
made them; and yet as much may be frequently collected from the manner in
which the evidence is delivered, as from the matter of *it. These are
ruco^-i
a few of the advantages attending this, the English, way of giving tes- *■
the
Which was also indeed familiar among
ancient
timony, ore tenus.
Romans, as may be collected from Quintilian; (/) who lays down very good
instructions for examining and cross-examining witnesses viva voce. And this,
or somewhat like
was continued as low as the time of Hadrian: {g) but the
civil law, as
now modelled, rejects all public examination of witnesses.
As to such evidence as the jury may have in their own consciences, by their
was an ancient doctrine, that this had as much
private knowledge of facts,
de
right to sway their judgment as the written or parol evidence which
livered in court. And therefore
hath been often held, (A) that though no
verdict. For
proofs be produced on either side, yet the jury might bring in
the oath of the jurors, to find according to their evidence, was construed (£)
to be, to do
according to the best of their own knowledge. This seems to
have arisen from the ancient practice in taking recognitions of assize, at the
first introduction of that remedy; the sheriff being bound to return such re
cognitors as knew the truth of the fact, and the recognitors, when sworn,
being to retire immediately from the bar, and bring in their verdict according
to their own personal knowledge, without hearing extrinsic evidence or receiv
ing any direction from the judge. (j) And the same doctrine (when attaints
came to be extended to trials by jury, (25) as well as to recognitions of assize)
was also applied to the case of common jurors; that they might escape the
heavy penalties of the attaint, in case they could show, by any additional
proof, that their verdict was agreeable to the truth, though not according to
the evidence produced; with which additional proof the law presumed they were
did not appear in *court. But this doc- r*„»--,
privately acquainted, though
trine was again gradually exploded, when attaints began to be disused,
and new trials introduced in their stead.
For
quite incompatible with
the grounds upon which such new trials are every day awarded, viz., that the
verdict was given without, or contrary to, evidence.
And, therefore, together
with new trials, the practice seems to have been first introduced (k) which now
universally obtains, that
juror knows any thing of the matter in issue, he
may be sworn as a witness, and give his evidence publicly in court.
When the evidence
gone through on both sides, the judge, in the presence
of the parties, the counsel, and all others, sums up the whole to the jury; omit
ting all superfluous circumstances, observing wherein the main question and
with
principal issue lies, stating what evidence has been given to support
such remarks as he thinks necessary for their direction, and giving them his
opinion in matters of law arising upon that evidence.
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1

5,
8.

;

;

j

I.
5,

e. 7.
(/) Institut. Orat.
ig) See his epistle to Varus, the legate or judge ot Olllcia: " Tu magit tcire potet. quanta fldet tit ha
bcnda tcttibue qui, et cujut dignitatis, et cujut cetiimationis tint et qui eimpliciter visi tint, dicere
utrum unuffl eundemque meditatum termonem attulerint, an ad ea qua interrogaverat extempore veritimilia retponderint.
(0 Vausrh. 148.149.
Sid. 133.
(fc) Styl. 233.
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(I)

The jury, after the proofs are summed up, unless the case be very clear,
withdraw from the bar to consider of their verdict: and in order to avoid in
and causeless delay, are to be kept without meat, drink, fire, or
temperance
candle, unless by permission of the judge, till they are all unanimously agreed.
A method of accelerating unanimity not wholly unknown in other constitutions
For, by the golden bull of the
of Europe, and in matters of greater concern.
after the congress
opened, the electors delay the election of
empire,
king of the Romans for thirty days, they shall be fed only with bread and water
our juries eat or drink at all, or have any
till the same
accomplished. But
eatables about them, without consent of the court, and before verdict,
fin
able; and
will set
they do so at his charge for whom they afterwards find,
aside the verdict.
Also,
they speak with either of the parties or their agents,
are gone *from the bar; or
they receive any fresh evidence
aftert^ey
T*376l
*■
in private; or
to prevent disputes they cast lots for whom they shall
find; any of these circumstances will entirely vitiate the verdict. (26)
And
the jurors do not agree in their verdict before the judges
has been held, that
are about to leave the town, though they are not to be threatened
or impris
oned, (m) the judges are not bound to wait for them, but may carry them round
the circuit from town to town in cart, (n) This necessity of total unanimity
seems to be peculiar to our own constitution; (o) or, at least in the nembda or
jury of the ancient Goths, there was required (even in criminal oases) only the
consent of the major part; and in case of an equality, the defendant was held
to be acquitted, (p) (27)
When they are all unanimously agreed, the jury return back to the bar; and,
bound to appear in court, by
before they deliver their verdict, the plaintiff
himself, attorney, or counsel, in order to answer the amercement to which, by
the old law, he
liable, as has been formerly mentioned, (g) in case he fails
in his suit, as
punishment for his false claim. To be amerced, or a mercie,
to be at the king's mercy with regard to the fine to be imposed; in misericordia domini regis pro /also clamore suo. The amercement
disused, but
the plaintiff does not appear, no verdict can
the form still continues; and
said to be nonsuit, non sequitur clamorem suum.
be given, but the plaintiff
Therefore
usual for
plaintiff, when he or his counsel perceives that he
has not given evidence sufficient to maintain his issue, to be voluntarily non
ordered to call the plain
suited, or withdraw himself whereupon the crier
neither he, nor any body for him, appears, he
nonsuited, the
tiff: and
at an end, and the defendant shall recover
jurors are discharged, the action
his costs.
that a nonsuit
The reason of this practice
more eligible for
nonsuit, which is only
the plaintiff than a verdict against him: for, after
default, he may commence the same suit '"again for the same cause of
toMh-i
action; but after
verdict had, and judgment consequent thereupon,
he
forever barred from attacking the defendant upon the same ground of
4.

1.

I.

8.

84.
(«) Lib. Ant. foL 40,pi.
(I) C.
(m) Mlrr. o.
(p) Stiern.
1., c.
(o) See BarrinKtOD on tue Statutes, 19,80, 81.
(8) Page 87S. See also book IV. 379.
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(26) That is, the court will set aside the verdict, on misconduct of this character being
proven. But the misconduct must be made out by other evidence than that of the jurors
themselves;
for they will not be allowed to testify to it. Dana v. Tucker,
Johns., 487;
Clum v. Smith,
Hill, 560. The general rule
that the evidence of jurors will not be re
ceived to impeach their verdict. Bridgewater v. Plymouth, 97 Mass. 382 Hann v. Wilson.
28 Ind., 296; Rutland v. Hathorn, 36 Qa., 380.
See this principle limited in Wright v.
Telegraph Co., 20 Iowa, 195.
(27) As to the origin and history of jury trial, see Forsyth's History of Tairl by Jury:
Proffatt on Jury Trial.
It has been conjectured by Mr. Christian, in note on the origin of the requirement of
unanimity in the jury, that as in grand juries and grand assizes and in the high court of
parliament, " less than twelve,
twelve or more were present, could pronounce no effec
tive verdict, when twelve only were sworn, they must have been unanimous."
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(s)

But, in case the plaintiff appears, the jury by their foreman de
complaint.
liver in their verdict. (28)
A verdict vere dictum, is either privy or public. A privy verdict is when
the judge hath left or adjourned the court: and the jury, being agreed, in
order to be delivered from their confinement, obtain leave to give their ver
dict privily to the judge out of court: (r) which privy verdict is of no force,
unless afterwards affirmed by a public verdict given openly in court; wherein
the jury may, if they please, vary from the privy verdict.
So that the privy
verdict is indeed a mere nullity; and yet it is a dangerous practice, allowing
time for the parties to tamper with the jury, and therefore very seldom in
dulged. (29) But the only effectual and legal verdict is the public verdict:
in which they openly declare to have found the issue for the plaintiff, or for
the defendant; and if for the plaintiff, they assess the damages also sustained
by the plaintiff, in consequence of the injury upon which the action is brought.
Sometimes, if there arises in the case any difficult matter of law, the jury,
for the sake of better information, and to avoid the danger of having their
verdict attainted, will find a special verdict; which is grounded on the statute
of Westra. 2, 13 Edw. I, c. 30, § 2. And herein they state the naked facts, as
they find them to be proved, and pray the advice of the court thereon; con
cluding conditionally, that if upon the whole matter the court should be of
opinion that the plaintiff had cause of action, they then find for the plaintiff ;
if otherwise, then for the defendant. This is entered at length on the record,
and afterwards argued and determined in the court at Westminster, from
whence the issue came to be tried.
*Another method of finding a species of special verdict, is when the r*oi;o-i
J
jury find a verdict generally for the plaintiff, but subject nevertheless
to the opinion of the judge of the court above, on a special case (30) stated by
the counsel on both sides with regard to a matter of law: which has this ad
vantage over a special verdict, that it is attended with much less expense, and
obtains a much speedier decision: the postea (of which in the next chapter)
being stayed in the hands of the officer of nisi prius, till the question is deter
mined, and the verdict is then entered for the plaintiff or defendant, as the
But, as nothing appears upon the record but the general
case may happen.
verdict, the parties are precluded hereby from the benefit of a writ of error,
if dissatisfied with the judgment of the court or judge upon the point of law.
Which makes it a thing to be wished, that a method could be devised of either
lessening the expense of special verdicts, or else of entering the cause at length
But in both these instances the jury may, if they think
upon the postea.
proper, take upon themselves to determine, at their own hazard, the compli
cated question of fact and law ; and, without either special verdict or special
case, may find a verdict absolutely either for the plaintiff or defendant,
recorded in court,
When the jury have delivered in their verdict, and
trial which, be
they are then discharged. And so ends the trial by jury
sides the other vast advantages which we have occasionally observed in its
also as expeditious and cheap, as
convenient, equitable, and
progress,
the Judge hath adjourned the court to his own lodgings, and there receives the verdict, it is a
(«) Litt. 868.

i

public and not a privy verdict.

if a

a

§

it

is

p.

it

a

the parties to with
Judge frequently recommended
(28) Under the English practice
was doubtful
draw
an action would lie.
juror when
This was done without costs,
and the plaintiff had the right to begin his suit again.
Tidd. Pr.,
861.
In the several
states the practice differs somewhat in regard to this proceeding, and the books of practice
of the states must be consulted.
(29) In criminal cases lower than capital felonies, the defendant may consent to have a
sealed verdict brought in. But when such verdict
afterwards actually rendered in court,
is his right to have the jury polled. Whart. Cr., L.,
3193; Reins v. People, 80
111., 266; Stewart v. People, 23 Mich., 63; Wright v. State, 11 Ind. 569.
in
Now
case may be submitted to the court on an agreed statement of
England
(30)
facts, and with or without formal pleadings.
Vol. 11—28
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certain; for a commission out of chancery, or the civil law courts, for examin
ing witnesses in one cause will frequently last as long, and of course be full
as expensive, as the trial of a hundred issues at nisi prius: and yet the fact
cannot be determined by such commissioners at all; no, not till the depositions
are published, and read at the hearing of the cause in court.
trust
*Upon these accounts the trial by jury ever has been, and
pohQ-i
L
J ever will be, looked upon as the glory of the English law. And if it
has so great an advantage over others in regulating civil property, how much
must that advantage be heightened, when it is applied to criminal cases 1 But
this we must refer to the ensuing book of these Commentaries: only observing
for the present, that it is the most transcendent privilege which any subject
can enjoy, or wish for, that he cannot be affected either in his property, his
liberty, or his person, but by the unanimous consent of twelve of his neigh
A constitution, that may venture to affirm has, under
bors and equals.
Providence, secured the just liberties of this nation for a long succession of
who concludes, that be
And therefore a celebrated French writer,
ages.
cause Rome, Sparta, and Carthage have lost their liberties, therefore those of
England in time must perish, should have recollected that Rome, Sparta, and
Carthage, at the time when their liberties were lost, were strangers to the
trial by jury.
Great as this eulogium may seem,
no more than this admirable constitu
tion, when traced to its principles, will be found in sober reason to deserve.
The impartial administration of justice, which secures both our persons and
But
that be entirely
our properties,
the great end of civil society.
intrusted to the magistracy,
select body of men, and those generally selected
by the prince or such as enjoy the highest offices in the state, their decisions,
in spite of their own natural integrity, will have frequently an involuntary
not to be expected from
bias towards those of their own rank and dignity:
human nature, that the few should be always attentive to the interests and good
the power of judicature were placed at
of the many. On the other hand,
random in the hands of the multitude, their decisions would be wild and capri
new rule of action would be every day established in our courts.
cious, and
It wisely therefore ordered, that the principles and axioms of law, which
and not *acr*ifiOl are general propositions, flowing from abstracted reason,
commodated to times or to men, should be deposited in the breasts of
the judges, to be occasionally applied to such facts as come properly ascer
tained before them.
For here partiality can have little scope: the law
well
follows as
known, and
the same for all ranks and degrees;
regular con
clusion from the premises of fact pre-established. But in settling and adjust
ing a question of fact, when intrusted to any single magistrate, partiality and
injustice have an ample field to range in; either by boldly asserting that to be
not so, or by more artfully suppressing some circumstances,
proved which
stretching and warping others, and distinguishing away the remainder. Here,
therefore,
competent number of sensible and upright jurymen; chosen by
lot from among those of the middle rank, will be found the best investigators
of truth, and the surest guardians of public justice. For the most powerful
individual in the state will be cautious of committing any flagrant invasion of
another's right, when he knows that the fact of his oppression must be ex
amined and decided by twelve indifferent men, not appointed till the hour of
trial; and that, when once the fact
the law must of course
ascertained,
redress it.
This, therefore, preserves in the hands of the people that share
which they ought to have in the administration of public justioe, and prevents
the encroachments
of the more powerful and wealthy citizens. Every new
tribunal, erected for the decision of facts, without the intervention of
jury
(whether composed of justices of the peace, commissioners of the revenue,
a step
court of conscience, or any other standing magistrates),
judges of
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towards establishing aristocracy, the most oppressive of absolute governments.
The feudal system, which, for the sake of military subordination, pursued an
aristocratical plan in all its arrangements of property, had been intolerable in
times of peace, had it not been wisely counterpoised by that privilege so uni
the trial by the feudal peers. And
versally diffused through every part of
in every country on the continent, as the trial by the peers has been gradually
disused, so the nobles have increased in power, till the state has been torn to
pieces by rival factions, and oligarchy in effect has been established, though
under the shadow of regal government; *unless where the miserable r*qoii
commons have taken shelter under absolute monarchy, as the lighter
evil of the two. And, particularly,
circumstance well worthy an English
man's observation, that in Sweden the trial by jury, that bulwark of northern
liberty, which continued in its full vigour so lately as the middle of the last
now fallen into disuse: (to) and that there, though the regal
century, (w)
in no country so closely limited, yet the liberties of the commons are
power
mere aristocracy, (x)
degenerated into
extinguished, and the government
It therefore, upon the whole, duty which every man owes to his country,
his friends, his posterity and himself, to maintain to the utmost of his power,
this valuable constitution in all its rights; to restore
to its ancient dignity,
at all impaired by the different value of property, or otherwise deviated
from its first institution; to amend
wherever
defective; and, above all,
to guard with the most jealous circumspection against the introduction of new
and arbitrary methods of trial, which, under
variety of plausible pretences,
may in time imperceptibly undermine this best preservative of English liberty.
must be owned, that the best and most effectual method to
Yet, after all,
preserve and extend the trial by jury in practice, would be by endeavouring to re
move all the defects, as well as to improve the advantages, incident to this mode
If justice not done to the entire satisfaction of the people, in this
of inquiry.
method of deciding facts, in spite of all encomiums and panegyrics on trials at
the common law, they will resort in search of that justice to another tribunal;
though more dilatory, though more expensive, though more arbitrary in its
If justice not done to the crown by the verdict
frame and constitution.
of
jury, the necessities of the public revenue will call for the erection of
The principal defects seem to be,
summary tribunals.
The want of
complete discovery by the oath of the parties. This each
of them
now entitled to have, by *going through the expense and r*qR2i
■»
sometimes had by concircuity of court of equity, and therefore
How far such mode of compulsive examin
sent, even in the courts of law.
ation
agreeable to the rights of mankind, and ought to be introduced in any
foreign to our present
country, may be matter of curious discussion, but
inquiries. It has long been introduced and established in our courts of equity,
seems the height of judicial absur
not to mention the civil law courts; and
dity, that in the same cause between the same parties, in the examination of
the same facts, discovery by the oath of the parties should be permitted on
one side of Westminster-hall, and denied on the other: or that the judges of
one and the same court should be bound by law to reject such
species of
trial at bar, but, when sitting the next day as a
evidence,
attempted on
court of equity, should be obliged to hear such examination read, and to found
their decrees upon it. In short, within the same country, governed by the
mode of inquiry should be universally admitted, or else uni
same laws, such
versally rejeoted. (31)
of nature somewhat similar to the first: the want of a
2. A second defect
compulsive power for the production of books and papers belonging to the parMod. Un. Hint, xxxlii, 22.

previous note that parties

are now competent

(x) Ibid. 17.
and
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In the hands of third persons they can generally be obtained by rule of
court, or by adding a olause of requisition to the writ of subpoena, which is
But, in mercantile transactions especially,
then called a subpoena duces tecum.
the sight of the party's own books is frequently decisive; as the day-book of a
trader, where the transaction was recently entered, as really understood at the
time; though subsequent events may tempt him to give it a different colour.
And, as this evidence may be finally obtained, and produced on a trial at law,
by the circuitous course of filing a bill in equity, the- want of an original power
for the same purposes in the courts of law is liable to the same observations at
were made on the preceding article. (32)
*3' -^not^er want i> tnat of power to examine witnesses abroad, and
'
f*-*383l
J to receive their depositions in writing, where the witnesses reside, and
To whioh
especially when the cause of action arises in a foreign country.
may be added the power of examining witnesses that are aged, or going
abroad, upon interrogatories de bene esse ; to be read in evidence if the trial
should be deferred till after their death or departure, but otherwise to be
Both these are now very frequently effected by mutual
totally suppressed.
-consent, if the parties are open and candid; and they may also be done in
directly at any time, through the channel of a court of equity; but such a
as the rule of
court of law.
praotice has never yet been directly adopted
suit
Yet where the cause of action arises m India, and
brought
{33)
thereupon in any of the king's courts at Westminster, the court may issue
commission to examine witnesses upon the spot, and transmit the depositions
to England, (z)
4. The administration of justice should not only be chaste, but should not
even be suspected.
A jury coming from the neighbourhood has in some re
often liable to strong objections; especially in
great advantage; but
spects
small jurisdictions, as in cities which are counties of themselves, and such
where assizes are but seldom holden; or where the question in dispute has an
extensive local tendency; where aery has been raised, and the passions of the
multitude been inflamed; or where one of the parties
popular, and the other
whole county
true that,
interested in the
stranger or obnoxious. It
question to be tried, the trial by the rule of law (a) must be in some adjoining
county; but, as there may be strict interest so minute as not to occasion any
bias, so there may be the strongest bias without any pecuniary interest. In
all these cases, to summon jury, laboring under local prejudices,
laying
8nare ^or tne*r consciences: and, though *they should have virtue and
T*384l
vigour of mind sufficient to keep them upright, the parties will grow
The
suspicious, and resort under various pretences to another mode of trial.
<sourts of law will therefore in transitory actions very often change the venue,
to be tried: (b) but in local actions, though
or county wherein the cause
they sometimes do
indirectly and by mutual consent, yet, to effect
directly
and absolutely, the parties are driven to
court of equity; where, upon makis
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(V) See page 75.

(») Stat. IS Geo. m. o. S3.

(a) Stra. 177.

(6) See page 394.
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(32) By the present English rules the judge may order produced under oath any docu
In the United States, usually, such documents, not
ments deemed necessary in the case.
in the hands of party, may be had by subpoena duces tecum. When they are under the
control of
party, notice to produce them at the trial may be given, and if they are not
then so produced, the party demanding them may on proof of notice, give parol evidence of
559, el seq.
the contents of the original documents.
See
Greenl. Ev.
Wm. IV, c. 22, the superior courts of law are empowered, u[>
(33) But now by statute
on the application of any party to an action therein, to order the examination of any wit
the witnesses are out of the jurisdiction of the court,
nesses upon interrogatories, and,
But the examination
commission may be issued for the purpose.
not to be read at the
trial, without the consent of the opposite party, unless
shall appear that the witness
dead,
court,
then beyond the jurisdiction of the
or
or unable from permanent sickness to
attend the trial.
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ing out a proper case, it is done upon the ground of being necessary to a fair,
impartial, and satisfactory trial, (c) (34)
The locality of trial required by the common law seems a consequence of the
All over the world, actions transitory follow
ancient locality of jurisdiction.
the person of the defendant, territorial suits must be discussed in the territo
rial tribunal.
may sue a Frenchman here for a debt contracted abroad; but
lands lying in France must be sued for there, and English lands must be sued
for in the kingdom of England. Formerly they were usually demanded only
in the court-baron of the manor, where the steward could summon no jurors
but such as were the tenants of the lord. When the cause was removed to the
hundred-court (as seems to have been the course in the Saxon times,) (d) the
lord of the hundred had a farther power, to convoke the inhabitants of differ
ent vills to form a jury: observing probably always to intermix among them a
stated number of tenants of that manor wherein the dispute arose.
When
afterwards it came to the county court, the great tribunal of Saxon justice,
the sheriff had wider authority, and could impanel a jury from the men of hia
county at large: but was obliged (as a mark of the original locality of the
number of hundredors; omitting the inferior
cause) to return a competent
And when at length, after the conquest,
distinction, if indeed it ever existed.
the king's justiciars drew the cognizance of the cause from the *county
J
court, though they could have summoned a jury from any part of the *•
with all its local
kingdom, yet they chose to take the cause as they found
appendages; triable by a stated number of hundredors, mixed with other free
holders of the county. The restriction as to hundredors hath gradually worn
away, and at length entirely vanished; (e) that of counties still remains, for
jurisdiction co-exten
many beneficial purposes: but, as the king's courts have
sive with the kingdom, there surely can be no impropriety in sometimes depart
ing from the general rule, when the great ends of justice warrant and require
an exception.
have ventured to mark these defects, that the just panegyrio, which have
given on the trial by jury, might appear to be the result of sober reflection,
and not of enthusiasm or prejudice. But should they, after all, continue un
trust that this
remedied and unsupplied, still (with all its imperfections)
mode of decision will be found the best criterion, for investigating the truth
of facts, that was ever established in any country. (35)
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I

a
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(e) This, among a number of other instances, was the case of the Issues directed by the house of lords
In the cause between the duke of Devonshire and the miners of the county of Derby, A. D. 17621
(e) See page 860.
(d) LL. Edvo. Con/, a. 82. Wlllc. 208.
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it

it

a
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a

change of venue.
(84) The courts of law now have authority to order
(35) So important has the right of trial by jury been regarded in the United States, that
not only the national constitution, but the constitution of each of the states, contains lim
itations, more or less broad, upon the power of the legislature to deprive parties of it. The
national constitution provides " that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed," and that "in suits at common law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved; and
in any court of the United States than
no fact tried by jury shall be otherwise re-examined
6th and 7th amendments.
The
according to the rules of the common law." Const. U.
restrictions in the state constitutions vary greatly, and they generally permit parties to
jury of less number than twelve.
waive the right in civil cases. Some of them also allow
It is well settled, however, that where the constitution preserves the right of trial by jury in
terms,
in
which
was demandable of right at the
for all those cases
preserves
general
R. I., 144; Dane Co. v. Dunning, 20 Wis., 210; Tabor
common law. Crandall v. James.
v. Cook, 15 Mich., 822; In r» Kemp, 16 Wis., 359; Byers v. Commonwealth, 42 Penn. St..
And the right cannot be made to depend upon any
89; Haines v. Levin, 61 Penn. St 412.
Curt. C. C, 311. And the number of the jury must be
Green v. Briggs,
condition.
twelve, and in criminal cases, at least, the party cannot waive the right, or bind himself by
Work v. State,
Ohio St., 296; Cancemi v. People,
consent to be tried by less number.
Blackf., 561; Hill v. People, 16 Mich., 851. Some cases
18 N. Y., 128; Brown v. State,
Met. (Ky.),
State v. Kauf
hold to the contrary of this. See Tyra v. Commonwealth,
man, 51 Iowa, 678; Commonwealth v. Daily, 12 Cush., 80.
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CHAPTER XXIV.
OF JUDGMENT AND ITS INCIDENTS.
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In the present chapter we are to consider the transactions in the cause next
immediately subsequent to arguing the demurrer, or trial of the issue.
If the issue be an issue of fact; and, upon trial by any of the methods men
tioned in the two preceding chapters, it be found for either the plaintiff or
defendant, or specially; or if the plaintiff makes default, or is nonsuit; or
whatever, in short, is done subsequent to the joining of issue and awarding the
trial, it is entered on record and is called a postea. (a) The substance of which
that postea, afterwards, the said plaintiff and defendant appeared by their
jury, being sworn, found such verdict;
attorneys at the place of trial; and
or, that the plaintiff, after the jury sworn, made default, and did not prosecute
This
added to the roll, which
now
his suit; or as the case may happen.
was sent; and the history of the cause,
returned to the court from which
was carried out,
thus continued by the postea.
from the time
Next follows, sixthly, the judgment of the court upon what has previously
passed; both the matter of law and matter of fact being now fully weighed
aQd adjusted.
Judgment *may however for certain causes be smr#ooi7i
<■
cannot be entered till the next term
pended, or finally arrested: for
after trial had, and that upon notice to the other party. So that
any defect
of justice happened at the trial, by surprise, inadvertence, or misconduct, the
new trial; or if, not
party may have relief in the court above, by obtaining
withstanding the issue of fact be regularly decided,
appears that the com
plaint was either not actionable in itself, or not made with sufficient precision
and accuracy, the party may supersede
by arresting or staying the judgment.
the judgment, by granting
new trial (1) are at
Causes of suspending
present wholly extrinsic, arising from matter foreign to, or dehors the
record. Of this sort are want of notice of trial; or any flagrant misbehaviour
of the party prevailing towards the jury, which may have influenced their ver
dict; or any gross misbehaviour of the jury among themselves: also
appears by the judge's report, certified to the court, that the jury have brought
verdict without or contrary to evidence, so that he
in
reasonably dissatis
fied therewith; (b) or
they have given exorbitant damages
(c) or if the
judge himself has misdirected the jury, so that they found an unjustifiable ver
the practice of the
dict: for these, and other reasons of the like kind,
But
twe juries agree in the same or
court to award
new, or second trial.
third trial
seldom awarded: (d) for the law will not
a similar verdict,
readily suppose, that the verdict of any one subsequent jury can countervail
the oaths of the two preceding ones.
The exertion of these superintendent powers of the king's courts, in setting
aside the verdict of jury and granting
new trial, on account of misbehaviour
in the jurors,
of a date extremely ancient.
There are instances in the year(6) Law of Nisi Prius, 803,304.

(c) Comb. 357.

(d)

t

|

4.

fi) Appendix No. II.

Mod. 28.

Balk. 649.

"a

8

7

1

is

a

a

a

new trial stated in the text, the following may be
(1) In addition to the grounds for
mentioned: The want of
proper jury; unavoidable absence of witnesses or attorneys;
conviction of perjury of material witness subsequent to the trial; discovery of new and
material evidence, and erroneous rulings of the judge in the course of the trial. The
motion for a new trial is, at common law, made to the trial court, and its granting
dis
Pet., 170; Chase
cretionary, and not ground of error. McLanahan v. Insurance Co.,
Davis,
Vt., 476; Brooklyn v. Patchen, Wend., 47. In criminal cases the general rule
is that when the defendant has been acquitted, no new trial can be granted on the applica
tion of the state; but this
changed by statute in some of the United States.
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books of the reigns of Edward HI,
Henry IV, (/) and Henry VII, {g) of
trial at bar) and *new venires r*oofl
judgments being stayed (even after
awarded, because the jury had eat and drank without consent of the
judge, and because the plaintiff had privately given
paper to a juryman
before he was sworn.
And upon these the chief justice Glynn in 1655,
reported in our books (/t) for granting a
grounded the first precedent that
new trial upon account of excessive damages given by the jury: apprehending,
with reason, that notorious partiality in the jurors was
principal species of
misbehaviour. A few years before, practice took rise in the common pleas, (i)
of granting new trials upon the mere certificate of the judge (unfortified by
any report of the evidence), that the verdict had passed against his opinion;
though Chief-justice, Rolle (who allowed of new trials in case of misbehaviour,
the verdict was notoriously contrary to evidence) (k)
surprise, or fraud, or
And at that time
refused to adopt that practice in the court of king's bench.
was clearly held for law,
that whatever matter was of force to avoid a
verdiot, ought to be returned upon the postea, and not merely surmised by the
new venire was awarded, without
court; lest posterity should wonder why
But very early in the reign
any sufficient reason appearing upon the record.
of Charles the Second new trials were granted upon affidavits (m) and the
former strictness of the courts of law, in respect of new trials, having driven
many parties into courts of equity to be relieved from oppressive verdicts,
they are now more liberal in granting them: the maxim at present adopted
not done upon one
being this, that (in all cases of moment) where justice
trial, the injured party
entitled to another, (n)
Formerly the principal remedy, for reversal of a verdict unduly given, was
by writ of attaint; of which we shall speak in the next chapter, and which is
at least as old as the institution of the grand assize by Henry II, (o) in lieu
of the Norman trial by battel. Such
sanction was probably thought
•necessary, when, instead of appealing to Providence for the decision r*oRa
of
dubious right,
was referred to the oath of fallible or perhaps
Our ancestors saw that
jury might give an erroneous ver
corrupted men.
dict; and
they did, that
ought not finally to conclude the question in the
first instance: but the remedy, which they provided, shows the ignorance and
ferocity of the times, and the simplicity of the points then usually litigated in
the courts of justice.
They supposed that the law being told to the jury by
the judge, the proof of fact must be always so clear, that,
they found a
Whereas a
wrong verdict, they must be willfully and corruptly perjured.
juror may find
just verdict from unrighteous motives, which can only be
known to the great Searcher of hearts: and he may, on the contrary, find a
verdict very manifestly wrong, without any bad motive at all; from inexperi
ence in business, incapacity, misapprehension, inattention to circumstances,
and a thousand other innocent causes.
But such
remedy as this laid the
conviction of the
injured party under an insuperable hardship, by making
jurors for perjury the condition of his redress.
The judges saw this; and therefore very early, even upon writs of assize,
they devised a great variety of distinctions; by which an attaint might be
avoided, and the verdict set to rights in more temperate and dispassionate
method, (p) Thus,
excessive damages were given, they were moderated by
the discretion of the justices, (q) And
either in that, or in any other
instance, justice was not completely done, through the error of either the judge
or the recognitors,
was remedied by certificate of assize, which was neither
more nor less than second trial of the same cause by the same jury, (r) And,
in mixed or personal actions, as trespass and the like (wherein no attaint origin(«) 24 Edw. m. 81 Bro. Abr. tit verdite, 17.
(J) 11Hen. IV, 18. Bro. Abr. tit. enquett, 75.
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2

1

)S)
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1.

14 Hen. VII,
Bro. Abr. tit. verdite, 18.
(0 Ibid. 238.
(X) Styl. 466.
Sid. 83J. Btyl. Pract. Keg. 310,811.edit. 1657.
.
(0 Cro. Eli*. 616. Palm. 885. BrownL 807.
Lev 140.
(m) Sid. 235.
(n) Burr. 895.
o. 4.
(p) Bract,
tr.
c. 18.
(o) Ipti regali inititutioni eteganter inserta. QIan.
c. 19,
tr.
c.
2. F. N. B. 181. Inst. 415.
(fl) Ibid. tr.
(r) Ibid.
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(a) 8i juratoret erraverint, et juttictarii secundum eorum dictum judicium pronuntiavertnt,
et ideo eequi rum debent eorum dictum, eed Ulud emendare trnenfur
faeiunt pronuntiationem;
Si autem aijudicare netciant, recurrendum erit ad majut judicium.
igentem examinaiionem.
tr.
o.
(I) Bee page 268.
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(s)

ally lay), if the jury gave a wrong verdict, the judges did not think themselves
warranted thereby to pronounce an iniquitous judgment; but amended it, if
possible, by subsequent inquiries of their own; and, if that *conld not
r*ofiol
*■
^ be
"When afterwards
they referred it to another examination,
attaints, by several statutes were more universally extended, the judges fre
quently, even for the misbehaviour of jurymen, instead of prosecuting the writ
of attaint, awarded
second trial: and subsequent resolutions, for more than
century past, have so amplified the benefit of this remedy, that the attaint
now as obsolete as the trial by battel which
succeeded; and we shall prob
And here
ably see the revival of the one as soon as the revival of the other.
the wisdom of suffering time to bring to perfec
cannot but again admire
tion new remedies, more easy and beneficial to the subject; which, by degrees,
from the experience and approbation of the people, supersede the necessity or
desire of using or continuing the old.
would tend to destroy this
If every verdict was final in the first instance,
valuable method of trial, and would drive away all causes of consequence to be
decided according to the forms of the imperial law, upon depositions in
Causes of great
writing; which might be reviewed in a course of appeal.
importance, titles to land, and large questions of commercial property, come
often to be tried by
jury, merely upon the general issue: where the facts are
complicated and intricate, the evidence of great length and variety, and some
times contradicting each other; and where the nature of the dispute very fre
quently introduces nice questions and subtilties of law. Either party may be
surprised by
piece of evidence which (had he known of its production) he
could have explained or answered: or may be puzzled by
legal doubt, which
little recollection would have solved. In the hurry of a trial the ablest judge
may mistake the law, and misdirect the jury: he may not be able so to state
and range the evidence as to lay
clearly before them, nor to take off the art
ful impressions which have been made on their minds by learned and experithat
The jury are to give their ""opinion instanter
ence0- advocates.
r*<?Qi
And under these circumstances
before they separate, eat, or drink.
the most intelligent and best intentioned men may bring in verdict, which
they themselves upon cool deliberation would wish to reverse.
Next to doing right, the great object in the administration of publio justice
■hould be to give public satisfaction. If the verdict be liable to many objections
and doubts in the opinion of his counsel, or even in the opinion of bystanders, no
party would go away satisfied unless he had prospect of reviewing it. Such
doubts would with him be decisive: he would arraign the determination as
manifestly unjust; and abhor tribunal which he imagined had done him an
possibility of redress.
injury without
Granting anew trial, under proper regulations, cures all these inconveniences,
and at the same time preserves entire and renders perfect that most excellent
a
A new trial
the glory of the English law.
method of decision, which
rehearing of the cause before another jury; but with as little prejudice to either
taken of the
No advantage
had never been heard before.
party, as
former verdict on the one side, or the rule of court for awarding such second
trial on the other: and the subsequent verdict, though contrary to the first,
imports no tittle of blame upon the former jury; who, had they possessed the
name lights and advantages, would probably have altered their own opinion.
more
The parties come better informed, the counsel better prepared, the law
now
more master of the subject; and nothing
fully understood, the judge
tried, but the real merits of the case.
A sufficient ground must however be laid before the court, to satisfy them that
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If the
necessary to justice that the canse should be farther considered.
matter be such, as did not or could not appear to the judge who presided at
nisi prim, it is disclosed to the court by affidavit: if it arises from what passed
at the trial, it is taken from the judge's information; who usually makes a
Counsel are heard on both sides to
special and minute report of the evidence.
impeach *or establish the verdict, and the court give their reasons at r*a9o n
-'
large why a new examination ought or ought not to be allowed. The
true import of the evidence is duly weighed, false colours are taken off, and
all points of law which arose at the trial are upon full deliberation clearly ex
plained and settled.
Nor do the courts lend too easy an ear to every application for a review of
the former verdict. They must be satisfied that there are strong probable
grounds to suppose that the merits have not been fairly and fully discussed,
and that the decision is not agreeable to the justice and truth of the case. A
new trial is not granted, where the value is too inconsiderable to merit a second
examination. It is not granted upon nice and formal objections, which do not
go to the real merits. It is not granted in cases of strict right, or summum
jus, where the rigorous exaction of extreme legal justice is hardly reconcilable
to conscience.
Nor is it granted where the scales of evidence hang nearly
equal: that which leans against the former verdict ought always very strongly
to preponderate.
In granting such farther trial (which is matter of sound discretion) the court
has also an opportunity, which it seldom fails to improve, of supplying those
defects in this mode of trial which are stated in the preceding chapter; by
laying the party applying under all such equitable terms as his antagonist
shall desire and mutually offer to comply with: such as the discovery of some
facts upon oath; the admission of others not intended to be litigated; the pro
duction of deeds, books and papers; the examination of witnesses, infirm, or
going beyond sea; and the like. And the delay and expense of this proceed
ing are so small and trifling, that it seldom can be moved for to gain time or
to gratify humour. The motion must be made within the first four days of the
next succeeding term, within which term it is usually heard and decided. And
it is worthy observation how infinitely superior to all others the trial by jury
approves itself, even in the very mode of its revision. In every other country
of Europe, and in those of our own tribunals which conform themselves to
the *process of the civil law, the parties are at liberty, whenever they r*qnq i
->
please, to appeal from day to day and from court to court upon ques- *■
tions merely of fact; which is a perpetual source of obstinate chicane, delay,
and expensive litigation, (m)
With us no new trial is allowed, unless there be
a manifest mistake, and the subject-matter be worthy of interposition.
The
party who thinks himself aggrieved, may still, if he pleases, have recourse to
his writ of attaint (2) after judgment: in the course of the trial he may demur
to the evidence, or tender a bill of exceptions. And, if the first is totally laid
aside, and the other two very seldom put in practioe, it is because long expe
rience has shown that a motion for a second trial is the shortest, cheapest, and
most effectual cure for all imperfections in the verdict; whether they arise
from the mistakes of the parties themselves, of their counsel or attorneys, or
even of the judge or jury.
2. Arrests of judgment (3) arise from intrinsic causes, appearing upon the
it is

(*) Not many yean ago an appeal was brought to the house of lords from the court of session In
Scotland, In a cause between Napier and Macf arlane. It was Instituted In March, 1745,and (after many
Interlocutory orders and sentences below, appealed from and reheard as far as the course of proceeding
— the question being only on the property in an ox,
would admit), was finally determined in April, 1749
adjudged to be of the value of three guineas. No pique or spirit could have made such a cause in the
court of king's bench or common pleas have lasted a tenth of that time, or have cost a twentieth part of
the expense.
(2) Since abolished.
(8) The defects upon record must be such as are not cured by verdict or by any statute of
Jeofails. The rule as to the defects that shall be cured by verdict is thus stated in 2 Saund.
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Of this kind are, first, where the declaration varies totally
face of the record.
from the original writ; as where the writ is in deht or detinue, and the plain
tiff declares in an action on the case for an assumpsit: for the original writ
out of chancery being the foundation and warrant of the whole proceedings in
the common pleas, if the declaration does not pursue the nature of the writ,
the court's authority totally fails. (4)
Also, secondly, where the verdict
materially differs from the pleadings and issue thereon; as if, in an action
for words, it is laid in the declaration that the defendant said, "the plaintiff
is a bankrupt;" and the verdict find specially that he said, "the plaintiff will be
a bankrupt."
Or, thirdly, if the case laid in the declaration is not sufficient in
t0 f°un<i an action upon.
And this is an invariable.*rule
P0"1* °f
T*394l
J with regard to arrests of judgment upon matters of law, "that what
!■
ever is alleged in arrest of judgment must be such matter as would upon de
murrer have been sufficient to overturn the action or plea." As if, on an action
for slander in calling the plaintiff a Jew, the defendant denies the words, and
issue is joined thereon ; now if a verdict he found for the plaintiff, that the
words were actually spoken, whereby the fact is established, still the defend
ant may move in arrest of judgment, that to call a man a Jew is not actionable:
and, if the court be of that opinion, the judgment shall be arrested, and never
But the rule will not hold e converso, " that every
entered for the plaintiff.
thing that may be alleged as cause of demurrer will be good in arrest of judg
ment;" for if a declaration or plea omits to state some particular circumstance,
without proving of which, at the trial, it is impossible to support the action or
As
in an action of tres
defence, this omission shall be aided by a verdict.
pass, the declaration doth not allege that the trespass was committed on any
the defendant justifies, by prescribing for a right of
certain day; (w) or
common for his cattle, and does not plead that his cattle were levant and
couchant on the land; (although either of these defects might be good cause to
the adverse party omits to take advan
demur to the declaration or plea, yet
verdict against
tage of such omission in due time, but takes issue, and has
him, these exceptions cannot, after verdict, be moved in arrest of judgment
For the verdict ascertains those facts, which before from the inaccuracy of the
pleadings might be dubious; since the law will not suppose that jury, under
the inspection of judge, would find verdict for the plaintiff or defendant,
unless he had proved those circumstances, without which his general allegation
defective, (y) Exceptions, therefore, that are moved in arrest of judgment, must
demurrer: or,
be much more material and glaring than such as will maintain
in other words, many inaccuracies and omissions, which would be fatal,
early
observed, are cured by
subsequent verdict; and not suffered, in the last stage
*But
the thing omitof
cause, to unravel the whole proceedings.
r*<i
3aoJ ted be essential to the aotion or defence, as
the plaintiff does not
title that
totally
merely state his title in defective manner, but sets forth
or
to an action of debt the defendant pleads not guilty
defective in itself,
verdict for the plaintiff in
instead of nil debet, (a) these cannot be cured by
the first case, or for the defendant in the second.
(x) Cro.

Jac

44.

(y)

1

(w) Carth. 389.

Mod. 294

-

(«) Salic 80S.

(a) Cro. Ella. 778.
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any defect, imperfection, or omission in any pleading,
Rep., 228, n, (1) "When there
whether in substance or form, which would have been fatal objection on demurrer, yet
the issue joined be such as necessarily required, on the trial, proof of the facts so defec
not to be presumed that
tively or imperfectly stated or omitted, and without which
either the judge would direct the jury to give, or the jury would have given, the verdict,
the
omission,
common law." See,
cured by the verdict at
such defect, imperfection or
18;
provided that
Chit. PL, 673. By 15 and 10 Vict., c. 76,
also, Gould PL. ch.10,
the
not
be
arrested
for any defect
has
been
on
demurrer
shall
joined
judgment
when issue
" according to the very right of the cause and matter
of form merely, but shall be given,
in law."
no longer necessary in England to mention in the writ any form of action.
(4) It
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If, by the misconduct or inadvertence of the pleaders, the issue be joined
on a fact totally immaterial, or insufficient to determine the right, so that the
court upon the finding cannot know for whom judgment ought to be given; as
if, in an action on the case in assumpsit against an executor, he pleads that he
in an action
himself (instead of the testator) made no suoh promise: (b) or
of debt on bond conditioned to pay money on or before
certain day, the de
found for the plaintiff,
fendant pleads payment on the day: (c) (which issue,
would be inconclusive, as the money might have been paid before;') in these
cases the court will after verdict award
repleader quod parties replacitent
unless
appears from the whole record that nothing material can possibly be
repleader would be fruitless, (d)
pleaded in any shape whatsoever, and then
And, whenever repleader
granted, the pleadings must begin de novo at
that stage of them, whether
be the plea, replication, or rejoinder, &c, where
in there appears to have been the first defect, or deviation from the regular
course,

If

(e)

, ...
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not by some of these means arrested within the first four
judgment
then to be entered on the roll or re
days of the next term after the trial,
cord. Judgments are the sentence of the law, pronounced by the court upon
First, where the
the matter contained in the record; and are of four sorts.
facts are confessed by the parties, and the law determined by the court; as in
case of judgment upon demurrer
admitted by the
secondly, where the law
verdict: thirdly,
parties, and the facts disputed; as in case of judgment on
where *both the fact and the law arising thereon are admitted by the r
*
the case of judgments by confession or default:
defendant; which
convinced that either fact, or law, or both, are
or, lastly, where the plaintiff
insufficient to support his action, and therefore abandons or withdraws his pro
the case in judgments upon
nonsuit or retraxit.
secution: which
The judgment, though pronounced or awarded by the judges,
not their
determination or sentence, out the determination and sentence of the lava. It
the conclusion that naturally and regularly follows from the premises of law
and fact, which stand thus: against him who hath rode over my oorn,
may
recover damages by law: but A hath rode over my oorn; therefore
shall re
If the major proposition be denied, this
cover damages against
demur
both be confessed
rer in law:
the minor,
then an issue of fact; but
(or determined) to be right, the conclusion or judgment of the court cannot
but follow.
Which judgment or conclusion depends not, therefore, on the
arbitrary caprice of the judge, but on the settled and invariable principles of
the remedy prescribed by law for the re
justice. The judgment, in short,
the vehicle or means of administer
dress of injuries; and the suit or action
ing it. What that remedy may be, is, indeed, the result of deliberation and
not that
study to point out, and therefore the style of the judgment
decreed or resolved by the court, for then the judgment might appear to be
their own; but "
considered," consideratum est per curiam, that the plain
tiff do recover his damages, his debt, his possession, and the like: which im
plies that the judgment is none of their own; but the act of law, pronounced
and declared by the court, after due deliberation and inquiry.
All these species of judgments are either interlocutory or final. Interloc
cause, upon some
utory judgments are such as are given in the middle of
plea, proceeding, or default, which
only intermediate, and does not finally
Of this nature are all judgments for the
determine or complete the suit.
-.
plaintiff upon pleas in abatement of the suit or action: in*which
considered by the court that the defendant do answer over, respondeat
It easy to observe, that
more substantial plea.
ouster; that is, put in
not final, but merely interlooutory; for there are
the judgment here given
a
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(e) 8tra. 991
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Saund. 80.
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(2>) Ventr. 190.
(e) Eaym. 488. Balk. 679.
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afterwards farther proceedings to be had, when the defendant hath put in a
better answer.
But the interlocutory judgments most usually spoken of are those incomplete
j udgments, whereby the right of the plaintiff is indeed established, but the quan
tum of damages sustained by him is not'ascertained: which is a matter that can
As by the old Gothic con
not be done without the intervention of a jury.
stitution the cause was not completely finished till the nembda or jurors were
called in " ad executionem decretorum judicii, ad ojstimationem, pretii, damni,
lucri," &c. (g) This can only happen where the plaintiff recovers; for, when
judgment is given for the defendant, it is always complete as well as final.
And this happens, in the first place, where the defendant suffers judgment to
go against him by default, or nihil dicit; as if he puts in no plea at all to the
plaintiff's declaration: by confession or cognovit actionem, where he acknow
ledges the plaintiff's demand to be just: or by non sum informatics, when the de
fendant's attorney declares he has no instructions to say any thing in answer to
the plaintiff, or in defence of his client; which is a species of judgment by default.
If these, or any of them, happen in actions where the specific thing sued for is
recovered, as in actions of debt for a sum certain, the judgment is absolutely
And therefore it is very usual, in order to strengthen a creditor's
complete.
security, for the debtor to execute a warrant of attorney to some attorney
named by the creditor, empowering him to confess a judgment by either of
the ways just now mentioned (by nihil dicit, cognovit actionem, or non sum in
formatics) in an action of debt to be brought by the creditor against the debt
or for the specific sum due: which judgment, when confessed, is absolutely
complete and binding; provided the same (as is also required in all other judg
abstracted and entered in
book,
ments) be regularly docquetted, that
, 'according to the directions of statute and
W. and M. c. 20. But
r^„„a
where damages are to be recovered,
jury must be called in to asses*
them, unless the defendant, to save charges, will confess the whole damages
laid in the declaration: otherwise the entry of the judgment
"that the plain
tiff ought to recover his damages
indefinitely), but because the court know
not what damages the said plaintiff hath sustained, therefore the sheriff
com
manded, that by the oaths of twelve honest and lawful men he inquire into the
said damages, and return such inquisition into court." This process
called
a writ of inquiry; in the execution of which the sheriff sits as judge, and tries
by jury, subject to nearly the same law and conditions as the trial by jury
at nisi prius, what damages the plaintiff hath really sustained; and when their
verdict
given, which must assess some damages, the sheriff returns the inqui
entered upon the roll in manner of
sition, which
postea; and thereupon
considered that the plaintiff do recover the exact sum of the damages so as
In like manner, when
determined for the plaintiff upon
sessed.
demurrer
also incomplete, with
an action wherein damages are recovered, the judgment
out the aid of a writ of inquiry. (5)
Final judgments are such as at onoe put an end to the action, by declaring
that the plaintiff has either entitled himself, or has not, to recover the remedy
In which case,
also consid
he sues for.
judgment be for the plaintiff,
ered that the defendant be either amerced, for his wilful delay of justice in
not immediately obeying the king's writ by rendering the plaintiff his due; (A)
or be taken up, capiatur, till he pays
fine to the king for the public misde
meanor which
coupled with the private injury, in all oases of force, (*) of
8

1

5

8

4.

(g) Stternhook, de jure Qoih.U. c.
(fc) Rep. 40,6L
Mod. 285. See Append. No. H. 4.
(4 Rep. 59. 11Rep. 43.

is

is

is

is

is

is

to grant the defendant permission to plead on terms,
(5) The common American practice
when his demurrer
overruled.
When damages are to be awarded, and the case
one for mere computation on a basis
which
determined by the pleadings, this computation
now commonly made by an of
ficer of the court, and the writ of inquiry
dispensed with.
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falsehood in denying his own deed, (k) or unjustly claiming property in replevin,
or of contempt by disobeying the command of the king's writ or the express
But now in case of trespass, ejectment, assault,
prohibition of any statute.
and false imprisonment,
is provided by the statute
and
W. and M., c.
12, that no writ of capias shall issue for this fine, nor any fine be paid; but the
plaintiff shall pay 6s. 8c?. to the proper officer, and be allowed
against the
defendant among his other costs. And, therefore, upon such judgments in
the common pleas, they used to enter that the fine was remitted, and now in
both courts they take no notice of any fine or capias at all. (m)
*But r«qQni
judgment be for the defendant, then, in case of fraud and deoeit to
the court, or malicious or vexatious suits, the plaintiff may also be fined; (n)
but in most cases
only considered that he and his pledges of prosecuting
be (nominally) amerced for his false claim, pro /also clamore svo, and that the
defendant may go thereof without
without
day, eat inde sine die, that
any farther continuance or adjournment; the king's writ commanding his
attendance, being now fully satisfied, and his innocence publicly cleared, (o)
Thus much for judgments; to which costs are
necessary appendage;
being now as well the maxim of ours as of the civil law, that "victtis victori
in expensis condemnandus est:" (p) though the common law did not profess
edly allow any, the amercement of the vanquished party being his only pun
ishment. The first statute which gave costs eo nomine, to the defendant in a
real action was the statute of Gloucester,
Edw.
o.
as did the statute of
to the defendant in one particular case, relative
Marlbridge, 52 Hen. Ill, c.
to wardship in chivalry: though in reality costs were considered and included in
the quantum of damages, in such actions where damages are given; and, even
now, costs for the plaintiff are always entered on the roll as increase of dam
But, because those damages were frequently inadequate
ages by the court,
to the plaintiff's expenses, the statute of Gloucester orders costs to be also
added; and farther directs, that the same rule shall hold place in all cases
And, therefore, in such actions where
to recover damages.
where the party
no damages were then recoverable (as in quare impedit, in which damages
13 Edw. I), no costs are now
were not given till the statute of Westm.
allowed; (r) unless they have been expressly given by some subsequent statute.
The statute Hen. VII, c. 10, was the first whioh allowed any costs on writ
of error. But no costs were allowed the defendant in any shape, till the
c.
and
Jao.
Win HI, c. 11, and
statutes 23 Hen. VIH, c. 15,
he prevailed, the same
Ann. c. 16, which very equitably gave the defendant,
costs as the plaintiff would have had, in case he had recovered.
These costs
on both sides are taxed and moderated by the prothonotary, or other proper
officer of the court.
shall neither pay nor
*The king (and any person suing to his use)
r*400i
not inoluded under the general
receive costs; for besides that he
his prerogative not to pay them to
words of these statutes, as
subject,
And
seems reasonable to
beneath his dignity to receive them. (6)
so
participates of the same privilege; for in
suppose, that the queen-consort
actions brought by her, she was not at the common law obliged to find pledges
of prosecution, nor could be amerced in case there was judgment against her.
In two other cases an exemption also lies from paying costs. Executors
and administrators, when suing in the right of the deceased, shall pay none;
(u) for the statute 23 Hen. VIII, c. 15, doth not give costs to defendants,
unless where the action supposeth the contract to be made with, or the wrong

a

(8)

In civil

cases the rule

is

1

if)

1
4.

8.

8

4

1

8

3,
1,

8

Boll. Abr. 310. LIU. Entr. 879,O. B. Hill.
Ann. rot. 480.
12L Oo. Lltt. 181. Hep. 60.
r(fc) P. N.
(») Rep. 59, 60.
(o) Appendix, No. IILJ6.
(m) Salk. 54. Cartta. 390.
(J) Rep. 60.
HenTvm,
10Rep.
118.
Stat.
84
o.
(p) C.id.
18.
(r)
(«)
(o) Appendix, No. H,
—
Jao. 229. Ventr. 89.
F. N. B. 101. Oo. lilt. 183.
(u) Cro. Jr

now otherwise.
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to be done to, the plaintiff himself. (7) And paupers, that
snch as will
swear themselves not worth five pounds, are, by statute 11 Hen. VII, c. 12, to
have original writs and subpoenas gratis, and counsel and attorney assigned
them without fee; and are excused from paying costs, when plaintiffs, by the
statute 23 Hen. VIII, c. 15, but shall suffer other punishment at the discretion of
the judges. And
was formerly usual to give such paupers,
nonsuited, their
election either to be whipped or pay the costs: (w) though that practice
now
disused,
pauper may recover costs, though
(x) It seems, however, agreed that
he pays none; (8) for the counsel and clerks are bound to give the labour to him,
but not to his antagonist, (y) To prevent also trifling and malicious actions,
for words, for assault and battery, and for trespass, it
enacted by statutes
43 Eliz. c.
21 Jac.
c. 16, and 22 and 23 Car. II, c.
136, that, where the
jury who try any of these actions shall give less damages than 40s., the plain
tiff shall be allowed no more costs than damages, unless the judge before whom
the cause
tried shall certify under his hand, on the back of the record, that
an aotual battery (and not an assault only) was proved, or that in trespass the
Also, by statutes
freehold or title of the land came chiefly in question.
and
HI, c 11,
an^
the trespass were
an^ ^* *c' 23' anc*
r*40ll
an inferior tradesman, or
committed in hunting or sporting
ap
pear to be wilfully and maliciously committed, the plaintiff shall have full
costs, (a) though his damages, as assessed by the jury, amount to less than 40s.
After judgment
entered, execution will immediately follow, unless the
party condemned thinks himself unjustly aggrieved by any of these proceed
ings, and then he has his remedy to reverse them by several writs in the nature
of appeals, which we shall consider in the succeeding chapter.

CHAPTER XXV.

OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE NATURE OF APPEALS.

it

a

a

;

a

a

1.

Peocbedings in the nature of appeals from the proceedings of the king's
courts of law, are of various kinds: according to the subject-matter in which
they are concerned.
They are principally four.
A writ of attaint: (1) which lieth to inquire whether
jury of twelve
men gave
false verdict; (a) that so the judgment following thereupon may
be reversed: and this must be brought in the lifetime of him for whom tho
verdict was given; and of two at least of the jurors who gave it. This lay,
and seems to have been coeval
at the common law, only upon writs of assize
with that institution by King Henry II, at the instance of his chief-justice,
Glanvil: being probably meant as check upon the vast power then reposed
verdict according to their own per
in the recognitors of assize, of finding
And even here
ex
sonal knowledge, without the examination of witnesses.
tended no farther than to such instances, where the issue was joined upon the
very point of assize (the heirship, disseisin, <fcc), and not on any collateral
matter; as villenage, bastardy, or any other disputed fact. In these cases the

Jx) Balk. 506.
(a) Finch, L. 484.

(y)

1

7

1

(to) Sid. 261. Mod. 114.
(z) See pages 214,215.

Eq. Ca. Abr. 126.

8

if

4

8

and Wm. IV, c. 42, gives costs against executors suing in the right of
(7) The statute
suing in their own right,
their testator, in all cases in which they would be liable to costs
unless the court or judge otherwise orders.
As to the law in America, see
Redf. on
Wills, 295; Boatwick v. Brown, 15 Hun, 308.
(8) Costs in such cases are given only when ordered by the court
(1) Now abolished.
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assize was said to be turned into an inquest or jury (assisa vertitur in juratum), or that the assize should be taken in modum juratce et non in modutn
that the issue should be tried by
common jury or inquest,
assises/ that
and not by recognitors of assize: (b) and then
apprehend that no attaint lay
against the inquest or jury that determined suoh collateral issue, (c) Neither
do
find any mention made by our ancient writers, of such a process obtain
ing after the trial by inquest or jury, in the old Norman or feudal actions
Nor did any attaint lie in trespass, r*A0a-i
by writ of entry.
•prosecuted
law: because those
debt, or other action personal, by the old common
At length the
were always determined by common inquests or juries, (d)
statute of Westm.
Edw.
c. 38, allowed an attaint' to be sued upon in
quests, as well as assizes, which were taken upon any plea of land or of free
so understood by the author
hold. But this was at the king's discretion, and
of Fleta, (e)
writer contemporary with the statute; though Sir Edward Coke
(/) seems to hold different opinion. Other subsequent statutes (g) intro
duced the same remedy in all pleas of trespass, and the statute 34 Edw. Ill, c.
extended
to all pleas whatsoever, personal as well as real; except only the
writ of right in such cases where the mise or issue
joined on the mere right,
and not on any collateral question.
For though the attaint seems to have been
generally allowed in the reign of Henry the Second (A), at the first introduc
tion of the grand assize (which at that time might consist of only twelve recog
nitors, in case they were all unanimous), yet subsequent
authorities have
holden, that no attaint lies on
false verdict given upon the mere right, either
at common law or by statute; because that
determined by the grand assize,
appealed to by the party himself, and now consisting of sixteen jurors,
The jury who are to try this false verdict must be twenty-four, and are
called the grand jury; for the law wills not that the oath of one jury of twelve
should be attainted or set aside by an equal number, nor by less indeed than
double the former, {k) If the matter in dispute be of forty pounds value in
year in lands and tenements, then, by statute
personals, or of forty shillings
each grand juror must have freehold to the annual value of
15 Hen. VI, c.
And he that brings the attaint can give no other evidence
twenty pounds.
to the grand jury than what was originally given to the petit For, as their
whether or no they did right upon
now trying, and the question
verdict
the highest absurdity
the evidence that appeared to them, the law adjudged
to produce any subsequent proof upon such trial, and to *condemn the r*4(u-i
prior jurisdiction for not believing evidence which they never knew. *brought are allowed, in affirmance of the first
But those against whom
because the petit jury may have formed
verdiot, to produce new matter:
their verdict upon evidence of their own knowledge, which never appeared in
false one, the judgment by the
court. If the grand jury found the verdict
common law was, that the jurors should lose their liberam legem and become
forever infamous; should forfeit their goods and the profits of their lands;
should themselves be imprisoned, and their wives and children thrown out of
doors
should have their houses razed, their trees extirpated, and their
meadows ploughed; and that the plaintiff should be restored to all that he
lost by reason of the unjust verdict. But as the severity of this punishment
had its usual effect, in preventing the law from being executed, therefore by
and made per
the statute 11 Hen. VII, c. 24, revived by 23 Hen. VHI, c.
allowed to be brought after the death of
petual by 13 Eliz. o. 25, an attaint
more moderate
the party, and
punishment was inflicted upon attainted
the cause of action were above 40/.
jurors; viz., perpetual infamy, and,

a 22,

j.
7.

Flat.

J.
6,

2.

|

4,

8,

I.
4,

1

42. Roll. Abr. 389.
tr.
0.
Ut) Bract.

(11Finch, L. 480.
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value, a forfeiture of 201. apiece by the jurors, or, if under 40/., then ol. apiece:
to be divided between the king and the party injured.
So that a man may
now bring an attaint either upon the statute or at common law, at his election;
But the practioe
(m) and in both of them may reverse the former judgment.
of setting aside verdicts upon motion, and granting new trials, has so super
seded the use of both sorts of attaints, that
have observed very few instances
of an attaint in our books, later than the sixteenth century, (n)
By the old
Gothic constitution, indeed, no certificate of a judge was allowed, in matters
of evidence, to countervail the oath of the jury; but their verdict, however
Yet there was a proceeding
erroneous, was absolutely final and conclusive.
from whence our attaint may be derived. If, upon a lawful trial before a su""tribunal, the jury were found to have given a false verdict, they
T*405 J1 Pe"or
L
were fined, and rendered infamous for the future, (o)
II. The writ of deceit, or.action on the case in nature of
may be brought
in the court of common pleas, to reverse
judgment there had by fraud or
collusion in real action, whereby lands and tenements have been recovered
to the prejudice of him that hath right. (2) But of this enough hath been
observed in
former chapter, (p)
re
where
defendant against whom judgment
III. An audita querela
therefore in danger of execution, or perhaps actually
covered, and who
execution, may be relieved upon good matter of discharge, which has happened
the plaintiff hath given him
since the judgment; as
general release; or
the defendant hath paid the debt to the plaintiff, without procuring satisfac
tion to be entered on the record. In these and the like cases, wherein the de
fendant hath good matter to plead, but hath had no opportunity of pleading
(either at the beginning of the suit, or puis darrein continuance, which, as
former chapter, (q) must always be before judgment), and
was shown in
bill in equity, to be relieved against the
audita querela lies, in the nature of
It
writ directed to the court, stating that the
oppression of the plaintiff.
complaint of the defendant hath been heard, audita querela defendentis. and
at length enjoins the court to
then, setting out the matter of the complaint,
call the parties before them, and having heard their allegations and proofs, to
It also lies for bail, when judg
cause justice to be done between them, (r)
ment
obtained against them by scire facias to answer the debt of their prin
happens afterwards that the original judgment against their
cipal, and
reversed: for here the bail, after judgment had against them, have
principal
no opportunity to plead this special matter, and therefore they shall have re
which
writ of a most remedial nature, and
dress by audita querela;
been invented, lest in any case there should *be an op*do«l Beems *° nave
party who hath a good defence is
pressive defect of justice, where
in the ordinary forms of law. But the indulgence now
too late to make
shown by the courts in granting
summary relief upon motion, in cases of
has almost rendered useless the writ of audita que
such evident oppression,
rela, and driven
quite out of practice. (3)
IV. But, fourthly, the principal method of redress for erroneous judgments
in the king's courts of record,
by writ of error to some superior court of
is

if

appeal.
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(n) Cro. Ellz. 309. Cro. Jac 90.
(m) Inst 164.
(o) "St tamen evidentl argument*}falsum jurasaeconvinaantur

(

1

8.

(idguod auperiua judicium cognotcere
Stiernh. dejure Goth.
debet) niulctantur inbonis, de ccetero perjuri et inteatabilea."
(p) See. page 165.
(r) Finch, L. 488. F. N. B. 103.
(fl) See page 816.
(t) Lord Raym. 439.
(u) Appendix, No. m,
(#) Roll. Abr. 308.
(2) Now abolished.
on new trial, with
the defendant
clearly entitled to relief the court will grant
(8)
the case is
Lister v. Mundell,
B. & P., 427; but
out forcing him to &a audita querela:
doubtful, the defendant will be left to his writ, that the plaintiff may demur or bring error.
R., 416.
Cr. M.
Symonds v. Blake,
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court of record; for to amend errors in a base oourt, not of record, a writ of
lies. (»)
The writ of error only lies upon matter of law arising
upon the face of the proceedings; so that no evidenoe is required to substantiate or support it: there being no method of reversing an error in the deter
mination of facts, but by an attaint, or a new trial, to correct the mistakes of
the former verdict (4)
Formerly, the suitors were much perplexed by writs of error brought upon
very slight and trivial grounds, as mis-spellings and other mistakes of the
olerks, all which might be amended at the common law, while all the proceed
ings were in paper; (w) for they were then considered as only in fieri, and
therefore subject to the control of the courts. But, when once the record was
made up, it was formerly held, that by the common law no amendment could
be permitted, unless within the very term in which the judicial act so recorded
was done: for during the term the record is in the breast of the court; but
afterwards it admitted of no alteration. (x) But now the courts are become
will allow of amendments at any
more liberal; and, where justice requires
time while the suit
depending, notwithstanding the record be made up, and
For they at present consider the proceedings as in fieri, till
the term be past.
given; and therefore that, till then, they have power to permit
judgment
once given
amendments*
by the common law: but when judgment
r*407i
and enrolled, no amendment
permitted in any subsequent term.(y)
Mistakes are also effectually helped by the statutes of amendment and jeofails:
so called, because when a pleader perceives any slip in the form of his pro
at liberty by those
ceedings, and acknowledges such error (jeo faile), he
seldom actually made, but the ben
statutes to amend it; which amendment
attained by the court's overlooking the exception.(z) These
efit of the acts
statutes are many in number, and the provisions in them too minute to be here
taken notice of otherwise than by referring to the statutes themselves; (a) by
which all trifling exceptions are so thoroughly guarded against, that writs of
-error cannot now be maintained, but for some material mistake assigned. (5)
This
at present the general doctrine of amendments; and its rise and his
tory are somewhat curious. In the early ages of our jurisprudence, when all
pleadings were ore tenns,
slip was perceived and objected to by the oppo
site party, or the court, the pleader instantly acknowledged his error and recti
fied his plea; which gave occasion to that length of dialogue reported in the
ancient year-books. So liberal were then the sentiments of the crown as well
the
as the judges, that in the statute of Wales, made at Rothelan, 12 Edw.
pleadings are directed to be carried on in that principality, "sine calumpnia
verborum, non obseruata ilia dura consuetudine, qui cad.it a syllaba cadit a tola
causa." The judgments were entered up immediately by the clerks and offi

J

I,

a

if

is

is

is

is

is

*■

is

is

is

it,

fake judgment

3

4

1

8

8.

L

6

9

8

4

4.

9

L

8.

8.

(y) Stat. 11Hen. IV, a
(is) Burr. 1099.
(x) Oo. Lit*. 280.
ce)Finch, L. 484.
(») Stra. 1011.
m,
VL
Hen.
V,
c.
Hen.
VL
c. 12 and 15. 82 Hen. VHI, c. 30.
14Edw.
0.
c.
Hen.
Stat.
(a)
18 Eli*, c. 14. 21 Jac
c. 18. 16 and 17Car. H, a (styled in Ventr. 100,an omnipotent act).
and
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o. 13.
Anne, c. 18.
Anne. c. 20.
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not error in law,
writ of
(4) If, however, there was error in fact in the proceedings,
to correct the
error coram nobis or coram vobit might issue to the trial court to enable
a minor and appears by attorney instead of by guardian,
«rror. Thus, if the defendant
under coverture and the husband
one of the parties
improperly omitted from the
there is some error in the record
one of the parties dies before judgment,
proceedings,
caused by
ministerial officer of the court; in any such case the judgment would be erro
If the cause were in the K. B., the writ
neous in fact, though perhaps
good in law.
con
would be coram nobis, before us, as the record remaining in the court where the king
were in the common pleas, the writ would be coram vobit, before you, since
structively;
Tidd. Pr., 1136-7.
See Kemp
the record remains then before the justices of that court.
Jones
v. Crook, 18 Md., 130; Lane v. Williams, 12 Sm. & M., 362; Boughton v. Brown,
Mich., 46.
<N. C), 893; Teller v. Wetherell,
Geo. IV, c. 15;
(6) In addition to the statutes referred to by the author in the note, see
Win. IV. c. 43. and the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852.
and
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cere of the court; and if any misentry was made, it was rectified by the min
utes, or by the remembrance of the court itself.
When the treatise by Britton was published, in the name and by authority
of the king (probably about the 13 Edw. I, because the last statutes therein
referred to are those of Winchester and Westminster the second), a check
*to be given to the unwarrantable practices of some
r*40RlJ seems intended
judges, who had made false entries on the rolls to cover their own mis
behaviour, and had taken upon them by amendments and rasures to falsify
The king therefore declares, (b) that " although we have
their own records.
our
to make record of pleas pleaded before them, yet we
to
justices
granted
will not that their own record shall be a warranty for their own wrong, nor
that they may rase their rolls, nor amend them, nor record them contrary to
The whole of which, taken together, amounts to
their original enrolment."
this, that a record surreptitiously or erroneously made up, to stifle or pervert
the truth, should not be a sanction for error; and that a record, originally
made up according to the truth of the case, should not afterwards by any pri
vate rasure or amendment be altered to any sinister purpose.
But when afterwards King Edward, on his return from his French domin
ions in the seventeenth year of his reign, after upwards of three years' absence,
found it necessary (or convenient, in order to replenish his exchequer) to prose
cute his judges for their corruption and other malpractices, the perversion of
judgments and other manifold errors, (c) occasioned by their erasing and alter
ing records, were among the causes assigned for the heavy punishments in
flicted upon almost all the king's justices, even the most able and upright, (d)
^e 8evel"ity °f which proceedings *seem9 so to have alarmed the suclI *409lJ ceeding judges, that through a fear of being said to do wrong, they
As it was so hazardous to alter a record
hesitated at doing what was right.
motives (as happened in Hengbam's
duly made up, even from compassionate
case, which in strictness was certainly indefensible), they resolved not to touch
a record any more; but held that even palpable errors, when enrolled and the
term at an end, were too sacred to be rectified or called in question; and,
because Britton had forbidden all criminal and clandestine alterations, to make
a record speak a falsity, they oonceived that they might not judicially and
to make
In Edward the Third's time
agreeable to truth.
publicly amend
indeed, they once ventured (upon the certificate of the justice in eyre) to
estreat
larger fine than had been recorded by the clerk of the court below; (e)
but instead of amending the clerk's erroneous record, they made a second
enrolment of what the justice had declared ore tenus
and left
to be settled
by posterity in which of the two rolls that absolute verity resides, which every

6.

I

9. 8)

1,

'I

1

4

1

.

6

I

(3

is 2

I,

I,

it

(4

;

Is

a

I,

6

(8

2,
3.

Matth. Wert. A A. 1*89.
(6) Brit, proem.
(c) Judicia pervertermt, et in alii* erraverunt.
(d) Among the other judges, Sir Ralph Hengham, chief justice of the king's bench, is said to have been
fined 7,000marks; Sir Adam Stratton, chief baron of the exchequer, 34,000marks; and Thomas Way land,
chief Justice of the common pleas, to have been attainted of felony, and to have abjured the realm, with
a forfeiture of all his estates; the whole amount of the forfeitures being upwards of 100,000marks, or
Pryn. Roc. 401,402)—an incredible sum In those days, before paper credit was in use, and
70,000pounds
m.
Dudg. Chron.
when the annual salary of a chief justice was only sixty marks.
Edw.
Clam.
8er. 26. The charge against Sir Ralph Hengham (a very learned judge, to whom we are obliged for two
excellent treatises of practice), was only, according to tradition that was current in Richard the Third's
time (Year-book, M. 2Ric. Ill, 10),his altering, out of mere compassion, a fine, which was set upon a
very poor man, from 13s.4d. to 6a.8d., for which he was fined 800 marks — a more probable sum than
7,0uO. It
true, the book calls the judge so punished Ingham, and not Hengham but find no judge of
the name of Ingham in Dugdale's Series; and Sir Edward Coke
Inst. 655)and Sir Matthew Hale (IP. C
to have been the chief Justice. And certainly his offence (whatever It was) was nothing
646)understand
very atrocious or disgraceful; for. though removed from the king's bench at this time (together with the
rest of the judges), we find him, about eleven years afterwards, one of the justices In eyre for the general
m.
perambulation of the forest (Rot. perambvl. foreeU in turri Lond. 29 Edw.
and the next year
made chief justice of the common pleas {Put. 29Edw.
m. 7; Dugd. Chron. Ser. 32), in which office he
II,
continued tin his death, in Edw. U, Claw.
m.
Dugd. 34. Selden
Edw. U, m. 19. Pat.
p.
Edw.
an appendix to this tradition, remembered by Justice Southcote in the reign
pref. to Hengham. There
of Queen Elizabeth
Inst. 72; Inst. 256),that with this fine of Chief Justice Hengham, a clock-bouse
was built at Westminster, and furnished with a clock, to be heard into Westminster hall. Upon which
story shall only remark that (whatever early Instances may be found of the private exertion of mechan
ical genius in constructing borological machines) clocks came not into common use till a hundred years
afterwards, about the end of the fourteenth century. Encyclopedic, tit. Horloge,
Kym. feed. 590.
Perham's Artif. Clockmaker, 91
(«) HaL P. a 647.
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record is said to import in itself. (/) And, in the reign of Richard the Second
there are instances (ff) of their refusing to amend the most palpable errors and
mis-entries, unless by the authority of parliament.
To this real sullenness, but affected timidity, of the judges, such a narrow
ness of thinking was added, that every slip (even of a syllable or letter), (A)
was now held to be fatal to the pleader, and overturned his client's cause, (t)
they durst *not, or would not, set right mere formal mistakes at any r+iU)i
■*
time, upon equitable terms and conditions, they at least should have
held, that trifling objections were at all times inadmissible; and that more
solid exceptions in point of form came too late when the merits had been tried.
They might, through a decent degree of tenderness, have excused themselves
from amending in criminal, and especially in capital, cases. They needed not
have granted an amendment, where it would work an injustice to either party;
or where he could not be put in as good a condition, as if his adversary had
made no mistake.
And, if it was feared that an amendment after trial might
subject the jury to an attaint, how easy was it to make waiving the attaint the
sondition of allowing the amendment!
And yet these were among the absurd
reasons alleged for never suffering amendments at all! (k)
The precedents then set were afterwards most religiously followed, (/) to the
great obstruction of justice, and ruin of the suitors: who have formerly suf
fered as much by this scrupulous obstinacy and literal strictness of the courts,
as they could have done even by their iniquity.
After verdicts and judgments
upon the merits, they were frequently reversed for slips of the pen or mis
spellings; and justice was perpetually entangled in a net of mere technical
jargon. The legislature hath therefore been forced to interpose, by no less
than twelve statutes, to remedy these opprobrious niceties: and its endeavors
have been of late so well seconded by judges of a more liberal cast, that this
unseemly degree of strictness is almost entirely eradicated ; and will, probably
in a few years, be no more remembered than the learning of essoigns and de
But to return to our
faults, or the counter-pleas of voucher, are at present.

If

writs of error.
If a writ of error be brought to reverse any judgment of an inferior court
of record, where the damages are less than ten pounds; or if it is brought to>
reverse the judgment of any superior court after verdict, he that brings the
writ, or that is plaintiff in error, must (except in some peculiar cases) find sub
stantial pledges of prosecution or bail: (m) to prevent *delays by frivol- r*4|
-»
ous pretences to appeal; and for securing payment of costs and dam- »■
ages, which are now payable by the vanquished party in all, except a few
particular instances, by virtue of the several statutes cited in the margin, (n)
A writ of error lies from the inferior courts of record in England into the
king's bench, (o) and not into the common pleas, (p) Also from the king's
It likewise may be brought
bench in Ireland to the king's bench in England.
from the common pleas at Westminster to the king's bench; and then from the
king's bench the cause is removable to the house of lords. From proceedings
on the lawside of the exchequer a writ of error lies into the court of exchequer
chamber before the lord chancellor, lord treasurer, and the judges of the court
of king's bench and common pleas; and from thence it lies to the house of
From proceedings in the king's bench, in debt, detinue, covenant,
peers.
account, case, ejectment, or trespass, originally begun therein by bill (except
where the king is party), it lies to the exchequer chamber, before the justices
of the common pleas and barons of the exchequer; and from thence also to the
bouse of lords; (q) but where the proceedings in the king's bench do not first
(p) 1 HaL P. O. 84a
117. See page 831.
(*) Stat. H Edw. IH, o. 6.
(/) 1 Leon. 188. Oo. Litt.
(0 In those days It was strictly true, what Ruggle (in his Ignoramus) has humorously applied to m<
modern pleadings — " in nostra Uge unum comma evertit totum placitum."
(I) 8 Rep. 196.&c.
(k) StyL 807.
(m) Stat. 8 Jaa L, 0. 8. 13Car. l£ o 2. 16and 17Oar. H, c. 8. 19Geo. Ill, c. 70.
(n) 3 Hen. VII, c. 10. 18Car. H, e. 2. 8 and 9 Win. in, c. 11. * and 6 Anne, c. 16.
(j) Stat. 27 Eliz. c. 8.
180. Dyer, 850.
(j> Finch,
(o) See oh. 4.
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cers of the court; and if any misentry was made, it was rectified by the min
utes, or by the remembrance of the court itself.
When the treatise by Britton was published, in the name and by authority
of the king (probably about the 13 Edw. I, because the last statutes therein
referred to are those of Winchester and Westminster the second), a cheek
r*j0(o seems intended *to be given to the unwarrantable practices of some
J judges, who had made false entries on the rolls to cover their own mis
behaviour, and had taken upon them by amendments and rasures to falsify
The king therefore declares, (i) that " although we have
their own records.
granted to our justices to make record of pleas pleaded before them, yet we
will not that their own record shall be a warranty for their own wrong, nor
that they may rase their rolls, nor amend them, nor record them contrary to
their original enrolment." The whole of which, taken together, amounts to
this, that a record surreptitiously or erroneously made up, to stifle or pervert
the truth, should not be a sanction for error; and that a record, originally
made up according to the truth of the case, should not afterwards by any pri
vate rasure or amendment be altered to any sinister purpose.
But when afterwards King Edward, on his return from his French domin
ions in the seventeenth year of his reign, after upwards of three years' absence,
found it necessary (or convenient, in order to replenish his exchequer) to prose
cute his judges for their corruption and other malpractices, the perversion of
judgments and other manifold errors, (c) occasioned by their erasing and alter
ing records, were among the causes assigned for the heavy punishments in
flicted upon almost all the king's justices, even the most able and upright, (d )
severity of which proceedings *seems so to have alarmed the sucI *4.onl
L
J ceeding judges, that through a fear of being said to do wrong, they
As it was so hazardous to alter a record
hesitated at doing what was right.
motives (as happened in Hengham's
duly made up, even from compassionate
case, which in strictness was certainly indefensible), they resolved not to touch
a record any more; but held that even palpable errors, when enrolled and the
term at ati end, were too sacred to be rectified or called in question; and,
because Britton had forbidden all criminal and clandestine alterations, to make
that they might not judicially and
a record speak a falsity, they conceived
to make
In Edward the Third's time
agreeable to truth.
publicly amend
indeed, they once ventured (upon the certificate of the justice in eyre) to
estreat
larger fine than had been recorded by the clerk of the court below; (e)
second
but instead of amending the clerk's erroneous record, they made
to be settled
and left
enrolment of what the justice had declared ore tenus
by posterity in which of the two rolls that absolute verity resides, which every

I

4

1

6

I
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I

9.
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2

1

2

I,
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it

it
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2

6

L
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2,
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Matth. West. A A. 1289.
(6) Brit, proem.
(e) Judicia perverterunt, et in alii* erraverunt.
(d) Among the other judges, Sir Ralph Hengham, chief justice of the king's bench, is said to have been
flued 7,000marks; Sir Adam Stratton, chief baron of the exchequer, 34,000marks; and Thomas Wayland,
chief justice of the common pleas, to have been attainted of felony, and to have abjured the realm, with
a forfeiture of all his estates: the whole amount of the forfeitures being upwards of 100,000marks, or
Pryn. Rec. 401,402)—an incredible sum In those days, before paper credit was in use, and
70,000pounds
when the annual salary of a chief justice was only sixty marks.
Claus.
Edw.
m.
Dudg. Chron.
Ser. 26. The charge against Sir Ralph Hengham (a very learned Judge, to whom we are obliged for two
excellent treatises of practice), was only, according to a tradition that was current in Richard the Third's
time (Year-book, M. Ric. Ill, 10),his altering, out of mere compassion, a fine, which was set upon a
very poor man, from 13.?.id. to 6s. Sd., for which he was fined 800 marks— a more probable sum than
7,0u0. It
true, the book calls the judge so punished Ingham, and not Hengham but find no judge of
the name of Ingham In Dugdale's Series; and Sir Edward Coke
Inst. 665)and Sir Matthew Hale (IP. C
to have been the chief justice. And certainly his offence (whatever
was) was nothing
646)understand
very atrocious or disgraceful; for. though removed from the king's bench at this time (together with the
rest of the judges), we find him, about eleven years afterwards, one of the justices in eyre for the general
m. 8) and the next year
perambulation of the forest (Rot. perambul. forest, in Utrri Land. 29 Edw.
made chief justice of the common pleas (Pur. 29 Edw.
m. 7: Dugd. Chron. Ser. 32), in which office he
continued till his death, in Edw. H. Clous. Edw. II, m. 19. Pat.
Edw. XL p. ' m
' Dugd. 84. Selden
">yJu
Justice Southcote in the
pref. to Hengham. There is an appendix to this tradition, remembered by
of Queen Elizabeth
Inst. 72; Inst. 266),that with this flee of Chief Justice Hengham, a clock-b
was built at Westminster, and furnished with a clock, to be heard into Westminster hall. Upon which
story shall only remark that (whatever early instances may be found of the private exertion of mechan
ical genius in constructing horological machines) clocks came not into common use till a hundred years
afterwards, about the end of the fourteenth century. Encyclopedic, tit. Borloge,
Rym. Fad 580.
Perhum's Artif. Clockmaker, 91.
HaL
P. a 647.
(«)
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record is said to import in itself. (/) And, in the reign of Richard the Second
there are instances (g) of their refusing to amend the most palpable errors and
mis-entries, unless by the authority of parliament.
To this real sullenness, but affected timidity, of the judges, such a narrow
ness of thinking was added, that every slip (even of a syllable or letter), (A)
was now held to be fatal to the pleader, and overturned his client's cause, (t)
they durst *not, or would not, set right mere formal mistakes at any r*410i
time, upon equitable terms and conditions, they at least should have ■■ -*
held, that trifling objections were at all times inadmissible; and that more
solid exceptions in point of form came too late when the merits had been tried.
They might, through a decent degree of tenderness, have excused themselves
from amending in criminal, and especially in capital, cases. They needed not
have granted an amendment, where it would work an injustice to either party;
or where he could not be put in as good a condition, as if his adversary had
made no mistake.
And, if it was feared that an amendment after trial might
subject the jury to an attaint, how easy was it to make waiving the attaint the
sondition of allowing the amendment!
And yet these were among the absurd
reasons alleged for never suffering amendments at all! (k)
The precedents then set were afterwards most religiously followed, (/) to the
great obstruction of justice, and ruin of the suitors: who have formerly suf
fered as much by this scrupulous obstinacy and literal strictness of the courts,
as they could have done even by their iniquity.
After verdicts and judgments
upon the merits, they were frequently reversed for slips of the pen or mis
spellings; and justice was perpetually entangled in a net of mere technical
jargon. The legislature hath therefore been forced to interpose, by no less
than twelve statutes, to remedy these opprobrious niceties: and its endeavors
have been of late so well seconded by judges of a more liberal cast, that this
unseemly degree of strictness is almost entirely eradicated; and will, probably
in a few years, be no more remembered than the learning of essoignsand de
But to return to our
faults, or the counter-pleas of voucher, are at present.

If

writ 8 of error.
If a writ of error be brought to reverse any judgment of an inferior court
of record, where the damages are less than ten pounds; or if it is brought to>

the judgment of any superior court after verdict, he that brings the
is plaintiff in error, must (except in some peculiar cases) find sub
, .,
stantial pledges of prosecution or bail: (m) to prevent ""delays by frivolr*4
-*
ous pretences to appeal; and for securing payment of costs and dam- <■
ages, which are now payable by the vanquished party in all, except a few
particular instances, by virtue of the several statutes cited in the margin, (n)
A writ of error lies from the inferior courts of record in England into the
king's bench, (o) and not into the common pleas, (p) Also from the king's
It likewise may be brought
bench in Ireland to the king's bench in England.
from the common pleas at Westminster to the king's bench; and then from the
king's bench the cause is removable to the house of lords. From proceedings
on the lawside of the exchequer a writ of error lies into the court of exchequer
chamber before the lord chancellor, lord treasurer, and the judges of the court
of king's bench and common pleas; and from thence it lies to the house of
From proceedings in the king's bench, in debt, detinue, covenant,
peers.
account, case, ejectment, or trespass, originally begun therein by bill (except
where the king is party), it lies to the exchequer chamber, before the justices
ef the common pleas and barons of the exchequer; and from thence also to the
house of lords; (q) but where the proceedings in the king's bench do not first
reverse

writ, or that

P. C. 548.

(70 Stat. 1! E.lw.

Ill,

c. 8.

In those days it was strictly true, what Ruggle ^lBU.
Jin his Ignoramus) has humorously applied to
n2iJem pleadings—" in nostra lege unum comma evertit totum placitum."
(0 8 Ren. 158,Ac.
(k) StyL 807.
(m) Stat. 3 Jao. I, e. 8. 13Car. U, o 3. 15and 17Oar. H, o. & 19Geo. in, c. 70.
Vn,
3
13Car. n, o. 2. 8 and 9 Wm. Ill, c. 11. 4 and 5 Anne, c. 16,
Hen.
o.
10.
(»)
(g) Stat. 87 Elta. c. 8.
<j> Finch, U 480. Dyer, 250.
(o) See oh. 4,
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therein by bill, but by original writ sued out of chancery, (r) this
so that the
takes the case out of the general rule laid down by the statute;
writ of error then lies, without any intermediate stage of appeal, directly to the
house of lords, the dernier resort for the ultimate decision of every civil
action. (6) Each court of appeal, in their respective stages, may, upon hearing
the matter of law in which the error
assigned, reverse or affirm the judgment
of the inferior courts, but none of them are final, save only the house of peers,
to whose judicial decisions all other tribunals must therefore submit and con
form their own.
And thus much for the reversal or affirmance of judgment!
at law, by writs in the nature of appeals.
is

(*)

■commence

XXVL

CHAPTER

OF EXECUTION.

If the

regular judgment of the court, after the decision of the suit, be not
superseded, or reversed, by one or other of the methods mentioned
in the two preceding chapters, the next and last step
the execution of that
judgment; or putting the sentence of the law in force. This
performed in
different manners, according to the nature of the action upon which
had or recovered.
founded, and of the judgment which
If the plaintiff recovers in an action real or mixed, whereby the seisin or
awarded to him, the writ of execution shall be an habere
possession of land
freehold; or an habere facias possess
facias seisinam, or writ of seisin, of
ionem, or writ of possession, (a) of a chattel interest, (b) These are writs
directed to the sheriff of the county, commanding him to give actual possess
ion to the plaintiff of the land so recovered: in the execution of which the
sheriff may take with him the posse comitatus, or power of the county; and
the possession be not quietly delivered.
may justify breaking open doors,
turf, or the ring of
be peaceably yielded up, the delivery of a twig,
But,
the door, in the name of seisin,
sufficient execution of the writ.
Upon
benefice recovered in
quare impedit, or assize of darrein
presentation to
*lne execution
by writ de clerico admittendo; directed
*4.i <n i3resew^7ncw'>
not to the sheriff, but to the bishop or archbishop, and requiring him
to admit and institute the clerk of the plaintiff.

is

a

Roll. Rep. 264. Sid. 424.
(6) Finch, L. 470.
1

(«)

1

1
4.

(r) See page tit.
(a) Appendix. No. II,

1

J
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a

a

is

a
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if

if

a

is

is

it

is

is

suspended,

Saund. 346. Carth. 180. Comb. 295.

is

§

it

1

Wm. IV, c. TO, and the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, error upon
(6) By statute
Any judgment of the queen's bench, common pleas or exchequer, must be brought in the
exchequer chamber before the judges, or judges and barons as the case may be, of the other
two courts, whence
again lies to the house of lords. But by the Judicature Acts of 1878
and 1875, the court of chancery, the queen's bench, the common pleas, the exchequer, the
the
court of probate, and the court for divorce and matrimonial causes,
court of admiralty,
The court was to con
were united to form one supreme court of judicature in England.
sist of two parts, one of which, designated her majesty's high court of justice, was to exer
cise original jurisdiction, and the other to be known as her majesty's court of appeal, to
have jurisdiction of appeals, superseding for this purpose the court of exchequer chamber,
and also taking to itself a large share of the former appellate jurisdiction of the house of
lords.
given with certain limita
By the Appellate Jurisdiction Act of 1876, 59, an appeal
tions as to amount recovered, etc., to the house of lords from the court of appeal in Eng
land, and from any Scotch or Irish courts from which an appeal lay to the house of lords
before this act.
The privy council has appellate jurisdiction in ecclesiastical causes and in
Ex parte The Bishop of Exeter, 10 C. B., 103;
colonial appeals, whether civil or criminal
Reg. v. Bertrand, 1L.RP, C, 520.
238

Of Execution.

Chap. 26.]

'

is,

a

Ill

if

if

a

a

(I)

it

it

it

1.

is
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a
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(i)

a

if
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(e)

In other actions, where the judgment is that something in special be done or
rendered by the defendant, then, in order to compel him so to do, and to see
the judgment executed, a special writ of execution issues to the sheriff, accord
ing to the nature of the case. As, upon an assize of nuisance, or quod permittat prosternere, where one part of the judgment is quod nocumentum amoveatur,
a writ goes to the sheriff to abate it at the charge of the party, which likewise
issues even in case of an indictment. (c)
Upon a replevin, the writ of execution
is the writ de retorno habendo:
(d) and, if the distress be eloigned, the defen
dant shall have a capias in withernam;
but on the plaintiff's tendering the
damages and submitting to a fine, the process in withernam shall be stayed.
(f) In detinue, after judgment, the plaintiff shall have distringas, to com
pel the defendant to deliver the goods, by repeated distresses of his chattels:
\g) or else a scire facias against any third person in whose hands they may
the
happen to be, to show cause why they should not be delivered: and
defendant still continues obstinate, then (if the judgment hath been by default
or on demurrer) the sheriff shall summon an inquest to ascertain the value of
the goods, and the plaintiff's damages: which (being either so assessed, or by
the verdict in case of an issue), (A) shall be levied on the person or goods of
the defendant. So that, after all, in replevin and detinue (the only actions for
the wrongdoer be
recovering the specific possession of personal chattels),
restitution of the identical thing
very perverse, he cannot be compelled to
taken or detained; but he still has his election to deliver the goods or their
an imperfection in the law, that results from the nature of personal
value:
property, which
easily concealed or conveyed out of the reach of justice,
and not always amenable to the magistrate.
*Exeoutions in actions where money only
debt or
recovered, as
^..o
damages (and not any specific chattel), are of five sorts: either against
the body of the defendant; or against his goods and ohattels; or against hia
goods and the profits of his lands; or against his goods and the possession of
his lands; or against all three, his body, lands, and goods.
The first of these species of execution
by writ of capias ad satisfacien
from the former capias ad responden
dum; (J) which addition distinguishes
dum, which lies to compel an appearance at the beginning of the suit. And
properly speaking, this cannot be sued out against any but such as were liable
to be taken upon the former capias, (k) (1) The intent of
to imprison
the body of the debtor till satisfaction be made for the debt, costs and dam
therefore doth not lie against any privileged persons, peers, or mem
ages:
bers of parliament, nor against executors or administrators, nor against such
other persons as could not be originally held to bail. And Sir Edward Coke
also gives us
where
defendant in 14 Edw.
was
singular instance,
capias, because he was of so advanced an age, quod poenam
discharged from
If an action be brought against an husband
imprisonamenti subire non potest.
and wife for the debt of the wife when sole, and the plaintiff recovers judg
ment, the capias shall issue to take both husband and wife in execution: (m)
the action was originally brought against herself when sole, and pending
but
the suit she marries, the capias shall be awarded against her only, and not
judgment be recovered against an husband
against her husband, (n) Yet,
and wife for the contract, nay, even for the personal misbehavior (o) of the
1

8

g
7.

1

2

(d) See page 150.
(e) See page 140.
(e) Comb. 10.
(/) Leon. 174.
(A) Bro. Abr. tit. damaget, 29.
(0 Kellw. 84.
(a) Roll Abr. 7S7. Bast. Kntr. SIS.
m,
No.
Rep.
VS.
Moor. 767.
(/) Inst. 289.
(5) Appendix,
(*)
(n) Cro. Jac. 828.
(o) Cro. Car. 518.
(at) Moor. 704.

If the suit might have been begun by eapias bu>
(1) Fuller v. Bowker, 11 Mich., 204.
was not, the fact that some other process was used does not preclude taking the body on »
Hunt v. Burdick, 42 Vt. 810; Eames v. Stevens, 25 N. EL, 117,
capiat ad satisfaciendum.
Wesson v. Chamberlain, 8N. T., 831.
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(a)

wife daring her coverture, the capias shall issue against the husband only:
which is one of the many great privileges of English wives. (2)
*The writ of capias ad satisfaciendum is an execution of the highest
f*4ifi
1
-* nature, inasmuch
l
as it deprives a man of his liberty, till he makes the
satisfaction awarded; and therefore, when a man is once taken in execution up
on this writ, no other process can be sued out against his lands or goods. Only
by statute 21 Jac. I, o. 24, if the defendant dies, while charged in execution
upon this writ, the plaintiff may, after his death, sue out a new exeoution against
his lands, goods, or chattels.
The writ is directed to the sheriff, commanding
him to take the body of the defendant and have him at Westminster on a day
therein named, to make the plaintiff satisfaction for his demand.
And, if he
doe9 not then make satisfaction, he must remain in custody till he does.
This
writ may be sued out, as may all other executory process, for costs, against a
plaintiff as well as a defendant, when judgment is had against him. (3)
When a defendant is once in custody upon this process, he is to be kept in arcta
et salva custodia : and if he be afterwards seen at large, it is an escape; and the
plaintiff may have an action thereupon against the sheriff for his whole debt.
For though, upon arrests, and what is called mesne process, being such as in
and end of a suit, (p) the sheriff, till the
tervenes between the commencement
statute 8 and 9 Wm. Ill, c. 27, might have indulged the defendant as he
pleased, so as he produced him in oourt to answer the plaintiff at the return of
the writ: yet, upon a taking in execution, he could never give any indulgence;
for, in that case, confinement is the whole of the debtor's punishment, and of
the satisfaction made to the creditor.
Escapes are either voluntary, or neglig
ent.
Voluntary are such as are by the express consent of the keeper; after
which he never can retake his prisoner again (q) (though the plaintiff may re
take him at any time), (r) bat the sheriff must answer for the debt.
Neglig
ent escapes are where the prisoner escapes without his keeper's knowledge or
consent; and then upon fresh pursuit the defendant may *be retaken,
r*4.i«1
■-I and the sheriff shall be excused, if he has him again before any action
A rescue of prisoner in execution,
brought against himself for the escape,
either going to gaol or in gaol, or breach of prison, will not excuse the sher
iff from being guilty of and answering for the escape; for he ought to have
sufficient force to keep him, since he may command the power of the county.
defendant, charged in execution for
(t) But by statute 32 Geo. II, c. 28,
any debt not exceeding 1001, will surrender all his effects to his creditors (except
his apparel, bedding, and tools of his trade, not amounting in the whole to the
value of 10/.), and will make oath of his punctual compliance with the statute,
the prisoner may be discharged, unless the creditor insists on detaining him;
in which case he shall allow him 2a. 4d. per week, to be paid on the first day
of every week, and on failure of regular payment the prisoner shall be dis
charged. Yet the creditor may at any future time have exeoution against the
lands and goods of such defendant, though never more against his person.
And, on the other hand, the creditors may, as in the case of bankruptcy, com8

8

1

8ld. 830.
(p) Seepage S7S.
(9)3 Rep. K.
(«) F. N. B. 130.
(r) Siat. and Wm. m, e. 27.

(Q Oro. Jao. 419.
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(2) A great change has been effected in the law of England regarding imprisonment for
were written, and now
not allowed in actions on con
debt since these commentaries
See statutes
and Vic. c. 10
and Vic. c. 16
tracts, except in cases of fraud.
and
Vic, c. 96; and 33 and 88 Vic. c. 62.
(3) Taking the body of the defendant in execution suspends the lien of the judgment
the plaintiff gives the defendant, when in execution,
Jackson v. Benedict, 13 Johns. 533.
and he will have no remedy either
discharged,
permission to go at large, the judgment
Blackburn v. Stupart, East, 243; Yates v. Van Rens
against the defendant or the sheriff.
Wend., 184. And this irrespective of the inten
oh as., 364; Poucher v. Holley,
selaer,
tion of the plaintiff, or of any violation by the defendant of any understanding on which he
Id. The same principle
applicable
was discharged.
one of several defendants is dis
Ransom v. Keyes,
Cow., 128.
charged by the plaintiff.
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pel (under pain of transportation for seven years) such debtor charged in
execution for any debt under 100/. to make a discovery and surrender of all
his effects for their benefit, whereupon he is also entitled to the like discharge
of his person.
If a capias ad satisfaciendum is sued out, and a non est inventus is returned
thereon, the plaintiff may sue out a process against the bail, if any were given:
who, we may remember, stipulated in this triple alternative, that the defend
ant should, if condemned in the suit, satisfy the plaintiff his debt and costs;
or that he should surrender himself a prisoner; or, that they would pay it for
him: as therefore the two former branches of the alternative are neither of
them complied with, the latter must immediately take place, (w) In order to
which a writ of scire facias may be sued out against the bail, commanding
them to show cause why the plaintiff should not have execution against them
for his *debt and damages; and on such writ if they show no sufficient r*j-,*i
*
cause, or the defendant does not surrender himself on the day of the *■
return, or of showing cause (for afterwards is not sufficient), the plaintiff may
have judgment against the bail, and take out a writ of capias ad satisfacien
dum, or other process of execution against them.
2. The next species of execution is against the goods and chattels of the de
fendant; and is called a writ of fieri facias, (to) from the words in it where
the sheriff is commanded, quod fieri faciat de bonis, that he cause to be made
of the goods and chattels of the defendant the sum or debt recovered. (4)
This lies as well against privileged persons, peers, &c, as other common per
sons; and against executors or administrators, with regard to the goods of the
deceased.
The sheriff may not break open any outer door, (x) to execute
either this, or the former writ: but must enter peaceably; and may then break
open any inner door, belonging to the defendant, in order to take the goods.
(y) And he may sell the goods and chattels (even an estate for years, which
is a chattel real) (z) of the defendant, till he has raised enough to satisfy the
judgment and costs; first paying the landlord of the premises, upon which the
goods are found, the arrears of rent then due, not exceeding one year's rent in
the whole, (a)
If part only of the debt be levied, on a fieri facias, the plain
tiff may have a capias ad satisfaciendum for the residue, (b) (5)
3. A third species of execution is by writ of levari facias; which affects a
man's goods and the profits of his lands, by commanding the sheriff to levy
the plaintiff's debt on the lands and goods of the defendant: whereby the
sheriff may seize all his goods, and receive the rents and profits of his lands,
till satisfaction be made to the plaintiff, (c) Little use *is now made r-*jlfi-i
■"
of this writ; the remedy by elegit, which takes possession of the lands *•
themselves, being much more effectual.
But of this species is a writ of exeou(«) Lntw. 1269-1273. (w) Appendix, No. nX I 7.
(*) 5 Rep. 92.
(») Palm. 54.
(a) Stat. 8 Anne, o. 14.
(«) 1 Roll. Abr. 904. Cro. Eli* 344.
(c) Finch, L. 471.

If

(f) 8 Rep. 171.

a judgment in tort is rendered against two and the execution is levied wholly on
(4)
the goods of one, he cannot compel contribution from his co-defendant; otherwise if the
186; Colburn v. Patmore, 1 Cr.
judgment is in contract. Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 T.
M. and R., 78; Armstrong Co. v. Clarion Co., 66 Pa. St., 218; Spalding v. Oaka, 43 Vt.,
It has been held that "the rule that wrongdoers cannot have redress or contribution
843.
as against each other is confined to cases where the person seeking redress must have known
that he was doing an unlawful act." Adamson v. Jams, 4 Bing. , 66, 73; Betts v. Gibbins,
2
and E., 74; Jacobs v. Pollard, 10 Cush., 287, and see Acheaon v. Miller, 2 Ohio St.,
203.
(5) A levy upon sufficient personal property to satisfy the judgment is a temporary bar
to further execution or suit, and will amount to satisfaction unless it fail, in whole or in part,
without the fault of the plaintiff.
Green v. Burke, 23 Wend., 490.
See Ladd v. Blunt, 4
Mass., 402; Webb v. Bumpass, 9 Port., 201; P. and M. Bank v. Kingsley, 2 Doug. Mich.,
379.
the defendant is allowed to retain the property, it is no satisfaction.
Peck v.
Tiffany, 2 N. Y., 451. Or if it is taken from the sheriff by due course of law. Alexander
v. Polk, 39 Miss., 737.
A levy upon real property is not a satisfaction. Ladd v. Blunt,
supra; Shepard v. Rowe, 14 Wend., 260; White v. Graves, 15 Texas, 183.
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tion proper only to ecclesiastics; which is given when the sheriff, upon a com
mon writ of execution sued, returns that the defendant is a beneficed clerk,
not having any lay fee. In this case a writ goes to the bishop of the diocese,
in the nature of a levari or fieri facias, (d) to levy the debt and damages de
bonis ecclesiasticis, which are not to be touched by lay hands, and thereupon
the bishop sends out a sequestration of the profits of the clerk's benefice,
directed to the churchwardens, to collect the same and pay them to the plain

tiff, till

the

full

sum be raised,

(e)

The fourth species of execution is by the writ of elegit,' which is a judi
cial writ given by the statute Westm. 2, 13 Edw. I, c. 18, either upon a judg
ment for a debt, or damages; or upon the forfeiture of a recognizance taken
in the king's court. By the common law a man could only have satisfaction
of goods, chattels, and the present profits of lands, by the two last-mentioned
writs of fieri facias, or levari facias; but not the possession of the lands
themselves; which was a natural consequenoe of the feudal principles, which
prohibited the alienation, and of course the incumbering of the fief with the
debts of the owner. And, when the restriction of alienation began to wear
away, the consequence still continued; and no creditor could take the posses
sion of lands, but only levy the growing profits: so that, if the defendant
aliened his lands, the plaintiff was ousted of his remedy. The statute there
fore granted this writ (called an elegit, because it is in the choice or election
of the plaintiff whether he will sue out this writ or one of the former), by
which the defendant's goods and chattels are not sold, but only appraised; and
all of them (except oxen and beasts of the plough) are delivered to the plain
tiff, at such reasonable appraisement and price, in part of satisfaction of his
^ tae g°°ds are not sufficient, then the moiety or *one-half of
^eDtr*419lJ
*■
his freehold lands, which he had at the time of the judgment given,
whether held in his own name, or by any other in trust for him, (g) are
also to be delivered to the plaintiff ; to hold, till out of the rents and profits
thereof the debt be levied, or till the defendant's interest be expired; as till
the death of the defendant, if he be tenant for life or in tail. During this
period the plaintiff is called tenant by elegit, of whom we spoke in a former
part of these Commentaries. (A) We there observed that till this statute, by
the ancient common law, lands were not liable to be charged with, or seized
for, debts; because by these means the oonnexion between lord and tenant
might be destroyed, fraudulent alienations might be made, and the services
be transferred to be performed by a stranger; provided the tenant incurred a
large debt, sufficient to cover the land. And therefore, even by this statute,
only one-half was, and now is, subject to execution; that out of the remainder
And
sufficient might be left for the lord to distrain upon for his services.
upon the same feudal principle, copyhold lands are at this day not liable to be
debt to the
But, in case of
taken in execution upon a judgment.
(6)
was allowed
that
the common law
king,
appears by magna carta, o.
for him to take possession of the lands till the debt was paid. For he, being
the grand superior and ultimate proprietor of all landed estates, might seize
the lands into his own hands, if any thing was owing from the vassal; and
could not be said to be defrauded of his services when the ouster of the vassal
This execntion, or seizing of lands by
from his own command.
proceeded
of so high
the body of the defendant cannot be
nature, that after
elegit,
execution can only be had of the goods, because there are no
taken: but
lands, and such goods are not sufficient to pay the debt,
capias ad satisfaci
in this case no more
endum may then be had after the elegit; for such elegit
4.

a

by

it

it
2

4

Burn. Ecel. Law, 828.
(0 BoIL Abr. 888.
1

i

2

Inrt.
(a)
(d) RegUtr. Ortg. 800,Judic 22.
(0) Stat. 28 Car. n, o.
(a) Book n, oh. 10.

(6) Lands may now be taken on execution in England.

240

(J)

2

is a

if

a

is

8,

it

(t)

(f)

Of Execution.

Chap. 26.]

419

in

effect than a fieri facias.(J)
So that body and goods maybe taken in exe
cution, or land and goods; but not body *and land too, upon any judg- r*,9n-i
*
ment between subject and subject in the course of the common law. *■

But,

Upon some prosecutions given by statute; as in the case of recognizances
debts acknowledged on statutes merchant, or statutes staple (pursuant to
the statutes 13 Edw. I, de mercatoribus, and 27 Edw. HI, c. 9) ; upon forfeiture
of these, the body, land and goods may all be taken at once in execution, to com
The process thereon is usually called an extent,
pel the payment of the debt.
or extendi facias, because the sheriff is to cause the lands, &c, to be appraised
to their full extended value, before he delivers them to the plaintiff, that it
may be certainly known how soon the debt will be satisfied. (£) And by stat
ute 83 Hen.
c. 39, all obligations made to the king shall have the same
force, and of consequence the same remedy to recover them, as a statute
staple; though indeed, before this statute, the king was entitled to sue out ex
ecution against the body, lands and goods of his accountant or debtor.
And
his debt shall, in suing out execution, be preferred to that of every other cred
itor, who hath not obtained judgment before the king commenced his suit.(/w)
The king's judgment also affects all lands which the king's debtor hath at or
after the time of contracting his debt, or which any of his officers mentioned
in the statute 13 Eliz. c.
hath at or after the time of his entering on the
office: so that
such offioer of the crown aliens for valuable consideration,
the land shall be liable to the king's debt even in the hands of
bona fide pur
chaser; though the debt due to the king was contracted by the vendor many
years after the alienation. (n) Whereas judgments between subject and sub
ject related, even at common law, no farther back than the first day of the
term in which they were recovered, in respect of the lands of the debtor; and
did not bind his goods and chattels, but from the date of the writ of execution:
the judgment shall not bind
and now, by the statute of frauds, 29 Car. II, c.
the land in the hands of
bona*fide purchaser, but only from the day ntc^ni-i
of actually signing the same: which
directed by the statute to be
punctually entered on the record; nor shall the writ of execution bind the
goods in the hands of
stranger, or the purchaser, (o) but only from the actual
therefore ordered to
delivery of the writ to the sheriff or other officer, who
endorse on the back of
the day of his receiving the same.
These are the methods which the law of England has pointed out for the
execution of judgments: and when the plaintiff's demand
satisfied, either by
the voluntary payment of the defendant, or by this compulsory process, or
otherwise, satisfaction ought to be entered on the record, that the defendant
second time on the same account.
may not be liable to be thereafter harassed
But all these writs of execution must be sued out within
year and
day after
the judgment
entered; otherwise the court concludes prima facie that the
will grant writ of scire
satisfied and extinot: yet, however,
judgment
13 Edw.
c. 45, for the defendant
facias in pursuance of statute Westm.
to show cause why the judgment should not be revived, and execution had
against him; to which the defendant may plead such matter as he has to allege,
in order to show why process of execution should not be issued or the plain
tiff may still bring an action of debt, founded on this dormant judgment, which
was the only method of revival allowed by the common law.(jE>)(7)
5.
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(I)

(m) 8t»t 88Hen. VDX o. 89, 74.
Beg. 18.
(p) Co. Litt. 290.
1

8

Hob. 68.
(fc)F. H. R 181.__
(o) Skin. 267.
(n) 10Hep. », 68.
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§

§

128, during the lives of the parties to a judgment and
(7) By 15 and 16 Vict., c. 76,
within six years of the judgment, execution may issue without scire facias. By the same
134,
writ of revivor to revive judgments less than ten years old shall be allowed
statute.
The common law rule as to
more than ten years old.
without rule or order otherwise
the time within which execution shall issue has been changed by statute in many American
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In this manner are the several remedies given by the English law for all sorts
of injuries, either real or personal, administered by the several courts of justice,
and their respective officers.
In the course, therefore, of the present book, we
have, first, seen and considered the nature of remedies, by the mere act of the
We have next
parties, or mere operation of law, without any suit in courts,
taken a review of remedies, by suit or action in courts: and therein have con
templated, first, the nature and species of courts, instituted for the redress of
injuries in general; and then have shown in what particular court application
must be made for the redress of particular injuries, or the doctrine of jurisdicWe afterwards proceed to consider the nature
rL *422lJ t'on9 an<^ *cognizance.
and distribution of wrongs and injuries affecting every species of per
sonal and real rights, with the respective remedies by suit, which the law of the
land has afforded for every possible injury.
And, lastly, we have deduced and
pointed out the method and progress of obtaining such remedies in the courts
of justice: proceeding from the first general complaint or original writ, through
all the stages of process, to compel the defendant's appearance; and of plead
ing, or formal allegation on the one side, and excuse or denial on the other;
with the examination of the validity of such complaint or excuse, upon de
murrer; or the truth of the facts alleged and denied, upon issue joined, and
its several trials; to the judgment or sentence of the law, with respect to the
nature and amount of the redress to be specifically given: till after consider
ing the suspension of that judgment by writs in the nature of appeals, we
have arrived at its final execution; which puts the party in specific possession
of his right by the intervention of ministerial officers, or else gives him an
ample satisfaction, either by equivalent damages, or by the confinement of his
body who is guilty of the injury complained of.
This care and circumspection in the law — in providing that no man's right
shall be affected by any legal proceeding without giving him previous notice,
and yet that the debtor shall not by receiving such notice take occasion to
escape from justice; in requiring that every complaint be accurately and pre
cisely ascertained in writing, and be as pointedly and exactly answered; in
clearly stating the question either of law or of fact; in deliberately resolving
the former after full argumentative discussion, and indisputably fixing the
latter by a diligent and impartial trial; in correcting such errors as may have
arisen in either of those modes of decision, from accident, mistake, or surprise;
and in finally enforcing the judgment, when nothing can be alleged to impeach
it; —this anxiety to maintain and restore to every individual the enjoyment of
his oivil rights, without intrenching upon those of any other individual in the
r
solicitude *which pervades our whole legal con*42oiJ nati°n> tfli8 parental
L
stitution, is the genuine offspring of that spirit of equal liberty which
is the singular felicity of Englishmen.
At the same time it must be owned
to have given a handle, in some degree, to those complaints of delay in the
practice of the law, which are not wholly without foundation, but are greatly
exaggerated beyond the truth. There may be, it is true, in this, as in all other
departments of knowledge, a few unworthy professors : who study the science
of chicane and sophistry rather than of truth and justice; and who to gratify
the spleen, the dishonesty, and wilfulness of their clients, may endeavor to
screen the guilty, by an unwarrantable use of those means which were intended
to proteot the innocent. But the frequent disappointments and the constant
discountenance that they meet with in the courts of justice, have confined
these men (to the honor of this age be it spoken) both in number and reputa
tion to indeed a very despicable compass.
Yet some delays there certainly are, and must unavoidably be, in the con
duct of a suit, however desirous the parties and their agents may be to come to
a speedy determination.
These arise from the same original causes as were
mentioned in examining a former complaint} (q) from liberty, property, oivility,
Zi9

(g) Bee page Iff!.
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commerce, and an extent of populous territory: which, whenever we are willing
to exchange for tyranny, poverty, barbarism, idleness and a barren desert, we
may then enjoy the same dispatch of causes that is so highly extolled in some
foreign countries. But common sense and a little experience will convince us
that more time and circumspection are requisite in causes, where the suitors
have valuable and permanent rights to lose, than where their property is trivial
and precarious, and what the law gives them to-day, may be seized by their
In Turkey, says Montesquieu
where little regard
prince to-morrow.
shown to the lives or fortunes of the subject, all causes are quickly decided:
the basha, on
summary hearing, orders which party he pleases to be bastina
But in '"free states,
doed, and then sends them about their business.
*
the trouble, expense, and delays of judicial proceedings are the price
that every subject pays for his liberty: and in all governments, he adds, the
formalities of law increase in proportion to the value which
set on the honour,
the fortune, the liberty, and life of the subject.
From these principles
might reasonably follow, that the English courts
should be more subject to delays than those of other nations; as they set
But
our peculiar felic
greater value on life, on liberty and on property.
ity to enjoy the advantage, and yet be exempted from a proportionable share
of the burthen. For the course of the civil law, to which most other nations
conform their practice,
much more tedious than ours; for proof of which
need only appeal to the suitors of those courts in England where the practice
of the Roman law
And particularly in France,
allowed in its nil extent.
not only our Fortescue
accnses (on his own knowledge) their courts of most
writer of their own
unexampled delays in administering justice; but even
has not scrupled to testify that there were in his time more causes there de
pending than in all Europe besides, and some of them a hundred years old.
But (not to enlarge on the prodigious improvements which have been made in
the celerity of justice by the disuse of real actions, by the statutes of amend
is
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ment and jeofails, (w) and by other more modern regulations, which
now
might be indelicate to remember, but which posterity will never forget) the
time and attendance afforded by the judges in our English courts are also
greater than those of many other countries. In the Roman calendar there were
in the whole year but twenty eight-judicial or triverbial (w) days allowed to
the prsetor for deciding causes: (x) whereas, with us one-fourth of the year
term time in which three courts constantly sit for the dispatch of matters of
law; besides the very close attendance of the court of chancery for determin
. „.-.
ing *suits in equity, and the numerous courts of assize and nisi prius
that sit in vacation for the trial of matters of faot.
Indeed, there
no other country in the known world, that hath an institution so commodious
and so adapted to the dispatch of causes, as our trial by jury in those courts
for the decision of facts; in no other nation under heaven does justice make
her progress twice in each year into almost every part of the kingdom, to de
cide upon the spot, by the voice of the people themselves, the disputes of the
remotest provinces.
And here this part of our Commentaries, which regularly treats only of re
dress at the common law, would naturally draw to
conclusion. But, as the
proceedings in the courts of equity are very different from those at common
law, and as those courts are of
very general and extensive jurisdiction,
in some measure
branch of the task have undertaken, to give the student
some general idea of the forms of practice adopted by these courts. These will,
therefore, be the subject of the ensning chapter.
6.

I.
8,

i

i.

2.

6,

c.
(u) Seepage 407.
(») De Laud, LL., c. 53.
(() Bodin. de repub.
(r) 8p. L. b. c,
fw) Otherwise called diet fasti in quibu* licebal prattori fari tria verba, do, dico, addico. Calv. Lex.
na.
a 2.
(x) Spelm&n of the Terms,
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OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE COURTS OF EQUITY.
Befobe we enter on the proposed subject of the ensuing chapter, viz., the
nature and method of proceedings in the courts of equity, (1) it will be proper
to recollect the observations which were made in the beginning of this book
(a) on the principal tribunals of that kind, acknowledged by the constitution
of England; and to premise a few remarks upon those particular causes,
wherein any of them claims and exercises a sole jurisdiction, distinct from
and exclusive of the other.
(a) Pages 4S„50,78.

(1) It is not to be assumed, because the system of equity has grown up as an independent
and distinct system from that of the common law, that therefore the two are opposed and
On the contrary,
hostile to each other, and may be expected to operate at cross purposes.
they are to be regarded as the two parts of a complete and symmetrical structure, the pur
pose of which is to accomplish justice in all the varying circumstances of human transac
tions.
On the other hand, we are not to suppose, because equity is said to supply the de
fects of the common law, that it may do this at the discretion of the chancellor, and re
It needs but the most
gardless of other rules than his own sense of what is right and just.
cursory examination to show that the jurisdiction of equity is very clearly defined and
limited, and that the discretion of the chancellor in administering this discretion is closely
restrained within the lines of precedents which have evolved general rules for his guid
ance.

The general heads of equity jurisdiction may be stated as follows:
Fkaud. — Equity is said to abhor fraud; and therefore it will lend its aid to set aside con
tracts which are tainted by it, and even to vacate judgments and decrees where they have
The law has a concurrent jurisdiction in a great many
been obtained by means of it.
cases, and will refuse to enforce contracts tainted with fraud ; but this negative relief is
not always sufficient for the purposes of complete justice, and therefore equity lends its
aid to compel the surrender of contracts, the restoration of property dishonestly obtained,
and the cancelment on public and corporate records of entries which have been made or
or devices.
Equity lends its
shaped by means of fraudulent documents, representations
aid also in the case of constructive frauds as where executors, administrators, guardians,
or other trustees take advantage of the confidence belonging to their fiduciary relation to
advance their own interests at the expense of those whose interests they were selected to
protect; or where attorneys and other professional men betray the confidence of their em
ployers. Unconscionable bargains obtained by the influence properly belonging to the
several family relations may also demand the aid of equity for their abrogation.
Accident. — Equity may relieve against the consequences of accident in some cases. A
familiar illustration is where, by reason of accidental circumstances and without bis fault,
a party has incurred a penalty or forfeiture. Here equity may give relief on such terms of
compensation as may be found just. This, however, is not universally true; for if the
parties themselves have stipulated what the damages shall bo when a forfeiture is Incurred,
It is also a general rule that equity cannot relieve against a for
equity will not interfere.
feiture imposed by statute.
Mistake. — If by mistake the contracts of parties are not made to express the actual in
tent, equity may give relief, provided they are founded upon a valuable, or even upon a
A common illus
good consideration; but purely voluntary transactions will not be aided.
tration of this head of equity is the correction of a deed or mortgage in which the descrip
In such a case the grantor or mortgagor will be compelled
tion is imperfect or erroneous.
to correct it if the mistake is clearly established.
Account. — Mutual dealings between partners can only be examined and the accounts
adjusted in equity, and the court may decree the final dissolution of a partnership and th»
appointment of a receiver to wind up its concerns when the case seems to demand it. Ac
counts and demands between other parties which are too complicated or numerous to be
properly tried at law, may also be adjusted in equity.
Infants. — Equity has general jurisdiction to protect infants and their estates, and may
appoint guardians and displace the custody of parents where the interest of infants appears
to require it.
The infant on whose behalf a bill is filed becomes a ward of court, and it is
a contempt of court to interfere with his custody, or to control or influence his action in,
such a manner as to defeat or embarrass the jurisdiction of the court which has been in
voked in the case.
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have already (b) attempted to trace (though very concisely) the history,
rise, and progress, of the extraordinary court, or court of equity, in chancery.
The same jurisdiction is exercised, and the same system of redress pursued,
in the equity court of the exchequer; with a distinction, however, as to some
few matters, peculiar to each tribunal, and in which the other cannot interfere.
And, first, of those peculiar to the chancery.
1. Upon the abolition of the court of wards, the care, which the crown was
bound to take as guardian of its infant tenants, was totally extinguished in
every feudal view; but ""resulted to the king in his court of chancery r

*427i'
together with the general protection (c) of all other infants in the king- >■
dom. When, therefore, a fatherless child has no other guardian, the court of
ohanceryhas a right to appoint one: and from all proceedings relative thereto,
•an appeal lies to the house of lords.
The court of exchequer can only appoint
a guardian ad litem, to manage the defence of the infant if a suit be comtti) Page BO,Ac

(c) F. N. B. 27.

Lunatics, Imbeciles, Etc. — Equity in these cases exercises a jurisdiction analogous to
that in the case of infants, and appoints guardians or committees to take charge of person
or estate. A statutory jurisdiction is sometimes conferred in the case of those who by
vicious habits have been rendered incompetent to manage their estates.
Married Women. — The protection of married women in the proper control of their
separate estates belongs to equity, as docs also the enforcement of their undertakings with
Equity will also, in respect to other prop
-creditors and others in respect to such estates.
erty which married women have brought to their husbands or have acquired during cover
ture, extend to them any needful protection, and make provision for an independent sup
port for themselves or their children out of it when it seems equitable to do so.
Specific Performance. — Equity has a discretionary power to decree the specific per
formance of contracts respecting lands, where damages for a breach would seem inadequate
redress, and also in cases where the plaintiff might be without remedy at law by reason of
In a few cases specific performance will be
failure in strict performance on his own part.
decreed in contracts respecting personalty, and it may also be had in some cases of pro
visions in marriage articles.
Foreclosure of Mortgages. —Mortgage and other liens may be foreclosed in equity,
not only in cases of real estate, but also when personalty has been conveyed or pledged by
way of security.
Dower. — A widow's dower may be recovered either at law or in equity, but in some
cases only the equitable jurisdiction will be found fully adequate.
Partition. — The partition of joint estates between the several owners of interests is
made on bill in equity filed by any party concerned.
Interpleader. — "Where two persons claim the same fund, which is in the custody of a
third, the custodian for his own protection may file a bill in equity to compel the claimants
to litigate as between themselves.
Trusts. — Equity has general jurisdiction in cases of trust and charity, and this is exclu
It also has jurisdiction in all matters of the administration of
sive of the courts of law.
estates of deceased persons, which however, in the United States, has generally been con
ferred upon special statutory courts.
Bills of Peace. — These are calculated to restrain unnecessary and vexatious litigation,
and to enjoin the bringing of numerous suits when one is adequate to all the purposes of
justice.
Bills Quia Timet. — The purpose of these bills is to prevent a threatened or possible
future injury, and to quiet titles and estates in respect thereto.
Injunctions. —The court of chancery will issue the writ of injunction, not only as a
temporary remedy pending litigation, but also as a permanent mandate against some threat
A common case is where a nuisance is being created to the
ened or contemplated injury.
injury of the plaintiff, or where patents are being infringed or trade marks pirated.
These sufficiently indicate the general heads of equity jurisdiction, and illustrate its great
It should be added that chancery formerly exercised important jurisdic
extent and value.
tion in compelling discovery where the common law courts were inadequate to reach the
facts; but this has been rendered uuimportant by the statutes which make parties to suits
and other interested persons competent witnesses.
In many states of the American Union chancery as a distinct system has been abolished.
Equitable principles nevertheless remain and are to be administered by the courts of law,
and those courts issue injunctions and employ other equitable remedies when justice is
found to require it. The valuable treatises of Story, Spence, Adams, Willard and Pomeroy
on equity jurisdiction are therefore as important as ever, even in the states which no longer
have chancery courts.
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menced against him; a power which is incident to the jurisdiction of every
court of justice: (d) but when the interest of a minor comes before the court
judicially, in the progress of a cause, or upon a bill for that purpose filed,
either tribunal indiscriminately will take care of the property of the infant.
2. As to idiots and lunatics: the king himself used formerly to commit the
custody of them to proper committees, in every particular case; but now, to
avoid solicitations and the very shadow of undue partiality, a warrant is issued
by the king, (e) under his royal sign manual, to the chancellor or keeper of
his seal to perform this office for him: and, if he acts improperly in granting
such custodies, the complaint must be made to the king himself in council. {/}
But the previous proceedings on the commission, to inquire whether or no the
party be an idiot or a lunatic, are on the law side of the court of chancery,
and can only be redressed (if erroneous) by writ of error in the regular course
of law.
8. The king, as parens patrim, has the general superintendence of all chari
And,
ties; which he exercises by the keeper of his conscience, the chancellor.
therefore, whenever it is necessary, the attorney-general, at the relation of some
informant (who is usually called the relator), files ex officio an information in the
court of chancery to have the charity properly established.
By statute, also,
43 Eliz. c. 4, authority is given to the lord chancellor, or lord keeper, and to the
chancellor of the duchy of Lancaster, respectively, to grant *commisI' *42ftl
L
■■sions under their several seals, to inquire into any abuses of charitable
donations, and rectify the same by decree ; which may be reviewed in the
respective courts of the several chancellors, upon exceptions taken thereto.
But, though this is done in the petty bag office in the court of chancery, be
cause the commission is there returned, it is not a proceeding at common law,
but treated as an original cause in the court of equity. The evidence below
is not taken down in writing, and the respondent, in his answer to the excep
tions, may allege what new matter he pleases; upon which they go to proof,
and examine witnesses in writing upon all the matters in issue: and the court
may decree the respondent to pay all the costs, though no such authority is
And as it is thus considered as an original cause through
given by the statute.
out, an appeal lies of course from the chancellor's decree to the house of peers,
(ff) notwithstanding any loose opinions to the contrary. (A)
4. By the several statutes relating to bankrupts, a summary jurisdiction
is
given to the chancellor, in many matters consequential or previous to the com
missions thereby directed to be issued; from which the statutes give no ap
peal. (2)
On the other
to some causes,
can be brought
by the statutes

a

it

a

■!

*■

(i)

hand, the jurisdiction of the court of chancery doth not extend
No information
wherein relief may be had in the exchequer.
in chancery for such mistaken charities as are given to the king
for suppressing superstitious uses. Nor can chancery give any
relief against the king, or direct any act to be done by him, or make any decree
disposing of or affecting his property; not even in cases where he is a royal
trustee,
Such causes must be determined in the court of exchequer, as
(3)
court °f revenue: which alone has power *over the king's treasury,
T*429l
and the officers employed in its management: unless where
properly
similar jurisdiction
belongs to the duchy court of Lancaster, which hath also
8

2

2

9

8.

2

L

ch.
(d) Cro. Jac. 641. Lev. ICS. T. Jones, 90. («) See book
(/) P. Wmi. 108. See Reg. Br. 267.
(g) Duke's Char. Uses, 62, 188. Corporation of Burford v. Lenthal, Cane. May, 1748.
ft) Vern. 118.
(i) Hugerins v. York Buildings' Company, Cane. 24 Oct. 1740. Reeve v. Attorney-General, Cane. 27 Nov.
1741. Lightbourn v. Attorney-General, Cane. May, 1748.
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now in the bankruptcy courts.
has already been stated that
not suable in its own courts, except
sovereignty
consent,
with its own
and this consent
given either by general law, or specially for the part
icular case. See note p. 257, supra.
(2)
(8)
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as a court of revenue, and, like the other, consists of both a court of law and
a court of equity.
In all other matters, what is said of the court of equity in chancery will be

equally applicable to the other courts of equity. Whatever difference there
may be in the forms of practice, it arises from the different constitution of their
officers: or, if they differ in any thing more essential, one of them must cer
tainly be wrong; for truth and justice are always uniform, and ought equally
to be adopted by them all.
. Let us next take a brief, but comprehensive view of the general nature of
equity, as now understood and practiced in our several courts of judicature.
deserves
have formerly touched upon it,
but imperfectly:
more complete
Yet as nothing
hitherto extant that can give
explication.
stranger a tol
erable idea of the courts of equity subsisting in England, as distinguished from
the courts of law, the compiler of these observations cannot but attempt
with diffidence: those who know them best are too much employed to find time
to write; and those who have attempted but little in those courts must be often
at loss for materials.
the soul and spirit of all
Equity, then, in its true and genuine meaning,
law: positive law
construed, and rational law is made by it. In this, equity
synonymous to justice; in that, to the true sense and sound interpretation
of the rule. But the very terms of a court of equity, and
court of law, as
contrasted to each other, are apt to confound and mislead us: as
the one
judged without equity, and the other was not bound by any law. Whereas
every definition or illustration to be met with, which now draws aline between
the two jurisdictions, by setting law and equity *in opposition to each r*4o0-i
other, will be found either totally erroneous, or erroneous to certain
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Thus in the first place
that
the business of
court of
said,
equity in England to abate the rigour of the common law. But no such power
contended for. Hard was the case of bond-creditors whose debtor devised
away his real estate; rigorous and unjust the rule, which put the devisee in a
better condition than the heir; (m) yet
court of equity had no power to
Hard
the common law still subsisting, that land devised, or des
interpose.
cending to the heir, shall not be liable to simple contract debts of the ancestor
or devisor, (n) although the money was laid out in purchasing the very land,
(4) and that the father shall never immediately succeed as heir to the real
estate of the son (o) but a court of equity can give no relief though in both
these instances the artificial reason of the law, arising from feudal principles,
has long ago entirely ceased. The like may be observed of the descent of lands
to remote relation of the whole blood, or even their escheat to the lord, in
preference to the owner's half brother; (p) and of the total stop to all justice,
sued as heir, or
by causing the parol to demur, (q) whenever an infant
real action. (5) In all such cases of positive law, the courts of
party to
equity, as well as the courts of law, must say with Ulpian, (r) "hoc quidem
perquam durum est, sed ita lex scripta est."
2. It
court of equity determines according to the spirit of
said, (s) that
the rule, and not according to the strictness of the letter. But so also does
court of law. Both, for instance, are equally bound, and equally profess, to
interpret statutes according to the true intent of the legislature. In general
law all cases cannot be foreseen; or,
foreseen, cannot be expressed: some will
arise that will fall within the *meaning, though not within the words, r^gji
of the legislator; and others which may fall within the letter, may be «•
9,

since abrogated by statute.
(4) Th's rule
IS) Demurrer of the parol was abolished by

(p) Ibid, p. 227.
14.p. 208.
Kaims, Princ. of Equity, 177.

1

is

L

introd.
ad calc.
(fc) Book
(I) Lord Kaims, Princ. of Equity, 44.
(n) Ibid, oh. 15,pp. 243,244; ch. 23, p. 877.
(fl) Bee page 800.
(r) Ef. 40,

Win. IV., c. 47.
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(t)

These cases, thus'
contrary to his meaning, though not expressly excepted.
oat of the letter, are often said to be within the equity of an act of parliament;
and so cases within the letter are frequently out of the equity.
Here by
equity we mean nothing but the sound interpretation of the law; though the'
words of the law itself may be too general, too special, or otherwise inaccurate
or defective. These, then, are the cases which, as Grotius
says, "lex non
exacte definit, sed arbitrio boni viri permittit;" in order to find out the true
sense and meaning of the lawgiver, from every other topic of construction.
But there not a single rule of interpreting laws, whether equitably or strict
not equally used by the judges in the courts both of law and equity:
ly, that
the construction must in both be the same: or,
they differ,
only as one
court of law may also happen to differ from another.
Each endeavors to fix
and adopt the true sense of the law in question; neither can enlarge, diminish,
or alter that sense in a single tittle.
3. Again,
hath been said, (u) that fraud, accident and trust, are the proper
and peculiar objects of court of equity. But every kind of fraud
equally
court of law: and some frauds are
cognizable, and equally adverted to, in
devise of lands, which
cognizable only there: as fraud in obtaining
always
sent out of the equity courts, to be there determined.
Many accidents are also
court of law; as loss of deeds, mistakes in receipts or accounts,
supplied in
wrong payments, deaths which make
impossible to perform condition liter
multitude of other contingencies and many cannot be relieved
ally, and
even in
ill suffered,
court of equity: as,
devise
by accident recovery
ill executed,
contingent remainder destroyed, or power of leasing omitted,
in
A technical trust, indeed, created by the limitation of
family settlement.
seeono- use> was f°roe<i into *tne courts of equity in the manner forT*432l
merly mentioned; (w) and this speoies of trusts, extended by inference
and construction, have ever since remained as
kind of peculium in those
courts. But there are other trusts, which are cognizable in a court of law: as
deposits, and all manner of bailments; and especially that implied contract, so
highly beneficial and useful, of having undertaken to account for money
received to another's use, (x) which
the ground of an action on the case
almost as universally remedial as bill in equity.
has been said that
not bound by rules
4. Once more;
court of equity
or precedents, but acts from the opinion of the judge, (y) founded on the cir
cumstances of every particular case.
Whereas the system of our courts of
laboured, connected system, governed by established rules, and
equity
bound down by precedents, from which they do not depart, although the rea
Thus the refusing of
son of some of them may perhaps be liable to objection.
a wife her dower in
trust-estate, (a) (6) yet allowing the husband his curtesy:
bond to be merely
the holding the penalty of
security for the debt and
sometimes as the debt itself, so that the interest
interest, yet considering
shall not exceed that penalty, (a) the distinguishing between
mortgage at
the interest be regularly
reduction to four,
clause of
five per cent, with
clause of enlargement to five,
paid, and mortgage at four per cent, with
the payment of the interest be deferred so that the former shall be deemed a
conscientious, the latter an unrighteous bargain: (b) all these, and other cases
that might be instanced, are plainly rules of positive law; supported only by
1.

Now otherwise, by
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the dower act,

and

i

(6)

3

3

2

a
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4

1

%
8.

Inst. 84. 10 Mod.
(f) Da ccquitate.
(u) Roll. Abr. 374.
(«0 Book II, ch. 80.
(x) Seepage 163.
" For law
(W) This is stated by Mr. Selden (TabTe-Talk, tit. Equity) with more pleasantry than truth.
wo have a measure, and know what to trust to: equity is according to the conscience of him that
chan
cellor; and as that is larger or narrower, so is equity. 'Tis all one as
they should make the standard
for the measure a chancellor's foot. What an uncertain measure would this be One chancellor has a
long foot, another a short foot, a third an indifferent foot. It is the same thing with the chancellor's
"
COOSCi©DC£*
(z) P. Wms. 640. See book II, p. 337.
(6) Vera. 289,816. Atk. 5S0.
(a) Salk. 154.

Wm. IV, c. 105.
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c) See the cue of Foster and Hunt

(1

(i)

*the reverence that is shown, and generally very properly shown, to a r»,„, ■>
L
J
series of former determinations; that the rule of property may be
that
followed,
uniform and steady.
Nay, sometimes a precedent is so strictly
a particular judgment, founded upon special circumstances, (c) gives rise to a
general rule.
In short, if a court of equity in England did really act as many ingenious
writers have supposed it (from theory) to do, it would rise above all law, either
common or statute, and be a most arbitrary legislator in every particular case.
No wonder they are so often mistaken. Grotius, or Puffendorf, or any other
of the great masters of jurisprudence, would have been as little able to dis
cover, by their own light, the system of a court of equity in England, as the
system of a court of law: especially, as the notions before mentioned of the
character, power, and practice of a court of equity were formerly adopted and
propagated (though jnot with approbation of the thing) by our principal anti
quaries and lawyers; Spelman,(cJ) Coke,(e) Lambard,(,/) and Selden, (g) and
even the great Bacon (A) himself. . But this was in the infancy of our courts
of equity, before their jurisdiction was settled, and when the chancellors them
selves, partly from their ignorance of law (being frequently bishops or states
by the arbitrary
men), partly from ambition or lust of power (encouraged
principles of the age they lived in), but principally from the narrow and un
just decisions of the oourts of law, had arrogated to themselves such unlimited
authority, as hath totally been disclaimed by their successors for now about a
The decrees of a court of equity were then rather in the nature
century past.
of awards, formed on the sudden pro re nata, with more probity of intention
than knowledge of the subject; *founded on no settled principles, as [■„...■.
J
But
being never designed, and therefore never used for precedents.
the systems of jurisprudence, in our courts both of law and equity, are now
equally artificial systems, founded on the same principles of justice and posi
tive law: but varied by different usages in the forms and mode of their pro
ceedings : the one being originally derived (though much reformed and
improved) from the feudal customs, as they prevailed in different ages in the
Saxon and Norman judicatures; the other (but with equal improvements) from
the imperial and pontifical formularies, introduced by their clerical chancellors.
The suggestion indeed of every bill, to give jurisdiction to the courts of
equity (copied from those early times), is that the complainant hath no remedy
at the common law. But he who should from thence conclude, that no case is
judged of in equity where there might have been relief at law, and at the same
time casts his eye on the extent and variety of the cases in our equity reports,
must think the law a dead letter indeed.
The rules of property, rules of evi
dence, and rules of interpretation in both courts are, or should be, exactly the
<aame: both ought to adopt the best, or must cease to be courts of justice.
Formerly some causes, which now no longer exist, might occasion a different
rule to be followed in one court, from what was afterwards adopted in the
other, as founded in the nature and reason of the thing: but, the instant those
causes ceased, the measure of substantial justice ought to have been the same
in both. Thus the penalty of a bond, originally contrived to evade the absurd
ity of those monkish constitutions which prohibited taking interest for money,
was therefore very pardonably considered as the real debt in the courts of law,
when the debtor neglected to perform his agreement for the return of the loan
with interest: for the judges could not, as the law then stood, give judgment
that the interest should be specifically paid. But when afterwards the taking
of interest became legal, as the necessary companion of commerce,
nay after
Vera. 478)with regard to the undisposed residuum of personal

8.

1.
8,

i

:

e

legum canons decernunt judices, solus {si res exigerit)
id) Quct in summis itaque tribunalibus multi
nec aliter decretis tenetur sues curiae vet sui ipsius, quin, elucents
eohibeat canceUarius ex arbitrio
ratione reeognoscat qua volurrit, mutet et deleat prout sitaevidebitur prudential.
Gloss. 108.
(8) Ubi supra,
(e) See pacs M, 55.
(/) Archeion. 71, 72,78.
c.
(0 See book II, p. 466.
(h) De Augm. Scient.
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8tatnte °* 37 **enc- 9> nad declared the *debt or loan itself
to be "the just and true intent" for which the obligation was given,
their narrow-minded successors still adhered wilfully and technically to the
letter of the ancient precedents, and refused to consider the payment of prin
cipal, interest, and costs, as a full satisfaction of the bond. At the same time
more liberal men, who sate in the courts of equity, construed the instrument
according to its "just and true intent," as merely a security for the loan: in
which light it was certainly understood by the parties, at least after these de
terminations; and therefore this construction should have been universally re
ceived. So in mortgages, being only a landed as the other is a personal secu
rity for the money lent, the payment of principal, interest, and costs, ought at
any time, before judgment executed, to have saved the forfeiture in a court of
law, as well as in a court of equity. And the inconvenience, as well as injus
tice, of putting different constructions in different courts upon one and the
same transaction, obliged the parliament at length to interfere, and to direct,
by the statutes 4 and 5 Ann. c. 16, and 7 -Geo. TL o. 20, that, in the cases of
bonds and mortgages, what had long been the practice of the courts of equity
should also for the future be universally followed in the courts of law; where
in it had before these statutes in some degree obtained a footing.( f)
Again; neither a court of equity nor of law can vary men's wills or agree
ments, or (in other words) make wills or agreements for them. Both are to
understand them truly, and therefore uniformly.
One court ought not to ex
tend, nor the other abridge, a lawful provision deliberately settled by the par
ties, contrary to its just intent. A court of equity, no more than a court of
law, can relieve against a penalty in the nature of stated damages; as a rent of
5l. an acre for ploughing up ancient meadow: (k) nor against a lapse of time,
where the time is material to the contract; as in covenants for the renewal of
leases.
Both courts will equitably construe, but neither pretends to control or
change, a lawful stipulation or engagement.
*The rules of decision are in both courts equally apposite to the subr*4381
*■
Where the subject-matter is such
jects of which they take cognizance.
as requires to be determined secundum cequum et bonum, as generally upon
actions on the case, the judgments of the courts of law are guided by the most
liberal equity. In matters of positive right, both courts must submit to and
follow those ancient and invariable maxims " gum relicta sunt et tradito."(l)
Both follow the law of nations, and collect it from history and the most ap
proved authors of all countries, where the question is the object of that law: as
in the case of the privileges of ambassadors,(m) hostages, or ransom-bills. (n)
In mercantile transactions they follow the marine law, (o) and argue from the
Where they exer
usages and authorities received in all maritime countries.
cise a concurrent jurisdiction, they both follow the law of the proper forum: (p)
in matters originally of ecclesiastical cognizance, they both equally adopt the
canon or imperial law, according to the nature of the subject;
and
a ques
tion came before either, which was properly the object of
foreign municipal
law, they would both receive information what
the rule of the country,(r)
and would both decide accordingly.
Such then being the parity of law and reason which governs both species of
courts, wherein
may be asked) does their essential difference consist?
principally consists in the different modes of administering justice in each; in
the mode of proof, the mode of trial, and the mode of relief. Upon these, and
upon two other accidental grounds of jurisdiction, which were formerly driven
into those oourts by narrow decisions of the courts of law, viz.: the true construot*on
securities for money lent, and the form and effect *of a
T*437l
trust or second use; upon these main pillars hath been gradually erected

r*435l
J
!■

J

I,

5

I,

I.
3,

2

6

9

Keb. 553.555. Balk. 697.
Hod. 11,60, 101.
(*) Atk. £89.
If) Dejure
natum cogitare per nos atque dicer* debemue; de jure popvli Roman!, qua relicti sunt et
(!)
tradita.
Cic. de Leg.
ad cole.
p. 253.
(ml See liook
(n) Ricord t. Bettenbam, Tr. Geo. III. B. R.
p. 75. Book U, pp. 459,461,467. (p) See book II, p. 513.
(o) See book
(j) Ibid. 504. (r) bid. 463.
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that structure of jurisprudence, which prevails in our courts of equity, and is
inwardly bottomed upon the same substantial foundations as the legal system
which hath hitherto been delineated in these Commentaries; however different
they may appear in their outward form, from the different taste of their arch
itects.
When facts, or their leading cir
1. And first, as to the mode of proof.
cumstances, rest only in the knowledge of the party, a court of equity applies
itself to his conscience, and purges him upon oath with regard to the truth of
the transaction; and, that being once discovered, the judgment is the same in
equity as it would have been at law. But for want of this discovery at law,
the courts of equity have acquired a concurrent jurisdiction with every other
court in all matters of account,
As incident to accounts, they take con
current cognizance of the administration of personal assets,
consequently
of debts, legacies, the distribution of the residue, and the conduct of executors
and administrators, (w) As incident to accounts, they also take the concur
rent jurisdiction of tithes, and all questions relating thereto; (w) of all dealings
in partnership, (as) and many other mercantile transactions; and so of bailiffs,
It would be endless to point out all the
receivers, factors, and agents, (y)
several avenues in human affairs, and in this commercial age, which lead to or
end in accounts.
From the same fruitful source, the compulsive discovery upon oath, the
courts of equity have acquired
jurisdiction over almost all matters of fraud:
(z) all matters in the private knowledge of the party, whioh, though concealed,
are binding in conscience; and all judgments at law, obtained through suoh
fraud or concealment.
And this, not by *impeaching or reversing the r*jqR-»
judgment itself, but by prohibiting the plaintiff from taking any advantage of judgment, obtained by suppressing the truth; (a) and which, had
the same facts appeared on the trial as now are discovered, he would never
have attained at all.
2. As to the mode of trial.
This
by interrogatories administered to the
witnesses, upon which their depositions are taken in writing, wherever they
If therefore the cause arises in a foreign country, and the
happen to reside.
witnesses reside upon the spot;
in causes arising in England, the witnesses
witnesses residing at home
are abroad, or shortly to leave the kingdom; or
are aged or infirm; any of these cases lays
ground for court of equity to
commission to examine them, and (in consequence) (7) to exercise the
grant
the witnesses
same jurisdiction, which might have been exercised at law,
could probably attend.
more specific remedy
The want of
3. With respect to the mode of relief.
than can be obtained in the courts of law gives a concurrent jurisdiction to a
court of equity in great variety of cases. To instance in executory agree
ments.
A court of equity will compel them to be carried into striot execu
tion, (b) unless where
improper or impossible: instead of giving damages
And hence fiction
for their non-performanoe.
established, that what
(8)
and shall re
ought to be done shall be considered as being actually done,
late back to the time when
ought to have been done originally: and this
2

(c)

8
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(«) Cha. Ca. 87.
(<) P. Wms. 145.
(u) Cha. Ca. 152.
Ibid. 638.
(*) Cha. Ca. 48.
io) Eq. Ca. Abr. 387. (*) Vern. 277.
(») Eq. Ca. Abr. 16.
(o) P. Wms. 148. Year-book, 22 Edw. IV, 87, pL 21.

P. Wms. 215.

4

3

,

6

a

(7) The courts of law now have this jurisdiction, under statutes heretofore referred to.
however, is not
matter of right, but always rests in the dis
(8) Specific performance,
cretion of the court, and will not be decreed unless the contract was reasonable and fair.
Cow., 445; Auter v. Miller, 18 Iowa, 405;.
222,
and
Johns. Ch.
Seymour v. Delancy,
Eq., 124; McCarty
Chambers v. Llvermore, 15 Mich., 381; Hawralty v. Warren, 18 N.
v Kyle,
Cold., 348; Pendleton v. Dalton, Pbill. (N. C.) Eq., 119. A contract which is.
Dumont v. Dufore, 2T
illegal, immoral, or against public policy, will not be enforced.
Ind., 283; Piatt v. Maples, 19 La. An., 459.
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is so closely pursued through all its consequences, that it necessarily
branches out into many rules of jurisprudence, which form a certain regular
So of waste, and other similar injuries, a court of equity takes a con
system.
current cognizance, in order to prevent them by injunction, (d)
Over ques
tions that may be tried at law, in a great multiplicity of actions, a court of
e1u'ty assumes a 'jurisdiction, to prevent the expense and vexation of
T*439
1
L
-I endless
In various kinds of frauds it assumes
litigations and suits, (e)
a concurrent (/) jurisdiction, not only for the sake of a discovery, but of a
more extensive and specific relief : as by setting aside fraudulent deeds, (g)
decreeing re-conveyances,
merely to
(A) or directing an absolute conveyance
stand as a security, (i) And thus, lastly, for the sake of a more beneficial
and complete relief by decreeing a sale of lands, (J) a court of equity holds
plea of all debts, incumbrances, and charges, that may affect it or issue there
out.
4. The true construction of securities for money lent is another fountain of
jurisdiction in courts of equity. When they held the penalty of a bond to be
the form, and that in substance it was only as a pledge to secure the repay
ment of the sum bona fide advanced, with a proper compensation for the use,
they laid the foundation of a regular series of determinations, which have set
tled the doctrine of personal pledges or securities, and are equally applicable
to mortgages of real property.
The mortgagor continues owner of the land,
the mortgagee of the money lent upon it; but this ownership is mutually
transferred, and the mortgagor is barred from redemption,
when called
upon by the mortgagee, he does not redeem within a time limited by the
-court; or he may when out of possession be barred by length of time, by
analogy to the statute of limitations. (9)
trust, or second use, gives the courts of equity an exclusive
5. The form of
jurisdiction as to the subject-matter of all settlements and devises in that form,
and of all the long terms created in the present complicated mode of convey
This
very ample source of jurisdiction: but the trust
governed
ancing.
by very nearly the same rules, as would govern the estate in court of law, (k)
n0 tru8tee wa8 interposed: and *by
regular positive system estabr*440l
*■
now reduced to
lished in the courts of equity, the doctrine of trusts
as great
certainty as that of legal estates in the courts of the common law.
omit the minuter) grounds of the jurisdiction
These are the priuoipal (for
at present exercised in our courts of equity: which differ, we see, very con
siderably from the notions entertained by strangers, and even by those courts
themselves before they arrived to maturity; as appears from the principles
laid down, and the jealousies entertained of their abuse, by our early juridical
writers cited in a former page;
and which have been implicitly received and
handed down by subsequent compilers, without attending to those gradual
accessions and derelictions, by which in the course of
century this mighty
Lambard, in particular, in the
river hath imperceptibly shifted its channel.
down, (m) that "equity should not be ap
reign of Queen Elizabeth, lays
pealed unto, but only in rare and extraordinary matters: and that a good
chancellor will not arrogate authority in every complaint that shall be brought
before him upon whatsoever suggestion: and thereby both overthrow the
con
authority of the courts of common law, and also bring upon men such
fusion and uncertainty, as hardly any man should know how or how long to
hold his own assured to him." And certainly,
court of equity were still
at sea, and floated upon the occasional opinion which the judge who happened
to preside might entertain of conscience in every particular case the incon-
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P. Wms. 289.
Vern. 82.
(a) Vern. 837.
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that would arise from this uncertainty would be a worse evil tban any
hardship that could follow from rules too strict and inflexible. Its powers
would have become too arbitrary to have been endured in a country like this,
(n) which boasts of being governed in all respects by law and not by wilL
But since the time when Lambard wrote, a set of great and eminent lawyers,
(o) who have successively held the great seal, have by degrees erected the
system of relief administered by a court of equity into a regular *science, r*44| ■»
■*
which cannot be attained without study and experience, any more than
the science of law: but from which, when understood, it may be known what
remedy a suitor is entitled to expect, and by what mode of suit, as readily and
with as much precision in a court of equity as in a court of law.
It were much to be wished, for the sake of certainty, peace, and justice, that
each court would as far as possible follow the other, in the best and most
effectual rules for attaining those desirable ends.
It is a maxim that equity
follows the law; and in former days the law has not scrupled to follow even
that equity which was laid down by the clerical chancellors. Every one who
is conversant in our ancient books, knows that many valuable improvements
in the state of our tenures (especially in leaseholds (p) and copyholds) (g) and
the forms of administering justice, (r) have arisen from this single reason, that
the same thing was constantly effected by means of a subpoena in the chancery.
And sure there cannot.be a greater solecism, than that in two sovereign inde
pendent courts established in the same country, exercising concurrent juris
diction, and over the same subject-matter, there should exist in a single
instance two different rules of property, clashing with or contradicting each
venience

other.

It would carry me beyond the bounds of my present purpose to go farther
into this matter.
have been tempted to go so far, because strangers are apt
to be confounded by nominal distinctions, and the loose unguarded expressions
to be met with in the best of our writers; and thence to form erroneous ideas
of the separate jurisdictions now existing in England, but which never were
It hath also afforded me an
separated in any other country in the universe.
opportunity to vindicate, on the one hand, the justice of our *courts of r*44n -i
■*
law from being that harsh and illiberal rule, which many are too ready
to suppose it; and on the other, the justice of our courts of equity from being
the result of mere arbitrary opinion, or an exercise of dictatorial power, which
rides over the law of the land, and corrects, amends and controls it by the loose
It is now high
and fluctuating dictates of the conscience of a single judge.
time to proceed to the practice of our courts of equity, thus explained, and
thus understood.
The first commencement
of a suit in chancery is by preferring a bill to the
lord chancellor, in the style of a petition; "humbly complaining, sheweth toyour lordship your orator A B that," &c. This is in the nature of a declara
tion at common law, or a libel and allegation in the spiritual courts: setting
forth the circumstances of the case at length, as, some fraud, trust or hard
" in tender consideration whereof"
ship;
(which is the usual language of the
hill), " and for that your orator is wholly without remedy at the common law,"
relief is therefore prayed at the chancellor's hands, and also process of subpoena
against the defendant, to compel him to answer upon oath to all the matter
charged in the bill. And, if it be to quiet the possession of lands, to stay
waste, or to stop proceedings at law, an injunction is also prayed, in the nature
of an interdictum by the civil law, commanding the defendant to cease.
This bill must call all necessary parties, however remotely concerned in in
terest, before the court, otherwise no decree can be made to bind them; and
Formust be signed by counsel, as a certificate of its decency and propriety.
it must not contain matter either scandalous or impertinent: if it does, the

I

(o) 8ee pagea M, 65,SB.
(n) 2 P. Wins. 885,886.
(gj Bru. Abr. tic. tenant per copie, pi. 10. LIU. | 77.

(p) QUb. of Ejectment. 2. 1 Bac. Abr. IN.
(r) See page SCO.
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(j) Smith's Commonw. b.
(u) Page 50.
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till such scandal or impertinence
defendant may refuse to answer
exdone upon an order to refer
to one of the officers of the
panged, which
master in chancery; of whom there are in number twelve, in
court, called
cluding the master of the rolls, all of whom, so late as the reign of Queen
The master
r*4.4i Elizabeth, were commonly doctors of the civil *law. («)
-'to examine the propriety of the bill: and he reports scandalous or
impertinent, such matter must be struck out, and the defendant shall have his
costs; which ought of right to be paid by the counsel who signed the bill.
When the bill
filed in the office of the six clerks (who originally were all
in orders; and therefore, when the constitution of the court began to alter,
was made to permit them to marry), when,
law
thus filed,
say, the bill
if an injunction be prayed therein, may be had at various stages of the
If the bill be to stay exe
cause, according to the circumstances of the case.
cution upon an oppressive judgment, and the defendant does not put in his
answer within the stated time allowed by the rules of the court, an injunction
will issue of course: and, when the answer comes in the injunction can only be
sufficient ground appearing from the answer itself.
continued upon
But
an injunction be wanted to stay waste, or other injuries of an equally urgent
nature, then upon the filing of the bill, and
proper case supported by affi
davits, the court will grant an injunction immediately to continue till the de
fendant has put in his answer, and till the court shall make some farther order
shall then be dis
concerning it: and when the answer comes in, whether
solved or continued till the hearing of the cause,
determined by the court
upon argument, drawn from considering the answer and affidavit together.
But, upon common bills, as soon as they are filed, process of subpoena
taken out: which
writ commanding the defendant to appear and answer
to the bill, on pain of 100/. But this
not all; for
the defendant, on ser
vice of the subpoena, does not appear within the time limited by the rules of
the court, and plead, demur or answer to the bill, he
then said to be in con
tempt; and the respective processes of contempt are in successive order
an attachment, which
awarded against him. The first of which
writ
nature °f
uireoted to the sheriff, and commanding
tae
capias,
r*444l
him to attach, or take up the defendant, and bring him into court. If
non est inventus, then an attachment
the sheriff returns that the defendant
with proclamations issues; which, besides the ordinary form of attachment,
directs the sheriff that he cause public proclamations to be made throughout
the county, to summon the defendant, upon his allegiance, personally to ap
If this be also returned with non est inventus, and he still
pear and answer.
awarded against him, for
commission of rebellion
stands out in contempt,
not obeying the king's proclamations according to his allegiance; and four
commissioners therein named, or any of them, are ordered to attach him whererebel and contemner of the
soever he may be found in Great Britain, as
king's laws and government, by refusing to attend his sovereign when there
unto required: since as was before observed, (m) matters of equity were orig
inally determined by the king in person, assisted by his council; though that
business
now devolved upon his chancellor. If upon this commission of
rebellion a non est inventus
returned, the court then sends sergeant-at-arms
in quest of him; and
he eludes the search of the sergeant also, then
se
questration issues to seize all his personal estate, and the profits of his real, and
to detain them, subject to the order of the oourt. Sequestrations were first
introduced by Sir Nicholas Bacon, lord keeper in the reign of Queen Eliza
beth, before which the court found some difficulty in enforcing its process and
decrees. (»)
After an order for sequestration issued, the plaintiff's bill
to
to be taken pro confesso, and a decree to be made accordingly.
So that the
sequestration does not seem to be in the nature of
process to bring in the
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defendant, but only intended to enforce the performance of the decree.
much if the defendant absconds.
If the defendant is taken upon any of this process, he is to be committed to
the Fleet, or other prison, till he puts in his appearance, or answer, or performs
whatever else this *process is issued to enforce, and also clears his con- , * . . .
tempts by paying the costs which the plaintiff has incurred thereby.
For the same kind of process (which was also the process of the court of starchamber till its dissolution) (to) is issued out in all sorts of contempts during
the progress of the cause, if the parties in any point refuse or neglect to obey
the order of the court.
The process against a body corporate is by distringas, to distrain them by
their goods and chattels, rents and profits, till they shall obey the summons or
directions of the court. And, if a peer is a defendant, the lord chancellor
sends a letter missive to him to request his appearance, together with a copy of
the bill ; and, if he neglects to appear, then he may be served with a subpoena;
and, if he continues still in contempt, a sequestration issues out immediately
against his lands and goods, without any of the mesne process of attachments,
&c, which are directed only against the person, and therefore cannot affect a
lord of parliament. The same process issues against a member of the house of
commons, except only that the lord chancellor sends him no letter missive.
The ordinary process before mentioned cannot be sued out till after service
of the subpoena, for then the contempt begins; otherwise he is not presumed
to have notice of the bill: and, therefore, by absconding to avoid the subpoena
a defendant might have eluded justice, till the statute 5 Geo. II, c. 25, which
enacts that, where the defendant cannot be found to be served with process of
subpoena, and absconds (as is believed) to avoid being served therewith, a day
shall be appointed him to appear to the bill of the plaintiff; which is to be
inserted in the London gazette, read in the parish church where the defendant
last lived, and fixed up at the royal exchange;
and, if the defendant doth not
appear upon that day, the bill shall be taken pro confesso.
But if the defendant appears regularly, and takes a copy of the bill, he is
next to demur, plead, or answer.
*A demurrer in equity is nearly of the same nature as a demurrer in r„ . -.
J
law; being an appeal to the judgment of the court, whether the defend- *■
ant shall be bound to answer the plaintiff's bill; as, for want of sufficient matter
of equity therein contained; or where the plaintiff, upon his own showing, ap
pears to have no right; or where the bill seeks a discovery of a thing which
may cause a forfeiture of any kind, or may convict a man of any criminal mis
behaviour. For any of these causes a defendant may demur to the bilL And
on demurrer, the defendant prevails, the plaintiff's bill shall be dismissed:
the demurrer be over-ruled, the defendant is ordered to answer.
A plea may be either to the jurisdiction; showing that the court has no cog
nizance of the cause: or to the person; showing some disability in the plaintiff,
as by outlawry, excommunication, and the like; or
in bar; showing some
matter wherefore the plaintiff can demand no relief, as an act of parliament, a
former decree.
And the truth of this plea the defendant
release, or
fine,
bound to prove,
the plaintiff.
But as bills are often of com
put upon
plicated nature, and contain various matter, man may plead as to part, demur
as to part, and answer to the residue.
But no exceptions to formal minutice
in the pleadings will be here allowed; for the parties are at liberty, on the dis
covery of any errors in form, to amend them, (x)
An answer
the most usual defence that
made to
plaintiff's bill. It
given in upon oath, or the honour of
peer or peeress: but where there are
amicable defendants, their answer
usually taken without oath by consent of
il

(to) 18Hym. Fad. 195.
(x) En cett court de chauncerie home ne terra predjudice par son mitpleding ou pur de/aut de fonnm.
m»j solonque le veryte del mater, ear
doit agarder solonque consciens, et nemi ex rigore juris. Dw<~tyt.: del cuurtes, edit. 1534,fol. 296,297. Bro. Abr. tit. Jurisdiction, 60.
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This method of proceeding is taken from the ecclesiastical courts,
of the practice in chancery: for there in almost every case the
r„ . . i plaintiff may demand the *oath of his adversary in supply of proof.
L
J Formerly this was done in those courts with compurgators in the man
ner of our waging of law; but this has been long disused; and instead of it the
resent kind of purgation, by the single oath of the party himself, was introThis oath was made use of in the spiritual courts, as well in criminal
S uced.
cases of ecclesiastical cognizance, as in matters of civil right; and it was then
usually denominated the oath ex officio : whereof theJugh commission court in
particular made a most extravagant and illegal use; forming a^jourt of inquisition, in which all persons were obliged to answer in cases of bare suspicion, if
the commissioners
thought proper to proceed against them ex officio for any
But when the high commission court was
supposed ecclesiastical enormities.
abolished by statute 16 Car. I, o. 11, this oath ex officio was abolished with it;
and it is also enacted by statute 13 Car. II, st. 1, c. 12, "that it shall not be
lawful for any bishop or ecclesiastical judge to tender to any person the oath
ex officio, or any other oath whereby the party may be charged or compelled to
But this does not
confess, accuse, or purge himself, of any criminal matter.
extend to oaths in a civil suit, and therefore it is still the practice, both in the
spiritual courts and in equity, to demand the personal answer of the party him
Yet if in the bill any question be put, that tends to the dis
self upon oath.
covery of any crime, the defendant may thereupon demur, as was before ob
served, and may refuse to answer.
If the defendant lives within twenty miles of London, he must be sworn be
fore one of the masters of the court: if farther off, there may be a dedimm
potestatem or commission to take his answer in the country, where the commis
sioners administer to him the usual oath; and then, the answer being sealed up,
either one of the commissioners carries it up to the court: or it is sent by a
messenger, who swears he received it from one of the commissioners, and that
the same has not been opened or altered sinoe he received it. An answer must
be signed by counsel, and must either deny or confess all the 'material
L
J parts of the bill; or it may confess and avoid, that
justify or palliate
If one of these not done, the answer may be excepted to for in
the facts.
sufficiency, and the defendant be compelled to put in a more sufficient answer.
A defendant cannot pray anything in this his answer, but to be dismissed the
he has any relief to pray against the plaintiff, he must do
court:
by an ori
oalled cross-bill.
ginal bill of his own, which
After answer put in, the plaintiff, upon payment of costs, may amend his
bill, either by adding new parties or new matter, or both, upon the new lights
obliged to answer afresh to
given him by the defendant; and the defendant
But this must be before the plaintiff has replied to the
such amended bill.
at issue: for afterwards,
new mat
defendant's answer, whereby the cause
forth by
ter arises which did not exist before, he must set
supplemental
bill of revivor when the suit
abated by the death
bill. There may be also
of any of the parties; in order to set the proceedings again in motion, without
bill of interpleader,
stand.
And there
likewise
which they remain at
debt or rent to one of the parties in suit, but, till
where a person who owes
the determination of
he knows not to which, desires that they may inter
usual to
plead, that he may be safe in the payment. In this last case
order the money to be paid into court for the benefit of such of the parties to
to be due. But this depends
whom, upon hearing, the court shall decree
upon circumstances; and the plaintiff must also annex an affidavit to his bill,
swearing that he does not collude with either of the parties. (10)
the plaintiff.
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bill of interpleader ought to pay into court the money due.
(10) The complainant in
Daniell, Ch. Prac, 4th ed., 1563, and cases. No interlocutory injunction of proceedings at
law will be granted without such payment, unless in some other way the payment
se
Daniell, 1567, and cases cited.
cured.
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If the plaintiff finds sufficient matter confessed in the defendant's answer
to ground a decree upon, he may proceed to the hearing of the cause upon bill
and answer only. But in that case he must take the defendant's answer to be
true in every point. Otherwise the course is for the plaintiff to reply gener
ally to the answer, averring his bill to be true, certain and sufficient, and the
defendant's answer to be *directly the reverse; which he is ready to
r*A4fll'
prove as the court shall award ; upon which the defendant rejoins, *■
averring the like on his side; which is joining issue upon the facts in dispute.
Toprove which facts is the next concern.
This is done by examination of witnesses, and taking their depositions in
writing, according to the manner of the civil law. And for that purpose in
terrogatories are framed, or questions in writing; which, and which only, are
to be proposed to, and asked of, the witnesses in the cause.
These interroga
tories must be short and pertinent; not leading ones; (as, " did not you see
this?" or, "did not you hear that?") for if they be such the depositions taken
thereon will be suppressed and not suffered to be read.
For the purpose of
examining witnesses in or near London, there is an examiner's office appointed ;
but for such as live in the country, a commission to examine witnesses is
usually granted to four commissioners, two named of each side, or any three
And if the witnesses reside be
or two of them, to take the depositions there.
yond sea, a commission may be had to examine them there upon their own
And it hath
oaths, and (if foreigners) upon the oaths of skillful interpreters.
been established (y) that the deposition of an heathen who believes in the
Supreme Being, taken by commission in the most solemn manner according to
the custom of bis own country, may be read in evidence.
are sworn to take the examinations truly and without
The commissioners
partiality, and not to divulge them till published in the court of chancery;
The witnesses are compellable
and their clerks are also sworn to secrecy.
by process of subpoena, as in the courts of common law, to appear and submit
to examination. And when their depositions are taken, they are transmitted
to the court with the same care that the answer of a defendant is sent.
*If witnesses to a disputable fact are old and infirm, it is very usual r*jB0-i'
to file a bill to perpetuate the testimony of those witnesses, although *■
no suit is depending; for, it may be, a man's antagonist only waits for the
This is most frequent when
death of some of them to begin his suit.
lands are devised by will away from the heir at law; and the devisee, in order
to perpetuate the testimony of the witnesses to such will, exhibits a bill in
chancery against the heir, and sets forth the will verbatim therein, suggesting
that the heir is inclined to dispute its validity; and then, the defendant hav
ing answered, they proceed to issue as in other cases, and examine the wit
nesses to the will; after which the cause is at an end, without proceeding to
any deoree, no relief being prayed by the bill; but the heir is entitled to his
This is what is usually meant by
costs, even though he contests the will.
proving a will in chancery.
When all the witnesses are examined, then, and not before, the depositions
may be published, by a rule to pass publication; after which they are open
for the inspection of all the parties, and copies may be taken of them. The
cause is then ripe to be set down for hearing, which may be done at the pro
curement of the plaintiff or defendant, before either the lord chancellor or the
master of the rolls, according to the discretion of the clerk in court, regulated
by the nature and importance of the suit, and the arrear of causes depending
before each of them respectively. Concerning the authority of the master of
the rolls, to hear and determine causes, and his general power in the court of
chancery, there were (not many years since) divers questions and disputes very
warmly agitated, to quiet which it was declared by statute 3 Geo. II, o. 30,
that all orders and decrees by him made, exoept suoh as by the course of the
Vol.

(y) Ormlctaund v. Barker, 1 Atk. 21.
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oourt were appropriated to the great seal alone, should be deemed to be valid;
subject nevertheless to be discharged or altered by the lord chancellor, and so
as they shall not be enrolled, till the same are signed by his lordship.
Either
mav 06 subpoenaed to hear judgment *on the day so fixed for the
Part7
f*451
1
L
-I
hearing: and then, if the plaintiff does not attend, his bill is dismissed
with costs; or, if the defendant makes default, a decree will be made against
him, whioh will be final, unless he pays the plaintiff's costs of attendance, and
shows good cause to the contrary on a day appointed by the court. A plain
tiff's bill may also at any time be dismissed for want of prosecution, which is
in the nature of a non-suit at law, if he suffers three terms to elapse without
moving forward in the cause.
When there are cross causes, on a oross bill filed by the defendant against
the plaintiff in the original cause, they are generally oontrived to be brought
on together, that the same hearing and the same decree may serve for both of
them.
The method of hearing causes in court is usually this. The parties on
both sides appearing by their counsel, the plaintiff's biU is first opened, or
briefly abridged, and the defendant's answer also, by the junior counsel on each
side; after which the plaintiff's leading counsel states the case and the matters
in issue, and the points of equity arising therefrom: and then such depositions
as are called for by the plaintiff are read by one of the 6ix clerks, and the
plaintiff may also read such part of the defendant's answer as he thinks
material or convenient:
and after this, the rest of the counsel for the plain
tiff make their observations and arguments.
Then the defendant's counsel go
through the same process for him, except that they may not read any part of
his answer; and the counsel for the plaintiff are heard in reply. When all are
heard, the court pronounces the decree, adjusting every point in debate, accord
ing to equity and good conscience; which decree being usually very long, the
The
minutes of
are taken down and read openly in court by the registrar.
not here held to be point of
matter of costs to be given to either party,
right, but merely discretionary (by the statute 11 Rio. II, c. 6), according to
r ..„, the circumstances of the oase, as they *appear more or less favourable
seems
to the party vanquished. And yet the statute 15 Hen. VI, c.
expressly to direct, that as well damages as costs shall be given to the defen
dant,
wrongfully vexed in this court.
The chancellor's decree
either interlocutory or final. It very seldom hap
any matter
pens that the first decree can be final, or conclude theoause; for,
of fact
so sensible of the deficiency of
strongly controverted, this court
trial by written depositions that
will not bind the parties thereby, but usu
ally directs the matter to be tried by jury; especially such important facts as
will, or whether A is the heir at law to
or the existence of
the validity of
modus decimandi, or real and immemorial composition for tithes. But, as
no jury can be summoned to attend this court, the fact
usually directed to
be tried at the bar of the court of king's bench, or at the assizes upon a
For (in order to bring
there, and have the point in dispute,
feigned issue.
and that only, put in issue) an action
brought, wherein the plaintiff, by a
fiction, deolares that he laid
wager of 5l. with the defendant that A was heir
The
at law to B; and then avers that he
so; and therefore demands the 5L
not the heir to B;
defendant admits the feigned wager, but avers that A
and therefore that issue
directed out of chancery to be
joined, which
tried; and thus the verdict of the jurors at law determines the fact in the court
of equity. These feigned issues seem borrowed from the sponsio judicialis of
the Romans: (a) and are also frequently used in the courts of law, by consent

I.
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the plaintiff reads any part of the defendant's answer, he must read the whole
(z) On trial at law,
of it; for, by reading any of it. he shows a reliance on the truth of the defendant's testimony, and makes
the whole of his answer evidence.
(a) Nota ext tpontio judicialis; "tpondetnt quingentot ti m«u sltf tpondeo.si ruu* tit. Et (u quoque
tpondetnt quingentot, ni turn tit
16,
and
tpondeo, ni metu fit," Vids Helneo. Antiquitat.
Bison, dtjudicli;
21,p. 466,eitat, Ibid.
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of the parties

to determine some disputed right without the formality of plead
ing, and thereby to save much time and expense in the decision of a cause.
So, likewise, if a question of mere law arises in the course of a cause, as
whether, by the words of a will, an estate for life, or *in tail is r*^eqT
'
created, or whether a future interest devised by a testator shall oper- *■
ate as a remainder or an executory devise, it is the practice of this court to refer
it to the opinion of the judges of the court of king's bench or common pleas,
upon a case stated for that purpose, wherein all the material facts are admit
ted, and the point of law submitted to their decision; who thereupon hear it
solemnly argued by counsel on both sides, and certify their opinion to the
chancellor. And upon such certificate the decree is usually founded.
Another thing also retards the completion of decrees.
Frequently long ac
counts are to be settled, incumbrances and debts to be inquired into, and a
hundred little facts to be cleared up, before a decree can do full and sufficient
justice. These matters are always, by the decree on the first hearing, referred
to a master in chancery to examine; which examinations frequently last for
years; and then he is to report the fact, as it appears to him, to the court.
This report may be excepted to, disproved, and overruled; or otherwise, is
confirmed and made absolute, by order of the court.
When all issues are tried and settled, and all references to the master
ended, the cause is again brought to hearing upon the matters of equity reserved ;
and a final decree is made: the performance of which is enforced (if necessary)
by commitment of the person, or sequestration of the person's estate. And if,
by this decree, either party thinks himself aggrieved, he may petition the chan
cellor for a rehearing ; whether it was heard before his lordship, or any of the
judges, sitting for him, or before the master of the rolls. For whoever may
have heard the cause, it is the chancellor's decree, and must be signed by him
before it is enrolled; {b) which is done of course, unless a rehearing be desired.
Every petition for a rehearing must be signed by two counsel of character,
usually such as have been concerned in the cause, certifying that they appre
hend the cause is proper to be reheard.
And upon the "rehearing, all r^...-.'
the evidence taken in the cause, whether read before or not, is now ad- *•
mitted to be read; because it is the decree of the chancellor himself, who only
now sits to hear reasons why it should not be enrolled and perfected; at which
time all omissions of either evidence or argument may be supplied, (c) But,
after the decree is once signed and enrolled, it cannot be reheard or rectified
but by bill of review, or by appeal to the house of lords.
A bill of review may be had upon apparent error in judgment, appearing on
the face of the decree; or by special leave of the court upon oath made of the
discovery of new matter or evidence, which could not possibly be had or used
But no new evidence or matter then in
at the time when the decree passed.
the knowledge of the parties, and which might have been used before, shall be
a sufficient ground for a bill of review.
An appeal to parliament, that is to the house of lords, is the dernier resort
of the subject who thinks himself aggrieved by an interlocutory order or
final determination in this court: and it is effected by petition to the house of
This
peers, and not by writ of error, as upon judgments at common law.
jurisdiction is said (d) to have begun in 18 Jao. I, and it is certain, that the
first petition which appears in the records of parliament, was preferred in that
year; (e) and that the first whioh was heard and determined (though the name
of appeal was then a novelty) was presented a few months after; (f) both
levelled against the lord chancellor, Bacon, for corruption and other misbe
haviour. It was afterwards warmly controverted by the house of commons in
the reign of Charles the Second, (g) But this dispute is now at rest: (A) it
(M Stat. S Geo. II, c. 89. See page 460.
(o) Glib. Rep. 151.158.
(/) Ibid. 8, 11,12Dec. 1831.
(«) Lords* Jour. S3 Mar. 1820.
(A) 8how. Pari. C. 81.

(<DCom. -Tnur. IS Mar. 1704.
to) Com Jour. 18Not. lliTB.
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being obvious to the reason of all mankind, that, when the oourts of equity
became principal tribunals for deciding causes of property, a revision of their
♦decrees (by way of appeal) became equally necessary, as a writ of r»4sg-»
■*
error from the judgment of a court of law. And, upon the same prin- *■
ciple, from decrees of the chancellor relating to the commissioners for the dis
solution of chauntries, &c, under the statute 37 Hen. Vill, o. 4, (as well as for
charitable uses, under the statute 43 Eliz. c. 4), an appeal to the king in parlia
ment was always unquestionably allowed,
ad
But no new evidence
mitted in the house of lords upon any account; this being
distinct jurisdic
tion: (k) which differs
very considerably from those instances, wherein the
same jurisdiction revises and corrects its own acts, as in rehearings and bills
of review. For
practice unknown to our law (though constantly fol
lowed in the spiritual courts), when superior court
reviewing the sentence
of an inferior, to examine the justice of the former decree by evidence that
was never produced below. And thus much for the general method of pro
ceeding in the courts of equity. (11)
(*) 811b.Rep. 155,156.

a

is

is

left in England of the
(11) Since the jurisdiction acts of 1873 and 1875, very little
former chancery practice.
The proceedings in equity are conformed to those at law, so far
as the circumstances and the relief applied for wUl admit, and issues of fact may be tried
by jury before the equity judge.
In many states of the American Union the distinction between law and equity
abolished, and the equity system, as
But th»
system of procedure, has ceased to exist.
peculiar equitable remedies are still available, and are given in the law courts.
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PROCEEDINGS
Bbct. 1. — Writ

No. 1.

l.

ON A WRIT OF RIGHT PATENT.

of Right Patent in the Court- Baron.

Sect.

2.

it,

Georoe the Second, by the grace of God, of Great Britain, France, and Ire
land king, defender of the faith, and so forth, to Willoughby, earl of Abing
don, greeting.
We command you that without delay you hold full right to
William Kent, Esquire, of one messuage and twenty acres of land with the
in Dorchester, which he claims to hold of you by the free ser
appurtenances,
vice of one penny yearly in lieu of all services, of which Richard Allen deforces
that we no
him. And unless you do so, let the sheriff of Oxfordshire do
Witness ourself at West
longer hear complaint thereof for defect of right
minster, the twentieth day of August, in the thirtieth year of our reign.

Writ of Tolt,

to Remove

it

into the County Court.

is

I

I

Charles Morton, Esquire, sheriff of Oxfordshire, to John Long, bailiff, er
Because by the complaint
rant of our lord the king and of myself, greeting.
of William Kent, Esquire, personally present at my county court, to wit, on
Monday, the Sixth day of September, in the thirtieth year of the reign of our
lord George the Second, by the grace of God, of Great Britain, France and
Ireland king, defender of the faith, and so forth, at Oxford, in the shire-house
am informed, that although he himself the writ of our said
there holden,
lord the king of right patent directed to Willoughby, earl of Abingdon, for
this that *fae should hold full right to the said William Kent, of one messuage
and twenty acres of land, with the appurtenances, in Dorchester, within my
said county, of which Richard Allen deforces him, hath brought to the said
Willoughby, earl of Abingdon; yet for that the said Willoughby, earl of Abing
don, favoureth the said Richard Allen in this part, and hath hitherto delayed
to do full right according to the exigence of the said writ,
command you on
the part of our said lord the king, firmly enjoining, that in your proper person
you go to the court-baron of the said Willoughby, earl of Abingdon, at Dor
chester aforesaid, and take away the plaint, which there
between tho said
William Kent and Richard Allen by the said writ, into my county court to be
next holden; and summon by good summoners the said Richard Allen, that he
be at my county court, on Monday, the fourth day of October next coming, at
Oxford, in the shire-house there to be holden to answer to the said William
Kent thereof.
And have you there then the said plaint, the summoners, and
this precept
Given in my county court, at Oxford, in the shire-house,
the
sixth day of September, in the year aforesaid.
Sect. 8.

Writ of Pone, to Remove it

into the Court of

Common

Pleas.

;

is

Georoe the Second, by the grace of God, of Great Britain, France, and Ire
land king, defender of the faith, and so forth, to the sheriff of Oxfordshire,
Put at the request of William Kent, before our justices at West
greeting.
minister, on the morrow of All Souls, the plaint which
in your county court
by our writ of right, between the said William Kent, demandant, and Rich
ard Allen, tenant, of one messuage and twenty acres of land, with the appur
tenances, in Dorchester and summon by good summoners the said Richard
Allen, that he be then there, to answer tothesaid William Kent thereof.
And
Witness ourself at Westminister,
have you there the summoners and this writ.
the tenth day of September, in the thirtieth year of our reign.
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Sect.

4.

Writ of

Right, Quia. Dominus Rkmis.it Curiam.

George the Second, by the grace of God, of Great Britain, France, and Ire
land king, defender of the faith, and so forth, to the sheriff of Oxfordshire,
Command Richard Allen, that he justly and without delay render
greeting.
unto William Kent one messuage and twenty acres of land, with the appur
tenances in Dorchester, which he claims to be his right and inheritance, and
whereupon he complains that the aforesaid Richard unjustly deforces him.
And unless he shall so do, and *if the said William shall give you security of
[*lil]
prosecuting his claim, then summon by good summoners the said Richard,
that he appear before our justices at Westminster, on the morrow of All Souls,
to show wherefore he hath not done it. And have you there the summoners and
Witness ourself at Westminster, the twentieth day of August, in
. this writ.
Because Willoughby, earl of Abingdon, the
the thirtieth year of our reign.
chief lord of that fee, hath thereupon remised unto us his court.
Summoners of the
) John Den.
) John Doe.
Sheriff's return Pledges of
within-named Richard, ) Richard Fen.
prosecution. (Richard Roe,
Sect. 5.

The Record, with Award op Battel, f

Pleas at Westminster before Sir John Willes, knight, and his brethren justices
of the bench of the lord the king at Westminster, of the term of Saint
Michael, in the thirtieth year of the reign of the lord George the Second, by
the grace of God, of Great Britain, France, and Ireland king, defender of
the faith, &c.
Oxon, ) William Kent, esquire, by James Parker, his attorney, demands
to wit. J against Richard Allen, gentleman, one messuage and twenty acres of
land, with the appurtenances in Dorchester, as his right and inheritance, by
Dominut
Hemiti curiam, writ of the lord the king of right, because Willoughby, earl of Abingdon, the
chief lord of that fee, hath now thereupon remised to the lord the king his
court. And wliereupon he saith that he himself was seized of the tenements
in his demesne as of fee and right, in the
aforesaid, with the appurtenances,
time of peace, in the time of the lord George the First, late king of Great Brit
ain, by taking the esplees thereof to the value! [of ten shillings and more, in
Esplees.
And that such is his right he offers [suit and good
rents, corn and grass].
proof]. And the said Richard Allen, by Peter Jones, his attorney, comes and
defends the right of the said William Kent, and his seisin, when [and where
It shall behoove him], and all [that concerns it], and whatsoever [he ought to
as of fee
defend] and chiefly the tenements aforesaid, with the appurtenances,
and right [namely, one messuage and twenty acres of land, with appurtenances
Wager <
in Dorchester]. And this he is ready to defend by the body of bis freeman,
battel.
George Rumbold by name, who is present here in court, ready to defend the
same by his body, or in what manner soever the court of the lord the king
*And if any mischance should befall
•hall consider that he ought to defend.
[IT]
the said George (which God defend), he is ready to defend the same by another
And the said William Kent
man, who [is bounden and able to defend it].
saith, that the said Richard Allen unjustly defends the right of him the said
&c,
Ac,
and all,
and whatsoever, <fcc, and chiefly of
William, and his seisin,
as of fee and right, &c. , be
the tenements aforesaid with the appurtenances
cause he saith, that he himself was seized of the tenements aforesaid, with the
in his demesne as of fee and right, in the time of peace, in the
appurtenances,
time of the said lord George the First, late king of Great Britain, by taking the
And that such is his right, he is prepared
esplees thereof to the value, Ac.
Joinder of
to prove by the body of his freeman, Henry Broughton by name, who is pres
battel.
ent here in court ready to prove the same by his body, or in what manner
soever the court of the lord the king shall consider that he ought to prove ; and
if any mischance should befall the said Henry (which God defend), he is ready
And hereupon it is demanded
to prove the same by another man, who, &c.
of the said George and Henry, whether they are ready to make battle as they
And the same George Rumbold
-1 before have waged it; who say that they are.
iveth gage of defending, and the said Henry Broughton giveth gage of provgive
ingz; and such engagement being given as the manner is, it is demanded of the
said
id William Kent and Richard Allen, if they can say any thing wherefore
Thenbattel ought not to be awarded in this case; who say that they cannot
Award of
Battel
And the said George
fare it is considered, that battel be made thereon, &c.
Rumbold flndeth pledges of battel, to wit, Paul Jenkins and Charles Carter;
t As to battel, see page 837,n. 7.
t N. B. The clauses between hooks, in this and the
dlr, are usually no otherwise
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and the said Henry Broughton flndeth also pledges of battel, to wit, Reginald
And thereupon day is here given as well to the said
Read and Simoa Tayler.
William Kent as to the said Richard Allen, to wit, on the morrow of Saint
the
assent as well of the said William Kent as of the
Martin next coming, by
And it is commanded that each of thein then have here
■aid Richard Allen.
his champion, sufficiently furnished with competent armour as becomes him,
and ready to make the battle aforesaid; and that the bodies of them in the
At which day here
mean time be safely kept, on peril that shall fall thereon.
come as well the said William Kent as the said Richard Allen by their attorneys aforesaid, and the said George Rumbold and Henry Broughton in their
proper persons likewise come, sufficiently furnished with competent armour as
becomes them, ready to make the battle aforesaid, as they have before waged
it. And hereupon day is further given by the court here, as well to the said
William Kent as to the said Richard Allen, at Tothill, near the city of Westminster, in the county of Middlesex, to wit, on the morrow of the Purification
of the Blessed Virgin Mary next coming, by the assent as well of the said "WillAnd it is commanded, that each of them
iam as of the aforesaid Richard.
have then there his champion, armed in the form aforesaid, ready to make the
battle aforesaid, and that their bodies in the meantime, &c.
At which day
here, to wit, at Tothill aforesaid, comes the said Richard Allen by his attorney
aforesaid, and the said George Rumbold and Henry Broughton in their proper
persons likewise come, sufficiently furnished with competent
armour as be
comes them, ready to make the battle aforesaid as they before had waged it.
And the said William Kent being solemnly called doth not come, nor hath
prosecuted his writ aforesaid.
Therefore itti considered, that the same William
and his pledges of prosecuting, to wit, John Doe and Richard Roe, be in mercy
for his false complaint, and that the same Richard go thereof without a day,
&c., and also that the said Richard do hold the tenements aforesaid with the
to him and his heirs, quit of the said William and his heirs, forappurtenances,
ever, &c.
Sect. 6.

Trial

No. JL
=====
Oontinuanoa.

champions
appear,

Adjournment
^efd^A*1,
[#TJ

Demandant
nonsuit

Final judgment
tor thB tenant

bt the Grand Assize.

— And the said Richard Allen, by Peter Jones, his attorney, comes and
defends the right of the said William Kent, and his seisin, when, &c., and all,
&c, and whatsoever, &c, and chiefly of the tenements aforesaid with the ap
as of fee and right, &c, and puts himself upon the grand assize
purtenances,
of the lord the king, and prays recognition to be made, whether he himself
hath greater right to hold the tenements aforesaid with the appurtenances to
him and his heirs as tenants thereof as he now holdeth them, or the said
William to have the said tenements with the appurtenances, as he above demandeth them.
And he tenders here in court six shillings and eight pence to
the use of the lord the now king, &c., for that, to wit, it may be inquired of the
time [of the seisin alleged by the said William].
And he therefore prays, that
it may be inquired by the assize, whether the said William Kent was seized of
the tenements aforesaid with the appurtenances
in his demesne as of fee in the
time of the said lord the king George the First, as the said William in his
demand before hath alleged.
Therefore it is commanded the sheriff, that he
summon by good summoners four lawful knights of his county, girt with
swords, that they be here on the octaves of Saint Hilary next coming, to
make election of the assize aforesaid.
The same day is given as well to the
said William Kent as to the said Richard Allen here, &c.
At which day here
come as well the said William Kent, as the said Richard Allen ; and the sheriff,
to wit, Sir Adam Alstone, knight, now returns, that he hod caused to be sum
moned Charles Stephens. Randel Wheler. Toby Cox, and Thomas Munday,
four lawful knights of *his county, girt with swords, by John Doe and Richard Roe his bailiffs, to be here at the said octaves of Saint Hilary, to do as the
said writ thereof commands and requires; and that the said summoners,
and
each of them, are mainprized by John Day and James Fletcher.
Whereupon
the said Charles Stephens, Randel Wheler, Toby Cox, and Thomas Munday,
four lawful knights of the county aforesaid, girt with swords, being called, in
their proper persons come, and being sworn upon their oath in the presence of
the parties aforesaid, chose of themselves and others twenty-four, to wit,
Charles Stephens, Randel Wheler, Toby Cox, Thomas Munday, Oliver Greenway, John Boys, Charles Price, knights; Daniel Prince, William Day, Roger
Lucas, Patrick Fleming, James Harris, John Richardson, Alexander Moore,
Peter Payne, Robert Quin, Archibald Stuart, Bartholomew Norton, and Henry
Davis, esquires; John Porter, Christopher Ball, Benjamin Robinson, Lewis
Long, William Kirby, gentlemen, good and lawful men of the county afore
said, who neither are of kin to the said William Kent nor to the said Richard
26.5

Defence,

Hise.

Tender of
deml-mark.

Summons of
the knights,
Return,

f*vf)

Election of the
recognitors,
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No. n.

Allen, to make recognition of the grand assize aforesaid.
Therefore It is <
the sheriff, that he cause them to come here from the day of Easter
in fifteen days, to make the recognition aforesaid.
The same day is there
to the parties aforesaid.
At which day here come as well the said
fiven
ITilliam Kent as the said Richard Allen, by their attorneys aforesaid, and
the recognitors of the assize, whereof mention is made above, being called,
Recognitor*
come, and certain of them, to wit, Charles Stephens,
Randel Wheler,
Toby Cox. Thomas Munday, Charles Price, knights; Daniel Prince, Roger
Lucas, William Day, James Harris, Peter Payne, Robert Quin, Henry
Davis, John Porter, Christopher Ball, Lewis Long, and William Dirby, being
Verdict for the elected, tried, and sworn upon their oath say, that the said William Kent hath
demandant.
more right to have the tenements aforesaid with the appurtenances
to him and
his heirs, as he demandeth the same, than the said Richard Allen to hold the
same as he now holdeth them, according as the said William Kent by his writ
Judgment.
aforesaid hath supposed.
Therefore it U considered, that the said William Kent
do recover his seisin against the said Richard Allen of the tenements afore
said, with the appurtenances,
to him and his heirs, quit of the said Richard
Allen and his heirs forever; and the said Richard Allen in mercy, &c.
'

manded

*No.

[»vii]

n.

IN AN ACTION OF TRESPASS IN EJECTMENT,
BY ORIGINAL, IN THE KING'S BENCH.

PROCEEDINGS

Sect. 1.
Sifeceret

te

Sheriff's,

Copt of the Declaration

against the Casual Ejector, wao

gives Notice thereupon to the Tenant in possession.
Michael/mas,

[»viil]

al Writ.

George the Second, by the grace of God, of Great Britain, France and Irelund, king, defender of the faith, and so forth, to the sheriff of Berkshire,
greeting.
.(f Richard Smith shall give you security of prosecuting his claim,
then put by gage and safe pledges William Stiles, late of Newbury, gentleman,
so that he be before us on the morrow of All-Souls, wheresoever
we shall then
be in England, to show wherefore with force and arms he entered into one
in Sutton, which John Rogers, esquire,
messuage with the appurtenances,
hath demised to the aforesaid Richard, for a term which is not yet expired,
farm,
and ejected him from his said
and other enormities to him did, to the
And have you
great damage of the said Richard, and again.it our peace.
there the names of the pledges and this writ.
Witness ourself at Westminste r,
the twelfth day of October, in the twenty-ninth year of our reign.
The within named 1 j0HN
Pledges of
£ John Dor^
dbh
William Stiles is at- ] Richard Fek
prosecution, J Richard Roe.
tached by pledges.
Sect. 2.

Declaration.

The Origin

Williak

the 29th of

King

George the Second.

Stii.es, late of^Newbury in the said county, gentleman,
£
"
'
ehei
with
$ was attached to answer Richard Smith, of a plea, wherefore
in Sut
force and arms he entered into one messuage, with the appurtenances,
ton in the county aforesaid, which John Rogers, Esquire, demised to the said
Richard Smith for a term which is not yet expired, and ejected him from his
said farm, and other wrongs to him did, to the great damage of the said Rich
ard, and against the peace of the lord the king, &c.
And whereupon die said
Richard by 'Robert Martin his attorney complains, that whereas the said
John Rogers, on the first day of October, in the twenty-ninth year of the reign
of the lord the king that now is, at Sutton aforesaid, had demised to the same
Richard the tenement aforesaid, with the appurtenances, to have and to hold
to the said Richard and his assigns,
the said tenement, with the appurtenances,
from the Feast of Saint Michael the Archangel then last past, to the end and
term of five years from thence next following and fully to be complete and
ended, by virtue of which demise the said Richard entered into the said tene
ment, with the appurtenances,
and was thereof possessed; and the said Rich
ard being so possessed thereof, the said William afterwards, that is to say, on
the said first day of October in the said twenty-ninth year, with force and
arms, that is to say, with swords, staves, and knives, entered into the said
tenement, with the appurtenances,
which the said John Rogers demised to the
said Richard in form aforesaid for the term aforesaid, which is not yet ex
pired, and ejected the said Richard out of his said farm, and other wrongs to
him did, to the great damage of the said Richard, and against the peace of the
Berks,
to wit.
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the king; whereby the said Richard saith, that he Is injured and
1
And thereupon he brings suit, &C.
alue of twenty
to the value
pounds.
Pledges of
Martin, for the plaintiff ,
)
(John Doe.
Pktkrs, for the defendant.
prosecution, J Richard Rob.
J

mid lord

Wo. n.

damaged

Mr. George

Saunders :
informed that you are in possession of, or claim title to, the premises
mentioned in this declaration of ejectment, or to some part thereof; and I,
being sued in this action as a casual ejector, and having no claim or title
to the same, do advise you to appear next Hilary Term, in his majesty's court
of king's bench at Westminster, by some attorney of that court, and then and
there, by a rule to be made of the same court, to cause yourself to be made
defendant in my stead; otherwise I shall suffer judgment to be entered against
me, and you will be turned out of possession.
Tour loving friend,
William Stiles.
5th January, 1756.

I am

♦Sect.

Hilary

Term,

in

8.

The Rule op Court.

the twenty-ninth

["ix]

Tear of King Oeorge (he Second.

It

is ordered by the court, by the assent of both parties, and their Smith against
Stiles, for one
to wit. ) attorneys, that George Saunders, gentleman, may be made defendant,
in the place of the now defendant, William Stiles, and shall immediately ap- the^appurte?
pear to the plaintiff's action, and shall receive a declaration in a plea of tres- nances in Sutpass and ejectment of the tenements in question, and shall immediately plead ton, on the dothereto not guilty : and, upon the trial of the issue, shall confess lease, entry, "^^2;
'
and ouster, and insist upon his title only. And if upon the trial of the issue,
ouster,
lease,
not
confess
and
and
reason
the said George do
thereof
entry,
by
the plaintiff cannot prosecute his writ, then the taxation of costs upon such
cease,
said
shall
such
costs
to
the
shall
and
the
pay
plaintiff,
George
nonpros,
as by the court of our lord the king here shall be taxed and adjudged, for such
his default in non-performance of this rule; and judgment shall be entered
against the said William Stiles, now the casual ejector, by default. And it is
further ordered, that if, upon the trial of the said issue, a verdict shall be
given for the defendant, or if the plaintiff shall not prosecute his writ upon
any other cause than for the not confessing lease, entry, and ouster, as afore
said, then the lessor of the plaintiff shall pay costs, if the plaintiff does not pay
them.
By the Court.
Martin, for the plaintiff.
Newman, for the defendant.
Berte, )

Sect. 4.

The Record.

Pleas before the lord the king at Westminster, of the Term of Saint Hilary, in
the twenty-ninth year of the reign of the lord George the Second, by the
grace of God, of Great Britain, France and Ireland king, defender of the
faith, &c.
Berki, ) George Saunders, late of Sutton, in the county aforesaid, gentleto wit. ) man, was attached to answer Richard Smith, of a plea, wherefor with
in Sut
force and arms he entered into one messuage, with the appurtenances,
ton, which John Rogers, Esq. , hath demised to the said Richard, for a term
which is not yet expired, and ejected him from his said farm, and other wrongs
to him did, to the great damage of the said Richard, and against the peace of
the lord the king that *now is. And whereupon the said Richard, by Robert
r«x]
Martin, his attorney, complains, that whereas, the said John Rogers, on the Declaration, or
first day of October in the twenty-ninth year of the reign of lie lord the count,
king that now is, at Sutton aforesaid, had demised to the said Richard the
to have and to hold the said tene
tenement aforesaid, with the appurtenances,
to the said Richard and his assigns, from the
ment, with the appurtenances,
feast of Saint Michael the Archangel then last past, to the end and term of
five years from thence next following, and fully to be complete and ended; by
virtue of which demise the said Richard entered into the said tenement, with
the appurtenances,
and was thereof possessed : and the said Richard being so
possessed thereof, the said George afterwards, that is to say, on the first day
of October in the said twenty-ninth year, with force and arms, that is to say,
with swords, staves, and knives, entered into the said tenement, with the
appurtenances, which the said John Rogers demised to the said Richard, in
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form aforesaid, for the term aforesaid, which is not yet expired, and ejected
the said Richard out of his said farm, and other wrongs to him did, to the
great damage of the aaid Richard, and against the peace of the said lord the
king; whereby the said Richard saith that he is injured and endamaged
to the value of twenty pounds : and thereupon he brings suit [and good
And the aforesaid George Saunders, by Charles Newman, his
proof.]
Defence.
Flea, not
attorney, comes and defends the force and injury, when [and where it shall
autlty.
behove him] ; and saith that he is in no wise guilty of the trespass and eject
ment aforesaid,
as the Richard above complains against him; and thereof
he puts himself upon the country; and the said Richard doth likewise the
same; Therefore let a jury come thereupon before the lord the king, on the
Venire
awarded.
octave of the purification of the blessed Virgin Mary, wheresoever he shall then
be in England, who neither [are of kin to the said Richard, nor to the said
George], to recognize [whether the said George be guilty of the trespass and
ejectment aforesaid] ; because as well [the said George as the said Richard, be
Respite for de tween whom
the difference is, have put themselves on the said jury].
The
fault of Jurors.
same day is there given to the parties aforesaid.
Afterward! the process there
in, being continued between the said parties of the plea aforesaid by the jury, it
Xitt print.
put between them in respite, before the lord the king shall then be in England;
until the day of Easter in fifteen days, wheresoever the said lord the king shall
then be in England; unless the justices of the lord the king, assigned to take
assizes in the county aforesaid, shall have come before that time, to wit, on
Monday the eighth of March, at Reading, in the said county, by the form of
the statute [in that case provided], by reason of the default of the jurors [sum
At which day, before the lord the king, at
moned to appear as aforesaid].
Westminster, come the parties aforesaid by their attorneys aforesaid; and the
aforesaid justices of 'assize, before whom [tlnj jury aforesaid came] sent here
[*zi]
jwro.
their record before them, had in these words, to wit: Afleneardt, at the day
and place within contained, before Heneage Legger, esquire, one of the barons
of the exchequer of the lord the king, and Sir John Eardly Wilmot, knight,
one of the justices of the said lord the king, assigned to hold pleas before the
king himself, justices of the said lord the king, assigned to take assizes at the
county of Berks by the form of the statute [in that case provided], come as
well the within-named Richard Smith, as the within-written George Saunders,
by their attorneys within contained; and the jurors of the jury whereof men
tion is within made being called, certain of them, to wit, Charles Holloway.
John Hooke, Peter Graham, Henry Cox, William Brown, and Francis Oakley,
come, and are sworn upon the jury; and because the rest of the jurors of the
others of the bystanders being chosen by
same jury did not appear, therefore
firTale* At
the sheriff, at the request of the said Richard Smith, and by the command of the
eu/'iitanttOu*.
justices aforesaid, are appointed anew, whose names are affixed to the panel
within written, according to the form of the statute in such case made and pro
vided; which said jurors so appointed anew, to wit, Roger Bacon, Thomas
Small, Charles Pye, Edward Hawkins, Samuel Roberts, and Daniel Parker,
being likewise called, come; and together with the other jurors aforesaid be
fore impanelled and sworn, being elected, tried, and sworn to speak the truth
of the matter within contained, upon their oath say, that the aforesaid George
verdict for the Saunders is guilty of the trespass and ejectment within-written, in manner and
form as the aforesaid Richard Smith within complains against him; and assess
the damages of the said Richard Smith, on occasion of that trespass and eject
ment, besides his costs and charges which he hath been put unto about his suit
in that behalf, to twelve-pence; and, for those costs and charges, to forty ahilWhereupon, the said Richard Smith, by his attorney aforesaid, prayeth
ings.
judgment against the said George Saunders, in and upon the verdict aforesaid,
by the jurors aforesaid given, in the form aforesaid; and the said George Saun
ders, by his attorney aforesaid, saith that the court here ought not to proceed to
give judgment upon the said verdict, and prayeth that judgment against him,
the said George Saunders, in and upon the verdict aforesaid, by the jurors afore
its ar
rest of Judg
said, given in the form aforesaid, may be stayed, by reason that the said verdict
ment,
is insufficient and erroneous, and that the same verdict may be quashed, and
that the issue aforesaid may be tried anew by other jurors, to be afresh im
And, because the court of the lord the king here is not yet advised
panelled.
Continuance.
of giving theii judgment of and upon the premises, therefore day thereof is
given as well to the said Richard Smith as the said George Saunders, before the
lord the king, until the morrow of the ascension of our Lord, wheresoever the
gaid lord *the king shall then be in England, to hear their judgment of and upon
[*xii]
the premises, for that the court of the lord the king is not yet advised thereof.
At which day, before the lord the king, at Westminster, come the parties afore
said, by their attorneys aforesaid ; upon which, the record and matters aforesaid
having been seen, and by the court of the lord the king now here fully i
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and all and singular the premises having been examined, and mature deliberation being bad thereupon, for that it seems to the court of the lord the
king now here that the verdict aforesaid is in no wise insufficient or erroneous,
and that the same ought not to be quashed, and that no new trial ought to be bad
of the issue aforesaid. — Therefore it i» eontidered, that the said Richard do recover against the said George his term vet to come, of and in the said tenements,
with the appurtenances, and the said damages assessed by the said jury in form
aforesaid, and also twenty-seven pounds six shillings and eight-pence for his
costs and charges aforesaid, by the court of the lord the king here awarded to
the said Richard, with his assent, by way of increase; which said damages in
the whole amount to twenty-nine pounds, seven shillings and eight-pence.
"And let the said George be taken [until he maketh fine to the lord the
king]."t And hereupon the said Richard, by his attorney aforesaid, prayeth a
writ of the lord the king, to be directed to the sheriff of the county aforesaid,
to cause him to have possession of his term aforesaid vet to come, of and in
the tenements aforesaid, with the appurtenances; and It is granted unto him,
returnable before the lord the king on the morrow of the Holy Trinity, where
At which day, before the lord the king,
soever he shall then be in England
at Westminster, cometh the said Richard, by his attorney aforesaid; and the
sheriff, that is to say, Sir Thomas Reeve, knight, now sendeth that he, by vir
tue of the writ aforesaid, to him directed, on the ninth day of June last past,
did cause the said Kichard to have his possession of his term aforesaid yet to
come, of and in the tenements aforesaid, with the appurtenances, as he was

We. m,

stood,

Opinion of
court,

judgment for
the plaintiff,
i

Capiatur
/>»•.

pr*

Writ of posse*
aton.

and return,

commanded.

•No.

IIL

['xllij

PROCEEDINGS ON AN ACTION OP DEBT IN THE COURT OP
COMMON PLEAS; REMOVED INTO THE KING'S BENCH BY
WRIT OP ERROR.
Sect.

Original

1.

George the Second, by the Grace of God, of Great Britain, France, and Pracip*.
Ireland king, defender of the faith, and so forth: to the sheriff of Oxfordshire,
Command Charles Long, late of Burford, gentleman,
that justly
greeting.
and without delay he render to William Burton two hundred pounds, which
he owes him and unjustly detains, as he saith.
And unless he shall do so, and
if the said William shall make you secure of prosecuting his claim, then sum
mon by good summoners the aforesaid Charles, that he oe before our justices
at Westminster, on the octave of Saint Hilary to show wherefore he hath not
And have you there then the summoners and this writ.
done it
Wiineu
ourself, at Westminster, the twenty-fourth day of December, in the twentyeighth year of our reign.

l^Zn I J°h»

Dor.

\ RxCHARD

BU»m,°£e™.^he

SEEKS

ROB.

Sect. 2.

I R°««*
\

Morris.

H»« JoHSSO*.

sh^mr.
re„m.

Process,

George the Second, by the grace of God, of Great Britain, Prance and Ireland king, defender of the faith, and so forth; to the sheriff of Oxfordshire,
Put by gage and safe pledges Charles Long, late of Burford, gentle
greeting.
man, that he be before our justices at Westminster, on the octave of the Puri
fication of the blessed Mary, to answer to William Burton of a plea, that he
render to him two hundred pounds, which he owes him and unjustly detains,
as he saith ; and to show wherefore he was not before our justices at West
minster on the octave of Saint Hilary, as he was summoned.
And have there
Witnett, Sir John Willes, knight,
then the names of the pledges and this writ.
at Westminster, the twenty-third day of January, in the twenty-eighth year
of our reign.
The within-named Charles Long ) Edward Leigh.
is attached by pledges,
\ Robert Tanker.

Attachment,

Pon*./

sheriff's
return.

•George the Second, by the grace of God, of Great Britain, France, and Diitringa*,
Ireland king, defender of the faith, and so forth; to the sheriff of Oxfordshire,
[*xivj
We command you that you distrein Charles Long, late of Burford,
greeting.
t Now omitted.

See pmre 80S.
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no. m.

Sheriff's
return.

Nihil.

Capias ad re
spondendum.

Sheriff's re
turn.
Non est
inventus.
Testatum ca-

[»XT]

Sheriffs re
turn. Cepi
corpus.

.! gentleman, by all his lands and chattels within your bailiwick, so that i
ne nor any one through him may lay hands on the same, until you shall re
ceive from us another command thereupon; and that you answer to us of the
issue of the same; and that you have his body before our justices at West
minster, from the day of Easter, in fifteen days, to answer to William Burton
of a plea, that he render to him two hundred pounds, which he owes him and
unjustly detains, as he saith, and to hear his judgment of his many defaults.
Witness. Sir John Willes, knight, at Westminster, the twelfth day of February,
in the twenty-eighth year of our reign.

The within-named Charles Long hath nothing in my bailiwick,
may be distreined.

whereby he

George the Second, by the grace of God, of Great Britain, France, and In
land king, defender of tie faith, and so forth; to the sheriff of Oxfordshire,
We command you, that you take Charles Long, late of Burford,
greeting.
gentleman, if he may be found in your bailiwick, and him safely keep, so that
you may have his body before ourjustices at Westminster from the day of
Easter in five weeks, to answer to William Burton, gentleman, of a plea, that
he render to him two hundred pounds, which he owes him and unjustly de
tains, as he saith ; and whereupon you have returned to our justices at West
minster, that the said Charles hath nothing in your bailiwick, whereby he
Witness, Sir John
And have you there then this writ
may be distreined.
Willes, knight, at Westminster, the sixteenth day of April, in the twentyeighth year of our reign.
The within named Charles Long is not found in my bailiwick.

George the Second, by the grace of God, of Great Britain, France, and Ire
land king, defender of the faith, and so forth ; to the sheriff of Berkshire
We command you, that you take Charles Long, late of Burford,
greeting.
gentleman, if he may be found in your bailiwick, and him safely keep, so that
you may have his body before our justices at Westminster, on the morrow of
the Holy Trinity, to answer to William Burton, gentleman, of a plea, that he
render to him two hundred pounds, which he owes him and unjustly detains,
as he saith; and whereupon our sheriff of Oxfordshire hath made a return to
our justices of Westminster, at a certain day now past, that the 'aforesaid
Charles is not found in his bailiwick; and thereupon it is testified in our said
court, that the *aforesaid Charles lurks, wanders, and runs about in your
county. And have you there then this writ. Witness, Sir John Willes, knight,
at Westminster, the seventh day of May, in the twenty -eighth year of our
reign.
to me directed, I have taken the body of the within
Charles Long; which I have ready at the day and place within con
according as oy this writ it is commanded me.

By virtue of this writ
named
tained,

Or, upon the Return of non est inventus upon the first capias, the plaintiff
may sue out an alias and a pluries, and thence proceed to outlawry : thus :

jiliat

capias.

8heri(T« re
turn. Non est
inventus.

Piuriss capias.

George the Second, by the grace of God, of Great Britain, France, and Ire
land king, defender of the faith, and so forth; to the sheriff of Oxfordshire
We command you, as formerly we commanded
you, that you take
greeting.
Charles Long, late of Burford, gentleman, if he may be found in your baili
wick, and him safely keep, so that you may have his body before our justices
at Westminster, on the morrow of the Holy Trinity, to answer to William
Burton, gentleman, of a plea, that he render to him two hundred pounds,
And have you then
which he owes him and unjustly detains, as he saith.
Witness, Sir John Willes, knight, at Westminster, the seventh
there this writ.
day of May, in the twenty -eighth year of our reign.
The within named Charles Long is not found in my bailiwick.

George the Second, by the grace of God, of Great Britain, France, and
Ireland king, defender of the faith, and so forth; to the sheriff of Oxfordshire
We command you, as we have more than once commanded you,
greeting.
that you take Charles Long, late of Burford, gentleman, if he may be found in
your bailiwick, and him safely keep, so that you may have his body before
our justices at Westminster, from the day of the Holy Trinity in three weeks,
to answer to William Burton, gentleman, of a plea, that he render to him two
268
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And
hundred pounds, which he owes him and unjustly detains, as he saith.
have you there then this writ.
Witness, Sir John Willes, knight, at "Westminster, the thirtieth day of May, in the twenty-eighth year of our reign.
The within named Charles Long is not found in my bailiwick.
•George the Second, by the grace of God, of Great Britain, France, and
Ireland king, defender of the faith, and so forth; to the sheriff of Oxfordshire,
We command you, that yo« cause Charles Long, late of Burford,
greeting.
gentleman, to be required from county court to county court, until, according
to the law and custom of our realm of England, he be outlawed, if he doth
not appear: and if he doth appear, then take him and cause him to be safely
kept, so that you may have his body before our justices at Westminster, on
the morrow of All Souls, to answer to William Burton, gentleman, of a plea,
that he render to him two hundred pounds, which he owes him and unjustly
detains, as he saith; and whereupon you have returned to our justices at
Westminster, from the day of the Holy Trinity in three weeks, that he is not
found in your bailiwick.
And have you then there this writ.
Witness, Sir
John Willes, knight, at Westminster, the eighteenth day of June, in the
twenty-eighth year of our reign.
By virtue of this writ to me directed, at my county court held at Oxford, in
the county of Oxford, on Thursday, the twenty-first day of June, in the twentyninth year of the reign of the lord the king within written, the within named
Charles Long was required the first time, and did not appear: and at my county
court held at Oxford aforesaid, on Thursday, the twenty-fourth day of June,
in the year aforesaid, the said Charles Long was required the second time, and
did not appear: and at my county court held at Oxford, aforesaid, on Thursday, the twenty-first day of August, in the year aforesaid, the said Charles
Long was required the third time, and did not appear: and at my county court
held at Oxford, aforesaid, on Thursday, the eighteenth day of September, Ln
the year aforesaid, the said Charles Long was required the fourth time, and
did not appear: and at my county court held at Oxford, aforesaid, on Thursday, the sixteenth day of October, in the year aforesaid, the said Charles Long
was required the fifth time, and did not appear; therefore the said Charles
Long, by the judgment of the coroners of the said lord the king, of the county
aforesaid, according to the law and custom of the kingdom of England, is out

We. in.

turn^.Yon
inventus.

est

[*xvi]
Ezigi facta*.

~~ Sheriff's ra

tut
mo exoctu*Secundo exactus. Tertio
e*octu*Tertio exactus.
Quarto cxactus.
Quinto e»
actus.

jfc0 utlagatus.

lawed.

George the Second, by the grace of God, of Great Britain, France, and
Ireland king, defender of the faith, and so forth; to the sheriff of Oxfordshire,
Whereas, by our writ we have lately commanded you that you should
greeting.
cause Charles Long, late of Burford, gentleman, to be required from county
court to county court, until, according to *the law and custom of our realm of
England, he should be outlawed, if he did not appear: and if he did appear,
then that you should take him and cause him to be safely kept, so that you
might have his body before our justices at Westminster, on the morrow of all
Souls, to answer to William Burton, gentleman, of a plea, that he render to
him two hundred pounds, which he owes him and unjustly detains, as he
saith: Therefore we command you, by virtue of the statute in the thirty-first
year of the lady Elizabeth, late queen of England, made and provided, that
you cause the said Charles Long to be proclaimed upon three several days
according to the form of that statute; (whereof one proclamation shall be
made at or near the most usual door of the church of the parish wherein he
inhabits) that he render himself unto you; so that you may have his body be
fore our justices at Westminster at the day aforesaid, to answer the said
And have you there then this writ.
William Burton of the plea aforesaid.
Witness, Sir John Willes, knight, at Westminster, the eighteenth day of June,
in the twenty-eighth year of our reign.
By virtue of this writ to me directed, at my county court held at Oxford, in
the county of Oxford, on Thursday the twenty-sixth day of June, in the twentyninth year of the reign of the lord and king within written, I caused to be
proclaimed the first time; and at the general quarter sessions of the peace,
held at Oxford aforesaid, on Tuesday, the fifteenth day of July, in the year
aforesaid,
caused to be proclaimed the second time; and at the most usual
door of the church of Burford within written, on Sunday the third day of
August in the year aforesaid, immediately after divine service, one month at
the least before the within named Charles Long was required the fifth time, I
caused to be proclaimed the third time, that the said Charles Long should ren
der himself unto me, as within it is commanded me.

I
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Sheriff's re
turn. Ctpt
Corpus.

George the Second, by the grace of God, of Great Britain, Prance, and
Ireland king;, defender of the faith, and bo forth; to the sheriff of Berkshire,
We command you, that you omit not by reason of any liberty of
greeting.
your county, but that you take Charles Long, late of Burford in the county of
Oxford, gentleman, (being outlawed in the said county of Oxford, on Thurs
day the sixteenth day of October last past, at the suit of William Burton, gen
tleman, of oplea of debt, as the sheriff of Oxforshire aforesaid returned to our
justices at Westminster on the morrow of All Souls then next ensuing,) if the
said Charles Long may be found in your bailiwick;
and him safely keep, so
that you may *have his body before our justice at Westminster from the day
of St. Martin in fifteen days to do and receive what our court shall consider
WUne**, Sir John Willes, knight, at Westmin
concerning him in this behalf.
ster, the sixth day of November, in the twenty-ninth year of our reign.
to me directed, I have taken the body of the within
Charles Long; which
have ready at the day and place within con
according as by this writ it is commanded me.

By virtue of this writ
named
tained,

Sect. 8.

Bin at Middle•ex for treapam.

Acetiam

Sheriff's re
turn. Non est
inventus.

Ae ttiam.

f_*xix]

Sheriff's reC^pi corpus,

I

fBiLL op Middlesex, and Latitat thetieupon
Kino's Bench.

in the Court of

Middlesex, ) The Sheriff is commanded that he take Charles Long, late of
to wit.
f Burford, in the county of Oxford, if he may be found in his bailiwick, and him safely keep, so that he may have his body before the lord and
king at Westminster, on Wednesday next after fifteen days of Easter, to answer William Burton, gentleman, of a plea of trespass [and also to a bill of the
said William against the aforesaid Charles, for two hundred pounds of debt,
according to the custom of the court of the said lord and king, before the king
himself to be exhibited] ; and that he have there then this precept.

The within named Charles Long is not found in my bailiwick.

George the Second, by the grace of God, of Great Britain, France and Ire
land king, defender of the faith, and so forth; to the sheriff of Berkshire greet
ing.
Wht reus we lately commanded
our sheriff of Middlesex that he should
take Charles Long, late of Burford, in the county of Oxford, if he might be
found in his bailiwick, and him safely keep, so that he might be before us at
Westminster, at a certain day now past, to answer unto William Burton, gentleman, of a plea of trespass [and alto to a bill of the said William against the
aforesaid Charles, for two hundred pounds of debt, according to the custom of
our court before us to be exhibited] ; and our said sheriff of Middlesex at that
day returned to us that the aforesaid Charles was not found in bis bailiwick;
whereupon on the behalf of the aforesaid William in our court before as it is
sufficiently attested that the aforesaid Charles lurks and runs about in your
county: Therefore we command you, that you take him, if he may be found
In *your bailiwick, and him safely keep, so that you may have his body before
us at Westminster, on Tuesday next after five weeks of Easter, to answer the
aforesaid William of the plea [and bill] aforesaid ; and have you there then this
Witness, Sir Dudley Ryder, knight, at Westminster, the eighteenth day of
writ
April, in the twenty-eighth year of our reign.

I

have taken the body of the withim
By virtue of this writ to me directed,
named Charles Long; which
have ready at the day and place within contained,
according as by this writ it is comman tied me.

I

Sect. 4.

George

Writ of

Quo Minus in the Exchequer.

by the grace of God, of Great Britain, France and Ire
land king, defender of the faith, and so forth; to the sheriff of Berkshire greet
We command you that you omit not by reason of any liberty of your
ing.
county, but that you enter the same, and take Charles Long, late of Burford,
in the county of Oxford, gentleman, wheresoever he shall be found in your
bailiwick, and him safely keep, so that you may have his body before the bar
ons of our exchequer st Westminster, on the morrow of the Holy Trinity, to
answer William Burton, our debtor of a plea, that he render to him two hundthe Second,

t Note, that section* S and 4 are the usual method of process, to compel an appearance
In the courts of king's bench and exchequer; in which the practice or those courts does
principally differ from the court of common pleas; the subsequent stages of proceedings
being nearly alike in them all.
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red pounds which he owes him and unjustly detains, whereby he
able to satisfy us the debts which he owes us at our said exchequer,
he can reasonably show that the same he ought to render: and hare
this writ.
Witneet, Sir Thomas Parker, knight, at Westminster, the
of May, in the twenty-eighth year of our reign.

467
is the less
as he said

m.

you there
sixth day

I

By virtue of this writ to me directed, have taken the body of the within Sheriffs re
mimed Charles Long; which
have ready before the barons within written, ac turn.
Cepi eorpue.
cording as within it is commanded me.

I

Sect.

5.

Special Bail, on the Arrest of the Defendant, pursuant to
thn Testatum Capias.

Know all Men by these presents, that we Charles Long, of Burford. in the Ban bond to
county of Oxford, gentleman, Peter Hamond of Bix, in the said county, yeo- the sheriff,
man, and Edward Thomlinson, of Woodstock, in the said county, innholder,
are held and firmly bound to Christopher Jones, esquire, sheriff of the county
of Berks, in four hundred pounds of lawful money of Great Britain, to be paid
to the said sheriff, or his certain attorney, executors, administrators, or assigns
for which payment well and truly to be made, we bind ourselves and each of
us by himself "for the whole and in gross, our and every of our heirs, execu*xx]
tors and administrators, firmly by those presents, scaled with our seals. Dated
the fifteenth day of May, in the twenty -eighth year of the reign of our sover
eign lord George the Second, by the grace of God, king of Great Britain,
France and Ireland, defender of the faith, and so forth, and in the year of our
Lord one thousand seven hundred and fifty -five.
The condition of this obligation is such, that if the above bounden Charles Becognbanoa.
Long do appear before the justices of our sovereign lord the king, at Westmin
ster, on the morrow of the Holy Trinity, to answer William Burton, gentle*
man, of a plea of debt of two hundred pounds, then this obligation shall be
void and of none effect, or else shall be and remain in full force and virtue.
Sealed and delivered, being first
Charles Lono.
[l. 8.1
Peter Hamond. [l. b.1
duly stamped, in the presence
Edward Thomlinson. [l- •-]
of
Henry Shaw.

Tuiotut Griffith.

You Charles Long do acknowledge to owe unto the plaintiff four hundred
pounds, and you John Rose and Peter Hamond do severally acknowledge to
owe unto the same person the sum of two hundred pounds a piece, to be levied
upon your several goods and chattels, lands and tenements, upon condition of ban before
that, if the defendant be condemned in the action, he shall pay the condemna- the committion, or render himself a prisoner in the Fleet for the same; and, if he fail so •lonBrto do, you John Rose and Peter Hamond do undertake to do it for him.
Trinity Term, 28 Geo.

II.

On a Testatum Capiat from Oxfordshire against Charles Long, late bail pleoe.
returnable on the
) of Burford, in the county of Oxford, gentleman,
morrow of the Holy Trinity, at the suit of William Burton, of a plea of debt

Berk*,
to vit.

)

of two hundred pounds:

The baU are John Rose, of Witney, In the county of Oxford, esquire, Peter
Hamond, of Bix, in the said county, yeoman.

Richard Price,

attorney

for the defendant.

)
)

The party himself in 400J.
Each of the bail in 2002.
Taken and acknowledged the twenty-eighth
day of May, in the year of our Lord one
thousand seven hundred and fifty-five, de
bene time, before

me,

Robert Grove,

one of the Coran/^ionen
S71
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[*xxl]
Writ of error.

Chief justice'!
The Record,

• Sect. 6.

The Record, as Remotes by

Writ of

'.

The lord the king hath given in charge to his trusty and beloved Sir John
Willes, knight, his writ closed in these words: — GEORGE the Second, by the
of God, of Great Britain, France and Ireland king, defender of the
Sace
ith, and so forth; to our trusty and beloved Sir John Wules, knight, greet
Because in the record and process, and also in the giving of judgment of
ing.
the plaint, which was in our court before you and your fellows, our Justices
of the bench by our writ, between William Burton, gentleman, and Charles
Long, late of Burford, in the county of Oxford, gentleman, of a certain debt
of two hundred pounds, which the said William demands of the said Charles,
manifest error hath intervened, to the great damage of him, the said William,
as we from his complaint are informed; we being willing that the error, if any
there be, should be corrected in due manner, and that full and speedy justice
should be done to the parties aforesaid in this behalf, do command you, that if
judgment thereof be given, then under your seal you do distinctly and openly
send the record and process of the plaint aforesaid, with all things concerning
them and this writ; so that we may have them from the day of Easter in fif
teen days, wheresoever we shall then be in England; that the record and pro
we may cause to be done thereupon for cor
cess aforesaid being inspected,
recting that error, what of right and according to the law and custom of our
Witness ourself at Westminster, the
realm of England ought to be done.
twelfth day of February, in the twenty-ninth year of our reign.
The record and process whereof in the said writ mention above
follow in these words, to wit:

is made.

at Westminster before Sir John Willes, knight, and his brethren, jus
tices of the bench of the lord the king at Westminster, of the term of the
Holy Trinity, in the twenty-eighth year of the reign of the lord George the
Second, by the grace of God, of Great Britain, France and Ireland king,
defender of the faith, &c.

Pleas

) Charles Long, late of Burford, in the county aforesaid, gentleman,
J was summoned to answer William Burton, of Tarnton, in the said
county, gentleman, of a plea that he render unto him two hundred pounds,
Declaration, or which he owes him and unjustly detains [as he saith].
And whereupon the
count, on a
William, by Thomas Gough, his attorney, complains, that whereas, on
our
Lord *one thousand seven hunin the year of
the first day of December,
"fxxiil
dred fifty-four, at Banbury, in this county, the said Charles by his writing
be
bound
to the said William in the
himself
to
obligatory did acknowledge
said sum of two hundred pounds of lawful money of Great Britain, to be paid
whenever after the said Charles should be thereto
to the said William,
required; nevertheless the said Charles (although of ten required) hath not paid
to the said William the said sum of two hundred pounds, nor any part thereof,
but hitherto altogether hath refused, and doth still refuse, to render the same;
wherefore he saith that, he is injured, and hath damage to the value of ten
Proftrt in
curio.
pounds: and thereupon he brings suit [and good proof]. And he brings here
into court the writing obligatory aforesaid; which testifies the debt aforesaid
in form aforesaid; the date whereof is the day and year before mentioned.
And the aforesaid Charles, by Richard Price, his attorney, comes and defends
the force and injury when [and where it shall behoove him], and craves oyer
of the said writing obligatory, and it is read unto him [in the form aforesaid] :
Oyer prayed of he likewise craves oyer of the condition of the said writing, and it is read unto
bond and con- jjim jn these words: "The condition of this obligation is such, that if the
and administrators, and
»bove bounden Charles Long, his heirs, executors
pirfo^n^an*0
award.
every of them, shall and do from time to time, and at all times hereafter, well
and truly stand to, obey, observe, fulfil and keep, the award, arbitrament,
order, rule, judgment, final end, and determination, of David Stiles of Wood
stock, in the said county, clerk, and Henry Bacon, of Woodstock aforesaid,
gentleman, (arbitrators indifferently nominated and chosen by and between
William Burton, to arbitrate,
the said Charles Long and the above-named
award, order, rule, judge and determine of all and all manner of actions,
cause or causes of action, suits, plaints, debts, duties, reckonings, accounts,
controversies, trespasses and demands whatsoever had, moved or depending,
or which might have been had, moved or depending, by_ and between the said
parties, for any matter, cause or thing, from the beginning of the world until
the day of the date hereof), which the said arbitrators shall make and publish,
of or in the premises, in writing under their hands and seals, or otherwise by
word of mouth, in the presence of two credible witnesses, on or before the
272
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first day of January next ensuing the date hereof; then this obligation to be
void and of none effect, or else to be and remain in full force and virtue."
Which being read and heard, the said Charles prays leave to imparl therein
here until the octave of the Holy Trinity; and it is granted unto him. The
same day is given to the said William Burton, here, &c.
At which day, to
]wit, on the octave of the Holy Trinity, here comes as well the said William
Burton as the said Charles Long, by their attorneys aforesaid: and hereupon
the said William "prays that the saia Charles may answer to his writ and count
aforesaid.
And the said Charles defends the force and injury, when, &a, and
saith, that the said William ought not to have or maintain his said action
against him; because he saith, that the said David Stiles and Henry Bacon, the
arbitrators before named in the said condition, did not make any such award,
. arbitrament, order, rule, judgment, final end or determination, of or in the
premises above specified in the said condition, on or before the first day of
January, in the condition aforesaid above mentioned, according to the form
and effect of the said condition: and this he is ready to verify. Wherefore he
prays Judgment, whether the said William ought to have or maintain his said
action thereof against him [and that he may go thereof without a day]. And
the aforesaid William saith, that for any thing above alleged by the said Charles
in pleadings he ought not to be precluded from having his said action thereof
against him ; because he saith, that after the making of the said writing obliga
tory, and before the said first day of January, to wit, on the twenty-sixth day
of December, in the year aforesaid, at Banbury aforesaid, in the presence of
two credible witnesses, namely, John Dew of Chalbury, in the county aforesaid,
and Richard Morris, of Wyndham, in the county of Berks, the said arbitrators
undertook the charge of the award, arbitrament, order, rule. Judgment, final
end and determination aforesaid, of and in the premises specified
in the con
dition aforesaid; and then and there made and published their award by word
of mouth in manner and form following, that is to say, the said arbitrators
did award, order and adjudge, that he the said Charles Long should forthwith
pay to the said William Burton the sum of seventy-five pounds, and that
thereupon all differences between them at the time of the making the said
And the said William
writing obligatory should finally cease and determine.
further saith that although he afterwards, to wit, on the sixth day of January,
in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and fifty-five, at Banbury
aforesaid, requested him the said Charles to pay to him the said William the
said seventy-five pounds, vet (by protestation that the said Charles hath not
stood to, obeyed, observed, fulfilled or kept any part of the said award, which
by him, the said Charles, ought to have been stood to, obeyed, observed, ful
filled and kept) for further plea therein he saith, that the said Charles the said
seventy-five pounds to the said William hath not hitherto paid; and this he is
Wherefore he prays judgment, and his debt aforesaid, toready to verify.
by the detention of the said debt, to be
gether with his damages occasioned
adjudged unto him, &c. And the aforesaid Charles saith that the plea aforesaid, by him the said William in manner and form aforesaid above in his
replication pleaded, and the matter in the same contained, are in no wise
sufficient in *law for the said William to have or maintain his action aforesaid
thereupon against him the said Charles; to which the said Charles hath no
neither is he obliged by the law of the land, in any manner to
necessity,
answer; and this he is ready to verify. Wherefore, for want 01 a sufficient
replication in this behalf, the said Charles, as aforesaid, prays judgment, and
that the said William maybe precluded from having his action aforesaid there
upon against him, &c. And the said Charles, according to the form of the
statute in that case made and provided, shows to the court here the cause of
demurrer following: to wit, that it doth not appear, by the replication aforesaid
that the said arbitrators made the same award in the presence of two credible
witnesses on or before the said first day of January, as they ought to have
done, according to the form and effect of the condition aforesaid ; and that the
replication aforesaid is uncertain, insufficient and wants form. And the aforesaid William saith, that the plea aforesaid by him the said William in manner
and form aforesaid above in his replication pleaded, and the matter in the
same contained, are good and sufficient in law for the said William to have and
maintain the said action of him the said William thereupon against the said
Charles; which said plea and the matter therein contained, the said William
is ready to verify and prove as the court shall award; and because the afore
said Charles hath not answered to that plea, nor hath he hitherto in any manner
denied the same, the said William as before prays judgment, and his debt
aforesaid, together with his damages occasioned by the detention of that debt,
to be adjudged unto him, &c. And because the justices here will advise them■elves of and upon the premises before they give judgment thereupon, a day is
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here, until the morrow of All 8crals,
.' thereupon given to the parties aforesaid
to hear their judgment thereupon, for that the said Justices are not vet advised
At which day here come as well the said Charles as the said William,
thereof.
by their said attorneys; and because the said justices here will farther advise
themselves of and upon the premises before they give judgment thereupon,
a
day is farther given to the parties aforesaid here until the octave of St. Hilary,
to hear their judgment thereupon, for that the said justices here are not yet
At which day here come as well the said William Burton as
advised' thereof.
Opinion of the the said Charles Long, by their said attorneys.
Wherefore, the record and
court.
matters aforesaid having been seen, and by the justices here fully understood,
and all and singular the premises being examined, and mature deliberation
being had thereupon; for that it seems to the said justices here, that the said
Replication
Insufficient.
plea of the said William Burton before in his replication pleaded, and the mat
ter therein contained, are not sufficient in law, to have and maintain the action
of the aforesaid William against the aforesaid Charles; therefore it is considered
that the aforesaid William "take nothing by his writ aforesaid, but that he and
Judgment for his pledges of prosecuting, to wit, John Doe and Richard Roe, be in mercy for
the defendant. his false complaint; and that the aforesaid Charles go thereof without a day
Querent ni~
And it is farther considered, that the aforesaid Charles do recover against
&C.
la I capiat
the aforesaid William eleven pounds and seven shillings, for his costs and
per breve.
charges by him about his defense in this behalf sustained, adjudged by the
court here to the said Charles with his consent, according to the form of the
statute in that case made and provided: and that the aforesaid Charles may
have execution thereof, &c.
Aftencards to wit, on Wednesday next after fifteen days of Easter In this
General error 3
same term before the lord the king, at Westminster, comes the aforesaid Willian? Burton, by Peter Manwaring his attorney, and saith, that in the record
and process aforesaid, and also in the giving of the judgment in the plaint
aforesaid, it is manifestly erred in this: to wit, that the judgment aforesaid
was given in form aforesaid for the said Charles Long against the aforesaid
William Burton, where by the law of the land judgment should have been
given for the said William Burton against the said Charles Long; and this he
And the said William prays the writ of the said lord the
is ready to verify.
Writ of
Scire
king, to warn the said Charles Long to be before the said lord the king, to
" facial
to
hear the record and process aforesaid; and it is granted unto him; by which
the sheriff aforesaid is commanded that by good [and lawful man of his baili
wick] he cause the aforesaid Charles Long to know, that he be before the lord
the king from the day of Easter in five weeks, wheresoever
[he shall then be in
England] to hear the record and process aforesaid, if [it shall have happened
that in the same any error shall have intervened] ; and farther [to do and re
Sheriff's re
turn; Scire
The
ceive what the court of the lord the king shall consider in his behalf.]
feci.
At which day before the
same day is given to the aforesaid William Burton.
lord the king, at Westminster, comes the aforesaid William Burton, by his at
torney aforesaid; and the sheriff returns, that by virtue of the writ aforesaid to
him directed, he had caused the said Charles Long to know, that he be before
the lord the king at the time aforesaid in the said writ contained, by John Den
and Richard Fen, goed, &c, as by the same writ was commanded him; which
said Charles Long according to the warning given him in this behalf, here
Whereupon the said William saith,
Error assigned cometh by Thomas Webb, his attorney.
afresh.
that in the record and process aforesaid, and also in the giving of the judg
ment aforesaid, it is manifestly erred, alleging the error aforesaid by him m
the form aforesaid alleged, and prays that the judgment aforesaid for the error
aforesaid, and others, in the record and process aforesaid being, may be re
versed, annulled and entirely for nothing esteemed, and that the said Charles
"may rejoin to the errors aforesaid ; and that the court of the said lord the king
[•xxvl]
here may proceed to the examination as well of the record and process afore
said, as of the matter aforesaid above for error assigned.
And the said Charles
Rejoinder;
saith, that neither in the record and process aforesaid, nor in the giving of the
In nulto est
erratum.
aforesaid,
in any thing is there erred; and he prays in like manner
judgment
that the court of the said lordthe king here may proceed to the examina
tion as well of the record and process aforesaid, as of the matters aforesaid
above for error assigned.
Continuance.
And because the court of the lord the king here is
not yet advised what judgment to give of and upon the premises, a day is
therefore given to the parties aforesaid until the morrow of the Holy Trinity,
before the lord the king wheresoever he shall then be in England, to near their
judgment of and upon the premises, for that the court of the lord the king here
is not yet advised thereof.
At which day before the lord the king, at West
Opinion of
minster, come the parties aforesaid by the attorneys aforesaid.
Whereupon, as
the court.
well the record and process aforesaid, and the judgment thereupon given,
'
the matters aforesaid by the said William above for error i
no. m.
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>»nd by the court of the lord the king here being fully understood, and mature
j deliberation being thereupon had, for that it appears to the court of the lord
the king here, that in the record and process aforesaid, and also in the giving
of the Judgment aforesaid, it is manifestly erred, therefore it is cmsidered, that
the judgment aforesaid for the error aforesaid, and others, in the record and
process aforesaid, be reversed, annulled and entirely for nothing esteemed; and
that the aforesaid William recover against the aforesaid Charles his debt aforesaid, and also fifty pounds for his damages which he hath sustained, as well
on occasion of the detention of the said debt, as for his costs and charges unto
which he hath been put about this suit in this behalf, to the said William with
his consent by the court of the lord the king here adjudged. And the said

Wo- nr.

Judgment or
!§ea£?reveraed
judgment for
the plaintiff,
R0?"-.,
amerced,

Charles in mercy.

Sect. 7.

Process op Execution.

George the Second, by the grace of God, of Great Britain, France, and Writ of capiat
Ireland king, defender of the faith, and so forth; to the sheriff of Oxfordshire
a^t^faci*n'
We command you, that you take Charles Long, late of Burford,
greeting.
gentleman, if he may be found in your bailiwick, and him safely keep, so that
you may have his body before us in three weeks from the day of the Holy
Trinity, wheresoever we shall then be in England, to satisfy William Burton,
for two hundred pounds debt, which the said William Burton hath lately re
covered against him in our court before us, and also fifty pounds, which were
•adjudged in our said court before us, to the said William Burton for his dam[ xxviij
ages which he hath sustained as well by occasion of the detention of the said
debt, as for his costs and charges to which he hath been put about his suit in
this behalf, whereof
record; and have y<ju there then this writ.
Witness, Sir Thomas Denison,
fknight, at Westminster, the nineteenth day of June, in the twenty-ninth year
of our reign.
By virtue of this writ to me directed, I have taken the body of the within sheriff's re
named Charles Long; which I have ready before the lord the king at West- turn. Cept
corpus.
minster, at the day within written, as within it is commanded me.
Grorqe the Second, by the grace of God, of Great Britain, France and Ire- Writ of Fieri
land king, defender of the faith, and so forth; to the sheriff of Oxfordshire, facia*.
We command you that of the goods and chattels within your baili
greeting.
wick of Charles Long, late of Burford, gentleman, you cause to be made two
hundred pounds debt, which William Burton latoly in our court before us at
Westminster hath recovered against him, and also fifty pounds, which were
adjudged in our court before us to the said William, for his damages which
he hath sustained as well by occasion of the detention of his said debt, as for
his costs and charges to which he hath been put about his suit in this behalf,
whereof the said Charles Long is convicted, as it appears to us of record; and
have' that money before us in three weeks from the day of the Holy Trinity,
we shall then be in England, to render to the said William of his
wheresoever
Witness, Sir
debt and damages aforesaid; and nave there then this writ.
Thomas Denison. knight, at Westminster, the nineteenth day of June, in the
twenty-ninth year of our reign.
have caused to be made of the goods sheriff's reBy virtue of this writ to me directed,
and chattels of the within written Charles Long, two hundred and fifty *urn. Fieri
pounds; which I have ready before the lord the king at Westminster, at the
day within written, as it is within commanded me.

I

flae

senior puisne Justice; there being no chief Justice that term-

275

COMMENTAKIES
oa

THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
BOOK THE FOURTH.

OF PUBLIC WRONGS.
CHAPTER L

OF THE NATURE OF CRIMES AND THEIR
PUNISHMENT.
Wi

are now arrived at the fourth and last branch of these Commentaries,
For we may
crimes and misdemeanors.
remember that, in the beginning of the preceding book, (a) wrongs were
divided into two species: the one private and the other public Private
wrongs, which are frequently termed civil injuries, were the subject of that
entire book: we are now therefore, lastly, to proceed to the consideration of
publio wrongs, or crimes and misdemeanors; with the means of their prevenshall consider, in the
tion and punishment. In the pursuit of which subject
first place, the general nature of crimes and punishments; secondly, the per
sons capable of committing crimes; thirdly, their several degrees of guilt,
r
as principals, or accessories; ^fourthly, the several species of crimes,
with the punishment annexed to each by the laws of England; fifthly, * *
the means of preventing their perpetration ; and sixtnly, the method of
inflicting those punishments, which the law has annexed to each several
crime and misdemeanor.
First, as to the general nature of crimes and their punishment; the disoussion and admeasurement of which forms in every country the code of criminal
law; or, as it is more usually denominated with us in England, the dootrine of
the pleas of the crown; so called, because the king, in whom centers the
majesty of the whole community, is supposed by the law to be the person

which treats of public wrongs, or

I

it

(b)

injured by every infraction of the publio rights, belonging to that community,
and is therefore in all cases the proper prosecutor for every publio offence,
The knowledge of this branch of jurisprudence, which teaches the nature,
extent, and degrees of every crime, and adjusts to its adequate and necessary
For (as
of the utmost importance to every individual in the state.
penalty,
a very great master of the crown law (c) has observed upon
similar occasion)
no rank or elevation in life, no uprightness of heart, no prudence or circum
spection of conduct, should tempt man to conclude, that he may not at some
time or other be deeply interested in these researches.
The infirmities of the
best among us, the vices, and ungovernable passions of others, the instability
(a) Book

m,at

9) See book

I,

a

a

is

•

p. 268.

(c) Sir Michael Foster, pret to rep.
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Baron Montesquieu, marcus Beccaria,
Stat. Geo.
c. 22. 81Geo. II, c. 48.
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it)

of all human affairs, and the numberless unforeseen events, which the compass
of a day may bring forth, will teach us (upon a moment's reflection) that to
know with precision what the laws of our country have forbidden, and the
deplorable consequences to whioh a wilful disobedience may expose us, is a
matter of universal concern.
In proportion to the importance of the criminal law ought also to be the
care and attention of the legislature in properly forming and enforcing it.
It
r*. J-| should be founded upon principles that are permanent, uniform, *and
universal; and always conformable to the dictates of truth and justice,
the feelings of humanity, and the indelible rights of mankind: though it
sometimes (provided there be no transgression of these external boundaries)
may be modified, narrowed, or enlarged, according to the local or occasional
And yet, either from a
necessities of the state which it is meant to govern.
want of attention to these principles in the first oonoootion of the laws, and
adopting in their stead the impetuous dictates of avarice, ambition, and re
venge; from retaining the discordant political regulations, which successive
conquerors or factions have established, in the various revolutions of govern
ment; from giving a lasting efficacy to sanctions that were intended to be
merely upon the spur of the
temporary, and made (as Lord Bacon expresses
occasion; or from, lastly, too hastily employing suoh means as are greatly
disproportionate to their end, in order to check the progress of some very pre
valent offence: from some, or from all, of these causes,
hath happened, that
in every country of Europe more rude and imperfect than
the criminal law
the civil.
shall not here enter into any minute inquiries concerning the local
constitutions of other nations: the inhumanity and mistaken policy of which
But
have been sufficiently pointed out by ingenious writers of their own. (d)
even with us in England, where our crown law
with justice supposed to be
more nearly advanced to perfection; where crimes are more accurately defined,
and penalties less uncertain and arbitrary; where all our accusations are public^
and our *trials in the face of the world; where torture
unknown, and
r-i,.-,
every delinquent
judged by such of his equals, against whom he can
form no exception nor even
personal dislike; — even here we shall occasionally
find room to remark some particulars that seem to want revision and amend
These have chiefly arisen from too scrupulous an adherence to some
ment.
rules of the ancient common law, when the reasons have ceased upon which
those rules were founded; from not repealing such of the old penal laws as
are either obsolete or absurd; and from too little care and attention in framing
and passing new ones.
The enacting of penalties, to which
whole nation
should be subject, ought not to be left as a matter of indifference to the pas
sions or interests of
few, who upon temporary motives may prefer or sup
bill; but be calmly and maturely considered by persons who know
port such
what provisions the laws have already made to remedy the mischief com
plained of, who can from experience foresee the probable consequences of those
which are now proposed, and who will judge without passion or prejudice how
It never usual in the house of peers even to
adequate they are to the evil.
read
private bill, which may affect the property of an individual, without
first referring
to some of the learned judges, and hearing their report there
on,
necessary, when laws are to be estab
(e) And surely equal precaution
lished, which may affect the property, the liberty, and perhaps even the lives
of thousands.
Had suoh
reference taken place,
impossible that in the
could ever have been made
eighteenth century
capital crime, to break down
(however maliciously) the mound of fish pond, whereby any fish shall escape;
or to cut down
committee ap
cherry tree in an orchard, (f) Were even
pointed but once in a hundred years to revise the oriminal law,
could not
have continued to this hour
felony, without benefit of clergy, to be seen for
4a

(e) See book H, p. S45.

and

their Punishment.

4

Crimes

1.]

Chap.

month in the company of persons who call themselves, or are called,
Egyptians, (g)
It true, that these outrageous penalties, being seldom or never inflicted,
are hardly known to be law by the public; *but that rather aggravates
r**-\
the mischief, by laying
snare for the unwary.
Tet they cannot but *■ ■■
occur to the observation of any one, who hath undertaken the task of examin
ing the great outlines of the English law, and tracing them up to their prin
the duty of such
one to hint them with decency to those,
ciples: and
whose abilities and stations enable them to apply the remedy. (1) Having
therefore premised this apology for some of the ensuing remarks, which might
otherwise seem to savour of arrogance,
proceed now to consider (in the first
place) the general nature of crimes.
A crime, or misdemeanor,
an act committed, or omitted, in violation of
a public law, either forbidding or commanding it.
This general definition
comprehends both crimes and misdemeanors; which, properly speaking, are
mere synonymous terms; though in common usage, the word "crimes "
made
to denote such offences as are of
deeper and more atrocious dye; while
smaller faults and omissions of less consequence are comprised under the
gentler name of "misdemeanors" only. (2)
The distinction of public wrongs from private, of crimes and misdemeanors
from civil injuries, seems principally to consist in this: that private wrongs or
civil injuries are an infringement or privation of the civil rights which belong
to individuals, considered merely as individuals: publio wrongs, or crimes
and misdemeanors, are
breach and violation of the public rights and duties,
due to the whole community, considered as community, in its social aggre
detain field from another man, to which the law has
gate oapacity.
As,
civil injury, and not a crime: for here only the
given him
right, this
concerned, and
immaterial to the public, which
right of an individual
oi us
in possession of the land but treason, murder, and robbery are prop
erly ranked among crimes; since, besides the injury done to individuals, they
strike at the very being of society, which cannot possibly subsist where aotions
of this sort are suffered to escape with impunity. (3)
In all cases the crime includes an injury; every publio offense
also
affects the individual, and
likewise
private wrong, and somewhat more;
is
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thorough revision has been made of the crim
(1) This hint has been taken, at last, and
of its worst and most barbarous features.
inal law of England, relieving
as felonies and misdemeanors.
As to felony, as
(2) Crimes are, in general, classified
defined at the common law. see post, 94, note, where the enlarged American meaning is also
Hill, 260. Offenses less than felonies are mis
explained. And see Carpenter v. Nixon,
demeanors.
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to be found in positive
(3) The distinction between public crimes and private wrongs
law. "Whenever, therefore, the public deems that an act of wrong to individuals
of
nature requiring the public protection to be cast over the individual with respect to
then
the public makes the act punishable at its own suit; or, in other words,
makes
533; see Ibid., 7th ed., vol.
crime." Bish. Cr. L., 4th ed.,
32.
The difference be
tween crimes and civil injuries
not to be sought in supposed difference between their
tendencies, but in the difference between the modes in which they are respectively pursued,
pursued at the
or wherein the sanction
applied in the two cases. An offense which
discretion of the injured party, or his representative,
civil injury.
An offense which
Austin,
by the sovereign, or by the subordinate of the sovereign,
crime.
Sursued
urisprudence, lecture xvii.
The meaning of the phrase, "high crimes and misdemeanors," underwent much discus
sion In the case of President Johnson, who was tried on articles of impeachment in 1868,
but the result of the case was not such that any authoritative rule can be derived from it
See, upon the general subject, articles in the American Law Register, voL vi (N. 8.), pp.
a

957 and 641.
remedy by private action, but
Wrongs done to individuals for which they may have
which involve no offense against the state, are usually spoken of as torts.
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*Thus treason, in imagining the king's death,
r«fli* affects the community.
involves in it conspiracy against an individual, which is also a civil in
jury; but, as this species of treason in its consequences principally tends to
the dissolution of government, and the destruction thereby of the order and
Mur
peace of society, this denominates it a crime of the highest magnitade.
der is an injury to the life of an individual; but the law of society considers
principally the loss which the state sustains by being deprived of a member,
and the pernicious example thereby set for others to do the like. Robbery
may be considered in the same view: it is an injury to private property; but
were that all, a civil satisfaction in damages might atone for it: the public
mischief is the thing, for the prevention of which our laws have made it a
In these gross and atrocious injuries the private wrong is
capital offence.
swallowed up in the public: we seldom hear any mention made of satisfaction
to the individual; the satisfaction to the community being so very great.
And, indeed, as the public crime is not otherwise avenged than by forfeiture
of life and property, it is impossible afterwards to make any reparation for the
private wrong: which can only be had from the body or goods of the aggres
sor. (4)
But there are crimes of an inferior nature, in which the public pun
ishment is not so severe, but it affords room for a private compensation also;
and herein the distinction of crimes from civil injuries is very apparent. For
instance: in the case of battery, or beating another, the aggressor may be in
dicted for this at the suit of the king, for disturbing the public peace, and be
punished criminally by fine and imprisonment; and the party beaten may also
have his private remedy by action of trespass for the injury which he in par
ticular sustains, and recover a civil satisfaction in damages.
So, also, in case
of a public nuisance, as digging a ditch across a highway, this is punishable by
indictment, as a common offence to the whole kingdom and all his majesty's
but if any individual sustains any special 'damage thereby, as
P^^i subjects;
*• ■! laming his horse, breaking his carriage, or the like, the offender may be
compelled to make ample satisfaction, as well for the private injury as for the
public wrong.
Upon the whole we may observe, that in taking cognizance of all wrongs,
or unlawful acts, the law has a double view: viz., not only to redress the party
injured, by either restoring to him his right, if possible; or by giving him an
equivalent; the manner of doing which was the object of our inquiries in the
preceding book of these Commentaries; but also to secure to the public the
benefit of society, by preventing or punishing every breach and violation of
those laws, which the sovereign power has thought proper to establish for the
government and tranquility of the whole. What those breaches are, and how
prevented or punished, are to be considered in the present book.
II. The nature of crimes and misdemeanors in general being thus ascer
tained and distinguished,
prooeed, in the next place, to consider the general
nature of punishments : which are evils or inconveniences, consequent upon
crimes and misdemeanors; being devised, denounced, and inflicted by human
laws, in consequence of disobedience or misbehavior in those, to regulate
L

I

(4) One reason why a civil suit is not permitted until after the termination of a criminal
prosecution is, that if the party injured were first to recover satisfaction in damages, he
See Cox v. Paxton, 17
might not thereafter be disposed to pursue the criminal action.
Ves., 829; Crosby v. Lens;, 12 East, 409; White v. Spettigue, 13 M. & W., 603.
"States,
where the management
and control of prosecutions for offenses
In the United
against the state are confided to officers chosen or appointed for the purpose, the civil
Parties
injured by a felony are not permitted to compound
remedy is not thus postponed.
with the offender, and to receive a compensation for suppressing a prosecution, or conceal
ing the evidence of the crime; but they may demand and recover compensation for the
private injury the crime has inflicted upon them, without awaiting the result of such
action as the public prosecutor may see fit to institute. See Plumer v. Smith, 0 N. H.,
653; Boston, etc., R. R Co. v. Dana, 1 Gray, 83, and cases cited.
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conduct such laws were respectively made.
And herein we will briefly
consider the power, the end, and the measure of human punishment.
1. As to the power of human punishment, or the right of the temporal legis
lator to inflict discretionary penalties for crimes and misdemeanors. (A) It is
clear, that the right of punishing crimes against the laws of nature, as murder
and the like, is in a state of mere nature vested in every individual.
For it
must be vested in somebody; otherwise the laws of nature would be vain and
fruitless, if none were empowered to put them in execution: and if that powei
is vested in any one, it must also be vested in all mankind; *since all r*o-i
*
are by nature equal.
Whereof the first murderer Cain was so sensible
that we find him
expressing his apprehensions, that whoever should find him
would slay him. In state of society this right
transferred from individuals
to the sovereign power; whereby men are prevented from being judges in their
own causes, which
one of the evils that civil government was intended to
remedy. Whatever power, therefore, individuals had of punishing offences
now vested in the magistrate alone; who
against the law of nature, that
bears the sword of justice by the consent of the whole community.
And to
this precedent natural power of individuals must be referred that right, which
some have argued to belong to every state (though in fact, never exercised by
any), of punishing not only their own subjects, but also foreign ambassadors,
oven with death itself; in case they have offended, not indeed against the
municipal laws of the country, but against the divine laws of nature, and be
come liable thereby to forfeit their lives for their guilt. (A)
As to offences merely against the laws of society, which are only mala proMbUa, and not mala in se; the temporal magistrate
to
also empowered
inflict coercive penalties for such transgressions; and this by the consent of
individuals; who, in forming sooieties, did either tacitly or expressly invest
the sovereign power with the right of making laws, and of enforcing obedience
to them when made, by exercising, upon their non-observance, severities ade
quate to the evil. The lawfulness, therefore, of punishing such criminals
founded upon this principle, that the law by which they suffer was made by
their own consent;
part of the original contract into which they entered,
when first they engaged in sooiety;
was calculated for, and has long con
tributed to their own security.
This right, therefore, being thus conferred by universal consent, gives to the
state exactly the same power, and no more, over all its members, as each indi
vidual member had naturally over himself or others.
Which has *occa- r *fl-.
sioned some to doubt how far human legislature ought to inflict capital *■ •*
punishments for positive offences; offences against the municipal law only, and
not against the law of nature: since no individual has, naturally,
power of
inflicting death upon himself or others for actions in themselves indifferent.
With regard to offences mala in se, capital punishments are in some instances
inflicted by the immediate command of God himself to all mankind
as in the
case of murder, by the precept delivered to Noah, their common ancestor and
representative, "whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed."
In other instances they are inflicted after the example of the Creator, in
his positive code of laws for the regulation of the Jewish republic: as in the
case of the crime against nature.
But they are sometimes inflicted without
such express warrant or example, at the will and discretion of the human legis
lature; as for forgery, for theft, and sometimes for offences of a lighter kind.
Of these we are principally to speak; as these crimes are, none of them, offences
against natural, but only against social rights; not even theft itself, unless it
be accompanied with violence to one's house or person: all others being an in(I)
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fringement of that right of property, which, as we have formerly seen, (m)
owes its origin not to the law of nature, but merely to civil society. (5)
The practice of inflicting capital punishments, for offences of human insti
tution, is thus justified by that great and good man, Sir Matthew Hale: (n)
" When offences grow enormous, frequent, and dangerous to a kingdom or
state, destructive or highly pernicious to civil societies, and to the great inse
curity and danger of the kingdom or its inhabitants, severe punishment, and
even death itself, is necessary to be annexed to laws in many cases by the pru
It is, therefore, the enormity, or dangerous tendency,
dence of lawgivers."
of the crime that alone can warrant any earthly legislature in putting him to
tha,t commits it.
*It is not its frequency, only, or the difficulty
T*i ol death
*■
that will excuse our attempting to prevent
otherwise preventing
wanton effusion of human blood. For, though the end of punishment
by
can never follow from thence that
is to deter men from offending,
law
ful to deter them at any rate and by any means; since there may be unlawful
methods of enforcing obedience even to the justest laws. Every humane legis
lator will be therefore extremely cautious of establishing laws that inflict the
penalty of death, especially for slight offences, or such as are merely positive.
He will expect better reason for his so doing than that loose one which gen
found by former experience that no lighter penalty
erally
given; that
found, upon farther experience, that capital pun
For,
will be effectual.
ishments are more effectual
Was the vast territory of all the Russias worse
regulated under the late empress Elizabeth, than under her more sanguinary
Is now, under Catherine H, less civilized, less social, less se
predecessors
cure
And yet we are assured that neither of these illustrious princesses have,
throughout their whole administration, inflicted the penalty of death; and the
latter has, upon full persuasion of its being useless, nay, even pernicious, given
orders for abolishing
entirely throughout her extensive dominions, (o) But
indeed, were capital punishments proved by experience to be a sure and effec
tual remedy, that would not prove the necessity (upon which the justice and
propriety depend) of inflicting them upon all occasions when other expedients
fear this reasoning would extend
fail.
great deal too far. For instance,
the damage done to our publio roads by loaded wagons
universally allowed,
and many laws have been made to prevent it; none of which have hitherto
But does not therefore follow that would be just for the
proved effectual.
legislature to inflict death upon every obstinate carrier, who defeats or eludes
the provision of former statutes.
Where the evil to be prevented
not ade
sovereign that thinks seriously can
quate to the violence of the preventive,
law to the dictates of Conscience and humanity.
rm. J, never justify such
matter that requires the
To shed the blood of our fellow creature
greatest deliberation and the fullest conviction of our own authority: for life
the immediate gift of God to man; which neither he can resign, nor can
be taken from him, unless by the command or permission of Him who gave it;
either expressly revealed, or collected from the laws of nature or society by
clear and indisputable demonstration.
would not be understood to deny the right of the legislature in any country
to enforce its own laws by the death of the transgressor, though persons of
some abilities have doubted it; but only to suggest a few hints for the consid
eration of such as are, or may hereafter become, legislators. When a question
arises, whether death may be lawfully inflicted for this or that transgression,
the wisdom of the laws must decide it; and to this public judgment or deci
sion all private judgments must submit; else there
an end of the first prin(n) Hal. P. C. 18.
(m) Book IL c.
it,
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(o) Grand instructions for framing a new code of laws for the Russian empire,
p. 11 and note.
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ciple of all society and government. The guilt of blood, if any, must lie at
their doors, who misinterpret the extent of their warrant; and not at the doors
of the subject who is bound to receive the interpretations that are given by
the sovereign power.
2. As to the end, or final cause of human punishments.
This is not by way
of atonement or expiation for the crime committed; for that must be left to
the just determination of the Supreme Being; but as a precaution against
future offences of the same kind. This is effected three ways: either by the
amendment
of the offender himself; for which purpose all corporal punish
ments, fines, and temporary exile or imprisonment, are inflicted: or, by deter
ring others by the dread of his example from offending in the like way, "ut
poena (as Tully (p) expresses it) ad paucos, metus ad omnes perveniat /" which
gives rise to all ignominious punishments, and to such executions of justice as
are open and public: *or, lastly, by depriving the party injuring of the r+-.„-i
power to do future mischief; which is effected by either putting him to *• ■»
death or condemning him to perpetual confinement,
The
slavery, or exile.
same one end, of preventing future crimes, is endeavoured to be answered by
each of these three species of punishment.
The public gains equal security,
whether the offender himself be amended by wholesome correction, or whether
he be disabled from doing any further harm: and if the penalty fails of both
these effects, as it may do, still the terror of his example remains as a warning
to other citizens.
The method, however, of inflicting punishment ought
always to be proportioned to the particular purpose it is meant to serve, and
by no means to exceed it: therefore, the pains of death, and perpetual dis
ability by exile, slavery, or imprisonment ought never to be inflicted, but when
the offender appears incorrigible: which may be collected either from a repetition'of minuter offences; or from the perpetration of some one crime of deep
malignity, which of itself demonstrates a disposition without hope or proba
bility of amendment; and in such cases it would be cruelty to the public to
defer the punishment of such a criminal, till he had an opportunity of repeat
ing perhaps the worst of villanies.
3. As to the measure of human punishments.
From what has been observed
in the former articles, we may collect, that the quantity of punishment can
never be absolutely determined by any standing invariable rule; but it must
be left to the arbitration of the legislature to inflict such penalties as are war
ranted by the laws of nature and society, and such as appear to be the best
calculated to answer the end of precaution against future offences.
Hence it will be evident, that what some have so highly extolled for its
equity, the lex talionis, or law of retaliation, can never be in all cases an
In some cases, indeed, it seems
adequate or permanent rule of punishment.
to be dictated by natural reason; as in the case of conspiracies to do an in
jury, or false accusations of the innocent; to which we may add that law of
the Jews and Egyptians, mentioned by *Josephus and Diodorus Siculus, that whoever without sufficient cause was found with any mortal *■ *
poison in his custody, should himself be obliged to take it. But, in general,
the difference of persons, place, time, provocation, or other circumstances, may
enhance or mitigate the offence; and in such cases retaliation can never be a
proper measure of justice. If a nobleman strikes a peasant, all mankind will
see, that if a court of justice awards a return of the blow, it is more than a just
On the other hand, retaliation may, sometimes, be too easy a
compensation.
sentence; as, if a man maliciously should put out the remaining eye of him who
had lost one before, it is too slight a punishment for the maimer to lose only one
of his: and therefore the law of the Locrians, which demanded an eye for an
eye, was in this instance judiciously altered by decreeing, in imitation of
Solon's laws, (q) that, he who struck out the eye of a one-eyed man, should
lose both his own in return.
Besides, there are very many crimes, that
(p) Pro Cluentio,

«.

(9) Pott. Ant. b. 1, 0. M.
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-will in no shape admit of these penalties, without manifest absurdity and
Theft cannot be punished with theft, defamation by defam
wickedness.
ation, forgery by forgery, adultery by adultery, and the like. And we may
add, that those instances, wherein retaliation appears to be used, even by the
divine authority, do not really proceed upon the rule of exact retribution, by
doing to the criminal the same hurt he has done to his neighbour and no more;
but this correspondence between the crime and punishment is barely a conse
Death is ordered to be punished with death;
quence from some other principle.
not because one is equivalent to the other, for that would be expiation, and not
punishment. Nor is death always an equivalent for death: the execution of a
needy, decrepit assassin is a poor satisfaction for the murder of a nobleman in
the bloom of his youth, and full enjoyment of his friends, his honours, and his
fortune. But the reason upon which this sentence is grounded seems to be,
that this is the highest penalty that man can inflict, *and tends most
r^. .-.
•■ J
to the security of mankind; by removing one murderer from thejearth,
«nd setting a dreadful example to deter others: so that even this grand instance
And truly if
proceeds upon other principles than those of retaliation.
any measure of punishment is to be taken from the damage sustained by the
sufferer, the punishment ought rather to exceed than equal the injury: since it
seems contrary to reason and equity, that the guilty (if convicted) should suf
fer no more than the innocent has done before him; especially as the suffer
ing of the innocent is past and irrevocable, that of the guilty is future,
With regard indeed to
contingent, and liable to be escaped or evaded.
crimes that are incomplete, which consist merely in the intention, and are not
yet carried into act, as conspiracies and the like; the innocent has a chance to
frustrate or avoid the villainy, as the conspirator has also a chance to escape
his punishment: and this may be one reason why the lex talionis is more pro
per to be inflicted, if at all, for crimes that consist in intention, than for such
It seems indeed consonant to natural reason, and has
as are carried into act.
therefore been adopted as a maxim by several theoretical writers, (r) that the
punishment due to the crime of which one falsely accuses another should be in
flicted on the perjured informer.
Accordingly, when it was attempted to in
troduce into England the law of retaliation, it was intended as a punishment
for such only as preferred malicious accusations against others; it being enacted
by statute 37 Edw. Ill, c. 18, that such as preferred any suggestions to the
to incur the same
king's great council should put in sureties of taliation; that
pain that the other should have had in case the suggestions were found untrue.
But, after one year's experience this punishment of taliation was rejected, and
imprisonment adopted in its stead.
But though from what has been said
appears that there cannot be any rer*usl gular or determinate method of rating the 'quantity of punishments
for crimes, by any one uniform rule; but they must be referred to the
will and discretion of the legislative power: yet there are some general prin
ciples, drawn from the nature and circumstances of the crime, that may be of
an adequate punishment.
some assistance in alloting
As, first, with regard to the object of it; for the greater and more exalted the
the more care should be taken to prevent that injury,
-object of an injury
and of course under this aggravation the punishment should be more severe.
Therefore treason in conspiring the king's death
by the English law, pun
ished with greater rigour than even actually killing any private subject.
And
not so flagrant an enormity as the act
design to transgress
yet, generally,
ual completion of that design.
For evil, the nearer we approach
the
more disagreeable and shocking; so that
requires more obstinacy in wicked
ness to perpetrate an unlawful action, than barely to entertain the thought of
it: and
an encouragement to repentance and remorse, even to the last stage
«f any crime, that
never too late to retract; and that
man stops even
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it is better for him than if he proceeds: for which reason an attempt torob, to ravish, or to kill, is far less penal than the actual robbery, rape, or murder.'
But in the case of a treasonable conspiracy, the object whereof is the king's
majesty, the bare intention will deserve the highest degree of severity; not be
cause the intention is equivalent to the act itself: but because the greatest rig
our is no more than adequate to a treasonable purpose of the heart, and there
is no greater left to inflict upon the actual execution itself.
Again: the violence of passion, or temptation, may sometimes alleviate a
crime; as theft, in case of hunger, is far more worthy of compassion than
when committed through avarice, or to supply one in luxurious excesses.
Tokill a man upon sudden and violent resentment, is less penal than upon cool,
deliberate malice.
The age, education, and character of the offender: the
repetition (or otherwise) *of the offence; the time, the place, the com- r*lfo
pany wherein it was committed; all these, and a thousand other inci- *■ ■»
dents, may aggravate or extenuate the crime,
Further: as punishments are chiefly intended for the prevention of futurebut reasonable that among crimes of different natures those should
crimes,
be most severely punished, which are the most destructive of the'public safety
and happiness; (w) and among crimes of an equal malignity, those which
man
has the most frequent and easy opportunities of committing, which cannot be
so easily guarded against as others, and which, therefore, the offender has the
strongest inducement to commit; according to what Cicero observes, (v) "ea
sunt animadverlenda peccata maxime, quae difficillime prcecaventur." Hence
that for
servant to rob his master
in more cases capital, than for
servant kills his master,
stranger:
species of treason; (6) in another
handkerchief or other trifle of above the value of
only murder; to steal
twelve pence, privately from one's person,
made capital; (7) but to carry off
load of corn from an open field, though of fifty times greater value,
pun
And in the island of Man this rule was form
ished with transportation only.
erly carried so far, that to take away horse or ox was there no felony, but
trespass, because of the difficulty in that little territory to conceal them or
pig or fowl, which
easily done, was
capital
carry them off: but to steal
and the offender was punished with death, (w)
misdemeanor,
Lastly: as a conclusion to the whole, we may observe that punishments of
unreasonable
severity, especially when indiscriminately inflicted, have les&
effect in preventing crimes, and amending the manners of a people, than such
as are more merciful in general, yet properly intermixed with due *disr*j*i
the sentiment of an ingenious writer, who >■ -*
tinctions of severity. It
seems to have well studied the springs of human action, (as) that crimes are
more effectually prevented by the certainty, than by the severity, of punish
ment.
For the excessive severity of laws (says Montesquieu) (y) hinders their
execution: when the punishment surpasses all measure, the publio will fre
quently out of humanity prefer impunity to it. Thus also the statute Mar.
st.
recites in its preamble, " that the state of every king consists mora
c.
assuredly in the love of the subject towards their prince, than in the dread of
laws made with rigorous pains; and that laws made for the preservation of the
commonwealth without great penalties are more often obeyed and kept, than
been for the nation,
laws made with extreme punishments." Happy had
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What was formerly petit treason
no longer the law.
(6) This
c. 31,
and
Geo.
(7) The capital punishment for this offence was abolished by statute
29.
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(() Thus Demosthenes (In his oration against MIdias), finely works up the aggravations of the Insults he
had received. " was abused," says he, "by my enemy. In cold blood, out of malice, not by heat of
wine, in the morning, publicly, before strangers as well as citizens; and that In the temple, whither the
duty of my office called me.
(x) Beccar. c.
(v) Pro Sexto Roscio, 40.
(u>) Inst. 285.
m) Beccar. c.
c 13.
(V) Sp. L. b.
Geo.
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the subsequent practice of that deluded princess in matters of religion, had
been correspondent to these sentiments of herself and parliament, in matters
of state and government ! We may further observe that sanguinary laws are
a bad symptom of the distemper of any state, or at least of its weak constitu
tion. The laws of the Roman kings, and the twelve tables of the decemviri,
were full of cruel punishments: the Porcian law, which exempted all citizens
from sentence of death, silently abrogated them alL In this period the repub
lic flourished: under the emperors severe punishments were revived; and then
the empire fell.
It is moreover absurd and impolitio to apply the same punishment to crimes
of different malignity. A multitude of sanguinary laws (besides the doubt
that may be entertained concerning the right of making them) do likewise
prove a manifest defect either in the wisdom of the legislative or the strength
of the executive power. It is a kind of quackery in government, and argues
a want of solid skill, to apply the same universal remedy, the ultimum supplimust be owned, much easier to exIt
cium, to every case of difficulty.
than
to
amend mankind: yet *that magistrate must be esteemed
tirpate
r*in-i
weak and cruel surgeon, who cuts off every limb, which through
both
It has been therefore
ignorance or indolence he will not attempt to cure.
ingeniously proposed, (z) that in every state scale of crimes should be formed,
with
corresponding scale of punishments, descending from the greatest to
the least; but,
wise legislator
that be too romantic an idea, yet at least
will mark the principal divisions, and not assign penalties of the first degree
to offences of an inferior rank. Where men see no distinction made in the
nature and gradations of punishment, the generality will be led to conclude
there
no distinction in the guilt.
Thus in France the punishment of rob
the same: (a) hence
that though
bery, either with or without murder,
perhaps they are therefore subject to fewer robberies, yet they never rob but
they also murder. In China, murderers are out to pieces, and robbers not:
hence in that country they never murder on the highway, though they often
rob. And in England, besides the additional terrors of
speedy execution,
and subsequent exposure to dissection, robbers have
hope of transportation
which seldom
extended to murderers. This has the same effect here as in
China; in preventing frequent assassination and slaughter.
Yet, though in this instance we may glory in the wisdom of the English law,
we shall find
more difficult to justify the frequency of capital punishment to
be found therein; inflicted (perhaps inattentively)
multitude of succes
sive independent statutes, upon crimes very different in their natures. It
melancholy truth, that among the variety of actions which men are daily liable
to commit, no less than hundred and sixty have been declared by act of par
liament (b) to be felonies without benefit of clergy; or, in words, to be worthy
of instant death. So dreadful list, instead of diminishing, increases the number
*The injured, through compassion, will often forbear
°^ °ffenders. (8)
l~*10l
■'to prosecute; juries, through compassion, will sometimes forget their
oaths, and either acquit the guilty or mitigate the nature of the offence; and
judges, through compassion, will respite one half of the convicts, and recom
mend them to royal mercy. Among so many chances of escaping, the needy
and hardened offender overlooks the multitude that suffer: he boldly engages
in some desperate attempt, to relieve his wants or supply his vices; and,
unexpectedly the hand of justice overtakes him, he deems himself peculiarly
unfortunate, in falling at last sacrifice to those laws, which long impunity
has taught him to contemn.
8,

8.

c. 18.
(2) Beccar. o.
(a) Sp. L. b.
(o) See Ruffhead's Index to the statutes, (tit. Felony), and the acts which hare Blnce been made.
(8) The legislature has at length been
ished this fearful list
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CHAPTER II.
OF THE PERSONS

CAPABLE OF COMMITTING
CRIMES.
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Having, in the preceding chapter, considered in general the nature of crimes
and punishments, we are led, next, in the order of our distribution, to inquire
what persons are, or are not, capable of committing crimes; or, which is all
one, who are exempted from the censures of the law upon the commission of
In the process
those acts, which in other persons would be severely punished.
of which inquiry, we must have recourse to particular and special exceptions:
that no person shall be excused from punishment for
for the general rule
disobedience to the laws of his country, excepting such as are expressly de
fined and exempted by the laws themselves.
All the several pleas and excuses, which protect the committer of forbid
den act from the punishment which
otherwise annexed thereto, may be
An involun
reduced to this single consideration, the want or defect of will.
has no claim to merit, so neither can
induce any guilt: the con
tary act, as
currence of the will, when
has its choice either to do or to avoid the fact in
question, being the only thing *that renders human action either praise- r*oii
worthy or culpable. Indeed, to make
complete crime cognizable by
human laws, there must be both
will and an act. For, though, in foro conalmost as heinous as
sciential, a fixed design or will to do an unlawful act,
the commission of
yet, as no temporal tribunal can search the heart, or
fathom the intentions of the mind, otherwise than as they are demonstrated by
outward actions,
therefore cannot punish for what
cannot know. For
which reason, in all temporal jurisdictions, an overt act, or some open evidence
of an intended crime,
necessary in order to demonstrate the depravity of the
liable to punishment. And, as a vicious will without
will, before the man
vicious act
no civil crime, so, on the other hand, an unwarrantable act with
out vicious will
no crime at all.
So that to constitute
crime against
human laws, there must be, first,
vicious will; and, secondly, an unlawful act
consequent upon such vicious will.
Now there are three cases, in which the will does not join with the act:
Where there
defect of understanding. For where there
no discernment,
no choice; and where there
there
no choice, there can be no act of the
will, which
determination of one's ohoice to do or to ab
nothing else but
stain from
particular action: he, therefore, that has no understanding can
have no will to guide his conduct. 2. Where there
understanding and will
sufficient, residing in the party; but not called forth and exerted at the time
of the action done; which
the case of all offences committed by chance or
ignorance. Here the will sits neuter; and neither concurs with the act, nor
3. Where the action
constrained by some outward force
disagrees to it.
Here the will counteracts the deed; and
and violence.
so far from concur
loaths and disagrees to, what the man
ring with, that
obliged to perform.
It will be the business of the present ohapter briefly to consider all the several
species of defect in will, as they fall under some one or other of these general
heads: as infancy, idiocy, lunacy, and intoxication, which fall under the first
class; misfortune and ignorance, which *may be referred to the second; r
and compulsion or necessity, which may properly rank in the third.
defect
First, we will consider the case of infancy or nonage; which
of the understanding. Infants, under the age of discretion, ought not to be
What the age of discre
punished by any criminal prosecution whatever, (a)
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in various nations,
tion
matter of some variety. The civil law distin
guished the age of minors, or those under twenty-five years old, into three
stages: infantia, from the birth till seven years of age: pueritia, from seven
to fourteen; and pubertas, from fourteen upwards. The period of pueritia,
or childhood, was again subdivided into two equal parts: from seven to ten
and an half was OBtaa infantia} proximo,; from ten and an half to fourteen,
was cetas pubertati proximo,.
During the first stage of infancy, and the
next half stage of childhood, infantia} proximo, they were not punishable for
During the other half stage of childhood, approaching to
any crime, (b)
puberty, from ten and an half to fourteen, they were indeed punishable,
found to be doli capaces, or capable of mischief but with many mitigations,
and not with the utmost rigour of the law. (c) During the last stage (at the
age of puberty, and afterwards), minors were liable to be punished, as well
capitally as otherwise.
The law of England does in some cases privilege an infant, under the age of
twenty-one, as to common misdemeanors, so as to escape fine, imprisonment,
and the like; and particularly in cases of omission, as not repairing
bridge,
or highway, and other similar offences; (d) for, not having the command of
his fortune until twenty-one, he wants the capacity to do those things which
the law requires.
But where there
riot,
any notorious breach of the peace,
battery, or the like (whioh infants, when full grown, are at least as liable as
r*2i1 others to commit), for these an infant, above *the age of fourteen,
equally liable to suffer, as person of the full age of twenty-one.
With regard to capital crimes, the law
still more minute and circumspect;
distinguishing with greater nicety the several degrees of age and discretion.
By the ancient Saxon law, the age of twelve years was established for the age
of possible discretion, when first the understanding might open; (e) and from
was cetas pubertati proximo, in which
thence till the offender was fourteen,
crime, according to his natural capacity
he might or might not be guilty of
or incapacity. This was the dubious stage of discretion: but under twelve
was held that he could not be guilty in will, neither after fourteen could he be
But by
supposed innocent, of any capital crime which he in fact committed.
now stands, and has stood at least ever since the time of Edward
the law, as
not so much
the Third, the capacity of doing ill, or contracting guilt,
measured by years and days, as by the strength of the delinquent's understand
For one lad of eleven years old may have as much cun
ing and judgment.
that "malitia
ning as another of fourteen; and in these cases our maxim
mpplet oetatem." Under seven years of age indeed an infant cannot be guilty
felonious discretion
almost an impossibility in
of felony; (/) for then
Also, under
nature: but at eight years old he may be guilty of felony,
(g)
fourteen, though an infant shall be prima facie adjudged to be doli incapax;
appear to the court and jury that he was doli capax, and could dis
yet,
Thus
cern between good and evil, he may be convicted and suffer death. (1)
and one boy of ten,
a girl of thirteen has been burnt for killing her mistress:
and another of nine years old, who had killed their companions, have been
sentenced to death, and he of ten years actually hanged; because
appeared
upon

9

2

Park. C.
Humph., 175; People v. Randolph,
(1) See upon this subject, 8tate v. Goin,
Pick., 380. A male child under the age of fourteen
174; Commonwealth v. Green,
but
has been decided that this
rape; but in Ohio
is supposed incapable of committing
presumption which may be overcome by evidence of maturity. Williams v. State, 14
Ohio, 222. So he may be convicted of an assault with intent to commit
People v.
rape.
liable civilly for his torts.
Randolph,
Humphrey t.
Park. 0. R., 174. An infant
Wend., 391; Neal v. Gillett, 23 Conn., 48?
Douglass, 10 Vt, 71; Bullock v. Babcock,
,And this even though under fourteen yean of age. Huehting v. Engel, 17 Wis. 380.
,
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killed, which hiding manifested a consciousness of guilt, and a discretion
*to discern between good and evil. (A) And there was an instance in rmn* i
*
*•
the last century where a boy of eight years old was tried at Abingdon
for firing two barns; and it appearing that he had malice, revenge, and cun
Thus
ning, he was found guilty, condemned, and hanged accordingly,
also in very modern times,
boy of ten years old was convicted on his own
confession of murdering his bedfellow, there appearing in his whole behaviour
mischievous discretion and, as the sparing this boy merely
plain tokens of
on account of his tender years might be of dangerous consequence to the
notion that children might commit such atrocious
public, by propagating
was unanimously agreed by all the judges, that he
crimes with impunity,
was
proper subject of capital punishment. (J) But in all such cases, th«
to supply age, ought to be strong and cleai
evidence of that malice which
beyond all doubt and contradiction.
H. The second case of deficiency in will, which excuses from the guilt of
defective or vitiated understanding, viz. in an idiot
crimes, arises also from
or lunatic.
For the rule of law as to the latter, which may easily be adapted
that, "furiosus furore solum punitur." In criminal caser
also to the former,
therefore, idiots and lunatics are not chargeable for their own acts,
commit
ted when under these incapacities: no, not even for treason itself, (k) (2)
man in his sound memory commits
Also
capital offence, and before ar
he becomes mad, he ought not to be arraigned for it; becaus*
raignment for
with that advice and caution that he ought. And
he is not able to plead to
if, after he has pleaded, the prisoner becomes mad, he shall not be tried: for
If, after he be tried and found guilty, he losef
how can he make his defence
his senses before judgment, judgment shall not be pronounced; and
aftei
judgment, he becomes of non-sane memory, execution shall be stayed: for peradventure, says the humanity of the English law, had the prisoner been ol
sound memory, he might have alleged *something in stay of judgment
*
or exeoution.
Indeed, in the bloody reign of Henry the Eighth,
statute was made, (m) which enacted that
person, being compos mentis,
should commit high treason, and after fall into madness, he might be tried in
his absence, and should suffer death, as
he were of perfect memory. But
this savage and inhuman law was repealed by the statute and
P. and M., c.
observed by Sir Ed ward Coke, (n) "the execution of an offender
10. For, as
for example, ut poena ad paucos, metus ad omnes perveniat: but so
not
1

«.

8

1

(0

(Q Emlyn on Hal. P. C. 25.
Inst.
83
H. Vm, c. 20.
(m)
(n) Inst.
6.

Hal. P. C. 26, 27.
(*)

Hal. P. C. 84.

8

1

(ft)

(i) Foster, 72.
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person from punishment
(2) As to the degree of mental unsoundness which shall excuse
for his acts, the works on medical jurisprudence and insanity will need to be consulted,
Denio,
and the trial of Huntington, will be found
and the case of Freeman v. People,
instructive, though they will probably leave upon the mind
painful sense of the difficul
ties surrounding this whole subject, and the impossibility of laying down definitions and
abstract rules which can be easily and safely applied in practice. See also McNaughton's
Case, 10 CL &Fin., 200.
As to the burden of proof when the defense of insanity
made to
criminal prosecu
tion, see Clark v. State, 12 Ohio, 483, 494; Loeffner v. State, 10 Ohio St., 598; Bond v.
State, 23 Ohio St, 349; State v. Felter, 82 Iowa, 49; McKenzie v. State, 42 Ga., 334; Boswell v. Commonwealth, 20 Gratt., 860; Baccigalupo v. Commonwealth, 83 Gratt., 807;
Neb., 407;
C. 36 Am. Rep., 795; State v. Hoyt, 47 Conn., 581; Wright v. People,
Houst. C, O., 249; Boswell v. State, 63 Ala., 307 8. C, 85 Am. Rep., 20;
State v. Pratt,
C, 86 Am. Rep., 462; Webb v. State, Tex. App., 490;
State v. Redemeier, 71 Mo., 178;
Johnson v. State, 10 Tex. App. 571 State v. Coleman, 27 La. Ann. 691 State v. Strauder,
C, 18 Am. Rep.,
11 W. Va., 745, 823; Ortwein v. Commonwealth, 76 Penn. St., 414;
420: State v. Smith, 53 Mo., 267; People v. McDonell, 47 Cal., 134; Commonwealth v.
State,
19 Ind., 170; Chase v. People. 40 111., 852; Stevens v.
Gray. 583; Polk v.
Eddy,
State, 81 Ind., 485; People v. Schryver, 42 N. Y.,
State v. Pike, 49 N. H., 899; State
H.,
Garbutt,
Jones,
50 N.
369; People v.
17 Mich.,
t.
People v. Finley, 88 Mich., 482;
Hopps v. People, 31 Dl., 385; State v. Klinger, 43 Mo., 127; State v. Crawford, 11 Kan.,
82; Cunningham v. State, 56 Miss., 269; S. C, 81 Am. Rep., 360.
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a madman is executed; but should be a miserable spectacle, both against
law, and of extreme inhumanity and cruelty, and can be no example to others."
But if there be any doubt, whether the party be compos or not, this shall be
And if he be so found, a total idiocy, or absolute insanity,
tried by jury.
excuses from the guilt, and of course from the punishment, of any criminal
aotion committed under such deprivation of the senses: but, if a lunatic hath
lucid intervals of understanding, he shall answer for what he does in
Yet, in the case of absolute
those intervals as if he had no deficiency, (o)
madmen, as they are not answerable for their actions, they should not be per
mitted the liberty of acting unless under proper control; and in particular,
they ought not to be suffered to go loose, to the terror of the king's subjects.
It was the doctrine of our anoient law, that persons deprived of their reason
might be confined till they recover their senses, (p) without waiting for the
forms of a commission or other special authority from the crown: and now,
by the vagrant acts, (q) a method is chalked out for imprisoning, ohaining,
and sending them to their proper homes.
III. Thirdly: as to artificial, voluntarily contracted madness, by drunken
ness or intoxication, which, depriving men of their reason, puts them in a tem
porary frenzy; our law looks upon this as an aggravation of the offence, rather
"than as an excuse for any criminal misbehaviour.
A drunkard, says
r*9Rl
-* Sir Edward Coke,
L
(r) who is voluntaries daemon, hath no privilege
thereby ; but what hurt or ill soever he doth, his drunkenness doth aggravate it:
It hath been observed, that
nam omne crimen ebrietas, et incendit et detegit.
the real use of strong liquors, and the abuse of them by drinking to excess,
The
depend much upon the temperature of the climate in which we live.
same indulgence, which may be necessary to make the blood move in Norway,
A German, therefore, says the president Mon
would make an Italian mad.
drinks through custom, founded upon constitutional necessity;
tesquieu,
Spaniard drinks through choice, or out of the mere wantonness of luxury: and
makes
drunkenness, he adds, ought to be more severely punished, where
men mischievous and mad, as in Spain and Italy, than where
only renders
And
them stupid and heavy, as in Germany and more northern countries.
law of Pittacus enacted, "that
accordingly, in the warm climate of Greece,
double punishment;"
crime when drunk, should receive
he who committed
one for the crime itself, and the other for the ebriety which prompted him to
commit it.(<) The Roman law, indeed, made great allowances for this vice: "per
But the law of England, con
vinum delapsis capitalis poena remittitur."
to counterfeit this excuse, and how weak an excuse
sidering how easy
(though real), will not suffer any man thus to privilege one crime by another.
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(3) A man who, by means of intoxication, voluntarily puts himself in condition to have
The safety of the com
no control of his actions, must be held to intend the consequences.
so
Intoxication
so easily counterfeited, and when real
munity requires this rule.
often resorted to as means of nerving the person up to the commission of some desperate
U. 8. v.
as an excuse for the commission of crime.
act, that the law cannot recognize
Gray.
Mason, 28; Pirtle v. State.
Drew,
Humph., 663- Commonwealth v. Hawkins,
v.
Geo.,
424; State
Avery, 44 N.
463; People v. Garbutt. 17 Mich., 9- Choice v. State, 81
often an important consideration
H., 392. Nevertheless, the drunkenness of the partv
in criminal cases, where the guilty knowledge or intent constitutes the principal ingredient
crime,
so as to make the peculiar state and condition of the criminal's mind at the
of the
See Swan v. State,
time, with reference to the act done, the important subject of inquiry.
Bald., 517; Roberts v. People, 19 Mich., 401;
v. Roudenbush,
Humph., 136; U.
and M., 518. As in the case of passing counterfeit money: Pigman
Kelley v. State,
property which might be larceny
v. State. 14 Ohio, 555; or the appropriation of another's
Rex
trespass merely, according as the specific intent to steal was present or absent.
or
v. Pitman,
C. and P., 428.
See further, O'Herrin v. State, 14 Ind., 420; State v. Cross,
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(z)

IV. A fourth deficiency of will is where' a man commits an unlawful act by
misfortune or chance, and not by design. Here the will observes a total neu
trality, and does not co-operate with the deed; which therefore wants one
Of this, when it affects the life of another, we
main ingredient of a crime.
shall find more occasion to speak hereafter; at present only observing, that if
any accidental mischief *happens to follow from the performance of a r*27i
*
lawful act, the party stands exoused from all guilt; but if a man be
doing any thing unlawful, and a consequence ensues which he did not foresee
or intend, as the death of a man or the like, his want of foresight shall be no
excuse; for, being guilty of one offence, in doing antecedently what is in it
self unlawful, he is oriminally guilty of whatever consequence may follow the
first misbehaviour, (a;)
V. Fifthly: ignorance or mistake is another defect of will; when a man, in
For here, the deed
tending to do a lawful act, does that which is unlawful.
•and the will acting separately, there is not that conjunction between them
whioh is necessary to form a criminal act. But this must be an ignorance or
mistake of fact and not an error in point of law. As if a man, intending to
kill a thief or house breaker in his own house, by mistake kills one of his own
family, this is no criminal action: (y) but if a man thinks he has a right to
kill a person excommunicated or outlawed, wherever he meets him, and does
For a mistake in point of law, whioh every person
bo; this is wilful murder.
of discretion not only may, but is bound and presumed to know, is in criminal
Ignorantia juris, quod quisque tenetur scire, nemicases no sort of defence.
as
nem excusat, is as well the maxim of our own law,
was of the Roman.
(«) (*)
VL A sixth species of defect of will that arising from compulsion and in
These are constraint upon the will, whereby man
evitable necessity.
urged
to be presumed,
to do that which his judgment disapproves; and which,
his will (if left to itself) would reject. As punishments are therefore only inflicted for the abuse of that free will which God has given to man,
highly
just and equitable that man should be excused for those acts which are done
through unavoidable force and compulsion.
the obligation of civil subjec*1. Of this nature, in the first place,
r*28-i
constrained by the superior to act contrary
tion, whereby the inferior
to what his own reason and inclination would suggest: as when
legislator
law, and commands the subject to do an act contrary
establishes iniquity by
(«) PlowdL 843.

(a) Ff. 22.
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27 Mo., 833; Golden v. State. 25 Geo., 527; Mooney v. State, 83 Ala., 419; Regina v. Cruse
C. and P., 541; State v. Garvey, 11 Minn., 154; People v. Harris, 29 Cal., 678; Bailey
v. State, 26 Ind., 422; State v. Schingen, 20 Wis., 74. Where insanity results from long
no more to be punished for his acts than
continued intoxication, the insane person
Mason,
the delirium had proceeded from causes not under his control. U. 8. v. Drew,
Spears, 884; Bailey v. State, 26 Ind., 422; State v. Hundley, 46
28; State v McCants,
Mo., 414.
bound to know, excuses no man.
See the
(4) Ignorance of the law, which every man
maxim and illustrations in Broom's Legal Maxims.
wrong, for there are few acts
And this maxim in criminal cases cannot often work
aware
party can be excusable for committing, whether he
punishable criminally which
of
the party may sometimes be ground
of the penalty or not. Nevertheless, the ignorance
to
or
him
Rex
v. Lynn,
T.
nominal punishment,
recommending
for inflicting
pardon.
Rex v. Esop,
0. and P., 456. And in some cases
R., 733; Rex v. Bailey, R. and Ry.,
crime,
of
constitute
defense.
where
may
the
As
per
the essence
where the intent
for larceny for the conversion to his own use of money which he had
son
prosecuted
found, and which he erroneously believed became his own by the finding. The Queen v.
house, in the mistaken be
Reed. Car. and M.. 306. Or where parties riotously destroy
lief that in law belongs to one of them. The Queen v. Langford. Car. and M, 602. Or
where
bankrupt, in honestly following the advice of counsel, withholds property from
his schedule which ought to be included, and makes to the same an affidavit which in law
McLean, 578.
U. S. v. Conner,
is false
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How far this excuse will be admitted in foro
to religion or sound morality.
conscientice, or whether the inferior in this case is not bound to obey the divine
rather than the human law, it is not my business to decide; though the ques
tion, believe, among the casuists, will hardly bear a doubt. But, however that
may be, obedience to the laws in being is undoubtedly a sufficient extenuation
The sheriff who burnt Latimer
of civil guilt before the municipal tribunal.
and Ridley, in the bigoted days of Queen Mary, was not liable to punishment
from Elizabeth, for executing so horrid an office; being justified by the com
mands of that magistracy which endeavoured to restore superstition under the
holy auspices of its merciless sister, persecution.
As to persons in private relations; the principal case, where constraint of a
superior is allowed as an excuse for criminal misconduct, is with regard to the
matrimonial subjection of the wife to her husband; for neither a son nor a ser
vant are excused for the commission of any crime, whether capital or other
wise, by the command or coercion of the parent or master; (b) though in some
cases the command or authority of the husband, either expressed or implied,
will privilege the wife from punishment, even for capital offences.
And there
fore if a woman oommit theft, burglary or other civil offences against the laws
of sooiety, by the coercion of her husband; or even in his company, which the
law construes a coercion; she is not guilty of any crime; being considered as
Which doctrine is at
acting by compulsion and not of her own will, (c)(5)
least a thousand years old in this kingdom, being to be found among the laws
And it appears that among the north°f King *Ina, the West Saxon,
l"*28l
L
J ern nations on the continent, (c?)
this privilege extended to any woman
transgressing in concert with a man, and to any servant that committed a joint
offence with a freeman; the male or freeman only was punished, the female or
slave dismissed: " prooul dubio quod alterum libertas, alter um necessitas impelleret." (e)
But (besides that in our law, which is a stranger to slavery, no im
punity is given to servants, who are as much free agents as their masters) even
with regard to wives this rule admits of an exception in crimes that are mala
in se, and prohibited by the law of nature, as murder and the like: not only
because these are of a deeper dye, but also, since in a state of nature no one is
in subjection to another, it would be unreasonable to screen an offender from
the punishment due to natural crimes, by the refinements and subordinations
of civil society. In treason, also (the highest crime which a member of society
can, as such, be guilty of), no plea of coverture shall excuse the wife; no pre
sumption of the husband's coercion shall extenuate her guilt: (/) as well be
cause of the odiousness and dangerous consequences of the crime itself, as be
cause the husband, having broken through the most sacred tie of social com-

I

1 Hawk. P. 0. 8.
Cap. 57.

(c) 1. Hal P. C. 45.
(e ) Stiernh. de jure Sueon. 1.S. c. 4.

(/)

1 Hal. P. 0. 47.

(5) The husband must, however, be present when the offense is committed, or the pre
Rex v. Morris, Russ. and Ry., 270. As tosumption of coercion by him does notarise.
what is sufficient presence, see R v. Connolly, 2 Lew. C. C. , 229. And even then the pre
sumption is not a conclusive one, but only prima facie, and it may be shown by evidence
that in fact the wife was the real criminal.
R v. Hammond, 1 Leach, 347; 1 Bish. Cr. L..
7th ed., §§359, 891a; Whart. Cr. L., §2475.
The wife may therefore be indicted and
tried jointly with the husband, and must rely on the coercion for an acquittal when the
proofs are adduced at the trial State v. Parkerson, 1 Strob. , 169; Commonwealth v. Mur
phy, 2 Gray, 510.
Coercion is not admitted as an excuse in the case of treason or murder. Reg. v. Man
ning, 2 C. and K., 887; and perhaps robbery should be added to this list Arch. Cr. L,
It is allowed in other
6; 1 Bish. Cr. L., 7th ed,. § 358; Rex v. Cruse, 8 C. and P., 54t.
felonies, and in misdemeanors
generally. R v. Ingram, 1 Salk., 384; Commonwealth v.
Neal, 10 Mass., 152. But the case of keeping a brothel and gaming-house are exceptions.
R. v. Dixon, 10 Mod., 336; State v. Bentz, 11 Mo., 27; Commonwealth v. Lewis, 1 Met.,
151. And husband and wife may be jointly indicted and convicted of an assault: Regina
v. Cruse, 8 C. and P., 541; or of keeping a liquor nuisance.
Commonwealth v. Tryon, 99Mass., 442.
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munity by rebellion against the state, has no right to that obedience from a
In inferior misde
•wife which he himself as a subject has forgotten to pay.
meanors, also, we may remark another exception; that a wife may be indicted
and set in the pillory with her husband for keeping a brothel; for this is an of
fence touching the domestic economy or government of the house, in which
the wife has a principal share; and is also such an offence as the law presumes
to be generally conducted by the intrigues of the female sex. {g) And in all
•cases, where the wife offends alone, without the company or coercion of her
husband, she is responsible for her offence as much as any feme-sole.
*2. Another species of compulsion or necessity is what our law calls
r*o0i*
*•
duress per minas; (h) or threats and menaces, which induce a fear of
other
and
which
take
for
that
reason
the
harm,
death or
guilt of
bodily
away
But then
many crimes and misdemeanors; at least before the human tribunal.
that fear which compels a man to do an unwarrantable action ought to be just
■and well-grounded; such "qui cadere possit in virum constantem, non timidum
in the words of the civil law. (A)
et meticulosum," as Bracton expresses
man may be justified in doing many
Therefore, in time of war or rebellion,
treasonable acts by compulsion of the enemy or rebels, which would admit of
This however seems only, or at least
no excuse in the time of peace.
(6)
principally, to hold as to positive crimes, so created by the laws of society; and
■which therefore society may excuse; but not as to natural offences so declared by
'the law of God, wherein human magistrates are only the executioners of div
man be violently assaulted, and hath
ine punishment. And therefore though
no other possible means of escaping death, but by killing an innocent person;
this fear and force shall not acquit him of murder; for he ought rather to die
But in such case he
himself, than escape by the murder of an innocent, (m)
is permitted to kill the assailant; for there the law of nature and self-defence,
its primary canon, have made him his own protector.
third species of necessity, which may be distinguished from
3. There
the actual compulsion of external force or fear; being the result of reason and
man's will, and oblige him to do an
reflection, which act upon and constrain
And that is, when
action which, without such obligation, would be criminal.
a man has his choice of two evils set before him, and, being under
necessity
Here the r*oi-i
■of choosing one, he chooses the *least pernicious of the two.
will cannot be said freely to exert itself, being rather passive than active,
rather in rejecting the greater evil than in choosing the less.
active,
or,
Of this sort
that necessity, where man by the commandment of the law
riot, and resist
bound to arrest another for any capital offence, or to disperse
here justifiable and even necessary to beat,
ance
made to his authority:
to wound or perhaps to kill the offenders, rather than permit the murderer to
For the preservation of the peace of the king
■escape, or the riot to continue.
dom, and the apprehending of notorious malefactors, are of the utmost conse-
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2

The presumption of coercion will apply to admissions made by the wife in the husband's
C. and K.,
)resence, calculated to exonerate him and inculpate herself.
Reg. v. Laugher,
not necessary for the woman to prove an actual marriage in these cases; the jury
i25. It
from evidence of cohabitation and reputation. Rex v. Woodward,
C.
may presume
C. and K., 185.
and P., 561; Reg. v. Good,
not excused from
That an agent or other person acting under the authority of another
criminal liability by the command of his superior, see Commonwealth v. Hadley, 11 Met.,
How. Miss, 806 Hays v. State, 13 Mo. 246 State v. Bugbee, 22 Vt.
66 Kliffleld v. State,
Hayw., 97. See, also, pott, p. 37, n.
32; Barrow v. Page,
Dall., 86. "In the eye of the law nothing will excuse the
(6) Respublica v. McCarty,
act of joining an enemy, but the fear of immediate death; not the fear of any inferior per
See, also, Rex v. Mcsonal injury, nor the apprehension of any outrage upon property."
Orowther,
East, P. C., 71.
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quence to the public; and therefore excuse the felony, which the killing would
otherwise amount to. (w) (7)
4. There is yet another case of necessity, which has occasioned great specu
lation among the writers upon general law; viz., whether a man in extreme

(s)

want of food or clothing may justify stealing either to relieve his present
necessities.
And this both Grotius (o) and Pufiendorf, (p) together with
many other of the foreign jurists, hold in the affirmative; maintaining by
many ingenious, humane, and plausible reasons, that in such cases the com
munity of goods, by a kind of tacit confession of society, is revived. And
some even of our own lawyers have held the same, (q) though it seems to be
an unwarranted doctrine, borrowed from the notions of some civilians: at least
it is now antiquated, the law of England admitting no such excuse at present,
(r) And this its doctrine is agreeable not only to the sentiments of many of
the wisest ancients, particularly Cicero,
who holds that " suum cuigue incommodum ferendum est, potius quam de alterius commodis detrahendum,Jt
but also to the Jewish law, as certified by King Solomon himself (t)
a
*h'ef 8teal8 10 satisfy his soul when he
hungry, he shall restore *seven["*<?2l
fold, he shall give all the substance of his house:" which was the ordin
And this
founded upon the
ary punishment for theft in that kingdom.
highest reason: for men's properties would be under
strange insecurity,
liable to be invaded according to the wants of others, of which wants no man
can possibly be an adequate judge, but the party himself who pleads them
In this country, especially, there would be peculiar impropriety in admitting
made for the
so dubious an excuse: for by our laws such sufficient provision
impossible that the most
poor by the power of the civil magistrate, that
needy stranger should ever be reduced to the necessity of thieving to support
nature.
The case of
by the way, the strongest instance put by
stranger
Baron Puffendorf, and whereon he builds his principal arguments: which, how
ever they may hold upon the continent, where the parsimonious industry of
the natives orders every one to work or starve, yet must lose all their weight
and efficacy in England, where charity
reduced to system, and interwoven
in our very constitution.
Therefore, our laws ought by no means to be taxed
with being unmerciful for denying this privilege to the necessitous; especially
when we consider, that the king, on the representation of his ministers of jus
tice, hath
power to soften the law, and to extend mercy in cases of peculiar
hardship. An advantage which
wanting in many states, particularly those
which are democratical; and these have in its stead introduced and adopted,
in the body of the law itself, multitude of circumstances tending to alleviate
better to vest in
its rigour. But the founders of our constitution thought
the crown the power of pardoning particular objects of compassion, than to
countenance and establish theft by one general undistinguishing law.
VII. To these several cases, in which the incapacity of committing crimes
arises from
deficiency of the will, we may add one more, in which the law
supposes an incapacity of doing wrong, from the excellence and perfection of
the *person; which extend as well to the will as to the other qualities
r*3Q-i
*■
of his mind.
mean the case of the king; who, by virtue of his royal
not under the coercive power of the law;(w) which will not
prerogative,
crime.
We are there
suppose him capable of committing a folly, much less
fore, out of reverence and decency, to forbear any idle inquiries, of what would
the king was to act thus and thus: since the law deems
be the consequence
so highly of his wisdom and virtue as not even to presume
possible for him
to do any thing inconsistent with his station and dignity: and therefore has
But of this sufficient was
made no provisions to remedy such
grievance.
former volume, (») to which
must refer the reader.
said in
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CHAPTER III.

OF PRINCIPALS AND ACCESSORIES.
It having been shown in the preceding chapter what persons are, or are not,
upon account of their situation and circumstances,
capable of committing
crimes, we are next to make a few remarks on the different degrees of guilt
among persons that are capable of offending, viz.: as principal, and as acces
sory.
I. A man may be principal in an offence in two degrees. A principal, in
the first degree, is he that is the actor, or absolute perpetrator, of the crime;
and, in the second degree, he who is present, aiding and abetting the fact to
be done, (a) Which presence need not always be an actual immediate stand
ing by, within sight or hearing of the fact; but there may be also a construc
tive presence, as when one commits a robbery or murder, and another keeps
watch or guard at some convenient distance, (6) (1) And this rule hath also
other exceptions: for, in case of murder by poisoning, a man may be a princi
pal felon by preparing and laying the poison, or persuading another to drink
it (c) who is ignorant of its poisonous quality, (d) or giving it to him for that
purpose; and yet not administer it himself, nor be present when the very deed
of poisoning is committed, (e) And the same reasoning will hold, with regard
to other murders committed in the absence *of the murderer, by means
r*3si
which he had prepared beforehand, and which probably could not fail <■ *
(a) 1 Hal. P.

a 615.

(6) Foster, 850.

(e) Eel. 52.

(d) Foster. 849.

(<)8 Inst. 188.

(1) To be a principal in the first degree, it is not necessary that one should be actually
present at the commission of the injury; as if one lay poison for another and the latter takes
several combine to forge an instrument, each
See Rex v. Harley, 4 C. & P., 369.
doing a separate part, and they are not together when the instrument is completed, all are
& R., 446. So, a person may be a principal
guilty as principals. See Rex v. Bingley,
if he acts by means of an insane or innocent person or an inanimate substance. See Com
monwealth v. HU1. 11 Mass., 186; Adams v. People, 1 N. T., 173; S. 0., 45 Am. Dec., 468;
Reg. v. Michael, 9 C. & P., 856; R, v. Mazeau, 8 0. & P., 676; Reg. v. Clifford, 2 C. & K.,
203.
the instrument so used is aware of his act, he is a principal in the first degree, and his
employer, if present at the time of the commission of the offense, is principal in the second
degree; if absent, an accessory before the fact.
See Rex v. Stewart, R. &
863; Fost,
As to criminal liability of a master for the acts of his servant in his business, see
849.
Com. v. Nichols, 10 Met., 259; S. C, 43 Am. Dec, 432. Mere presence at the commis
sion of a felony, if one takes no part in it and does not act in concert with the felons, does
not make one a principal in the second degree.
See Connaughty v. State, 1 Wis., 159;
Piummur v. Commonwealth, 1 Bush, 76; People v. Ah Ping, 27 Cal., 489; State v. Maloy,
44 la., 104.
To convict a person as principal in the second degree, it is not necessary to show actual
assistance.
It is enough if one s will contributed to the criminal act, ana at the time was
in position to render assistance to the perpetrator, if necessary.
Rex v. Owen, 1 Mood. 96;
Commonwealth v. Enapp, 9 Pick., 496; Thompson v. Commonwealth, 1 Mete. (Ky.), 18;
Rex v. Kelly,
&
420.
Any concerted participation in a general felonious plan, provided there be constructive
presence, is enough to warrant a conviction as a principal in the second degree.
See
Rex v. Standby, R. & R., 305 ; Rex v. Passey, T. C. & P., 282; Rex v. Lockett, Ibid.,
300.
one counsels another to commit suicide, and it is committed, the one so advising
is guilty of murder.
So, the seconds at a
See Commonwealth v. Bowen, 13 Mass., 306.
duel, if death ensue are held as principals for murder.
Reg. v. Young, 8 C. & P., 644.
In some states the distinction between a principal in the first and in the second degree is
abolished by statute.
All concerned in the commission of the offense, and all who aid or
abet its commission, may be punished as principals.
A person may be principal in a crime in a state where, at the time, he is not, if he is
instigator of the criminal act and accomplishes it through innocent agents.
People v.
Adams, 3 Denio, 190; 8. C, 45 Am. Dec., 468.
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of their mischievous effect.
As by laying a trap or pitfall for another, where
by he is killed : letting out a wild beast, with an intent to do mischief, or in
citing a madman to commit murder, so that death thereupon ensues; in every
of these cases the party offending is guilty of murder as a principal in the first
For he cannot be called an accessory; that necessarily pre-supposing
degree.
a principal; and the poison, the pitfall, the beast, or the madman, cannot ba
held principals, being only the instruments of death.
As therefore he must be
certainly guilty either as principal or accessory, and cannot be so as accessory,
it follows that he must be guilty as principal, and, if principal, then in the first
degree; for there is no other criminal, much less a superior in the guilt, whom
he could aid, abet, or assist^/)
II. An accessory is he who is not the chief actor in the offence, nor present
at its performance, but in some way concerned therein, either before or after
the fact committed. In considering the nature of which degree of guilt, we
will, first, examine what offences admit of accessories, and what not: secondly,
who may be an accessory, before the fact: thirdly, who may be an accessory
after it: and, lastly, how accessories, considered merely as such, and distinct
from principals, are to be treated.
1. And, first, as to what offences admit of accessories, and what not.
In
high treason there are no accessories, but all are principals: the same acts, that
make a man accessory in felony, making him a principal in high treason, upon
account of the heinousness of the crime, (g) Besides it is to be considered,
that the bare intent to commit treason is many times actual treason: as imag
ining the death of the king, or conspiring to take away his crown. And, as no
one can advise and abet such a crime without an intention to have it done,
*bere can De no accessories before the fact; since the *very advice and
T*36l•*
L
abetment amount to principal treason.
But this will not hold in the
inferior species of high treason, which do not amount to the legal idea of com
passing the death of the king, queen, or prince. For in those no advice to
commit them, unless the thing be actually performed, will make a man a prin
cipal traitor. (A) In petit treason, murder and felonies, with or without benefit
of clergy, there may be accessories: except only in those offences which by
judgment of law are sudden and unpremeditated, as manslaughter and the
like; which therefore cannot have any accessories before the fact.(t)
So, too,
in petit larceny, and in all crimes under the degree of felony, there are no
accessories either before or after the fact; but all persons concerned therein, if
guilty at all, are principals ;(&) the same rule holding with regard to the highest
and lowest offences, though upon different reasons.
In treason all are princi
pals, propter odium delicti; in trespass all are principals, because the law, quae
de minimis non curat, does not descend to distinguish the different shades of
It is a maxim, that accessorius sequitur naturam
guilt in petty misdemeanors.
eui principalis/
and therefore an accessory cannot be guilty of a higher
crime than his principal; being only punished as
So
partaker of his guilt.
that
servant instigates
stranger to kill his master, this being murder in
the stranger as principal, of course the servant
accessory only to the crime
of murder; though, had he been present and assisting, he would have been
guilty as principal of petit treason, and the stranger of murder, (wi)
2. As to the second point, who may be an accessory before the fact; Sir
Matthew Hale (n) defines him to be one who being absent at the time of the
crime committed, doth yet procure, counsel, or command another to commit
Herein absence
crime.
such pro
necessary to make him an accessory: for
curer, or the like, be present, he
guilty of the crime as principal. If A then
to kill another, and *B does
in the absence of A, now
r^g^-. advises
And this holds, even
principal and A
accessory in the murder.
though the party killed be not in rerum natura at the time of the advice
(g) Inst. 138. Hal. P. C. 815.
(h) Foster. SO.
(/) Hal. P. C. 617. Haw. P. 0. «1S.
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given. As if A, the reputed father, advises B, the mother of a hastard child,
unborn, to strangle it when born, and she does so; A is accessory to this mur
der, (o) And it is also settled, (p) that whoever procureth a felony to be
■committed, though it be by the intervention of a third person, is an accessory
before the fact. It is likewise a rule, that he who in any wise commands or
counsels another to commit an unlawful act, is accessory to all that ensues
upon that unlawful act; but is not accessory to any act distinct from the
other. As if A commands B to beat C, and B beats him so that he dies: B is
guilty of murder as principal, and A as accessory. (2) But if A commands B
to burn C's house; and he, in so doing, commit a robbery; now A, though
accessory to the burning, is not accessory to the robbery, for that is a thing
of a distinct and unconsequential nature, (q) (3) But if the felony committed
be the same in substance with that which is commanded, and only varying in
command to poison Titius, he
some circumstantial matters; as
upon
still accessory to the murder; for
stabbed or shot, and dies: the commander
the substance of the thing commanded was the death of Titius, and the man
mere collateral circumstance,
ner of its execution
(r)
3. An accessory after the fact may be, where
person, knowing
felony to
have been committed, receives, relieves, comforts, or assists the felon, («)
in the first place requisite
Therefore, to make an accessory ex post facto,
In the next place he must re
that he knows of the felony committed.
(4)
ceive, relieve, comfort, or assist him. And generally, any assistance whatever,
given to felon, to hinder his being apprehended, tried, or suffering punish
As furnishing him with
ment, makes the assistor an accessory.
horse to
escape his *pnrsuers, money or victuals to support him, a house or other r*38-|
shelter to conceal him, or open force and violence to rescue or protect
him. (w) So likewise to convey instruments to felon to enable him to break
man an accessory to the
gaol, or to bribe the gaoler to let him escape, makes
felon in gaol with clothes or other necessaries,
no
felony. But to relieve
the hinderance
offence; for the crime imputable to this speoies of accessory
of public justice, by assisting the felon to escape the vengeance of the law. (v)
To buy or receive stolen goods, knowing them to be stolen, falls under none of
was therefore at common law a mere misdemeanor, and
these descriptions;
made not the receiver accessory to the theft, because he received the goods
only, and not the felon: (v>) but now by the statutes Ann. c. 31, and Geo.
c. 11, all such receivers are made accessories (where the principal felony admits
of accessories), (x) and may be transported for fourteen years; and, in the
case of receiving linen goods stolen from the bleach ing-grounds, are by statute
In France such
18 Geo. II, c. 27, declared felons without benefit of clergy. (5)

I
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1

1

2
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(p) Foster, 125.
(a) HaL P. 0. 017.
(o) Dyer, 188.
Hawk. P. C. 819.
Ir) Hawk. P. C. 816.
(t) Hal. P. C. 818.
«)
(u) bid. 817,318.
(v) HaL P. C. 620,621.
(u>)Ibid. 020.
(*) Poster. 78.
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case, that the command was by
no excuse for the party beating in such
mas
(2) It
ter to his servant, by parent to his child, or by any other person occupying
position of
the beating was unwarranted by law, both are criminally responsible.
authority;
dish., 279; Hays v. State, 13 Mo., 246; State v. Bell, Port.,
Commonwealth v. Drew,
365: Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 How., 115; State v. Bugbee, 22 Vt., 82; Curtis v. Knox,
Denio, 341.
Where the offense committed
C. and P., 309.
not the
(8) See Regina v. Taunton,
precise one planned and advised, Mr. Justice Foster says the proper criterion to determine
"
not,
is,
involved
in
the
Did
the
whether the adviser
principal commit the
legal guilt or
offense he stands charged with under the influence of the flagitious advice; and was the
event, in the ordinary course of things,
probable consequence of that felony? or did he,
following the suggestions of his own wicked heart, willfully and knowingly commit felony
Fost., 872.
of another kind?
Arch. Cr. L., ch.
As to accessories in general, see Bish. Cr. L., 7th ed., ch. 47 and 48;
Russ. on Cr., ch.
Hale, P. C. 823, 622; Whart. Cr. L.
146;
Bish. Cr. L., 7th ed.,
(4) See
692^693.
(5) These statutory provisions are repealed, and the death penalty abolished,
is now punished under statue 24 and 25 Vic. c. 96.
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receivers are punished with death: and the Gothic constitutions distinguished
also three sorts of thieves, " unum qui consilium daret, alterum qui contrectaret, tertium qui receptaret et occuleret; pari pomes singulos obnoxios." (y)
The felony must be complete at the time of the assistance given; else it
makes not the assistant an accessory.
As if one wounds another mortally,
and after the wound given, but before death ensues, a person assists or receives
the delinquent: this does not make him accessory to the homicide; for, till
death ensues, there is no felony committed.
But so strict
the law where
felony
actually oomplete, in order to do effectual justice, that the nearest
relations are not suffered to aid or receive one another. (6) If the parent as
sists his child, or the child his parent,
the brother receives the brother, the
master his servant, or the servant his master, or even
the husband relieves
his wife, who have any of them committed a *felony, the receivers be|-*„„i
come accessories ex post facto, (a)
But feme-covert cannot become an
accessory by the receipt and concealment of her husband; for she
presumed
to act under his coercion, and therefore she
not bound, neither ought she, to
discover her lord, (b)
how accessories are to be treated, considered
4. The last point of inquiry
distinct from principals. And the general rule of the ancient law (borrowed
from the G< '.hie constitutions), (c)
this, that accessories shall suffer the same
one be liable to death, the other
also
punishment as their principals:
liable: (d) as, by the laws of Athens, delinquents and their abettors were to re
ceive the same punishment, (e)
may be asked, are such elaborate
Why, then,
distinctions made between accessories and principals,
both are to suffer the
same punishment?
For these reasons:
To distinguish the nature and
denomination of crimes, that the accused may know how to defend himself,
different
when indicted; the commission of an actual robbery being quite
accusation from that of harboring the robber. 2. Because, though by the
ancient common law the rule
as before laid down, that both shall be pun
dis
ished alike, yet now by the statutes relating to the benefit of clergy
tinction
made between them; accessories after the fact being still allowed
the benefit of clergy in all cases, except horse-stealing (f) and stealing of
denied to the principals and acces
linen from bleaching-grounds: (g) which
sories before the fact, in many cases, as, among others, in petit treason, murder,
a distinction were con
robbery, and willful burning. (A) And perhaps
stantly to be made between the punishment of principals and accessories, even
little less severity than the
befcre the fact, the latter to be treated with
former,
might prevent the perpetration of many crimes, by increasing the
person to execute the deed itself; as his danger would
difficulty of finding
*than that of his accomplices, by reason of the difference of
MMnl ^e greater
his punishment,
3. Because formerly no man could be tried as ac
cessory till after the principal was convicted, or at least he must have been
now much altered, as will
tried at the same time with him: though that law
man be indicted
4. Because, though
be shown more fully in its proper place.
as accessory and acquitted, he may afterwards be indicted as principal:
for an
no acquittal of the felony itself;
felon
acquittal of receiving or counselling
man be acquitted as principal, he
but
matter of some doubt, whether,
can be afterwards indicted as accessory before the fact; since those offences are
frequently very nearly allied, and therefore an acquittal of the guilt of one
clearly held, that one
may be an acquittal of the other also, (k) (7) But
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1,

1

2

5.

2

Ik) i
1 33

I

8,

c.
(*) Hawk, P. 0. 820.
(«) Stlernhook, de jure. Qoth.
See Stlernhook, ibid.
(a) iDst. 108. Hawk P. 0. 820.
(S) Hal. P. C. 621.
Inst. 188.
Antlq.
26.
Pott
b.
o.
"
(e)
ai EYir. c. 12.
Stat. 18Geo. H, c. 27.
Stat 81Elir.
~(g\
(o) SlaXWOebrnVc.
(0 Beccar. c. 87.
f) StiV
(A) Hal. P. 0. 615.
Hal. P. C. 628,626. Hawk. P. 0. 878. Foster, 861

1
;

§

2,

is

(6) This has been changed by statute in some states so that near relatives may aid each
other in such cases without becoming accessories after the fact.
c. 85,
disputed by Hawkins and Foster. Hawkins, b.
Poster, 861.
(7) This
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acquitted as a principal may be indicted as an accessory after the fact; since
that is always an offence of a different species of guilt, principally tending to
evade the public justice, and is subsequent in its commencement
to the other.
Upon these reasons, the distinction of principal and accessory will appear to
be highly necessary;
though the punishment is still much the same with
regard to principals, and such accessories as offend before the fact is commit
ted. (8)

CHAPTER IV.

OF OFFENCES AGAINST GOD AND RELIGION.

pages 123,121.
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In the present chapter we are to enter upon the detail of the several species
of crimes and misdemeanors, with the punishments annexed to each by the
laws of England.
It was observed in the beginning of this book, (a) that
crimes and misdemeanors are a breach and violation of the puty-io rights and
duties owing to the whole community, considered as a community, in its social
aggregate capacity. And in the very entrance of these Commentaries (b) it
was shown that human laws can have no concern with any but social and rela
tive duties, being intended only to regulate the conduct of man, considered un
der various relations, as a member of civil society.
All crimes ought therefore
to be estimated merely according to the mischiefs which they produce in civil
society; (c) and of consequence private vices or breach of mere absolute duties,
which man is bound to perform considered only as an individual, are not, can
not be, the object of any municipal law, any farther than as by their evil ex
ample, or other pernicious effects, they may prejudice the community, and
Thus the vice of drunkenness, if
thereby become a species of public crimes.
committed privately and alone, is beyond the knowledge, and of course beyond
the reach of human tribunals: but if committed publicly,
the face of the
The vice of
world, its evil example makes
liable to temporal censures.
criminal violation of truth, and
ing, which consists (abstractedly taken) in
not how- r,,.-)
therefore in any *shape
derogatory from sound morality,
ever taken notice of by our law, unless
carries with
some public inconvenience, as spreading false news; or some social injury, as slander and ma
licious prosecution, for which
private recompense
given. And yet drunk
enness and malevolent lying are, in foro conscientice, as thoroughly criminal
when they are not, as when they are, attended with public inconvenience. The
that both public and private vices are subject to the vengeonly difference
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before the fact to
felony may be
(8) By statute 24 and 25 Vic, c. 94, an accessory
Indicted, tried, and punished as
he were
principal felon; and, by section
whoever
shall counsel, procure or command any other person to commit felony, shall be guilty of
felony, and may be punished either as accessory before the fact, or for substantive felony,
amenable to justice or not
previously convicted, or
and whether the principal felon
And, by section
accessories after the fact to
felony may be indicted and convicted of
a substantive felony, whether the principal felon shall or shall not be previously convicted,
or amenable to justice or not.
In number of the United States there are similar modifications of the common law
For the rule, in the absence of such statutes, see Stoops v. Com
relating to this subject
monwealth,
& R, 491; Commonwealth v. Knapp, 10 Pick., 477; State v. Duncan,
Ired., 98; Holmes v. Commonwealth, 25 Penn. St., 221.
As to charging accessories with
substantive felony, under statutes permitting that
course, see State v. Weston,
Conn., 527; Noland v. State, 19 Ohio, 181; Shannon v.
Mich., 71.
PeoDle,
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-aiice of eternal justice; and public vices are besides liable to the temporal pun
ishments of human tribunals.
On the other hand, there are some misdemeanors which are punished by the
municipal law, that have in themselves nothing criminal, but are made unlaw
ful by the positive constitutions of the state for public convenience; such as
poaching, exportation of wool, and the like. These are naturally no offences
at all; but their whole criminality consists in the disobedience to the supreme
power, which has an undoubted right, for the well-being and peace of the com
munity, to make some things unlawful which were in themselves indifferent.
Upon the whole, therefore, though part of the offences to be enumerated in the
following sheets are offences against the revealed law of God, others against the
law of nature, and some are offenoes against neither; yet, in a treatise of muni
cipal law, we must consider them all as deriving their particular guilt, here
punishable, from the law of man.
Having premised this caution, shall next proceed to distribute the several
offences, which are either directly or by consequence injurious to civil society,
and therefore punishable by the laws of England, under the following general
heads: first, those which are more immediately injurious to God and his holy
religion; secondly, such as violate and transgress the law of nations; thirdly,
fluch as more especially affect the soverign executive power of the state, or the
and his government; fourthly, such as more directly *infringe the
r%.„1 king
*■• J
rights of the public or commonwealth; and lastly, such as derogate from
those rights and duties which are owing to particular individuals, and in the
preservation and vindication of which the community is deeply interested.
First, then, of such crimes and misdemeanors as more immediately offend
Almighty God, by openly transgressing the precepts of religion, either natural
or revealed: and mediately, by their bad example and consequence, the law of
society also: which constitutes that guilt in the action which human tribunals
are to censure.
L Of this species the first is that of apostasy, or a total renunciation of
This
■Christianity, by embracing either a false religion, or no religion at all.
offence can only take place in such as have once professed the true religion.
The perversion of a Christian to Judaism, paganism, or other false religion, was
punished by the emperors Constantius and Julian with confiscation of goods;
\d) to which the emperors Theodosius and Valentinian added capital punish
ment, in case the apostate endeavoured to pervert others to the same inquity:
{e) a punishment too severe for any temporal laws to inflict upon any spiritual
offence; and yet the zeal of our ancestors imported it into this country; for we
find by Bracton
that in his time apostates were to be burnt to death.
Doubtless the preservation of Christianity, as a national religion,
abstracted
from its own intrinsic truth, of the utmost consequence to the civil state: which
a single instance will sufficiently demonstrate.
The belief of a future state of
rewards and punishments, the entertaining just ideas of the moral attributes of
the Supreme Being, and
firm persuasion that he superintends and will finally
all which are clearly revealed in the
-compensate every action in human life
doctrines, and forcibly inculcated by the precepts, of our Saviour Christ), these
are the grand foundation of all judical oaths; which call God to witness the
. truth of those facts, which perhaps may be only known to him and the party
attesting: all moral evidence, ""therefore, all confidence in human verar*a.4.1
*■
city, must be weakened by apostasy, and overthrown by total infidelity.
Wherefore all affronts to Christianity, or endeavours to depreciate its effi
{g)
are highly deserving of censure.
cacy, in those who have once professed
But yet the loss of life
heavier penalty than the offence, taken in
civil

I

a

a

is

it,

J

(

a

is,

(f)

7.

t

I

a,

9.

:

/

L

«.

1,
7,

c.
(d>Cod.
(e) Ibid.
(/)
quanta
(a) Utiles esse opiniones has, quis nr.gat, cum intelltgat, quam multa firmentur jurejurando;
salutis sint fcederum reliqiones quam multos dioini supplicii metus a scelere revocarit
quamque
sancta sit societal civiutn inter ipsos, DO* immortalibus interpositis turn judieilnu, turn ttstibus
Cic
■deL. L. U.
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(t)
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Hal. P. C. 884.
(n) c d« katretici*.
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(k) lietcroyantz In our ancient law books Is the name of unbelievers.
s, 40,c. 27.
(m) Cod.
(*) Cap. de katrtticiM.
(I) Decretal.
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light, deserves: and, taken in a spiritual light, our laws have no jurisdiction
over it. This punishment therefore has long ago become obsolete; and the of
fence of apostasy was for along time the object only of the ecclesiastical courts,
which corrected the offender pro salute animal. But about the close of thelast century, the civil liberties to which we were then restored being used as a
cloak of maliciousness, and the most horrid doctrines subversive of all religion
being publicly avowed both in discourse and writings, it was thought necessary
again for the civil power to interpose, by not admitting those miscreants (A) to
the privileges of society, who maintained such principles as destroyed all moral
To this end it was enacted by statute 9 and 10 Wm. Ill, c. 32,.
obligation.
that if any person educated in, or having made profession of, the Christian re
ligion, shall, by writing, printing, teaching, or advised speaking, deny the
Christian religion to be true, or the holy scriptures to be of divine authority^
he shall upon the first offence, be rendered incapable to hold any office or placo
of trust; and for the second, be rendered incapable of bringing any action, be
ing guardian, executor, legatee, or purchaser of lands, and shall suffer three
years' imprisonment without bail. To give room, however, for repentance,
within four months after the first conviction, the delinquent will in open
court publicly renounce his error, he
discharged for that once from all dis
abilities.
total denial of
that of heresy, which consists not in
II. A second offence
Christianity, but of some of its essential *doctrines, publicly and obr*4r-i
stinately avowed; being defined by Sir Matthew Hale, "sententia rerum
divinarum humano sensu excogitata, palam docta et pertinaciter de/ensa." (i)
And here
must also be acknowledged that particular modes of belief or un
belief, not tending to overturn Christianity itself, or to sap the foundations of
morality, are by no means the object of coercion by the civil magistrate.
What doctrine shall therefore be adjudged heresy was left by our old consti
tution to the determination of the ecclesiastical judge; who had herein
most
arbitrary latitude allowed him. For the general definition of an heretic given
by Lyndewode, (k) extends to the smallest deviation from the doctrines of holy
church: " Iwsreticus est qui dubitat de fide catholica, et qui negligit servare ea,
Or, as the statute
ecclesia statuit, seu servare decreverat."
qua} Romana
in English, "teaahers of erroneous opinions, con
Hen. IV, c. 15, expresses
Very con
trary to the faith and blessed determinations of the holy church.
trary this to the usage of the first general councils, which defined all heretical
And what ought to have
doctrines with the utmost precision and exactness.
alleviated the punishment, the uncertainty of the crime, seems to have en
true that the
hanced
in those days of blind zeal and pious cruelty. It
sanctimonious hypocrisy of the canonists went at first no farther than enjoin
ing penanoe, excommunication, and ecclesiastical deprivation for heresy; though
afterwards they proceeded boldly to imprisonment by the ordinary, and con
But in the mean time they had prevailed
fiscation of goods in pios usus.
upon the weakness of bigoted princes to make the civil power subservient totheir purposes, by making heresy not only
temporal, but even a capital
offence: the Romish ecclesiastics determining, without appeal, whatever they
pleased to be heresy, and shifting off to the secular arm the odium and drudg
ery of executions; with which they themselves were too tender and delicate
to intermeddle. Nay, they pretended to intercede and pray, on behalf of the
convicted heretic, ut citra mortis periculum sententia circa eum moderalur:
r
well *knowing at the same time that they were delivering the unhappy
*
Hence the capital punishments inflicted on
victim to certain death.
the ancient Donatists and Manichseans by the emperors Theodosius and Jus
tinian; (m) hence also the constitution of the emperor Frederic mentioned by
Lyndewode, (n) adjudging all persons without distinction to be burnt with
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The same
fire, who were convicted of heresy by the ecclesiastical judge.
emperor, in another constitution, (o) ordained that if any temporal lord, when
admonished by the church, should neglect to clear his territories of heretics
within a year, it should be lawful for good catholics to seize and occupy the
And upon this foun
lands, and utterly to exterminate the heretical possessors.
dation was built that arbitrary power, so long claimed and so fatally exerted
by the pope, of disposing even of the kingdoms of refractory princes to more
dutiful sons of the church. The immediate event of this constitution was
something singular, and may serve to illustrate at once the gratitude of the
holy see, and the just punishment of the royal bigot: for upon the authority
of this very constitution, the pope afterwards expelled this very emperor
Frederic from his kingdom of Sicily, and gave it to Charles of Anjou. (p)
Christianity being thus deformed by the daemon of persecution upon the
-continent, we cannot expect that our own island should be entirely free from
And therefore we find among our ancient precedents (q) a
the same scourge.
writ de hwetico comburendo, which is thought by some to be as ancient as the
However, it appears from thence, that the conviction of
common law itself.
heresy by the common law was not in any petty ecclesiastical court, but before
the archbishop himself, in a provincial synod; and that the delinquent was de
livered over to the king, to do as he should please with him: so that the crown
had a control over the spiritual power, and might pardon the convict by issu
ing no process against him; the writ de hceretico comburendo being not a writ
r
*of course, but issuing only by the special direction of the king in
-J
"council, (r) But in the reign of Henry the Fourth, when the eyes of
the Christian world began to open, and the seeds of the protestant religion
took root in the kingdom;
(though under the opprobrious name of lollardy)
the clergy taking advantage from the king's dubious title to demand an increase
which sharpened the
of their own power, obtained an act of parliament,
For, by that statute, the diocesan
edge of persecution to its utmost keenness.
alone, without the intervention of
synod, might convict of heretical tenets:
after abjuration he relapsed,
and unless the convict abjured his opinions, or
the sheriff was bound, ex officio,
required by the bishop, to commit the un
happy victim to the flames, without waiting for the consent of the crown. By
the statute
Hen. V, o.
temporal offence, and in
lollardy was also made
dictable in the king's courts; which did not thereby gain an exclusive, but only
a concurrent, jurisdiction with the bishop's consistory.
Afterwards, when the final reformation of religion began to advance, the
power of the ecclesiastics was somewhat moderated: for though what heresy
is, was not then precisely defined, yet we were told in some points what
not; the statute 25 Hen. YIH, c. 14, declaring that offences against the see of
Rome are not heresy; and the ordinary being thereby restrained from proceed
ing in any case upon mere suspicion; that is, unless the party be accused by
two credible witnesses, or an indictment of heresy be first previously found in
the king's courts of common law. And yet the spirit of persecution was not
then abated, but onlydiverted into
For in six years afterwards,
lay channel.
by statute 81 Hen. VIII, c. 14, the bloody law of the six articles was made,
wk'°k established the six most contested points of *popery, transubT*481
stantiation, communion in one kind, the celibacy of the clergy, monastic
vows, the sacrifice of the mass, and auricular confession; which points were
" determined and resolved by the most godly study, pain, and travail of his
majesty: for which his most humble and obedient subjects, the lords spiritual
and temporal, and the commons in parliament assembled, did not only render
and give unto his highness their most high and hearty thanks," but did also

2

1

(p)Baldus*n Cod. 1,5,4.
(0) Cod 1,6, 4.
(r) Hal P. 0. 896.
(?) F. N. B. 289.
(») So called not from lolium or tares, (an etymology which wa9 afterwards devised in order to Justify
the burning of tliem, Matth. xlii. SOibut from one Walter Lolhard, a German reformer, A. D. 1315. Mod.
Va. Hist, xxvi, 18. Spelm. Glow. 8H.
(t) Hen. IV, c. 16.
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enact and declare all oppugners of the first to be heretics, and to be burnt
with fire; and of the five last to be felons, and to suffer death. The same
statute established a new and mixed jurisdiction of clergy and laity for the
trial and conviction of heretics; the reigning prince being then equally intent
on destroying the supremacy of the bishops of Rome, and establishing all
other their corruptions of the Christian religion.
shall not perplex this detail with the various repeals and revivals of these
sanguinary laws in the two succeeding reigns; but shall proceed directly to
the reign of Queen Elizabeth; when the reformation was finally established
with temper and decency, unsullied with party rancour, or personal caprice and
resentment.
By statute 1 Eliz., o. 1, all former statutes relating to heresy are
repealed, which leaves the jurisdiction of heresy as it stood at common law;
viz., as to the infliction of common censures, in the ecclesiastical courts; and
in case of burning the heretic, in the provincial senate only, (u) Sir Matthew
Hale is indeed of a different opinion, and holds that such power resided in the
diocesan also, though he agrees that, in either case, the writ de hmretico comof common right, but grantable or otherwise
burendo was not demandable
merely at the king's discretion, (v) But the principal point now gained was,
that by this statute a boundary is for the first time set to what shall be ac
counted heresy; nothing for the future being to be so determined, but only
such tenets, which have been heretofore so declared: 1. By the words of the
canonical scriptures; 2. By the first four general councils, or such *others r*4f,-i
as have only used the words of the holy scriptures; or, 3. Which shall >■ J
hereafter be so declared by the parliament, with the assent of the clergy in
convocation. Thus was heresy reduced to a greater certainty than before;
though it might not have been the worse to have defined it in terms still more
precise and particular: as a man continued still liable to be burnt for what
perhaps he did not understand to be heresy till the ecclesiastical judge so in
terpreted the words of the canonical scriptures.
For the writ de hceretico comburendo remained still in force; and we have
instances of its being put in execution upon two anabaptists in the seventeenth
of Elizabeth, and two arians in the ninth of James the First. But it was totally
abolished, and heresy again subjected only to ecclesiastical correction, pro
For in one and the
salute animce, by virtue of the statute 29 Car. II, c. 9.
same reign, our lands were delivered from the slavery of military tenures, our
bodies from arbitrary imprisonment by the habeas corpus act, and our minds
from the tyranny of superstitious bigotry, by demolishing this last badge of
persecution in the English law.
In what have now said, would not be understood to derogate from the
just rights of the national ohurch, or to favor a loose latitude of propagating
any crude, undigested sentiments, in religious matters. Of propagating, I say;
for the bare entertaining them, without an endeavor to diffuse them, seems
only mean to illustrate the
hardly cognizable by any human authority.
excellence of our present establishment, by looking back to former times.
Every thing is now as it should be, with respect to the spiritual cognizance,
and spiritual punishment, of heresy: unless perhaps that the crime ought to be
more strictly defined, and no prosecution permitted, even in the ecclesiastical
courts, till the tenets in question are by proper authority previously declared
to be heretical. Under these restrictions it seems necessary, for the support of
the national religion, that the officers of the church should have power to cen
sure heretics; yet not to harass them with temporal penalties, much less to
The legislature hath indeed thought it r*fin-i
exterminate or '''destroy them.
*
proper, that the civil magistrate should again interpose, with regard to ^
one species of heresy very prevalent in modern times; for by statute 9 and
10 Wm. Ill, c. 32, if any person educated in the Christian religion, or profes
sing the same, shall, by writing, printing, teaching, or advised speaking, deny
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(«) 6 Rep. 23. 12Rep. 68.92.

(«) 1 HaL P. G 405.
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any one of the persons in the holy trinity to be God, or maintain that there
are more gods than one, he shall undergo the same penalties and incapacities,
which were just now mentioned to be inflicted on apostacy by the same stat
ute. (1)
And thus much for the crime of heresy.
III. Another species of offences against religion are those which affect the
established church.
And these are either positive or negative; positive, by
Of
reviling its ordinances; or negative, by non-conformity to its worship.
both of these in their order.
1. And, first, of the offence of reviling the ordinances of the church. (2)
This is a crime of a much grosser nature than the other of mere non-conform
ity, since it carries with it the utmost indecency, arrogance, and ingratitude;
indecency, by setting up private judgment in virulent and factious opposition
to public authority; arrogance, by treating with contempt and rudeness what
has at least a better chance to be right than the singular notions of any par
ticular man; and ingratitude, by denying that indulgence and undisturbed
liberty of conscience to the members of the national church, which the retain
ers to every petty conventicle enjoy.
However, it is provided by statutes 1
Edw. VI, c. 1, and 1 Eliz. c. 1, that whoever reviles the sacrament
of the
Lord's supper shall be punished by fine and imprisonment; and by statute 1
Eliz. o. 2, if any minister shall speak any thing in derogation of the book of
common prayer, he shall, if not beneficed, be imprisoned one year for the first
offence, and for life for the second; and if he be beneficed, he shall for the first
offence be imprisoned six months, and forfeit a year's value of his benefice:
for the second offence he shall be deprived, and suffer one year's imprison
ment: and for the third, he shall in like manner be deprived, and suffer imf°r life. *And if any person whatsoever shall, in plays,
r*511 Prisoninent
*■
J songs, or other open words, speak any thing in derogation, depraving,
or despising of the said book, or shall forcibly prevent the reading of
or
cause any other service to be used in its stead, he shall forfeit for the first
offence an hundred marks; for the second, four hundred; and for the third,
shall forfeit all his goods and chattels, and suffer imprisonment for life. (3)
These penalties were framed in the infancy of our present establishment, when
the disciples of Rome and of Geneva united in inveighing with the utmost bit
terness against the English liturgy; and the terror of these laws (for they sel
dom,
ever, were fully executed) proved
principal means, under Providence,
of preserving the purity as well as decency of our national worship. Nor can
their continuance to this time (of the milder penalties at least) be thought too
severe and intolerant so far as they are levelled at the offence, not of thinking
differently from the national church, but of railing at that church and obstruct
ing its ordinances, for not submitting its public judgment to the private opinion
of others.
clear that no restraint should be laid upon
For, though
rational and dispassionate discussions of the rectitude and propriety of the
established mode of worship; yet contumely and contempt are what no estab
lishment oan tolerate, (w)
rigid attachment to trifles, and an intemperate
zeal for reforming them, are equally ridiculous and absurd; but the latter
at present the less excusable, because from political reasons, sufficiently hinted
at in
former volume, (a;)
would now be extremely unadvisable to make
any alterations in the service of the church; unless by its own consent, or un-

I,

{w) By an ordinance 23 Aug. 1645,which continued till the restoration, to preach, write, or print any
thing In derogation or depraving or the director)/, for the then established presbyterian worship, subject
ed the offender upon indictment to a discretionary fine, not exceeding 501. (ScobeU 98.)
p. 88.
(z) Book

it

affected Unitarians was repealed by the 53 Geo.
(1) This enactment, so far as
160.
On
of
the
general subject
religious liberty, see Cooley, Const. Lira., ch. 13.
(2)
c. 32.
(3) Repealed as far as relates to protestant dissenters, by the 31 Geo.

Ill,
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less it can be shown that some manifest impiety or shocking absurdity will
follow from continuing the present forms.
2. Non-conformity
to the worship of the church is the other, or negative
branch of this offence.
And for this there is much more to be pleaded than
for the former; being a *matter of private conscience, to the scruples r*-2-i
of which our present laws have shown a very just and Christian indul- *• -I
For undoubtedly all persecution and oppression of weak consciences,
gence.
on the score of religious persuasions, are highly unjustifiable upon every prin
But care must be
ciple of natural reason, civil liberty, or sound religion.
taken not to carry this indulgence into such extremes, as may endanger the
national church: there is always a difference to be made between toleration

J
1

2,

is

1,

&

1

a

I

a

is

is

L

is

if

it,

and establishment.
Non-conformists are of two sorts: first, such as absent themselves from di
vine worship in the established church, through total irreligion, and attend the
service of no other persuasion.
These, by the statutes of 1 Eliz. c. 2, 23 Eliz.
e. 1, and 8 Jac. I, c. 4, forfeit one shilling to the poor every Lord's day they
so absent themselves, and 20l. to the king if they continue such default for a
month together. And if they keep any inmate, thus irreligiously disposed, in
their houses, they forfeit 102. per month.
The second species of non-conformists are those who offend through a mis
taken or perverse zeal. Such were esteemed by our laws, enacted since the
time of the reformation, to be papists and protestant dissenters; both of whom
were supposed to be equally schismatics in not communicating with the na
tional church; with this difference, that the papists divided from it upon ma
terial, though erroneous reasons; but many of the dissenters upon matters of
indifference, or, in other words, upon no reason at all. Tet certainly our an
cestors were mistaken in their plans of compulsion and intolerance.
The sin
of schism, as such, is by no means the object of temporal coercion and punish
If through weakness of intellect, through misdirected piety, through
ment.
perverseness and acerbity of temper, or (which is often the case,) through a
prospect of secular advantage in herding with a party, men quarrel with the
un
ecclesiastical establishment, the civil magistrate has nothing to do with
less their tenets and practice are such as to threaten ruin or disturbance to the
bound, indeed, to protect the established church; *and,
state.
He
°
this can be better effected, by admitting none but its genuine members
to offices of trust and emolument, he
certainly at liberty so to do: the dis
But, this point being
posal of offices being matter of favour and discretion.
once secured, all persecution for diversity of opinions, however ridiculous
and absurd they may be,
contrary to every principle of sound polioy and
The names and subordination of the clergy, the posture of de
civil freedom.
votion, the materials and colour of the minister's garment, the joining in
known or an unknown form of prayer, and other matters of the same kind,
must be left to the option of every man's private judgment
With regard, therefore, to protestant dissenters, although the experience of
their turbulent disposition in former times occasioned several disabilities and
shall not undertake to justify) to be laid upon them by
restrictions (which
abundance
of statutes (y) yet at length the legislature, with
spirit of true
magnanimity, extended that indulgence to these sectaries, which they them
selves, when in power, had held to be countenancing schism, and denied to the
church of England. (2) The penalties are conditionally suspended by the stat
M. st.
0. 18, "for exempting their majesties' protestant subjects,
ute W.
dissenting from the church of England, from the penalties of certain laws,"
confirmed by statute 10 Ann.
commonly called the toleration act; which
and declares that neither the laws above mentioned, nor the statutes
o.

Vol. II.—

1.

1.

0.

1.

29Eliz. o.
SBEllis, c.
22Car. U, o.
(V) 23Eliz. c.
(£) The ordinance of IMS (before cited) inflicted imprisonment for a year on the third offence, and
pecuniary penalties on the former two. In case of using the book of common prayer, not only in a place
•f public worship hut also In any private family.
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o. 2, § 14, 3 Jao. I, o. 4 and 5, nor any other penal laws made against
popish recusants (except the test acts), shall extend to any dissenters, other
than papists and such as deny the trinity; provided, first, that they take the
oaths of allegiance and supremacy (or make a similar affirmation, being
quakers) (a) and subscribe the declaration against popery; second, that they
repair to some congregation certified to and registered in the court of the
bishop or archdeacon, or at the county sessions; third, that the doors of such
shall be unlocked, unbarred, and unbolted; in default of which
meeting-house
*the persons meeting there are still liable to all the penalties of the
[•54] former acts.
Dissenting teachers in order to be exempted from the pen
alties of the statutes 13 and 14 Car. II, c. 4, 16 Car. II, c. 6, 17 Car. II, c. 2, and
22 Car. II, c. 1, are also to subscribe the articles of religion mentioned in the
statute 13 Eliz. c 12 (which only concern the confession of the true Christian
faith, and the doctrine of the sacraments), with an express exception of those
relating to the government and powers of the church, and to infant baptism; or
if they scruple subscribing the same, shall make and subscribe the declaration
prescribed by statute 19 Geo. Ill, c. 44, professing themselves to be Christians
and protestants, and that they believe the scriptures to contain the revealed
will of God, and to be the rule of doctrine and practice. Thus, though the
crime of non-conformity is by no means universally abrogated, it is suspended
and ceases to exist with regard to these protestant dissenters, during their
compliance with the conditions imposed by these acts; and, under these con
ditions, all persons who will approve themselves no papists or oppugn era of
the trinity, are left at full liberty to act as their consciences shall direct them,
in the matter of religious worship. And if any person shall wilfully, malic
iously, or contemptuously disturb any congregation, assembled in any church
or permitted meeting-house, or shall misuse any preacher or teacher there, he
shall (by virtue of the same statute, 1 W. and M.) be bound over to the ses
sions of the peace, and forfeit twenty pounds. But by statute 5 Geo. I, c. 4,
no mayor or principal magistrate must appear at any dissenting meeting with
the ensigns of his office, (b) on pain of disability to hold that or any other
office: the legislature judging it a matter of propriety, that a mode of worship
in peace,
set up in opposition to the national, when allowed to be exercised
Dissenters,
should be exercised also with decency, gratitude and humility.
also, who subscribe the declaration of the act 19 Geo. Ill, are exempted
(unless in the case of endowed schools, and colleges), from the penalties of the
statutes 13 and 14 Car. II, o. 4, and 17 Car. II, c. 2, which prohibit (upon pain
of fine and imprisonment) all persons from teaching school, unless they be
r^..-i licensed by the ordinary, and *subscribe a declaration of conformity to
J the liturgy of the church, and reverently frequent divine service, estab
L
lished by the laws of this kingdom. (4)
As to papists, what has been said of the protestant dissenters would hold
equally strong for a general toleration of them; provided their separation was
founded only upon difference of opinion in religion, and their principles did
If once they could
not also extend to a subversion of the civil government.
be brought to renounce the supremacy of the pope, they might quietly enjoy
their seven sacraments, their purgatory, and auricular confession; their wor
But while
ship of reliques and images; nay, even their transubstantiation.
L
stat.
8
Geo.
o.
S.
(a) See

Eliz.

(6) Sir Humphrey Edwin, a lord mayor of London, had the imprudence soon after the toleration act to
go to a presbyterian meeting-house In his formalities; which is alluded to by Dean Swift, in bid tale of a
tub, under the allegory of Jack getting on a great horse, and eating custard.

and others operating as restraints and impediments to
(4) The statutes here mentioned,
the religious worship and education of persons not in communion with the established
church, are nearly ail repealed.
See statutes 9 Geo. IV., c. 17; 8 and 9 Vic, c. 102; 9 and
10 Vic, c. 59; 29 and 30 Vic, c. 52; 80 and 31 Vic, c. 62.
For an account of the modern
advance of religious liberty in England, see May, Const. Hist., cc 12-14.
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they acknowledge a foreign power, superior to the sovereignty of the king
dom, they cannot complain if the laws of that kingdom will not treat them
upon the footing of good subjeots.
Let us therefore now take a view of the laws in force against the papists;
who may be divided into three classes, persons professing popery, popish
recusants convict, and popish priests.
1. Persons professing the popish re
ligion, besides the former penalties for not frequenting their parish church,
are disabled from taking their lands either by descent or purchase, after
eighteen years of age, until they renounce their errors; they must at the age
of twenty-one register their estates before acquired, and all future convey
ances and wills relating to them; they are incapable of presenting to any
advowson, or granting to any other person any avoidance of the same; they
may not teach or keep any school under pain of perpetual imprisonment; and
if they willingly, say or hear mass, they forfeit, the one two hundred, and the
other one hundred marks, and each shall suffer a year's imprisonment. Thus
much for persons who, from the misfortune of family prejudices or otherwise,
have conceived an unhappy attachment to the Romish church from their in
fancy, and publicly profess its errors. But if any evil industry is used to rivet
these errors upon them, if any person sends another abroad to be educated in
the popish religion, or to reside in any religious house abroad for that purpose,
or contributes to their maintenance when there; *both the sender, the i-*5e-i'
sent, and the contributor, are disabled to sue in law or equity, to be ^
executor or administrator to any person, to take any legacy or deed of gift,
and to bear any office in the realm, and shall forfeit all their goods and chat
tels, and likewise all their real estate for life. And where these errors are also
aggravated by apostasy, or perversion, where a person is reconciled to the see
of Rome, or procures others to be reconciled, the offence amounts to high
treason. 2. Popish recusants, convicted in a court of law of not attending
the service of the church of England, are subject to the following disabilities,
They are
penalties, and forfeitures, over and above those before mentioned.
considered as persons excommunicated; they can hold no office or employ
ment; they must not keep arms in their houses, but the same may be seized
by the justices of the peace; they may not come within ten miles of London,
on pain of 100/./ they can bring no action at law, or suit in equity; they are
not permitted to travel above five miles from home, unless by license, upon
pain of forfeiting all their goods; and they may not come to court under pain
No marriage or burial of such recusant, or baptism of his child, shall
of 100/.
be had otherwise than by the ministers of the church of England, under other
A married woman, when recusant, shall forfeit two-thirds
severe penalties.
of her dower or jointure, may not be executrix or administratrix to her hus
band, nor have any part of his goods; and during the coverture may be kept
in prison, unless her husband redeems her at the rate of 10/. a month, or the
And, lastly, as a feme-covert recusant may be im
third part of all his lands.
prisoned, so all others must, within three months after conviction, either sub
mit and renounce their errors, or, if required so to do by four justices, must
abjure and renounce the realm; and if they do not depart, or if they return
without the king's license, they shall be guilty of felony, and suffer death as
felons without benefit of clergy. There is also an inferior species of recu
sancy (refusing to make the declaration against popery, enjoined by statute
30 Car. II, st. 2, when tendered by the proper magistrate), which, if the party
resides within ten miles of London, makes him an absolute recusant conviot;
or if at a greater distance, suspends him from having any seat in *par- r*5*n '
liament, keeping arms in his house, or any horse above the value of five L
pounds. This is the state, by the laws now in being, (c) of a lay papist. But,
8. The remaining species or degree, viz., popish priests, are in a still more
(r) Stat. 28 EIlz. c. 1. 27 El it c. 2, 29EIlz. c. 6. 35 Eliz. c. 2. 1 Jaa I, c. 4. 8 Jac. I, a 4 and 5. 7 Jaa I, o. 6.
8 Car. L c. 8. » Car. II, c. 2. SOCar. n. St. 2. 1 W. and X. a 9, 16 and 8t>. 11 and 12Wm. Ill, a 4. 12 Ann.
M, 2, a 14. 1 Geo. I, st. 2, c. 55. 3 Oeo. I. a 18. 11 Geo. n, a 17.
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For by statute 11 and 12 Wm. HI, c. 4, popish priest*
dangerous condition.
or bishops, celebrating mass, or exercising any part of their functions in
England, except in the houses of ambassadors, are liable to perpetual im
prisonment. And by the statute 27 Eliz. c. 2, any popish priests, born in the
dominions of the crown of England, who shall come over hither from beyond
sea (unless driven by stress of weather, and tarrying only a reasonable time,
(d) or shall be in England three days without conforming and taking the
oaths), is guilty of high treason: and all persons harbouring him are guilty of
felony without the benefit of clergy.
This is a short summary of the laws against the papists, under their three
several classes, of persons professing the popish religion, popish recusants con
Of which the president Montesquieu observes,
vict, and popish priests.
that
they are so -rigorous, though not professedly of the sanguinary kind, that they
do all the hurt that can possibly be done in cold blood. But, in answer to this,
may be observed (what foreigners who only judge from our statute-book
are not fully apprized of), that these laws are seldom exerted to their utmost
would be very difficult to excuse them.
they were,
rigour: and, indeed
For they are rather to be accounted for from their history, and the urgency of
the times which produced them, than to be approved (upon cool review) as
standing system of law. The restless machinations of the jesnits during the
reign of Elizabeth, the turbulence and uneasiness of the papists under the new
religious establishment, and the boldness of their hopes and wishes for the
succession of the queen of Scots, obliged the parliament to counteract so dan
great, and then perhaps necessary, severity. The
spirit by laws of
gerous
in
*ne succeeding reign, struck
Powder-treason,
panio into *james
I*«ifll
occasioned
the enacting of new
which operated in different ways:
laws against the papists; but deterred him from putting them into execution.
the prospect of a
The intrigues of Queen Henrietta in the reign of Charles
popish successor in that of Charles II, the assassination-plot in the reign of
popish pretender to the crown in.
King William, and the avowed claim of
that and subsequent reigns, will account for the extension of these penalties at
But
a time should ever arrive, and
those several periods of our history.
not very distant, when all fears of
pretender shall have van
perhaps
ished, and the power and influence of the pope shall become feeble, ridiculous,
and despicable, not only in England, but in every kingdom of Europe;
prob
ably would not then be amiss to review and soften these rigorous edicts: at
least till the civil principles of the Roman catholics called again upon the legis
ought not to be left in the breast of every merci
lature to renew them: for
less bigot to drag down the vengeance of these occasional laws upon inoffensive,
though mistaken, subjects; in opposition to the lenient inclinations of the civil
magistrate, and to the destruction of every principle of toleration and religious
liberty.
This hath partly been done by statute 18 Geo. Ill, c. 60, with regard to such
papists as duly take the oath therein prescribed, of allegiance to his majesty,
abjuration of the pretender, renunciation of the pope's civil power, and abhor
rence of the doctrines of destroying and not keeping faith with heretics, and
deposing or murdering princes excommunicated by authority of the see of
Rome: in respect of whom only the statute of 11 and 12 Wm.
repealed,
disables them from purchasing or inheriting, or authorizes the
so far as
apprehending or prosecuting the popish clergy, or subjeots to perpetual im
prisonment either them or any teachers of youth. (5)
(e) Bp. L. b. 19,a 87.

1.

(d) Raym. 877,lAtch.
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(5) The restrictions, penalties and disabilities, imposed by statute upon persons profession
8ee statutes 10 Geo. IV, c.
the Roman Catholic religion, are now nearly all removed.
Vic, c. 103; and 10 Vic., c. 59 29 and 30 Vic, c. 22; 30 and 31 Vic. c. <B;
and
May's Const. Hist., cc 12-14.
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<g)Stat. 28 Car. II, c.
explained by
(4 Ventr. 293. Strange, 834.
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5.

Stat. IS Car. TL st.
Hawk. P. a

1
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Geo. II,
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(i)

In order the better to secure the established church against perils from non
conformists of all denominations, infidels, Turks, Jews, heretics, papists, and
sectaries, there are however two bulwarks erected; called the corporation and
test acts : (6) by the former of which (f) no person can be legally elected to
any office relating to the government of any city or corporation, unless, within
a twelvemonth before he has received the sacrament of the Lord's supper,
according to the rites of the church of England; and be is also enjoined to
take the oaths of allegiance and supremacy at the *same time that he
r*Bpi'
<■
takes the oath of office: or, in default of either of these requisites, such
election shall be void. The other, called the test act, (g) directs all officers,
civil and military, to take the oaths and make the declaration against transubstantiation, in any of the king's courts at Westminster, or at the quarter ses
sions, within six calendar months after their admission; and also within the
same time to receive the sacrament
of the Lord's supper, according to the
usage of the church of England, in some public church, immediately after
divine service and sermon, and to deliver into oourt a certificate thereof signed
by the minister and church warden, and also to prove the same by two credible
And
witnesses; upon forfeiture of 500/. and disability to hold the said office.
of much the same nature with these, is the statute 7 Jac. I, c 2, which permits
no persons to be naturalized or restored in blood, but such as undergo a like
test: which test having been removed in 1753, in favor of the Jews, was the
next session of parliament restored again with some precipitation.
Thus much for offences, which strike at our national religion, or the doctrine
I proceed now to con
and discipline of the church of England in particular.
sider some gross impieties and general immoralities, which are taken notice of
and punished by our municipal law; frequently in concurrence with the ecclesi
astical, to which the censure of many of them does also of right appertain;
though with a view somewhat different: the spiritual court punishing all sinful
enormities for the sake of reforming the private sinner, pro salute animal ;
while the temporal courts resent the public affront to religion and morality on
which all government must depend for support, and correct more for the sake
of example than private amendment.
IV. The fourth species of offences, therefore, more immediately against God
and religion, is that of blasphemy against the Almighty, by denying his being
of our Saviour Christ. (7)
-or providence ; or by contumelious reproaches
Whither also may be referred all profane scoffing at the holy scripture, or ex
These are offences punishable at common
posing it to contempt and ridicule.
law by fine and imprisonment, or other infamous corporal punishment; (A) for
Christianity is part of the laws of England,
V. Somewhat allied to this, though in an inferior degree,
the offence of
profane and common swearing and *cursing. By the last statute against r*fin-i
which, 19 Geo. II, c. 21, which repeals all former ones, every labourer,
c SB.

&

8

2

is

(6) But these "bulwarks" of the church, having become generally odious, were in 1828
repealed, with the consent even of the prelates, and to the general satisfaction of the nation.
so fully considered in the cases of People v.
(7) The law on the subject of blasphemy
Harr., 558; Updegraph v. Commonwealth, 11
Ruggles,
Johns.. 290; State v. Chandler,
R.,
894; and Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 20 Pick., 206, as to leave little to be added
S.

6.

\
2

is

is

is

is

by other authorities.
The doctrine of our commentator, that " Christianity
part of the law of England,"
the pre
true in the qualified sense that the law takes notice of the fact that Christianity
the
vailing religion among the people, and that evil speech concerning the Being who
object of adoration by the Christian, and malicious reproach or profane ridicule of Christ
or the books of the Bible, have an evil effort in sapping the foundations of society and of
And the punishment of the
public order, and are therefore properly ptiiished as crimes.
Bee upon this subject
lower species of profanity may be referred to the same principle.
Bish. Cr. L., 7tUed., ch.
Ooolcy's Const. Lim., 472, et uq.
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Bailor, or soldier profanely cursing or swearing shall forfeit la.; every other
person under the degree of a gentleman 2s.; and every gentleman or person of
superior rank 5*. to the poor of the parish; and, on the second conviction,
double; and, for every subsequent offence, treble the sum first forfeited; with
all charges of conviction: and in default of payment shall be sent to the house
of correction for ten days.
Any justice of the peace may convict upon his
own hearing, or the testimony of one witness; and any constable or peace offi
cer, upon his own hearing, may secure any offender and carry him before a
the justice omits his duty, he forfeits 5l.
justice, and there convict him.
and the constable 40s. And the act is to be read in all parish churches and
public chapels, the Sunday after every quarter-day, on pain of 5/. to be levied by
warrant from any justice. (8) Besides this punishment for taking God's name
in vain in common discourse, it is enacted by statute 3 Jac. I, c. 21, that if in
any stage-play, interlude, or show, the name of the holy trinity or any of the
persons therein, be jestingly or profanely used, the offender shall forfeit 10/.,
one moiety to the king, and the other to the informer.
VI. A sixth species of offence against God and religion, of which our ancient
books are full, is a crime of which one knows not well what account to give.
mean the offence of witchcraft, conjuration, inchantment or sorcery.
Todeny the possibility, nay, actual existence, of witchcraft and sorcery, is at once
flatly to contradict the revealed word of God, in various passages both of the
Old and New Testament: and the thing itself is a truth to which every nation
in the world hath in its turn borne testimony, either by examples seemingly
well attested, or by prohibitory laws; which at least suppose the possibility of
commerce with evil spirits.
The civil law punishes with death not only the
sorcerers themselves, but also those who consult them, (j) imitating in tho
former the express law of God, (k) " thou shalt not suffer a witch to live." And
our own laws, both before and since the conauest, have been *equally
r*fll-i-I
*■
penal; ranking this crime in the same class with heresy, and condemn
The president Montesquieu (m) ranks them also
ing both to the flames.
down as an important
both together, but with
very different view; laying
maxim, that we ought to be very circumspect in the prosecution of magic and
heresy; because the most unexceptionable conduct, the purest morals, and the
constant practice of every duty in life, are not sufficient security against thesuspicion of crimes like these. And indeed the ridiculous stories that are
generally told, and the many impostures and delusions that have been discov
dubious crime;
ered in all ages, are enough to demolish all faith in such
the contrary evidence were not also extremely strong. Wherefore
seems to
be the most eligible way to conclude, with an ingenious writer of our own, (»)
that in general there has been such
thing as witchcraft; though one cannot
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give credit to any particular modern instance of it.
Our forefathers were stronger believers, when they enacted by statute 33
all witohcraft and sorcery to be felony without benefit of
Hen. VIII, o.
Jac.
o. 12, that all persons invoking any evil
clergy; and again by statute
spirit, or consulting, covenanting with, entertaining, employing, feeding, or
rewarding any evil spirit; or taking up dead bodies from their graves to be used
in any witchcraft, sorcery, oharm, or inchantment; or killing or otherwise hurt
ing any person by such infernal arts, should be guilty of felony without bene
fit of clergy, and suffer death. And,
any person should attempt by sorcery
to discover hidden treasure, or to restore stolen goods, or to provoke unlawful
love, or to hurt any man or beast, though the same were not effected, he or sheshould suffer imprisonment and pillory for the first offence, and death for the sec
ond.
These acts continued in force till lately, to the terror of all ancient females
U)

I.
9,

Cod.
c. 18.
(fc) Kxod. xxfl, 18.
(n) Mr. Addison, Spect No. 17.
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in the kingdom: and many poor wretches were sacrificed thereby to the prejudice
of their neighbours, and their own illusions; not a few having, by some means
or other confessed the fact at the gallows. But all executions for this dubious
crime are now at an end; our legislature having at length followed the wise
example of *Louis XIV, in France, who thought proper by an edict to r*noi'
restrain the tribunalsof justioe from receiving informations of witchcraft. *And accordingly it is with us enacted by statute 9 Geo. II, o. 5, that no
(o)
prosecution shall for the future be carried on against any persons for conjura
But the misdemeanor of persons
tion, witchcraft, sorcery, or inchantment.
pretending to use witchcraft, tell fortunes, or discover stolen goods by skill in
the occult sciences, is still deservedly punished with a year's imprisonment, and
standing four times in the pillory. (9)
VII. A seventh species of offenders in this class are all religious imposters;
such as falsely pretend an extraordinary commission from heaven; or terrify
These, as tending
and abuse the people with false denunciations of judgments.
to subvert all religion, by bringing it into ridicule and contempt, are punish
able by the temporal courts with fine, imprisonment, and infamous corporal
punishment, (p)
VIII. Simony, or the corrupt presentation of any one to an ecclesiastical
benefice for gift or reward, is also to be considered as an offence against relig
ion; as well by reason of the sacredness of the charge which is thus profanely
bought and sold, as because it is always attended with perjury in the person
The statute 31 Eliz. c. 6 (which, so far as it relates to the for
presented, (q)
feiture of the right of presentation, was considered in a former book), (r) en
acts, that if any patron, for money or any other corrupt consideration or promise,
direotly or indireotly given, shall present, admit, institute, induct, install, or
collate any person to an ecclesiastical benefice or dignity, both the giver and
taker shall forfeit two years value of the benefice or dignity; one moiety to the
king, and the other to any one who will sue for the same. If persons also cor
ruptly resign or exchange their benefices, both the giver and the taker shall in
like manner forfeit double the value of the money or other corrupt consideration.
And persons who shall "corruptly ordain or license any minister or pro- r*fi„-|
J
cure him to be ordained or licensed (which is the true idea of simony), L
shall incur a like forfeiture of forty pounds; and the minister himself of ten
pounds, besides an incapacity to hold any ecclesiastical preferment for seven
Corrupt elections and resignations in colleges, hospitals,
years afterwards.
and other eleemosynary corporations, are also punished by the same statute
with forfeiture of the double value, vacating the place or office, and devolution
of the right of election for that turn to the crown.
IX. Profanation of the Lord's day, vulgarly (but improperly) called Sab
bath breaking, is a ninth offence against God and religion, punished by the
For, besides the notorious indecency and
municipal law of England. (10)
Hist, zzt, 215. Tet Voughlans (de droit criminel, 853,
(o) Voltaire tiecl. hov.it XIV. ch. 89. Hod. TJn.
459),still reckons up sorcery and witchcraft among the crimes punishable in France,
S
Inst.
ISO.
(p) 1 Hawk, P. Ctt
(r) See book U, p. 279.
(9)
(9) The vagrant act treats these as rogues and vagabonds, and restrains and punishes them
accordingly.
(10) In the United States generally, by statute, persons are prohibited by law from follow
ing their ordinary calling on Sunday, and contracts entered into on that day are made void.
These statutes have sometimes been assailed as unconstitutional, because encroaching upon
Commonwealth v. Wolf, 3 S. & R,
religious liberty; but the courts have sustained them.
48; Commonwealth v. Usher, 17 S. & R, 1S5; Shover v. State, 10 Ark., 259; Vogelsong v.
State. 9 Ind., 113; State v. Ambs, 20 Mo., 214; Cincinnati v. Rice, 16 Ohio, 225; Specht v.
Commonwealth, 8 Penn. St., 812.
As to exceptions in-such statutes of works of necessity or charity, see Commonwealth v.
Knox, 16 Mass., 76; Myers v. State, 1 Conn., 502; Murray v. Commonwealth, 24 Penn. St,
270; Allen v. Duffle, 43 Mich., 1; 8. C. 38 Am. Rep., 159; Mueller v. State, 76 Ind., 810;
8. C, 40 Am. Rep., 245; Buctier v. Railroad Co., 131 Mass.. 156; S. C, 41 Am. Rep., 216
jYouoski v. State, 79 Ind , 893; S. C, 41 Am. Rep., 614; Dale v. Knapp OS Penn. St, 889.'
811
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scandal of permitting any secular business to be publicly transacted on that
day, in a country professing Christianity, and the corruption of morals which
usually follows its profanation, the keeping one day in the seven holy, as a
time of relaxation and refreshment as well as for public worship, is of admir
able service to a state considered merely as a civil institution.
It humanizes,
by the help of conversation and society, the manners of the lower classes;
which would otherwise degenerate into a sordid ferocity and savage selfish
ness of spirit: it enables the industrious workman to pursue his occupation in
the ensuing week with health and oheerfulness: it imprints on the minds of
the people that sense of their duty to God, so necessary to make them good
citizens; but which yet would be worn out and defaced by an unremitted con
tinuance of labour, without any stated times of recalling them to the worship
of their Maker. And therefore the laws of King Athelstan (s) forbade all
And by the
merchandizing on the Lord's day, under very severe penalties.
statute 27 Hen. VL, o. 5, no fair or market shall be held on the principal festi
vals, Good Friday, or any Sunday (except the four Sundays in harvest), on
of forfeiting the goods exposed to sale. And since, by the statute 1 Car.
out of their own parishes, for any sport
fain
, c. 1, no person shall assemble
whatsoever upon this day; nor, in their parishes, shall use any bull or
interludes, plays, or. other unlawful exercises, or pasr*(UTJ *bear-baiting,
L
times; on pain that every offender shall pay 3s. 4d. to the poor. This
statute does not prohibit, but rather impliedly allows, any innocent recreation
or amusement, within their respective parishes, even on the Lord's day, after
But by statute 29 Car. II, o. 7, no person is allowed to
divine servioe is over.
work on the Lord's day, or use any boat or barge, or expose any goods to sale;
except meat in publio houses, milk at certain hours, and works of necessity or
charity, on forfeiture of 5s. Nor shall any drover, carrier, or the like, travel
upon that day, under pain of twenty shillings.
X. Drunkenness is also punished by statute 4 Jac. I, c. 5, with the forfeit
ure of 5s.; or the sitting six hours in the stocks: by which time the statute
presumes the offender will have regained his senses, and not be liable to do
mischief to his neighbours. And there are many wholesome statutes, by way
of prevention, chiefly passed in the same reign of King James I, which regu
late the licensing of alehouses, and punish persons found tippling therein; or
the master of such houses permitting them.
shall mention, more immediately against
XI. The last offence which
religion and morality, and cognizable by the temporal courts, is that of open
and notorious lewdness ; either by frequenting houses of ill-fame, which is an
indictable offence;
(11) or by some grossly scandalous and publio indecency
In the year
for which the punishment
by fine and imprisonment, (u) (12)
is

(t)

I

«) Poph. 808.

(«)

1

(f) O. 24.

Bid. 188.

a

5

3

4

;

6

a

6 a

is

nuisance at the common law, and indictable as
bawdy-house
(11) The keeping of
Gill, 425; Smith v. Commonwealth,
such.
B. Monr., 21 State v. Evans,
Smith v. State,
Pick., 26; People v. Erwin,
Denio, 129
Ired., 603; Commonwealth v. Harrington,
And any form of open and notorious lewdness and indecency. See the following note.
And probably frequenting houses of ill-fame may be so open and scandalous as to consti
tute
public offense, also, but single acts of private lewdness certainly are not such at the

1

3

a

t

2

is

,

8;

1

3

1

common law.
(12) The indecent exposure of one's person to public view is an indictable offense at
Sid., 168; Britain v. State,
Dev. and
common law.
Humph., 203; State v. Roper,
Bat., 208; State v. Rose, 32 Mo., 560. It would seem, however, that the exposure must be
Catlin,
more
than
v.
to
one
See
Commonwealth
such as would be offensive
person.
Mass.,
Publishing obscene books and pictures was in
State v. Millard, 18 Vt., 574
Commonwealth v. Holmes, 17 Mass. 336; Commonwealth v.
dictable at common law.
also in many states made indictable by statute.
To procure
S. and R., 91. It
Sharplcss,
woman, or to lead one into prostitution, or to conspire to seduce one,
lie seduction of
Burr., 1434. As to the force of American statutes punish
are crimes at common law.
ing enticement for purposes of prostitution, see Kauffman v. People, 18 N. Y. (Sup. Ct),
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1650, when the ruling powers found it for their interest to put on the semblance
of a very extraordinary strictness and purity of morals, not only incest and
wilful adultery were made capital crimes; but also the repeated act of keeping

it

4,
a

a

is

if

is

7

I,

(z)

a brothel, or committing fornification, were (upon a second conviction) made
felony without benefit of clergy, (w) But at the restoration, when men, from
an abhorrence of the hypocrisy of the late times, fell into a contrary extreme
•of licentiousness,
it was not thought proper to renew a law of *such unr*fl-n'
fashionable rigour.
And these offences have been ever since left to the *■
feeble coercion of the spiritual court, according to the rules of the canon law;
a law which has treated the offence of incontinence, nay, even adultery itself,
with a great degree of tenderness and lenity; owing perhaps to the constrained
The temporal courts therefore take no cogni
■celibacy of its first compilers.
sance of the crime of adultery, otherwise than as a private injury, (as) (13)
But, before we quit this subject, we must take notice of the temporal pun
ishment for having bastard children, considered in a criminal light; for with
regard to the maintenance of such illegitimate offspring, which is a civil con
cern, we have formerly spoken at large, (y) By the statute 18 Eliz. c. 3, two
justices may take order for the punishment of the mother and reputed father;
but what that punishment shall be is not therein ascertained; though the con
temporary exposition was that a corporal punishment was intended,
By
statute
c.
Jac.
specific punishment (viz., commitment to the house of
inflicted on the woman only. Bat in both cases
seems that
correction)
the penalty can only be inflicted
the bastard becomes chargeable to the
de
considered as
parish; for otherwise the very maintenance of the child
gree of punishment. By the last-mentioned statute the justices may commit
the mother to the house of correction, there to be punished and set on work
for one year; and, in case of a second offence, till she find sureties never to
•offend again. (14)

CHAPTER V.

OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE LAW OF NATIONS.
According to the method marked ont in the preceding ohapter, we are next
to consider the offences more immediately repugnant to that universal law of
(x) See book JO, p. 189.

(w) 8cobell, 121.

(y) See book

I,

society which regulates the mutual intercourse between one state and another;
(«) Dalt Just, ch. 11.

p. 488.

a

4,

I,

7

is

is

1

I,

it

a

is

it

a

a

9;

S2; People v. Roderigas, 49 Cal.,
Osborn v. State, S3 Ind., 526; People v. Carrier, 46
Mich., 442.
Under the old English law there was in strictness no property in
dead body.
Burial
courts.
But removal of
dead body
rights were within the cognizance of ecclesiastical
and stealing the grave clothes were indictable offenses.
In the United States
has been
a quasi- property in
held that there
dead body; that relatives have rights over
which
a court of equity will protect, and enjoin the removal of dead bodies against their will.
227; 8. C, 14 Am. Rep., 667; Bogert v. Indian
See Pierce v. Proprietors. &c, 10 R.
apolis, 13 Ind., 134, 138; Guthrie v. Weaver.
Mo. App., 136; Wynkoop v. Wynkoop,
42 Penn. St., 293; Meagher v. Driscoll, 99 Mass., 281. In the United States the violation
of graves and defacing of monuments, &c,
generally made criminal by statute.
In
(13) Adultery and seduction are punished criminally in some of the United States.
others the only redress
by civil action for the recovery of damages.
The statute
c.
was repealed by 50 Geo. Ill, c. 51, which made new
James
(14)
provisions for these cases.
In the United States the statutes upon the subject of bastard children do not usually go
much beyond the protection of the public against the bastard becoming public charge.
With this object in view proceedings may be taken against the putative father, and he may
be compelled to support the child, either alone or with the assistance of the mother.
813
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I

a

is

e.

<<f)Bee book

p. OTL

by

(«) Bp. L. b.

I,

p. to.

S.

(6) See book

1,

(0)27.1,1,8.

I,

a

it

is

is

J

is

is

a

it

is

is

is

a

is it

is

is
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(c)

those, mean, which are particularly animadverted on, as such, by the English
law. (1)
The law of nations is a system of rules, deducible by natural reason, and
established by universal consent among the civilized inhabitants of the world;
(a) in order to decide all disputes, to regulate all ceremonies and civilities, and
to insure the observance of justice and good faith, in that intercourse which
must frequently occur between two or more independent states, and the in
dividuals belonging to each, (b) This general law is founded upon this prin
ciple, that different nations ought in time of peace to do one another all the
good they can, and in time of war as little harm as possible, without prejudice
And, as none of these states will allow
to their own real interests,
superiority in the other, therefore neither can dictate or prescribe the rules of
this law to the rest; but such rules must necessarily result from those
°f natural justice, in whioh all the learned of every nation
r*«"7l *Prin°iples
agree; or they depend upon mutual compacts or treaties between the
also no judge
respective communities; in the construction of which there
to resort to, but the law of nature and reason, being the only one in which all
the contracting parties are equally conversant, and to which they are equally
subject.
In arbitrary states, this law, wherever
contradicts, or
not provided for
enforced by the royal power; but
by, the municipai law of the country,
since in England no royal power can introduce
new law, or suspend the
execution of the old, therefore the law of nations (wherever any question
arises which
here adopted in its
properly the objeot of its jurisdiction)
full extent by the common law, and
held to be a part of the law of the
land. And those acts of parliament which have from time to time been made
to enforce this universal law, or to facilitate the execution of its decisions, are
not to be considered as introductive of any new rule, but merely as declaratory
must
of the old fundamental constitutions of the kingdom: without which
cease to be
part of the civilized world. Thus, in mercantile questions, such
as bills of exchange, and the like; in all marine causes, relating to freight,
average, demurrage, insurances, bottomry, and others of a similar nature; the
a branch of the law of nations,
law merchant, (d) which
regularly and
constantly adhered to. So, too, in all disputes relating to prizes, to ship
no other rule of decision but
wrecks, to hostages, and ransom bills, there
this great universal law, collected from history and usage, and such writers
of all nations and languages as are generally approved and allowed of. (2)
But though in civil transactions and questions of property between the sub
jects of different states, the law of nations has much scope and extent, as
adopted by the law of England; yet the present branch of our inquiries
*within a narrow compass, as offences against the law of nar*««l
tions can rarely be the object of the crimipal law of any particular state.
For offences against this law are principally incident to whole states or nations,
in whioh case recourse can only be had to war; which
an appeal to the God
of hosts, to punish such infractions of public faith as are committed by one
independent people against another: neither state having any superior juris
diction to resort to upon earth for justice. But where the individuals of any
state violate this general law,
then the interest as well as duty of the gov
ernment, under which they live, to animadvert upon them with
becoming
severity, that the peaoe of the world may be maintained. For in vain would

is

the
(1) The offenses enumerated in this chapter are in the United States cognizable
federal courts.
They will be found treated of by Mr. Wbeaton in his International Law,
as well as in other treatises on that subject, and those on criminal law.
forbidden by statute 83 Geo III, c. 00, and contracts and se
(2) The ransom of ships
curities for that purpose are made void.
.114
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nations in their collective capacity observe these universal rules, if private
subjects were at liberty to break them at their own discretion, and involve the
two states in a war.
It is therefore incumbent upon the nation injured, first
to demand satisfaction and justice to be done on the offender, by the state to
which he belongs, and, if that be refused or neglected, the sovereign then
avows himself an accomplice or abettor of his subject's crime, and draws upon
his community the calamities of foreign war.
The principal offences against the law of nations, animadverted on as such
by the municipal laws of England, are of three kinds: 1. Violation of safeconducts; 2. Infringement of the rights of ambassadors; and 3. Piracy.
L As to the first, violation of safe-conducts or passports, expressly granted
by the king or his ambassadors (e) to the subjects of a foreign power in time
of mutual war; or committing acts of hostilities against such as are in amity,
league, or truce with us, who are here under a general implied safe-conduct:
these are breaches of the public faith, without the preservation of which there
can be no intercourse or commerce between one nation and another: and such
offences may, according to the writers upon the law of nations, be a just ground
of a national war; since it is not in the power of *the foreign prince to r*fifii
cause justice to be done to his subjects by the very individual delin- *■ *
And as during the
quent, but he must require it of the whole community.
continuance of any safe-conduct, either express or implied, the foreigner is
under the protection of the king and the law: and, more especially, as it is one
of the articles of magna carta,
that foreign merchants should be entitled
to safe-conduct and security throughout the kingdom; there is no question but
that any violation of either the person or property of such foreigner may be
punished by indictment in the name of the king, whose honor is more particu
larly engaged in supporting his own safe conduct. And, when this malicious
rapacity was not confined to private individuals, but broke out into general
hostilities, by the statute 2 Hen. V, st. 1, c. 6, breaking of truce and safe con
ducts, or abetting and receiving the truce-breakers, was (in affirmance and
support of the law of nations) declared to be high treason against the crown
and dignity of the king; and conservators of truce and safe-conducts were
appointed in every port, and empowered to hear and determine such treasons,
(when committed at sea) according to the ancient marine law then practiced in
the admiral's court; and, together with two men learned in the law of the land,
to hear and determine according to that law the same treasons when committed
within the body of any county. Which statute, so far as it made these of
fences amount to treason, was suspended by 14 Hen. VI, c. 8, and repealed by
20 Hen. VI, o. 11, but revived by 29 Hen. VI, o. 2, which gave the same
powers to the lord chancellor, associated with either of the chief justices, as
belonged to the conservators of truce and their assessors; and enacted that,
notwithstanding the party be convicted of treason, the injured stranger should
have restitution out of his effects, prior to any claim of the crown. And it is
farther enacted by the statute 31 Hen. VI, c. 4, that if any of the king's sub
jects attempt or offend upon the sea, or in any port within the king's obeysauce, against any stranger in amity, league, or truce, or under safe-conduct;
and especially by attaching *his person, or spoiling him, or robbing him
r«9o-i'
of his goods, the lord chancellor, with any of the justices of either the *■
king's bench or common pleas, may cause full restitution and amends to be
made to the party injured.
It is to be observed, that the suspending and repealing acts of 14 and 20
Hen. VI, and also the reviving act of 29 Hen. VI, were only temporary, so
that it should seem that, after the expiration of them all, the statute 2 Hen. V
continued in full force; but yet it is considered as extinct by the statute 14
Edw. IV, o. 4, which revives and confirms all statutes and ordinances, made
before the accession of the house of York, against breakers of amities, truces,

(f)

(«) See book I, page MO.

(J) i Hen.

HZ, o. 80. Bee book I, page 259,&c.
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leagues,

with an express

and safe-conducts,

[Book

exception to the statute of

2

IV.
Hen.

But (however that may be) I apprehend it was finally repealed by the
general statutes of Edw. VI, and Queen Mary, for abolishing new-created
treasons; though Sir Matthew Hale seems to question it as to treasons commit
ted on the sea. (g) But certainly the statute of 31 Hen. VI remains in full

V.

(t)

force to this day.
H. As to the rights of ambassadors, which are also established by the law
■of nations, and are therefore matter of universal concern, they have formerly
been treated of at large, (h)
It may here be sufficient to remark, that the
common law of England recognizes them in their full extent, by immediately
stopping all legal process sued out through the ignorance or rashness of indi
viduals, which may intrench upon the immunities of a foreign minister or any
of his train. And, the more effectually to enforce the law of nations in this
respect, when violated through wantonness or insolence, it is declared, by the
-statute of 7 Ann. c. 12, that all process whereby the person of any ambassa
dor, or of his domestic or domestic servant, may be arrested, or his goods dis
trained or seised, shall be utterly null and void; and that all persons prose
cuting, soliciting, or executing such prooess, being convicted by confession or
r(». -J the oath of one witness, before the *lord chancellor and the chief jus*■
J tices, or any two of them, shall be deemed violators of the laws of na
tions, and disturbers of the public repose; and shall suffer such penalties and
corporal punishment as the said judges, or any two of them, shall think fit.
Thus, in cases of extraordinary outrage, for which the law hath provided
(3)
no special penalty, the legislature hath intrusted to the three principal judges
of the kingdom an unlimited power of proportioning the punishment to the
■crime.

III.

is

Lastly, the crime of piracy, or robbery and depredation upon the high
an offence against the universal law of society; a pirate being, accord
As, therefore, he has re
ing to Sir Edward Coke, (k) hostis humani generis.
nounced all the benefits of society and government, and has reduced himself
afresh to the savage state of nature, by declaring war against all mankind, all
mankind must declare war against him: so that every community hath
right, by the rule of self-defence, to inflict that punishment upon him which
state of nature have been otherwise entitled to do,
-every individual would in
for any invasion of his person or personal property.
committed by
By the ancient common law, piracy,
subject, was held to
be
species of treason, being contrary to his natural allegiance; and by an
alien, to be felony only; but now, since the statute of treasons, 25 Edw. HI, c.
held to be only felony in
was only cognis
subject (I). Formerly
able by the admiralty courts, which proceed by the rules of the civil law. (m)
But
being inconsistent with the liberties of the nation that any man's life

it

a

is

it

p. 253. (0 See the occasion of making this statute, book
(m) Hawk. F. a 88.

p. 256.

1

I,

81

(o) HaL P. 0. 907. (A) See book
(fc) Inst. 113.
(QIMd.

L
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a

a
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a

a
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4
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4

3

3

, a

a

2

4

a

is

4

1

4

1

§

is

§

3,

1

Stat
(8) For similar statutory provisions in the United States, see act of April 30, 1790,
at Large, 117; Brightly's Dig., 40.
As to privileges of foreign ambassadors and consuls, see Const. TJ. 8., art.
Rev.
Stat. 1878, §§ 563, 687, 4063, et seg. A foreign minister
from arrest and bis
protected
4062, et seg. His household and tbe attaches of the legation are
goods from seizure. R. 8.,
likewise protected.
United States v. Benner,
Bald., 240; Same v. Lafontaine,
Cranch
C. C, 173; Same v. Jeffers,
Cranch C. C, 704; Ex parte Cabrera,
Wash. C. C, 232.
The protection exists even after the minister has his passports.
DalL,
Dupont v. Pichon,
And when minister
321.
Holbrook
passing through the country accredited to another.
Sandf., 619. The minister's property is identified with his person in pro
v. Henderson,
tection. United States v. Hand,
Wash. C. C, 435. Ignorance is not
defense to an
action for injury to
Wash, C.
minister. United States v. Ortega,
581; Same v.
Liddle,
Wash. C. C. 205. A consul has not the same privilege, but he can only be sued In
the federal courts.
Ravara,
Packard,
DalL, 297; Davis v.
United States v.
Pet 276.
Recognition of foreign representatives by the president
conclusive upon the judiciary.
United States v. Ortega, supra.
Wheat,
See in general, note to same case, 11
468.
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should be taken away unless by the judgment of his peers, or of the common
law of the land, the statute 28 Hen. VIII, o. 15, established a new jurisdiction
for this purpose, which proceeds according to the course of the common law,
and of which we shall say more hereafter.
*The offence of piracy, by common law, consists in committing those
acts of robbery and depredation upon the high seas, which, if committed [*72]
upon land, would have amounted to felony there, (n) But, by statute some
other offences are made piracy also; as, by statute 11 and 12 Wm. Ill, o. 7, if
any natural born subject commits any act of hostility upon the high seas
against others of his majesty's subjects, under colour of a commission from
any foreign power; this, though it would only be an act of war in an alien,
And, farther, any commander, or other
shall be construed piracy in a subjeot.
seafaring person, betraying his trust, and running away with any ship, boat,
ordnance, ammunition or goods; or yielding them up voluntarily to a pirate,
or conspiring to do these acts; or any person assaulting the commander of a
vessel to hinder him from fighting in defence of his ship, or confining him, or
making, or endeavoring to make a revolt "on board; shall, for each of these
offences, be adjudged a pirate, felon and robber, and shall suffer death, whether
he be principal, or merely accessory, by setting forth such pirates, or abetting
them before the fact, or receiving or concealing them or their goods after it.
And the statute 4 Geo. I, o. 11, expressly excludes the principals from the
benefit of clergy. By the statute 8 Geo. I, c. 24, the trading with known
pirates, or furnishing them with stores or ammunition, or fitting out any vessel
for that purpose, or in any wise consulting, combining, confederating, or cor
responding with them: or the forcibly boarding any merchant vessel, though
without seizing or carrying her off, and destroying or throwing any of the
goods overboard, shall be deemed piracy: and such accessories to piracy as are
described by the statute of King William are declared to be principal pirates,
and all parties convicted by virtue of this act are made felons without
benefit* of clergy.
By the same statutes also (to encourage the defence of mer
chant vessels against pirates), the commanders or seamen wounded, and the
widows of such seamen as are slain, in any piratical engagement, shall be en
titled to a bounty, to *be divided among them, not exceeding one-fiftieth r*»<>T
*•
■*
part of the value of the cargo on board: and such wounded seamen shall
seamen
of
which
no
other
be entitled to the pension
Greenwich hospital:
are,
And if the commander
except only such as have served in a ship of war.
shall behave cowardly, by not defending the ship, if she carries guns or arms^
or shall discharge the mariners from fighting, so that the ship falls into the
hands of pirates, such oommander shall forfeit all his wages, and suffer six
months' imprisonment. Lastly, by statute 18 Geo. II, c. 30, any natural born
subject or denizen, who in time or war shall commit hostilities at sea against
any of his fellow-subjects, or shall assist an enemy on that element, is liable tobe tried and convicted as a pirate. (4)
These are the principal cases, in which the statute law of England interposes
to aid and enforce the law of nations, as a part of the common law: by in
flicting an adequate punishment upon offences against that universal law, com(n) 1 Hawk. P. C. 100.

The laws of congress
(4) Piracy is punished in the United States in the federal courts.
prescribe what acts shall be punishable as piracy; and the act of April 80, 1790, 1 Stat, at
large, 113; that of May 15, 1820; 8 id., 300; that of August 8, 1846, U id., 78; and that of
The act of 1820 makes the slave
March 3, 1847, id., 175, are referred to for particulars.
The act of March 8, 1819, which was only temporary, provided for the pun
trade piracy.
ishment of offenses which were piracy by the laws of nations: as to which see U. 8. v.
Smith, 5 Wheat, 158; and TJ. 8. v. Furlong, id., 184; The Marianna Flora, 11 id., 1. And
as to piracy under the act of 1790. see U. S. v. Palmer, 3 Wheat., 610; U. 8. v. Klintock.
Sid., 144; U. 8. v. Furlong, id.. 184.
See statute 6 and 7 Vic, c. 98.
The slave trade is made piracy by English statutes.
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We 'shall proceed in the next chapter to consider
mitted by private persons.
offences which more immediately affect the sovereign executive power of oar
own particular state, or the king and government; which species of crimes
branches itself into a much larger extent than either of those which we have
already treated.

CHAPTER VL

OF HIGH TREASON.
The third general division of crimes consists of such as more especially
affect the supreme executive power, or the king and his government; which
amount either to a total renunciation of that allegiance, or at the least to a
criminal neglect of that duty, which is due from every subject to his sovereign.
In a former part of these Commentaries (a) we had occasion to mention the
nature of allegiance, as the tie or ligamen which binds every subject to be
true and faithful to his sovereign liege lord the king, in return for that pro
tection which is afforded him; and truth and faith to bear of life and limb,
ami earthly honour; and not to know or hear of any ill intended him, without
defending him therefrom. And this allegiance, we may remember, was dis
tinguished into two species: the one natural and perpetual, which is inherent
only in natives of the king's dominions; the other local and temporary, which
is incident to aliens also.
Every offence, therefore, more immediately affect
ing the royal person, his crown, or dignity, is in some degree a breach of this
duty of allegiance, whether natural or innate, or local and acquired by resi
dence: and these may be distinguished into four kinds; 1. Treason. 2. Felo
4. Other mispri
3. Praemunire.
nies injurious to the king's prerogative.
Of which crimes, the first and principal is that of
sions and contempts.
treason.

*Treason, proditio, in its very name (which is borrowed from the
French) imports a betraying, treachery, or breach of faith. It there
fore happens only between allies, saith the Mirror: (b) for treason is indeed a
general appellation made use of by the law, to denote not only offences against
the king and government, but also that accumulation of guilt which arises
whenever a superior reposes a confidence in a subject or inferior, between
whom and himself there subsists a natural, a civil, or even a spiritual relation:
and the inferior so abuses that confidence, so forgets the obligations of duty,
subjection and allegiance, as to destroy the life of any such superior or lord.
{c) This is looked upon as proceeding from the same principle of treachery,
in private life, as would have urged him who harbours it to have conspired m
public against his liege lord and sovereign; and therefore for a wife to kill her
lord or husband, a servant his lord or master, and an ecclesiastic his lord or
ordinary: these being breaches of the lower allegiance, of private and domes
tic faith, are denominated petit treasons. (1) But when disloyalty so rears its
crest as to attack even majesty itself, it is called by way of eminent distinction
high treason alta proditio ; being equivalent to the crimen leasee majestatit of
the Romans, as Glanvil (d) denominates it also in our English law.
As this is the highest civil crime which (considered as a member of the
community) any man can possibly commit, it ought therefore to be the most
For if the crime of high treason be indeterminate, this
precisely ascertained.
alone (says the president Montesquieu) is sufficient to make any government
into arbitrary power,
And yet, by the ancient common law,
degenerate

not recognized in the United States, and
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now abolished in England.
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there was a great latitude left in the breast of the judges to determine what
was treason or not so: whereby the creatures of tyrannical princes had oppor
to raise, by force
tunity to create abundance of constructive treasons; that
and arbitrary constructions, offences into the *crime and punishment of
r*78-i*
Thus the accroaching
treason which never were suspected to be suoh.
or attempting to exercise, royal power
very uncertain charge) was in the 21
held to be treason in
Edw.
knight or Hertfordshire, who forcibly as
saulted and detained one of the king's subjects till he paid him 90/. (f)
must be owned, well deserving of punishment; but which seems to
crime,
be of
Killing the king's
complexion very different from that of treason.
father, or brother, or even his messenger, has also fallen under the same de
nomination, (ff) The latter of which
almost as tyrannical
doctrine as that
of the imperial constitution of Arcadius and Honorius, which determines that
any attempts or designs against the ministers of the prince shall be treason.
ih) But, however, to prevent the inconveniences which began to arise in
England from this multitude of constructive treasons, the statute 25 Edw. Ill,
c.
was made; which defines what offences only for the future should be
held to be treason: in like manner as the lex Julia majestatia among the
Romans, promulged by Augustus Caesar, comprehended all the ancient laws,
that had before been enacted to punish transgressors against the state,
This statute must therefore be our text and guide, in order to examine into
And we shall find that
the several species of high treason.
comprehends
all kinds of high treason under seven distinct branches.
" When a man doth compass or imagine the death of our lord the king, of
our lady his queen, or of their eldest son and heir." Under this description
held that queen regnant (such as Queen Elizabeth and Queen Anne)
within the words of the act, being invested with royal power, and entitled to
the allegiance of her subjects: (J) but the husband of such
not com
queen
prised within these words, *and therefore no treason can be committed r*»»i
the king in possession,
against him. (k) The king here intended
without any respect to his title; for
held, that
king de facto and not de
jure, or, in other words, an usurper that hath got possession of the throne,
a king within the meaning of the statute: as there
temporary allegiance
due to him, for his administration of the government and temporary protection
of the public: and, therefore, treasons committed against Henry VI were pun
ished under Edward IV, though all the line of Lancaster had been previously
declared usurpers by act of parliament. But the most rightful heir of the
crown, or king dejure and not de facto, who hath never had plenary possession
of the throne, as was the case of the house of York during the three reigns of
the line of Lancaster,
not king within this statute against whom treasons
And very sensible writer on the crown-law carries
may be committed.
the point of possession so far, that he holds, (m) that
king out of possession
is so far from having any right to our allegiance, by any other title which he
may set up against the king in being, that we are bound by the duty of our
allegiance to resist him. A doctrine which he grounds upon the statute 11
Hen. VII, o.
which
declaratory of the common law, and pronounces all
subjects excused from any penalty or forfeiture, which do assist and obey
king de facto. But, in truth, this seems to be confounding all notions of right
and wrong; and the consequence would be, that when Cromwell had mur
dered the elder Charles, and usurped the power (though not the name) of king,
the people were bound in duty to hinder the son's restoration: and were the
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Hawk. P. C. 84.
(a) Britt. c. 84
Qui de nece virorum illustrium, qui consiliis et consistoHa nostra inter tun srnatorum etinm
ret
ipsi
cuius
libet postremo, qui militat nobtscum cogitaverit: {eadem
et
corporis
nostri
pare
aunt)
(nam
enim severitnte voluntatem tceleris, qua effectum puniriiura votuerint) ipse quidetn, utpote majestatia
reus, glaiiio feriatur, bonis ejus omnibus Jisco nostra addictis.
(Cod.
6.)
(<)Onivi n Orig.
34.
HaL P. 0. 108.
(j) HaL P. C. 101.
but. 7.
Hal. P. C. 101
(0 Inst. 7.
(*)
(m) Hawk. P. C. 86
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king of Poland or Morocco to invade this kingdom, and by any

means to get
of the crown (a term, by the way, of very loose and indistinct sig
nification), the subject would be bound by his allegiance to fight for bisnatural prince to-day, and by the same duty of allegiance to fight against him
The true distinction seems to be, that the statute of Henry
to-morrow.
*tne Seventh does by no means command any opposition to a king ae
*■ J jure ; but excuses the obedience paid to a king de
When, there
facto.
fore, an usurper is in possession, the subject is excused and justified in obeying
and giving him assistance: otherwise, under an usurpation, no man could besafe: if the lawful prince had a right to hang him for obedience to the powers
in being, as the usurper would certainly do for disobedience.
Nay, farther, a*
the mass of people are imperfect judges of title, of which in all cases posses
sion is prima facie evidence, the law compels no man to yield obedience t»
that prince whose right is by want of possession rendered uncertain and dis
putable, till Providence shall think fit to interpose in his favour, and decide
the ambiguous claim: and, therefore, till he is entitled to such allegiance by
possession, no treason can be committed against him. Lastly, a king, whohas resigned his crown, such resignation being admitted and ratified in parlia
ment,
according to Sir Matthew Hale, no longer the object of treason, (n)
And the same reason holds, in case king abdicates the government; or, by
actions subversive of the constitution, virtually renounces the authority which
he claims by that very constitution: since, as was formerly observed, (o) when
the fact of abdication
and determined by the proper
once established,
thereby vacant,
judges, the consequence necessarily follows, that the throne
and he
no longer king.
Let us next see, what
compassing or imagining the death of the king,
&c. These are synonymous terms; the word compass signifying the purpose or
design of the mind or will (p) and not, as in common speech, the carrying such
design to effect, (q) And therefore an accidental stroke, which may mortally
nowound the sovereign, per infortuniam, without any traitorous intent,
treason: as was the case of Sir Walter Tyrrel, who, by the command of King
William Rufus, *shooting at hart, the arrow glanced against a tree^
*7»
*■
But, as this compassing or im
and killed the king upon the spot, (r)
cannot possibly fall under any judicial cog
an act of the mind,
agining
And yet
be demonstrated by some open, or overt act. (2)
nizance, unless
recorded
to have executed
the tyrant Dionysius
subject, barely for
dreaming that he had killed him; which was held of sufficient proof, that he
But such
not the temper of the
had thought thereof in his waking hours.
English law; and therefore, in this, and the three next species of treason,
more full and explicit
necessary that there appear an open or overt act of
The statute expressly requires that the
nature, to convict the traitor upon.
accused " be thereof, upon sufficient proof, attainted of some open act by men
of his own condition."
Thus, to provide weapons or ammunition for the pur
held to be palpable overt aot of treason in imagin
pose of killing the king
To conspire to imprison the king by force, and move
ing his death.
towards
an overt act of compassing the king's
by assembling oompany,
death; (w) for all force, used to the person of the king, in its consequence may
tend to his death, and
strong presumption of something worse intended
than the present force, by such as have so far thrown off their bonnden duty
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(n) Hal. P. 0. 104.
(p) By the ancient law compassing or intending the death of any man, demonstrated by some evident
fact, was equally penal as homicide Itself.
Inst. 6.)
<«) Hal. P. 0. 107.
(() Inst. 12.
(«) Plutarch in vtt
(u) HaL P. O. 109.
(r) Inst.
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(2) See Foster C. L., 194. The most thorough examination and discussion of the law
to be found in the report of Hardy's Case, 24 State Trials, 199, in which
of high treason
Mr. Erskine made one of his finest displays of matchless ability as an advocate. See alsoBurr's Trial.
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to their sovereign; it being an old observation, that there is generally bat a
short interval between the prisons and the graves of princes.
There is no
question, also, but that taking any measures to render such treasonable parposes effectual, as assembling and consulting on the means to kill the king, is
a sufficient overt act of high treason, (to)
How far mere words, spoken by an individual, and not relative to any trea
sonable act or design then in agitation, shall amount to treason, has been
formerly matter of doubt. We have two instances in the reign of Edward
the Fourth, *of persons executed for treasonable words: the one a r „,„. -.
'
citizen of London who said he would make his son heir of the crown,
being the sign of the house in which he lived; the other a gentleman whose
favorite buck the king killed in hunting, whereupon he wished
horns and
all, in the king's belly. These were esteemed hard cases: and the chief justice.
Markham, rather chose to leave his place than assent to the latter judgment
seems clearly to be agreed, that by the common law and the
But now
(a;)
statute of Edward III, words spoken amount to only
high misdemeanor, and
For they may be spoken in heat, without any intention, or be
no treason.
mistaken perverted, or mis-remembered
by the hearers; their meaning depends
always on their connection with other words and things; they may signify
differently even according to the tone of voice with which they are delivered;
more expressive than any discourse.
and sometimes silence itself
As, there
fore, there can be nothing more equivocal and ambiguous than words,
would
And accord
indeed be unreasonable to make them amount to high treason.
Car.
on
reference to all the judges, concerning some very atro
ingly in
cious words spoken by one Pyne, they certified to the king, " that though the
words were as wicked as might be, yet they were no treason: for unless
be
by some particular statute, no words will be treason." (y) If the words be
has been held
set down in writing,
argues more deliberate intention: and
an overt act of treason: for scribere est agere.
But even in this
that writing
case the bare words are not the treason, but the deliberate act of writing
And such writing, though unpublished, has in some arbitrary reigns
them.
convicted its author of treason: particularly in the cases of one Peachum, a
and of
clergyman, for treasonable passages in sermon never preached;
Algernon Sydney, for some papers found in his closet; which, had they been
plainly relative to any previous formed design of dethroning or murdering the
,
king, might doubtless have been properly read in evidence as overt *acts r
of that treason, which was speoially laid in the indictment, (a) But
being merely speculative, without any intention (so far as appeared) of making
any publio use of them, the convicting the authors of treason upon such an
insufficient foundation has been universally disapproved. Peachum was there
fore pardoned: and though Sydney indeed was executed, yet
was to the
general discontent of the nation and his attainder was afterwards reversed by
parliament. There was then no manner of doubt, but that the publication of
sufficient overt act of treason at the common
such treasonable writing was
law; (b) though of late even that has been questioned.
"
The second species of treason
a man do violate the king's com
the
eldest
king's
daughter unmarried, or the wife of the king's
panion, or
eldest son and heir."
meant his wife; and by vio
By the king's companion
understood carnal knowledge, as well without force, as with it: and
lation
both be consenting; as some of the wives
this
high treason in both parties,
of Henry the Eighth by fatal experience evinced. The plain intention of this
law
to guard the blood royal from any suspicion of bastardy, whereby the
succession to the crown might be rendered dubious: and therefore, when this rea
son ceases, the law ceases with it; for to violate
queen or princess-dowager
U) Ibid.

(o)

1

1
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Hal. P. C. 110.
(to) Hawk. P. C. 88.
(y! Oro. Oar. 185.
(*) Hal. P. 0. 115.
jt) Hal. P. C. 118. Hawk. P. 0. 88.
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held to be no treason: (c) in like manner as, by the feudal law, it was a felony
and attended with a forfeiture of the fief, if the vassal vitiated the wife or
daughter of his lord; (<2) but not so, if he only vitiated his widow. («)
" if a man do levy war against our lord the
3. The third species of treason is
king in his realm." And this may be done by taking arms, not only to dethrone
the King, but under pretence to reform religion, or the laws, or to remove evil
For the law
counsellors, or other grievances, whether real or pretended.
^oes not' ne't,'ler °'an
or
set of men, to interman,
*any
permit
private
r*82l
*■
has es
fere forcibly, in matters of such high importance; especially as
tablished a sufficient power, for these purposes, in the high court of parliament:
neither does the constitution justify any private or particular resistance for pri
vate or particular grievances; though incases of national oppression the nation
has very justifiably risen as one man, to vindicate the original contract subsist
To resist the king's forces by defending
ing between the king and his people.
an insurrection with an
castle against them,
levying of war; and so
avowed design to pull down all inolosures, all brothels, and the like; the univer
a rebellion against the state, an usurpation of the
sality of the design making
powers of government, and an insolent invasion of the king's authority, (g)
tumult, with
view to pull down a particular house, or lay open
But,
par
ticular inclosure, amounts at most to riot; this being no general defianoe of
two subjects quarrel and levy war against each
public government. So,
other (in that spirit of private war, which prevailed all over Europe (A) in the
Thus
early feudal times),
only great riot and contempt, and no treason.
who
happened between the earls of Hereford and Gloucester, in 20 Edw.
raised each
little army, and committed outrages upon each other's lands, burn
ing houses, attended with the loss of many lives: yet this was held to be no
A bare conspiracy to levy war
high treason, but only great misdemeanor.
does not amount to this species of treason; but (if particularly pointed at the
falls within the first, of compassing or
person of the king or his government)
imagining the king's death, (k)
4. " If
man be adherent to the king's enemies in his realm, giving to them
also declared guilty of high
aid and comfort in the realm, or elsewhere," he
treason.
This must likewise be proved by some overt act, as by giving them
intelligence, (3) by sending them provisions, by selling them arms, by treacherfortress, or the *like.(l)
By enemies are here underously surrendering
r*B<>i
stood the subjects of foreign powers with whom we are at open war. As
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very carefully defined and limited by the consti
(8) Treason against the United States
tution, and
can consist "only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies,
Const, of United States, art.
And by the same sec
giving them aid and comfort.
tion, "No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to
Stat,
See, also, act of April 30, 1790
the same overt act, or on confession in open court"
at Large 112), prescribing the penalty of death for this offense.
The question, what
treason under the constitution, was considered in Ex parte Bollman,
Cranch, 75, and
conspiracy to subvert the government bv force
was there held that
v Han way,
See also U.
not treason, but that war must be actually levied.
Wall Jr.,
189; Respublica v. Carlisle,
Dall., 35. In Fries' Case (Whart. State Trials, 634), Judge
Chase, of the United States supreme court, charged the jury, among other things, as fol
lows:
"
the opinion of the court that any insurrection or rising of any body of people, with
in the United States, to attain oreffect by force or violence any objectof
great public nat
a levying of war against the United
ure, or of public and general (or national) concern,
States within the contemplation and construction of the constitution.
"On this general position the court are of opinion that any such insurrection or rising to
resist, or to prevent by force or violence, the execution of any statute of the United States,
for levying or collecting taxes, duties, imposts or excises; or for calling forth the militia to
execute the laws of the Union, or for any other object of
general nature or national con
cern, under any pretence, as that the statute was unjust, burthensome,
oppressive or uncon
stitutional,
war
the
States
within
the contemplation and conatruo
United
levying
against
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to foreign pirates or robbers, who may happen to invade onr coasts, wbithont
any open hostilities between their nation and onr own, and without any com
mission from any prince or state at enmity with the crown of Great Britain,
the giving them any assistance is also clearly treason; either in the light of
adhering to the public enemies of the king and kingdom, (m) or else in that
of levying war against his majesty. And, most indisputably, the same actB of
adherence or aid, which (when applied to foreign enemies) will constitute
treason under this branch of the statute, will (when afforded to our own fellowsubjects in actual rebellion at home) amount to high treason under the descrip
tion of levying war against the king, (n) But to relieve a rebel, fled out of
the kingdom, is no treason: for the statute is taken strictly, and a rebel is not
an enemy: an enemy being always the subject of some foreign prince, and one
who owes no allegiance to the crown of England, (o) And if a person be
of actual force and constraint, through a well grounded
under circumstances
apprehension of injury to his life or person, this fear or compulsion will excuse
his even joining with either rebels or enemies in the kingdom, provided he
leaves them whenever he hath a safe opportunity, (p)
5. "If a man counterfeit the king's great or privy seal," this is also high
But if a man takes wax bearing the impression of the great seal off
treason.
from one patent, and fixes it on another, this is held to be only an abuse of the
seal, and not a counterfeiting of it: as was the case of a certain chaplain, who
in such manner framed a dispensation for non-residence.
But the knavish arti
fice of a lawyer much exceeded this of the divine. One of the clerks in chan
cery glued together two pieoes of parchment, on the uppermost of which he
wrote a patent, to which he regularly obtained the great seal, the label going
through both the skins. He *then dissolved the cement; and taking off r*s.-i
the written patent, on the blank skin wrote a fresh patent, of a differ- «■ *
ent import from the former, and published it as true. This was held no coun
terfeiting of the great seal, but only a great misprision; and Sir Edward
(m) Foster, 219.

In) Ibid. 218.

(o) 1 Hawk. P. 0. 88.

(j>)Foator, MS.

1

8

§

8.

is

I

jly

The reason for this opinion is, that an insurrection to resist or pre
tion of the constitution.
vent by force the execution of any statute of the United States has a direct tendency to dis
solve all the bands of society, to destroy all order and all laws, and also all security for the
lives, liberties and property of the citizens of the United States.
"The court are of opinion that military weapons (as guns and swords, mentioned in the
indictment) are not necessary to make such insurrection or rising amount to a levying war,
because numbers may supply the want of weapons and other instruments may effect the
intended mischief. The legal guilt of levying war may be incurred without the use of mil
itary weapons or military array.
"The court are of the opinion that the assembling of bodies of men, armed and arrayed
in a warlike manner, for purposes only of a private nature, is not treason, although the
judges or other peace officers should be insulted or resisted, or even great outrages commit
ted to the persons or property of our citizens.
"The true criterion whether acts committed are treason or a less offense (as a riot) is the
When the intention is
qua animo, or the intention, with which the people did assemble.
universal or general, as to effect some object of a general public nature, it will be treason, and
construed,
considered,
or
reduced to a riot.
The commission of any number of
cannot be
cannot alter their nature, so as to make them amount
fe onies, riots, or other misdemeanors,
hand,
other
if
treason;
and
on
the
the
intention
and
acts
combined amount to a treason,
to
they cannot be sunk down to a felony or riot The intention with which any acts (as fel
onies, the destruction of property or the like) are done, will show to what class of crimes
the case belongs." See also U. S. v. Hanway, 2 Wall. Jr., 189; U. 8. v. Mitchell, 2 DalL
848; U. 8. v. Vigol. id., 346; U. 8 v.. Hoxie, 1 Paine, 265; U. 8. v. Greathouse, 2 Abb. U.
8., 864; Shortridge v. Macon, Chase, 136. And as to what is adhering to the enemies of
the United States, see, U. S. v. Pryor, 3 Wash. C. C, 284. And see 2 Bish. Cr. L., 7th ed.
«h. 46; Whart Cr. L. § 2718, etteq.
Attainder of treason against the United States works corruption of blood, or forfeiture, onConst., art.
during the life of the person attainted.
The crime generally defined
Treason may be also committed against the several stales.
Land limited in the state constitutions in the same manner as in the constitution of the Unitfed States, and the punishment prescribed is the same.
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Coke (q) mentions it with some indignation, that the party was living at that
•lay.

(a)

it,
is

it,

6. The sixth species of treason under this statute, is "if a man counterfeit
the king's money: and if a man bring false money into the realm counterfeit
to the money of England, knowing the money to be false, to merchandise and
make payment withal."
As to the first branch, counterfeiting the king's
money; this is treason, whether the false money be uttered in payment or not.
Also, if the king's own minters alter the standard or alloy established by law,
it is treason.
But gold and silver money only are held to be within the stat
ute,
(r) With regard likewise to the second branch, importing foreign coun
terfeit money, in order to utter it here; it is held that uttering
without
But of this we shall presently say
not within the statute,
importing

more. (4)

J

J

1

if

is

(4) In the United
felonies.
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The last species of treason ascertained by the statute, is, "if
man slay
the chancellor, treasurer, or the king's justices of the one bench or the other,,
justioes in eyre, or justices of assize, and all other justices assigned to hear and
These high magistrates,
determine, being in their places doing their offices."
as they represent the king's majesty during the execution of their offices, are
therefore for the time equally regarded by the law. But this statute extends
only to the actual killing of them, and not wounding, or bare attempt to kill
It extends also only to the officers therein specified; and therefore the
them.
barons of exchequer, as such, are not within the protection of this act:
but
the lord keeper or commissioners of the great seal now seem to be within it, by
virtue of the statutes
W. and M. c. 21.
Eliz. o. 18, and
"Thus careful was the legislature, in the reign of Edward the Third*
r*„s-|
to specify and reduce to
certaintv the vague notions of treason that
had formerly prevailed in our courts.
But the act does not stop here, but
"Because other like cases of treason may happen in time to come*
goes on.
which cannot be thought of nor declared at present,
accorded, that
any
not above specified, doth happen
other case supposed to be treason, which
before any judge; the judge shall tarry without going to judgment of thetreason, till the cause be showed and declared before the king and his parlia
Sir Matthew
ment, whether
ought to be judged treason, or other felony.
Hale (w)
very high in his encomiums on the great wisdom and care of the
parliament, in thus keeping judges within the proper bounds and limits of this
act, by not suffering them to run out (upon their own opinions) into construc
tive treasons, though in cases that seem to them to have a like parity of reason,
but reserving them to the decision of parliament. This
great security tothe public, the judges, and even this sacred act itself; and leaves
weighty
memento to judges to be careful and not over-hasty in letting in treasons by
construction or interpretation, especially in new cases that have not been
resolved and settled.
2. He observes, that as the authoritative decision of
reserved to the king and parliament, the most regular way
these casus omissi
to do
by a new declarative act; and therefore the opinion of any one or
of both houses, though of very respectable weight,
not that solemn declara
tion referred to by this act, as the only criterion for judging of future treasons.
In consequence of this power, not, indeed, originally granted by the statute
of Edward III, but constitutionally inherent in every subsequent parliament
(which cannot be abridged of any rights by the act of a precedent one), the
legislature was extremely liberal in declaring new treasons in the unfortunate
reign of King Richard the Second; as, particularly, the killing of an ambassa^or was ma<^e B0> "which seems to be founded upon better reason than
r*Rfi1
the multitude of other points, that were then strained np to this high
(q) Inst. 18.
(») Ibid. 48.
(r) Hawk. P. 0. «.
(«) HaL P. C. 159.
(t) Hal. F. 0. 281.
are not treason,
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offence; the most arbitrary and absurd of all which was by the statute 21 Rio.
II, o. 3, which made the bare purpose and intent of killing or deposing the
And yet so little
high treason.
king, without any overt act to demonstrate
effect have over-violent laws to prevent any crime, that within two years after
wards this very prince was both deposed and murdered. And in the first year
of his successor's reign, an act was passed, (v) reciting " that no man knew
how he ought to behave himself, to do, speak, or say, for doubt of such pains
was accorded, that in no time to come any treason
■of treason; and therefore
be judged otherwise than was ordained by the statute of King Edward the
Third." This at once swept away the whole load of extravagant treasons
introduced in the time of Richard the Second.
But afterwards, between the reign of Henry the Fourth and Queen Mary,
and particularly in the bloody reign of Henry the Eighth, the spirit of invent
ing new and strange treasons was revived: among which we may reckon the
offences of clipping money; breaking prison or rescue, when the prisoner
committed for treason; burning houses to extort money; stealing cattle by
Welshmen; counterfeiting foreign coin; wilful poisoning; execrations against
the king, calling him opprobrious names by publio writing; counterfeiting the
sign manual or signet; refusing to abjure the pope; deflowering or marrying,
without the royal license, any of the king's children, sisters, aunts, nephews,
or nieces; bare solicitation of the chastity of the queen or princess, or advances
made by themselves;
marrying with the king by a woman not virgin, with
out previously discovering to him such her unchaste life; judging or believing
(manifested by any overt act) the king to have been lawfully married to Ann
of Cleves; derogating from the kings royal style and title; impugning his
supremacy; and assembling riotously to the *number of twelve, and r*a*i
not dispersing upon proclamation: all which new-fangled treasons were
Mar. c.
which once more reduced all
totally abrogated by the statute
treasons to the standard of the statute 25 Edw. HL Since which time, though
the legislature has been more cautious in creating new offences of this kind,
short
very considerably increased, as we shall find upon
yet the number
review.
These new treasons, created since the statute
Mar. c.
and not compre
hended under the description of statute 25 Edw. Ill,
shall comprise under
Such as relate to papists.
three heads.
2. Such as relate to falsifying the
coin, or other royal signatures. 3. Such as are created for the security of the
protestant succession in the house of Hanover.
1. The first species, relating to papists, was considered in
preceding chapter, among the penalties incurred by that branch of non-conformists to the
national church; wherein we have only to remember, that by statute Eliz. o.
to defend the pope's jurisdiction in this realm,
for the first time, heavy
misdemeanor: and,
the offence be repeated,
Also by
high treason.
statute 27 Eliz. c.
any popish priest, born in the dominions of the crown
of England, shall come over hither from beyond the seas, unless driven by stress
of weather, (w) and departing in a reasonable time; (as) or shall tarry here
three days without conforming to the church, and taking the oaths; he
guilty
And by statute Jac.
■of high treason.
c.
any natural-born subject be
withdrawn from his allegiance, and reconciled to the pope or see of Rome, or
any other prince or state, both he and all such as procure such reconciliation
shall incur the guilt of high treason.
These were mentioned under the divi
sion before referred to, as spiritual offences, and
now repeat them as temporal
ones also; the reason of distinguishing these overt acts of popery from all
others, by setting the mark of high treason upon them, being certainly on civil,
and not on
religious account. For every popish priest of course renounces
his allegiance to his ^temporal sovereign upon taking orders; that being r*88-i
inconsistent with his new engagements of canonical obedience to the
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pope; and the same may be said of an obstinate defence of his authority here,
or a formal reconciliation to the see of Rome, which the statute construes to
be a withdrawing from one's natural allegiance; and therefore, besides being
reconciled "to the pope," it also adds, " or any other prince or state,"
2. With regard to treasons relative to the coin or other royal signature*, we
may recollect that the only two offences respecting the coinage, which are
made treason by the statute 25 Edw. Ill, are the actual counterfeiting the
gold and silver coin of this kingdom; or the importing of such counterfeit
to be false.
But, these not being
money with intent to utter
knowing
found sufficient to restrain the evil practices of coiners and false moneyers,
other statutes have been since made for that purpose.
The crime itself
made
breach of allegiance by infringing the
species of high treason; as being
king's prerogative, and assuming one of the attributes of the sovereign, to
whom alone
belongs, to set the value and denomination of coin made at
home, or to fix the currency of foreign money: and besides, as all money which
bears the stamp of the kingdom
sent into the world upon the public faith,
as containing metal of
particular weight and standard, whoever falsifies this
an offender against the state, by contributing to render that public faith
And upon the same reasons, by law of the emperor Constantino,
suspected.
(y) false coiners were declared guilty of high treason, and were condemned to
be burnt alive: as, by the laws of Athens
all counterfeiters, debasers, and
diminishers of the current coin were subjected to capital punishment.
How
must be owned that this method of reasoning
little overstrained:
ever,
counterfeiting or debasing the coin being usually practiced rather for the sake
of private and unlawful lucre, than out of any disaffection to the sovereign.
"^n<^ "therefore, both this and jits kindred species of treason, that of
T*8Bl
counterfeiting the seals of the crown or other royal signatures, seem
better denominated Dy the later civilians
branch of the crimen falsi or for
gery (in which they are followed by Glanvil, (a) Bracton, (6) and Fleta) (c)
than by Constantino and our Edward the Third,
species of the crimen lasses
For this confounds the distinction and propor
majestatis, or high treason.
tion of offences; and, by affixing the same ideas of guilt upon the man who
coins
leaden groat and him who assassinates his sovereign, takes off from
that horror which ought to attend the very mention of the crime of high trea
Before the statute 25 Edw.
more familiar to the subject.
son, and makes
Ill, the offence of counterfeiting the coin was held to be only a species of
petit treason; (d) but subsequent acts in their new extensions of the offence
have followed the example of that statute, and have made
equally high
treason with an endeavour to subvert the government, though not quite equal
in its punishment.
In oonsequence of the principle thus adopted, the statute 1-Mar. c.
having
at one stroke repealed all intermediate treasons created since the 25 Edw. ID,
was thought expedient by statute
Mar. st.
c.
to revive two species,
viz.:
That
any person falsely forge or counterfeit any such kind of coin
of gold or silver, as
not the proper coin of this realm, but shall be current
shall falsely forge or counter
within this realm by consent of the crown; or,
feit the sign manual, privy signet, or privy seal such offences shall be deemed
And by statute and P. and M. c. 11, any persons do bring
high treason.
into this realm such false or counterfeit foreign money, being current here,
knowing the same to be false, with intent to utter the same in payment, they
The money referred to in these
shall be deemed offenders in high treason.
statutes must be such as
absolutely current here, in all payments, by the
none at present, Portugal money being
king's proclamation; of whioh there
only taken by consent, as approaohing the nearest to our standard: and falling
in well enough with oar divisions of money into pounds and shillings: there
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fore to counterfeit it is not high treason, but another inferior offenoe.
•"Clipping or defacing the genuine coin was not hitherto included in r*an\*
these statutes; though an offence equally pernicious to trade, and an *equal insult upon the prerogative, as well as personal affront to the sovereign:,
whose very image ought to be had in reverence by all loyal subjects. And
therefore among the Romans,
defacing or even melting down the emperor's
statues was made treason by the Julian law; together with other offences of
the like sort, according to that vague conclusion, " aliudve quid simile, si adAnd now, in England, by statutes
Eliz. o. 11, clipping, washing,
miserint."
rounding, or filing, for wicked gain's sake, any of the money of this realm, or
other money suffered to be current here, shall be adjudged to be high treason;
and by statute 18 Eliz. o.
(because "the same law, being penal, ought to be
taken and expounded strictly according to the words thereof, and the like
offences, not by any equity to receive the like punishment or pains "), the same
therefore described in other more general words, viz.
species of offences
impairing, diminishing, falsifying, scaling, and lightening; and made liable to
Wm. Ill, c. 26, made perpetual by
the same penalties.
By statute and
Ann. c. 25, whoever without proper authority, shall knowingly make or mend,
or assist in so doing, or shall buy, sell, conceal, hide, or knowingly have in his
possession, any implements of coinage specified in the act, or other tools or
instruments proper only for the coinage of money; (5) or shall convey the
same out of the king's mint; he, together with his counsellors, procurers, aid
ers, and abettors, shall be guilty of high treason, which
by much the severest
branch of the coinage law. The statute goes on farther, and enacts that to
mark any coin on the edges with letters, or otherwise in imitation of those
used in the mint; or to colour, guild, or case over any coin resembling the
current coin, or even round blanks of base metal; shall be construed high
But all prosecutions on this act are to be commenced within three
treason.
•months after the commission of the offence, except those for making or r#fl, -■
mending any coining tool or instrument, or for marking money round «■
the edges; which are directed to be commenced within six months after the
And, lastly, by statute 15 and 16 Geo. II, c. 28,
offence committed,
any person colours or alters any shilling or sixpence, either lawful or counter
feit, to make them respectively resemble
guinea or half guinea; or any
shilling or six
halfpenny or farthing to make them respectively resemble
also high treason: but the offender shall be pardoned, in case
pence; this
(being out of prison) he discovers and convicts two other offenders of the
same kind. (6)
3. The other new species of high treason
such as
created for the security
of the protestant succession over and above such treasons against the king and
government as were comprised under the statute 25 Edw. IIL For this pur
pose, after the act of settlement was made, for transferring the crown to the
illustrious house of Hanover,
was enacted by statute 13 and 14 Wm. HI, c.
that the pretended Prince of Wales, who was then thirteen years of age,
and had assumed the title of King James III, should be attainted of high
was made high treason for any of the king's subjects, by letters,
treason; and
(•) jy. 48,4,8.
(/) 8tat.TAnn.a2B.
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now reduced to felony in England.
(5) This offense
(6) The counterfeiting, etc. of copper coin, the making, mending, etc., of tools or imple
ments for the purpose, and having the same in custody without lawful excuse, etc., were
Wm, IV, c. 84. The uttering or putting In
made punishable as felonies under statute
circulation of counterfeit copper coin was not before indictable at all: Rex v. Curwan,
East P. C, 182; and the making, etc., of tools, etc., for counterfeiting the copper coin was
a common-law misdemeanor only. Offenses against the currency are punishable in the
federal courts of the United States, under various acts of congress, as statutory offenses.
But they may also be punished by the states; the same act constituting an offense against
How., 560; Moore
v. Marigold,
each sovereignty.
Fox v. Ohio, How., 410; U.
People, 14 How., 18.
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with him, or any person
or otherwise, to hold correspondence
employed by him, or to remit any money for his use, knowing the same to be
ifor his service.
And by statute 17 Geo. II, c. 89, it is enacted, that if any of
the sons of the pretender shall land or attempt to land in this kingdom, or be
found in Great Britain, or Ireland, or any of the dominions belonging to the
same, he shall be judged attainted of high treason, and suffer the pains thereof.
And to correspond with them, or to remit money for their use, is made high
treason in the same manner as it was to correspond with the father.
By the
statute 1 Ann. st. 2, c. 17, if any person shall endeavor to deprive or hinder
any person, being the next in succession to the crown according to the limita
tions of the act of settlement, from succeeding to the crown, and shall malic'ous'y an^ directly attempt the same by any *overt act, such offence
T*92l
L
J shall be high treason. And by statute 6 Ann. c. 7, if any person shall
maliciously, advisedly, and directly, by writing or printing, maintain and
affirm, that any other person hath any right or title to the crown of this realm,
otherwise than according to the act of settlement; or that the kings of this
realm with the authority of parliament are not able to make laws and statutes,
to bind the crown and the descent thereof; such person shall be guilty of high
This offence (or indeed maintaining this doctrine in any wise, that
treason.
the king and parliament cannot limit the crown) was once before made high
treason by statute 13 Eliz. o. 1, during the life of that princess.
And after her
decease it continued a high misdemeanor,
punishable with forfeiture of goods
and chattels, even in the most flourishing sera of indefeasible hereditary right
and jure divino succession.
But it was again raised into high treason, by the
statute of Anne before mentioned, at the time of a projected invasion in
favour of the then pretender; and upon this statute one Matthews, a printer,
was convicted and executed in 1719, for printing a treasonable pamphlet,
entitled " Voxpopuli vox Dei." (g)
Thus much for the crime of treason, or Icbsob majestatis, in all its branches ;
which consists, we may observe, originally, in grossly counteracting that alle
giance which is due from the subject by either birth or residence; though, in
some instances, the zeal of our legislators to stop the progress of some highly
pernicious practices has occasioned them a little to depart from this its primi
tive idea.
But of this enough has been hinted already: it is now time to
pass on from defining the crime to describing its punishment.
The punishment of high treason in general is very solemn and terrible.
1. That the offender be drawn to the gallows, and not be carried or walk;
though usually (by connivance, (h) at length ripened by humanity into law) a
sledge or hurdle is allowed, to preserve the offender from the extreme torment
That he *be
r*Ml °^ Dem& dragged on the ground or pavement,
That his entrails be
hanged by the neck, and then cut down alive.
taken out and burned, while he
yet alive. 4. That his head be cut off. 5.
That his body be divided into four parts. 6. That his head and quarters be
at the king's disposal, (k) (7)
The king may, and often doth, discharge all the punishment, except behead
ing, especially where any of noble blood are attainted. For beheading, being
part of the judgment, that may be executed, though all the rest be omitted by
no part of the judgment, as
the king's command. (I)
But where beheading
in murder or other felonies,
hath been said that the king cannot change the
judgment, although at the request of the party, from one species of death to
another,
But of this we shall say more hereafter, (n)
(m)
2.
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(a) State Tr. lz. 880.
(A) S3Asa. pi.
<fl HaL P. C. 382.
(fc) This punishment for treason, Sir Edward Coke tells us, is warranted bj direr* examples 1b Scrip
ture; for Joan was drawn, Bithan was hanged, Judas was embowelled, and so of the rest.
lust. 211.)
(m) Inst. 62.
(1) HaL P. C. 851.
(n) See ch. 82.
(7) The punishment for treason was changed to hanging in case of women by stat. 30
Geo.
c. 48, and in case of men by stat. 54 Geo.
c. 146.
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In the case of coining, which is a treason of a different complexion from the
rest, the punishment is milder for male offenders; being only to be drawn and
hanged by the neck till dead, (o) But in treasons of every kind the punish
ment of women is the same, and different from that of men.
For as the
decency due to the sex forbids the exposing and publicly mangling their
bodies, their sentence (which is to the full as terrible to sensation as the other)
is to be drawn to the gallows, and there to be burned alive, (p)
The consequence of this judgment (attainder, forfeiture, and corruption of
blood) must be referred to the latter end of this book, when we shall treat of
them all together, as well in treason as in other offences.

CHAPTER VII.

OF FELONIES INJURIOUS TO THE KING'S PREROGA
TIVE.

I

As, according to the method have adopted, we are next to consider such
felonies as are more immediately injurious to the king's prerogative, it will
not be amiss here, at our first entrance upon this crime, to inquire briefly into
the nature and meaning of felony: before we proceed, upon any of the par
ticular branches into which it is divided.
Felony, in the general acceptation of our English

law, comprises every

species of crime, which occasioned at common law the forfeiture of lands or
goods. (1) This most frequently happens in those crimes, for which a capital
punishment either is or was liable to be inflicted: for those felonies which are
«alled clergyable, or to which the benefit of clergy extends, were anciently
punished with death, in all lay, or unlearned offenders; though now by the
atatute-law that punishment is for the first offence universally remitted.
Treason itself, says Sir Edward Coke, (a) was anciently comprised: under the
name felony: and in confirmation of this we may observe that the statute of
treasons, 25 Edw. TTT, c. 2, speaking of some dubious crimes, directs a refer■ence to parliament; *that it may there be adjudged, "whether they be r*ge'i
treason, or other felony."
All treasons, therefore, strictly speaking, are *■ *
And to this also we may add,
felonies; though all felonies are not treasons.
that not only all offences, now capital, are in some degree or other felony; but
that this is likewise the case with some other offences, which are not punished
with death; as suicide, where the party is already dead; homicide by chance
medley, or in self-defence; and petit larceny or pilfering: all which are
(strictly speaking) felonies, as they subject the committers of them to for
feitures. So that upon the whole the only adequate definition of felony seems
to be that which is before laid down; viz., an offence which occasions a total
(o) 1 Hal P. 0. 891.

(p) 2 EaL P. 0. 899.

(a) 8 Inst. 15.

(1) In some of the United States by statute the term "felony" is made to embrace all
offenses for which a specified punishment maybe Imposed; e. g., imprisonment in the state
penitentiary. People v. Van Steenburgh, 1 Park. C. R., 39. In the absence of such statu
tory definition, those offenses are felonies which were so at the common law. Ward v.
People, 8 Hill, 895; Drennan v. People, 10 Mich., 169; though in Ohio, where all offenses
are statutory, it has been said that " the term felony has no distinct and well-defined mean
In England it has a well-known
ing applicable to our system of criminal jurisprudence.
and extensive signification, and comprises every species of crime which, at common law,
criminal
code the word feUmiout,
But under our
worked a forfeiture of goods and lands.
though occasionally used, expresses a signification no less vague and Indefinite than the
word eriminal." Matthews v. State, 4 Ohio St. 539.
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forfeiture of either lands, or goods, or both, at the common law; and to which
capital or other punishment may be superadded, according to the degree of
guilt.
To explain this matter a little farther: the word felony or fdonia is of un
doubted feudal origin, beinj* frequently to be met with in the books of feuds,
&c; but the derivation of it has much puzzled the juridical lexicographers,
Prseteus, Calvinus and the rest: some deriving it from the Greek <ptj\oi, an
im poster or deceiver; others from the Latin folio, fefelli, to countenance which
Sir Edward Coke, as his manner
has
they would have it called fallonia.
still stranger etymology; {b) that
crimen anima felleo perpegiven us
tratum, with
bitter or gallish inclination.
But all of them agree in the de
such a crime as occasions
forfeiture of all the offender's
scription, that
lands or goods.
And this gives great probability to Sir Henry Spelman's
Teutonic or German derivation of it: (c) in which language indeed, as the
word
of clearly feudal original, we ought rather to look for its signification,
than among the Greeks and Romans. Fe-lon then, according to him,
de
rived from two northern words: fit, which signifies (we well know) the fief,
feud, or beneficiary estate; and Ion, which signifies price or value.
Felony
r*Bfll therefore the same as pretium feudi, the "consideration for which man
as much
gives up his fief; as we say in common speech, such an act
worth, in this sense
as your life or estate
will dearly signify the feudal
forfeiture, or act by which an estate
forfeited, or escheats to the lord.
To confirm this we may observe, that
in this sense, of forfeiture to the
lord, that the feudal writers constantly use it. For all those acts, whether of
criminal nature or not, which at this day are generally forfeitures of copy
hold estates, (d) are styled felonia in the feudal law: "scilicet per quas feodum
As "si domino deservire noluerit;
siper annum et diem cesamittitur."(e)
saverit in patenda investitura
e., ncgaverit se a
(g) si dominum ejuraverit,
domino feudum habere; (A) si a domino, in jus eum vocante, ter citatus non
all these, with many others, are still causes of forfeiture in
comparuerit;"
our copyhold estates, and were denominated felonies by the feudal constitu
tions. So likewise injuries of more substantial or criminal nature were de
nominated felonies, that
forfeitures: as assaulting or beating the lord; (k)
«., cum uxors
vitiating his wife or daughter, "si dominum cucurbitaverit,
all these are esteemed felonies, and the latter
ejus concubueritf
expressly
And
so denominated, "sifecerit felonium, dominum forte cucurbitando." (m)
as these contempts, or smaller offences, were felonies or acts of forfeiture, of
course greater crimes, as murder and robbery, fell under the same denomin
ation. On the other hand, the lord might be guilty of felony, or forfeit his
seigniory to the vassal, by the same acts as the vassal would have forfeited his
feud to the lord. "Si dominus commiserit feloniam, per quam vassalus amitterit feudum si earn commiserit in dominum, feudi proprietatem etiam dominus
One instance given of this sort of felony in the lord
perdere debet." (n)
beating the servant of his vassal, so that he loses his service; which seems
respects the vassal.
r*nf-i merely in the nature of a civil 'injury, so far as
*■
And all these felonies were to be determined "per laudamentum sivs
hidicum parium suorum" in the lords court; as with us forfeiture of copyhold
lands are presentable by the homage in the court-baron.
Felony and the act of forfeiture to the lord, being thus synonymous terms
in the feudal law, we may easily trace the reason why, upon the introduction
of that law into England, those crimes which induoed such forfeiture or escheat
of lands (and, by small deflection from the original sense, such as induced the
was said, that
forfeiture of goods also) were denominated felonies. Thus
the consequence of such
suicide, robbery and rape, were felonies; that
is,

it

*

it

is

is

(I)

i.

is,

a

(t)

:

i.

(f)

330

U.

to) Ibid.
(I) bid.

M.

\

H

L I.
S,
1.
t
i.

(*) Ibid.
86and 47.

/

(f) Ibid.

1.
1,L
t. L
f.
1
1.

I.
S,
t.

I.

t.

1 2.

I.
8,
1.

5
3.

(.
2.
t.

I. I.
i, (.2,

I

1

(b) Init. 891.
(o) Qlomr. Ht. Felon.
16, in eale.
(e) Feud.
<d)See book II, pafre 284.
28,
<h) but.
34.
29.
«) Ibid.
t.88. Brittan, LI. a SS.
(m)Ibid.
(») bid.

Offences Relating to the Coin.

Chap. 7.]

97

crimes was forfeiture; till by long use we began to signify by the term of
And upon
felony the actual crime committed, and not the penal consequence.
this system only can we account for the cause, why treason in ancient times
was held to be a species of felony: viz., because it induced a forfeiture.
Hence it follows, that capital punishment does by no means enter into the
true idea and definition of felony. Felony may be without inflicting capital
punishment, as in the cases instanced of self-murder, excusable homicide and
petit larceny: and it is possible that capital punishments may be inflicted, and
yet the offence be no felony; as in case of heresy by the common law, which
though capital, never worked any forfeiture of lands or goods, (o) an insepar
able incident to felony.
And of the same nature was the punishment of stand
ing mute, without pleading to an indictment, which at common law was oapital, but without any forfeiture, and therefore such standing mute was nofelony. In short, the true criterion of felony is forfeiture; for, as Sir Edward
Coke justly observes (p) in all felonies which are punishable with death, the
offender loses all his lands in fee-simple, and also his goods and chattels; in
such as are not so punishable, his goods and chattels only.
*The idea of felony is indeed so generally connected with that of •>
-.
■»
capital punishment, that we find it hard to separate them; and to this
And, therefore, if a
usage the interpretations of the law do now conform.
statute makes any new offence felony, the law (q) implies that it shall be
punished with death, viz., by hanging as well as with forfeiture: unless the
offender prays the benefit of clergy which all felons are entitled once to have,
And in compliance
provided the same is not expressly taken away by statute.
herewith, shall for the future consider it also in the same light, as a generical
term, including all capital crimes below treason; having premised thus much
concerning the true nature and original meaning of felony, in order to account
for the reason of those instances
have mentioned, of felonies that are not
capital, and capital offences that are not felonies: which seem at first view reugnant to the general idea which we now entertain of felony, as a crime to
e punished by death: whereas properly it is a crime to be punished by for
feiture, and to which death may, or may not be, though it generally is,

I

I

superadded.
I proceed

now to consider such felonies as are more immediately injurious
to the king's prerogative. These are, 1. Offences relating to the coin, not
2. Offences against the king's council.
3. The offence
amounting to treason.
of serving a foreign prince. 4. The offence of embezzling or destroying the
king's armour or stores of war. To which may be added a fifth, 5. Desertion
from the king's armies in time of war.
1. Offences
relating to the coin, under which may be ranked some inferior
not amounting to felony, are thus declared by a series of statutes
misdemeanors
which I shall recite in the order of time. And first, by statute 27 Edw. I, o.
8, none shall bring pollards and crockards, which were foreign coins of base
metal, into the realm on pain of forfeiture of life and goods.
By statute &
Edw. Ill, st. 2, no sterling money shall be melted down, upon pain of forfei
ture thereof. *By statute 17 Edw. Ill, none shall be so hardy to bring r
■*
false and ill money into the realm, on pain or forfeiture of life and L
member by the persons importing, and the searchers permitting such importa
tion. By statute 3 Hen. V, st. 1, to make, coin, buy, or bring into the realm
any gally-half pence, suskins, or dotkins, in order to utter them, is felony; and
knowingly to receive or pay either them or blanks (r) is forfeiture of an hun
dred shillings. By statute 14 Eliz. c. 3, such as forge any foreign coin, although
it be not made current here by proclamation, 8hall(witn their aiders and abet
tors) be guilty of misprision of treason, a crime which we shall hereafter con
sider.
By statute 13 and 14 Car. H, c. 31, the offence of melting down any
(0)8 Inst 48.
(r) 3 Scat. Hen.

(j>)1 Inst. 881.

Vl o. 9.

(fl) 1 Hawk. P. C. 107. 9 Hawk. P.

a
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•current silver money shall be punished with forfeiture of the same, and also
the double value: and the offender, if a freeman of any town, shall be dis
franchised; if not, shall suffer six months' imprisonment. By statute 6 and 7
o. 17, if any person buys or sells, or knowingly has in his custody,
Wm.
any clippings, or filings, of the coin, he shall forfeit the same and 5002.; one
moiety to the king, and the other to the informer; and be branded in the cheek
with the letter R. By statute 8 and 9 Wm.
c. 26, if any person shall
blanch or whiten copper for sale (which makes it resemble silver) ; or buy or
sell, or offer to sell any malleable composition, which shall be heavier than
-silver, and look, touch, and wear like gold, but be beneath the standard: or if
any person shall receive or pay at a less rate than it imports to be of (which
of its baseness, and a fraudulent design,) any
-demonstrates a consciousness
■counterfeit or diminished milled money of this kingdom, not being cut in
pieces (an operation which is expressly directed to be performed when any
such money shall be produced in evidence, and which any person to whom any
gold or silver money is tendered, is empowered by statutes 9 and 10 Wm.
o. 70, to perform at his own haz
c. 21, 13 Geo.
c. 71, and 14 Geo.
ard, and the officers of the exchequer and receivers general of the taxes are
particularly required to perform) : all such persons shall be guilty of felony;
and may be prosecuted for the same at any time within three months after the
°^enoe committed.
*But these precautions not being found sufficient
f*100l
*' to
prevent the uttering of false or diminished money, which was only
a misdemeanor at oommon law, it is enacted by statute 15 and 16 Geo. II, c.
28, that if any person shall utter or tender in payment any counterfeit coin,
knowing it so to be, he shall for the first offence be imprisoned six months,
-and find sureties for his good behaviour for six months more; for the second
offence, shall be imprisoned two years, and find sureties for two years longer;
and for the third offence shall be guilty of felony without benefit of clergy.
Also, if a person knowingly tenders in payment any counterfeit money, and
at the same time has more in his oustody; or shall, within ten days after,
knowingly tender other false money; he shall be deemed a common utterer of
-counterfeit money, and shall for the first offence be imprisoned one year, and
find sureties for his good behaviour for two years longer; and for the second,
be guily of felony without benefit of clergy.
By the same statute it is also
-enacted, that if any person counterfeits the copper coin, he shall suffer two
years' imprisonment, and find sureties for two years more.
By statute 1 1 Geo.
IH, c. 40, persons counterfeiting copper half-pence or farthings, with their

Ill,

Ill,

Ill,

Ill,

Ill,

abettors; or buying, selling, receiving, or putting off any counterfeit copper
money (not being cut in pieces or melted down) at a less value than it imports
to be off; shall be guilty of single felony. And by a temporary statute (14
Geo. Ill, c. 42), if any quantity of money, exceeding the sum of five pounds,
being or purporting to be the silver coin of this realm, but below the standard
of the mint in weight or fineness, shall be imported into Great Britain or Ire
land, the same shall be forfeited in equal moieties to the crown and prosecu
tor. Thus much for offences relating to the coin, as well misdemeanors as
felonies, which
thought it most convenient to oonsider in one and the same
view. (2)
First, by statute
are these.
2. Felonies, against the king's counsel,
Hen. VII, c. 14,
any sworn servant of the king's household conspires or confederates to kill any lord of this *realm, or other person sworn of the
f*lOl1
«■
king's council, he shall be guilty of felony. Secondly, by statute
(j) See book
is

now covered
(8) This subject
tioned in the text are repealed.
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I
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Ann. c. 16, to assault, strike, wound, or attempt to kill, any privy councillor
in the execution of his office, is made felony without benefit of clergy. (3)
3. Felonies in serving foreign states, which
service is generally inconsist
ent with allegiance to one's natural prince, are restrained and punished by
statute 3 Jac. I, c. 4, which makes it felony for any persons whatever to goout of the realm, to serve any foreign prince, without having first taken the
oath of allegiance before his departure. And it is felony also for any gentle
man, or person of higher degree, or who hath borne any office in the army, to
go out of the realm to serve such foreign prince or state, without previously
entering into a bond, with two sureties, not to be reconciled to the see of
Rome, or enter into any conspiracy against his natural sovereign. And
further, by statute 9 Geo. EC, c. 30, enforced by statute 29 Geo. II, c. 17, if
any subject of Great Britain shall enlist himself, or if any person shall procure
him to be enlisted, in any foreign service, or detain or embark him for that
purpose, without license under the king's sign manual, he shall be guilty of
felony without benefit of clergy; but if the person so enlisted or enticed shall
discover his seducer within fifteen days, so as he may be apprehended and con
victed of the same, he shall be indemnified. By the statute 29 Geo. II, o. 17, it
is moreover enacted, that to serve under the French King, as a military officer,
shall be felony without benefit of clergy; and to enter into the Scotch brigade
in the Dutch service, without previously taking the oaths of allegiance and
abjuration, shall be a forfeiture of 500£ (4)
4. Felony by embezzling or destroying the king's armour or warlike store*
is, in the first place, so declared to be by statute 31 Eliz. c. 4, which enacts,
that if any person having the charge or custody of the king's armour, ordin
ance, ammunition, or habiliments of war, or of any victual provided for victu
alling the king's soldiers or mariners, shall either for gain, or to impede his
majesty's servioe, embezzle the same *to the value of twenty shillings,
r*inoi
suoh offence shall be felony.
And the statute 22 Car. II, c. 5, takes «■
1
away the benefit of clergy for this offence, (5) and from stealing the king's
naval stores to the value of twenty shillings; with a power for the judge, after
sentence, to transport the offender for seven years.
Other inferior embezzle
ments and misdemeanors,
that fall under this denomination, are punished by
statutes 9 and 10 Win. Ill, o. 41, 1 Geo. I, c. 25, 9 Geo. I, c. 8, and 17 Geo.
II, c. 40, with fine, corporal punishment, and imprisonment. And by statute
12 Geo. Ill, c. 24, to set on fire, burn, or destroy any of his
majesty's ships of
war, whether built, building, or repairing; or any of the king's arsenals,
maga
zines, dock-yards, rope-yards, or victualling offices, or materials thereunto be
or
or
naval,
military,
victualling stores, or ammunition; or causing,
longing;
aiding, procuring, abetting, or assisting in, such offence; shall be felony with
out benefit of clergy.
5. Desertion from the king's armies in time of war, whether
by land or sea,
in England or in parts beyond the sea, is by the standing laws of the land
(exclu
sive of the annual acts of parliament, to punish mutiny and desertion), and
particularly by statute 18 Hen. VI, c. 19, and 5 Eliz. c. 5, made felony, but
not without benefit of clergy. But by the statute 2 and 3 Edw. VI, o. 2,
clergy
is taken away from such deserters, and the offence is made triable by the jus
tices of every shire.
The same statutes punish other inferior military offences
with fines, imprisonment, and other penalties. (6)
(8) All attempts to commit murder are now punishable without any distinction respecting
the rank of the party, except in the case of the king and the royal family.
See statute 24
and 25 Vic, c. 100.
The
statutes
9
Geo.
and
29
Geo.
are
(4)
repealed.
(5) This provision was repealed by statutes 5 Geo. IV, c. 53.
(6) There are also statutes for punishing attempts to seduce from their duty and allegi
ance persons serving in the military and naval forces.

II,
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CHAPTER VIIL

OF PRAEMUNIRE.
A third speoies of offence more immediately affecting the king, and his
government, though not subject to oapital punishment, is that of praemunire;
to called from the words of the writ preparatory to the prosecution thereof:
"praemunire (a) facias A B" cause A B to be forewarned that he appear
before us to answer the contempt wherewith he stands charged: which con
tempt is particularly recited in the preamble to the writ, (b) It took its
original from the exorbitant power claimed and exercised in England by the
pope, which even in the days of blind zeal, was too heavy for our ancestors to
bear.

(1)

It may justly be

it)

a

it,

a

a

is

I

J

■*•

observed, that religious principles, which (when genuine and
pure) have an evident tendency to make their professors better citizens as well
been usually subversive of
-ma better men, have (when perverted and erroneous)
•civil government, and been made both the cloak and the instrument of every
The unbounded
pernicious design that can be harboured in the heart of man.
authority that was exercised by the Druids in the west, under the influence of
pagan superstition, and the terrible ravages committed by the Saracens in the
east, to propagate the- religion of Mahomet, both witness to the truth of that
ancient universal observation, that in all ages and in all countries, civil and
ecclesiastical tyranny are mutually productive of each other. It is therefore
the glory of the church of England, that she inculcates due obedience to lawful
r*l04l autnority, aQd hath been (as her prelates on *a trying occasion once
expressed
(c) in her principles and practice ever most unquestion
ably loyal. The clergy of her persuasion, holy in their doctrines and unblem
ished in their lives and conversation, are also moderate in their ambition, and
entertain just notions of the ties of society and the rights of civil government.
As in matters of faith and morality they acknowledge no guide but the Scrip
tures, so, in matters of external polity and of private right, they derive all
their title from the civil magistrate; they look up to the king as their head,
to the parliament as their lawgiver, and pride themselves in nothing more
justly, than in being true members of the church emphatically by law estab
lished. Whereas the notions of ecclesiastical liberty, in those who differ from
here only speak of extremes),
them, as well in one extreme as the other (for
are equally and totally destructive of those ties and obligations by which all
society
kept together; equally encroaching on those rights which reason and
the original contract of every free state in the universe have vested in the
distinct independent supremacy of
-sovereign power; and equally aiming at
their own, where spiritual men and spiritual causes are concerned.
The dread
ful effects of such Religious bigotry, when actuated by erroneous principles,
even of the protestant kind, are sufficiently evident from the history of the
anabaptists in Germany, the covenanters in Scotland, and that deluge of sec
taries in England, who murdered their sovereign, overturned the church and
monarchy, shook every pillar of law, justice, and private property, and most
devoutly established a kingdom of the saints in their stead. But these horrid
•devastations, the effects of mere madness, or of zeal that was nearly allied to
short duration.
Whereas,
though violent and tumultuous, were but of
the progress of the papal policy, long actuated by the steady counsels of suoeesive pontiffs, took deeper root, and was at length in some places with diffi-

(1) This chapter
334

is

(a) A barbarous word for prcemontri.
(e) Address to James II, 1687.

(6) Old Nat. Brev. 101,edit.

wholly inapplicable in the United States.
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culty, in others never yet, extirpated. For thia we might oall to witness the
blaok intrigues of the jesuits, so lately triumphant over Christendom, but now
universally abandoned by even the Roman Catholio powers; bnt the subject of
oar present *chapter rather leads us to consider the vast strides which r*105-i
*
were formerly made in this kingdom by the popish clergy; how nearly *•
they arrived to effecting their grand design; some few of the means they made
use of for establishing their plan; and how almost all of them have been de
feated or converted to better purposes, by the vigour of our free constitution,
and the wisdom of successive parliaments.
The ancient British church, by whomsoever planted, was a stranger to the
But the pagan Saxon in
bishop of Rome, and all his pretended authority.
vaders, having driven the professors of Christianity to the remotest corners of
our island, their own conversion was afterwards effected by Augustin the
monk, and other missionaries from the court of Rome. This naturally intro
duced some few of the papal corruptions in point of faith and doctrine; but
we read of no civil authority claimed by the pope in these kingdoms, till the
sera of the Norman conquest; when the then reigning pontiff, having favoured
Duke William in his projected invasion, by blessing his host and consecrating
his banners, took that opportunity also of establishing his spiritual encroach
ments: and was even permitted so to do by the policy of the conqueror, in
order more effectually to humble the Saxon clergy and aggrandize his Norman
prelates ; prelates, who, being bred abroad in the doctrine and practice of
and took
slavery, had contracted a reverence and regard for
pleasure in
free-born people.
riveting the chains of
The most stable foundation of legal and rational government
due sub
ordination of rank, and
gradual scale of authority; and tyranny, also, itself
most surely supported by
regular increase of despotism, rising from the
slave to the sultan: with this difference, however, that the measure of obedi
ence in the one
extended no
grounded on the principles of society, and
limited only
farther than reason and necessity will warrant: in the other
by absolute will and pleasure, without permitting the inferior to examine the
title upon which
founded. More effectually, therefore, to enslave the con
sciences and minds of the people, the Romish *clergy themselves paid r
*10fi-i
the most implicit obedienoe to their own superiors or prelates; and
were
as
devoted
to the will of the sovereign pontiff,
blindly
they, in their turn,
whose decisions they held to be infallible, and his authority co-extensive with
Hence his legates a latere were introduced into every
the Christian world.
kingdom of Europe, his hulls and decretal epistles became the rule both of
faith and discipline, his judgment was the final resort in all cases of doubt or
difficulty, his decrees were enforced by anathemas and spiritual censures, he
dethroned even kings that were refractory, and denied to whole kingdoms
(when undutiful) the exercise of Christian ordinances, and the benefits of the
gospel of God.
But, though the being spiritual head of the church was
thing of great
sound, and of greater authority, among men of conscience and piety, yet the
court of Rome was fully apprised that (among the bulk of mankind) power
cannot be maintained without property; and therefore its attention began very
early to be riveted upon every method that promised pecuniary advantage.
The doctrine of purgatory was introduced, and with
the purchase of masses
to redeem the souls of the deceased.
New-fangled offences were created, and
The
indulgences were sold to the wealthy, for liberty to sin without danger.
canon law took cognizance of crimes, enjoined penance pro salute animce, and
commuted that penance for money.
Non-residence and pluralities among the
clergy, and marriages among the laity, related within the seventh degree, were
strictly prohibited by canon; but dispensations were seldom denied to those
In short, all the wealth of Christendom was
who could afford to buy them.
thousand channels into the coffers of the holy see.
gradually drained by
335.
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The establishment also of the feudal system in most of the governments of
Europe, whereby the lands of all private proprietors were declared to be holden
of the prince, gave a hint to the court of Rome for usurping a similar au
thority over all the preferments of the church; whioh began first in Italy, and
The pope became a *feudal lord;
gradually spread itself to England.
r>■
*1071*
and all ordinary patrons were to hold their right of patronage under
this universal superior. Estates held by feudal tenure, being originally gratui
tous donations, were at that time denominated
beneficia; their very name as
well as constitution was borrowed, and the care of the souls of a parish thence
came to be denominated a benefice.
Lay fees were conferred by investiture or
delivery of corporal possession; and spiritual benefices, which at first were
universally donative, now received in like manner a spiritual investiture, by
institution from the bishop, and induction under his authority.
As lands
escheated to the lord, in defect of a legal tenant, so benefices lapsed to the
bishop upon non-presentation by the patron, in the nature of a spiritual escheat,
The annual tenths collected from the clergy were equivalent to the feudal
render, or rent, reserved upon a grant; the oath of canonical obedience was
copied from the oath of fealty required from the vassal by his superior; and
the primer seisins of our military tenures, whereby the first profits of an heir's
estate were cruelly extorted by his lord, gave birth to as cruel an exaction of
first fruits from the beneficed clergy. And the occasional aids and talliages,
levied by the prince on his vassals, gave a handle to the pope to levy, by the
means of his legates a latere, peter-pence and other taxations.
At length the holy father went a step beyond any example of either emperor
or feudal lord. He reserved to himself, by his own apostolical authority, (d)
the presentation to all benefices which became vacant while the incumbent was
attending the court of Rome upon any occasion, or on his journey thither, or
back again: and moreover such also as became vacant by his promotion to a
bishopric or abbey: "etiamsi ad ilia personal consueverint et debuerint per
And this last, the canonists
electionem ant quemvis alium modum assumi."
declared, was no detriment at all to the patron, being only like the change of a
life in a feudal estate by the lord. Dispensations to avoid these vacancies begat
the doctrine of commendams : and papal provisions were the previous nominat'on t0 8Ucn Denefice8> by a kind of anticipation, before they 'became
r*in«1
L
J actually void: though afterwards indiscriminately applied to any right
of patronage exerted or usurped by the pope. In consequence of which the
best livings were filled by Italian and other foreign clergy, equally unskilled
The very nomination
in and averse to the laws and constitution of England.
to bishoprics, that ancient prerogative of the crown, was wrested from King
Henry the First, and afterwards from his successor King John ; and seemingly,
indeed, conferred on the chapters belonging to each see; but by means of the
frequent appeals to Rome, through the intricacy of the laws which regulated
canonical elections, was eventually vested in the pope.
And, to sum up this
head with a transaction most unparalleled and astonishing in its kind, Pope
had at length the effrontery to demand, and King John had the
Innocent
meanness to consent to, a resignation of his crown to the Pope, whereby Eng
land was to become forever St. Peter's patrimony; and the dastardly monarch
reaccepted his sceptre from the hands of the papal legate, to hold as the vassal
of the holy see, at the annual rent of a thousand marks.
Another engine set on foot, or at least greatly improved, by the court of
Rome, was a master-piece of papal policy. Not content with the ample pro
vision of tithes, which the law of the land had given to the parochial clergy,
they endeavoured to grasp at the lands and inheritances of the kingdom, and
(had not the legislature withstood them) would by this time have probably
been masters of every foot of ground in the kingdom.
To this end they in
troduced the monks of the Benedictine and other rules, men of sour and
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from the world and its concerns by a vow of perpetual
celibacy, yet fascinating the minds of the people by pretences to extraordinary
sanctity, while all their aim was to aggrandize the power and extend the influ
And as, in those times of civil tumult,
ence of their grand superior, the pope.
great rapines and violence were daily committed by overgrown lords and their
adherents,
they were taught to believe, that founding a monastery a little
before their death would atone for a life of incontinence, disorder and blood
Hence innumerable abbeys and religious houses were built within a
shed.
*century after the conquest, and endowed, not only with the tithes of r*i0p/i'
parishes which were ravished from the secular clergy, but also with *■
Jands, manors, lordships, and extensive baronies. And the doctrine inculcated
was, that whatever was so given to, or purchased by, the monks and friars, was
consecrated to God himself; and that to alienate or take it away was no less
than the sin of sacrilege.
might here have enlarged upon other contrivances, which will occur to the
recollection of the reader, set on foot by the court of Rome, for effecting an
entire exemption of its clergy from any intercourse with the civil magistrate:
such as the separation of the ecclesiastical court from the temporal; the ap
pointment of its judges by merely spiritual authority without any interpo
sition from the crown; the exclusive jurisdiction it claimed over all ecclesias
tical persons and causes; and the privilegium clericale, or benefit of clergy,
which delivered all clerks from any trial or punishment except before their own
But the history and progress of ecclesiastical courts, (e) as well as of
tribunal.
purchases in mortmain, (/) have already been fully discussed in the preceding
book: and we shall have an opportunity of examining at large the nature of
the privilegium clericale in the progress of the present one. And therefore
shall only observe at present, that notwithstanding this plan of pontifical
power was so deeply laid, and so indefatigably pursued by the unwearied poli
tics of the court of Rome through a long succession of ages; notwithstanding
it was polished and improved by the united endeavours of a body of men,
who engrossed all the learning of Europe for centuries together; notwith
standing it was firmly and resolutely executed by persons the best calculated
for establishing tyranny and despotism, being fired with a bigoted enthusiasm
(which prevailed not only among the weak and simple, but even among those
of the best natural and acquired endowments), unconnected with their fellow
subjects, and totally indifferent what might befal that posterity to which they
bore no endearing relation: — yet it vanished into *nothing, when the r*lln-i
'
eyes of the people were a little enlightened, and they set themselves
with vigour to oppose it. So vain and ridiculous is the attempt to live in
society, without acknowledging the obligations which it lays us under; and to
affect an entire independence of that civil state which protects us in all our
rights, and gives us every other liberty, that only excepted of despising the
laws of the community.
Having thus, in some degree, endeavoured to trace out the original and sub
sequent progress of the papal usurpations in England, let us now return to the
statutes of prcBtnunire, which were framed to encounter this overgrown, yet
increasing evil. King Edward I, a wise and magnanimous prince, set himself
in earnest to shake off this servile yoke, (g) He would not suffer his bishops
to attend a general council, till they had sworn not to reoeive the papal bene
diction.
He made light of all papal bulles and processes: attacking Scotland
in defiance of one: and seizing the temporaries of his clergy, who under pre
tence of another, refused to pay a tax imposed by parliament.
He strength
ened the statutes of mortmain; thereby closing the great gulph in which all
the lands of the kingdom were in danger of being swallowed.
And, one of his
subjects having obtained a bulle of excommunication against another, he ortere religion, separated

I
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as a traitor, according to the ancient law. (A)
And
in the thirty-fifth year of his reign was made the first statute against papal
the foundation of all the
provisions, being, according to Sir Edward Coke,
statutes of prcemunire, which we rank as an offence immediately
subsequent
a dimin
against the king, because every encouragement of the papal power
ution of the authority of the crown.
In the weak reign of Edward the Second the pope\again endeavored to
was one of the
encroach, but the parliament manfully withstood him; and
principal articles charged against that unhappy prince, that he had given allow
ance to the bulles of the see of Rome. But Edward the Third was of
temper
and to remedy these "inconveniences first by
r*ml eztrcnidy different:
gentle means, he and his nobility wrote an expostulation to the pope:
but receiving
menacing and contemptuous answer, withal acquainting him,
few years before, at the diet of Nuremburg, A. D.
that the emperor (who
1823, had established law against provisions), (k) and also the king of France,
had lately submitted to the holy see; the king replied, that if both the emperor
and the Frenoh king should take the pope's part, he was ready to give battle
to them both, in defence of the liberties of the crown. Hereupon more sharp
which enact severally, that
and penal lawR were devised against provisors,
the court of Rome shall not present or collate to any bishopric or living in
England; and that whoever disturbs any patron in the presentation to living
virtue of
papal provision, such provisor shall pay fine and ransom to the
king at his will, and be imprisoned till he renounces such provision: and the
inflicted on such as cite the king, or any of his subjects, to
same punishment
answer in the court of Rome. And when the holy see resented these proceed
ings, and Pope Urban V attempted to revive the vassalage and annual rent to
was unanimously agreed by
which King John had subjected his kingdom,
all the estates of the realm in parliament assembled (40 Edw. Ill), that King
John's donation was null and void, being without the concurrence of parlia
ment, and contrary to his coronation oath: and all the temporal nobility and
the pope should endeavour, by process or otherwise,
commons engaged, that
to maintain these usurpations, they would resist and withstand him with all
their power, (m)
was found necessary to sharpen and
In the reign of Richard the Second
was enacted by statutes
Ric. II, a
strengthen these laws, and therefore
and Rio. II, c. 12, first, that no alien should be capable of letting his benefice
to farm; in order to compel such as had crept in, at least to reside on their
r*H2l* Preferment8: and, afterwards, that no alien *should be capable to be
to any ecclesiastical preferment, under the penalty of the
presented
statutes of provisors.
By the statute 12 Rio. H, o. 15, all liegemen of the king,
accepting of living by any foreign provision, are put out of the king's pro
tection, and the benefices made void. To which the statute 13 Ric. H, st.
adds banishment and forfeiture of lands and goods: and, by chapter
a
of
the same statute, any person bringing over any citation or excommunication
from beyond sea, on account of the execution of the foregoing statutes of pro
visors, shall be imprisoned, forfeit his goods and lands, and moreover suffer
pain of life and member.
In the writ for the execution of all these statutes, the words praemunire
citation of the party, have
/ados, being (as we said) used to command
denominated, in common speech, not only the writ, but the offense itself of
And accordingly
maintaining the papal power, by the name of praemunire.
the next statute
snail mention, whioh
generally referred to by all subse
the statute
quent statutes,
usually called the statute of prcemunire. It
16 Ric. II, c.
which enacts, that whoever procures at Rome, or elsewhere,
any translations, processes, excommunications, bulles, instruments, or other
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things which touch the king, against him, his crown, and realm, and all per
sons aiding and assisting therein, shall he put out of the king's protection,
their lands and goods forfeited to the king's use, and they shall be attached
by their bodies to answer to the king and his council: or process of praemunire
facia* shall be made out against them as in other cases of provisory.
By the statute 2 Hen. IV, c. 3, all persons who accept any provision from
the pope, to be exempt from canonical obedience to their proper ordinary, are
And this is the last of our
also subjected to the penalties of praemunire.
ancient statutes touching this offence; the usurped civil power of the bishop of
Rome being pretty well broken down by these statutes, as his usurped religious
power was in about a century afterwards; the spirit of the nation being so
much raised *against foreigners, that about this time, in the reign of r*118i
*
Henry the Fifth, the alien priories, or abbeys for foreign monks, were *•
And
no
to
the
crown.
farther
were
and
their
lands
attempts
given
suppressed,
afterwards made in support of these foreign jurisdictions.
A learned writer, before referred to, is therefore greatly mistaken, when he
says, (n) that in Henry the Sixth's time the Archbishop of Canterbury and
other bishops offered to the king a large supply if he would consent that all
laws against provisors, and especially the statute 16Ric. n, might be repealed;
but that this motion was rejected. This account is incorrect in all its branches.
For, first, the application, which he probably means, was not made by the
bishops only, but try the unanimous consent of a provincial synod, assembled
in 1439 (18 Hen. VI), that very synod which at the same time refused to con
firm and allow a papal bulle, which then was laid before them.
Next, the pur
port of it was not to procure a repeal of the statutes against provisors, or that
of Richard n in particular; but to request that the penalties thereof, which
by foroed construction were applied to all that sued in the spiritual, and even
in many temporal courts of this realm, might be turned against the proper ob
jects only; those who appealed to Rome, or to any foreign jurisdiction; the
tenor of the petition being, " that those penalties should be taken to extend
only to those that commenced any suits or procured any writs or public in
struments at Rome or elsewhere out of England; and that no one should be
prosecuted upon that statute for any suit in the spiritual courts or lay juris
dictions of this kingdom."
Lastly, the motion was so farirom being rejected,
that the king promised to recommend it to the next parliament, and in the
mean time that no one should be molested
And the
upon this account.
clergy were so satisfied with their success, that they granted to the king a
whole tenth upon this occasion, (o)
*And, indeed, so far was the archbishop, who presided in this synod, .#n
1
from countenancing the usurped power of the pope in this realm, that *•
he was ever a firm opposer of it. And, particularly in the reign of Henry the
Fifth, he prevented the king's uncle from being then made a cardinal, and
legate a latere from the pope; upon the mere principle of its being within the
mischief of papal provisions, and derogatory from the liberties of the English
church and nation. For, as he expressed himself to the king in his letter upon
that subject, " he was bound to oppose it by his ligeance, and also to quit him
self to God and the church of this land, of which God and the king had made
him governor."
This was not the language of a prelate addicted to the slavery
of the see of Rome; but of one who was indeed of principles so very oppo
site to the papal usurpations, that in the year preoedmg this synod (17 Hen.
VI), he refused to consecrate a bishop of Ely, that was nominated by Pope
Eugenius IV. A conduct quite consonant to his former behaviour, in 6 Hen.
VI. when he refused to obey the commands of Pope Martin V, who had re
quired him to exert his endeavours to repeal the statute of pramunire (" execrabile Ulud statutum," as the holy father phrases it); which refusal so far
exasperated the court of Rome against him, that at length the pope issued a
(n) D»t. 96.
(o) WUk. Condi. Mag. Brit. III. 638.
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bulle to suspend him from his office and authority, which the archbishop dis
regarded, and appealed to a general council. And so sensible were the nation
of their primate's merits, that the lords spiritual and temporal, and also the
university of Oxford, wrote letters to the pope in his defence; and the house
of commons addressed the king, to send an ambassador forthwith to his holi
ness, on behalf of the archbishop, who had incurred the displeasure of the
pope for opposing the excessive power of the court of Rome, (p)
*This then is the original meaning of the offence, which we call
r*115l
I
J prcemunire, viz. : introducing a foreign power into this land, and cre
ating imperium in imperio, by paying that obedience to papal process, which
constitutionally belonged to the king alone, long before the reformation in the
reign of Henry the Eighth: at which time the penalties of praemunire were
indeed extended to more papal abuses than before; as the kingdom then
entirely renounced the authority of the see of Rome, though not at all the
corrupted doctrines of the Roman church. And therefore by the several stat
utes of 24 Hen. "VTH, c. 12, and 25 Hen. VHI, cc. 19 and 21, to appeal to
Rome from any of the king's courts, which (though illegal before) had at time*
been connived at; to sue to Rome for any license or dispensation; or to obey
And, ia
any process from thence; are made liable to the pains of prmmunire.
order to restore to the king in effect the nomination of vacant bishoprics, and
yet keep up the established forms, it is enacted by statute 25 Hen. VIII, c. 20,
that if the dean and chapter refuse to elect the person named by the king, or
any archbishop or bishop to confirm or consecrate him, they shall fall within
the penalties of the statutes of prcemunire. Also by statute 5 Eliz. c. 1, toref use the oath of supremacy will incur the pains of prcemunire ; and to defend
the pope's jurisdiction in this realm, is a prcemanire for the first offence, and
So, too, by statute 13 Eliz. c. 2, if any one
high treason for the second.
import any agnus Dei, crosses, beads, or other superstitious things pretended
to be hallowed by the bishop of Rome, and tender the same to be used; or
receive the same with such intent, and not discover the offender; or if a justice
of the peace, knowing thereof, shall not within fourteen days declare it to a
privy counsellor; they all incur prcemunire. But importing or selling massbooks, or other popish books, is by statute 3 Jac. I, c. 5, § 25, only liable to a
Lastly, to contribute to the maintenance of a
penalty of forty shillings.
or any popish seminary whatever beyond sea; or any person
Jesuit's college,
in the same; or to contribute to the maintenance of any jesuit or popish priest
made liable to the penalties of prae
in England,
by statute 27 Eliz. o.
munire.
*Thus far the penalties of prcemunire seem to have kept within the
r*
proper bounds of their original institution, the depressing the power of
has been
the pope; but, they being pains of no inconsiderable consequence,
thought fit to apply the same to other heinous offences; some of which bear
more, and some less, relation to this original offence, and some no relation at
all.
to molest the possessors of
Thus,
By the statute and P. and M. c.
abbey lands granted by parliament to Henry the Eighth and Edward the
the offence of acting as
So likewise
broker or
Sixth,
prcemunire.
taken, by
agent in any usurious contract, when above ten per cent, interest
statute 13 Eliz. c. 8. 3. To obtain any stay of proceedings, other than by
likewise
arrest of judgment or writ of error, in any suit for a monopoly,
4. To obtain an exclusive patent for
c. 3.
prcemunire by statute 21 Jac.
the sole making or importation of gunpowder or arms, or to hinder others from
also ^praemunire by two statutes: the one 16 Car.
c. 21,
importing them,

ni

!

if

;

(p) See Wllk. Condi. Mag. Sr. vol. 111.'pastim, and Dr. Duck's life of Archbishop Chlchele, who
In vin
the prelate here spoken of, and the1munificent founder of All Souls college m Oxford
indeed It be a digression to
dication of whoce memory the author hopes to be excused this digression;
■howhow contrary to the sentiments of so learned and pious a prelate, even In the days of popery, those
usurpations were, which the statutes of prmmunire and provisory were made to
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the other 1 Jac. II, c. 8. 5. On the abolition by statute 12 Car. II, o. 24, of
purveyance, (q) and the prerogative of pre-emption, or taking any victual,
beasts, or goods for the king's use, at a stated price, without consent of the
proprietor, the exertion of any such power for the future was declared to incur
the penalties of praemunire.
6. To assert maliciously and advisedly, by speak
ing or writing, that both or either house of parliament have a legislative
authority without the king, is declared a •praemunire by statute 13 Car. II, c. 1.
7. By the habeas corpus act also, 31 Car. II, c. 2, it is a praemunire, and in
capable of the king's pardon, besides other heavy penalties, (r) to send any
subject of this realm a prisoner into parts beyond the seas. 8. By the statute
1 W. and M. st. 1, c. 8, persons of eighteen years of age, refusing to take the
new oaths of allegiance, as well as supremaoy, upon tender by the proper
magistrate, are subject to the penalties of a praemunire ; and by statute 7 and
*8 Wm. Ill, c. 24, Serjeants, counsellors, proctors, attorneys, and all r*iiy]
*
officers of courts, practising without having taken the oaths of allegi- *■
ance and supremacy, and subscribed the declaration against popery, are guilty
of a praemunire, whether the oaths be tendered or no. 9. By the statute 6
Ann. c. 7, to assert maliciously and directly, bypreaching, teaching, or advised
speaking, that the then pretended prince of Wales, or any person other than
according to the acts of settlement and union, hath any right to the throne of
these kingdoms; or that the king and parliament cannot make laws to limit
the descent of the crown ; such preaching, teaching, or advised speaking is a
praemunire ; as writing, printing, or publishing the same doctrines amounted,
10. By statute 6 Ann. o. 23, if the
we may remember, to high treason.
assembly of peers in Scotland, convened to elect their sixteen representatives
in the British parliament, shall presume to treat of any other matter save only
the election, they incur the penalties of & praemunire.
11. The statute 6 Geo.
I, c 18 (enacted in the year after the infamous south-sea project had beggared
half the nation), makes all unwarrantable undertakings by unlawful subscrip
tions, then commonly known by the names of bubbles, subject to the penalties
of a praemunire. 12. The statute 12 Geo. Ill, c. 11, subjects to the penalties
of the statute of praemunire all such as knowingly and wilfully solemnize, assist
•or are present at any forbidden marriage of such of the descendants
of the
body of King George II, as are by that act prohibited to contract matrimony
without the consent of the crown.
Having thus inquired into the nature and several species of praemunire, its
punishment may be gathered from the foregoing statutes, which are thus short
summed up by Sir Edward Coke:
"that from the conviction, the de
fendant shall be out of the king's protection, and his lands and tenements,
goods and chattels, forfeited to the king: and that his body shall remain in
,
prison at the king's pleasure: *or (as other authorities have
during
both
which
amount
to
the
same
as
the
his
thing,
king,
by
prelife:" (u)
rogative, may any time remit the whole, or any part, of the punishment, except
in the case of transgressing the statute of habeas corpus. These forfeitures
here inflicted do not (by the way) bring this offence within our former defini
tion of felony; being inflicted by particular statutes,and not by the common law.
But so odious, Sir Edward Coke adds, was this offence of praemunire, that a man
that was attainted of the same might have been slain by any other man without
was provided by law, (w>) that any man might do to
danger of law; because
him as to the king's enemy; and any man may lawfully kill an enemy.
How
at anytime lawful to kill an enemy,
ever, the position itself, that
by no
means tenable:
only lawful, by the law of nature and nations, to kill him
in the heat of battel, or for necessary self-defence.
And to obviate such sav
Eliz. c.
shall not
provides, that
age and mistaken notions, (x) the statute
be lawful to kill any person attainted in praemunire, any law, statute, opinion,
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or exposition of law to the contrary notwithstanding.
Bat still snch delin
quent, though protected as a part of the public from public wrongs, can bring
no action for any private injury, how atrocious soever, being so far out of the
protection of the law, that it will not guard his civil rights, nor remedy any
And no man, knowing him to
which he as an individual may suffer.
frievanoe
e guilty, oan with safety give him comfort, aid, or relief, (y)

CHAPTER IX.

OF MISPRISIONS AND CONTEMPTS AFFECTING THE
KING AND GOVERNMENT.
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Thb fourth speoies of offences more immediately against the king and gov
ernment are entitled misprisions and contempts.
Misprisions (a term derived from the old French, mespria, a neglect or con
tempt) are, in the acceptation of our law, generally understood to be all such
high offences as are under the degree of capital, but nearly bordering thereon:
and it is said, that a misprision is contained in every treason and felony what
soever: and that if the king so please, the offender may be proceeded against
for the misprision only, (a) And upon the same principle, while the jurisdic
tion of the star-chamber subsisted, it was held that the king might remit a
prosecution for treason, and cause the delinquent to be censured in that court,
merely for a high misdemeanor: as happened in the case of Roger, earl of Rut
land, in 43 Eliz., who was concerned in the earl of Essex's rebellion. (6) Mis
prisions are generally divided into two sorts: negative, which consist in the
concealment of something which ought to be revealed; and positive, which
consist in the commission of something which ought not to be done.
firot, or negative kind, is what is called misprision
^
r*i<2nl
J treason; (1) consisting in the bare knowledge and concealment of
of
treason, without any degree of assent thereto: for any assent makes the party
a principal traitor; as indeed the concealment,
which was construed aiding
and abetting, did at the common law: in like manner as the knowledge of a
was a capital crime at Florence
plot against the state, and not revealing
and in other states of Italy, (c) But
now enacted by the statute
and
P. and M. c. 10, that bare concealment of treason shall be only held
mis
the party apprized of the
prision. This concealment becomes criminal,
treason does not, as soon as conveniently may be, reveal
to some judge of
assize or justice of the peace, (d)
But
there be any probable circumstances
of assent, as
one goes to
treasonable meeting, knowing before-hand that
intended against the king; or, being in such company once by
conspiracy
accident, and having heard such treasonable conspiracy, meets the same com
an implied assent in
but conceals it; this
pany again, and hears more of
law, and makes the concealer guilty of actual high treason, (e)
There
also one positive misprision of treason, created so by act of parlia
The statute 13 Eliz. c
ment.
enacts, that those who forge foreign coin, not
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1
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1

1
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1

(y) Hawk. P. C. 86.
Ric m, 10. Staundf . P. 0. 87. KM. 71. Hal. P. 0. 874. Hawk. P. 0. 55, 68.
(a) Year-book,
(6) Hudson of the court of star chamber. MS. in Jfiu. Brit.
(c) Quioolard. Hist. b. and 18.
(d) Hal. P. C. 872.
(e) Hawk. P. 0. 66.
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(1

is

defined by the act of congress of
(1) Misprision of treason against the United States
Stat, at Large, 112), and made punishable by imprisonment not exceeding
30 1790
seven years, and by fine not exceeding one thousand dollars.
Rev. Stat TJ. 8., 1878,
6383.
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currrent in this kiugdom, their aiders, abettors, and procurers, shall all be guilty
of misprision of treason. (2) For, though the law would not put foreign coin
upon quite the same footing as our own; yet if the circumstances of trade
concur, the falsifying it may be attended with consequences almost equally
pernicious to the public; as the counterfeiting of Portugal money would be at
present; and therefore the law has made it an offence just below capital, and
that is all. For the punishment of misprision of treason is loss of the profits
of land during life, forfeiture of goods, and imprisonment during life, (f) (3)
Which total forfeiture of the goods was originally inflicted while *the rt.„.i
-■
to principal treason, and of course included in it a ^
offence amounted
felony, by the common law; and therefore is no exception to the general rule
laid down in a former chapter, (g) that wherever an offence is punished by
such total forfeiture, it is felony at the common law.
Misprision of felony is also the concealment of a felony which a man
knows, but never assented to; for if he assented, this makes him either prin
And the punishment of this, in a publio officer, by the
cipal or accessory.
statute West. 1, 3 Edw. I, c. 0, is imprisonment for a year and a day; in a
common person, imprisonment for a less, discretionary time; and, in both, fine
and ransom at the King's pleasare: which pleasure of the king must be ob
served, once for all, not to signify any extra-judicial will of the sovereign, bat
such as is declared by his representatives, the judges in his oourts of justice;
" voluntas regis in curia, non in camera."
(A)
There is also another speoies of negative misprisions: namely, the conceal
ing of treasure-trove, which belongs to the king or his grantees by prerogative
bat
royal: the concealment of which was formerly punishable by death;
now only by fine and imprisonment. (J)
II. Misprisions, which are merely positive, are generally denominated con
tempts or nigh misdemeanors; of which
The first and principal
the mal-administration of such high officers, as
This
are in public trust and employment.
usually punished by the method
wherein such penalties, short of death, are
of parliamentary impeachment:
inflicted, as to the wisdom of the house of peers shall seem proper; consisting
Hitherw>
usually of banishment, imprisonment, fines, or perpetual disability.
also may be referred the *offence of embezzling the public money, called r*12n-i
among the Romans peculatus, which the Julian law punished with
death in magistrate, and with deportation, or banishment, in
private per
son,
not
capital crime, but subjects the committer of
to
(k) With us
a discretionary fine and imprisonment. (5)
Other misprisions are, in general,
such contempts of the executive magistrate as demonstrate themselves by
Inst. 138.

4.
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a

ments.

the law of impeachment, see The Trial
Also, articles in
vols.
Am. Law Reg. (N S.), 257 and 641.
(6) See statute 24 and 25 Vic, c. 96, s. 70.
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made felony, or, in case of copper coin, misde
(2) By subsequent statutes the offense
meanor.
Misprision of lower degree
only in case of high treason.
punishable only
(3) This
by fine and imprisonment.
(4) In the United States "The president, vice-president, and all civil officers of the
United States, shall be removed from office on impeachment for and conviction of treason,
Const of U. S., art.
The sen
bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.
the tribunal to try impeachments; the chief justice presiding when the president
ate
en trial. Judgment in case of conviction shall not extend further than to removal from
office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the
United States; but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to indict
Const., art.
ment, trial, judgment, and punishment, according to law.
empowered to try state officers on impeach
In the several states
similar tribunal
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arrogant and undutiful behaviour towards the king and government
These are,
As, by refusing to assist him
2. Contempts against the king's prerogative.
for the good of the public; either in his councils, by advice, if called upon;
or in his wars by personal service for defence of the realm, against a rebellion
or invasion.
Under which class may be ranked the neglecting to join the
posse comitatus, or power of the county, being thereunto required by the
sheriff or justices, according to the statute Hen. V, c.
which
a duty in
cumbent upon all that are fifteen years of age, under the degree of nobility,
and able to travel, (m)
Contempts against the prerogative may also be, by
foreign potentate to those of our own, or doing
preferring the interests of
ox receiving any thing that may create an undue influence in favour of such
extrinsic power; as, by taking
pension from any foreign prince without the
Or, by disobeying the king's lawful commands;
consent of the king, (n)
summons to
whether by writ, issuing out of his courts of justice, or by
attend his privy council, or by letters from the king to
subject commanding
him to return from beyond seas (for disobedience to which his lands shall be
seized till he does return, and himself afterwards punished), or by his writ of
ne exeat regnum, or proclamation, commanding the subject to stay at home,
Disobedience to any of these commands
high misprision and con
(o)
disobedience to any act of parliament, where no
tempt; and so, lastly,
punishable, like the rest of
particular penalty
assigned: for then
fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the
"these contempts,
r*l23l
■■
king's courts of justice, (p)
3. Contempts and misprisions against the king's person and government may
be by speaking or writing against them, oursing or wishing him ill, giving out
scandalous stories concerning him, or doing any thing that may tend to lessen
him in the esteem of his subjects, may weaken his government, or may raise
It has been also held an offence of
jealousies between him and his people.
traitor; or for clergyman to
this species to drink to the pious memory of
absolve persons at the gallows, who there persist in the treasons for which
they die, these being acts whioh impliedly encourage rebellion. And for this
species of contempt a man may not ouly be fined and imprisoned, but suffer
the pillory (6) or other infamous corporal punishment: (g) in like manner, as
m the ancient German empire, such persons as endeavored to sow sedition,
and disturb the public tranquility, were condemned to become the objects of
dog upon their shoulders from one
public notoriety and derision, by carrying
and Frederic Barbarossa intown to another. The emperors Otho
Sreat
icted this punishment on noblemen of the highest rank, (r)
4. Contempts against the king's title, not amounting to treason or praemunire,
are the denial of his right to the crown in common and unadvised discourse;
that
be by advisedly speaking, we have seen
amounts to a profor,
however punished by our law
munire. This heedless species of contempt
Likewise
with fine and imprisonment.
any person shall in any wise hold,
affirm, or maintain, that the common law of this realm, not altered
parlia
ment, ought not to direct the right of the crown of England; this is a mis
and punishable with forfeiture of goods
demeanor, by statute 13 Eliz. c.
A contempt may also arise from refusing or neglecting to
and chattels.
take the oaths, appointed by statute for the better securing the government;
and yet *acting in public office, place of trust, or other capacity, for
rm-iai-]
which the said oaths are required to be taken; viz. those of allegiance,
supremacy and abjuration; which must be taken within six calendar months
is

it

J
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pillory was finally altogether abolished by statute
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(0) The punishment of the

L

page 888,
(m) Lamb. Eir. 888.
(n) Inst. 144.
(o) See book
(a) Ibid.
(r) Hod. Un. Hist, xxlx, 88, 119.
(*) See page 91.
8

1

(I) Hawk. P. C. 59.
(p) Hawk. P. 0. 80.
1
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The penalties for this contempt, inflioted by statute

after admission.

1

Geo.

st. 2, 0. 13, are very little, if any thing short of those of praemunire:
being an incapacity to hold the said offices, or any other; to prosecute any
snit; to be guardian or executor; to take any legacy or deed of gift; and to
vote at any election for members of parliament: and after conviction the
offender shall also forfeit 500/. to him or them that will sue for the same.
Members on the foundation of any college in the two universities, who by this
statute are bound to take the oaths, must also register a certificate thereof in
the college-register, within one month after; otherwise, if the electors do not
remove him, and elect another within twelve months, or after, the king may
Besides
nominate a person to succeed him by his great seal or sign manual.
thus taking the oaths for offices, any two justices of the peace may by the
same statute summon, and tender the oaths to, any person whom they shall
suspect to be disaffected: and every person refusing the same, who is properly
called a non-juror, shall be adjudged a popish recusant convict, and subjected
which in
to the same penalties that were mentioned in a former chapter:
the end may amount to the alternative of abjuring the realm, or suffering
felon. (7)
death as
5. Contempts against the king's palaces or courts of justice, have been always
looked upon as high misprisions: and by the ancient law, before the conquest,
fighting in the king's palace, or before the king's judges, was punished with
-death,
(u) So, too, in the old Gothic constitutions, there were many places
privileged by law, quibus major reverentia ei securitas debetur, ut templa et
judicia, qua) sancta habebantur, — arces et aula regis, — denique locus quilibet
And at present, with us, by the statute
praisente aut adventante rege. (v)
a

(f)

I,

c.

3.

(b) Stlernh. dejwre Goth.

1

8

6.

7

8

(u) Inst. 140. LL. Alured. cap. and 84.
(l) See page 55.
LL. Canut. 56. LL. Alured. c. 7.
(to) LL. Inm c
(y) Hawk. P. O. 57.
88.
Inst. 140,141.
Staund.
P.
a
IX)

I.
8,

is

a

is

a

is

a

a

a

a

is

is

offender's right hand, the solemn execution of which sentence
prescribed in
the statute at length.
But striking in the king's superior courts of justice, in Westminster-hall, or
made still more penal than even in the king's palace.
The
at the assizes,
reason seems to be, that those courts, being anciently held in the king's palace,
and before the king himself, striking there included the former contempt
against the king's palace, and something more; viz., the disturbance of publio
justice. For this reason, by the ancient common law before the conquest, (to)
sword therein, was a
striking in the king's courts of justice, or drawing
capital felony: and our modern law retains so much of the ancient severity as
only to exchange the loss of life for the loss of the offending limb. Theref ore
a stroke or blow in such
court of justice, whether blood be drawn or not, or
even assaulting
judge sitting in the court, by drawing
weapon, without
any blow struck,
punishable with the loss of the right hand, imprisonment
for life, and forfeiture of goods and chattels, and of the profits of his lands
during life. (x) A rescue also of prisoner from any of the said courts, with
blow,
out striking
punished with perpetual imprisonment, and forfeiture
of goods, and of the profits of lands during life; (y) being looked upon as an
offence of the same nature with the last; but only, as no blow
actually given,

is

a

a

a

7,

assuming any ecclesiastical title established in England
(7) By statute 10 Geo. IV, c.
brief which, while evad
was made punishable by One of 1002. In 1850 the pope issued
ing this statute appointed catholic bishops with territorial designations different from those
were
enthroned
with
church,
and they
great pomp.
This lead to statute
of the established
14 and 15 Vic., c. 60, which forbade all such titles, and declared this and all similar briefs
letter, and
however,
has
been
statute,
dead
im
substantially
and
void.
The
Illegal
portant only as a protest of the English nation against any assumption of authority by the
pope within the realm.
345
Vol. II. —44

Offences

125

Against Public Justice.

[Book

IV.

(e)

For the like reason, an affray, or riot,
the amputation of the hand is excused.
near the said courts, but out of their actual view, is punished only with fine
and imprisonment, (z) (8)
*Not only such as are guilty of an actual violence, but of threatening
r*
1
J or reproachful words to any judge sitting in the courts, are guilty of a
!■
high misprision, and have been punished with large fines, imprisonment, and
corporal punishment, (a) Ana, even in the inferior courts of the king, an
affray or contemptuous behaviour is punishable with a fine by the judges there
sitting; as by the steward in a court-leet, or the like, (b)
Likewise all such as are guilty of any injurious treatment to those who are
immediately under the protection of a court of justice, are punishable by fine
and imprisonment: as if a man assaults or threatens his adversary for sning
him, a counsellor or attorney for being employed against him, a juror for his
verdict, or a gaoler or other ministerial officer for keeping him in custody, and
properly executing his duty: (c) which offences, when they proceed farther
than bare threats, were punished in the Gothio constitutions with exile and
forfeiture of goods, (df)
Lastly, to endeavour to dissuade a witness from giving evidence; to disclose
an examination before the privy council; or, to advise a prisoner to stand
mute (all of whioh are impediments of justice); are high misprisions, and con
tempts of the king's courts, and punishable by fine and imprisonment. (9)
And anciently it was held, that if one of the grand jury disclosed, to any
person indicted, the evidence that appeared against him, he was thereby made
And at this
accessory to the offence, if felony: and in treason a principal.
and liable to be fined
day it is agreed that he is guilty of a high misprision,
and imprisoned, (f) (10)

CHAPTER X.

OF OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC JUSTICE.
The order of our distribution will next

lead us to take into consideration
especially affect the commontoealtA, or
public polity of the kingdom: which, however, as well as those which are pe
culiarly pointed against the lives and security of private subjects, are also
offences against the king, as the pater-familias of the nation: to whom
ap
pertains by his regal office to protect the community, and each individual
therein, from every degree of injurious violence, by executing those laws which
the people themselves in conjunction with him have enacted; or at least have
consented to, by an agreement either expressly made in the persons of their ren
as more

c

8.

(d) Stiernh. de jura Qoth.
Hawk. P. C. 69.

(/)

1

8

%
4,

1

te) Cro. Car. 373.
(a) Ibid. BOS.
(c) Inst. 141,142.
(6) Hawk. P. C. 58.
fol. 188.
(e) See Bar. 212. XI Ass. pi. 44,

I.
8,

it

such crimes and misdemeanors

8

9;
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8

7

4

a

is

2

8

a

8

is

j

8

a

is

;
2

§

8426,
(8) As to contempts of court and the methods of punishment, see Whart. Cr. L.,
«t teq.
Bish. Cr. L., 7th ed., ch. 12.
witness
an indictable offense.
(9) To prevent or attempt to prevent the attendance of
Vt, 57 8tate v. Carpenter, 20 Vt,
State v. Keeyes,
State v. Early,
Harr. (DeL), 562;
King v. Chandler, Mod., 836. So the making and publishing false affidavits, whether
in the course of suit or in any other proceedings in which affidavits are necessary or
East, 364; Regina v. Chapman,
proper. Omealy v. Newell,
C. and K., 846; Rump v.
Commonwealth, 80 Penn. St., 475.
an exception to this rule in the case of
witness before the grand jury who
(10) There
is indicted for perjury.
The jurors in this case are not only competent but compellable to
evidence of what was sworn to before them.
State v. Offutt,
Black! 855; State v.
five
asset, 16 Conn., 457; State v. Broughton,
Ixed., 96; Huidekoper v. Cotton,
Watts, 56.

Offences

Chap. 10.]

Against Public Justice.

127

or by a tacit and implied consent presumed from and proved by
immemorial usage.
The species of crimes which we have now before us is subdivided into such
a number of inferior and subordinate classes, that it would much exceed the
bounds of an elementary treatise, and be insupportably tedious to the reader,
were to examine them all minutely, or with any degree of critical accuracy.
shall therefore confine myself principally to general definitions, or descrip
tions of this great variety of offences, and to the punishments inflicted by law
for each particular offence; with now and then a few incidental observations:
referring the student for more particulars to other voluminous authors; who
have treated of these subjects with greater precision and more in detail than
is consistent with the plan of these Commentaries.
The crimes and misdemeanors that more especially affect the commonwealth,
may be divided into five species, viz.: *offences against publio jus- r*12fli
'
tice, against the public peace, against publio trade, against the publio
health, and against the public police or economy: of each of which we will
take a cursory view in their order.
First, then, of offences against public justice : some of which are felonies,
shall
whose punishment may extend to death; others only misdemeanors.
begin with those that are most penal, and descend gradually to such as are of
less malignity.
1. Embezzling or vacating records, or falsifying certain other proceedings in
a court of judicature, is a felonious offence against public justice.
It is en
acted by statute 8 Hen. VI, c. 12, that if any clerk, or other person, shall wil
fully take away, withdraw, or avoid any record or process in the superior
courts of justice in Westminster-hall, by reason whereof the judgment shall be
reversed or not take effect; it shall be felony not only in the principal actors,
but also in their procurers and abettors. And this may be tried either in the
king's bench or common pleas, by a jury de medietate: half officers of any of
the superior courts, and the other half common jurors. (1) Likewise by stat
ute 21 Jac. I, c. 26, to acknowledge any fine, recovery, deed enrolled, statute,
recognizance, bail, or judgment, in the name of another person not privy to
the same, is felony without benefit of clergy.
Which law extends only to pro
ceedings in the courts themselves: but by statute 4 W. and M. c. 4, to person
ate any other person (as bail) before any judge of assize or other commissioner
authorized to take bail in the country, is also felony. (2) For no man's prop
erty would be safe, if records might be suppressed or falsified, or persons*
names be falsely usurped in courts or before their publio officers.
2. To prevent abuses by the extensive power which the law is obliged to re
pose in gaolers, it is enacted by statute 14 Edw. Ill, o. 10, that if any gaoler by
too great duress of imprisonment makes any prisoner, that he hath in ward,
,
•become an approver or an appellor against his will; that
as we shall r$
see hereafter, to accuse and turn evidence against some other person;
not
felony in the gaoler. (3) For, as Sir Edward Coke observes, (a)
lawful to induce or excite any man even to just accusation of another; much
less to do
by duress of imprisonment; and least of all by
gaoler, to whom
the prisoner
committed for safe custody.
resentatives,

I

I

(a)

8

'
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is

a

it

a

it

is

it
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is,
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7

2

8

1

1

7
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For statutes for the punishment of offenses of the
now repealed.
(1) This statute
character mentioned in the text, and others of a somewhat similar nature, see statutes
and
Vic, c. 90; and Vic, c 94; and Vic, c. 19; 14 and 15 Vic, a
Geo. IV, c 29;
99, and 16 and 17 Vic, c. 99; and 25 Vic, c. 96, s. 80; 24 and 25 Vic, c 98.
24 and 25 Vic, c. 98,
(2) The statute now in force for the punishment of this offense,

is

a

§

is

and

7

a

The false personation of voters at elections was made
misdemeanor by statute
18,
33.
It also statutory crime in the United States.
now repealed.
(8) This statute
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A

third offence against public justice is obstructing the exeoution of law
This is at all times an offence of a very high and presumptuous
nature; but more particularly so, when it is an obstruction of an arrest upon
And it hath been holden, that the party opposing such arrest
criminal process.
an accessory in felony, and prin
becomes thereby particeps criminis; that
cipal in high treason, (b) Formerly one of the greatest obstructions to pub
lic justice, both of the civil and criminal kind, was the multitude of pretended
privileged places, where indigent persons assembled together to shelter them
selves from justice (especially in London and Southwark), under the pretext of
their having been ancient palaces of the crown, or the like: (c) all of which
sanctuaries for iniquity are now demolished, and the opposing of any process
made highly penal, by the statutes
and
therein
Win. Ill, c. 27, Geo.
c. 28, and 11 Geo.
c. 22, which enact, that persons opposing the execution of
any process in such pretended privileged places within the bills of mortality,
or abusing any officer in his endeavours to execute his duty therein, so that he
receives bodily hurt, shall be guilty of felony, and transported for seven years:
and persons in disguise, joining in or abetting any riot or tumult on such ac
count, or opposing any process, or assaulting and abusing any officer executing
or for having executed the same, shall be felons without benefit of clergy.
4. An escape of
person arrested upon criminal process by eluding the vigil
ance of his keepers before he
also an offence against public
put in hold,
ana< tne Party himself *is punishable by fine or imprisonment.
3U8tice>
f*130l
(d) (5). But the officer permitting such escape, either by negligence
or connivance,
much more culpable than the prisoner; the natural desire of
liberty pleading strongly in his behalf, though he ought in strictness of law to
submit himself quietly to custody, till cleared by the due course of justice.
Officers therefore who, after arrest, negligently permit
felon to escape, are
also punishable by fine:'(e) but voluntary escapes, by consent and connivance of
much more serious offence: for
the officer, are
generally agreed that such
escapes amount to the same kind of offence, and are punishable in the same de
in cus
guilty, and for which he
gree, as the offence of which the prisoner
And this whether he were actually
tody, whether treason, felony, or trespass.
bare arrest. {/)
But the officer cannot be
committed to gaol, or only under
thus punished, till the original delinquent hath actually received judgment or
been attainted upon verdict, confession, or outlawry, of the crime for which
he was so committed or arrested: otherwise
may happen, that the officer
might be punished for treason or felony, and the person arrested and escaping
But, before the conviction of the prin
might turn out to be an innocent man.
cipal party, the officer thus neglecting his duty may be fined and imprisoned
3.

I,

9

9

is

is

misdemeanor,

(g) (6)

1

2

p. c. m.
White-Friart, and It* environs; the Savoy; and the Hint, In Southwark.
P. C. 122.
Hawk. P.
(e) Hal. P. C. 800.
(/) Hal. P. C. 690.
C. 598,599. Hawk. P. 0. 134,185.
1

1 8

2

(b) Hawk,
(c) Such as
<d) Hawk.
(S) Hal. P.

2
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a
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a
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184.
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(4) For provisions punishing similar offenses, see statute 24 and 25 Vic, c. 100. The will
misde
ful refusal to aid peace officer in the performance of his duty, when requested,
a

&

C,
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is
a

is

if

is

a

a

is

is
a

a

7

§

1

M., 814.
C.
meanor at common law.
Regina v. Brown,
A prisoner confined on void warrant mar
29.
(5) See statute 14 and 15 Vic, c. 100,
State v. Leach,
Conn. 452; 8.
18 Am. Dec, 118.
lawfully break prison and escape.
(6) Air. Bishop, in his treatise on Criminal Law, discusses fully this subject, with the
"
To constitute an escape, there must be an actual arrest and legal and
following result:
continuing imprisonment. The arrest must be for some criminal offense which justifies
No escape
detained
felony, unless the cause for which the prisoner
imprisonment
jailer de facto or his depu
was actually felony at the time of the escape. A private person,
ties, but not his mere servant, may be liable for an escape.
The rule is, that whenever any
made by himself or
person has another lawfully in his custody, whether the arrest
another, he
he allows him to go at large before delivering him into
guilty of an escape
the custody of some legally constituted authority.
The escape
misdemeanor in tha
See, generally upon the subject.
prisoner, apart from the charge upon which he
held.
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(i)

5. Breach of prison by the offender himself, when committed for any cause,
was felony at the common law: (h) or even conspiring to break it.
But thi*
Edw. II, st.
severity
mitigated by the statute de frangentibus prisonam,
which enacts that no person shall have judgment of life or member for break
ing prison, unless committed for some capital offence. So that to break prison
and escape, when lawfully committed for any treason or felony, remains still
be the countyfelony as at the common law; and to break prison (whether
gaol, the stocks, or other usual place of security), when lawfully confined upon
still *punishable as high misdemeanor by r«iqiT
any other inferior charge,
For the statute which ordains that such
fine and imprisonment.
offence shall be no longer capital, never meant to exempt
entirely from every
degree of punishment. (J) (7)
the forcibly and knowingly freeing another from an arrest or
6. Rescue
generally the same offence in the stranger so rescuing,
imprisonment; and
as
would have been in
gaoler to have voluntarily permitted an escape. A
rescue, therefore, of one apprehended for felony,
felony; for treason, trea
misdemeanor also.
But here, likewise, as upon
misdemeanor,
son; and for
voluntary escapes, the principal must first be attainted or receive judgment be
fore the rescuer can be punished: and for the same reason; because, perhaps,
in fact,
may turn out there has been no offence committed, (k) By statutes
five or more persons assemble to res
11 Geo. II, o. 26, and 24 Geo. II, c. 40,
cue any retailers of spirituous liquors, or to assault the informers against them,
By the statute 1ft
felony, and subject to transportation for seven years.
Geo. II, c. 31, to convey to any prisoner in custody for treason or felony any
arms, instruments of escape, or disguise, without the knowledge of the gaoler,
though no escape be attempted, or any way to assist such prisoner to attempt
an escape, though no escape be actually made,
felony, and subjects the of
the prisoner be in custody for
fender to transportation for seven years: or,
debt of 100/.,
petit larceny, or other inferior offence, or charged with
misdemeanor punishable with fine and imprisonment.
then
And by sev
eral special statutes (l), to rescue, or attempt to rescue, any person committed
for the offences enumerated in those acts,
felony without benefit of clergy;
felon executed for murder,
and to rescue, or attempt to rescue, the body of
single felony, and subject to transportation for seven years.
Nay, even if any
Geo.
o.
person be charged with any of the offences against the black-act,
22, and being required by order *of the privy council to surrender him- r>. .„••
■»
self, neglects so to do for forty days, both he and all that knowingly
conceal, aid, abet, or succour him, are felons, without benefit of clergy. (8)
the returning from trans
7. Another capital offence against public justice
portation, or being seen at large in Great Britain, before the expiration of the

8
r

8

9

1,

1

621

e.
AM Hal. P. C. 807.
(0 Bract.
(fc) Hal. P. C. 807. Fost. 844.
(f) Hawk. P. C. 128.
Geo. I.o. 22. (Black-act.)
(Transportation.)
Geo. H, c. 20. (Destroying turnc. 23.
(i) Geo.
Ikes. &c.) 19Geo. II, c. 34. (Smuggling. See the 82 Geo. Ill, c. 148,a. 11.) 26 Geo. D, c. 37. (Murder.)
Geo. II, a IS. (Black-act.)
5

a

6

7

Conn., 884; Colby v. Sampson,
Mass., 810; Commonwealth v. FarrelL
State v. Doud,
Allen, 130. And as to liability of deputies for escape, State v. Errickson, 82 N. J., 421;
Kavanaugh v. State. 41 Ala., 399.
criminal offense and the im
(7) Ou the old authorities the commitment must be for
there
no proper warrant, or no legal right to detain with
prisonment must be lawful.
warrant,
be
no
breach
of
there can
the commitment is legal, any breach
prison, but
out
Prison
held to be any place where one
under lawful arrest.
constitutes the offense.
violence;
or
must
actual
some
force
not such as
There
be
breaking,
implied by law. As,
It an escape
one walk out of prison through an open door, there is no prison breach.
Offense
not com
simply. The breaking must be by the prisoner, or with his privity.
mitted
the prison
broken by others not in privity with him, or by fire or lightning, and
Johns., 449; Commonwealth v. Briggs,
then the prisoner escape.
See People v. Duell,
Met, 659. A prison breach
misdemeanor when the imprisonment
on civil process.
M., 295.
C.
Beg. v. Allan,
(8) These statutes are since repealed or essentially changed.
is is
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term for which the offender was ordered to he transported, or had agreed to
transport himself. This is made felony without benefit of clergy in all cases,
by statutes 4 Geo. I, c. 11, 8 Geo. I, c. 23, 16 Geo. II, o. 15, and 8 Geo. HI, c
15, as is also the assisting them to escape from such as are conveying them to
the port of transportation. (9)
of helping the
8. An eighth is that of taking a reward, under pretence
This was a contrivance carried to a great length of
owner to his stolen goods.
villainy in the beginning of the reign of George the First; the confederates
of the felons thus disposing of stolen goods at a cheap rate, to the owners
The famous Jonathan
and thereby stifling all farther inquiry.
themselves,
Wild had under him a well disciplined corps of thieves, who brought in all
their spoils to him; and he kept a sort of public office for restoring them to
the owners at half price. To prevent which audacious practice, to the ruin
and in defiance of public justice, it was enacted by statute 4 Geo. I, c 11,
that whoever shall take a reward under the pretence of helping any one to
stolen goods, shall suffer as the felon who stole them; unless he causes such
■
principal felon to be apprehended and brought to trial, and also gives evidence
Wild, still continuing in his old practice, was upon this statute
against them
at last convicted and executed, (m) (10)
9. Receiving of stolen goods, knowing them to be stolen, is also a high mis
demeanor and affront to public justice. We have seen in a former chapter, (n)
that this offence, which is only a misdemeanor at common law, by the statute
8 and 4 W. and M. c. 9, and 5 Ann. c. 31, makes the offender accessory to the
, theft and felony. But because the accessory cannot in *general be
I 133 J tried, unless with the principal, or after the principal is convicted, the
receivers by that means frequently eluded justice. To remedy which, it is
enacted by statute 1 Ann. o. 9, and 5 Ann. c. 31, that such reoeivers may still
for a misdemeanor, and punished by fine and imprisonment,
be prosecuted
though the prinoipal felon be not before taken so as to be prosecuted and con
victed. And, in oase of receiving stolen lead, iron, and certain other metals,
snoh offence is by statute 29 Geo. II, c. 30, punishable by transportation for
fourteen years. (o) So that now the prosecutor has two methods in his choice:
either to punish the reoeivers for the misdemeanor immediately, before the
thief is taken; (p) or to wait till the felon is convicted, and then punish them as
accessories to the felony. But it is provided by the same statutes, that he shall
By the
only make use of one, and not both of these methods of punishment.
same statute, also, 29 Geo. II, o. 30, persons having lead, iron, and other metals
in their custody, and not giving a satisfactory account bow they came by the
and punishable by fine or imprisonment.
same, are guilty of a misdemeanor,
And by statute 10 Geo. Ill, c. 48, all knowing reoeivers of stolen plate or
jewels, taken by robbery on the highway, or when a burglary accompanies the
stealing, may be tried as well before as after the conviction of the principal,
9.
(nl See page 88.
(m) See stat. t Geo. I, c. 28,1
In, o. SB,1 13,for the punishment of reoeivers of goods stolen by bumboat*.
(o) See also statute 3 Geo.

Ac, in the Thames,
(p) Foster, 878.

(9) These offenses are no longer capital.
Vic, c. 96, s. 151, persons corruptly taking money or reward
(10) By statute 24 and 25
on pretense of helping any person to property which has been stolen, embezzled, etc..
unless they shall use all due diligence to bring the offenders to trial, are made guilty of
felony. See Reg. v. King. 1 Cox C. C, 86; Reg. v. Pascoe, 1 Den. C. C, 456. And by
section 50, any person advertising a reward for the return of property stolen or lost, and
using words purporting that no questions will be asked, or that a reward will be given for
the property stolen or lost, without seizing or making any inquiry after the person pro
ducing it, or promising to return to any pawnbroker or other person money advanced or
paid by him on such property, or any other sum or reward for the return of such property,
and any person publishing such advertisement is made subject to a fine of 60L

350

Chap. 10.]

Compounding

Felony

:

Baeeetey.

133

and whether he be in or out of custody; and, if convicted, shall be adjudged
guilty of felony, and transported for fourteen years. (11)
10. Of a nature somewhat similar to the two last is the offence of theft bote,
which is where the party robbed not only knows the felon, but also takes his
This is fre
goods again, or other amends upon agreement not to prosecute.
quently called compounding of felony; and formerly was held to make a man
an accessory;
but it is now punished only with fine and imprisonment, (a)
This perversion of justice, in the old Gothic constitutions, was liable to the
most severe and infamous punishment. And the Salic law, "latroni eum *similem habuit, qui fertum celare vellet, et occulte sine judice compositio- r*i 04.-1
*
nem ejus admittere." (r)
By statute 25 Geo. IL, 0. 36, even to advertise l
a reward for the return of things stolen, with no questions asked, or words to
the same purport, subjects the advertiser and the printer to a forfeiture of 50/.
each. (12)

11. Common barretry is the offence of frequently exciting and stirring up
suits and quarrels between his majesty's subjects, cither at law or otherwise,
The punishment for this offence, in a common person, is by fine and
(a) (13)
imprisonment; bnt if the offender (as is too frequently the case) belongs to
the profession of the law, a barretor who is thus able as well as willing to do
mischief, ought also to be disabled from practising for the future. (<) And,
indeed, it is enacted by statute 12 Geo. I, c. 29, that if any one who hath been
convicted of forgery, perjury, subordination of perjury, or common barretry,
shall practice as an attorney, solicitor, or agent, in any suit; the court, upon
complaint, shall examine it in a summary way; and, if proved, shall direct the
Hereunto may also be referred
offender to be transported for seven years.
that of suing another
another offence, of equal malignity and audaciousness;
in the name of a fictitious plaintiff; either one not in being at all, or one who
is ignorant of the suit. This offence, if committed in any of the king's supe
rior courts, is left, as a high contempt, to be punished at their discretion. But
in courts of a lower degree, where the crime is equally pernicious, but the
authority of the judges not equally extensive, it is directed by statute 8 Eliz.
c. 2, to be punished by six -months' imprisonment, and treble damages to the
party injured.
12. Maintenance is an offence that bears a near relation to the former; being
an officious intermeddling in a suit that no way belongs to one, by maintaining
or assisting either party with money or otherwise, to prosecute or defend it:
(u) a practice that was greatly encouraged by the first introduction of uses,
This is an offence against public justice, as it *keeps alive strife p*. _ _-■
(to)
*
and contention, and perverts the remedial process of the law into an
And, therefore, by the Roman law, it was a species of
engine of oppression.
the crimen falsi to enter into any confederacy, or do any act to support anoth
er's lawsuit, by money, witnesses, or patronage, (x) A man may, however,
(r) Stlernh. de hire Goth. 1.8. c. 6.
(0) 1 Hawk. P. 0. US.
(i)l Hawk. P. 0. 848.
it) Ibid. 284.

(tt) Ibid. 848.

(to) Dr. and St 803.

(*) Ff. 48. 10,28.

The punishment is
(11) These offenses are covered by statutes 24 and 25 Vic, c. 96.
penal servitude or imprisonment, and in case of males under sixteen years of age, with or
Statutes for the punishment of these offenses are general in the United
without whipping.
States.

(12) See also stat. 24 and 25 Vic, c. 96, § 102.
(18) 1 Hawkins P. C, ch. 81, defines a barrater to be one who is a common mover,
exciter or maintainor of suits or quarrels in courts or in the country, including all kinds of
disturbances of the peace, and spreading false rumors and calumnies through which discord
Though it has been held that, to be a barrater, one must not
may arise among neighbors.
sue in his own right, if the suits are oppressive and merely to harrass and annoy, it would
One act is not
See Commonwealth v. McCulloch, 15 Mass., 227.
seem to be barratry.
It would seem there must be three. State v. Chitty, 1 Bailey,
enough to make a barrater.
Davis,
Pick.,
v.
Prav,
11
482; Com
879; Commonwealth v.
18 Pick.. 859; Commonwealth
monwealth v. Mohn, 52 Penn. St., 243; Commonwealth v. Tubbs, 1 Cush., 2; and on the
Saund.,
308, and note.
whole subject, Hex v. Urlyn, 2
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(z)

maintain the suit of his near kinsman, servant, or poor neighbour, oat of char
ity and compassion, with impunity. Otherwise, the punishment by common
law is fine and imprisonment; (y) and by the statute 32 Hen. Vlii, c 9, a for
feiture of ten pounds.
13. Champerty, campi-partitio, is a species of maintenance, and punished La
the same manner:
being
bargain with
plaintiff or defendant campum
partire, to divide the land or other matter sued for between them,
they pre
vail at law; whereupon the champerter
to carry on the party's suit at his
own expense, (a) Thus, champart, in the French law, signifies a similar divi
sion of profits, being
part of the crop annually due to the landlord by bargain
or custom.
In our sense of the word'
signifies the purchasing of a suit, or
one
right of suing: (14)
practice so much abhorred by our law, that
main reason why
chose in action, or thing of which one hath the right but
not the possession,
not assignable at common law; because no man should
These pests of civil society,
purchase any pretence to sue in another's right.
that are perpetually endeavoring to disturb the repose of their neighbours, and
officiously interfering in other men's quarrels, even at the hazard of their own
fortunes, were severely animadverted on by the Roman law, "qui improbe
cceuni in alienam litem, ut quia quid ex condemnatione in rem ipsius redactum
"
fuerit inter eos communicaretur, lege Julia de vi privata tenentur
(6) and
third part of their goods, and per
they were punished by the forfeiture of
petual infamy. Hitherto, also, must be referred the provision of the statute
32 Hen. VIII, c.
that no one shall sell or purchase any pretended right or
**^e t0 land, unless the vendor *hath received the profits thereof for
l"*136l
one whole year before such grant, or hath been in actual possession of
the land, or of the reversion or remainder; on pain that both purchaser and
vender shall each forfeit the value of such land to the king and the prose
cutor. These offences relate ohiefly to the commencement of civil suits; but,
14. Compounding of informations
an offence of an
upon penal statutes
equivalent nature in criminal causes; and is, besides, an additional misde
meanor against publio justice, by contributing to make the laws odious to the
At once, therefore, to discourage malicious informers, and to provide
people.
that offences, when once discovered, shall be duly prosecuted,
enacted by
that
statute 18 Eliz. c.
any person, informing under pretence of any penal
law, makes any composition without leave of the court, or takes any money or
promise from the defendant to excuse him (which demonstrates his intent in
commencing the prosecution to be merely to serve his own ends, and not for
the publio good), he shall forfeit 10/., shall stand two hours on the pillory,
and shall be forever disabled to sue on any popular or penal statute. (15)
15. A conspiracy, also, to indict an innocent man of felony falsely and mali
a farther abuse and per
ciously, who is accordingly indicted and acquitted,
version of publio justice; (16) for which the party injured may either have
48,

is

This subject fully discussed by Mr. Bishop.
The tendency of late has been to confine these offences within bounds somewhat narrower
than those indicated by the older authorities.
(15) This subject was considered and the previous cases examined by Ch. J. Tindal, in
"
Keir v. Leeman,
Q. B.. 392, where the conclusion was that in all offenses which involve
competent for
damages to an injured party, for which he may maintain an action,
him, notwithstanding they are also of public nature, to compromise and settle his private
damage in any way he may think fit;" but that an agreement to pay money in consideration
of a prosecution for riot and assault being abandoned, was illegal and void. On the same
subject, see Jones v. Rice, 18 Pick., 440.
HawkinsP.O., & 78, states
not confined to the instance given above.
(16) This offense
that all conspiracies whatsoever, wrongfully to prejudice the rights of third person, are
0., 88 Am. Dec, 840,
Met, 111;
highly criminal at law. In Commonwealth v. Hunt,
said: " It
criminal and indictable offense for two or more to confederate and com
bine together by concerted means to do that which is unlawful and criminal, to the injury
of the public, or portions or classes of the community, or even to ,tha rights of the Individ
352
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civil action by writ of conspiracy (of which

is,

we spoke in the preceding book),
(c) or the conspirators, for there must be at least two to form a conspiracy,
may be indicted at the suit of the king, and were by the ancient common law
(d) to receive what is called the viUenous judgment; viz., to lose their liberam
legem, whereby they are discredited and disabled as jurors or witnesses; to
forfeit their goods and chattels, and lands for life; to have those lands wasted,
their houses razed, their trees rooted up, and their own bodies committed to
prison, (e) But it now is the better opinion, that the villenous' judgment is
by long *disuse become obsolete; it not having been pronounced for r*j3^i
*
some ages: but instead thereof the delinquents are usually sentenced
To this head may be referred the offence
to imprisonment, fine, and pillory.
of sending letters, threatening to accuse any person of a crime punishable
with death, transportation, pillory, or other infamous punishment, with a view
This is punishable
to extort from him any money or other valuable chattels.
by statute 30 Geo. II, c. 24, at the discretion of the court, with fine, imprison
ment, pillory, whipping, or transportation for seven years. (17)
16. The next offence against public justice is when the suit is past its com
And that
the crime of willful and corrupt
mencement, and come to trial.
defined by Sir Edward Coke,
to be
crime committed
perjury: which
administered, in some judicial proceeding, to
when a lawful oath
person
who swears willfully, absolutely, and falsely, in a matter material to the issue
or point in question.
The law takes no notice of any perjury but such as
committed in some court of justice, having power to administer an oath; or
before some magistrate or proper officer, invested with
similar authority, in
some proceedings relative to
civil suit or
criminal prosecution: for
esteems all other oaths unnecessary at least, and therefore will not punish the
breach of them. (18) For which reason
much to be questioned, how far
(c) See book 1H, 128.
(d) Bro. Abr. tit. Conspiracy, 28.
(«) Hawk. P. C. 193.
(/) Inst 184.
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ual.
"A conspiracy must be combination of two or more persons, by some con
certed action, to accomplish Rome criminal or unlawful purpose, or to accomplish some
in
itself criminal or unlawful, by criminal or unlawful means."
See further,
purpose not
on what constitutes this offense, O'Connell v. Queen, 11 CI. &Fin., 155; Collins v. Common
C,
wealth,
Serg. & R., 220; Mifflin v. Commonwealth.
461;
&
8.,
40
W.
Am. Dec.,
527; State v. Rowley, 12 Conn., 101; Alderman v. People,
Mich., 414; State v. Younger,
Dev., 857; S. C, 17 Am. Dec, 571; State v. Murphy,
Ala., 765; 8. C, 41 Am. Dec..
79; People v. Mather,
C, 21 Am. Dec, 122; State v. Rickey.
Halst
Wend.. 229;
293; State v. Straw, 42 N. H., 893; Smith v. People, 25 111., 17; People v. Powell, 63 N. Y.,
The thing proposed to be done by conspirators need not be an indictable offense.
88.
Burnham, 15 N. H., 396; State v. Buchanan,
State
Har. & J., 217; 8. C,
Am. Dec,
534; State v. Rowley, 12 Conn., 101. Conspiracy must be the act of more than one person,
but husband and wife, without others, cannot commit the offense.
Hawkins P. C. ch.
The mere combination completes the crime. The intended acts need not be done.
72.
Balk., 174; Commonwealth v. Judd,
Mass., 829; Hazen v. Common
Rex v. Best,
wealth, 23 Penn. St., 355. If two are jointly charged with conspiracy, the acquittal of one
works the acquittal of both.
Dev., 569. But one may be convicted after
State v. Tom,
the other
dead.
M., 208: Rex v. Niccolls,
Stra., 1227. All
Dav.
Reg. v. Kenrick,
concerned in one conspiracy need not be indicted or tried together.
Rex v. Cooke. B. &
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538.
(17) Stat. 24 and 25 Vic, c. 100, covers this subject
Commonwealth v. Warden, 11
(18) The oath must be taken in the course of justice.
Met., 406. But every one who appears in any court and
duly sworn, whether compell
able to testify or not,
liable for perjury
he willfully swears falsely.
Commonwealth
Knight, 12 Mass., 274; Chamberlain v. People, 23 N. Y., 85. Even though he be wit
ness for himself when, legally, his evidence
not admissible.
Dev., 263;
8tate v. Molier,
VanSteenbergh v. Eortz, 10 Johns. 167. The oath must be administered by an officer
duly authorized. Rex v. Hanks, C. & P., 419; McGregor v. State,
Ind., 232; State v.
McCord, 308. The case must be one over which the magistrate before whom
McCroskey,
has jurisdiction.
State v. Hayward,
Nott & McCord, 546; State v. Furlong, 26 Me.,
Pick., 453. As to sufficiency of allegation of jurisdiction,
69; Commonwealth v. White,
Am. Dec, 72. An unnecessary and
see Commonwealth v. Knight, 12 Mass., 273; S. C,
unimportant oath to
bill in equity, though false, is not perjury. Gaige v. People, 86
Mich., 30.
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any magistrate is justifiable in taking a voluntary affidavit in any extra-judi
cial matter, as is now too frequent upon every petty occasion: since it is more
than possible, that by such idle oaths a man may frequently in foro conscientiat incur the guilt, and at the same time evade the temporal penalties, of per
committed malo animo),
jury. The perjury must also be corrupt, (that
wilful, positive, and absolute: (19) not upon surprise, or the like:
also
must be in some point material to the question in dispute; (20) for
only be in some trifling collateral circumstance, to which po regard
no more penal than in the voluntary extra-judicial
oaths
paid,
before mentioned.
Subornation of perjury
the offence of procuring
false oath, as constitutes perjury in the
f*nsl an°ther to *take such
principal. (21) The punishment of perjury and subornation, at com
mon law, has been various. It was anciently death; afterwards banishment,
or cutting out the tongue; then forfeiture of goods; and now
fine and im
prisonment, and never more to be capable of bearing testimony, (g) But the
Eliz. c. (if the offender be prosecuted thereon), inflicts the pen
statute of
alty of perpetual infamy, and a fine of 40/. on the suborner: and, in default
of payment, imprisonment for six months, and to stand with both ears nailed
to the pillory.
Perjury itself
thereby punished with six months' imprison
ment, perpetual infamy, and fine of 20/., or to have both ears nailed to the
But the prosecution
usually carried on for the offence at common
pillory.
Inst. its.
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(10) Mere negligence or carelessness in swearing to the witness' belief, when proper pain*
would have enabled him to ascertain the truth to be otherwise, seems not to be penury,
inasmuch as the specific willful intent
Bald., 878; U.
v. Shell mire.
wanting. U.
McLean, 118; State v. Cockran,
v. Babcock,
Bailey, 50. See State v. Lea, Ala., 602;
Commonwealth v. Brady,
Gray, 78.
Murph.,
(20) That the testimony should be pertinent and material, see State v. Dodd,
Cush., 212; Bullock v. Koon,
226; Commonwealth v. Parker,
Wend., 631; Pollard
People, 69 111., 148; Nelson v. State, 47 Miss.. 621; State v. Mooney, 65 Mo., 494; Plain v.
C, 17 Am. Dec., 578.
Braunsdorff, 40 Wis., 107; State v. Mumford,
Dev., 519;
" It seemeth clear that
the oath for which a man
indicted for perjury be wholly
foreign from that purpose, or altogether immaterial, and neither any way pertinent to the
matter in question, nor tending to aggravate or extenuate the damages, nor likely to induce
the jury to give
readier credit to the substantial part of the evidence,
cannot amount to
Hawk. P. C, ch. 65,
But the
perjury, because
merely idle and insignificant."
testimony may be material enough to warrant an indictment for perjury,
affect any
Rich., 456; State v. Lavalley,
collateral issue in the case. State v. Keenan,
Mo., 824;
State v. Shupe, 16 la., 86; Commonwealth v. Pollard, 12 Met., 225; Commonwealth v.
Grant, 116 Mass., 17. The late English cases qualify the doctrine as stated by Hawkins.
In Reg. v. Mullany, Leigh & C, 593, was held that any false testimony in judicial pro
ceeding, with intent to mislead, whether material or not, would amount to perjury.
In
Reg. v. Gibbon, Leigh & C, 109,
was held that certain evidence had been wrongly ad
mitted, but that the witness might be indicted for perjury on it. In Reg. v. Philpott,
Cos
C, C. & K., 135; on which the foregoing depend, the court uses this lan
C. C, 363;
is less perjury
guage: "This brings us to the question whether
the document turns
out not to be admissible in evidence, and the judge has done wrong in admitting it If
would, as has been already observed, make the commission of the offense
that were so,
bill of exceptions in the house of
nice question of law upon
depend upon the decision of
document; that docu
lords. Here the evidence was offered to procure the admission of
admissible, would be material to the question being tried; and the evidence was
ment,
Here, therefore, are all the elements of the crime of perjury."
false.
Mr. Bishop, Cr. L,
1036, says: " The true view
5th ed.,
to consider whether the evidence, assuming
to
have been rightly admitted, could have properly influenced the judge or the jury, to whom
indictment,"
could,
was addressed.
false,
If
and
should subject the witness to
See Ibid., 7th ed.,
1030, et tea.
statutes
in
most of the United States the offense
made broader, and includes false
By
affidavits made in matters outside of, as well as in, court proceedings.
To
constitute
subornation
of perjury, the party charged must have procured the
(21)
commission of perjury by inciting, instigating or persuading the guilty party to commit the
crime. Commonwealth v. Douglass,
Met., 241; United States v. Staats,
How.. 41;
Commonwealth v. Smith, 11 Allen, 248. Mere solicitation
misdemeanor at common
law. Reg. v. Darby,
Mod., 100.
354

Bribery.

Chap. 10.]

138

is

it

is

is

<*)De Leg,

(f)

1

(0 Britton, c.

2,
9.

(ft) Montesq. 8p. L. b. 29, o. U.

6.

a

a

it

a

it

is

it

a

is

is

it

(J)

a

is

it

is,

is

(i)

law; especially as to the penalties before inflicted, the statute 3 Geo. II, c. 25,
superadds a power for the court to order the offender to be sent to the house
of correction for a term not exceeding seven years, or to be transported for
the same period; and makes it felony without benefit of clergy to return or
It has sometimes been wished that perjury, at
escape within the time. (22)
least upon capital accusations, whereby another's life has been or might have
been destroyed, was also rendered capital, upon a principle of retaliation : as
it is in all cases by the laws of France. (A) And certainly the odionsness of
the crime pleads strongly in behalf of the French law. But it is to be con
sidered, that there they admit witnesses to be heard only on the side of the
In such
prosecution, and use the rack to extort a confession from the accused.
a constitution, therefore, it is necessary to throw the dread of capital punish
ment into the other scale, in order to keep in awe the witnesses for the crown,
on whom alone the prisoner's fate depends; so naturally does one cruel law
But corporal and pecuniary punishments, exile and perpetual
beget another.
infamy, are more suited to the genius of the English law: where the fact is
openly discussed between witnesses on both sides, and the evidence for the
crown may be contradicted and disproved by those of the prisoner. Where
•indeed, the death of an innocent person has actually been the conse- p*.
**
-quence of such wilful perjury, it falls within the guilt of deliberate
murder, and deserves an equal punishment: which our ancient law in fact in
flicted,
But the mere attempt to destroy life by other means not being
no reason that an attempt by perjury should; much less that
capital, there
this crime should in all judicial cases be punished with death.
For to multi
ply capital punishments lessens their effect, when applied to crimes of the
not by any means to be com
deepest dye; and detestable as perjury
pared with some other offences, for which only death can be inflicted; and
therefore
seems already (except perhaps in the instance of deliberate murder
by perjury) very properly punished by our present law, which has adopted the
-opinion of Cicero, (k) derived from the law of the twelve tables, "perjurii
poena divina, exitium; humana, dedecus."
the next species of offence against public justioe; which
17. Bribery
when
judge, or other person concerned in the administration of justice,
In the
takes any undue reward to influence his behaviour in his office.
(23)
East
the custom never to petition any superior for justice, not excepting
their kings, without
This
calculated for the genius of despotic
present.
countries; where the true principles of government are never understood,
and
no obligation from the superior to the
imagined that there
inferior, no relative duty owing from the governor to the governed. The
Roman law, though
contained many severe injunctions against bribery, as
well for selling
man's vote in the senate or other public assembly, as for the
bartering of common justice, yet, by
strange indulgence in one instance,
tacitly encouraged this practice: allowing the magistrate to receive small
hundred crowns in the
presents, provided they did not in the whole exceed

Haw. P. 0. 168.
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if
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a

is
a a

is

a

a 2

a

is

8;

27 and 28 Tic, c. 47.
(23) See, as to these offenses, stat. 20 and 21 Vic, c.
" Any attempt
(23) The offense of bribery is not confined to influencing judicial officers.
to influence an officer in his official conduct, whether in the executive, legislative or judi
cial department of the government, by the offer of reward or pecuniary compensation,
an indictable common law misdemeanor."
State v. Ellis, 83 N. J., 102: Rex v. Plvmpton,
Cal., 564: U. S. v. Worrall,
Dall., 385.
Lord Raym., 1377; People ex rel. Purley,
Whether the proposal to receive
bribe is
misdemeanor,
see Walsh v. People, 65 111.,
58; Hutchinson v. State, 86 Tex., 293. An unsuccessful attempt to bribe
an offense.
Barefield v. State, 14 Ala., 603. See Rex v. Vaughan, Burr, 2494.
It
candidate for office to get votes by offering,
elected, to
species of bribery for
donate sum of money to an individual, or to
public corporation. State v. Purdy, 86
Wis., 213. See Harvey v. Tama County, 53 Iowa, 228; State t. Collier, 72 Mo., 18; 8. O.,
87 Am. Rep., 417; State v. Church,
Oreg., 875.
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year: (m) not considering the insinuating nature and gigantic progress of thisvice, when once admitted. Plato therefore more wisely, in his ideal republic,.
*orders those who take presents for doing their duty to be punished
T*i4n1 (w)
*•
J in the severest manner: and by the laws of Athens he that offered wasas well as he that received a bribe, (o)
In England this
also prosecuted,
offence of taking bribes is punished, in inferior officers, with fine and impris
onment; and in those who offer a bribe, though not taken, the same, (p) But
in judges, especially the superior ones, it hath been always looked upon as so
heinous an offence, that the chief justice Thorp was hanged for it in the reign
of Edward III. By a statute (q) 11 Hen. IV, all judges and officers of the
king, convicted of bribery, shall forfeit treble the bribe, be punished at the
king's will, and be discharged from the king's service forever. (24) And some
notable examples have been made in parliament, of persons in the highest sta
tions, and otherwise very eminent and able, contaminated with this sordid
vice.
18. Embracery is an attempt to influence a jury corruptly to one side by
The
promises, persuasions, entreaties, money, entertainments, and the like, (r)
punishment for the person embracing is by fine and imprisonment; and for the
juror so embraced, if it be by taking money, the punishment is (by divers stat
utes of the reign of Edward III) perpetual infamy, imprisonment for a year,
and forfeiture of the tenfold value.
The false verdict of jurors, whether occasioned by embracery or not,
19.
was anciently considered as criminal, and therefore ezemplarily punished by
attaint in the manner formerly mentioned,
the negligence of public officers,
20. Another offence of the same species
intrusted with' the administration of justice, as sheriffs, coroners, constables
and the like, which makes the offender liable to be fined; and in very notori
beneficial one.
forfeiture of his office,
be
ous cases will amount to
Also the omitting to apprehend persons offering stolen *iron, lead and
r#1
stated fine,
other metals to sale,
misdemeanor, and punishable by
or imprisonment, in pursuance of the statute 29 Geo. II, c. 80.
crime of
21. There
yet another offence against publio justice, which
deep malignity; and so much the deeper, as there are many opportunities of
in practice, and the power and wealth of the offenders may often
putting
the oppression and tyran
deter the injured from
legal prosecution. This
nical partiality of judges, justices, and other magistrates, in the administration
However, when prosecuted, either by
and under the colour of their office.
impeachment in parliament, or by information in the court of the king's bench
sure to be severely punished with
(according to the rank of the offenders),
forfeiture of their offices (either consequential or immediate), fines, imprison
ment, or other discretionary censure, regulated by the nature and aggravations,
of the offence committed.
an abuse of publio justice, which consists in any offi
22. Lastly, extortion
cer's unlawfully taking, by colour of his office, from any man, any money or
not due to him, or more than
due, or before
due.
thing of value, that
fine and imprisonment, and sometimes
The punishment
forfeiture of
(m)

1

23.
(0) Pott. Antlq. b.
(1) See book III, pp. 402,403.

(p)

Inst. 147.
Hawk. P. C. 158.

1S

1

1.

12.
(nl Dt Lrn.
(m) Ff. 48, 11,8.
(r) Hawk. P. C. 859.
(o) Ibid. 146
(u) Hawk. P. C. ITT).

1,
c

the office. (25)

(0
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repealed.
(24) This statute
(25) Extorting an agreement to pay money or deliver something of value seems not suf
Mass., 523; Commonwealth v.
ficient to make out the offense.
Commonwealth v. Cony,
Pease, 16 Mass., 91. Nor does the receiving of
reward voluntarily given. State v. Stotts,
Blackf., 460; Evans v. Trenton, 24 N. J., 764. A custom to take larger fees than the
law permits
no defense to the officer who has demanded and received them.
Lincoln v.
Bhuw, 17 Mass., 410; Commonwealth v. Bagley,
Pick., 279. The taking must be willful
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CHAPTER XI.
OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE PUBLIC PEACE.
Wk

are next to consider offences against the public peace; the conservation
which is intrusted to the king and his officers, in the manner and for the
These offences are either
reasons which were formerly mentioned at large, (a)
such as are an actual breach of the peace, or constructively so, by tending to
make others break it. Both of these species are also. either felonious, or not
felonious. The felonious breaches of the peace are strained up to that degree
of malignity by virtue of several modern statutes: and, particularly,
of twelve persons, or more, and not dispersing
1. The riotous assembling
upon proclamation. This was first made high treason by statute 3 and 4 Edw.
VI, c. 5, when the king was a minor, and a change in religion to be effected;
but that statute was repealed by the statute 1 Mar. c. 1, among the other trea
sons created since the 25 Edw. Ill: though the prohibition was in substance
re-enacted, with an inferior degree of punishment, by statute 1 Mar. st. 2, o.
a single felony.
These statutes specified
12, which made the same offence
and particularized the nature of the riots they were meant to suppress; as,
for example, such as were set on foot with intention to offer violence to the
privy council, or to change the laws of the kingdom, or for certain other spe
cific purposes: in which cases, if the persons were commanded, by proclama
tion, to disperse, and they did not, it was, by the statute of Mary, made felony,
but within the benefit of clergy; and *also the act indemnified the
r,., ,
*■
•
peace officers and their assistants, if they killed any of the mob in
endeavouring to suppress such riot. This was thought a-necessary security in
that sanguinary reign, when popery was intended to be re-established,
which
was likely to produce great discontents: but at first it was made only for a
year, and was afterwards continued for that queen's life. And, by statute 1
Eliz. o. 16, when a reformation in religion was to be once more attempted, it
was revived and continued during her life also; and then expired.
From the
accession of James the First to the death of Queen Anne, it was never once
thought expedient to revive it; but in the first year of George the First, it was
judged necessary, in order to support the execution of the act of settlement,
to renew it, and at one stroke to make it perpetual, with large additions. For,
whereas, the former acts expressly defined and specified what should be ac
counted a riot, the statute 1 Geo. I, stat. 2, c. 5, enacts, generally, that if any
twelve persons are unlawfully assembled to the disturbance of the peace, and
any one justice of the peace, sheriff, under-sheriff, or mayor of a town, shall
think proper to command them, by proclamation, to disperse, if they contemn
his orders and continue together for one hour afterwards, such contempt shall
be felony, without benefit of clergy. (1)
And, farther, if the reading of the
proclamation be by force opposed, or the reader be in any manner wilfully
such opposers and hinderers are felons, with
hindered from the reading of
out benefit of clergy: and all persons to whom such proclamation ought to
have been made, and knowing of such hinderance, and not dispersing, are
(o) Book

I,

it,

■of

pp. 118,MS, 860.

1

is

is

3

2

Mo., 23; People v. Coon, 15 Wend., 277; United States
State v. Gardner,
and corrupt
v. Waitz,
8a wy., 478.
In the United States corrupt misconduct by judges of courts of record punishable by
impeachment. Inferior judicial officers are punishable by indictment, and possibly in
some states by impeachment.
Vic, c.
now reduced to transportation or imprisonment (statute
(1) The punishment
Statute 16 and 17 Vic, c. 99.
<1), or penal servitude may be substituted.
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felons, without benefit of clergy. There is the like indemnifying clause, in
case any of the mob be unfortunately killed in the endeavour to disperse them:
And, by a subsequent clause of
being copied from the act of Queen Mary.
the new act, if any person, so riotously assembled, begin,' even before procla
mation, to pull down any church, chapel, meeting-house,
dwelling-house, or
out-houses, they shall be felons, without benefit of clergy. (2)
2. By statute 1 Hen. VII, c. 7, unlawful hunting in any legal forest, park, or
r
warren, not being the king's property, *by night, or with painted faces,
*144-iJ
was declared to be single felony. But now, by the statute 9 Geo. I, c
22, to appear armed in any inclosed forest or place, where deer are usually
kept, or in any warren for hares or conies, or in any high road, open heath,
common, or down, by day or night, with faces blacked, or otherwise disguised,
or (being so disguised) to hunt, wound, kill, or steal any deer, to rob a warren
or to steal fish, or to procure, by gift or promise of reward, any person to join
them in such unlawful act, is felony without benefit of clergy. (3)
mention
these offences in this place, not on account of the damage thereby done to
private property, but of the manner in which that damage is committed:
namely, with the face blacked or with other disguise, and being armed with
offensive weapons, to the breach of the publio peace and the terror of his
majesty's subjects.
8. Also by the same statute, 9 Geo. I, c. 22, amended by statute 27 Geo. n>
o. 15, knowingly to send any letter without a name, or with a fictitious name,
demanding money, venison, or any other valuable thing, or threatening (with
out any demand) to kill any of the king's subjects, or to fire their houses, out
This
houses, barns, or ricks, is made felony without benefit of clergy. (4)
offence was formerly high treason by the statute 8 Hen. VI, c. 6.
4. To pull down or destroy any lock, sluice or floodgate, erected by authority
of parliament on a navigable river,
Geo. H, st.
o. 19, made
by statute
By the statute Geo.
felony, punishable with transportation for seven years.
H, c. 20, the offence of destroying such works, or rescuing any person in cus
made felony without benefit of clergy; and
tody for the same,
may be
the fact had been therein
inquired of and tried in any adjacent county, as
committed. By the statute Geo*, in, c. 12, maliciously to damage or destroy
any banks, sluices, or other works on such navigable river, to open the flood
again made felony, punishable
gates or otherwise obstruct the navigation,
And by the statute Geo. TTT,
w'tb. transportation for seven years.
f*i4.fil*
c. 40 "(which repeals all former acts relating to turnpikes), maliciously
to pull down or otherwise destroy any turnpike-gate or fence, toll-house, or
weighing engine thereunto belonging, erected by authority of parliament, or
made felony without benefit of
to rescue any person in custody for the same,
clergy; and the indictment may be inquired of and tried in any adjacent
county. (5) The remaining offences against the publio peace are merely mis
demeanors and no felonies; as,
5. Affrays (from affraier, to terrify) are the fighting of two or more persons
in some publio place, (6) to the terror of his majesty's subjects; for,
the
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(2) Subsequent statutes embrace other cases than these here mentioned, and the punish
now reduced to penal servitude.
ment
and Geo.
(8) The statutes relating to these offenses were repealed and consolidated by
IV, cc. 27 and 29, and the punishments greatly mitigated.
covered by statute 24 and 25. Vic, cc. 96, 97, 100.
(4) This subject
(6) Upon the subject of this paragraph, see statute 24 and 25 Vic., c. 97.
(6) To be public, the place must be one where the public may go at will without invita
forest,
field surrounded
mile from any highway or public place, does
tion. Thus,
not lose its character as private by the casual presence of three persons.
Taylor v. The
State, 22 Ala. 15. But, where
fight took place in an enclosed lot, ninety feet from the
it,
although
no person in the street was shown to have seen the en
street and visible from
counter, the spot was held public place and the fight an affray. Carwile ▼. The State, 35
Ala., 892. And has been held that legal highway,
sufficiently secluded, is not necea
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(6)1 Hawk. P. 0.134

(o) Ibid. 188.

(d) Ibid. 187.

(t) Ibid. 188.

(/)

8
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it,

fighting be in private, it is no affray, but an assault, (b) Affrays may be sup
pressed by any private person present, who is justifiable in endeavouring to
part the combatants, whatever consequence may ensue, (c) But more especi
ally the constable, or other similar officer, however denominated, is bound to
keep the peace; and to that purpose may break open doors to suppress an affray,
or apprehend the affrayers; and may either carry them before a justice, or im
prison them by his own authority for a convenient space till the heat is over;
and may then perhaps also make them find sureties for the peace, (d) The
punishment of common affrays is by fine and imprisonment; the measure of
which must be regulated by the circumstances of the case; for, where there is
As where
any material aggravation, the punishment proportionably increases.
two persons cooly and deliberately engage in a duel; this being attended with
an apparent intention and danger of murder, and being a high contempt of the
of the nation, is a strong aggravation of the affray, though no mischief
i'ustice
Another aggravation is when thereby the officers of
ias actually ensued.(e)
justice are disturbed in the due execution of their office: or where a respect to
the particular place ought to restrain and regulate men's behaviour, more than
in common ones; as in the king's court and the like. And upon the same
account also all affrays in a church or church-yard are esteemed very
•heinous offences, as being indignities to him to whose service those r*1
J
Therefore mere quarrelsome words, which are »•
places are consecrated.
neither an affray nor an offence in any other place, are penal here.
For it is
enacted by statute 5 and 6 Edw. VI, c. 4, that if any person shall, by words
only, quarrel, chide, or brawl, in a church or church-yard, the ordinary shall
suspend him, if a layman, ab ingressu ecclesias; and, if a clerk in orders, from
And if any person in such
the ministration of his office during pleasure.
church or church-yard proceeds to smite or lay violent hands upon another, he
shall be excommunicated ipso facto; or if he strikes him with a weapon, or
draws any weapon, with intent to strike, he shall, besides excommunioation
(being convicted by a jury), have one of bis ears cut off: or, having no ears, be
Two persons may be guilty of an
branded with the letter F in his cheek. (7)
affray: but,
0. Riots, routs, and unlawful assemblies, must have three persons at least
An unlawful assembly is when three or more do assemble
to constitute them.
themselves
together to do an unlawful act, as to pull down enclosures, to
or making
destroy a warren or the game therein ; and part without doing
where three or more meet to do an
any motion towards it.(/") (8) A rout
Inrt. 178.
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public reproof to parish
(7) A clergyman may be guilty of brawling who addresses
ioner daring his sermon, without anyjust cause or provocation, and with great warmth of
loud voice.
Cox v. Goodday,
passion, and
Hagg. Cons., 138. On this subject, see
statute 23 and 24 Vic, c. 32.
so far as relates to the punishment of persons convicted of
Edw. VI, c.
The statute
striking with any weapon, or drawing any weapon with intent to strike, as therein men
tioned, was repealed by Geo. IV, c. 81, s.
And so far as relates to persons not in holy
orders,
was repealed by statute 23 and 24 Vic," c. 32,
" Also an assembly of man's friends for the defense of his person against those who
(8)
market, etc.,
unlawful; for he who
threaten to beat him,
he go to such
in fear of
such insults must provide for his safety by demanding the surety of the peace against the
threatened,
and not make use of such violent methods which can
persons by whom he
not but be attended with the danger of raising tumults and disorders to the disturbance of
of
man's friends in his own house, for the defense of
the public peace; yet an assembly
359
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sarily
As illustrating what
State v. Weekly, 29 Ind., 206.
held to be
public place.
public place, see, where gaming has been the offense charged, Windham v. State, 26 Ala,,
69; McCauley v. State, 26 Ala., 185; Burdine v. State, 25 Ala., 60; Roquemore v. State,
19 Ala., 528; Clarke v. State, 12 Ala., 492; Lowrie v. State, 43 Tex., 602; Smith v. State,
And where indecent exposure has been the charge: Reg. v. Orchard,
52 Ala., 384.
Cox
C. & K., 360, where an omnibus was held to be
C. O., 248, and Reg. v. Holmes,
public
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Inst 176.

(0

1

(a)

8

Biot,

4,
5.

(g) Bro. Abr.

t.

(i)

unlawful act upon a common quarrel, as forcibly breaking down fences upon a
right claimed of common or of way; and make some advances towards it.(g)
A riot is where three or more actually do an unlawful act of violence, either with
or without a common cause or quarrel: (h) as if they beat a man; or hunt and
kill game in another's park, chase, warren, or liberty; or do any other unlaw
ful act with force and violence; or even do a lawful act, as removing a nui
The punishment of unlawful
sance, in a violent and tumultuous manner. (9)
assemblies, if to the number of twelve, we have just now seen, may be capital,
according to the circumstances that attend it; but, from the number of three
to eleven, is by fine and imprisonment only. The same is the case in riots and
rou*8 "7 *ne common law; to *which the pillory (10) in very enormous
T*i4.71
■>
J cases has
And by the statute 13 Hen.
been sometimes superadded,
Hawk. P. C. 159.
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the possession thereof, against those who threaten to make an unlawful entry thereinto, or
for the' defense of his person against those who threaten to beat him therein, is indulged by
looked upon as his castle."
Hawk. P. 0., ch. 65,
10.
law; for man's house
" What thus said by Hawkins about an assemblage to defend man's castle
clearly
correct. The other branch of the doctrine of this eminent author doubtless needs some
man may receive the
qualification. For plainly there may be circumstances in which
assistance of his friends in the defense merely of his person, without exposing them to in
L.,
Bish. C.
5th ed.,
1359.
dictment for unlawful assembly."
Salk., 374, and
R. v. Heaps,
(9) At common law, two could not be guilty of riot
Blackf.,
72; where three were indicted and but one found guilty, and
State v. Turpin,
was held no sentence could be pronounced. Where several were indicted and two found
the indictment had been against the two
guilty, no judgment should be given; otherwise,
Rex v. Sudbury, 12
and divers others, etc., and upon that indictment verdict as above.
Mod., 262. Where six were indicted and two died before trial, two acquitted, and two
Rex v. Scott, Burr., 1262. Where
were found guilty, the two latter could be sentenced.
three were indicted and one was tried separately and found guilty, the others not having
subsequent
trial one of the others was
been tried, judgment was pronounced, though at
Terg., 428. To convict of rioting,
enough
person
acquitted. State v. Allison,
to the disturbance, without being himself active in
present giving aid and countenance
Mo., 270 8tate v. Straw, 33 Me., 554. Where three com
Williams v. State,
the riot.
bine to do an unlawful act, all are guilty, though only one threatens violence. Bell v.
absent from the actual
Mallory, 61 111., 167. One who; by speech, stirs up riot, but
disturbance,
the speech and the disturbance are nseparably connected.
guilty of rioting,
R v. Sharpe, Cox C. C, 288. Acquiescence must be explained, to prevent bystander
nt
riot from being held guilty.
held not
Pennsylvania v. Craig, Addison, 190; but
riot, are guilty.
State v. Mcto be law that all present and not engaged in suppressing
Bride, 19 Mo., 289.
Hawk. P. C, ch. 65,
To constitute a riot, the act must be such as to inspire terror.
R v. Soley, Salk., 594; R v. Hughes, C. & P., 873. If the tendency of an unlaw
to inspire terror, and they execute their purpose,
ful act of several persons
enough,
State v. Alexander,
large number of people.
although the act does not in fact frighten
Rich.,
number of armed men in violent way come to search a house, they
So where
Sanders v.
may be guilty of riot though the owner of the house treated them hospitably:
Ind., 114, where persons were, under a stat
State, 60 Ga., 126; and see Baukus v. State,
ute, held guilty of riot for
mock serenade at night.
done in turbulent manner.
The act need not be in itself unlawful
"It no way
material whether the act intended to be done by such an assembly be of itself lawful or
unlawful, from whence
more than three persons assist
follows that
man to make
like num
forcible entry into lands to which one of them has
good right of entry, or
ber in violent and tumultuous manner join together in removing nuisance or other thing,
in
as
done
manner,
are
the
peaceful
properly rioters as
which may be lawfully
they,
act intended to be done by them was never so unlawful, for the law will not suffer persons
to seek redress of their private grievances by such dangerous disturbances of the public
cer
peace; however, the justice of the quarrel in which such an assembly doth engage
Kiphart v. State, 42
Hawk. P. C, ch. 05,
tainly
great mitigation of the offense."
Ind., 273; State v. Brooks, Hill (S. C), 361. So an officer may be guilty of riot in serving
Terg. 535.
Douglass v. State,
process.
A combination of persons, lawful in the first instance, may become guilty of riot by sub
sequent unlawful action, and this though they do not fully carry out the wrong purpose.
It has been held that, to constitute riot,
tha
State v. Snow, 18 Me., 346.
enough
facts charged constitute an attempt to commit an act of violence.
State v. York, 70 N. C. 66.
(10) Since abolished
360
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IV, c. 7, any two justices, together with the sheriff or under-sheriff of the
county, may come with the posse eomitatus, if need be, and suppress any such
riot, assembly, or rout, arrest the rioters, and record upon the spot the nature
-and circumstances of the whole transaction; which record alone shall be a
In the interpretation of which statute
sufficient conviction of the offenders.
it hath been holden, that all persons, noblemen and others, except women,
■clergymen, persons decrepit, and infants under fifteen, are bound to attend the
justices in suppressing a riot, upon pain of fine and imprisonment; and that any
battery, wounding, or killing the rioters, that may happen in suppressing the
riot, is justifiable, (j) So that our ancient law, previous to the modern riot
«ct, seems pretty well to have guarded against any violent breach of the pub
lic peace; especially as any riotous assembly on a public or general account,
■as to redress grievances or pull down all enclosures, and also resisting the
king's forces if sent to keep the peace, may amount to overt acts of high trea
son, by levying war against the king.
7. Nearly related to this head of riots is the offence of tumultuous petition
ing ; which was carried to an enormous height in the times preceding the
grand rebellion. Wherefore by statute 13 Car II, st. 1, c. 5, it is enacted, that
not more than twenty names shall be signed to any petition to the king or
either house of parliament, for any alteration of matters established by law in
■church or state; unless the contents thereof be previously approved, in the
country, by three justices, or the majority of the grand jury at the assizes or
quarter sessions; and, in London, by the lord mayor, aldermen and common
council, (&) and that no petition shall be delivered by a company of more than
ten persons; on pain *in either case of incurring a penalty not exceed- „...■,
J
L
ing 100/. and three months' imprisonment. (11)
8. An eighth offence against the public peace is that of a forcible entry or
detainer ; which is committed by violently taking or keeping possession of
lands and tenements, with menaces, force and arms, and without the authority
■of law.
This was formerly allowable to every person disseised, or turned out
of possession, unless his entry was taken away or barred by his own neglect,
-or other circumstances; which were explained more at large in a former book.
{/) But this being found very prejudicial to the public peace, it was thought
necessary by several statutes to restrain all persons from the use of such vio
lent methods, even of doing themselves justice; and much more if they have
no justice in their claim, (m) So that the entry now allowed by law is a
peaceable one; that forbidden is such as is carried on and maintained with
force, with violence, and unusual weapons.
By the statute 5 Ric. II, st. 1, c.
8, all forcible entries are punished with imprisonment and ransom at the
kind's
will. And by the several statutes of 15 Ric. II, c. 2, 8 Hen. VI, c. 9, 31 Eliz.
•c. 11, and 21 Jac. I, c. 15, upon any forcible entry, or forcible detainer after
peaceable entry, into any lands, or benefices of the church, one or more jus
tices of the peace, taking sufficient power of the county, may go to the place,
and there record the force upon his own view, as in case of riots; and upon
«uch conviction may commit the offender to gaol, till he makes fine and ran
som to the king. And moreover the justice or justices have power to summon
& jury to try the forcible entry or detainer complained of: and if the same be
found by that jury, then, besides the fine on the offender, the justices shall
make restitution by the sheriff of the possession, without inquiring into the
merits of the title: for the force is the only thing to be tried, punished, and
remedied by them: and the same may be done by indictment at the general
(J) 1 Hal. P. C. 495. 1 Hawk. P. 0. 161.
(fc) This may be one reason (among others) why the corporation of London has, since the Restoration,
usually taken th" lead in petitions to parliament for the alteration of any established law.
(<)See book I.I, page 174,&c.
(m) 1 Hawk. P. 0. 141.
(11) See Rex v.
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Gordon, Doug. 590.
361

Offences against the Public Peace.

148
sessions.
r*ia.n1

J

*•

[Book

IV.

But this provision does not extend to such as endeavour to maintain
P08ses8i°n by force, where they 'themselves, or their ancestors, have
been in the peaceable enjoyment of the lands and tenements for three

it,

a

9

if

is

years immediately preceding. («) (12)
9. The offence of riding or going armed, with dangerous or unusual weap
ons, is a crime against the public peace, by terrifying the good people of the
land; and is particularly prohibited by the statute of Northampton, 2 Edw.
Ill, o. 8, upon pain of forfeiture of the arms, and imprisonment during the
king's pleasure, in like manner, as by the laws of Solon, every Athenian was
finable who walked about the city in armour, (o)
10. Spreading false news, to make discord between the king and nobility, or
concerning any great man of the realm, is punishable by common law (p) with
fine and imprisonment; which is confirmed by statutes Westm. 1, 3 Edw. I, c
34, 2 Ric. II, st. 1, c. 5, and 12 Ric. II, c. 11.
11. False and pretended prophecies, with intent to disturb the peace, are equally
unlawful, and more penal; as they raise enthusiastic jealousies in the people,
and terrify them with imaginary fears.
They are therefore punished by our
law, upon the same principle that spreading of public news of any kind, with
out communicating it first to the magistrate, was prohibited by the ancient
Gauls. (<?) Such false and pretended prophecies were punished capitally by
statute 1 Edw. VI, c. 12, which was repealed in the reign of Queen Mary.
And now by the statute, 15 Eliz. c. 15, the penalty for the first offence is a fine
of ten pounds and one year's imprisonment; for the second, forfeiture of all
goods and chattels, and imprisonment during life.
*12, besides actual breaches of the peace, any thing that tends to
r*150lJ
*an offence of the same de
provoke or excite others to break
Therefore, challenges to fight, either by word or letter, or to be
nomination.
the bearer of such a challenge, are punishable by fine and imprisonment, ac
cording to the circumstances of the offence, (r) (13) If this challenge arises
on account of any money won at gaming, or
any assault or affray happen
Ann. c. 14, shall forfeit all his
upon such account, the offender, by statute
goods to the crown, and suffer two years' imprisonment.
nature very similar to challenges are, libels, UbeUi famosi, which,
18. Of
taken in their largest and most extensive sense, signify any writings, pictures,
S

1

6,

f

L

2

(n) Holding over by force, where the tenant's title was under a lease, now expired. Is said to be a forci
ble detainer. <Cro. Jao. 189.)
(p) Inst 228. Inst. 198.
(o) Pott Antiq. b. c. 88.
(q) " Habent legibut sanctum, si quit quid de republica a finitimit rumore aut fama acceperit, uti ad
magittratum deferat, neve cum alio communicet: quod scepehomines temerarios atque imperitot falsi*
rumoribus terrtri, et ad acinus impelli, et de summit rebut consilium capere cognitum est" Cmm.de
cap. 19.
bell. Gall. lib.
(r) Hawk. P. C. 135,188.

is

2

a

1

1

2

362

4

8

§

1.

Met (Ky.),

P

a

§

1

2 is

if

§

is

a

1

is

3

2

is

a

it

is

a

1

6

6

a

a

8

3

a

is

indictable at common law as misdemeanor. State
(12) A forcible entry and detainer
Mo., 125; Com. v. Shattuck, 4Cush., 141; Henderson's Case,
v. Wilson,
Grat., 708.
duel, or trying to provoke
an indictable misde
challenge,
(13) Challenging to
meanor at common law. Rex v. Philips,
East, 4(54; Reg. v. Langley,
Ld. Raym., 1024;
Blackf., 20; State v. Farrier,
Hawks, 487. The mere sending letter
State v. Perkins,
do not reach its destination,
a misdemeanor.
challenge, though
tending to provoke
Rex v. Williams,
Camp., 506. If the meaning
plain, the words of challenge are un
Dana, 418; and see Aulgerv.
important. Ivey v. State, 12 Ala., 276; Com. v, Pope,
A challenge to fight outside the state indictable. State v. Farrier,
People, 34 111., 486.
Hawks, 487.
Wherever two persons, in cold blood, meet and fight on precedent quarrel, and one of
killed, the other
them
Hawk. P. C, ch. 31,
21; and see
guilty of murder.
Bisb_
811;
Cr. L., 6th ed.,
How. St. Tr., 1033. All persons present, countenancing
duel,
death ensue, are guilty of murder as principals in the second degree.
Hawk.
C, ch. 81, 81; Reg. v. Young,
C. & P., 644; Reg. v. Cuddy, 1C.&E., 210; and see
Reg. v. Barronet, Dears. Cr. C., 51.
In many of the United States duelling and challenging to fight are the subject of statut
ory enactments.
As throwing light on some such statutes, see Harris v. State, 58 Ga., 332;
Royall v. Thomas, 28 Gratt, 180; State v. Dupont,
McCord, 834; Moody v. Com.,
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Rep. 125.

9.

:

I

1

1

21

(0 Moor. 818.
(t) Hawk. P. C. 193.
Hawk. P. 0. 195.
(c) Moor, 627.
(u) BrownL 151. IS Rep. 35. Hob. 215. Poph. 189.
III, page 125.
book
See
Hawk. P. 0. 198.
11Mod. 99.
(u>)
(*)
(y)
Quinrtiam lex
Poenatrue lata, mala qucenollet carmine quenquam
Deecrioi
—vertere modum tormidine
ustis.—Hor. ad Aug. 152.
Cod.
88.
(»)
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(t)

a
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(s)

or the like, of an immoral or illegal tendency; but, in the sense under which
we are now to consider them, are malicious defamations of any person, and
especially a magistrate, made public by either printing, writing, signs, or pic
tures, in order to provoke him to wrath, or expose him to public hatred, con
the breach
The direct tendency of these libels
tempt, and ridicule,
(14)
of the public peace, by stirring up the objects of them to revenge, and perhaps
libel to any one person
The communication of
to bloodshed.
publica
and therefore the sending an abusive private
tion in the eye of the law:
as much
libel as
were openly printed, for
letter to a man
equally
breach of the peace, (u)
For the same reason
immaterial with
tends to
be true or false; (v)
libel, whether the matter of
respect to the essence of
the thing to be punished crimin
since the provocation, and not the falsity,
may aggravate its guilt and en
ally: though doubtless, the falsehood of
In civil action, we may remember,
libel must ap
hance its punishment.
the charge be true, the plain
pear to be false, as well as scandalous; (to) for,
tiff has received no private injury, and has no ground to demand
compensa
tion for himself, whatever *offence
may be against the public peace; r*1e1-i
civil action, the truth of the accusation may be
and therefore, upon
But, in a criminal prosecution, the tendency which
pleaded in bar of the suit.
the
all libels have to create animosities, and to disturb the public peace,
And, therefore, in such prosecutions, the only
whole that the law considers.
points to be inquired into are, first, the making or publishing of the book or
both these
writing: and, secondly, whether the matter be criminal: and,
complete.
points are against the defendant, the offence against the public
The punishment of such libellers, for either making, repeating, printing, or
the libel,
fine, and such corporal punisnment as the court in its
Sublishing
iscretion shall inflict: regarding the quantity of the offence, and the quality
of the offender, (x) By the law of the twelve tables at Rome, libels, which
affected the reputation of another, were made
capital offence: but, before
the reign of Augustus, the punishment became corporal only, (y)
Under the
was again made capital, not only to write, but to
emperor Valentinian
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a

it

had been held that, in a criminal prosecution for libel, the court was
(14) Up to 1792
libel. The jury could simply find
to decide whether any given fact was an excuse for
could not decide whether writing was
whether any fact alleged as an excuse was true;
"
If satisfied with the evidence of publication aud the meaning and innuendoes
criminal.
were as stated, they (the jury) ought to find the defendant guilty; the question of law was
T. R, 428; Rex v.
upon the record for the judgment of the court." Rex v. Withers,
T. R, 428 n. To obviate the results of this doctrine, statute 82 Geo.
Dean of St. Asaph,
"
Ill, c. 60, provided that the jury might give general verdict of guilty or not guilty upon
the whole matter put in issue, and should not be required or directed by the court or judge to
find the defendant guilty merely on the proof of the publication by the defendant of the
of the sense ascribed in the indictment or information."
paper charged to be •libel, and
■
what
known as Mr. Fox's Libel Act, and
Th.>eact above mentioned in this note
violent controversy in which the judges were charged with per
passed to put an end to
Vic, c. 96, s. 6), provides
and
verting the common law. A still more recent statute
that on the trial of any indictment or information for libel, the defendant having properly
pleaded, the truth of the matter charged may be inquired into, but shall not amount to a
was for the public benefit that the matter charged should be published;
defense unless
defense, he must in pleading
and to enable the defendant to give the truth in evidence as
was for the public benefit that the matters
allege the truth of such matters, and that
after such plea, the defendant
convicted, the court
charged should be published; and
may, in pronouncing sentence, consider whether the guilt of the defendant
aggravated or
addition,
The defendant, in
may plead not guilty.
mitigated by the plea.
In the United States generally, the truth of the alleged libellous matter made defense
made with good motives ana for justifiable ends.
where the publication
See Townsend
Bish. Cr. L., 7th ed.,
920; Whart Cr. L.,
2525, el teq.; Cooler
on Slander and Libel;
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Our law, in this and many other
Ipublish, or even to omit destroying them.
respects, corresponds rather with the middle age of Roman jurisprudence,
when liberty, learning and humanity were in their full vigour, than with the
cruel edicts that were established in the dark and tyrannical ages of the ancient
decemviri, or the later emperors.
In this and the other instances which we have lately considered, where blas
phemous, immoral, treasonable, schisraatical, seditious, or scandalous libels are
punished by the English law, some with a greater, others with a less, degree
of severity; the liberty of the press, properly understood, is by no means in
fringed or violated. The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature
of a free state; but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon publicaan(^ *no* m freedom from censure for criminal matter when pubf*i
<!9l' *'on9i
*•
lished.
Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments
he pleases before the public; to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of the
press; but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous, or illegal, he must
take the consequence of his own temerity. To subject the press to the restric
tive power of a licenser, as was formerly done, both before and since the revo
lution, (a) is to subject all freedom of sentiment to the prejudices of one man,
and make him the arbitrary and infallible judge of all controverted points in
learning, religion, and government. But to punish (as the law does at present)
any dangerous or offensive writings, which, when published, shall on a fair
and impartial trial be adjudged of a pernicious tendency, is necessary for the
preservation of peace and good order, of government and religion, the only
solid foundations of civil liberty.
Thus the will of individuals is still left free;
the abuse only of that free-will is the object of legal punishment. Neither is
any restraint hereby laid upon freedom of thought or enquiry: liberty of
private sentiment is still left; the disseminating, or making public, of bad
sentiments, destructive of the ends of society, is the crime which society cor
A man (says a *fine writer on this subject) may be allowed to
ps,. -„i rects.
*■
*
keep poisons in his closet, but not publicly to vend them as cordials.
And to this we may add, that the only plausible argument heretofore used for
the restraining the just freedom of the press, "that it was necessary to prevent
the daily abuse of it," will entirely lose its force, when it is shown (by a seas
onable exertion of the laws) that the press cannot be abused to any bad pur
pose without incurring a suitable punishment: whereas it never can be used to
any good one, when under the control of an inspector. So true it will be
found, that to censure the licentiousness, is to maintain the liberty, of the
press. (15)

it

;
9

;

4

1

ii,

(a) The art of printing, soon after its Introduction, wu looked upon (as well in England as in other
countries) as merely a matter of state, and subject to the coercion of the crown. It was therefore regu
lated with us by the king's proclamations, prohibitions, charters of privilege and of licence, and, finally,
by the decrees of the court of star-chamber; which limited the number of printers, and of presses which
each should employ, and prohibited new publications, unless previously approved by proper licensers.
On the demolition of this odious jurisdiction in 1641,the long parliament of Charles I, after their rupture
with that prince, assumed the same powers as the star-chamber exercised with respect to the licensing
of books: and in 1643,1647,1649,and 1662(Scobell, 1,44, 184; 88,830),issued their ordinances for that
purpose, founded principally on the star-chamber decree of 1637. In 1663was passed the statute 13and
14Car. II, c. 33, which (with some few alterations) was copied from the parliamentary ordinances. This
act expired in 1679,but was revived by statute Jac II, c. 17.and continued till 1692. It was then con
tinued for two years longer by statute W. and M., c. 24; but though frequent attempts were made by the
government to revive It, in the subsequent part of that reign: Com. Journ. 11Feb. 1694 26 Nov. 1695:22
Oct. 1696 Feb. 1697;81Jan. 1698;yet the parliament resisted so strongly that it finally expired, and
the press became properly free, In 1694;and has ever since so continued.
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And, as to what shall establish good motives and Justifiable
Const. Lim., 424, 438, 464.
ends, see King v. Root,
Wend., 113; Commonwealth v. Bonner,
Met., 410; Regina v.
Newman,
Hill, 248; State v. White,
El. & Bl., 268 and 558; Barthelemy v. People,
Ired., 180; Commonwealth v. Snelling, 15 Pick., 337.
attempts to restrain the licentiousness of the
(15) It may well be doubted, however,
press through criminal prosecutions usually serve
beneficial purpose.
The attempt by the
government of the United States, by means of the " Sedition Act," during the administra
tion of the first Adams, was so conspicuous and mortifying
failure, that
not likely to
lie soon repeated.
The excesses of the press seem to be best restrained by public sentiment,
and by the infliction of damages at the hands of jury where private character
unjustly
assailed.
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OwENOES AGAINST PuBHC TfiADK

CHAPTER XII.

OF OFFENCES AGAINST PUBLIC TRADE.
Offences against public trade, like those of the preceding classes, are
either
felonious, or not felonious. Of the first sort are,
1. Owling, so called from its being
usually carried on in the night, which is
the offence of transporting wool or sheep out of this
kingdom, to the detriment
of its staple manufacture. This was forbidden at common
law, (a) and more
particularly by statute 11 Edw. Ill, c. 1, when the importance of our woolen
manufacture was first attended to; and there are now many
latcr^tatutes
relating to this offence, the most useful and principal of which are those enact
ed in the reign of Queen Elizabeth and since.
The statute 3 Eliz. o. 3, makes
the transportation of live sheep, or embarking them on bo^rd
any ship, for the
first offence forfeiture of goods, and imprisonment for' a
year, and that at the
end of the year the left hand shall be cut off in
soma public market, and shall
be there nailed up in the openest place; and the
second offence is felony.
The
statutes 12 Car. II, c. 32, and 7 aii<l"8 Wm. Ill, c.
28^make the exportation of
wool, sheep, or fuller's eart!>4iable to
and the forfeiture
pecuniajy^penalties,
of the interest of the shijrand cargo fey the^wners, if
privy, and confiscation
of goods, and three years imDjisCmmentto the master and all the
mariners.
And, the statute 4
and farther enforced by 12 Geo.
GeojJrt$^ii^mended
"W^ojtt, andlj^G^flTer^4), makes it transportation for seven
r*1RK-i
years'
2.

)
\

i(Jfy^^\tieaJhiTnot

paid.

L 1W>J

(1)

f^rnnggling^/rruie offence of importing goods without paying the duties
""P'osed thereon by the laws of the custom and excise, is an offence generally
c0 nneote'ff and carried on hand in hand with the former.
This is restrained by
:i great variety of statutes, which inflict pecuniary penalties and seizure of the
goods for clandestine smuggling; and affix the guilt of felony, with transpor
tation for seven years, upon more open, daring, and avowed practices: but the
last of them, 19 Geo. II, c. 34, is for this purpose instar omnium; for it makes
all forcible acts of smuggling, carried on in defiance of the laws, or even
in disguise to evade them, felony without benefit of clergy; enacting, that if
three or more persons shall assemble, with fire-arms or other offensive weapons,
to assist in the illegal exportation or importation of goods, or in rescuing the
same after seizure, or in rescuing offenders in custody for such offences; or
shall pass with such goods in disguise; or shall wound, shoot at, or assault any
officers of the revenue when in the execution of their duty; such persons shall
be felons without the benefit of clergy.
As to that branch of the statute
which required any person, charged upon oath as a smuggler, under pain of
death to surrender himself upon proclamation, it seems to be expired; as the
subsequent statutes (b) which continue the original act to the present time, do
in terms continue only so much of the said act as relates to the punishment of
offenders, and not to the extraordinary method of apprehending or causing
them to surrender: and for offences of this positive species, where punishment
(though necessary) is rendered so by the laws themselves, which by imposing
high duties on commodities increase the temptation to evade them, we cannot
surely be too cautious in inflicting the penalty of death, (c) (2)
(a) Mir C. 1. 1 8.
(6) Stat. 88Geo. I, o. 82. 82 Geo. II, c. W.
(1) These statutes are since repealed.
(2) The present law on this subject
greatly mitigated.

4. Geo.

Ill,

c. 12.

(c) See book I, p. 817. Beccar. c. 88.

is in 16 and 17 Vic. . c. 107.

The punishments are
365
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*s. Another offence against publio trade is fraudulent bankruptcy,
shall there
which was sufficiently spoken off in a former vol umo; (d)
fore now barely mention the several species of fraud taken notice of by the
statute law, viz.: the bankrupt's neglect of surrendering himself to his credi
tors; his non-conformity to the directions of the several statutes; his conceal
ing or embezzling his effects to the value of 20/.; and his withholding any
books or writings with intent to defraud his creditors: all which the policy
of our conmercial country has made felony without benefit of clergy, [e) (3)
And indeed it is allowed by such as are the most averse to the infliction of
capital punishment, that the offence of fraudulent bankruptcy, being an atro
cious species of the crimen falsi, ought to be put upon a level with those of
forgery and falsifying the coin. (/) And even without actual fraud, if the
bankrupt cannot make it appear that he is disabled from paying his debts by
some casual loss, he shall by the statute 21 Jao. I, c 19, be set on the pillory
for two hours, with one of his ears nailed to the same, and cut off. To this
head we may also subjoin, that by statute 32 Geo. II, c. 28, it is felony punish
able by transportation for seven years, if a prisoner, charged in execution for
any debt under 100/., neglects or refuses on demand to discover and deliver up
his effects for the benefit of his creditors. And these are the only felonious
offences against publio trade; the residue being mere misdemeanors; as,
4. Usury, which is an unlawful contract upon the loan of money, to receive
Of this also we had occasion to dis
the same again with exorbitant increase.
Wp there observed that by statute 37
course at large in a former volume, (g)
Hen. VIII, c 9, the rate of interest was fixed" aM-9/. percent, per annum, which
the statute 13 Eliz , c. 8, confirms: and ordains that "SH-4?rokers shall be guilty
of a praemunire that transact any contracts for more, and the Bounties them
selves shall be void.
The statute 21 Jao. I, o. 17, reduced interest t o eight
per cent.; and, it having been lowered in 1650, during the usurpation, to 8,x
per cent., the same reduction was re-enacted after the restoration by statute «2
Car. II, c. 13; and, lastly, the statute 12 Ann. st. 2, o. 16, has reduced it to five^
per cent. Wherefore, not only all contracts for taking more are in themselves
v°idj but also the lender shall forfeit treble the *money borr*l«7l
tota^7
*■
* rowei
Also, if any scrivener or broker takes more than five shil
(4)
lings per cent, procuration money, or more than twelve pence for making a bond,
he shall forfeit 20/. with costs, and shall suffer imprisonment for half a year.
And by statute 17 Geo. Ill, c. 26, to take more than ten shillings per cent, for
procuring any money to be advanced on any life-annuity, is made an indict
able misdemeanor, and punishable with fine and imprisonment: as is also the
offence of procuring or soliciting any infant to grant any life-annuity; or to
promise, or otherwise engage to ratify it when he comes of age.
5. Cheating is another offence, more immediately against public trade; as
that cannot be carried on without a punctilious regard to common honesty,
and faith between man and man.
Hither, therefore, may be referred that
prodigious multitude of statutes, whioh are made to restrain and punish de
ceits in particular trades, and which are enumerated by Hawkins and Burn, but
The offence also of breaking
are chiefly of use among the traders themselves.
the assize of bread, or the rules laid down by law, and particularly
by the
statutes 31 Geo. II, c. 29, 3 Geo. Ill, o. 11, and 13 Geo. Ill, c. 62, for ascer
taining its price in every given quantity, is reducible to this head of cheating;
as is likewise in a peculiar manner the offence of selling by false weights and

r*
I 16"J1

id) See book II, page 481,482.
(g) See book II, page 455, &c

I

(e) Stat. 6 Geo. n, c. SO.

(/) Beccar.

c, 84.

by the bank
(8) The previous statutes on the subject of bankruptcy were superseded
rupt law which took effect Jan. 1, 1870. The penalties are now much less severe than those
Specified in the text
Stat. 17 and 18 Vic., a 90.
(4) Securities are no longer void for usury.
As to usury in general, see Book II, 455, et teg.
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Hawk. P. C. 284.
(o) Ff. 48, 12,2.
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(I)
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(fc) Hawk. P. C. 188.
(n)
(m) Cro. Car. 232.
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(I)
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is

if

1,

is

is is

if

(i)

6,

(h)

measures: the standard of which fell under oar consideration in a former
volume,
The punishment of bakers breaking the assize was anciently to
stand in the pillory, by statute 51 Henry HI, st.
and for brewers (by the
same act), to stand in the tumbrel or dungcart:
which, as we learn from
domesday book, was the punishment for knavish brewers in the city of Ches
ter, so early as the reign of Edward the Confessor. " Malam cerevisiam faciens, in cathedra ponebatur stercoris." (j) But now the general punishment
indicted (as they may be) at common
for all frauds *of this kind,
r*1J5Qi
-•
law,
by fine and imprisonment: though the easier and more usual
by levying on a summary conviction, by distress and sale, the forfeit
way
ures imposed by the several acts of parliament. Lastly, any deceitful prac
tice, in cozening another by artful means, whether in matters of trade or other
wise, as by playing with false dice, or the like,
punishable with fine, impris
and 30
onment, and pillory. (A) (5) And by the statutes 33 Hen. VIII, c.
Geo. II, o. 24,
any man defrauds another of any valuable chattels by colour
of any false token, counterfeit letter, or false pretence, or pawns or disposes of
another's goods without the consent of the owner, he shall suffer such punish
ment by imprisonment, fine, pillory, transportation, whipping, or other corporal
pain, as the court shall direct. (6)
also an offence against publio
The offence of forestalling the market
also an offence at com
trade. This, which (as well as the two following)
was described by statute
and
Edw. VI, o. 14, to be the buying
mon law,
or contracting for any merchandize or victual coming in the way to market;
or dissuading persons from bringing their, goods or provisions there; or per
suading them to enhance the price, when there: any of which practices make
the market dearer to the fair trader. (7)
Regrating was described by the same statute to be the buying of corn, or
other dead victual, in any market, and selling
again in the same market, or
For this also enhances the price of the pro
within four miles of the place.
successive profit.
visions, as every successive seller must have
8. Engrossing was also described to be the getting into one's possession, or
buying up, large quantities of corn, or other dead victual, with intent to sell
This must of course be injurious to the public, by putting
in
them again.
the power of one or two rich men to raise the price of provisions at their own
discretion. And so the total engrossing of any other commodity, with intent
an offence indictable and finable r*jgg-i
at an unreasonable *price,
to sell
And the general penalty for these three ofat the common law. (m)
fences by the common law (for all the statutes concerning them were repealed
by 12 Geo. IH, c. 71), is, as in other minute misdemeanors, discretionary fine and
Among the Romans these offences, and other malpractices
imprisonment, (n)
" Poena
to raise the price of provisions, were punished by a pecuniary mulct.
viginti aureorum statuitur adversus eum, qui contra annonam fecerit, societatemve coierit quo annona carior fiat.n (o)
page 274.
(0 Inst 219.
(A Seld. tit of Hon. b. c
(A) See book

8

7

2

1

a

s,

1

(5) Frauds upon public Justice and such ss affect the crown and public, though arising
from some particular transaction with an individual, are indictable as cheats at common
Russell on Crimes, 285. Under this head come such cheats as are effected by
law.
Russell, 289.
means of false tokens, measures or weights, and false dice.
88, " Whosoever shall, by any false pretense, ob
(6) By statute 24 and 25 Vic,, c. 96,
chattel,
money or valuable security with intent to defraud,
tain from any other person any
and, being convicted thereof, shall be liable, at the dis
misdemeanor,
shall be guilty of
cretion of the court, to bo kept in penal servitude for the term of three years, or be im
prisoned for any term not exceeding two years, with or without hard labor, and with or
without solitary confinement."
Bish. Cr. L. §518;
Rusb. on Crimes, 286, et seg.
See, as to this offense,
and
Vic.,
(7) This and the two following offenses are now done away with by statute
p. 24.
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(r) Cod.

69,

(») See book

I,

is

Inst 181.

1.

Hawk. P. 0.821.

4,

(q
)
S

(p)

1

(«)

9. Monopolies are much the same offence in other branches of trade, that
engrossing is in provisions: being a license or privilege allowed by the king
for the sole buying and selling, making, working or using of any thing whatso
ever; whereby the subject in general is restrained from that liberty of manu
facturing or trading which he had before, (p) These had been carried to an
enormous height during the reign of Queen Elizabeth; and were heavily com
plained of by Sir Edward Coke, (q) in the beginning of the reign of King
James the First: but were in great measure remedied by statute 21 Jac ft
c. 3, (8) which declares such monopolies to be contrary to law and void
(ex
cept as to patents, not exceeding the grant of fourteen years, to the authors
of new inventions; and except also patents concerning printing, saltpetre, gun
powder, great ordnance and shot); and monopolists are punished with the for
feiture of treble damages and double costs, to those whom they attempt to
disturb; and if they procure any action, brought against them for these dam
ages, to be stayed by any extra-judicial order, other than of the court wherein
it is brought, they incur the penalties of praemunire. Combinations, also,
among victuallers or artificers, to raise the price of provisions, or any com
modities, or the rate of labor, (9) are in many cases severelypunished by par
ticular statutes; and in general by statute 2 and 8 Edw. VI, c. 16, with the
forfeiture of lOl., or twenty-one days' imprisonment with an allowance of only
bread and water, for the first offence; 20i. or the pillory, for the second; and
*40'- f°r
third, or else the pillory, loss of one ear and perpetual inr*lfiOl
L
J
famy. In the same manner by a constitution of the Emperor Zeno, (r)
all monopolies and combinations to keep up the price of merchandise, provi
sions or workmanship, were prohibited upon pain of forfeiture of goods and
perpetual banishment. (10)
10. To exercise a trade in any town, without having previously served as
looked upon to be detrimental to public
an apprentice for seven years,
page 427.

is

;

9

6

,

8

7

4.

6

5

and
c. 83.
See also statute
and Vic. c. 24.
Wm.
(8) Amended by statute
Geo. IV, c. 129. See(9) All prior acts relative to labor combinations were repealed by
Geo. IV, c. 31 and 22 Vic, c. 84, and 24 and 25 Vic.,
further in reference to the matter,
c. 100.
an important recent enactment —34 and 35 Vic, c. 82 — for the pro
(10) The following
and laborers, against unlawful combinations and attempts at
tection of both employers

a

1.

is

:

it

intimidation.
enacted, etc.
Be
to say:
Any person who shall do any one or more of the following acts, that
(1) Use violence to any person or any property;
justice of the(2) Threaten or intimidate aiiy person in such manner as would Justify
peace, on complaint made to him, to bind over the person so threatening or intimidating

a

it
is

a

a

to keep the peace;
(3) Molest or obstruct any person in manner defined by this section.
With a view to coerce such person;
workman,
muster, to dismiss or cease to employ any workman, or, being
(1) Being
finished;
to quit any employment, or to return work before
master, not to offer, or, being a workman, not to accept any employment
(2) Being
;

or work
(8) Being

is

a

a

;

a

a

master or workman, to belong or not to belong to any temporary or perm
anent association or combination;
master or workman, to pay any fine or penalty imposed by any temporary
(4) Being
or permanent association or combination
master, to alter the mode of carrying on his business, or the number or
(5) Being
description of any persons employed by him,
term not exceeding
Shall be liable to imprisonment, with or without hard labor, for
three months.
A person shall, for the purposes of this act, be deemed to molest or obstruct another
to say:
person in any of the following cases, that
ho persistently follow such person about from place to place;
(1)
he hide any tools, clothes or other property owned or used by such person, or
(2)
deprive him of or hinder him in the use thereof;
he watch or beset the house or other place where such person resides or works.
(8)

If
If

If
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(t)

trade, upon the supposed want of sufficient skill in the trader: and therefore
is punished by statute 5 Eliz. o. 4, with the forfeiture of forty shillings by the
month. (11)
11. Lastly, to prevent the destruction of our home manufactures by trans
porting and seducing our artists to settle abroad, it is provided by statute 6
Geo. I, c. 27, that such as so entice or seduce them shall be fined 1007., and be
imprisoned three months: and for the second offence shall be fined at discre
tion, and be imprisoned a year: and the artificers, so going into foreign coun
tries, and not returning within six months after warning given them by the
British ambassador where they reside, shall be deemed aliens, and forfeit all
their lands and goods, and shall be incapable of any legacy or gift. By statute
23 Geo. II, c. 13, the seducers incur, for the first offence, a forfeiture of 500i
for each artificer contracted with to be sent abroad, and imprisoned for twelve
months: and for the second 1,0001., and are liable to two years' imprisonmentand by the same statute, connected with 14 Geo. Ill, c. 71, if any person exports any tools or utensils used in the silk, linen, cotton, or woollen manufac
he forfeits the same and 200/.,
tures (except wool-cards to North America),
and the captain of the ship (having knowledge thereof) 100?.; and
any cap
tain of king's ship, or officer of the customs, knowingly suffers such exporta
for ever made incapable of
tion, he forfeits 100Z. and his employment; and
bearing any publio office; and every person collecting such tools or utensils in
order to export the same, shall, on conviction at the assizes, forfeit such tools,
and also 200/. (12)

CHAPTER XIII.

OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE PUBLIC HEALTH, AND
THE PUBLIC POLICE OR ECONOMY.

if

(t) Stat 15Geo. m, c.

&

if

is

it

I,

1 a

is

a

The fourth species of offences more especially affecting the commonwealth,
are such as are against the publio health of the nation;
concern of the high
est importance, and for the preservation of which there are in many countries
special magistrates or curators appointed.
a felony; but, by the blessing of Providenoe,
1. The first of these offences
for more than
century past, incapable of being committed in this nation.
For by statute Jac. o. 31,
enacted, that
any person infected with
the plague, or dwelling in any infected house, be commanded by the mayor
or constable, or other head officer of his town or vill, to keep his house, and
shall venture to disobey it, he may be enforced, by the watchman appointed
on such melancholy occasions, to obey such necessary command: and
any
or carries on business, or happens to be, or the approach to such house or place, or if,
more other persons, he follow such person in
disorderly manner in or
through any street or road.
Nothing in this section shall prevent any person from being liable under any other act or
provided for any offense by this sec
otherwise to any other or higher punishment than
tion, so that no person be punished twice for the same offense.
Provided, that no person shall be liable to any punishment for doing or conspiring to do
any act on the ground that such act restrains or tends to restrain the free course of trade,
unless such act
done with the
one of the acts hereinbefore specified in this section, and
object of coercing as hereinbefore mentioned.
(11) The part of this statute here referred to was repealed by statute 64 Geo. Ill, c. 06,
7

6

a. 1.
(12) All statutes prohibiting artificers from going abroad are repealed by Btaiute
Vic, c. 84.
and
o. 97, and

Vol. IL— 47

369

5

is

is

is

a

with two or

Geo.

IV,

Offences Against Public Health,

161

<fcc.

[Book

IV.

it

a

I

if

if

is

is

7,

6,

is
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it,

hart ensue by such enforcement, the watchmen are thereby indemnified.
And
farther, if such person so commanded to confine himself goes abroad, and con
verses in company, if he has no plague sore upon him, he shall be punished as
a vagabond by whipping, and be bound to his good behavionr; but, if he has
any infectious sore upon him, unoured, he then shall be guilty of felony.
By
the statute 26 Geo. II, c 6 (explained and amended by 29 Geo. H, c. 8), the
*metbod °f performing quarantine, or forty days' probation, by ships
T*lfi2l
L
J coming from infected countries, is put in a much more regular and
effectual order than formerly, and masters of ships coming from infected
places, and disobeying the directions there given, or having the plague on
board and concealing
are guilty of felony, without benefit of clergy.
The
same penalty also attends persons escaping from the lazarets, or places where
in quarantine
to be performed; and officers and watchmen neglecting their
duty; and persons conveying goods or letters from ships performing quaran
tine. (1)
2. A second, but much inferior species of offence against public health
the selling of unwholesome provisions. (2) To prevent which the statute 51
and the ordinance for bakers, c.
Hen. Ill, st.
prohibit the sale of corrupted
wine, contagious or unwholesome flesh, or flesh that
bought of a Jew; un
der pain of amercement for the first offence, pillory for the second, fine and
And
imprisonment for the third, and abjuration of the town for the fourth.
by the statute 12 Car. II, c. 25, s. 11, any brewing or adulteration of wine
done by the wholesale merchant; and
punished with the forfeiture of 100/.
40/.
These are all the offences which
done by the vintner or retail trader.
may properly be said to respect the public health. (3)
V. The last species of offences which especially affect the commonwealth, are
those against the public police or economy.
By the public police and economy
mean the due regulation and domestio order of the kingdom; whereby the
individuals of the state, like members of well-governed family, are bound to
conform their general behaviour to the rules of propriety, good neighbour
hood, and good manners; and to be decent, industrious and inoffensive in their
This head of offences must therefore be very miscella
respective stations.
neous, as
comprises all such crimes as especially affect public society, and
These amount,
are not comprehended under any of the four preceding species.
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(It Other statutes imposing lighter punishments now take the place of those mentioned
in the text.
statute 16 and 17 Via, a 100,
Vaccination of children was made compulsory
contractor was indicted for selling bad bread to prisoners of war, the court
(2) Where
held that the giving of any person unwholesome victuals not fit for man to eat, Inert eauta,
an indictable offense.
Treeve's Case,
East P. C, 821. So
or from malice or deceit,
where lumps of crude alum were mixed with bread sent to charity school
R. v. Dixon,
liable for his agent's sale of noxious provisions,
M. & 8eL, 11. A principal
by ordin
Head,
ary care he could have ascertained the condition of the food sold. Hunter v State,
indictable,
161. On the ground that mixing any poisonous ingredient with food or drink
well from which
dead animal into
throwing
family was known to drink, was held an
N. H., 203. The sale of bad food
not only an offense st
State v. Buckman,
offense.
F. &F., 106), but knowingly
common law (State v. Smith, Hawks, 878; R. v. Stevenson,
likewise an offense.
R. v. Jarvis,
F.
carrying to market meat unfit for human food,
the meat
meant for feeding animals. R v. Crawley,
F., 108; not, however,
F. & F.,
wholesale dealer, the ignorance of the seller
So, where the sale of bad food was to
109.
no excuse,
he sells knowing the state of the provisions.
as to the person to use the food
People v. Parker, 88 N. V., 85. The food must be in such condition as to affect the health
miller was charged in an indict
Ired., 40. Where
of those using it. State v. Norton,
ment with delivering: four bushels of musty, unwholesome, mixed oat and barley meal, after
receiving four bushels of barley to grind, without stating that the meal was to be used for
If had been mill to which the inhabitants
human food, held no offense was stated.
Burr., 1175; R v.
were bound to resort for grinding, query? citing R v. Wheatley,
M. & Sel. 214.
Hay dps,
c,
M.,
W. and
st
84, s. 20;
Geo. IV, c. 106;
and Win.
(8) See also the statutes
,rv, c. 37; and Vic, c. 24; 24 and 25 Vic, c 100, 24.
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come of them to felony, and others to misdemeanors only.
Among the former
are,
*1. The offence of clandestine marriages: for by the statute 26 Geo. r*1Boi
II, c. 33, 1. To solemnize marriage in any other place besides a church, *■ *
or public chapel wherein banns have been usually published, except by license
from the archbishop of Canterbury; and, 2. To solemnize marriage in such
church or chapel without due publication of banns, or license obtained from a
proper authority; do both of them not only render the marriage void, but sub
ject the person solemnizing it to felony, punished by transportation for four
teen years; as, by three former statutes, (a) he and his assistants were subject
to a pecuniary forfeiture of 100/. 3. To make a false entry in a marriage
register; to alter it when made; to forge, or counterfeit such entry, or a mar
riage license; to cause or procure, or act or assist in such forgery; to utter the
same as true, knowing it to be counterfeit; or to destroy or procure the des
truction of any register, in order to vacate any marriage, or subject any person
to the penalties of this act; all these offences, knowingly and wilfully commit-'
ted, subject the party to the guilt of felony without benefit of clergy. (4)
2. Another felonious offence, with regard to this holy estate of matrimony,
is what some have corruptly called bigamy, which properly signifies being
twice married; but is more justly denominated polygamy, or having a plurality
of wives at once, (b) Suoh second marriage, living the former nusband or
wife, is simply void, and a mere nullity, by the *ecclesiastical law of r*1(Ui
-■
England: and yet the legislature has thought it just to make it felony, ■~by reason of its being so great a violation of the public economy and decency
of a well-ordered state. For polygamy can never be endured under any ra
tional civil establishment, whatever specious reasons may be urged for it by
the eastern nations, the fallaciousness of which has been fully proved by many
sensible writers: but in northern countries the very nature of the climate
seems to reclaim against it; it never having obtained in this part of the world,
even from the time of our German ancestors, who, as Tacitus informs us, (c)
"prope soli barbarorum singulis uxoribus contenti sunt." It is therefore pun
ished by the laws both of ancient and modern Sweden with death,
And

(d)

is enacted by statute 1 Jac. I, o. 11, that if any person,
being married, do afterwards marry again, the former husband or wife being
alive, it is felony; but within the benefit of clergy. The first wife in this case
shall not be admitted as a witness against her husband, because she is the true
wife, but the second may, for she is indeed no wife at all; (e) and so vice versa,
of a second husband. This act makes an exception to five cases, in whioh such
second marriage, though in the three first it is void, is yet no felony,
1.
Where either party hath been continually abroad for seven years, whether the
party in England hath notice of the other's being living or no. 2. Where
either of the parties hath been absent from the other seven years within this
kingdom, and the remainingparty hath had no knowledge of the other's being
3. vVhere there is a divorce (or separation a mensa et
alive within that time.

with

us in England

it

(f)

(a) 8 and 7 Wm. TH, o. 6. 7 and 8 Wm. HI, c. 85. 10Ann. o. 19, 1 178.
(6) 8 Inst. 88. Bigamy, according to the canonists, consisted in marrying two virgins successively, one
after the death of the other, or once marrying a widow. Such were esteemed Incapable of orders, 4c. ;
and by a canon of the council of Lyons, A. D. 1274,held under Pope Gregory X, were omni privilegin
clericali nudati, et coercioni fori secularia oddicti (6 Decretal, 1, 12). This canon was adopted and ex
plained in England, by statute 4 Edw. I, st. 3, c. 6, and bigamy thereupon became no uncommon counterplea to the claim of the benefit of clergy, if. 40 Edw. Ill, 42; M 11 Hen. IV. 11,48. M. 18Hen. TV, 6:
Staundf. P. 0. 184. The cognizance of the plea of bigamy was declared by statute 18 Edw. Ill, st 8, c. 2,
to belong to the court christian, like that of bastardy. But by statute 1 Edw. VI, a 12, | 19, f
declaredto be no longer an Impediment to the claim of clertry. See DaL 21j Dyer, 201.
(d) Stiernh. dejure Sueon. L 8, c. 2.
(e) Du mor. Qerm. 18.
(<) 1 Hal. P. O. 888.
(/) 8 Inst. 88. Kel. 27. 1 Hal. P. C. 684.
8ee statute 4 Geo.
(4) The law on this subject Is much modified by subsequent statutes.
72; and 24
c. 76; 6 and 7 Wm. IV, c. 85; 7 Wm.
and Vic, c. 22; 3 and 4 Vic,
Vic,
and 25
98. Marriages solemnized knowingly except in the manner provided are
void, and the persons officiating are guilty of felony.
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thoro) by sentence in the ecclesiastical court. 4. Where the first marriage is
declared absolutely void by any such sentence, and the party loosed a vinculo.
Or, 5. Where either of the parties was under the age of consent at the time of
the first marriage, for in such case the first marriage was avoidable by the dis
agreement of either party, which the second marriage very clearly amounts to.
pia _-. But *if at the age of consent the parties had agreed to the marriage,
L
' which completes the contract, and is indeed the real marriage; and
should apprehend that such
afterwards one of them should marry again;
second marriage would be within the reason and penalties of the act. (5)
8. A third species of felony against the good order and economy of the
kingdom, is by idle soldiers and mariners wandering about the realm, or per
sons pretending so to be, and abusing the name of that honorable profession.
(g) Such a one not having a testimonial or pass from a justice of the peace
limiting the time of his passage; or exceeding the time limited for fourteen
days, unless he falls sick; or forging such testimonial; is by statute 39 Eliz.
This sanguinary law,
c. 17, made guilty of felony without benefit of clergy.
though in practice deservedly antiquated, still remains a disgrace to our stat
ute-book; yet attended with this mitigation, that the offender may be deliv
ered, if any honest freeholder or other person of substance will take him into
his service and he abides in the same for one year; unless licensed to depart
by his employer, who in such case shall forfeit ten pounds. (6)
4. Outlandish persons calling themselves
Egyptians or gypsies, are another
These are a strange
object of the severity of some of our unrepealed statutes.
kind of commonwealth among themselves of wandering imposters and jugglers,
who were first taken notice of in Germany about the beginning of the fifteenth
century, and have since spread themselves all over Europe. Munster (A) who
is followed and relied upon by Spelman
and other writers, fixes the time of
their first appearance to the year 1417; under passports real or pretended,
from the emperor Sigismund, king of Hungary.
And Pope Pius
(who died
A. D. 1464) mentions them in his history as thieves and vagabonds, then wan
dering with their families over Europe under the name of Zigari; and whom
r*l«fll ne 8UPPoses *° bave migrated from the country of *Zigi, which nearly
In the compass of few years they
answers to the modern Circassia.
number of idle proselytes (who imitated their language and
gained such
complexion, and betook themselves to the same arts of chiromancy, begging,
(i)

I
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a
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Geo. IV, c. 81, which was superseded by this, Mr. Chitty
(5) Of the previous statute,
" First, the offense
says that three important improvements were introduced by it.
now
was not punishable at all,
punishable wherever committed formerly
committed out of
Secondly, the absence of one party for seven years abroad
the jurisdiction of England.
will not now excuse the second marriage,
such party be known by the- other party to
have been alive within that period: formerly the mere absence was
protection, though
the absent party was well known by the other to be living.
Thirdly, a divorce a vinculo
divorce a mensa et thoro was held
alone will now justify the second marriage; formerly
has been said, that marriage
prosecution for bigamy
sufficient
East P. C. 460. In
Burr. 2057; but see Truman's Case,
in fact must be proved: Morris v. Miller,
East P.
C, 470; but proved by person who was present,
does not seem necessary to prove the
matters not that the first
registry or license: Rex v. Allison, R. &R. C. C, 100; and
voidable, by reason of affinity, etc.
Inst. 88. Parties who are within age at the
marriage
time of the first marriage (subsequently
affirming the union by their consent) will be liable
to be punished for bigamy
East P. C. 488.
they break that contract and marry again.
in England,
On an indictment for bigamy, where the first marriage
not a valid
divorce a vinculo out of England before the second marriage, founded
defense to prove
on grounds on which
divorce a vinculo could not be obtained in England. Rex v. Lolley.
Dow, 117. The burthen of proving the
R. &
C. O., 237, cited in Tovey v. Lindsay,
first marriage to have been legal lies upon the prosecutor.
Rex v. James, R. & R, C.
17; Rex v. Morton, id,, 19; Rex v. Butler, id., 61."
The offense of bigamy
made
felony by statutes in the several states of the .
Union.
Bish. Stat. Cr.,
577, et teq.
repealed.
(6) This act
is

§
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Hal. P. C. 671.
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(2)

and pilfering), that they became troublesome, and even formidable to most of
the states of Europe.
Hence they were expelled from France in the year 1560,
and from Spain in 1591. (k)
And the government in England took the alarm
muoh earlier: for in 1530 they are described by statute 22 Hen. VIII, c. 10, as
"outlandish people, calling themselves Egyptians, using no craft nor feat of
who have come into this realm and gone from shire to shire and
merchandise,
place to place in great company, and used great, subtil and crafty means to
deceive the people; bearing them in hand, that they by palmestry could tell
men's and women's fortunes; and so many times by craft and subtility have
deceived the people of their money, and also have committed many heinous
felonies and robberies." Wherefore they are directed to avoid the realm, and
not to return under pain of imprisonment, and forfeiture of their goods and
chattels: and upon their trials for any felony which they may have committed,
they shall not be entitled to a jury de medietate lingua. And afterwards it is
enacted by statutes 1 and 2 P. and M., c. 4, and 5 Eliz. c. 20, that if any such
persons shall be imported into this kingdom, the importer shall forfeit 40/.
And if the Egyptians themselves remain one month in this kingdom, or if any
person being fourteen years old (whether natural-born, subject or stranger),
which hath been seen or found in the fellowship of such Egyptians, or which
hath disguised him or herself like them, shall remain in the same one month,
at one or several times, it is felony without benefit of clergy: and Sir Matthew
Hale informs us,
that at one Suffolk assizes no less than thirteen gypsies
were executed upon these statutes
few years before the restoration. But, to
the honour of our *national humanity, there are no instances more r*jgi»l
modern than this, of carrying these laws into practice. (7)
short of death.
Com
5. To descend next to offences whose punishment
mon nuisances are
species of offences against the publio order and economi
cal regimen of the state; being either the doing of
thing to the annoyance
of all the king's subjects, or the neglecting to do a thing which the common
The nature of common nuisances, and their distinction
good requires, (m)
from private nuisances, were explained in the preceding book: (w) when we
considered more particularly the nature of the private sort, as civil injury to
individuals.
shall here only remind the student, that common nuisances are
such inconvenient or troublesome offences, as annoy the whole community
in general, and not merely some particular person; and therefore are indict
able only, and not actionable; as
would be unreasonable to multiply
suits, by giving every man
separate right of action, for what dam
Of this nature
nifies him in common only with the rest of his fellow-subjects.
are
Annoyances in highways, bridges, and publio rivers, (8) by rendering
the same inconvenient or dangerous to pass, either positively, by actual ob
structions; or negatively, by want of reparations. For both of these, the per
son so obstructing, or such individuals as are bound to repair and cleanse
them, or (in default of these last) the parish at large, may be indicted, dis
trained to repair and amend them, and in some cases fined.
And
present
ment thereof by
judge of assize, &c, or
justice of the peace, shall be in
Hawk. P. 0. 197.

(n) Book m. page 216.

and gypsies are now only punishable under the vag
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is
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may be advan
indictable, though in some ways
(8) An obstruction to navigation
E., 384. A dam
A.
an obstruction for which the own«r
tageous.
v. Ward,
Hill, 575; but though vessel sunk by accident may be
Ren wick v. Morris,
indictable.
R. v. Watts,
an obstruction, the owner
not indictable for his failure to remove
vessel aground in
channel where she ordinarily can safely go, may be
Esp., 675. So,
an obstruction to navigation, but her owner
not liable for the injury caused thereby to
B.
Another vessel.
Cummins v. Spruance, Harr. (Del.), 315; and see Reg. v. Betts, 16
M. & M., 281.
1022, 1087; Works v. Junction R. R. Co.,
McLean, 425; Rex v. Watts,

Offences Against Public Health, &o.

167

[Book

IV.

all respects equivalent to an indictment, (o) (9) Where there is a house
erected, or an mclosure made, upon any part of the king's demesnes, or of an
highway, or common street, or public water, or such like public things, it is
properly called a purpresture. {p) (10) 2. All those kind of nuisances (such as
offensive trades and manufactures), which when injurious to a private man
are actionablei are, when detrimental to the public, 'punishable by
r*l68l
L
J public prosecution, and subject to fine according to the quantity of the

(s)

is

a

if

in

(q)

misdemeanor: and particularly the keeping of hogs in any city or market
town is indictable as a public nuisance,
3. All disorderly inns or ale
(11)
houses, bawdy-houses, gaming-houses, stage-plays, unlicensed booths and stages
for rope-dancers, mountebanks, and the like, are public nuisances, and may
upon indictment be suppressed and fined, (r) Inns, in particular, being
tended for the lodging and receipt of travellers, may be indicted, suppressed,
and the inn-keepers fined,
traveller without a very
they refuse to entertain
sufficient cause: for thus to frustrate the end of their institution
held to be
Thus, too, the hospitable laws of Norway punish in
disorderly behaviour,
the severest degree such inn-keepers as refuse to furnish accommodations at a
(p) Co. Litt. 277,from the French pourprit,
(o) Stat Geo. HI, c. 42.
(«) Ibid. 225.
(r) Hawk. P. C. 188,225.
19) Salic. 460.
1
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and Wm. IV, c. 50, the proceeding by presentment for the
(9) By the highway act,
abolished, and
summary mode of proceeding before magistrates
non-repair of highways
substituted. See also statutes 25 and 26 Vic., c. 61.
the passage of the public; whatever interferes
(10) The primary object of
highway
with
a nuisance.
It is an indictable offense to keep one or more wagons
unnecessarily
constantly in narrow street loading and unloading goods, so blocking the street that car
room on the other.
R. v. Russell,
riages can not pass on that side at all, though there
East, 427. So, when stage coaches waiting for passengers are accustomed to stand in
R. v. Cross,
public place in so great numbers as to obstruct the passage.
Camp.,
small yard to deposit habitually long
a nuisance for
timber merchant with
224. It
to
in
the
enough
in
till
be
cut
small
go
So,
yard.
Camp.,
the
street
can
230.
timber
wall ten feet over the line of the road and ten rods along it: State v. Knapp,
building
Conn., 415; erecting gates across
highway, though the public can pass through them:
wall so as to encroach upon the limits of high
Henline v. People, 81 111., 269; building
Com. v. King,
way, though the space enclosed can not, from its nature, be used as road.
right to pass.'
13 Met., 115; erecting a fence across a town way where all citizens had
house projeotinginto a highway may
Mass., 878. So, the steps of
Com. v, Qowen,
form an indictable obstruction. Com. v. Blaisdell, 107 Mass. 234. Where the refuse from
a distillery was conveyed in pipes to casks placed in wagons standing in the public street
in front of the distillery, and the customers' wagons came in great numbers, and their
drivers, in waiting their turns, created much disturbance; where this was done systematic
People v. Cunningham,
Den., 524.
ally, the distillers were held guilty of nuisance.
Com. v. Passmore,
S.
nuisance to obstruct the streets with goods at auction sales.
& R., 403; or by col
R. 219; or at constable's sales on execution: Com. v. Milliman, 13
Barker v. Commonwealth, 19 Peon.
lecting crowd through violent or indecent language.
St, 412. It not an offense for one to fail to remove from the line of road an obstruc
tion which was there when the road was laid out: People v. Young, 72 111., 411; nor for
highway impassable from natural obstacles: State v. Shinkle, 40 la., 131;
one to obstruct
road, as laid out,
impassable, and for many years another line has been used,
but where
State v. McGee 40
the owner of the land may not fence off the road commonly travelled.

la.,
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Wend., 815; Com
not legalized by length of time, see Mills v. Hall,
nuisance
That
Denio, 524; Douglass v. State,
Gray, 473; People v. Cunningham,
monwealth v. Upton,
Wis., 887.
place and
(11) Generally, the carrying on of an offensive trade or manufacture in such
Where the odors from
nuisance.
factory were in
manner as to disturb the public
that
the
need
was held
odors
not be unwhole
tensely disagreeable to the neighborhood,
P., 485; and in the
Peake, 91; R v. Neil,
C.
nuisance.
some to make the factory
near
which
factories
diffuse
by,
offensive
held that the existence of other
latter case
Esp., 217.
no defense; and see R. v. Davey,
odors,
manufactures,
"The
see
offensive
trades
Act
of
Sanitary
and
1866."
As to nuisances by
And on
29 and 80 Vic, c. 90; St. Helen's Smelting Co. v. Tipping, 11 H. L. Cas., 642.
the same subject reference may also be had to Commonwealth v. Brown, 18 Met, 865;
Denio, 524; Moses
Smith v. Commonwealth,
B. Monr., 21; People v. Cunningham,
•.State, 58 Ind., 185.
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{v.) Ibid.
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c.
(u) KItch. of courts, 20.
(ftStlernh. dejun Sueon.
(y) Inst. 219.
(w) Mod. 21.
(*) Hawk. P. C. 188,800.
o.
(a) Nov. 80, c.
(«) Valer. Maxim.
6

And statute
Geo. IV, c. 60, entirely abolishes state lotteries.
(12) Since repealed.
an early day lotteries were sometimes authorized in the United States for public pur
See Clark v. Washington, 12 Wheat., 40. But now in nearly every state lotteries
poses.
are prohibited by constitutional provisions: and
held that, under its police power, the
state may annul previous grants of the right to set up lotteries.
Stone v. Mississippi, 101
V. 8., 814.
See also Will(18) See statute 28 and 24 Vic, c. 189. and the acts amendatory thereof.
C, Am. Dec,
Johns., 78;
lams v. East India Co.,
East, 192, 201; People v. Sands,
296.
v. Royall,
220; U.
Cranch C. C, 620.
ri4) James v. Commonwealth, 12 S. &
3

R,
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By statute 10 and 11 Wm. Ill, c. 17, all lot
just and reasonable price,
teries are declared to be public nuisances, and all grants, patents, or licenses
for the same to be contrary to law. But, as state-lotteries have, for many
ready mode for raising the supply, an act was made,
years past, been found
19 Geo. Ill, c. 21, to license and regulate the keepers of such lottery-offices.
5. The making and selling of fire-works, and squibs, or throwing them
(12)
about in any street, is, on account of the danger that may ensue to any thatched
or timber buildings, declared to be
common nuisance, by statute
and 10
and therefore
Wm. Ill, c.
And to this head we may
punishable by fine.
common nuisance) the making, keeping, or car
refer (though not declared
riage of too large
quantity of gunpowder at one time, or in one place or
vehicle; which
prohibited by statute 12 Geo. HI, c. 61, under heavy penal
6. Eaves-droppers, or such as listen under walls or
ties and forfeiture. (13)
house to hearken after discourse, and thereupon to
windows or the eaves of
frame slanderous and mischievous tales, are
common nuisance and present
able at the court-leet: (u) or are indictable at the sessions, and punishable by
fine and finding sureties for their good behaviour. («)
Lastly, a common
to the feminine gender),
scold, communis rixatrix (for our law-latin confines
is public nuisance to her neighborhood.
For which offence she may be in
convicted, shall (a;) be sentenced to be placed r*ingi
dicted: (w) (14) *and
in
certain engine of correction called the trebucket, castigatory, pr
said to signify the scolding
cucking stool, which in the Saxon language
stool; though now
frequently corrupted into ducking stool, because the
that, when she
residue of the judgment
so placed therein, she shall be
plunged in the water for her punishment, (y)
6. Idleness in any person whatsoever
also a high offence against the pub
In China
lic economy.
there be
man who does not
maxim, that
work, or woman that
idle, in the empire, somebody must suffer cold or
hunger: the produce of the lands not being more than sufficient, with culture,
to maintain the inhabitants: and therefore, though the idle person may shift
off the want from himself, yet
must in the end fall somewhere.
The court
also of Areopagus at Athens punished idleness, and exerted
right of examin
ing every citizen in what manner he spent his time; the intention of whioh
was, (z) that the Athenians, knowing that they were to give an account of
their occupations, should follow only such as were laudable, and that there
The civil law ex
might be no room left for suoh as lived by unlawful arts.
pelled all sturdy vagrants from the city: (a) and, in our own law, all idle per
sons or vagabonds, whom our ancient statutes describe to be "such as wake
on the night and sleep on the day, and haunt customable taverns, and ale
houses, and routs about; and no man wot from whence they come ne whither
they go," or such as are more particularly described by statute 17 Geo. II, e.
and divided into three classes, idle and disorderly persons, rogues and vaga
bonds and incorrigible rogues — all these are offenders against the good order,
and blemishes in the government, of any kingdom. They are therefore all
that
to say, idle and disorpunished by the statute last mentioned
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derly persons with one month's imprisonment in the house of correction;
rogues and vagabonds with whipping and imprisonment not exceeding six
*montn8> an<^ incorrigible rogues with the like discipline and confineT*l70l
IJ ment, not exceeding two years; the breach and escape from which
confinement in one of an inferior class, ranks him among incorrigible rogues;
and in a rogue (before incorrigible) makes him a felon and liable to be trans
Persons harboring vagrants are liable to a fine of
ported for seven years.
forty shillings, and to pay all expenses brought upon the parish thereby; in
tbe same manner as, by our ancient laws, whoever harboured any stranger for
more than two nights, was answerable to the public for any offence that such
his inmate might commit, (b) (16)
7. Under the head of public economy may also be properly ranked all sump
tuary laws against luxury, and extravagant expenses in dress, diet, and the
like; concerning the general utility of which to a state, there is much contro
versy among the political writers. Baron Montesquieu lays it down, (c) that
luxury is necessary in monarchies, as in France; but ruinous to democracies,
as in Holland.
With regard therefore to England, whose government is comof both species, it may still be a dubious question how far private
ftounded
uxury is a public evil; and as such cognizable by public laws. And indeed
our legislators have several times changed their sentiments as to this point;
for formerly, there were a multitude of penal laws existing, to restrain excess
in apparel; (d) chiefly made in the reigns of Edward the Third, Edward the
Fourth and Henry the Eighth, against piked shoes, short doublets, and long
coats; all of which were repealed by statute 1 Jac. I, o. 25. But, as to excess
in diet there still remains one ancient statute unrepealed, 10 Edward HI, st.
3, which ordains, that no man shall be served at dinner or supper, with more
than two courses; except upon some great holidays there specified, in which
he may be served with three.
8. Next to that of luxury naturally follows the offence of gaming, which is
genera^7 introduced to supply or retrieve *the expenses occasioned by
T
*- *1711J the former: it being a kind of tacit confession, that the
company en
gaged therein do, in general, exceed the bounds of their respective fortunes;
and therefore they cast lots to determine upon whom the ruin shall at present
fall, that the rest may be saved a little longer. But, taken in any light, it is
an offence of the most alarming nature; tending by necessary consequence
to
promote public idleness, theft and debauchery among those of a lower class;
and, among persons of a superior rank, it hath frequently been attended with
the sudden ruin and desolation of ancient and opulent families, an abandoned
prostitution of every principle of honor and virtue, and too often hath ended
in self-murder. (16) To restrain this pernicious vice among the inferior sort
of people, the statute 33 Hen. VIII, c. 9 was made; which prohibits to all but
gentlemen the games of tennis, tables, cards, dice, bowls and other unlawful
diversions there specified, («) unless in the time of Christmas, under pecuniary
And the same law, and also the statute 30 Geo. II,
pains and imprisonment.
c. 24, inflict pecuniary penalties, as well upon the master of any public house
wherein servants are permitted to game, as upon the servants themselves, who
are found to be gaming there.
But this is not the principal ground of modern
complaint; it is the gaming in high life that demands the attention of the
magistrate; a passion to which every valuable consideration is made a sacri
fice, and which we seem to have inherited from our ancestors the ancient Ger(M LL. Bdv>.e. 87. Bracton, I. 8, rr. 2, e. 10, 1 8.
(e) Bp. L. b. 7. cc. 8 and 4.
(d) 8 lost. 190.
(e) Logetting in the fields, slide thrift or shove groat, cloyish cayles, half-bowl and coytiog.
(15) These offenses are now punishable under statute 5 Geo. IV, c. 88, amended by 1 and
c. 38.
(16) Playing at cards, dice, etc., for recreation was not an offense at common law, but
at play by means of false dice, etc., was indictable.
cheating
Bac. Abr. Gaming, A, and
~
i cited.
2
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whom Tacitus (/") describes to have been bewitched with a spirit of play
" They addict themselves," says he, " to dice
degree.
when
and as a serious employment : with such a
sober,
(which is wonderful)
mad desire of winning or losing, that when stript of everything else, they will
The loser goes into a volun
stake at last their liberty and their very selves.
tary slavery, and though younger and stronger than his antagonist, suffers him
And this perseverance in so bad a cause they call
self to be bound and sold.
the point of honor: *ea est in reparva pervicacia, ipsi fidem vocant." r*172i
J
One would almost be tempted to think Tacitus was describing a modern *■
with
are
thus
intoxicated
so
a
When
men
frantic
laws
spirit,
Englishman.
will be of little avail; because the same false sense of honor that prompts a
man to sacrifice himself, will deter him from appealing to the magistrate. Yet
it is proper that laws should be, and be known publicly, that gentlemen may
consider what penalties they wilfully inour, and what a confidence they repose
in sharpers; who, if successful in play, are certain to be paid with honour, or
if unsuccessful, have it in their power to be still greater gainers by informing.
For by statute 16 Car. II. c. 7, if any person by playing or betting shall lose
more than 100/. at one time, he shall not be compellable to pay the same, and
the winner shall forfeit treble the value, one moiety to the king, the other to
The statute 9 Ann, c. 14, enacts, that all bonds and other secu
the informer.
rities, given for money won at play, or money lent at the time to play withal,
shall be utterly void; that all mortgages and incumbrances of lands, made
upon the same consideration, shall be and enure to the use of the heir of the
mortgagor; that if any person at any time or sitting lose 10/. at play, he may
sue the winner, and recover it back by action of debt at law; and in case the
loser does not, any other person may sue the winner for treble the sum so
lost; (17) and the plaintiff may by bill in equity examine the defendant him
self upon oath; and that in any of these suits no privilege of parliament shall
The statute further enacts, that if any person by cheating at play
be allowed.
shall win any money or valuable thing, or shall at any one time or sitting win
more than 10/., he may be indicted thereupon, and shall forfeit five times the
value to any person who will sue for it; and (in case of cheating) shall be
deemed infamous, and suffer such corporal punishment as in case of wilful
By several statutes of the reign of King George II, (g) all private
perjury.
lotteries by tickets, cards or dice (and particularly the games of faro, basset, ace
of hearts, hazard, passage, roily polly, and all other games with dice except
backgammon) are prohibited under a penalty of 200/. for him that Bhall erect
such lotteries, and 50/ a time for the players. Public *Iotteries, unless r*i7qi
'
by authority of parliament, and all manner of ingenious devices, under
the denomination of sales or otherwise, which in the end are equivalent to lot
teries, were before prohibited by a great variety of statutes (A) under heavy
But particular descriptions will ever be lame and defi
pecuniary penalties.
cient, unless all games of mere chance are at once prohibited: the inventions
of sharpers being swifter than the punishment of the law, which only hunts
them from one device to another. The statute 13 Geo. II, o. 19, to prevent
the multiplicity of horse races, another fund of gaming, directs that no plates
or matches under 50/. value shall be run, upon penalty of 200/. to be paid by
the owner of each horse running, and 100/. by such as advertise the plate. By
statute 18 Geo. II, c. 34, the statute 9 Ann. is farther enforced, and some de
ficiencies supplied; the forfeitures of that act may now be recovered in a court
of equity; and moreover, if any man be convicted upon information or indict•mans;

to a most exorbitant

(a) IS Geo. n, a 28. 18Geo. II, o. 19. 18Geo. IL c. 34.
(/) De Mot. (term. e. 24.
(fc) 10and 11Wm HI, e. 17. » Ann. o. 8, 1 56. 10Ann. c. 28, 1 109. 8 Geo. I, o. 2,55 88.37.
19. H 4, B. t Geo. IL c. 86, || 29, 80.

9Qeo.I,c.

(17) The penalties for winning or losing to a certain amount are repealed by 8 and 9 Vic,
See also 14 and 15 Vic, c. 100; 16 and 17 Vic., c.
c. 109, which makes new provisions.
119; 17 and 18 Vic, c. 38; and 23 and 23 Vic, c. 17.
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raent of winning or losing at play, or by betting at any one time 10/. or 20/., within
twenty-fonr hours, he shall be fined five times the sum for the benefit of tfce
poor of the parish. Thus careful has the legislature been to prevent this de
structive vice; which may show that our laws against gaming are not so defi
cient, as ourselves and our magistrates in putting those laws in execution. (IS-)
9. Lastly, there is another offence, constituted by a variety of acts of parlia
ment, which are so numerous and so confused, and the crime itself of so ques
tionable a nature, that
shall not detain the reader with many observations
And yet it is an offence which the sportsmen of England seem to
thereupon.
think of the highest importance; and a matter, perhaps the only one, of gen
eral and national concern: associations having been formed all over the king
dom to prevent its destructive progress.
mean the offence of destroying
such beasts and fowls as are ranked under the denomination of game; which,
we may remember, was formerly observed
(upon the old principles of the
f°res' 'aw)> *t0 De trespass and offence in all persons alike who have
I~*l74l
not authority from the crown to kill game (which
royal property),
free warren, or at least
manor of their own. Bnt
by the grant of either
the laws, called the game laws, have also inflicted additional punishments
(chiefly pecuniary) on persons guilty of this general offence, unless they be
therein particularly specified.
All per
people of such rank or fortune as
sons, therefore, of what property or distinction soever, that kill game out of
their own territories, oreven upon their own estates, without the king's license,
franchise, are guilty of the first original offence,
expressed by the grant of
of encroaching on the royal prerogative. And those indigent persons who do
so, without having such rank or fortune as
generally called
qualification,
are guilty not only of the original offence, but of the aggravations also, created
by the statutes for preserving the game: which aggravations are so severely
punished, and those punishments so implacably inflicted, that the offence against
the king
seldom thought of, provided the miserable delinquent can make his
This offence, thus aggravated,
have
peace with the lord of the manor.
ranked under the present head, because the only rational footing upon which
as
that in low and indigent persons
we can consider
crime,
promotes
idleness, and takes them away from their proper employments and callings;
which
an offence against the public police and economy of the common
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wealth.
The statutes for preserving the game are many and various, and not a little
Ann.
obsoure and intricate;
being remarked, (j) that in one statute only,
false grammar in no fewer than six places, besides other mis
c. 14, there
takes: the occasion of which, or what denomination of persons were probably
shall not at present inquire. It
the penners of these statutes,
in general
sufficient to observe, that the qualifications for killing game, as they are usually
called, or more properly the exemptions from the penalties inflicted by the
8*a'iUt'e law> are»
^e having freehold estate of 100/. *per annum:
T*l75l
man to kill a>
there being fifty times the property required to enable
leasehold for ninety-nine
partridge, as to vote for knight of the shire: 2.
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of 18 Geo. II, c. 19, referred to in the text, was repealed by and
(18) The enactment
Vic., c. 109. s.
and the penalties under statute
Anne were repealed by and
c.
15. Bection 18 of the same statute made all wagers and wagering contracts null and void,
That wagers in general were legal at the com
and prohibited suit to recover the stakes.
mon law, see Good v. Elliot,
T. R., 693; Bland v. Collett, Campb., 37; Marryat v. Broderick,
the subject matter of the wager
such as to make
incon
M. & W. 869. But
sistent with public policy, either party may demand his stakes, and recover from the stake
back,
holder
he refuse to pay
even though the wager is determined (Cotton v. Thurland.
T. H. 405 Lacaussade v. White, 7T.
535), unless the stakeholder has actually paid
over to the winner before notice not to do so. Howson v. Hancock,
T. R., 575; Perk
ins v. Eaton.
N. H., 153; Livingston v. Wootan,
N. & McC, 178. In the United States
wagers are generally made illegal by statute.
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years of 1507. per annum: 3. Being the son and heir-apparent of an esquire
(a very loose and vague description), or person of superior degree: 4. Being
the owner or keeper of a forest, park, chase or warren. For unqualified per
sons transgressing these laws, by killing game, keeping engines for that pur
pose, or even having game in their custody, or for persons (however qualified)
that kill game or have it in possession, at unseasonable times of the year, or
hours of the day or night, on Sundays or on Christmas day,
unseasonable
there are various penalties assigned, corporal and pecuniary, by different stat
utes; (k) on any of which, but only on one at a time, the justices may convict
in a summary way, or (in most of them) prosecutions may be carried on at the
And, lastly, by statute 28 Geo. II, c. 12, no persons, however qualified
assizes.
to kill, may make merchandise of this valuable privilege, by selling or exposing
to sale any game, on pain of like forfeiture as if he had no qualification. (19)

CHAPTER XIV.

OF HOMICIDE.
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In the ten preceding chapters we have considered, first, such crimes and
misdemeanors as are more immediately injurious to God, and hifl holy reli
gion; secondly, such as violate or transgress the law of nations; thirdly, snch
as more especially affect the king, the father and representative of his people;
fourthly, such as more directly infringe the rights of the public or common
wealth, taken in its collective capacity; and are now, lastly, to take into con
sideration those which in a more peculiar manner affect and injure individuals
or private subjects.
Were these injuries indeed confined to individuals only, and did they affect
none but their immediate objects, they would fall absolutely under the notion
of private wrongs; for which a satisfaction would be due only to the party
injured; the manner of obtaining which was the subject of our inquiries in the
preceding book. But the wrongs, which we are now to treat of, are of a
1. Because
it is impossible they can be
much more extensive consequence:
committed without a violation of the laws of nature; of the moral as well as
political rules of right: 2. Because they include in them almost always a
breach of the public peace: 3. Because by their example and evil tendency
they threaten and endanger the subversion of all civil society. Upon these
*that, besides the private satisfaction due and given in r*i7»-t
accounts it
many cases to the individual, by action for the private wrong, the
government also calls upon the offender to submit to public punishment for
the public crime. And the prosecution of these offences
always at the suit
and in the name of the king, in whom, by the texture of our constitution, the
jus gladii, or executory power of the law, entirely resides. Thus, too, in the old
Gothic constitution, there was a three-fold punishment inflicted on all delin
quents; first, for the private wrong to the party injured; secondly, for the
offence against the king by disobedience to the laws; and, thirdly, for the
(ft) Burn's Justice, tit. Game.
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(19) The changes made in the game laws by which the property qualifications are dis
pensed with, and the buying and selling of game are legalized under certain restrictions,
and
See statute
Win. IV, c. 32. and
are elsewhere referred to.
and Vic, c. 35. And
Vic, c. 29, and 24 and 25
Geo. IV, c. 69;
and
as to taking game by night, statute
Vic, 90, s. 17. In this connection, the offense of buying and selling offices may properly
are
and
Edw. VI,
The statutes concerning
be mentioned.
18, and 49 Geo.
misdemeanor.
106, which make
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crime against the public by their evil example, (a)
Of which we may trace
the groundwork, in what Tacitus tells us of his Germans; (b) that whenever
offenders were fined, "pars mulctat regi, vel civitati, pars ipsi, qui vindicator
vel propinguis ejus, exsolvilur."
These crimes and misdemeanors against private subjects are principally of
three kinds; against their persons, their habitations, and their property.
Of crimes injurious to the persons of private subjects, the most principal and
important is the offence of taking away that life which is the immediate gift
of the great Creator; and of which therefore no man can be entitled to de
prive himself or another, but in some manner either expressly commanded in,
or evidently deducible from those laws which the Creator has given us; the
divine laws, mean, of either nature or revelation. The subject therefore of
the present chapter, will be the offence of homicide, or destroying the life of
man, in its several stages of guilt, arising from the particular circumstances
of mitigation or aggravation which attend it.
Now homicide, or the killing of any human creature, is of three kinds; jus
The first has no share of guilt at all; the
tifiable, excusable, and felonious.
Becon^ very little; but the *third is the highest crime against the law
r*178]
*•
of nature that man is capable of committing.
L Justifiable homicide is of divers kinds.
1. Such as is owing to some unavoidable necessity, without any will, inten
tion, or desire, and without any inadvertence or negligence in the party kill
As, for instance, by virtue
ing, and therefore without any shadow of blame.
of such an office as obliges one, in the execution of public justice, to put a
malefactor to death, who hath forfeited his life by the laws and verdict of his
This is an act of necessity, and even of civil duty; and therefore
country.
not only justifiable, but commendable, where the law requires it. But the law
not justifiable: therefore, wantonly to kill the
must require
otherwise
felon or traitor, attainted or outlawed, deliberately,
greatest of malefactors,
murder, (c) For, as Bracton
uncompelled, and extrajudicially,
very
justly observes, "istud homicidium, si fit ex livore, vel delectatione effiindendi
humanum sanguinem, licet juste occidatur iste, tarnen occisor peccat mortaliter,
And farther,
judgment of death be given
propter intentionem corruptam."
done accord
by judge not authorized by lawful commission, and execution
guilty of murder, (e) And upon this account, Sir Matthew
ingly, the judge
Hale himself, though he accepted the place of
judge of the common pleas
under Cromwell's government (since
necessary to decide the disputes of
■civil property in the worst of times), yet declined to sit on the crown side at
the assizes, and try prisoners; having very strong objections to the legality
distinction perhaps rather too refined;
of the usurper's commission;
at least as necessary to society, as maintain
since the punishment of crimes
Also, such judgment, when legal, must be
ing the boundaries of property.
executed by the proper officer, or his appointed deputy; for no one else
re
that justifies the homicide.
which requisition
quired by law to do
held to be murder: (a)
of his own head,
f*l 701 anotner *person doth
It must farther be executed
even though it be the judge himself. (A)
must pursue the sentence of the court. If an officer
servato juris ordine;
beheads one who
murder: (t) for
adjudged to be hanged, or vice versa,
he
merely ministerial, and therefore only justified when he acts under the
authority and compulsion of the law: but if sheriff changes one kind of death
for another, he then acts by his own authority, which extends not to the com
mission of homicide; and besides, this license might occasion a very gross
The king, indeed, may remit part of
abuse of his power.
sentence; as in
the case of treason, all but the beheading; but this is no change, no introduc
a

is

is

is

it

it

1
->.

is

a

a

is

is

it

it

-I

*■

If

is

it

it,

is

is

(f)

a

it

a

is

a

is

if

(d
)

is

a

it

it,

I

380

1

8

1

1

1

1 5.

1

1.
1,

o.
ed)Stlerntaoofc
(6) De mor. Germ, c
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HaL P. C. 497.
(e) Hawk. P. 0. 70.
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life.
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tion of a new punishment; and in the case of felony, where the judgment is tobe hanged, the king (it hath been said) cannot legally order even a peer to be
But this doctrine will be more fully considered in a subsequent
beheaded. (&)
chapter.
Again, in some cases homicide is justifiable, rather by the permission, than
by the absolute command, of the law, either for the advancement, of public
justice, which without such indemnification would never be carried on with
proper vigour; or, in such instances where it is committed for the prevention
of some atrocious crime, which cannot otherwise be avoided.
2. Homicides committed for the advancement
of public Justice, are; 1.
Where an officer, in the execution of his office, either in a civil or criminal
case, kills a person that assaults and resists him.
2. If an officer, or any
private person, attempts to take
man charged with felony, and
resisted;
and, in the endeavour to take him, kills him. (m)
This
similar to the old
Gothic constitutions, which (Stiernhook informs us) (n) "furem, si aliter capi
non posset, occidere *permittunt."
8. In case of
riot, or rebellious r*ifioT
the officers endeavouring to disperse the mob are justi- >■
assembly,
fiable in killing them, both at common law, (o) and by the riot act,
Geo.
c. 5.
Where the prisoners in gaol, or going to gaol, assault the gaoler
or officer, and he in his defence kills any of them,
justifiable for the sake
of preventing an escape, (p) 5. If trespassers in forests, parks, chases, or
warrens, will not surrender themselves to the keepers, they may be slain; by
virtue of the statute 21 Edw.
st.
de malefactor ibus inparcis, and
and
W. and M. c. 10. (1) But in all these cases, there must be an apparent neces
sity on the officer's side, viz. that the party could not be arrested or appre
hended, the riot could not be suppressed, the prisoners could not be kept in
hold, the deer-stealers could not out escape, unless such homicide were com
mitted: otherwise, without such absolute necessity,
not justifiable. (2)
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(1) These statutes are since repealed.
'*
In all cases, whether civil or criminal, when persons having authority to arrest or
(2)
imprison, and using the proper means for that purpose, are resisted in so doing, they may
repel force with force, and need not give back; and if the party making resistance
un
Russell on Crimes, p. 646.
justifiable."
avoidably killed in the struggle, this homicide
"But, generally, when one refuses to submit to arrest after he has been touched by theeffected, he may be lawfully killed,
officer, or endeavors to break away after the arrest
And, in cases of felony, the killing is justifi
provided this extreme measure
necessary.
made,
able before an actual arrest
in no other way the escaping felon can be taken."
155, et seq.
Bish. Cr. Pro.,
660. See also
Bishop Cr, L., 4th ed.,
person having
actually committed felony, will not suffer himself to be arrested, but stands on his own,
alive by those who pursue him,
defense, or fly so that he cannot possibly be apprehended
warrant from
whether private persons or public officers, with or without
magistrate, he
11.
felon flies, and refusing
Hawk. P. C, c. 28,
may be lawfully slain by them."
to stop,
killed by his pursuers, the homicide
justifiable: Fost., 271; but in cases of
misdemeanor or breaches of the peace, if the criminal flies and will not stop, killing him is
Still, in such cases,
he
caught and resists the officer and will not suffer
not justifiable.
arrest, the latter may kill him,
East P. C, ch.
70.
necessary.
person resisting
killed, the homicide
arrest
justifiable. State v. Anderson, Hill (S. C), 327; Clements
y. State, 50 Ala., 117 Reg. v. Dadson, Eng. L. & Eq., 566; 14 Jur., 1051. To justify
the killing,
felony must have been committed, the person killed must have notice of theintention to arrest, and must have refused to submit. State v. Roane, Dev., 28.
the jailer kill one, the
prisoners attempt to break jail and escape, and, in preventing
but
must appear to the jailer that the
Hawk. P. G, c. 28,
homicide is justifiable:
East P. G, ch.
91. Under the Texas stat
escape can in no other way be prevented.
ute, an officer
convict escaped from the penitentiary, in trying
notiustifled in killing
to recapture him. Wright v. State, 44 Tex., 645. Query, whether, apart from such stat
ute, the killing would not in such case be justifiable under the authority of Hawkins and
Foster cited above,
all offenses punished by imprisonment in the state prison are felonies.
The killing of those engaged in rioting or breaches of the peace is justifiable,
they
in no other way the riot can
refuse to desist on demand; this even by private persons,

Homicide.

180

[Book

IV.

If the champions in a trial by battel killed either of them the other, such
homicide was justifiable, and was imputed to the just judgment of God, who
was thereby presumed to have decided in favour of the truth, (q) (3)
In the next place, such homicide as is committed for the prevention of any
forcible and atrocious crime, is justifiable by the law of nature; (r) and also
by the law of England, as it stood so early as the time of Bracton, (<) and as
it is since declared in statute 24 Hen. V1L1, c. 5. (4) If any person attempts
a robbery or murder of another, or attempts to break open a house in the
and shall be killed
night-time (which extends also to an attempt to burn it),
in such attempt, the slayer shall be acquitted and discharged. This reaches
not to any crime unaccompanied with force, as picking of pockets; or to the
carries with
an attempt
breaking open of any house in the day-time, unless
of robbery also. So the Jewish law, which punished no theft with death,
makes homicide only justifiable in case of nocturnal house-breaking;
thief
f°un<^ breaking up, and he be "smitten that he *die, there shall no
1*1811
the sun be risen upon him, there shall
blood be shed for him: but
blood be shed for him; for he should make full restitution." (u) At Athens,
was lawful to kill the criminal,
any theft was committed by night,
taken in the fact: (to) and by the Roman law of the twelve tables, a thief
he armed himself
might be slain by night with impunity: or even by day,
with any dangerous weapon: (x) which amounts very nearly to the same as
permitted by our own constitutions.
The Roman law also justifies homicide, when committed in defence of the
chastity either of one's self or relations: (y) and so also, according to Selden,
The English law likewise justifies
stood the law in the Jewish republic.
woman killing one who attempts to ravish her: (a) and so, too, the husband
man who attempts a rape upon his wife or
or father may justify killing
he takes them in adultery by consent, for the one
forci
daughter: but not
ble and felonious, but not the other, (b) And make no doubt but the forci
crime of
still more detestable nature may be equally re
bly attempting
For the one uniform principle
sisted by the death of the unnatural aggressor.
that runs through our own, and all other laws, seems to be this: that where
endeavoured
to be committed by foroe,
lawful
crime, in itself capital,
to repel that foroe by the death of the party attempting. But we must not
carry this doctrine to the same visionary length that Mr. Locke does: who
holds, (c) "that all manner of force without right upon man's person, puts
state of war with the aggressor; and, of consequence, that being in
him in
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(to) Potter, Antiq. b. c. 24.
" Divnt Hadrtanui retcripsit
turn, qui ttuprum ribi ml *ui* Infertntem occidit. dimittendum."
hi)
UFf. 48, 1.)
Hawk. P. C. 71.
c.
(a) Baa Elem. 34.
(6) Hal. P. C. 485,485.
(*) Da legib. Hebrasor.
c.
(c) Ess. on Gov. p.
8

§

R,

382

is

it

a

S.

7

8

J.
J.

if

a

a

if

5

it

is

If

9

1

a

1

8

it
is

4

Park Cr.

1

Mich., 150; People v. Cole.
Hawk. P.
ch. 28,
14; Pond v. People,
85.
(8) See note, p. 846, pott.
necessary to prevent the perpetration of
(4) The law justifies the taking of life when
Mich., 150; Oliver v. State. 17 Ala,, 587; State v. Harris,
a felony. Pond v. People,
Jones ("N. C), 190. There must be reasonable belief in the slayer's mind that the neces
Hawks, 457; 3. C,
Noles v. State, 26 Ala., 81, State v. Rutherford,
Am.
sity exists.
thus stated in Coke: "
Dec., 658. The doctrine
thieves come to
man's house to rob
him or murder, and the owner or his servants kill any of the thieves in defense of himself
Co., 91. In Connecticut,
is not felony."
or his house,
Semayne's Case,
said that
"the class of crimes in prevention of which man may,
necessary, exercise his natural
right to repel force by force, to the taking of the life of the aggressor, are felonies which
are committed by violence or surprise: such as murder, robbery, burglary, arson, breaking
a house in the daytime with intent to rob, sodomy and rape." State v. Moore, 31 Conn.,
479.
trespasser went upon another's land with intent and with the means to
So, where
commit a felony,
necessary to accomplish his end, the owner of the property was held
justified in meeting force with force, even to the killing of the trespasser. People v. Payne,
Cal., 841. See Gray v. Combs,
C, 23 Am. Dec., 431.
Marsh., 478;
be suppressed.
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of war, he may lawfully kill him that puts him under this un
However just this conclusion may be in a state of un
natural restraint."
civilized nature, yet the law of England, like that of every other *well- r«n aoi
*
regulated community, is too tender of the public peace, too careful of *■
the lives of the subjects, to adopt so contentious a system; nor will suffer
with impunity any crime to be prevented by death, unless the same, if com
mitted, would also be punished by death.
In these instances of justifiable homicide, it may be observed, that the slayer
is in no kind of fault whatsoever, not even in the minutest degree; and is
therefore to be totally acquitted and discharged, with oommendation rather
than blame.
But that is not quite the case in excusable homicide, the very
name whereof imports some fault, some error, or omission; so trivial, how
ever, that the law excuses it from the guilt of felony, though, in strictness, it
judges it deserving of some little degree of punishment.
II. Excusable homicide is of two sorts; either per infortunium, by mis
We will
adventure; or se defendendo, upon a principle of self preservation.
first see wherein these two species of homicide are distinct, and then wherein
they agree.
or misadventure is where a man, doing a law
1. Homicide per infortunium
ful act, without any intention of hurt, unfortunately kills another: as where a
man is at work with a hatchet, and the head thereof flics off, and kills a
stander-by; or where a person, qualified to keep a gun, is shooting at a mark,
and undesignedly kills a man: (d) for the act is lawful, and the effect is merely
accidental. So where a parent is moderately correcting his child, a master
his apprentice or scholar, or an officer punishing a criminal, and happens to
occasion his death, it is only misadventure; for the act of correction is lawful:
but if he exceeds the bounds of moderation, either in the manner, the instru
ment, or the quantity of punishment, and death ensues, it is manslaughter at
least, and in some cases (according to the circumstances) murder: (e) for the
*Thus, by an edict of the r*1Rq-|
act of immoderate correction is unlawful.
J
emperor Constantino, (f) when the rigour of the Roman law with L
regard to slaves began to relax and soften, a master was allowed to chastise
his slave with rods and imprisonment, and if death accidentally ensued, he was
guilty of no crime: but if he struck him with a club or a stone, and thereby
in any other, yet grosser manner, " immoderate suo
occasioned his death; or
jure utatur, tunc reus homicidii sit"
A tilt or tournament, the martial diversion of our ancestors,
But to proceed.
was, however, an unlawful act: and so are boxing and sword-playing, the suc
ceeding amusement of their posterity: and, therefore,
knight in the former
case, or
gladiator in the latter, be killed, such killing
felony or man
But
the king command or permit such diversion,
said to be
slaughter.
lawful, (g) In the like manner, as by
only misadventure; for then the act
the laws both of Athens and Rome, he who killed another in the pancratium,
or public games authorized or permitted by the state, was not held to be guilty
of homicide. (A) Likewise, to whip another's horse, whereby he runs over a
child and kills him, held to be accidental in the rider, for he had done nothing
unlawful: but manslaughter in the person who whipped him, for the act was
a trespass, and at best a piece of idleness, of inevitably dangerous conse
And in general,
death ensues in consequence of an idle, dan
quence,
town, or the bar
gerous, and unlawful sport, as shooting or casting stones in
barous diversion of cock-throwing, in these and similar cases the slayer
guilty of manslaughter, and not misadventure only, for these are unlawful
acts. (*) (fi).
14.
(d) Hawk. P. C. 78,74.
(«) HaL P. C. 473,474.
(/) Cod.
is
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2. Homicide in self-defence, or se defeAdendo, upon a sudden affray, is also
This species of selfexcusable, rather than justifiable, by the English law.
defence must be distinguished from that just now mentioned, as calculated to
*hinder the perpetration of a capital crime; which is not only a matter
I*
4. 1
J of excuse, but of justification. But the self-defence which we are now
L
speaking of is that whereby a man may protect himself from an assault, or the
like, in the course of a sudden broil or quarrel, by killing him who assault*
him. And this is what the law expresses by the word chance-medley \ or (as
the former of which in its
chaud-medley,
some rather choose to write
etymology signifies casual affray, the latter an affray in the heat of blood or
in
passion; both of them of pretty much the same import: but the former
common speech too often erroneously applied to any manner of homicide byand our
misadventure; whereas
appears by the statute 24 Hen. VllI, c.
that
ancient books,
properly applied to such killing as happens in selfThis right of natural defence does not
defence upon
sudden rencounter, (m)
right of attacking; for, instead of attacking one another for injuries
imply
past or impending, men need only have recourse to the proper tribunals of
justice. They cannot, therefore, legally exercise this right of preventing de
fence, but in sudden and violent cases when certain and immediate suffering
would be the consequence of waiting for the assistance of the law. Where
must appear that the
fore, to excuse homicide by the plea of self-defence,
slayer had no other possible (or, at least, probable) means of escaping from his
assailant.
It frequently difficult to distinguish this species of homicide (upon chancemedley in self-defence) from that of manslaughter, in the proper legal sense of
the word, (n) But the true criterion between them seems to be this: when
both parties are actually combating at the time when the mortal stroke
then guilty of manslaughter; but
the slayer has not
given, the slayer
Inst. 85.
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one
engaged tin harmless
arrow glances and death ensues, or
o,

is

death ensue he
excusable.
East P.
ch.
86.
diversion, like shooting at butts, or at a bird, and the
for
rats
so
as
one lay poison
not to be mistaken easily
and die; or
one driving and using due care
for human food, and another partake of
of
him
these
are
cases
excusable
kills
all
homicide.
Hawk. P. C. ch.
runt over another and
caused in innocent sports, like foot ball, wrestling, and the like. Fost,
So,
death
29.
L.,
But
29;
1012.
not
0.,
Whart.
Cr.
innocent
fighting
ch.
259; Hawk. P.
sport. Eait
for the purposes of
42. See Pennsylvania v. Levin, Add. (I'a.), 279. And
P. C., ch.
fire
in
built,
boat
takes
fires
are
and
excessive
consequence,
and
lives are
boat racing,
lost, the persons accountable for the excessive fires are guilty of manslaughter.
People v.
Park. Cr. R, 659.
The Sheriff,
If death
produced by willful neglect to prevent mischief which should be provided
against, or by an omission through gross carelessness to do something which the safety of
due care be used,
others requires, or by negligently doing something proper to be done
Therefore, where an ox known to be dangerous it not
not excusable.
the homicide
East P. C, ch.
man, the owner
guilty of manslaughter.
36.
secured, and be kills
carriage, and thereby
collision occurred in
So, where an omnibus driver raced with
R v. Timmins, C. & P., 499. And see R. v. Murray,
which
passenger was killed.
hack driver, who seeing the danger to which
little child was ex
Cox, 509. So where
moderate rate and killed the child.
Lee v.
posed of being run over by him, drove on at
loaded gun into the street in the dark and killed
Coldw., 62. So where one shot
State,
Park. Cr. R, 16. See
People v. Fuller,
a man, though the killing was unintentional,
Bush, 111; State v. Vance, 17 Iowa, 138. So where one shot
Sparks v. Commonwealth,
at
man in his yard at night, after hailing him and receiving no answer, though his pur
Dev., 58. So where one pointed a pistol at
State v. Roane,
pose was only to frighten.
Human life
girl intending merely to frighten her, and the pistol went off accidentally.
not to be sported with by the use of firearms, even though the person using them may have
not loaded, or that being loaded
will do
good reason to believe that the weapon used
no injury.
When persons engage in such reckless sport, they should be held liable for the
Iowa,
647.
consequences of their acts." State v. Hardie, 47
in
Homicide resulting from negligence
perfectly lawful calling
manslaughter.
Bush, 669. As where an engineer in charge of hoisting
Chrystal v. Commonwealth,
384

roper caution to prevent danger,
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(«)

began the fight, or having begun, endeavours to decline any farther struggle,
and afterwards, being closely pressed by his antagonist, kills him to avoid his
For which
own destruction, this is homicide excusable by self-defence,
(o)
reason the law requires that the person who kills another, in his own defence,
*should have retreated as far as he conveniently or safely can,to avoid
r*185 n
■*
the violence of the assault, before he turns upon his assailant; and that *■
not factitiously, or in order to watch his opportunity, but from a real tender
And though it may be cowardice in
ness of shedding his brother's blood.
time of war between two independent nations, to flee from an enemy; yet
between two fellow-subjects the law countenances no such point of honour;
because the king and his courts are the vindieea injuriarurn, and will give to
the party wronged all the satisfaction he deserves, (p) In this the civil law
also agrees with ours, or perhaps goes rather farther: "qui cum aliter tueri se
non possunt, damni culpam dederint, innoxii aunt." (q) The party assaulted
must therefore flee as far as he conveniently can, either by reason of some
wall, ditch, or other impediment; or as far as the fierceness of the assault .will
permit him: (r) for it may be so fierce as not to allow him to yield a step,
without manifest danger of his life, or enormous bodily harm: and then in his
And this is the doctrine of uni
defence he may kill his assailant instantly.
as well as of the municipal law.
versal justice,
also the time to be considered: for
And as the manner of the defence, so
the person assaulted does not fall upon the aggressor till the affray
over,
or when he
Neither, under
revenge, and not defence.
running away, this
the colour of self-defence, will the law permit a man to screen himself from
two persons, A and B, agree to fight a
the guilt of deliberate, murder: for
retreats as far as he safely can, and
duel, and A gives the first onset, and
then kills A, this
murder; because of the previous malice and concerted de
A upon
But
sudden quarrel assaults
first, and upon B's
sign,
HoL P. 0. 488.
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in charge of an incompetent person, and workmen are killed.
apparatus leaves
R. v.
Cox, 191. Or, where a railroad switchman fails to move
switch when
Pargeter,
is
his duty to do so, and loss of life ensues in consequence.
State v. O'Brien, 82 N. J., 169.
Or, where workmen cast rubbish into
street without warning, whereby
passer-by
Fost., 262. See further, R v. "Waters,
C. & P. 328.
If one assume the charac
killed.
ter of physician, and through ignorance administer to his patient
medicine which he
not guilty of manslaughter.
intends and expects will cure, but which causes death, he
Mass., 137; State v. Shultz, 65 Iowa, 628; S. O, 39 Am.
Commonwealth v. Thompson.
Mo., 561. If, however, the party prescribing have so much
Rep., 187; Rice v. State,
knowledge of the fatal tendency of the prescription that
may be reasonably presumed
that he administered the medicine from an obstinate, willful rashness, and not with an
honest intention and expectation of effecting cure, he
guilty of manslaughter at the
least, though bodily harm may not have been intended.
Rice v. State,
Mo., 561; Fairlee
C,
Shultz,
111.,
Iowa,
11
State
v.
v. People,
55
628;
89 Am. Rep., 187. In England,
seems
to
be
that
rule
who
the
person
holds himself out as
practitioner of medicine is
guilty of manslaughter in case his patient dies through his gross ignorance and unskillf ill
ness.
R. v. Spiller,
C. & P., 333; R. v. Long,
C. & P., 398. And see State v. Hardister,
C, 42 Am. Rep.,
38 Ark., 605;
Homicide by practical joke
fire was kindled around a
manslaughter. As where
drunken man to frighten him, but he rolled into
and was killed.
Errington's Case,
Lewin C. 0., 217. See Fenton's Case, Ibid., 179; Martin's Case,
C. & P., 211.
And
where the bolt of partly loaded cart was pulled out and the cartman was thrown out and
R. v. Sullivan,
killed in consequence.
C. & P., ',641.
Involuntary manslaughter must be charged as such.
Com. v. Oable,
S. & R., 423;
"Walters v. Commonwealth, 44 Penn. St., 135; Bruner v. State, 58 Ind., 159.
Contra:
Isham v. State, 88 Ala, 213. If the killing was from negligence,
not necessary to
State v. Smith, 65 Me., 257; State v. O'Brien, 82 N. J.,
allege or prove criminal intent
That homicide in performance of an act unlawful, though not felonious,
169.
not excus
able, see Reg. v. Packard.
Car. & M., 236.
On the subject of homicide in self-defense and of the necessity of endeavor to avoid so
see note
Also, see State v. Wells, Coxe, 424;
serious
consequence,
book
page
Am. Dec, 211; Grainger v. State,
B.
Yerg., 459; 8. C, 26 Am. Dec, 278.
385
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returning the assault A really and bona fide flees; and, being driven to the
vail, turns again upon B and kills him; this may be se defendendo according
t0 80me °* our writer8; (M) *though others (to) have thought this
r*is«l
L
-I
opinion too favourable: inasmuch as the necessity, to which he is at last
reduced, originally arose from his own fault. Under this excuse of selftlefence, the principal civil and natural relations are comprehended; therefore
master and servant, parent and child, husband and wife, killing an assailant in
the necessary defence of each other respectively, are excused; the act of the
relation assisting being construed the same as the act of the party himself, (z)
There is one species of homicide se defendendo, where the party slain is
equally innocent as he who occasions his death: and yet this homicide is also
from the great universal principle of self-preservation, which
excusable
prompts every man to save his own life preferable to that of another, where
one of them must inevitably perish. As, among others, in that case mentioned,
by Lord Bacon, (y) where two persons, being shipwrecked, and getting on the
same plank, but finding it not able to save them both, one of them thrusts the
drowned. He who thus preserves his own life at
other from
whereby he
excusable through unavoidable necessity, and
the expense of another man's
the principle of self-defence: since their both remaining on the same weak
mutual, though innocent, attempt upon, and an endangering of each
plank
other's life.
Let us next take view of those circumstances wherein these two species of
homicide, by misadventure and self-defence, agree; and those are in their blame
and punishment. For the law sets so high value upon the life of man, that
away, unless
always intends some misbehaviour in the person who takes
the command or express permission of the law. In the case of misadventure,
want of sufficient caution in him who was
presumes negligence, or at least
not altogether faultless,
so unfortunate as to commit it; who therefore
man who *kills another *«
as t0 tbe necessity which excuses
r*i r<7
necessitas culpabilis, and thereby
defendendo, Lord Bacon (a) entitles
from the former necessity of killing a thief or
malefactor.
distinguishes
For the law intends that the quarrel or assault arose from some unknown
wrong, or some provocation, either in word or deed: and since in quarrels both
scarce can be tried who
parties may be, and usually are, in some fault; and
was originally in the wrong; the law will not hold the survivor entirely guilt
kill thief that breaks into
clear in the other case, that where
But
less.
The law besides
my house, the original default can never be upon my side.
farther view, to make the crime or homicide more odious, and to
may have
caution men how they venture to kill another upon their own private judgment;
by ordaining, that he who slays his neighbour without an express warrant from
the law so to do, shall in no case be absolutely free from guilt.
Even the slaughter of
Nor
the law of England singular in this respect.
solemn purgation among the Jews; which implies that the
enemies required
And the
man, however
death of
happens, will leave some stain behind it.
" who killed hia
Mosaical law (6) appointed certain cities of refuge for him
neighbour unawares: as when man goeth into the wood with his neighbour to
stroke with the axe to cut down the tree,
hew wood, and his hand fetcheth
and the head slippeth from the helve, and lighteth upon his neighbour that he
But seems he was not
die, he shall flee unto one of those cities and live."
held wholly blameless, any more than in the English law since the avenger
he afterwards
of blood might slay him before he reached his asylum, or
till the death of the high priest. In the imperial law like
stirred out of
wise (c\ casual homicide was excused, by the indulgence of the emperor signed
with his own sign-manual, " annotation* principis:" otherwise the death of
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(e)

man, however committed, was in some degree punishable. Among the Greeks
( d) homicide by misfortune was expiated by voluntary '"banishment r
_„•■
for a year,
In Saxony fine
paid to the kindred of th« slain
which also, among the Western Goths, was little inferior to that of voluntary
and in France {g) no person
ever absolved in cases of this
homicide:
nature, without a largess to the poor, and the charge of certain masses for the
soul of the party killed.
said by Sir Edward Coke to have been
The penalty inflicted by our laws
with reason denied by
anciently no less than de'ath; (A) which, however,
It seems rather to have consisted in a
later and more accurate writers.
forfeiture, some say of all the goods and chattels, others of only part of them,
by way of fine or weregild (A) which was probably disposed of, as in France,
in pios uaus, according to the humane superstition of the times, for the benefit
of hit soul who was thus suddenly sent to his account, with all his imperfec
tions on his head.
But that reason having long ceased, and the penalty, espe
total forfeiture, growing more severe than was intended, in propor
cially
tion as personal property has become more considerable, the delinquent has
now, and has had as early as our records will reach,
pardon and writ of
restitution of his goods as matter of course and right, only paying for suing
out the same, (m) (6) And, indeed, to prevent this expense, in cases where
the death has notoriously happened by misadventure or in self-defence, the
not direct,
general verdict of acquittal. (»)
judges will usually permit,
TTT Felonious homicide
an act of very different nature from the former,
being the killing of human creature, of any age or sex, without justification
This may be done either
or excuse.
killing one's self, or another man.
*Self -murder, the pretended heroism, but real cowardice, of the Stoic
flfl-i
philosophers, who destroyed themselves to avoid those ills which they
seems to be counte
had not the fortitude to endure, though the attempting
nanced by the civil law, (o) yet was punished by the Athenian law with cutting
off the hand, which committed the desperate deed, (p) And also the law of
England wisely and religiously considers, that no man hath power to destroy
life, but by commission from God, the author of it: and as the suicide is
guilty of a double offence: one spiritual, in invading the prerogative of the
Almighty, and rushing into his immediate presence uncalled for; the other
temporal, against the king, who hath an interest in the preservation of all his
subjects the law has therefore ranked this among the highest crimes, making
And this ad
a peculiar species of felony,
felony committed on one's self.
one per
mits of accessories before the fact, as well as other felonies; for
suades another to kill himself, and he does so, the adviser
guilty of murder.
A fdo de se therefore he that deliberately puts an end to his own exis
(g)
tence, or commits any unlawful malicious act, the consequence of which
his
own death: as
attempting to kill another, he runs upon his antagonist's
sw.ord: or, shooting at another, the gun bursts and kills himself, (r) (7) The
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(d) Plato da Leg. lib.
(e) To this expiation by banishment the spirit of Patroclus in Homer may be thought to allude, when
he reminds Achilles, in the twenty-third Iliad, that when a child he was obliged to flee his country for
casual ly killing his playfellow; "v^JTloS ovx eBeXoo."
e.
to) De Morney on the digest.
(/) SUernh. de Jure GofA.
(a) Inst. 148,815.
Hawk. P. a 75. Fost. 282, &c.
Hal. P. C. 425.
(ft) Fost. 287.
(i) Ibid. 288.
(i)
(n) Fost 288.
(m) " Hawk. P. O. 381.
furor*,
pudore,
impatientia
dolorit,
aut
tcedio
vitas,
aut
morbo,
aut
mori malu.it, non
aut
Si
quit
(o)
animadvertatur in eum." jy. 42, 16,
(p) Pot. Antiq. b. c. 26.
Hal. P. C. 418.
(q) Kellw. 188:
<r) Hawk. P. O. 68.
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now removed in such cases.
(6) AH forfeiture and punishment
A discharge gun at B, with intent to kill, and the gun burst and kill A, he a(7)
So,
A strike B, and hastily falling upon him wound himself with knife in
YWo d» m.
Hawk. P. C, ch. 27,
5.
purposely hold the knife so as to kill A.
B's hand, unless
He who kills another at his desire or command is, in judgment of law, as much a murderer
not looked upon as
merely of his own head, and the person killed
he had done
as
887
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party must be of years of discretion, and in his senses, else it is no crime.
Bat this excuse ought not to be strained to that length to which oar coroners*
an evidence of in
viz.: that the very act of suicide
jaries are apt to carry
sanity; as
every man, who acts contrary to reason, had no reason at all: for
the same argument would prove every other criminal non compos, as well as
the self-murderer.
The law very rationally judges that every melancholy or
man of the capacity of discerning right
hypochondriac fit does not deprive
from wrong; which
necessary, as was observed in a former chapter, (*) to
*f°rm a legal excuse. And therefore
real lunatic kills himself in
*100l
lucid interval, he
felo de se as much as another man.
But now the question follows, what punishment can human laws inflict on
one who has withdrawn himself from their reach
They can only act upon
what he has left behind him, his reputation and fortune: on the former, by an
ignominious burial in the highway, with a stake driven through his body; (8)
on the latter, by
forfeiture of all his goods and chattels to the king: hoping
that his care for either his own reputation, or the welfare of his family, would
be some motive to restrain him from so desperate and wicked an act. And
observable, that this forfeiture has relation to the time of the act done in
the felon's lifetime, which was the cause of his death.
As husband and wife
be possessed jointly of
term of years in land, and the husband drowns him
ill be forfeited to the king, and the wife shall not have
self; the land
by
For
the act of casting himself into the water he forfeits the
survivorship.
term which gives
title to the king, prior to the wife's title by survivorship,
which could not accrue till the instant of her husband's death, (u)
And
must be owned that the letter of the law herein borders little upon
though
some alleviation that the power of mitigation
left iii the
severity, yet
breast of the sovereign, who upon this, as on all other occasions,
reminded
by the oath of his office to execute judgment in mercy. (9)
The other species of criminal homicide
that of killing another man.
Bat
in this there are also degrees of guilt, which divide the offence into manslaughter
and murder. The difference between which may be partly collected from what
has been incidentally mentioned in the preceding articles, and principally con
sists in this, that manslaughter, when voluntary, arises from the sudden heat
of the passions, murder from the wickedness of the heart.
therefore thus defined, (v) the unlawful killing
Man8huighter
T*1911
of another without malice either express or implied; which may be
either voluntarily, upon sudden heat; or involuntarily, but in the commissioL

is
a

is

If

R

is

,
8
7,

1

4

a

388

•

is

a

1

a

R

9

R,

is

R

is

is

is

is
a

R

&

8

R

6.

§

1

felo de m, inasmuch as his assent was merely void, as being against the laws of God and
man.
But where persons agree to die together and one of them, at the persuasion of the
other, buys poison and both drink, and the buyer alone survives, the other
felo de «
Hawk., ch. 27,
Contra;
P., 418, where the survivor
v. Alison,
C.
held
guilty of murder as principal.
Where one was present and encouraged another to commit
suicide, he
v. Tyson,
&
523.
one procures another
principal in murder.
to commit suicide, but
done, he
an accessory
absent when the act
before the fact,
and
not punishable, since at common law an accessory could not be tried unless the prin
cipal could be:
Moo., 350;
v. Russell,
thing manifestly impossible here.
v. LedC. & P., 79. But where
dington,
prisoner counselled another in an adjoining cell to
kill himself, the former was held guilty. Com. v. Bowen, 13 Mass., 356. It suggested that
this must have been on the ground that he was present at the death.
Com. v. Dennis, 105
Mass., 102. This case holds an attempt to commit suicide not an indictable offense.
stake driven through the body, is done away with
(8) Interment in the highway, with
Geo. IV, c. 52. And see stat. 45 and 40 Vic, c. 19.
by statute
(9) The offender forfeits all chattels, real and personal, held in his own right, all chattels
real possessed jointly with his wife or in her right, all bonds or personal choses in action
belonging to him, a moiety of such chattels as may be severed to which he is Jointly
entitled with another, but nothing held as executor or administrator.
Hawk. P. C., ch.
*7
which see for further discussion of the point.
The offense of self-murdor
not punishable in the United States.
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unlawful act. These were called in the Gothic constitutions " homU
quae out cam, aut etiam aponte committuntur, sed in subitaneo
And hence it follows, that in man
yuodam iracundioe colore el impetu." (to)
slaughter there can be no accessories before the fact; because it must be done
without premediation.
As to the first, or voluntary branch: if upon a sudden quarrel two persona
they
fight, and one of them kills the other, this is manslaughter: and so it
field; for this
one continued aot
upon such an occasion go out and fight in
or passion: (x) and the law pays that regards to human frailty, as not to put
So also
deliberate aot upon the same footing with regard to guilt.
hasty and
man be greatly provoked, as by pulling his nose, or other great indignity,
not excusable se defenaendo,
and immediately kills the aggressor, though this
to preserve himself yet neither
no absolute necessity for doing
since there
no previous malice; but it
murder, for there
manslaughter, (y) But
suffi
there be
in this and every other case of homioide upon provocation,
cient cooling-time for passion to subside and reason to interpose, and the per
deliberate revenge and not
son so provoked afterwards kills the other, this
So
man takes
heat of blood, and accordingly amounts to murder,
(10)
another in the act of adultery with his wife, and kills him directly upon the
spot: though this was allowed by the laws of Solon, (a) as likewise by the Ro
man civil law (if the adulterer was found in the husband's own house), (b) and
not absolutely ranked in
also among the ancient Goths; (c) yet in England
the class of justifiable homicide, as in case of forcible rape, *but
r*i 92i
however the lowest degree of it; and
It
manslaughter, (d) (11).
therefore in such oase the oourt directed the burning in the hand to be gent
ly inflicted, because there could not be greater provocation. («) Manslaugh
sudden provocation differs from excusable homioide se deter, therefore, on
an apparent necessity, for self-pre
fendendo in this: that in one case there
servation, to kill the aggressor; in the other, no necessity at all, being only
sudden act of revenge.
The second branch, or involuntary manslaughter, differs also from homicide
excusable by misadventure in this; that misadventure always happens in conse
lawful act, but, this species of manslaughter in consequence of an
quence of
unlawful one. As,
two persons play at sword and buckler, unless by the
manslaughter, because
king's command, and one of them kills the other: this
not murder, for the one had no intent
the original act was unlawful; but
to do the other any personal mischief, (f) So where
person does an act,
lawful in itself, but in an unlawful manner, and without due caution and cir
stone or piece of timber into
cumspection: as when workman flings down
the street, and kills man; this may be either misadventure, manslaughter, or
murder, according to the circumstances under which the original act was done:
if were in country village, where few passengers are, and he calls out to
all people to have
misadventure only; but
were in London, or
care,
other populous town, where people are continually passing,
manslaughter,
he knows of their passing,
though he gives loud warning; (g) and murder,
malioe against all mankind, (h)
and gives no warning at all, for then
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sufficient cooling time under all the circumstances of the case
(10) The question what
one of fact for the jury, in which the nature of the aggravation
an important consider
ation.
See Rex v. Lynch,
C. & P., 324; Rex v. Hay ward,
C. & P., 157; State v. Norris,
0.,
Hayw., 429;
Am. Dec, 564; Maher v. People, 10 Mich., 212. But see as to this,
Bish. Cr. L., 7th ed.,
983.
718; Whart. Cr. L.,
Jones (N. C), 74; State v. John, Ired., 330; Whart. Cr. L.p
(11) See State v. Samuel,
983.
As to the distinction between manslaughter and murder, see, in general, Pennsyl
C, Am. Dec., 298; State v. Ferguson, Hill, 619; S. C.,
vania v. Bell, Addison, 158;
27 Am. Dec, 412.
3S9
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And, in general, when an involuntary killing happens in consequence of ait
unlawful act, it will be either murder or manslaughter,
according to the
be in prosecution of a felonious
nature of the act which occasioned it. If
ln ^9 consequences, naturally tended to bloodshed,
will
*193l *'ntent> or>
no more was intended than
be murder; but
mere civil trespass,
will only amount to manslaughter. (J)
Next, as to the punishment of this degree of homicide: the crime of man
slaughter amounts to felony, but within the benefit of clergy; and the offender
shall be burnt in the hand, and forfeit all his goods and chattels.
But there
one species of manslaughter which
punished as murder, the
benefit of clergy being taken away from
by statute namely, the offence of
For by
mortally stabbing another, though done upon sudden provocation.
statute
Jac.
c.
when one thrusts or stabs another, not then having
weapon drawn, or who hath not then first stricken the party stabbing, so that
he dies thereof within six months after, the offender shall not have the benefit
This statute was
not of malice aforethought.
of clergy, though he did
made on account of the frequent quarrels and stabbings with short daggers,
between the Scotch and the English at the accession of James the First, (k)
and being therefore of
temporary nature, ought to have expired with the
meant to remedy. For in point of solid and substantial
mischief which
cannot be said that the mode of killing, whether by stabbing,
justice,
strangling, or shooting, can either extenuate or enhance the guilt; unless
carries with
an internal evidence of cool
where, as in case of poisoning,
and deliberate malioe.
But the benignity of the law hath construed the
statute so favourably in behalf of the subject, and so strictly when against
him, that the offence of stabbing now stands almost upon the same footing as
did at the common law.
Thus, not to repeat the cases before mentioned,
of stabbing an adultress, <fcc, which are barely manslaughter as at common
hath been doubted whether, if the
law, in the construction of this statute
deceased had struck at all before the mortal blow given, this does not take
out of the statute, though in the preceding quarrel the stabber had given the
*i ful ^rs* blow; an<^ *i* seems to be the better opinion that this not within
Also
hath been resolved, that the killing a man by
the statute, (m)
not within the statute; and
hammer or other blunt weapon
throwing
doubted, (n)
But
the party
whether
shot with
pistol be so or not,
slain had cudgel in his hand, or had thrown
pot or bottle, or discharged
sufficient having
weapon drawn on his
pistol at the party stabbing, this
side within the words of the statute, (o) (12)
2. We are next to consider the crime of deliberate and wilful murder; a
believe, punished almost
crime at which human nature starts, and which is,
The words of the Mosaical law
universally throughout the world with death.
"
(over and above the general precept to Noah, (p) that whoso sheddeth man's
blood, by man shall his blood be shed "), are very emphatical in prohibiting the
" Moreover
pardon of murderers, (q)
ye shall take no satisfaction for the life
of murderer, who
guilty of death, but he shall surely be put to death; for
shed therein but by the blood
the land cannot be cleansed of the blood that
of him that shed it." And therefore our law has provided one course of pro-
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The crime of attempt to murder
punish
Murder and manslaughter are punishable under Hit
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James
c.
(13) The statute
able under 24 and 25 Vic, c. 100.
same statute.

1

1

1

1

(0 Our statute law has severely animadverted on one species of criminal negligence, whereby the
death of a man is occasioned. For by statute 10Geo. II. c. 31, if any waterman between Gravesena and
Windsor receives into his boat or barge a greater number of persons than the act allows, and any paspenger shall then be drowned, such waterman is guilty (not of manslaughter, but) of felony, and shall bo
transported as a felon.
Hawk. p. C. 84.
(f) Fost. 899,300.
U) Fost. 258.
(Jfe)Lord Raym. 140.
Hawk. P. a 77.
<m)Fost. 801. Hawk. P. O. 77.
(n) Hal. P. a 470.
(o)
(p) Gen. lx, 6.
(q) Numb. XXXV, 81.
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secution (that by appeal, of which hereafter), wherein the king himself is ex

cluded the power of pardoning murder; so that, were the king of England so
inclined he could not imitate that Polish monarch mentioned by Puffendorf : (r)
"who thought proper to remit the penalties of murder to all the nobility, in an
edict, with this arrogant preamble, " nos, divini juris rigorem moderantes," Ac.

But

let us now consider the definition of this great offence.
name of murder (as a crime) was anciently applied only to the secret
killing of another;
(which the word moerda signifies in the Teutonio lan
and
was defined, " homicidium quod nullo vidente, nullo sciente,
guage)
clam perpetrator :" (u) for which the vill wherein
was committed or (if that
were too poor) the whole hundred was liable to a heavy *amercement;
r*Tor-i
which amercement itself was also denominated murdrum, (w). This
was an ancient usage among the Goths in Sweden and Denmark; who supposed
the neighbourhood, unless they produced the murderer, to have perpetrated, or
at least connived at the murder; (aj) and according to Bracton, (y) was intro
duced into this kingdom by King Canute, to prevent his countrymen the Danes
from being privily murdered by the English; and was afterwards continued by
William the Conqueror, for the like security to his own Normans,
And
therefore
appeared that the person found slain was
upon inquisition had,
an Englishman (the presentment whereof was denominated englescherie), (a)
the country seems to have been excused from this burthen. But, this differ
ence being totally abolished by statute 14 Edw. Ill, st.
c.
we must now (as
observed by Staunford) (b) define murder in quite another manner, without regardingwhether the party slain was killed openly or secretly, or whether he
was of English or foreign extraction.
Murder
therefore now thus defined, or rather described, by Sir Edward
" when person of sound memory and discretion
Coke:
unlawfully killeth
any reasonable creature in being, and under the king's peace, with malice afore
The best way of examining the nature of
thought, either express or implied."
this crime will be by considering the several branches of this definition.
must be committed by person of sound memory and discretion/ for
First,
lunatics or infants, as was formerly observed, are incapable or committing any
consciousness of doing wrong,
crime: unless in such cases where they show
and of course
discretion, or discernment, between good and evil.
Next happens when person of such sound discretion unlawfully killeth.
The unlawfulness arises from the killing without *warrant or excuse; r*lani
and there must also be an actual killing to constitute murder; for bare
assault, with intent to kill,
was
only great misdemeanor, though formerly
held to be murder, (d) The killing may be by poisoning, striking, starving,
drowning, and a thousand other forms of death, by which human nature may
be overcome.
And
person be indicted for one species of killing, as by
poisoning, he cannot be convicted by evidence of a totally different species of
But where they only differ in
death, as by shooting with
pistol, or starving.
as
wound be alleged to be given with sword, and
circumstances,
proves to
immaterial,
have arisen from staff, an ax, or hatchet, this difference
(13)
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c.
c. 10.
(•) Dial, de Scacch.
(r) L. of N.
The word murdre in our old statutes also signified any kind of
c.
Stlernh. de jure Bueon.
Exeter,
14Edw.
stifling.
So
in
the
statute
of
"je n'etw ne celerai. ne tufferai estre cele
or
concealment
c. 18. 4. Ifullam veritatem celabo, nee celari perne murdre;" which is thus translated in Fleta.
mittam nee murdrari." And the words "pur murdre le droit." in the articles of that statute, are ren
''pro jure alicujus mxtrdrando."
dered in Fleta, ibid.
c. 15,
Stat. Marl. c. 28. Fost. 281.
tr.
(u) Glan v. 14,c.
(to) Bract.
(y)
tr.
c. 15.
Hal P. a 447.
c.
(*)
(a) Bract, ubi supra.
(z) Stiernh.
Hal.
P.
Inst.
47.
0. 425.
HaL P. 0. 185.
0. 10.
(c)
(d)
(e) Inst. 135.
(4) P. 0.

a

a

§

is

(13) The common-law rule in setting forth the instrument of death is, that where the in
no variance,
strument laid and that proved are of the same nature and character, there
Whart. Cr. L.
but where they are of an opposite nature and character, the contrary.
dagger will support the averment of a knife, but evidence of a
1059. Thus, evidence of
knife will not support the averment of a pistol. If the indictment allege a death by one
kind of poison, proof of death by another kind of poison will support the indictment Id.
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Of all species of deaths, the most detestable is that of poison; because it can
of all others be the least prevented either by manhood or forethought. (/)
And therefore by the statute 22 Hen. VIII, c. 0, it was made treason, and a more
grievous and lingering kind of death was inflicted on it than the common law
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(i)

allowed, namely, boiling to death : but this act did not live long, being repealed
by 1 Edw. VI, c. 12. There was also by the ancient common law, one species
of killing held to be murder, which may be dubious at this day; as there hath
not been an instance wherein it has been held to be murder for many ages
past: (g) I mean by bearing false witness against another, with an express
premeditated design to take away his life, so as the innocent person be con
demned and executed. (A)
The Gothic laws punished, in this case, both the
judge, the witnesses, and the prosecutor: "peculiars poena judicem puniunt;
peculiars testes, quorum fides judicem sedux.it; peculiar i denique et maxima
auctorem, ut homicidamP
And, among the Romans, the lex, Cornelia
de sicariis, punished the false witness with death, as being guilty of
species
of assassination, (k) And there
no doubt but this
equally murder \aforo
r *,ni;-| conscienlicB as killing with a *sword; though the modern law (to avoid
the danger of deterring witnesses from giving evidence upon capital
must be at the peril of their own lives) has not yet punished
prosecutions,
it as such. If man, however, does such an act of which the probable conse
death; such killing may be murder, although
quence may be, and eventually
no stroke be struck by himself, and no killing may be primarily intended: as was
the case of the unnatural son who exposed his sick father to the air, against
his will, by reason whereof he died;
of the harlot who laid her child under
leaves in an orchard, where
and killed it; (m) and of the parish
kite struck
child from parish to parish, till
died from want of
officers, who shifted
care and sustenance, (n) (14)
used to do
man hath
beast that
So, too,
to go abroad, and
kills a man; even
mischief; and he knowing
suffers
this
he had purposely turned
loose,
manslaughter in the owner: but
called sport,
with us
though barely to frighten people, and make what
he had incited a bear or dog to
(as in the Jewish law) as much murder as
worry them, (o) If
physician or surgeon gives his patient potion or plaster

E
8,

8.
1.

8.

1

1

I.
8,

1,
j
9.

I

It

8

(/) Inst. 48.
(g) Tout. 18JS. In the case of Maodaniel and Berry, reported by sir Michael Foster, though the then at
torney general declined to argue this point of law. have good grounds to believe
was not from any ap
prehension of his that the point was not maintainable, but from other prudential reasons. Nothing there
fore should be concluded from the waiving of that prosecution,
Brit. c. Si. Bract.
o. 4.
(ft) Mirror, c.
c.
(0 Stiernh. de jure Ooth.
(k) Ff. 48.
(0 Hawk. P. 0. 78.
(m) HaL P. C. 432.
(n) Palm. 845.
(o) Ibid. 481.
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But where an indictment charged that the injury was inflicted with
hatchet or knife,
Hill,
evidence was admitted to show that death was caused by
pistol. People v. Colt,
432.
Where the averment was that
razor or knife was the instrument employed to cause
death, evidence was admitted to show that
State v. Fox,
blunt instrument was used.
Dutch., 566. But conviction
erroneous, when the indictment charged striking and killing
by blows, but the fact appeared that the deceased was knocked down and, in falling, struck
v. Thompson,
some substance which caused death.
v. Kelly,
Moo. C. C, 113;
id. 189. An averment that death was caused by
blow of
hammer
supported by
blow from any hard instrument held in the hand.
v. Mertin, 5C. and P.,
evidence of
128.
See State v. Smith, 32 Me., 369; Miller v. State, 25 Wis., 884, and Archbold's Cr.
collection of English cases on the point
Pleading, 10th ed., 406, 407 for
(14) Where an apprentice died who, coming back from the bridewell sick and in a filthy
condition, was not allowed by his master to sleep in bed, but was made to lie on bare boards,
the
and did not receive proper medical attention, the master was held guilty of murder
v. Self,
East P. C, 226. So, where an old woman died from neg
jury found malice.
lect in the house of one who was under obligation to care for her.
C.
Reg. v. Marriott,
6 P., 425. The withholding
master of sufficient food from an apprentice may be
murder.
v. Squires,
Russ. Cr. 20.
mother willfully neglects to nourish her infant
dies, she
v. Hughes.
child so that
C. & P., 611;
v. Edwards,
guilty of murder.
the child
Cox, 801; but not
of such age that
the duty of the father to furnish
food.
v. Saunders,
C. &P., 277.
prisoner dies from unreasonably harsh treat
ment by his jailer, the latter
And see
v. Huggins, Stra., 882.
guilty of murder.
Nun v. State, 11 Humph., 159; Beg. v. Plummer,
K., 600; Roscoe Cr. Ev., 724
C.
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cure him, which contrary to expectation, kills him, this is neither murder
nor manslaughter, but misadventure; and he shall not be punished criminally,
however liable he might formerly have been to a oivil action for neglect or
ignorance: (p) (15) but it hath been holden, that if it be not a regular physi
cian or surgeon, who administers the medicine, or performs the operation, it
is manslaughter at the least, (q) Yet, Sir Matthew Hale very justly questions
the law of this determination, (r) (16) In order also to make the killing mur
der, it is requisite that the party die within a year and a day after the stroke
received, or cause of death administered; in the computation of which, the
whole day upon which the hurt was done shall be reckoned the first, (s)
Farther; the person killed must be "a reasonable creature in being, and
under the king's peace," at the time of the *killing. Therefore to kill
r*^nQ]J
■an alien, a Jew, or an outlaw, who were all under the king's peace and *■
protection, is as much murder as to kill the most regular-born Englishman;
To kill a child in its mother's
-except he be an alien enemy in time of war. (t).
womb, is now no murder, but a great misprision: but if the child be born
alive, and dieth by reason of the potion or bruises it received in the womb, it
seems, by the better opinion, to be murder in such as administered or gave
them, (m) But, as there is one case where it is difficult to prove the child's
being born alive, namely, in the case of the murder of bastard children by the
unnatural mother, it is enacted by statute 21 Jac. I, c. 27, that if any woman
should by law be a bastard; and
endeavours privately to conceal its death, by burying the child or the like; the
mother so offending shall suffer death as in the case of murder, unless she can
prove, by one witness at least, that the child was actually born dead. This law,
which savours pretty strongly of severity in making the concealment of the
death almost conclusive evidence of the child's being murdered by the mother,
is nevertheless to be also met with in the criminal codes of many other nations
of Europe: as the Danes, the Swedes, and the French, (v) But I apprehend
it has of late years been usual with us in England, upon trials for this offence,
to require some sort of presumptive evidence that the child was born alive,
before the other constrained presumption (that the child whose death is con
cealed was therefore killed by its parent) is admitted to convict the prisoner.

to

Lastly, the killing must be committed with malice aforethought, to make it
the crime of murder. This is the grand criterion which now distinguishes
murder from other killing: and this malice prepense, malitia prascogitata, is
not so properly spite or malevolence to the deceased in particular, as any evil
design in general: the dictate of a wicked, depraved, and malignant heart; (to)
un disposition a /aire un male chose; (x) and it may be either express or im?
plied in law. Express *malice is when one, with a sedate deliberate r*10Q-i'
mind and formed design, doth kill another: which formed design is
(p) Mlrr. c. 4. J 18. See book III. page 128.
(o) Britt c. 5. 4 Inst. 251.

I

(r) 1 Hal. P. C. 430.
(») Hawk. P. C. TO.
(() S Inst. BO. 1 Hal. P. C. 488.
(») See Barrington on the statutes, 425.
(u) 8 Inst. 60. 1 Hawk. P. C. 80, but see, 1 Hal. P. C. 433.
Foster,
p. 462.
236.
2
Roll.
Rep. 461.
(to)
(z)
(15) A physician is liable to a civil action for damages for want of reasonable care and
Hallam v. Means, 82 111., 879; Gramm v. Boener, 56 Ind., 407: Hyatt v. Adams, 10
skill.
Mich., 180; Hathorn v. Richmond, 48 Vt., 557; Riper v. Menifee, 12 B. Mon., 465; Leighton v. Sargent, 11 Fost ,119; Simonds v. Henry, 39 Me., 155 (case of a dentist).
(16) Whether one is a regular physician or not, he is bound to use competent skill, or the
death of the patient may render him guilty of manslaughter. R. v. Spiller, 5 C. & P., 333.
If a surgeon, regular or not, uses his best skill he is not liable for death. R. v. Williamson,
8C. & P., 635; R. v. VanButchell, 8 C. & P., 629; R. v. Long. 4 C. & P., 368; Com. v.
Thompson. 6 Mass., 184; Rice v. State, 8 Mo., 561. Otherwise if the fatal treatment was
But if one undertakes
adopted through obstinate rashness. Com. v. Thompson, ubi supra.
to act as surgeon, where competent assistance is attainable, he is responsible for the conse
R v. Webb, 1 Moo. & Rob. , 405.
quences, if death ensue.
The present law on the subject of this para
(17) Statute 21 James I, c. 27, is repealed.
graph is 24 and 25 Vic., c. 100.
393
Vol.
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(2)

evidenced by external circumstances discovering that inward intention; as
lying in wait, antecedent menaces, former grudges, and concerted schemes
to do him some bodily harm (y) This takes in the case of deliberate duelling,
where both parties meet avowedly with an intent to murder: thinking it their
duty as gentlemen, and claiming it as their right, to wanton with their own
lives and those of their fellow creatures; without any warrant or authority
from any power either divine or human, but in direct contradiction to the laws
both of God and man; and therefore the law has justly fixed the crime and
Yet
re
punishment of murder on them, and on their seconds also.
(18)
quires such
degree of passive valour to combat the dread of even undeserved
contempt, arising from the false notions of honour too generally received in
Europe, that the strongest prohibitions and penalties of the law will never be
entirely effectual to eradicate this unhappy custom; till a method be found out
of compelling the original aggressor to make some other satisfaction to the
affronted party, which the world shall esteem equally reputable, as that which
now given at the hazard of the life and fortune, as well of the person
insulted, as of him who hath given the insult. (19) Also,
even upon a sud
den provocation one beats another in a cruel and unusual manner, so that he
dies, though he did not intend his death, yet he
guilty of murder by express
malice: that
by an express evil design, the genuine sense of malitia. As,
when
horse's tail, and
park-keeper tied
boy that was stealing wood, to
master corrected his servant with an iron
dragged him along the park; when
bar; and a schoolmaster stamped on his scholar's belly; so that each of the
sufferers died
these were justly held to be murders, because the correction
bad heart,
was
being excessive, and such as could not proceed but from
equivalent to deliberate act of slaughter, (a) (20)
less crime, who kills another *in conser*200l-* Neither shall he be guilty of
wilful act as shows him to be an enemy to all man
quence of such
kind in general; as going deliberately, and with an intent to do mischief, (b) upon
a horse used to strike, or coolly discharging
multitude of
gun among
man resolves to kill the next man he meets, and does kill
So,
people, (c)
him,
murder, although he knew him not; for this
universal malice.
And,
two or more come together to do an nnlawful act against the king's
peace, of which the probable consequence might be bloodshed, as to beat man,
to commit
riot, or to rob a' park: and one of them kills
murder
man;
in them all, because of the unlawful act, the malitia proBcogitata, or evil in
tended beforehand, (d) (21)
Also, in many cases where no malice
as,
expressed, the law will imply
(«) Hawk. P. C. 83.
(J) Lord Raym. 143.
1

(c)

1

11

<v) Hal. P. 0. 451.
(a) HaL P. C. 454,473,474.

Hawk. P. C. 74.

(<i)Ibid. 84.
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(18) On the subject of challenges and duels, see note p. 150, ante.
Cush., 295, for the meaning of "malice
(19) See the case of Commonwealth v. Webster,
lied., 101; Whiteford v. Commonwealth,
Also State v. Martin,
Rand.,
aforethought"
721; Dale v. State, 10 Yerg., 551 Shoemaker v. State, 12 Ohio, 43; U.
v. Ross,
Gallis..
"
624 The words premeditated design,"
held, mean in legal effect the same as
" malice aforethought." McDaniel v. State, has 8.been
and M., 401.
Whether
legally with
malice aforethought when one
killed upon the sudden impulse of passion without previ
ous design, compare Commonwealth v. Webster,
295,
Austin,
Cush.
and People v.
Park.
C.
154, with Clark v. State,
Humph., 671, and Bivens v. State,
Eng. (Ark.), 455, and
the cases referred to in each.
(20) See Bishop, Cr. L., 7th ed., §§ 663, 683; Whart. Cr. L., 7th ed., §§ 969-990.
the act from which death ensues be malum inse,
will be murder or manslaugh
(21)
ter according to the circumstances;
done in prosecution of
felonious intent, but the
death ensued against or beside the intent of the party,
will be murder; but on the other
hand,
the intent went no further than to commit
bare trespass,
will be manslaughter.
* * * •
number of persons conspire to do an unlawful act, and they inflict death
as
means of effecting the design,
is murder in all.
the unlawful act was
trespass,
the murder to affect all must be done in the prosecution of the design.
the unlawful
act be
will be murder in all, although the death happened collaterally or beside
felony,
the principal design."
Wharton Cr. L. §§ 997, 98; and see generally §§ 997-1001.
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where a man wilfully poisons another; in such a deliberate act the law pre
sumes malice, though no particular enmity can be proved,
And
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-»

*■

(i)

is

a

is

1

1

\h)
11

1

is

it,

(I)

is

it

if

is

a

it

it

is

a

it

a

if

it,

is

if

is

a

is

if

a

if

it

a

if

is

a

a

kills another suddenly, without any, or without
considerable, provocation,
the law implies malice; for no person, unless of an abandoned heart, would
be guilty of such an act, upon
No affront, by
slight or no apparent cause.
a sufficient provocation, so as to excuse or extenu
words or gestures only,
ate such acts of violence as manifestly endanger the life of another, (f) But
the person so provoked had unfortunately killed the other, by beating him
in such
manner as showed only an intent to chastise and not to kill him, the
law so far considers the provocation of contumelious behaviour as to adjudge
In like manner,
one kills an
only manslaughter, and not murder, (g)
officer of justice, either civil or criminal, in the execution of his duty, or any
of his assistants, endeavouring to conserve the peace, or any private person
endeavouring to suppress an affray or apprehend felon, knowing his author
ity or the intention with which he interposes, the law will imply malice, and
the killer shall be guilty of murder. (A) And
one intends to do another
also murder,
Thus
man, this
felony, *and undesignedly kills
r*2oil
murder; because
one shoots at A and misses him, but kills B, this
of the previous felonious intent, which the law transfers from one to the other.
The same
the case where one lays poison for A; and B, against whom the
kills him; this
and
likewise
prisoner had no malicious intent, takes
murder, (j) So also
woman with child
medicine to procure
one gives
murder in the
abortion and
operates so violently as to kill the woman, this
person who gave it. (k) It were endless to go through all the cases of homi
cide which have been adjudged, either expressly or impliedly, malicious: these,
for
therefore, may suffice as specimen; and we may take
general rule,
that all homicide
malicious, and, of course, amounts to murder, unless where
justified by the command or permission of the law; excused on the account of
accident or self-preservation; or alleviated into manslaughter, by being either
the involuntary consequence of some act, not strictly lawful, or
voluntary,
And all these
occasioned by some sudden and sufficiently violent provocation.
incumbent upon tho
circumstances of justification, excuse, or alleviation,
prisoner to make out, to the satisfaction of the court and jury; the latter of
whom are to decide whether the circumstances alleged are proved to have
actually existed; the former, how far they extend to take away or mitigatethe guilt.
For all homicide
presumed to be malicious, until the contrary appeareth upon evidence.
(22)
The punishment of murder and that of manslaughter, was formerly one and
the same; both having the benefit of clergy; so that none but unlearned per
were put to death for this enormous
sons, who least knew the guilt of
crime, (m) But now by several statutes, (n) the benefit of clergy
taken
(?) Fost. 291.
(«) Hal. P. a 455.
(/) Hawk. P. 0. 88. Hal. P. C. 465,458.
Hal P. O. 467. Fost. 808,4c
(0 Hal. P. C. 465.
(J) Ibid. 466.
5

4

1

L

1

(I) Fost. 255.
(m) Hal. P. C. 450.
(Ic) Ibid. 429.
and Ph. and M. c. 4.
Kdw. VI, c. 12.
(n) 23Hen. Vm, o.

2

,

it
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5

3
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(22) As the majority of homicides are not, infact, malicious, but occur through misadvent
legal pre
ure, or under circumstances which would reduce the offence to manslaughter,
sumption of malice seems inconsistent with the general doctrines of the criminal law, as
referred to the Review of the
well as with humanity. On this subject the reader
Trial of Prof. Webster, by Hon. Joel Parker, North American Review, No. 72, p. 178.
That malice is not a legal presumption, from the fact of homicide, but an inference
to be drawn by the jury from the surrounding circumstances, see Wharton Or. L., 7th ed
712;Bish., 6th ed., §673; Farris v. Com., 14 Bush, 362; State v. Swayze,80La. Ann. II, 1323Dukes v. State, 14 Fla., 499;Maher v. People, 10 Mich., 212; Stokes v. People, 53 N. Y
164; State v. McDonnell, 82 Vt, 491; Clem v. State, 81 Ind., 480; Eiland v. State, 52 Ala.'
was held that the jury must infer malice, when
Gray, 463,
822. In Com. v. Hawkins,
the surrounding circumstances are known, limiting the application of the doctrine laid down
Met 93. See also U. 8. v Arm
Cush., 295, and Com. v. York,
in Com. v. Webster,
strong, Curt C. 0., 446; Brwin v. State, 29 Ohio St., 186.
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away from murderers through malice prepense, their abettors, procurers, and
In atrocious cases, it was frequently usual for the court to direct
-counsellors.
the murderer, after execution, to be hung upon a gibbet in chains near the
committed: but this was no part of the legal
T*202lJ P^ace *where the fact was
*■
judgment ; and the like is still sometimes practised in the case of
notorious thieves. This being quite contrary to the express command of the
Mosaical law, (o) seems to have been borrowed from the civil law: which, besides
the terror of the example, gives also another reason for this practice, viz.:
that it is a comfortable sight to the relations and friends of the deceased, (p)
But now in England, it is enacted by statute 25 Geo. II, c. 37, that the judge,
before whom any person is found guilty of wilful murder, shall pronounce sen
tence immediately after conviction, unless he sees cause to postpone it; and
shall, in passing sentence, direct him to be executed on the next day but one (un
less the same shall be Sunday, and then on the Monday following), and that his
body be delivered to the surgeons to be dissected and anatomized: (q) and that
the judge may direct his body to be afterwards hung in chains, but in nowise
to be buried without dissection. And, during the short but awful interval be
tween sentence and execution, the prisoner shall be kept alone, and sustained
But a power is allowed to the judge, upon good
with only bread and water.
and sufficient cause, to respite the execution, and relax the other restraints of
this act. (23)
By the Roman law, parricide, or the murder of one's parents or children,
was punished in a much severer manner than any other kind of homicide.
After being scourged, the delinquents were sewed up in a leathern sack, with a
live dog, a cock, a viper, and an ape, and so cast into the sea. (r) Solon, it is true,
in his laws, made none against parricide; apprehending it impossible that any
And the Persians, accord
■one should be guilty of so unnatural a barbarity. («)
ing to Herodotus, entertained the same notion, when they adjudged all persons
And, upon some such reason
who killed their reputed parents to be bastards.
as this, we must account for the *omission of an exemplary punishment
rt„.„1
*■
for this crime in our English laws; which treat it no otherwise than as
simple murder, unless the child was also the servant of his parent.
observed, yet the breach of
For, though the breach of natural relation
■civil or ecclesiastical connexions, when coupled with murder, denominates
new offence, no less than
species of treason, called parva proditio, or petit
treason which however
nothing else but an aggravated degree of murder;
stigmatized
(u) although, on account of the violation of private allegiance,
And thus, in the ancient Gothic consti
as an inferior species of treason. (»)
tution, we find the breach both of natural and civil relations ranked in the same
«lass with crimes against the state and the sovereign, (w)
Petit treason, (24) according to the statute 25 Edward IU, o.
may happen
three ways, by a servant killing his master,
wife her husband, or an ecclesias
tical person (either secular or regular) his superior, to whom he owes faith and
A servant who kills his master, whom he has left, upon grudge
obedience.
conceived against him during his service,
guilty of petit treason: tor the
traitorous intention was hatched while the relation subsisted between them;

(o) "The body of a malefactor shall not remain all night upon the tree, but thou shalt In any wtae
bury him that day, that the land be not defiled." Deut.
S3.
(p) " Famotot latronet, in hit locis, ubi grattati sunt, /urea Agendas placu.it ut, et contpectu dettrreantur alii, et solatio sit cognatit interemptorum eodem loco poena reddita, in quo latronet homicidia
Ff. 48, 19,28, 16.
fecissent."
(q) Fost. 107.
83.
Hal. P. C. 880.
(r) Ff. 41,
(») Olo. pro. 3. Rotcio,
(f)
107,824,886.
(u) Foster,
(t>)See page 76.
"
(t£) Omnium gravitsima censetur vis facta ab incolis in patriam, tubditis in renem. libertt in parenies, maritit in rtxoret, {etvice verta), tervit in dominos, out etiam ab homine in semet iptum. Stiera. de
jure Goth.
o.
1
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c. 37,
repealed, and by and
Win.
(23) The act 25 Geo.
cases of murder was made the same as in other capital cases.
unknown to the law of the United States,
(24) Petit treason
land by statute
Geo. IV, c. 31,

in

IV,

c. 30, sentence of death

and was abolished in Ensr-
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and this is only an execution of that intention, (z) So, if a wife be divorced
a mema et thoro, still the vinculum matrimonii subsists, and if she kills such
divorced husband, she is a traitress, (y) And a clergyman is understood toowe canonical obedience to the bishop who ordained him, to him in whose dio
cese he is beneficed, and also to the metropolitan of such suffragan or diocesan
bishop: and therefore to kill any of these is petit treason, (z) As to the rest,
whatever has been said, or remains to be observed hereafter, with respect towilful murder, is also applicable to the crime of petit treason, which is no other
than murder in *its most odious degree: except that the trial shall be r»of)4l"
as in cases of high treason, before the improvements therein made by
the statutes of William III. (a) But a person indicted of petit treason may
be acquitted thereof, and found guilty of manslaughter or murder: (b) and insuch case it should seem that two witnesses are not necessary, as in case of
petit treason they are. Which crime is also distinguished from murder in itspunishment.
The punishment of petit treason, in a man, is to be drawn and hanged, and
in a woman to be drawn and burnt; (c) the idea of which latter punishment
seems to have been handed down to us by the laws of the ancient Druids, which
condemned a woman to be burnt for murdering her husband; (d) and it is now
the usual punishment for all sorts of treason committed by those of the female
Persons guilty of petit treason were first debarred the benefit of
sex. (e) (25)
clergy, by statute 12 Hen. VII, c. 7, which has been since extended to their
aiders, abettors and counsellors, by statutes 23 Hen. VIII, c. 1, and 4 and 5 P.
and M. c. 4.

CHAPTER XV.

OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSONS OF INDIVID
UALS.
Having in the preceding chapter considered

the prinoipal orime, or public
wrong, that can be committed against a private subject, namely, by destroy
ing his life; proceed now to inquire into such other crimes and misdemeanors,
as more peculiarly affect the security of his person, while living.
Of these some are felonies, and in their nature capital; others are simple mis
demeanors, and punishable with a lighter animadversion.
Of the felonies, thefirst is that of mayhem.
I. Mayhem, mayhemittm, was in part considered in the preceding book,
(a) as a civil injury; but it is also looked upon in a criminal light by the law,
being an atrocious breach of the king's peace, and an offence tending to deprive
him of the aid and assistance of his subjects.
For mayhem is properly defined
to be, as we may remember, the violently depriving another of the use of such
of his members as may render him the less able in fighting, either to defend
himself, or to annoy his adversary, (b) _ And therefore the cutting off, or dis
abling, or weakening a man's hand or 'finger, or striking out his eye or fore
tooth, or depriving him of those parts the loss of which in all animals abate*
But the cutting off his ear, r^,..,
their courage, are held to *be mayhems.
or nose, or the like, are not held to be mayhems at common law; be- *cause they do not weaken but only disfigure him.

I

(jrt 1 Hat P. 0. 881.
(i) 1 Hawk. P. C. 89. 1 Hal. P. 0. 880.
(«) Foster, 106. 1 Hal. P. C. 878L 2 Hal. P. O. 184.

(*) Ibid.

(e) 1 Hal. P. C. 883. 8 Inst. 811.
(d) Caesar de bell. Gall. I. 8, c. 19.
(a) See book m, p. 191.
(4) Britt. 1.1, c. 25. 1 Hawk, P. C. 111.
(25)

It

was abolished by 30 Qeo.

Ill,

C 48 .

(a) Fort, 897.
(«) see page 93.
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By the ancient law of England he that maimed any man, whereby he lost
any part of his body, was sentenced to lose the like part; membrum pro memwhich
still the law in Sweden, (d) But this went afterwards out of
bro;
at best
use: partly because the law of retaliation, as was formerly shown,
an inadequate rule of punishment; and partly because upon a repetition of the
So that, by the common law,
offence the punishment could not be repeated.
as
for long time stood, mayhem was only punishable with fine and impri
sonment; (f) unless perhaps the offence of mayhem by castration, which all
our old writers held to be felony: " et aequitur cdiquando poena capitalis, aliAnd this,
■quando perpetuum exilium, cum omnium bonorum ademptione." (g)
although the mayhem was committed upon the highest provocation. (A)
But subsequent statutes have put the crime andpunishment of mayhem more
to remedy
out of doubt. For first, by statute
mischief
Henry IV, o.
man, and then cutting
that then prevailed of beating, wounding, or robbing
out his tongue, or putting out his eyes, to prevent him from being an evidence
declared to be felony,
done of malice prepense;
against them, this offence
that is, as Sir Edward Coke
explains
voluntarily, and of set purpose,
the statute
Next, in order of time,
though done upon sudden occasion.
man shall maliciously and unlawwhich directs, that
37 Hen. VIII, c.
the ear °f anv °f the *king's subjects, he shall not only
f*9fy7l fQUy ou'
"■
forfeit treble damages to the party grieved, to be recovered by action of
civil satisfaction; but also 10i. by way of fine to
trespass at common law, as
The last statute, but by far the
the king, which was his criminal amercement.
that of 22 and 23 Car. H, c.
most severe and effectual of all,
called the
Coventry Act; being occasioned by an assault on Sir John Coventry in the
street, and slitting his nose, in revenge (as was supposed) for some obnoxious
enacted, that
words uttered by him in parliament. By this statute
any
person shall, of malice aforethought and by lying in wait, unlawfully cut out or
nose or lip, or out
disable the tongue, put out an eye, slit the nose, cut off
off or disable any limb or member of any other person, with intent to maim or
to disfigure him,' such person, his counsellors, aiders, and abettors, shall be
guilty of felony without benefit of clergy, (k)
Thus much for the felony of mayhem; to which may be added the offence of
wilfully and maliciously shooting at any person in any dwelling-house or other
place; an offence, of which the probable oonsequence may be either killing or
him. This, though no suoh evil consequence "'ensues,
made
*2os1 maimmS
*■
Geo.
c. 22, and thereupon
felony without benefit of clergy by statute
one Arnold was convicted in 1723 for shooting at Lord Onslow; but, being half
a madman, was never executed, but confined in prison, where he died about
thirty years after. (1)
(c) Inst. US — Met, ti lapleynte eoit faite de femme qu'avera tolie a home tee membree, en fief earn

8

, i

(3

1

I.
8,
t.

perdra le feme laune meyn par jugement, come le memore dount ele avera tretpaete. (Brit, c. 24.)
8.
(d) Stiernbook tie jure Sueon.
(») See page 12.
P. C. 112.
(0) Brao. fol 144.
(/) Sir Hawlc.
Inst. 62)baa transcribed
Edward Coke
(h)
m. 9), by which a gentleman of Somersetshire and
mitted to prison, being indicted for dealing thus
the wife.
(t) Inst. 62.
(k) On this statute Mr. Coke, a gentleman of Suffolk, and one Woodburn, a laborer, were Indicted In
1722;Coke for hiring and abetting Woodburn, and Woodburn for the actual fact of slitting the nose of
Mr. Crispe, Coke's brother-in-law. The case was somewhat singular. The murder of Crispe was intended,
and he was left for dead, being terribly backed and disfigured with a hedge-bill: but he recovered. Now
the bare Intent to murder is no felony; but to disfigure with an Intent to disfigure, is made so by the
statute; on which they were therefore indicted. And Coke, who was a disgrace to the profession of the
law, had the effrontery to rest his defence upon this point, that the assault was not committed with an in
tent to disfigure, but with an Intent to murder; and therefore not within the statute. But the court held,
that if a man attacks another to murder him with such an instrument as a hedge-bill, which cannot but

8

is

7

,

7

1

(1) All the previous statutes, so far as they relate to offenses against the person, were
Vic., c. 85. For the most recent revision of the law on this
Wm. IV, and
repealed by
now the extreme
subject, see statute 24 and 25 Vic. c. 100. Penal servitude for life
As to the proper mode of charging mayhem, see Chick v. State,
icnalty.
Humph., 161;
.tate v. Briley,
Port. (Ala.), 472.
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II. The second offence, more immediately affecting the personal security of
individuals, relates to the female part of his majesty's subjects; being that of
their forcible abduction and marriage; which is vulgarly called stealing an
For by statute 3 Hen. VII, c. 2, it is enacted, that if any person shall
heiress.
for lucre take any woman, being maid, widow, or wife, and having substance
either in goods or lands, or being heir apparent to her ancestors, contrary to
her will; and afterwards she be married to such misdoer, or by his consent to
another, or defiled; such person, his procurers and abettors, and such as know
ingly receive such woman, shall be deemed principal felons; and by statute 39
Ehz. c. 9, the benefit of clergy is taken away from all such felons, who shall
be principals, procurers, or accessories before the fact. (2)
In the construction of this statute it hath been determined: 1. That the in
dictment must allege that the taking was for lucre, for such are the words of
the statute.
2. In order to show this,
must appear that the woman has
an heir apparent, (m) 3. It must appear
substance, either real or personal, or
that she was taken away against her wilL 4. It must also appear that she was
afterwards married, or defiled. And though possibly the marriage or defile
ment might be by her subsequent consent being won thereunto by flatteries
after the taking, yet this
the first taking were against her will: (n)
felony,
and so vice versa,
the woman be originally taken away with her own con
she afterwards refuse to continue with the offender, and be forced
sent, yet
against her will, she may from that time as properly *be said to be r* „og-i
taken against her will, as
she never had given any consent at all;
for till the force was put upon her she was in her own power, (o) It
held
that
woman thus taken away and married may be sworn and give evidence
against the offender, though he her husband de facto; contrary to the general
rule of law; because he
no husband de jure, in case the actual marriage was
In cases, indeed, where the actual marriage good,
also against her will,
by the consent of the inveigled woman obtained after her forcible abduction,
Sir Matthew Hale seems to question how far her evidence should be allowed:
but other authorities (q) seem to agree, that
should even then be admitted;
absurd, that the offender should thus take advantage of his own
esteeming
wrong, and that the very act of marriage, which
principal ingredient of
his crime, should (by
forced construction of law) be made use of to stop the
mouth of the most material witness against him.
An inferior degree of the same kind of offence, but not attended with force,
and
P. and M. c.
which enacts, that
punished by the statutes
any
person, above the age of fourteen, unlawfully shall convey or take away any
woman child unmarried (which
held (r) to extend to bastards as well as to
legitimate children), within the age of sixteen years, from the possession and
against the will of the father, mother, guardians, or governors, he shall be im
prisoned for two years, or fined at the discretion of the justices; and
he de
flowers such maid or woman ohild, or without the consent of parents contracts
matrimony with her, he shall be imprisoned five years, or fined at the dis
cretion of the justices, and she shall forfeit all her lands to her next of kin,
So that as these stolen marriages, under
during the life of her said husband.
the age of sixteen, were usually upon mercenary views, this act, besides punish-

8

1

1

11

11

ly

It

it

endanger the disfiguring him; and In such attack happens not to kill, but only to disfigure him; he may
be indicted on this statute: and
shall be left to the Jury to determine whether
were not a design to
murder by disfiguring, and consequently a malicious Intent to disfigure as well as to murder. According
the jury round them guilty of such previous intent to disfigure, in order to effect the principal intent to
murder, and they were both condemned and executed. (State Trials, VL 212.)
Hawk. P. C. 109.
(1) Hawk. P. C. 110.
(m) Hal. P. C. 660.
(n) Hal. P. C. 660.
(p)
HaL P. C. 661.
(q) Cro. Car. 488. Keb. 193. State Trials. V, 455.
(o) Hawk. P. 0. 110.
<r) Stra. 1162.

is

is

is

now punishable under statute 24 and 25 Via, c. 100. The extreme
(2) This offense
fourteen years' penal servitude. The guilty party is made incapable, by the
penalty
statute, of taking any estate or interest in the property of the woman married, but the
to be settled as the court of chancery may appoint.
property, on his conviction,
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ing the seducer, wisely removed the temptation. But this latter part of the
r*2lOlJ *°* *8 now ren<Jered 'almost useless, by provisions of a very different
*■
kind, which make the marriage totally void, (s) in the statute 26 Geo.

if,

c. 38. (8)

III. A

8.

Ut. 13.
(u) Li. Out. Oonq. e. 19.
(6' Barrington, 14*.
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and
P. and M.,
repealed, and the subject of this paragraph
(8) The act
ered by 24 and 26 Vic,
100. See Roecoe Cr. Ev., 6th ed., 244.
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(«) Cod.
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c. 88.

I.
8, t.
8.
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J.

6.

1. L
8,

page 497,Ac
<t) Dent. zzU, 25.
(«) See book
c S8.
(x) Btlernh. dejure Sueon,
(to) Bracton,
14,c.
Bract
(ft) Hal F. a 483.
(a) Qiao.
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third offence, against the female part also of his majesty's subjects,
but attended with greater aggravation than that of forcible marriage, is the
crime of rape, raptus mulierum, or the carnal knowledge of a woman forcibly
and against her will.
was punished with death,
This, by the Jewish law,
in case the damsel was betrothed to another man and in case she was not
betrothed, then
heavy fine of fifty shekels was to be paid to the damsel's
father, and she was to be the wife of the ravisher all the days of his life; with
out that power of divorce, which was in general permitted by the Mosaic law.
The civil law (u) punishes the crime of ravishment with death and confisca
tion of goods: under which
includes both the offence of forcible abduction,
or taking away woman from her friends, of which we last spoke: and also the
present offence of forcibly dishonouring them; either of which, without the
in that law sufficient to constitute capital crime. Also the stealing
other,
woman from her parents or guardians, and debauching her,
away
equally
forced: " sive volentipenal by the emperor's edict, whether she consent or
And this,
bus, sive nolentibus mulieribus, tale /acinus fuerit perpetratum."
in order to take away from women every opportunity of offending in this way:
whom the Roman law supposes never to go astray, without the seduction ami
arts of the other sex: and therefore, by restraining and making so highly penal
the solicitations of the men, they meant to secure effectually the honour of
" Si enim ipsi raptores metu, vel atrocitate poena;, ab hujusmodi
the women.
facinore se temperaverint, nulli mulieri, sive volenti, sive nolenti, peccandi
locus relinquetur; quia hoc ipsum velle mulierum, ab insidiis nequissimi hominis
yu*mea'itatur rapinam, inducitur. *Nisi etenim earn solicitaverit, nisi,
*2111
odiosis artibus circumvenerit, non faciei earn velle in tantum dedecu*
But our English law does not entertain quite such sublime ideas
sese prodere."
of the honour of either sex, as to lay the blame of mutual fault upon one of the
necessary ingredient in the crime
transgressors only: and therefore makes
must be against the woman's will.
of rape, that
Rape was punished by the Saxon laws, particularly those of King Athelstan, (to) with death: which was also agreeable to the old Gothic or Scandi
navian constitution, (a;) But this was afterwards thought too hard: and in its
stead another severe but not capital punishment was inflicted by William the
viz., castration and loss of eyes; (y) which continued until
Conqueror
after Bracton wrote, in the reign of Henry the Third. But, in order to pre
vent malicious accusations,
was then the law (and,
seems, still continues
to be so in appeals of rape), (z) that the woman should immediately after,
dum reeens fuerst mnleficium, go to the next town, and there make discovery
to some credible persons of the injury she has suffered; and afterwards should
acquaint the high constable of the hundred, the coroners, and the sheriff with
the outrage, (a) This seems to correspond in some degree with the laws of
Scotland and Arragon, (q) which require that complaint must be made within
c 13, the time
twenty-four hours: though afterwards, by statute Westm.
of limitation in England was extended to forty days.
At present there no
time of limitation fixed: for as
usually now punished by indictment at
the suit of the king, the maxim of law takes place, that nullum tempus occurrit
stale complaint.
regi; but the jury will rarely give credit to
During the

cot.
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former period also it was held for law, (c) that the woman (by consent of the
judge and her parents) might redeem the offender from the execution of his
sentence, by accepting him for her husband; if he also was willing to agree
to the exchange, but not otherwise.
*In the 3 Edw. I, by the statute Westm. 1, c. 13, the punishment of rtoiol
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(e) ibid.
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rape was much mitigated; the offence itself of ravishing a damsel
twelve years old), either with her consent or without, or of
within age (that
not prose
trespass,
any. other woman against her will, being reduced to
cuted by appeal within forty days, and subjecting the offender only to two
fine at the king's will.
But this lenity being pro
years' imprisonment, and
ductive of the most terrible consequences,
was in ten years afterwards, 13
Edw.
found necessary to make the offence of forcible rape felony by statute
made felony without benefit
Westm.
And by statute 18 Eliz. c.
c. 34.
of clergy; as
also the abominable wickedness of carnally knowing and
abusing any woman child under the age of ten years: in which case the con
in
immaterial, as by reason of her tender years she
sent or non-consent
indeed of opinion
capable of judgment and discretion. Sir Matthew Hale
that such profligate actions committed on an infant under the age of twelve
years, the age of female discretion by the common law, either with or without
consent, amount to rape and felony: as well since as before the statute of
Queen Elizabeth; (d) but that law has in general been held only to extend to
infants under ten: though
should seem that damsels between ten and twelve
are still under the protection of the statute Westm.
the law with respect
to their seduction not having been altered by either of the subsequent stat
utes. (4)
A male infant, under the age of fourteen years, presumed by law incapa
ble to commit
seems cannot be found guilty of it.
For
rape, and therefore
though in other felonies mulitia supplet cetaiem, as has in some cases been shown;
et, as to this particular species of felony, the law supposes an imbecility of
ody as well as mind,
(5)
The civil law seems to suppose
prostitute or common harlot incapable of
any injuries of this kind: (f) not allowing *any punishment for violat- r,„.„,
ing the chastity of her who hath indeed no chastity at all, or at least
hath no regard to it. But the law of England does not judge so hardly of of
fenders, as to cut off all opportunity of retreat even from common strumpets,
and to treat them as never capable of amendment.
It therefore holds to be
concubine or harlot; because the woman may have for
felony to force even
saken that unlawful course of life: {g) for, as Bracton well observes, (A) "licet
meretrix fuerit antea, certe tunc temporis non fuit, cum reciamando nequitice
ejus consentire noluit. (6)
As to the material facts requisite to be given in evidence and proved upon
an indictment of rape, they are of such
nature, that though necessary to be
known and settled, for the conviction of the guilty and preservation of the in
nocent, and therefore to be found in such criminal treatises as discourse of these
matters in detail, yet they are highly improper to be publicly discussed, except
Hawk. P.

a

108.

(Jk) fol. 147.

4
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a

female child under tea
(4) The punishment for rape, and also for carnal knowledge of
Vic, c. 56, and now
years of age, was reduced to transportation for life, by statute
and
to penal servitude or imprisonment.
Statute 34 and 35 Vic, c. 100.
boy under the age of puberty, or woman, or husband in respect to his own
(5) But
wife, may become guilty as principal in the second degree of this offense of rape.
In Com
Pick., 380,
monwealth v. Green,
Was held that
boy under fourteen might be guilty of
an assault with intent to commit rape.
And see Williams v. State, 14 Ohio, 222. But the
decisions generally are the other way.
Bish. Cr. L., 7th ed.,
Bee
740.
or not, she
entitled to the protection of the law.
(6) And whether she has forsaken
See Wright v. State,
Humph., 194; Pleasant t. State, 15 Ark., 624. But her character
may have an important bearing on the credibility of her accusation.
51
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shall, therefore, merely add upon this head a few
only in a court of justice.
remarks from Sir Matthew Hale: with regard to the competency and credibil
ity of witnesses; which may, salvo pudore, be considered.
And, first, the party ravished may give evidence upon oath, and is in law a
competent witness; but the credibility of her testimony, and how far forth she
is to be believed, must be left to the jury upon the circumstances of fact that
concur in that testimony. For instance: if the witness be of good fame; if she
presently discovered the offence, and made search for the offender; if the party
accused fled for it; these and the like are concurring circumstances which give
But on the other side, if she be of evil
greater probability to her evidence.
fame, and stand unsupported by others; if she concealed the injury for any
considerable time after she had opportunity to complain; if the place where the
fact was alleged to be committed was where it was possible she might have been
an<^ 8ne ma(ie no outcry; these and the *like circumstances carry
T*2l4l neard>
a strong but not conclusive presumption that her testimony is false or
feigned. (7).
Moreover, if the rape be charged to be committed on an infant under twelve
years of age, she may still be a competent witness, if she hath sense and under
standing to know the nature and obligations of an oath; or even to be sensibleof
the wickedness of telling a deliberate lie. Nay, though she hath not, it is thought
that she ought to be heard without oath, to give
by Sir Matthew Hale
the court information; and others have held, that what the child told her mother,
or other relations, may be given in evidence, since the nature of the case admits
now settled [Brazier's case, before the
frequently of no better proof. But
twelve judges, P. 19 Geo. in], that no hearsay evidence can be given of the
child who hath not capacity to be sworn, nor can such child
declaration of
no determinate age at
be examined in court without oath: ana that there
which the oath of child ought either to be admitted or rejected. Yet, where
admitted,
muoh to be wished, in order to render
the evidence of children
their evidence credible, that there should be some concurrent testimony of time,
place, and circumstances, in order to make out the fact; and that the convic
tion should not be grounded singly on the unsupported accusation of an infant
under years of discretion. There may be therefore, in many cases of this nature,
who may be admitted to be heard; and
witnesses who are competent, that
bound
yet, after being heard, may prove not to be credible, or such as the jury
that the jury are triers
For one excellence of the trial by jury
to believe.
of the credit of the witnesses, as well as of the truth of the fact.
" *8 true>" 8avs tn'9 learned judge, (j) " that rape
a most der*2 >>1
testable crime, and therefore ought severely and impartially to be punHaL P. 0. 63S.
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(7) The complaint made by the person alleged to have been ravished, immediately after
cannot be put in as independent evidence, to show who were the persons
the occurrence,
C.
Reg. v. Mcgson,
-who committed the offense, even though she be since deceased.
P., 420; and see People v. McGee, Denio, 19.
The general doctrine in the United States i9, that the details of the complaint are not ad
missible in evidence to corroborate the complaining witness, although the fact of complaint
different doctrine seems to be held, and the
But in Ohio, Connecticut and Tennessee
is.
For discussion and full collection of cases on the point, see note to
details are admitted.
no
Amor. Crim. Rep. See, also, Roscoe Cr. Ev. p. 26. There
Maillet v. People, in
legal presumption against the truth of charge from long silence on the part of the com
simply matter for the jury to consider. State v. Peter, Jones. 19.
plainant. The delay
obtained br
not committed where the woman's consent
It has been held that rape
fraud, she at the time supposing the man to be her husband. Rex v. Jackson, Russ.
Rv.
Ala.,
C. & P., 265; Reg. v. Williams, ui.,286; State v. Murphv,
487; Reg. v. Saunders.
Swan, 394. But this has been doubted.
People v. Metcalf,
705; Wyatt v. Slate,
Conn., 54. Carnal knowledge of the
Wheel. C. 0., 378 and note, 381; State v. Shepard,
not rape,
woman, unaccompanied with any circumstance of force or fraud,
person of
though the woman mav have been at the time mentally incompetent to give consent. Crosewell v. People, 13 Mich., 427.
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idled with death; hut it must he remembered that it is an accusation easy to
make, hard to be proved, but harder to be defended by the party accused,
though innocent." He then relates two very extraordinary cases of malicious
prosecution for this crime, that had happened within his own observation; and
conoludes thus: " I mention these instances, that we may be the more cautious
upon trials of offences of this nature, wherein the court and jury may with so
much ease be imposed upon, without great care and vigilance; the heinousness
of the offence many times transporting the judge and jury with so much indig
nation that they are over-hastily carried to the conviction of the person accused
thereof, by the confident testimony sometimes of false and malicious wit
nesses." (8)
IV. What has been here observed, especially with regard to the manner of
proof, which ought to be more clear in proportion as the crime is the more
detestable, may be applied to another offence, of a still deeper malignity; the
infamous crime against nature, committed either with man or beast.
A orime
which ought to be strictly and impartially proved, and then as strictly and im
partially punished. But it is an offence of so dark a nature, so easily charged,
and the negative so difficult to be proved, that the accusation should be clearly
made ont: for, if false, it deserves a punishment inferior only to that of the
orime itself.
will not act so disagreeable a part, to my readers as well as myself, as to
dwell any longer upon a subject, the very mention of which is a disgrace to
human nature. It will be more eligible to imitate in this respect the delicacy
in its very indictments, as crime not fit
of our English law, which treats
to be named
"peccatum illud horribile, inter christianos non nominandum."
(k) A taciturnity observed ""likewise by the edict of Constanti us and r*o1R-i
"uoi scelus est id, quod non prqficit scire, jubemus insurConstans:
gere leges, armarijura gladio ultore, ut exquisitis pcenis subdantur infamee qui
word concerning its
sunt, vel qui futuri sunt ret'." "Which leads me to add
punishment.
This the voice of nature and of reason, and the express law of God, (m) de
termined to be capital. Of which we have
signal instance long before the
Jewish dispensation, by the destruction of two cities by fire from heaven; so
an universal, not merely
And our ancient
that this
provincial precept.
law in some degree imitated this* punishment, by commanding such miscreants
to be burnt to death; (n) though Fleta (o) says they should be buried alive;
either of which punishments was indifferently used for this crime among the
ancient Goths, (p)
But now the general punishment of all felonies
the
same, namely, by hanging; and this offence (being in the times of popery only
subjeot to ecclesiastical
censures) was made felony without benefit of clergy
revived and confirmed by
Eliz. c. 17. And
by statute 25 Hen. VIH, c.
that
both are arrived at years of discretion, agentes
the rule of law herein
et eonsentientes pari poena plectantur. (q) (9)
These are all the felonious offences more immediately against the personal
security of the subject. The inferior offences or misdemeanors, that fall un
der this head, are assaults, batteries, wounding, false imprisonment, and kid
napping. (10)
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(*) See In Rot. Pari. SOEdw. m, n, 88, complaint, that a Lombard did commit the ato, that waa not
to be named." IS Rep. 87.
(pi) Lerlt. xz, 18,16.
c. 87.
81.
(n) Britt c.
(o)
(I) Cod.
(j) Inst. 59.
e.
(p) Stlernh. de jure Qoth.
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female child under the age of twelve
(8) By statute 88 and 39 Vic, c. 94, carnal abuse of
the
punishable by penal servitude for tlife or not less than thirteen years, and
years
misdemeanor,
even though the
female be over twelve, but under thirteen, the act
female consents.
01, which makes
(9) As to this offense, see statute 24 and 25 Vic, c. 100,
punishable
And see Blah. Or. I*,
by penal servitude for life, or for any term not less than ten years.
Cr.,
Russ. on
698.
7th ed., eh. 48; Ros. Or. Ev., 871;
(10) See, as to these offenses, statute 24 and 25 Via, 0. 100.
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V. VI. VTL With regard to the nature of the three first of these offences in
general, have nothing further to add to what has already been observed in
the preceding book of these Commentaries; (r) when we considered them as
private wrongs, or civil injuries, for which a satisfaction or remedy is given
*° *ne Par*7 aggrieved. But, taken in a public light as a 'breach of
X*i\1~\J
L
the king's peace, an affront to his government, and a damage done to
his subjects, they are also indictable and punishable with fines and imprison
ment; or with other ignominious corporal penalties, where they are committed
As in case of an assault with an intent towith any very atrocious design.
murder, or with an intent to commit either of the crimes last spoken of; for
which intentional assaults, in the two last cases, indictments are much more
usual than for the absolute perpetration of the facts themselves, on account of
the difficulty of proof; or, when both parties are consenting to an unnatural
usual not to charge any assault; but that one of them laid hands
attempt,
on the other with intent to commit, and that the other permitted the same
with intent to suffer the commission of, the abominable orime before men
tioned. And, in all these cases, besides heavy fine and imprisonment,
usual to award judgment of the pillory. (11)
There
also one species of battery, more atrocious and penal than the rest,
which
the beating of
clerk in orders, or clergyman on account of the
respect and reverence due to his sacred character, as the minister and am
enacted by the statute called articuli
bassador of peace.
Accordingly
cleri, Edw. II, c.
that
clerk, the
any person lay violent hands upon
amends for the peace broken shall be before the king: that is, by indictment
in the king's courts; and the assailant may also be sued before the bishop, that
excommunication or bodily penance may be imposed: which
the offender
will redeem by money, to be given to the bishop, or the party aggrieved,
may be sued for before the bishop whereas otherwise to sue in any spiritual
court for civil damages for the battery, falls within the danger of praemunire,
But suits are and always were, allowable in the spiritual court, for money
commutation for penance, (u) So that upon the whole
agreed to be given as
sub
appears, that
clergyman
person guilty of such brutal behavior to
ject to three kinds of prosecution, all of which may be pursued for one and
the same offence: an indictment, for the breach of the king's peace by such
assault and battery; a civil action, for the special damage sustained by the
party injured; and a suit in the ecclesiastical court, first, pro corrections et
salute animce, by enjoining penance, and then again for such sum of money
a8 shall be agreed on for taking off the penance enjoined; *it being
r*21Rl
*usual in those courts to exchange their spiritual censures for
round
compensation in money;
generally esteemed by
perhaps because poverty
the moralists the best medicine pro salute anima. (12)
VHL The two remaining crimes and offences, against the persons of his
majesty's subjects, are infringements of their natural liberty: concerning the
first of which, false imprisonment, its nature and incidents,
must content
myself with referring the student to what was observed in the preceding book,
But besides the private
as
mere civil injury.
(to) when we considered
satisfaction given to the individual by action, the law also demands public
vengeance for the breach of the king's peace, for the loss which the state sus
tains by the confinement of one of its members, and for the infringement of
the good order of society. We have seen before, (as) that the most atrocious
degree of this offence, that of sending any subject of this realm
prisoner into
See
book
page
ISO,
Hawk.
P.
65.
C.
in.
(r)
(»)
F. N. B. 63.
(() Inst. 492,620.
(u) Arctic. Cler. Edw. II, o.
(t>) Roll. Hep. «8i.
(«) See page 116.
(to) See book III, page 127.
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parts beyond the seas, whereby he is deprived of the friendly assistance of the
laws to redeem him from such his captivity, is punished with the pains of
prcemunire, and incapacity to hold any office, without any possibility of par
don, (y) And we may also add, that by statute 48 Eliz. c. 13, to carry any
one by force out of the four northern counties, or imprison him within the
same, in order to ransom him or make spoil of his person or goods, is felony
without benefit of clergy, in the principals and all accessories before the fact.
Inferior degrees of the same offence, of false imprisonment, are also punish
able by indictment, (like assaults and batteries) and the delinquent may be
fined and imprisoned, (a) And, indeed,
there can be no doubt but that all
(a)
kinds of crimes of a public nature, all disturbances of the peace, all oppres
sions, and other misdemeanors whatsoever of a notoriously evil example, may
be indicted at the suit of the king.
*IX. The other remaining offence, that of kidnapping, being the ra-oioi
J
forcible abduction or stealing away of a man, woman, or child, from «■
their own country, and sending them into another, was capital by the Jewish
law. " He that stealeth a man, and selleth him, or if he be found in his hand,
he shall surely be put to death." (b)
So likewise in the civil law, the offence
of spiriting away and stealing men and children; which was called plagium,
and the offenders plagiarii, was punished with death, (c) This is unquestion
ably a very heinous crime, as it robs the king of his subjects, banishes a man
from his country, and may in its consequences be productive of the most cruel
and disagreeable hardships; and therefore the common law of England has
punished it with fine, imprisonment, and pillory, (d) And also the statute 11
and 12 Wm. Ill, c. 7, though principally intended against pirates, has a clause
that extends to prevent the leaving of such persons abroad, as are thus kid
napped or spirited away; by enacting, that if any captain of a merchant
vessel shall (during his being abroad) force any person on shore, or wilfully
leave him behind, or refuse to bring home all such men as he carried out, if
able and desirous to return, he shall suffer three months' imprisonment. (13)
And thus much for offences that more immediately affect the persons of indi
viduals.

CHAPTER XVI.

OF OFFENCES

AGAINST THE HABITATIONS
INDIVIDUALS.

OF

Thk only two offences that more immediately affect the habitations of indi
viduals or private subjects, are those of arson and burglary.
1. Arson, ab ardendo, is the malicious and wilful burning the house or out
house of another man.
This is an offence of very great malignity, and much
more pernicious to the publio than simple theft: because first, it is an offence
against that right of habitation, which is acquired by the law of nature as well
as by the laws of society; next, because of the terror and confusion that neces
sarily attend it; and, lastly, because in simple theft the thing stolen only
changes its master but still remains in esse for the benefit of the public, where
as by burning the very substance is absolutely destroyed. It is also frequently
a £10.

(y) Stat. Si Car. n. e. 8.
(z) Weat. Symbol, part 2, page 02. (a) 2 Hawk. P.
9 Show. 221.
Skin. 40.
Comb. 10.
(o) FJ. 48, 15. 1.
(d) Barm. 474.

Vic, c. 100, for the punishment of abduction and kidnapping.
Vic, a 104, for the punishment of willfully and wrongfully leaving

(13) See statute 24 and 35

Also, statute 17 and 18
persons

abroad.

(t>)Exod. xxL, 10.
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more destructive than murder itself, of which, too, it is often the cause:
murder, atrocious as it is, seldom extends beyond the felonious act designed;
whereas fire too frequently involves in the common calamity persons unknown
to the incendiary, and not intended to be hurt by him, and friends as well as
enemies.
For which reasons the civil law (a) punishes with death such as mali
ciously set fire to houses in towns, and contiguous to other; but is more merci
ful to such as only fire a cottage, or house, standing by itself. (1)
*Our English law also distinguishes with much accuracy upon thi»
IT*22ll-I crime. And therefore we will inquire, first, what is such a house as
may be the subject of this offence; next, wherein the offence itself consists, or
what amounts to a burning of such house; and, lastly how the offenoe is pun

ished.

if

(e) Inst. 67.
Hawk. P. C. 106.

(d)

1

Hal. P. C. 867.
HaL P. C. 548.

(/)

8

(6)

1

Jon. SSL

1

M.

1

1$

(a) Ff. 48, 19, 28,
(«) Oro. Car. 877.
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(c)

1. Not only the bare dwelling-house, but all outhouses that are parcel there
of, though not contiguous thereto, or under the same roof, as barns and stables,
may be the subject of arson, (b) And this by the common law; which also
accounted it felony to burn a single barn in the field, if filled with hay or corn
The burning of
stack of corn
though not parcel of the dwelling-house,
was anciently likewise accounted arson, (a) And indeed all the niceties and
distinctions whioh we meet with in our books, concerning what shall, or shall
not, amount to arson, seem now to be taken away by a variety of statutes;
which will be mentioned in the next chapter, and have made the punishment
of wilful burning equally extensive as the mischief. The offence of arson
(strictly so called) may be committed by willfully setting fire to one's own house,
one's neighbour's house
no mischief
thereby also burnt; but
Srovided
one but to one's own,
does not amount to felony, though the fire was
For by the common law no intention
kindled with intent to burn another's,
to commit
does, in some cases,
felony amounts to the same crime; though
However, such wilful firing one's own house, in a totcny
by particular statutes.
a high misdemeanor,
and punishable by fine, imprisonment, pillory, and per
And
landlord or reversioner
petual sureties for the good behaviour. (,/")
in possession under
sets fire to his own house, of whioh another
lease from
Hawk. P.

a

106.

it

it
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a

if
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a

a

if
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(1) The English statutes on this subject were revised and consolidated in 24 and 25 Vic,
C. 07.
Section makes
felony, punishable with penal servitude for life, or for any term not
less than three years, or with imprisonment not more than two years, with or without
the offender be
male over sixteen years of age, to set Are, unlawfully and
whipping,
maliciously, to any church, chapel, meeting-house or other place of divine worship.
Section
dwelling-house, any person
imposes the like punishment for setting fire to
being therein.
fire
to
house, stable, coach-house,
the
for
any
Section imposes
like punishment
setting
warehouse,
outhouse,
office, shop, mill, malt-house,
hop-oast, barn, storehouse, granary,
hovel, shed, or fold, or to any farm building, or to any building or erection used in farm
ing land, or in carrying on any trade or manufacture, whether in possession of the offender
or not, with intent to injure or defraud any person.
And by subsequent sections the unlawfully and maliciously setting fire to buildings be
longing or appertaining to railways, ports, docks, harbors, or canals, or to public buildings,
or to any thing
or " to any buildings other than such as are in this act before mentioned,
in, against or under building, under such circumstances that,
the building were thereby
set fire to, the offense would be felony, or to crops of hay, grass, corn, grain or pulse, or of
any cultivated vegetable produce, standing or cut, or to any wood, coppice or plantation of
trees, or to any heath, gorse, furze, fern, or to stacks of hay, grain, straw, coal, peat, wood,
also made felony.
Attempts to burn the
etc., or to coal mines, or to ships or vessels,
like buildings or property are also provided for by the same act; and, by section 68,
is
not essential to any of these offenses that they should be committed from the malice con
ceived against the owner of the property.
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(»)

himself, or from those whose estate he hath, it shall be accounted arson; for
during the lease the house is the property of the tenant, (g) (2)
As to what shall be said to be a burning, so as to amount to ar- r*oooi
*2.
*
son, a bare intent, or attempt to do it, by actually setting fire to a house, *■
unless it absolutely burns, does not fall within the description of incendit et
combussit; which were words necessary, in the days of law-latin, to all indict
But the burning and consuming of any part is sufficient;
ments of this sort.
though the fire be afterwards extinguished, (h) Also, it must be a malicious
burning: otherwise it is only a trespass: and, therefore, no negligence or mis
chance amounts to it. (3) For which reason, though an unqualified person, by
shooting with a gun, happens to set fire to the thatch of a house, this Sir Mat
thew Hale determines not to be felony, contrary to the opinion of former
Ann. c. 31, any servant negligently setting fire
But by statute
writers.
to a house or outhouses shall forfeit 100t or be sent to the house of correction
for eighteen months; in the same manner as the Roman law directed, "eos,
qui negligenter ignes apud se habuerint, fustibus vel flagellis coedi." (A)
And
3. The punishment of arson was death by our ancient Saxon laws.
in the reign of Edward the First this sentence was executed by kind of lex
talionis for the incendiaries were burnt to death: (m) as they were also by
Hen. VI, c.
made the wilful
the Gothic constitutions, (n) The statute
burning of houses, under some special circumstances therein mentioned,
was again reduced to felony by
But
amount to the crime of high treason.
the general acts of Edward VI, and Queen Mary; and now the punishment ol'
uniform, namely, by hanging. The offence of arson was
all capital felonies
but that statute was
denied the benefit of clergy by statute 23 Hen. VIII, c.
Edward VI, c. 12, and arson was afterwards held to be ousted
repealed by
of clergy, with respect to the principal offender, only by inference and deduc
and
P. and M. c.
*which expressly denied r*oo<ji
tion from the statute
*
to the accessories before the fact; (o) though now
expressly
c. 22. (4)
denied to the principal in all cases within the statute Geo.
H. Burglary, or nocturnal housebreaking, burgi latrocinium, which by our
in Scotland to this day, has always
ancient law was called hamesecken, as
been looked upon as
very heinous offence; not only because of the abundant
forcible invasion and
but also as
terror that
naturally carries with
2

9.

7.

4.

I.
8,

1

1,

1

(p) Font 115.
(ft) Hawk. P. C. 106.
15,
(k) Ff.
(m) Britt. o.
(1) Hal. P. 0. 580.
(T) LL. Inae. e.
c. 6.
HaL P. C. 346,347. Post. 338.
(n) Stiernh. dejure Qoth.
(o) 11Bep. 85.
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13. It
usual to provide by statute that the burning
Bish. Cr. L., 7th ed.
(2) See
"House,"
seems, imports a
one's own house, with intent to defraud, shall be felony.
C, Am. Dec, 560.
Call, 109;
Commonwealth v. Posey,
dwelling house.
(3) To complete the offense, there must be an actual burning of some part of the build
ing. Com. v. VanSchaack, 16 Ma68., 105; People v. Butler. 16 Johns., 203; but to set Are
K., 128; Com. v.
to
C.
building was misdemeanor at common law.
v. Clayton,
the fibre of the wood
People
Flynn, Cush., 525. It a sufficient burning
destroyed.
floor
charred to the depth of half an inch, as this pre
v. Haggerty, 46 Cal., 354. So,
Ired., 570. It
burning. State v. Sandy,
not necessary that the flame
supposes
thatched roof was fired so that
should be visible; as where
smoked and was in part
Stallion,
R. v.
Moo., 398. Enough
the burnt surface
destroyed, but did not blaze.
P.,
Parker,
C. &
has been at
red heat.
45; but not
v. Rus
only scorched.
M.,
541.
C.
sell.
house,
so
own
near
would
other houses that the latter
standing
probably
one fires his
deemed
be destroyed by the fire, and the latter are actually destroyed, the burning
no occasion
East P. C, 1031. "There
that any malice or ill-will should
malicious.
so destroyed.
subsist against the person whose property
It is a malicious act in contem
plation of law when man willfully does that which
illegal, and which, in its necessary
So, where one
Tindal C. J., C. & P., 263, note.
consequence must injure his neighbor."
wood.
set fire to a summer-house
in such
way as to destroy wood, held guilty of firing
P., 728; and see
v. Price,
v. Cooper,
barn was burnt
C.
C. & P., 534, where
See further on intent, Jesse v. State, 28 Miss.,
by fire set originally to a straw stack.
100; and Wharton Cr. Law, 7th ed.,
1663.
no longer capital in England.
(4) The punishment of arson
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(0 See pages 180,18L
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disturbance of that right of habitation which every individual might acquire
even in a state of nature; an invasion, which in such a state would be sure to
be punished with death, unless the assailant were the stronger.
But in civil
society the laws also come in to the assistance of the weaker party; and, be
sides that they leave him this natural right of killing the aggressor, if he can
(as was shown in a former chapter), (p) they also protect and avenge him, in
case the might of the assailant is too powerful.
And the law of England has
so particular and tender a regard to the immunity of a man's house, that it
styles it his castle, and will never suffer it to be violated with impunity;
agreeing herein with the sentiments of ancient Rome, as expressed in the
words of Tully; (q) "quid enim sanctius, quid omni religione munitius, quam
domus uniuscujusque civium?"
For this reason no outward doors can in
general be broken open to execute any civil process; though, in criminal
cases, the public safety supersedes the private.
Hence also, in part, arises the
animadversion of the law upon eaves-droppers, nuisancers and incendiaries:
and to this principle it must be assigned, that a man may assemble people to
gether lawfully (at least if they do not exceed eleven) without danger of
raising a riot, rout, or unlawful assembly, in order to protect and defend his
house; which he is not permitted to do in any other case, (r) (5)
"The definition of a burglar, as given us by Sir Edward Coke, (») is
T*224lJ
"he that by night breaketh and entereth into a mansion-house, with
intent to commit a felony."
In this definition there are four things to be con
sidered; the time, the place, the manner, and the i?itent.
1. The time must be by night, and not by day: for in the day time there is
no burglary.
We have seen,
in the case of justificable homicide, how much
more heinous all laws made an attack by night, rather than by day; allowing
the party attacked by night to kill the assailant with impunity.
As to what
reckoned night, and what day, for this purpose: anciently the day was ac
counted to begin only at sun-rising, and to end immediately upon sun-set; but
the better opinion seems to be, that
there be daylight or crepusctdum enough,
is no burglary, (u)
But this
begun or left to discern man's face withal,
does not extend to moonlight; for then many midnight burglars would go un
punished and besides, the malignity of the offence does not so properly arise
from its being done in the dark, as at the dead of night; when all the creation,
except beasts of prey, are at rest; when sleep has disarmed the owner, and ren
dered his castle defenceless.
It must be, according to Sir Edward Coke's definition,
2. As to the place.
in
mansion-house: and, therefore, to account for the reason why breaking
undoubtedly is, he quaintly observes that
open a church
burglary, as
domus mansionalis l)ei. (v)
does not seem absolutely necessary that
But
should in all cases be
mansion-house; (6) for
may be also committed by

S.

a

a

1

is

is

a

8.

2

7

3

4

1

1

a

is

is

is

is

24 and 25 Vic, c. 96. The
(5) The English statute for the punishment of this offense
penal servitude for life, or for any term not less
penalty in the discretion of the court
than three years, or imprisonment for any term not exceeding two years, with or without
hard labor, and with or without solitary confinement.
within the curtilage, see
considered
dwelling-house, and what
(6) As to what
Dev.,
N. and McC, 583; State v. Langford,
Fisher v. State, 43 Ala, 17; State v. Ginns,
Johns., 424; Commonwealth v.
253; Armour v. State,
Humph., 879; People v. Parker,
Estabrook, 10 Pick., 293; State v. Shaw, 31 Me., 623; Ratekin v. State, 26 Ohio 8L, 420;
Biss., 269; State v. Mordccai, 68 N. C. 207;
State v. Outlaw, 72 N. C, 598; Be Lammer,
Mich., 250; Pitcher v. People, 16 Mich..
State v. Potts, 75 N. C, 129; People v. Taylor,
leased
C, 27 Am. Rep., 85. Where building
142; Quinn v. People, 71 N. Y., 576;
the dwelling house of the
10 different persons in distinct apartments, each apartment
And see Dale
lessee.
Stedman v. Crane, 11 Met., 295; Mason v. People, 20 N. Y., 200.
v. State. 27 Ala., 31; Ullman v. State,
Tex. App., 220; S. C, 28 Am. Rep., 405. But in
charging burglary in an inn, the room of guest must be laid as the dwelling of the inn
C, 40 Am. Rep., 548.
keeper.
Rodgers v. People, 80 N. Y., 300;
408
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breaking the gates or walls of a town, in the night; (w) though that perhaps
have called the mansion-house
of the garrison or cor
poration.
Spelman defines burglary to be " nocturna diruptio alicujus r*225l
*
*habitacuii, vel ecclesice, etiam murorum portarumve burgi, ad feloniam *■
And
therefore
the
that
of
conclude,
we«may
safely
requisite
pcrpetrandam.
its being domus mansionalia is only in the burglary of a private house: whioh
is the most frequent, and in which it is indispensably necessary to form its
uilt, that it must be in a mansion or dwelling-house. For no distant barn, wareouse, or the like are under the same privileges, nor looked upon as a man's castle
of defence: nor is a breaking open of houses wherein no man resides, and
which, therefore, for the time being, are not mansion-houses, attended with the
flame circumstances of midnight terror. A house, however, wherein a man
sometimes resides,{and which the owner hath only left for a short season, animo
revertendi, is the object of burglary, though no one be in it at the time of
the fact committed, (as) And if the barn, stable, or warehouse, be parcel of
the mansion-house, and within the same common fence, (y) though not under
the same roof or contiguous, a burglary may be committed therein; for the
if
capital house protects and privileges all its branches and appurtenances,
within the curtilage or homestall. (z) A chamber in a oollege or an inn of
■courti where each inhabitant hath a distinct property, is to all other purposes
of the owner, (a) So also is a room or lodg
as well as this, the mansion-house
ing, in any private house, the mansion for the time being of the lodger; if the
owner doth not himself dwell in the house, or if he and the lodger enter by
But if the owner himself lies in the house, and hath
different outward doors.
but one outward door at which he and his lodgers enter, such lodgers seem only
to be inmates, and all their apartments to be parcel of the one dwelling house
of the owner, (b) Thus, too, the house of a corporation, inhabited in separate
apartments by the officers of the body corporate, is the mansion-house of the
corporation, and not of the respective officers, (c) But if hire a shop, parcel
of another man's house, and work or trade in
but never lie there,
no
dwelling house, nor can burglary be committed therein; for by the lease r*2o«i
*it severed from the rest of the house, and therefore not the dwellbe said to dwell
ing-house of him who occupies the other part: neither can
never lie there,
Neither can burglary be committed in
therein, when
tent or booth erected in market or fair; though the owner may lodge therein;
house or
(e) for the law regards thus highly nothing but permanent edifices;
church, the wall or gate of
town; and though
may be the choice of the
owner to lodge in so fragile
tenement, yet his lodging there no more makes
it burglary to break open, than would be to uncover tilted wagon in the

Sir Edward Coke would

■"
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a

it

it

a a

it

a

a

)

I

(d

I

is

is

*■

it

it,

I

a

if

a

same circumstances.
3. As to the manner of committing burglary: there must be both
breaking
and an entry to complete it. But they need not be both done at once; for
hole be broken one night, and the same breakers enter the next night through
the same they are burglars.
There must in general be an actual breaking:
not
mere legal clattsum fregit (by leaping over invisible ideal boundaries,
which may constitute
civil trespass), but substantial and forcible irruption.
As at least by breaking, or taking out the glass of, or otherwise opening, a
a

a

a

(/)

a

is

no burglary;

so. (g) (7)

yet,

But to

he after
come down

if

it

1

1

1

1

P. C. 103.
Hal. P. C. M6. Fost. 77.
(s)
the judges.
Hal. P. 0. 558.
Hawk. P. C. 104.
(*)
Hal. P. C. 556.
(c) Foster. 38,39.
(d) Hal. P. 0. 558.
O. 551.
(?) Ibid. 552,553.
1

1

1

Hawk.
(to) Spelm, Oloas Burglary.
(y) K. v. Garland, P. 16 Geo. HI. by all
(a) Hal. P. C. 556.
(6) Kel. 84.
(«) Hawk. P. C. 104.
(/) HaL P.
t.

is is

it it

a

if

man enters therein,
negligence, and
wards unlocks an inner or chamber door,
1 1

it

window sash was raised two inches and the prisoner pushed
up and entered
(7) Where
Moo., 178. So, where sash was raised only
the house, held no breaking. R. v. Smith,
400
1

a

.

a

if

a

a

it

lock, or opening
with
window; picking
key; nay, by lifting up the latch
of
door, or unloosing any other fastening which the owner has provided.
But
his own folly and
person leaves his doors or windows open,
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(I)

a

a

is

it,

it
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a

it

if

a

if

(i)

a chimney is held a burglarious entry; for that is as much closed as the nature
of things will permit. (A) So also to knock at the door, and upon opening it
to rash in, with a felonious intent: or under pretence of taking lodgings, to
fall upon the landlord and rob him; or to procure a constable to gain admit
tance, in order to search for traitors, and then to bind the constable and rob
the house; all these entries have been adjudged burglarious, though there was
*no actua^ breaking; for the law will not suffer itself to be trifled with
r*<2<2'7l
L
J by such evasions, especially under the cloak of legal process,
And
servant opens and enters his master's chamber-door with a felonious
so,
design; or
any other person lodging in the same house, or in a publio inn
burglary.
opens and enters another's door, with such evil intent,
Nay,
the servant conspires with
robber and lets him into the house by night, this
doing an unlawful act, and the oppor
burglary in both; (k) for the servant
with greater ease rather aggravates than ex
tunity afforded him of doing
As for the entry, any the least degree of
tenuates the guilt.
with any part
of the body, or with an instrument held in the hand,
sufficient; as to step
hand or
hook in at the window to draw out
over the threshold, to put
goods, or pistol to demand one's money, are all of them burglarious entries.
The entry may be before the breaking as well as after: for by the statute
(8)
12 Ann, c.
person enters into the dwelling-house of another, without
breaking in, either by day or by night, with intent to commit felony, or being
in such
house, shall commit any felony; and shall in the night break out of
the same, this
declared to be burglary: there having been before different

is

a

it

opinions concerning it: Lord Bacon (m) holding the affirmative, and Sir Mat
But
thew Hale (n) the negative.
universally agreed, that there must be
both
breaking, either in fact or by implication, and also an entry, in order
to complete the burglary.
1

1

1

Hawk. P. G. 108. Fort. 108.

1

1

1

1

1

Hal. P. C. 562.
(ft) Hawk. P. 0. 102.
(0 Hawk. P. C. 108.
Hawk. P. C. 103.
(fc) Stra. 881. Hal. P. C. 653.
({) Hal. P. C. 858.
Elem.
Hal.
66.
P.
C.
664.
(m)
(n)
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a
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8

a
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Am. Rep., 656. But
one-fourth of an inch. Com. v. Strupney, 105 Mass., 688; 8. O..
where an open window was covered by twine netting nailed to the sash, and this was cut
Pick., 854.
and thus an entrance effected, held sufficient breaking. Com. v. Stephenson,
the entrance
gained by lifting heavy iron grating and pushing open
It
breaking
R v. Hall, R. & R, 355.
a cellar window which swings on hinges and
wedged together.
lifted. People
So,
the cellar window
open and the grating over the area in front of
window shut, but unbolted, be opened.
It is enough
v. Nolan, 22 Mich., 229.
Stat*
closed door
v. Boon, 13 Ired., 244; Frank v. State, 30 Miss., 705. So, pushing open
State v. Reid, 20 la., 413; Timmons v. State, 34 Ohio St, 426;
which swings on hinges.
C, 32 Am. Rep., 376. Unlatching door which was latched, but not bolted,
break
Hill, 336;
Park. Cr. R, 652; Curtis v. Hubbard,
ing at common law. People v. Bush,
vi. 437. Breaking the glass in door so as to get in without opening the door,
enough.
R. v. Smith, R. & VL, 417. So, where glass had been cut through previously but stayed in
out R. v. Bird,
C. & P., 44 So, getting into
place, and the prisoner simply pushed
R., 450; State v. Willis,
Jones, 190. So,
R. v. Price, R
a chimney in order to enter.
R v. Russell, Moo., 377. The break
raising trap door held down by its own weight
not merged in the consumption of the building.
White v.
ing may be by fire, and this
State, 49 Ala., 844.
Where one, by fraud or trick upon the inmate, gets
door opened
a breaking. State v. Johnson, Phill. <N. C.), 186; Ducher v.
and immediately enters,
If one finds an outer door open and
State, 18 Ohio, 808; Johnston v. Com., 85 Pa. St 54
breaking. Rolland v. Com., 85 Pa. St., 66; 8. C, 27 Am Rep.,
opens an inner door,
chest or box.
626; not if, all doors being open, one breaks open
State v. Wilson, Coxe,
Am. Dec., 216. Erskine, J., said in one case, that
thief who
489 8. C,
lawfully
within even lifts the latch to get out of the house with the stolen property, that is a burWheeldon,
P.,
of
the
house.
R
v.
C.
747.
See State v. Reid,
breaking out
flarious
Iowa. 413.
hand inside
not an entry,
the window
(8) Breaking outer shutters, and putting
down and the glass unbroken; but the least entry of dwelling house by hand or foot, or
an instrument with which
intended to commit
felony
enough. State v. McCall,
Ala., 648.
It is enough to introduce the hand between the window-glass and shutter, if, to do it, the
R. v. Bailey, R and R, 841. So
glass must be broken first
inside by
finger merely
410
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4. As to the intent ; it is clear, that such hreaking and entry must be with
And it is the same, whether
a felonious intent, otherwise it is only a trespass.
such intention be actually carried into execution, or only demonstrated by
some attempt or overt act, of which the jury is to judge.
And therefore such
a breach and entry of a house as has been before described, by night, with in
tent to commit a robbery, *a murder, a rape, or any other felony, is r*2ooi
Nor does <■ ■»
burglary; whether the thing be actually perpetrated or not.
it make any difference whether the offence were felony at common law, or
only created so by statute; since that statute which makes an offence felony,
gives it incidentally all the properties of a felony at common law. (o) (9)
Thus much for the nature of burglary ; which is a felony at common lawv
but within the benefit of clergy. The statutes, however, of 1 Edw. VI, c. 12,
and 18 Eliz. c. 7, take away clergy from the principals, and that of 3, and 4
W. and M. c. 9, from all abettors and accessories before the fact, (p) And in
like manner, the law of Athens, which punished no simple theft with death,
made burglary a capital crime, (q)
(o) 1 Hawk. P. 0. 106.
( p) Burglary In any bouse belonging to the plate glass company, witb Intent to steal tbe stock or utenails. Is by statute 18Geo, HI, c. 38, declared to be single felony, and punished with transportation for
(g) Pott. Antiq. b. 1, c 88.
■evenyears.

R v. Davis, R and R., 499. Where a window had been
pushing in a window-pane.
raised, and a crowbar pushed under the inner shutters to pry them open, but the hands of
the men had not been put inside, there was no entry. R. v. Rust, Moo., 183. So where one
with a bit had bored through a door, because the instrument was not introduced for the pur
Compare Walker v. State, 68 Ala., 49; S. C. 85pose of taking property: 2 East P. C, 490.
Am. Rep., 1. An entry through a hole in a roof left unguarded, is not burglarious. R. v.
Spriggs, 1 Moo. and Rob., 357.
(9) The English and American courts seem to differ upon the question, whether there can.
be any burglary when, though the intent is present, there is unknown to the thief an absence of
anything to steal. Thus, when one was indicted for breaking the house of J. D. with in
tent to steal the goods of J. W., and it appeared that J. W. had no goods in the house, hetot
that there could be no conviction. R. v. Jenks, 2 East P. C, 514. Where an indictment
charged breaking and entering with intent to steal certain specified goods, and it appeared
that no such goods were there, held, that though the breaking and entering was proved,
there could be no conviction. While the intent to steal those goods might have existed,
" an attempt must be to do, that which if suc
there could have been no attempt, because
cessful would amount to the feloDy." R. v. McPherson, Dears, and B., 197. So where the
charge was attempt to commit larceny by pocket picking, and there was nothing in the
R. v. Collins, L. and C, 471.
pocket, held for similar reason no conviction was possible.
This question has not arisen in American courts, so far as known, in reference to burglary,
but has been adjudicated in larceny cases, and a different conclusion has been reached from
Thus where one was indicted for attempt to commit larceny by
that arrived at in England.
pocket picking, but the indictment did not set out the property, which the prisoner at
tempted to steal, and it did not appear that there was anything in the pocket, the court held
that the offense was complete by the general attempt to steal, and the act done toward the
commission of the offense by thrusting the hand into the pocket; that to attempt was sim
ply "to make an effort to effect some object, to make a trial or experiment, to endeavour, to
Com. v. McDonald, 6 Cush., 865. In a similar case in
use exertion for some purpose."
Connecticut, it was held that ' 'the attempt is complete and punishable, when an act is done
with intent to commit the crime, which is adapted to the perpetration of it, whether the
purpose fail by reason of interruption, or because there was nothing in the pocket, or for
other extrinsic cause." State v. Wilson, 80 Conn., 500, and see Com. v. Rogers, 5 S. andR.,
It would seem that breaking and entering with intent
461; People v. Jones, 46 Mich., 441.
to steal that which it is physically impossible to steal, might be an offense within the rea
soning of the American cases, notwithstanding the case of R. v. McPherson, contra.
.11
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IV.

CHAPTER XVII.

OF OFFENCES AGAINST PRIVATE PROPERTY.
Thb next and last species of offences against private subjects, are such M
more immediately affect their property.
Of which there are two, which an
attended with a breach of the peace; larceny and malicious mischief: and one,
that is equally injurious to the rights of property, but attended with no act of
Of these three in their order.
violence, which is the crime of forgery.
I. Larceny, or theft, by contraction for lactrociny, laclrocinium, is distin
guished by the law into two sorts: the one called simple larceny, or plain
theft, unaccompanied with any other atrocious circumstances; ana mixed or
compound larceny, which also includes in it the aggravation of a taking from
one's house or person.
And, first, of simple larceny; which, when it is the stealing of goods above
the value of twelve-pence, is called grand larceny; when of goods to that
value, or under, is petit larceny; offences which are considerably distinguished
in their punishment, but not otherwise.
shall, therefore, first consider the
nature of simple larceny in general; and then shall observe the different de
grees of punishment inflicted on its two several branches.
Simple larceny, then, " is the felonious taking and carrying away of the perBOna' g°oas of another."
This ""offence certainly commenced then,
f*230l
whenever it was, that the bounds of property, or laws of meum and
How far such an offence can exist in a state of
tuum, were established.
nature, where all things are held to be common, is a question that may be
The disturbance of any individual, in the
solved with very little difficulty.
occupation of what he has seized to his present use seems to be the only
But unquestionably, in social
offence of this kind incident to such a state.
-communities, when property is established, the necessity whereof we have for
merly seen, (a) any violation of that property is subject to be punished by the
laws of society: though how far that punishment should extend, is matter of
considerable doubt. At present we will examine the nature of theft, or lar
ceny, as laid down in the foregoing definition.
This implies the consent of the owner to be
1. It must be a taking. (2)
Therefore, no delivery of the goods from the owner to the offender,
wanting.

I

(a) See book n, p. 8, 4c.
(1) The punishment for this offense is now provided for by statute 24 and 25 Vic., c. 86.
statute abolishes the distinction between grand and petit larceny, and limits the pun
ishment for the first offense of simple larceny to three years' penal servitude, or two years'
imprisonment, with or without hard labor, and with or without solitary confinement.
the owner, from any cause, voluntarily parts with the property in the goods
(2) 1.
taken, there is no larceny. To make it larceny, the taking must be against the owner's
Therefore, if the owner, through mistake or fraud or force, parts
will.
2 East P. C, 665.
with the possession and title, t. «., with the property in goods taken, the taking is not
larceny. "Welsh v. People, 17 111., 839. 8o, where A paid C, servant to B, money which
he owed B, on the erroneous
held no
supposition that C was empowered by B to take
P., 281.
C.
larceny from A, as he voluntarily parted with the property. R. v. Hawtin,
half
guinea on the pretense that silver would be sent in exchange,
Where one obtained
C,
Case,
false pretense.
held no larceny, but
Coleman's
East P.
672.
Where one, in
paying bill, could not make change, and bystander took coin to get
changed, and
converted it, held no larceny, because the owner could not have expected the return of the
specific coin, and therefore he had divested himself of his property in
when he surren
dered possession of it.
R. v. Thomas,
C. & P., 741.
A hatter, by trick, was induced
to send
hat to man who had no right to it, supposing he was sending
to the owner:
held no larceny, as he voluntarily parted absolutely with the property. R. v. Adams, R.
235. One who could not read was induced by
fraudulent representation to give billi
to man for certain pretended purpose, and took in return worthless metal pieces, sup
posing them to be valuable coin. Held no larceny, as he had parted with his property in
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upon trust, can ground a larceny. As if A lends B a horse, and he rides away
with him: or, if send goods by a carrier, and he carries them away: these*
are no larcenies, (b)
But if the carrier opens a bale or pack of goods, or

I

(4) 1 Hal. P. C. B04.
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a
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a

if

it,

the bills, which were not to be returned. Kelly v. People, 18 N. Y. Sup. Ct., 509. Bee,
also, Kellogg v. State, 26 Ohio St., 15.
2. If, with intent to steal them, one gets possession of goods by consent, the title remain
" If the owner does not part with the title, ex
ing in the owner, he is guilty of larceny.
pecting and intending that the same thing shall be returned to him, or that it shall be dis
posed of on his account, or in a particular way as directed or agreed upon for his benefit,"
then a bailee may feloniously convert the goods so as to make the conversion larceny, if at
the time of the taking possession he had the felonious intent. State v. Gorman, 2 N. <fc
McC, 90 ; 8. C, 10 Am. Dec, 576; Welsh v. People, 17 111., 339. If one, by fraud or
otherwise, is induced to part with the possession of goods merely, and the taker has a
felonious intent when the goods are thus taken, it is larceny. Lewer v. Com., 15 S. & R,
93; Mancino v. People, 19 N. Y. Sup. Ct., 127; Elliott v. Com., 12 Bush, 176; State v.
Gorman, 2 Nott & McC, 90. Where one hired a horse for a journey and sold it the same
day, and the jury found the hiring was with felonious intent, held larceny. Pear's Case, 2
East P. C, 685. So, where a carriage was hired with like intent, and was not returned.
Major Semple's Case, 2 East P. C, 691. A received some gold from B, on pretense of
going up stairs to get some silver for it, which he was to bring B. A ran off with thegold. The jury found that B did not intend to part with the property in the gold till he
got the silver, and that A took the gold with felonious intent; held larceny on the ground
that B had parted with possession only. State v. Watson, 41 N.H., 533. A jeweler brought
some goods to an inn for the defendant to select such as he wished to purchase.
Just at
that time the defendant received a letter purporting to be from a friend who agreed toThe jeweler was thus induced
furnish funds for the purchase at another place a little later.
to leave his goods at the inn for the intervening time, and went away. The defendant then
them.
The
swore
he
did
not
consider
the
jeweler
goods sold till he got the cash,
converted
and the jury found that the defendant had a felonious intent, in regard to the transaction,
from the beginning: held larceny. R. v. Campbell, 1 Moo., 179. See also R v. Brown,
Dears., 616. If one fraudulently induces a servant to part with his master's goods, it may
be larceny, since the servant's possession is the master's, and a mere servant has no author
ity to transfer the property in such goods. Hite v. State, 9 Yerg., 198; R v. Longstreeth, 1
Moo., 187. In Commonwealth v. Wilde, 5 Gray, 83, the defendant wished to get a pair
of trousers on his father's credit. The owner of the shop refused to let them go without a
written order. The defendant left the shop, but soon returned, and, while a salesman, ignor
ant of what had passed, was busy with a customer, folded up the trousers, put them un
der bis coat, and walked off, telling the salesman that he had made it all right with theowner. Held larceny, as there was no actual or intended transfer of the property. In R
Robins, Dears., 418, one servant induced another to give him some wheat in charge of
their employee on pretense of carting it to a specified place.
He made off with it instead.
Held, that the second servant did not part with the property in the wheat, but delivered it
for a specified purpose, and that the falsehood made no difference, and the conversion waslarceny.
8. If, without felonious intent, one gets possession of goods as a bailee; and subsequently
converts them with felonious intent, there is, in general, no larceny.
held no
Where a watchmaker received a watch to repair, and afterwards converted
this felonious intent was not formed when the watch was received.
R v. Thrislarceny,
tailor, received goods to be made up.
The defendant,
He finished
tle,
C. and K, 842.
them, and was then induced to sell them instead of returning them to his bailor. Nothing
Held no larceny. Abrams v. Peo
showed an intent to convert them when he took them.
special purpose, andple, 18 N. Y. Sup. Ct., 491. So where one borrowed a horse for
held no larceny,
the intent to convert was formed
next day took the horse away, and sold
Banks, R. and R. 441. So when after borrowing horses to go to a
after the taking. R
certain place, the borrower drove on instead of returning. State v. Stone, 68 Mo., 101. See
Wright v. Lindsay. 20 Ala., 428. Although, while the relation of bailor and bailee exists,
entitled to possession, so that he does not commit the trespass necessary in lar
the latter
ended, his taking such
the relation
ceny in taking the goods entrusted to him, yet,
Thus,
a bailee takes goods to their destina
goods with felonious intent may be larceny.
tion and then converts them, he may be guilty of larceny, for the delivery has taken effect,
determined.
East. P. C, 696. Where several separate arti
and the point of bailment
tortious act, in reference to some of the articles,
cles of
parcel make but one bailment,
lar
the bailment, and
fraudulent conversion of the remainder
determines
subsequent
R. v. Poyser,
Cox. 241. A miller had some barilla given him to grind, which he
ceny.
Held that his act in separating a part, from the rest of the barilla,.
returned adulterated.
for bis own use, while the general property remained in the owner, determined the contract,
413
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(c)

pierces a vessel of wine, and takes away part thereof, or if he carries it to the
place appointed, and afterwards takes away the whole, these are larcenies;
for here the animvs furandi
manifest; since in the first oase he had other8

(c)

Inst. 107.
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and his taking was larceny, on the principle that
goods, originally delivered on
special
contract, which
determined by fraudulent act of the party, or by the completion of the
contract, are, subsequent to such determination, taken with felonious intent,
larceny.
Pick., 375. If bailee tortiously breaks a package entrusted to him, and
Com. v. James,
animo furandi, this breaking terminates the bailment, and he may be
takes goods from
guilty of larceny. R v. Madox, R. and R, 93. A bailee of wheat in bags emptied all the
wheat out of several of the bags. Held that taking all the wheat out of each bag was as
much breaking bulk as taking part out of each, and he was convicted. R v. Brazier, R
and R, 887. See as establishing the rule that
enough to take one of several articles
bailed without breaking any package.
Nichols v. People, 17 N. Y., 114; Com. v. Brown,
Mass., 580.
If without felonious intent one gets possession of goods as mere custodian, or under
a bare charge, and subsequently converts them with felonious intent, he is guilty of larceny.
between custody and possession.
A servant who receives from hi*
The distinction
master goods or money to use for
specific purpose, has the custody of them, but the pos
in
the
master.
So where
servant, sent by
member of
firm with money
session remains
was larceny.
Com. v. Berry,
to another member of the same firm, converted the money,
Mass.,
Davis,
Mass.,
See
v.
If
who
has
99
428.
Com.
104
548.
servant
charge of his
master's horses steals them,
Park. Cr. R, 22; People v.
larceny. People v. Wood,
Belden, 37 Cal., 51. So,
clerk in charge of store takes from the stock of goods.
Mar
cus v. State, 26 Ind., 101; Walker v. Com.,
Leigh, 748. In these cases the felonious in
tention may be formed after the goods have come under the charge of the custodian, and
the conversion will then be larceny. R. v. Jones, C. and M., 611; R v. Beaman, C. and
M., 595; R. v. Goode, C. and M., 582.
A servant was given goods
his master to take with the master's team to a specified
He was to sell the goods and bring back the proceeds.
He converted the team.
place.
felonious intent was formed after starting, as he had but bare charge,
Held larceny even
State v Schingen, 20 Wis., 74.
the possession remaining in the master.
So where ser
vant has been given check to be delivered at specified place, and he has converted
East P. C, 565; R v. Heath, Moo., 83. And see
v. Chiplarceny. R v. Paradice,
C, 566, servant was held guilty of
chase,
East P. C, 567. In Bass's Case,
East
larceny who sold goods given him to carry to customer, as the master still had possession
was larceny where
servant put certain bags belonging to his employer
of them. So
with new ones which the employer was to buy, thus hoping to cheat the employer, since
R v. Manning, Dears., 21. The defend
the servant had but the custody of the old bags.
A lady gave him some
crowded railway station.
ant stood near the paying place in
It was larceny, as he had but
money to buy ticket. He offered to buy it, but ran away.
R. v. Thompson, Leigh and C, 225. The holder of
note
the custody of the money.
to the maker to indorse
back.
handed
payment on ft. The latter refused to give
Held that the maker had but the custody of the note, not the possession in law, and that
formed after the taking, was enough to make the taking lar
the felonious intent, even
Denio, 120. A was induced by
pretended
deposit of funds as
ceny. People v. Call.
check in favor of B. A went with
to get the check cashed, and
security to draw
should be done, but the cash was paid B. The jury found that A did not
directed how
ran
intend to part with the property in the check till he was paid the funds deposited
Held larceny, as B had but
off with the money, and the supposed deposit did not exist.
C,
Johnson,
872;
Cox,
of
the
cash
and
8.
Den.
A the possession. R. v.
the custody
in
C. C, 810; 14 E. L. and Eq., 570. A sent his watch to London to be regulated
then, by personat
send
watchmaker
to
the
to A in care of the postmaster at C.
duced
Held that by sending the watch to the post
ing A, got the watch from the postmaster.
master, the watchmaker was divested of his special property in it; that the postmaster held
under bare charge to deliver to the true owner, to that extent as servant of A, and that
R. v. Eay,7 Cox, 289. That servant's consent does not pass prop
the crime was larceny.
In R v. Watts, Eng. L. and
erty, see Longstreeth's Case and Hite v. State cited supra.
shareholder in the company,
clerk in an insurance company, who was also
Eq., 558.
He stole such
was employed by the directors to keep returned checks, among other duties.
was in possession of the directors, hav
check. Held that when the check came to him
ing reached its ultimate destination; that as shareholder he had no property in the check,
In
case where a servant
and that having custody merely, he was guilty of larceny.
was sent to haul certain amount of coal to his master's house, the coal was loaded into
the master's wagon, and then converted by the servant.
Held that as the wason was in the
possession of the master and in the charge of the servant, the coal was likewise In the mas
ter's possession, and the conversion was larceny.
R v. Reed, Dears., 257. A broker wh»
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Chap-

Larceni.

17.1

230

wise no inducement to open the goods, and in the second the trust was deter
mined, the delivery having taken its effect.
But bare non-delivery shall not
of course be intended to arise from a felonious design; since that may happeu
from a variety of other accidents.
Neither by the common law was it larceny
in any servant to run away with the goods committed to him to keep, but only
a breach of civil trust. But by statute 33 Hen. VI, c. 1, the servants of per
sons deceased; accused of embezzling their masters' goods, may by writ out
of chancery (issued by *the advice of the chief justices and chief r*23il
baron, or any two of them), and proclamation made thereupon, be *summoned to appear personally in the court of king's bench, to answer their
masters' executors in any civil suit for such goods; and shall, on default of
appearance, be attainted of felony. And by statute 21 Hen. VJJl, o. 7, if any
servant embezzles his masters' goods to the value of forty shillings, it is made
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had no funds in the bank was given by a bank a certified check with which to buy silver.
Held that he had the mere custody of the check,
He used the check for his own purposes.
and the taking was larceny. People v. Abbott, 53 Cal., 284. But where one received a
and ran off with part of the proceeds; held
check to buy exchequer bills with, cashed
no larceny, as the giving of the check was not induced by fraud, and the prosecutor never
R v. Walsh, R and R, 215. Where money
had possession of the money at the bankers.
in drawer, where
should have gone,
was paid to bank clerk who, without putting
kept it, held no larceny, as master never had possession of except through he clerk; other
East P. C, 571. A ser
wise had he put in the drawer before taking it. Bazely's Case,
bill, cashed
and ran off.
check to be cashed for the payment of
vant entrusted with
Cush.,
Com. v. King,
Held no larceny, as the master had no possession of the money.
Held embez
So where servant given bill to change, ran away with the change.
284.
R. ▼. Sullens, Moo., 129.
zlement.
Lost goods. The old doctrine seems to be that there could be no larceny of lost goods,
Hawk. P. C,
because the element of trespass necessary to make the crime was lacking.
Porter v. State, Mart. & Yerg., 226; People v. Anderson, 14 Johns., 294,
ch. 33, §§
"The finder of lost goods
thus stated:
Am. Dec., 462. The present doctrine
8. C,
he does so without any felonious inten*
may lawfully take them into his possession, and
subsequent conversion to his own use, by whatever intent that conversion
at that time,
accompanied, will not constitute larceny. But if, at the time of first taking them into his
felonious intent to appropriate them to his own use, and to deprive the
possession, he has
owner of them, and then knows or has the reasonable means of knowing or ascertaining by
marks on the goods or otherwise, who the owner is, he may be found guiltyof larceny.
held in Wolfington v.
Commonwealth v. Titus, 116 Mass., 42. Substantially the same
State, 53 Ind., 843; State v. Conway, 18 Mo 821; Tanner v. Commonwealth, 14 Gratt.,
4535; Ransom v. State, 22 Conn., 153; Tyler v. People, Breese, 227; S. C, 12 Am. Dee.,
Hill, 94. In Griggs v.
And see People v. Cogdell,
176; State v. Dean, 49 Iowa, 78.
divided court that the subsequent conversion of lost
was held
State, 58 Ala., 425,
goods, taken innocently, may make the finder guilty of larceny. The modern English doc
trine, as laid down in R ▼. Tnurborn, 2C. &K., 831, is: "If man finds goods that have been
actually lost, or are reasonably supposed by him to have been lost, and appropriates them
with intent to take entire dominion over them, really believing when he takes them that the
is not larceny. But
he has taken them with like intent, though
owner cannot be found,
lost or reasonably supposed to be lost, but reasonably believing that the owner can be
Den. 0. 0., 853;
found,
larceny." See also R v. Dixon, Dears. 580; Preston's Case,
C, Cox, 91. If goods have been abandoned by the
Christopher's Case, Bell, 271;
R. v. Reed, C. &
owner, not lost merely, the finder commits no larceny in taking them.
distinction" between taking lost goods
M., 306; McGoon v. Ankeny, 11 111.,558. There
and those put in particular place by the owner and forgotten. Thus, in paying barber,
table in the shop and went off without it.
Soon after, he came
a man laid his purse on
and failed to find it. It appeared that the barber took it; held larceny, as being
back for
Lawrence v. State,
Humph., 228.
not lost, but in the owner's constructive possession.
In R v. West, Dears. 402, person left his purse at market stall and afterwards came to
look for it. Meanwhile, the stall-keeper had taken it. Held larceny, and the court said
clear distinction between property lost and mislaid, put down, left by mis
that there was
See People v.
take, under circumstances enabling the owner to know where he left it.
McGarren, 17 Wend., 460. In Connecticut case lady using wash tub lost in
ring,
tub,
but
could
not
find
her servant,
in
the
it.
Meantime
looked
soon noticed her loss and
circumstances,
as,
under
the
it.
there
larceny,
tub,
had
taken
Held
the
was
who had used
no loss except for the defendant's act. State v. Cummings, 33 Conn., 260. A man dropped
shop, and coming back failed to find it. The jury found that, when the shop
note in
means of knowing, the
man picked up the note, he did not know, and had not reasonable
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felony; except in apprentices, and servants under eighteen years old. (3) But
if he had not the possession, but only the care and oversight of the goods, as
the butler of the plate, the shepherd of the sheep, and the like, the embezzling
of them is felony at common law. (d) So, if a guest robs his inn or tavern
of a piece of plate, it is larceny: for he hath not the possession delivered to
and so
and
W.
declared to be by statute
Aim, but merely the use,
and M. c.
lodger runs away with the goods from his ready fur
nished lodgings.
man may be guilty of
Under some circumstances, also,
he steals them from a pawnbroker, or
felony in taking his own goods: as
any one to whom he hath delivered and entrusted them, with intent to charge
he robs his own messenger on the road, with
such bailee with the value; or
an intent to charge the hundred with the loss, according to the statute of Win
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owner of
but afterwards acquired knowledge and converted it; that when he picked
up he believed the owner could be found, but intended then to convert the note; held lar
lost note.
R. v. Moore, L. &
ceny, as not
Stealing one's own good*. A man may be guilty of larceny in stealing his own goods
from his bailee, who has a right to possession or interest in possession, and who is injured
by losing possession.
R. v. Wilkinson, R. & R, 470; People v. Thompson, 84 Cat, 671;
Palmer v. People, 10 Wend., 165; and see State v. DeWitt, 82 Mo., 571. A member of
society stole some of the society's property from the society's bailee; held larceny in the
part owner, since the bailee was answerable.
R. v. Bramley, R & R., 478; R. v. Burgess,
L. & C. 299. So,
one part owner steals from another, the latter being responsible for
Moo., 204, a trustee
the safety of the goods.
R. v. Webster, L. & C, 77. In R. v. Cain,
of
In
society was held guilty of larceny of society funds from the society treasurer.
Eirksey v. Fike, 29 Ala., 206, held that
joint owner or tenant in common cannot be
from
bailee who
there
guilty of larceny of the property jointly owned, unless he take
by made answerable.
also covered by statute 24 and 25 Vic, c. 96, which imposes the pun
(3) This subject
ishment of penal servitude for not more than fourteen and not less than three years, or
imprisonment not more than two yeara
(4) A very slight removal of an article from its place has been held to constitute carrying
A parcel lying in wagon was carried from one end of the wagon to the other, but
away.
East P. C, 556.
was not taken from it; held sufficient carrying away.
R. v. Cozlett,
But where
package in
wagon was set on end and the wrapper cut open without remov
East P. C, 557.
was held no asportation.
R. v. Cherry,
ing any of the contents,
barrel which was standing on end was held not enough, in
Turning on its side
State v. Jones, 65 N. C, 395.
Where a purse tied to keys was drawn from
R. t. Wil
pocket, but the keys remained in the pocket, there was no asportation.
East P. C., 556.
kinson.
So, where goods in
shop were tied to the counter and
thief carried them as far as the cord would permit.
East P. C, 556.
Anon.
As
was for
A thief snatched an earring from
fell in her hair.
lady's ear, but
East P. C,
an instant in his possession, held
sufficient carrying away. R. v. Lapier,
was not drawn
557. A bag in
stage boot was lifted off the bottom of the boot, but
entirely out of it; held sufficient.
pocket-book ia
R v. Walsh, Moo., 14. So, where
an inside coat pocket was drawn completely out of the pocket, but so little that, on the
fell back into the pocket. R. v. Thompson,
Moo.. 78. See
prisoner's dropping
Com. v. Luckis, 99 Mass., 431. A watch was snatched from the owner's pocket and the
chain was drawn clear through the button hole, but the key at end of the chain then caught on
button and the thief was seized held sufficient asportation, as in the thief control for an
note, the latter
R. v. Simpson, Dears. 421. A person called on defendant to pay
instant.
State
asked to see it; on its being handed him, he concealed or destroyed it; held sufficient.
Denio, 120. A person stole keys from another**
v. Fenn, 41 Conn., 590; People v. Call,
safe, took
pocket, opened
money drawer completely out and was handling the money
when caught; held sufficient carrying away of the money.
State v. Green, 81 N. C, 560.
A man put in pipe connecting the gas-main and the delivery pipe in his house, cutting off
the flow through the gas meter; held that by necessary physical action there was such
severance of the gas in the main as to constitute asportation.
R. v. White, Dears. 203
Com. v. Shaw, Allen, 80S. To constitute larceny of an animal,
must be removed whila
Moo., 107; but
alive: R. v. Williams,
enough. Stat*
very slight change of position
Port
v. Carr, 13 Vt., 571.
See State v. Alexander, 74 N. C, 232, and State v. Wisdom,
(Ala.), 511. An indictment charging larceny of turkey and pea hen in Massachusetts
not supported by evidence o' taking them alive in Connecticut and bringing them dead Into
416
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A bare removal from the place in which he found
tavit was the old law-latin.
the goods, though the thief does not quite make off with them, is a sufficient
As, if a man be leading another's horse out
asportation, or carrying away.
of a close, and be apprehended in the fact; or if a guest, stealing goods out
of an inn, has removed them from his chamber down stairs: these have been
adjudged sufficient carryings away to constitute a larceny, (g) Or, if a thief,
intending to steal plate, takes it out of a chest in which it was, and lays it
down upon the floor, but is surprised before he can make his escape with it;
this is larceny. (A)
8. *This taking, and carrying away, must also be felonious;
that is, r*o<jo7
lucri causa,
done animo furandi: or, as the civil law expresses
(5)
This requisite, besides excusing those who labour under incapacities of mind
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It should have been alleged that they were dead. Com. v. Beaman,
Massachusetts.
Gray, 497.
"He who steals my goods in the county of and carries them to the county of
may
as well as that of B, because, the possession still con
be indicted or appealed in county of
as much
tinuing in me, every moment's continuance of the trespass
wrong to it, and
Hawk. P. C, c. 83,
may come under the word eepii as much as the first taking."
Wend.,
129; State v. Somerville, 21 Me., 14; Com. v.
East P. C, 771; People v. Burke, 11
Moo., 46; State v.
Dewitt, 10 Mass., 154; People v. Mellon, 40 Cal., 648; R v. Parkin,
Smith, 66 Mo., 61. But this doctrine applies only in cases of simple larceny; not
the
Ala.,
State,
Smith
v.
55
59.
compound.
original offense
in
as
to
make
but
one
articles
are
Btolen
such
way
transaction,
several
there
but on*
mine lessee had taken coal for several
taking and can be but one prosecution. Thus,
all through one shaft This
years from the mines of adjoining proprietors, but had raised
one continuous taking, though the work was done at different levels
was held, by Erie
and in different cuttings. R v. Bleasdale,
C. & K., 765. Where
mill owner, by pipe
connecting with the main and cutting out the gas meter, had for several years gotten gas
held one continuous taking, not merely taking from time to time,
without paying for
as the gas was turned on inside the mill, since the connecting pipe had always had gas in it.
R v. Firth, 11 Cox C. C, 234. Where man stole two pigs at the same time, and was
undergoing punishment for stealing one, held he could not be tried for stealing the other.
R, v. Brettef. C. & M., 609. Where half an hour intervened between taking articles of
R v. Birdseye, C. & P., 386. So, where one stole a
different sorts, held two offences.
Bush,
Fisher v. Com.,
horse and harness and wagon all at once, held but one offense.
See, also, State v. Williams, 10 Humph., 101. Where
211; State v. Cameron, 40 Vt., 555.
but one offense.
one steals goods belonging to different persons at same time and place,
Mo., 55; State v. Morphin, 37 Mo., 873; State v. Nelson, 29 Me., 829.
Lorton v. State,
McMuIlen, 882.
Obntra, State v. Thurston,
That where goods are stolen in one state and carried into another.this may be treated
See
as a larceny in the latter state as well as the former, has been held in many cases.
C, Am. Dec, 17; Commonwealth v. White,
Mass., 14;
Commonwealth v. Andrews,
C,
Conn., 185:
Am. Dec, 175; State v. Cummings, 38
128 Mass.. 430; State v. Ellis,
C, 20 Am. Dec, 66; Hamilton v. State, 11
Stew., 123;
Conn., 260; State v. Seay,
Mich.,
156; State v. Main, 16 Wis., 898; Powell v. State,
Ohio, 435; People v. Williams, 24
52 Wis., 217; State v. Bennett, 14 Iowa, 479; State v. Bartlett, 11 Vt., 650; Myers v. People.
HI.,
173;
v.
115;
State
State v. Underwood, 49 Me., 181; Watson v.
Johnson,
Oreg.,
26
Duv., 153; Worthington v. State, 58 Md.,
State, 36 Miss., 593; Ferrill v. Commonwealth,
408; Regina v. Hennessy, 85 Up. Can. R, 608, But there are cases to the contrary which
and Ohio
held that
the original con
are referred to in these, and in Massachusetts
foreign country, the doctrine of continuous larceny would not be
version took place in
Gray, 434; Stanley v. State, 24 Ohio St, 166;
Commonwealth v. Upricbard,
applied.
8. C, 15 Am. Rep., 604. As to offenses committed in another state through innocent
Denio, 190; S. C, 45 Am. Dec, 468.
agents, see People v. Adams,
R, 118, the master of foreign ship captured by the Eng
(5) In R v. VanMayen, R &
lish, took from the ship some of the cargo entrusted to his care. Held no larceny, unless
Where, from similarity of name, one took from the
he intended to appropriate the goods.
postoffice letter intended for another and appropriated an enclosed draft, held no larceny
without proof of felonious intent at the time of getting it. R v. Mucklow, R & R., 160;
see R v. Leigh,
East P. O, 694. A tanner took hides from one part of the tannery
where he was employed to another, with intent, not to take them away, but to get paid for
Held no larceny, since the intent must be to deprive
them as
they were his own work.
See R v. Webb,
the owner of his property permanently. R v. Holloway, 2C. &K..742.
Moo., 481; R. v. Hall,
Bay, 242; R v. Poole, Dears. &
C. & K, 947; State v. Self,
You II.— 53
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or will (of whom we spoke sufficiently at the entrance of this book) (k) indem
nifies also mere trespassers, and other petty offenders.
As if a servant takes
his master's horse without his knowledge, and brings him home again; if a
neighbour takes another's plough that is left in the field, and uses it upon his
own land, and then returns it: if under colour of arrear of rent where none is
distrain another's cattle, or seize them; all these are misdemeanors and
due,
The ordinary discovery of
felonious intent
trespasses, but no felonies.
where the party doth
clandestinely; or, being charged with the fact denies
it. But this
by no means the only criterion of criminality: for, in cases
that may amount to larceny, the variety of oircumstances
so great, and the
complications thereof so mingled, that
impossible to recount all those
which may evidence a felonious intent, or animum furandi: wherefore they
must be left to the due and attentive consideration of the court and jury.
4. This felonious taking and carrying away must be of the personal good*
another: for,
they are things real, or savour of the realty, larceny at the
Lands, tenements, and heredita
common law cannot be committed of them.
ments (either corporeal or incorporeal) cannot in their nature be taken and
carried away. And of things, likewise, that adhere to the freehold, as corn,
house, no larceny could be committed
grass, trees, and the like, or lead upon
by the rules of the common law: but the severance of them was, and in many
still, merely
trespass which depended on the subtility in the legal
things
notions of our ancestors.
These things were parcel of the real estate; and,
therefore, while they continued so, could not by any possibility, be the sub
ject of theft, being absolutely fixed and immovable, (m) And
they were
r*2ail *8evere^ hy violence, so as to be changed into movables; and, at the
same time, by one and the same continued act, carried off by the person
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McAllister, 196. The same principle applies where one
v. Durkee,
B., 845; and see IT.
horse to ride without intention to deprive the owner of his property in it.
takes
R. v.
East P. C, 662; Umphrey v. State, 68 Ind., 223; State v. York,
Harr. (DeL).
Phillips,
While generally the taking must he with intent to retain property permanently, yet
493.
such use would destroy the thing taken, or to
seems that an intent to use temporarily,
time,
not entirely inconsistent with the commission of the felonv,
use an unreasonable
State v. South, 28 N. J., 28.
but should be left to the jury.
Having once taken property with felonious intent, no subsequent return obliterates the
R v. Peat, East P. C, 557; State v. Scott, 64 N. C, 586; R. v. Wright, C.
offense.
P., 754. The Jury should consider the fact of the party's offering full value for the prop
felonious intent, but
pregnant evidence in the
erty taken. This does not preclude
negative.
East P. C, 662.
The doctrine that the taking must be for the sake of gain, that intention to injure
not enough, is laid down
another without converting the property to one's own use
Port., 461; McDaniel v. State.
8m. & M., 401; R. v. Holloway,
State v. Hawkins,
C.
& P., 624, by Vaughan, B. R. v. Godfrey, C. P., 563, by Lord Abinger. On the other
hand,
said that there need not be any pecuniary advantage to the one who takes the
he thus gratifies some wish. R v. Garrett,
Cox, 260; People
property, but
enough
v. Juarez, 28 Cal., 389; Keely v. State, 14 Ind., 86; Hamilton v. State, 35 Miss., 214.
The
into the fire.
obligor in bond got from the obligee on pretense of looking at and threw
debt;
held larceny. Dignowitty
It was benefit to him thus to destroy the evidence of his
To aid in preventing the conviction of another for the larceny of
v. State, 17 Tex., 521.
the
horse
from
the
owner's
and
man
took
stable
drove
into an old coal-pit
horse,
was held larceny, on the ground that, without any gain to the taker,
was enough
he
intended wholly to deprive the owner of his property. R v. Cabbage, R & R.292.
servant broke into his master's granary and took beans with intent to give them to his mas
Held larceny, but some of the judges thought that not only was the mas
ter's horses.
ter injured, but. as the servant's work was lessened, the act was lueri eauia.
In R v.
similar state of facts,
was held larceny without reference to
Privett,
C. & K., 114, on
In R. v. Jones, C. & K., 236, servant, knowing that
letter in reference to
any gain.
at the postofflce
and burnt it. Held
her character was sent to a former employer, got
mistake,
postal clerk, to prevent detection and punishment for
larceny. So, where
threw some letters into water-closet; held larceny, as the taking was for purpose of his
own, and with intent to deprive the owners wholly of the letters.
R. v. Wynn,
EL,
C.

Chap.
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7

if

is

2

(s)

who severed them: they never could be said to he taken from the proprietor,
in this their newly acquired state of mobility (which is essential to the nature
of larceny), being never, as such, in the actual or constructive possession of
any one, but of him who committed the trespass.
He could not, in strictness
be said to have taken what at that time were the personal goods of another,
since the very act of taking was what turned them into personal goods.
But
if the thief severs them at one time, whereby the trespass is completed, and
they are converted into personal chattels, in the constructive possession of him
on whose soil they are left or laid; and come again at another time, when they
are so turned into personalty, and take them away; it is larceny: and so it is,
if the owner, or any one else, has severed them, (n) And now, by the statute
4 Geo. II, o. 82, to steal, or rip, cut, or break, with intent to steal any lead, or
iron bar, rail, gate, or palisado, fixed to a dwelling-house or out-house, or in
any court or garden thereunto belonging, or to any other building, is made
felony, liable to transportation for seven years; and to steal, damage, or de
stroy underwood or hedges, and the like, to rob orchards or gardens of fruit,
growing therein, to steal or otherwise destroy any turnips, potatoes, cabbages,
parsnips, peas, or carrots, or the roots of madder, when growing, are (o) punish
able, criminally, by whipping, small fines, imprisonment, and satisfaction to
the party wronged, according to the nature of the offence.
Moreover, the
stealing by night of any trees, or of any roots, shrubs, or plants, to the value
of 5s., is, by statute 6 Geo. HI, c. 36, made felony in the principals, aiders and
abettors,.and in the purchasers thereof, knowing the same to be stolen: and by
statutes 6 Geo. IQ, c. 48, and 18 Geo. m, c. 33, the stealing of any timber
trees therein specified, {p) and of any root, *snrub or plant, by day r *2oji
'
or night, is liable to pecuniary penalties for the two first offences, and *•
for the third is constituted a felony, liable to transportation for seven years.
Stealing ore out of mines is also no larceny, upon the same principle of adher
ence to the freehold, with an exception only as to mines of black lead, the steal
ing of ore out of which, or entering the same with intent to steal, is felony,
punishable with imprisonment and whipping, or transportation not exceeding
seven years; and to escape from such imprisonment, or return from such trans
portation, is felony, without benefit of clergy, by statute 25 Geo. H, c 10.
Upon nearly the same principle the stealing of writings relating to a real
estate is no felony; but a trespass:
(q) because they concern the land, or (ac
cording to our technical language) savour of the realty, and are considered as
part of it by the law: so that they descend to the heir, together with the land
which they concern, (r) (6)
Bonds, bills, and notes, which concern mere choset in action, were also, at
the common law, held not to be suoh goods whereof larceny might be com
mitted; being of no intrinsic value:
and not importing any property in
possession of the person from whom they are taken.
But by the statute Geo.
II, o. 25, they are now put upon the same footing, with respect to larcenies, as
the money they were meant to secure.
By statute 15 Geo. II, o. 13, officers
or servants of the bank of England, secreting or embezzling any note, bill,
warrant, bond, deed, security, money, or effects intrusted with them or with
the company, are guilty of felony without benefit of olergy.
The same
enacted by statute 24 Geo. II, c. 11, with respect to officers and servants of the
South-Sea company. And by statute
Geo. IH, c. 60,
any officer or servant
of the post office shall secrete, embezzle, or destroy any letter or pacquet, con«

1

t

1

1

8

(n) Inst. 109. Hal P. 0. 510.
io) Stat. 48 Eliz. o. 7. 15Car. n, e.
SI Geo. II, c. 85.
Geo. III. e. 48.
Geo. m, c 41. 18Geo. m,
e. 81
(p) Oak. beech, chestnut, walnut, ash, elm, cedar, fir, ash, lime, sycamore, birch, poplar, alder, larch,
maple, and hornbeam.
(<)8Rep. 83.
(«) HaL P. 0. 610. Stra.1187.
(r) See book n, p. 423.

is

now covered by statute 34 and 25 Vic, o. 00, which
(6) The subject of this paragraph
provides for the criminal punishment of. the various wrongs here enumerated.
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Hat P.O. 611.
(t>) Hawk. P. C. 94.
(y) Dalt. Just, c 168.
1

6,
8,

18.
rt) Cod.
(v)l HaL P. G. 611. Fost. 868.
(is) See stat 22 and 23 Car. ft. c 25.
(x) Inst. 98.
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(<)

taining any bank note or other valuable paper particularly specified in the act,
r*■*2<ifi1 or 8^a^ steal the same out of any letter or *pacquet, he shall be guilty
of felony without benefit of clergy. Or, if he shall destroy any letter
or pacquet with which he has received money for the postage, or shall advance
the rate of postage on any letter or pacquet sent by the post, and shall secrete
the money received by such advancement, he shall be guilty of single felony.
Larceny also could not, at common law, be committed of treasure-trove or
wreck, till seized by the king or him who hath the franchise, for till such
seizure no one hath a determinate property therein.
But by statute 26 Geo.
II, c. 19, plundering or stealing from any ship in distress (whether wreck orno
wreck) is felony, without benefit of clergy: in like manner as, by the civil
law,
this inhumanity
punished in the same degree as the most atrocious
theft. (7)
no prop
Larceny also cannot be committed of animals in which there
erty either absolute or qualified: as of beasts that are ferm natures and unre
claimed, such as deer, hares, and conies in a forest, chase, or warren; fish in an
But
open river or pond: or wild fowls at their natural liberty, (u)
they are
reolaimed or confined, and may serve for food,
otherwise, even at common
law for of deer so inclosed in park that they may be taken at pleasure, fish
trunk, and pheasants or partridges in a mew, larceny may be committed. (») (8)
And now, by statute Geo.
c. 22, to hunt, wound, kill, or steal any deer; to
rob warren; or to steal fish from
river or pond (being in these cases armed
and disguised); also to hunt, wound, kill, or steal any deer, in the king's forests
or chases inclosed, or in any other inclosed place where deer have been usually
kept; or by gift or promise of reward to procure any person to join them
such unlawful act; all these are felonies without benefit of clergy.
And the
statute 16 Geo. Ill, c. 30, enacts that every unauthorized person, his aiders and
abettors, who shall course, hunt, shoot at, or otherwise attempt to kill, wound,
or destroy any red or fallow deer, in any forest, chase, purlieu, or ancient walk,
or *n any *nc^ose^ park, paddock, wood, or other ground, *where deer
r*236l
«are usually kept, shall forfeit the sum of 201., or for every deer actu
ally killed, wounded, destroyed, taken in any toil or snare, or carried away,
the sum of 30/., or double those sums in case the offender be a keeper: and
second offence (whether of the same or
different species), shall be
upon
guilty of felony, and transportable for seven years. Which latter punishment
is likewise inflicted on all persons armed with offensive weapons, who shall
come into such places with an intent to commit any of the said offences, and
shall there unlawfully beat or wound any of the keepers in the execution of
their offices, or shall attempt to rescue any person from their custody. Also,
by statute Geo. Ill, c. 14, the penalty of transportation for seven years
inflicted on persons stealing or taking fish in any water within
park, paddock,
garden, orchard, or yard: and on the receivers, aiders, and abettors: and the
like punishment, or whipping, fine, or imprisonment,
provided for the taking
or killing of conies (to) by night in open warrens: and
forfeiture of five
made payable by persons taking or de
pounds to the owner of the fishery,
stroying (or attempting so to do) any fish in any river or other water within
any inclosed ground, being private property. Stealing hawks, in disobedience
to the rules prescribed by the statute 37 Edw. Ill, c. 19,
also felony, (z)
It also said, (y) that, swans be lawfully marked,
felony to steal them,
likewise felony to steal them,
though at large in publio river; and that
in any private river or pond; otherwise
though unmarked,
only a tres-
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also covered by statute 24 and 25 Vic. c. 96.
(7) The subject of this paragraph
Den. C. C, 861. The statutes mentioned in this paragraph
(8) See Reg. v. Cheafor,
arc now repealed.
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But of all valuable domestic animals, as horses and other beasts of
raught, and of all animals domitce naturae, which serve for food, as neat or
other cattle, swine, poultry, and the like, and of their fruit or produce, taken
from them while living, as milk or wool,
larceny may be committed; and
also of the flesh of such as are either domitCB or ferae naturae, when killed, (a)
As to those animals which do not serve for food, and which, therefore, the law
holds to have no intrinsic value, as dogs of all sorts, and other creatures kept
base property therein, and
for whim and pleasure, though man may have
maintain
civil action for the loss of them, (6) yet they are not of such esti
mation as that the crime of stealing them amounts to larceny,
But by
statute 10 Geo. Ill, o. 18, very high pecuniary penalties, or
long imprison
ment, and whipping in their stead, may be inflicted by two justices of the
very extraordinary mode of appeal to the quarter sessions), on
peace (with
stolen dog, or have in their custody the
6uch as steal, or knowingly harbour,
skin of dog that has been stolen, (d) (9)
Notwithstanding however that no. larceny can be committed, unless there
the owner be un
be some property in the thing taken, and an owner; yet,
known, provided there be
larceny to steal it; and an indict
property,
In like manner as
ment will lie, for the goods of
person unknown,
among the Romans, the lex Hoatilia de furtis provided that prosecution for
theft might be carried on without the intervention of the owner, (f) This
the property of those,
the case of stealing shroud out of
grave; which
-whoever they were, that buried the deceased: but stealing the corpse itself,
matter of great indecency)
no felony, unless
which has no owner, (though
some of the grave-clothes be stolen with it. (g) (10)
Very different from the
law of the Franks, which seems to have respected both as equal offences: when
directed that
corpse out of the ground in order to
person who had dug
should be banished from society, and no one suffered to relieve his
strip
wants, till the relations of the deceased consented to his re-admission. (A)
Having thus considered the general nature of simple larceny, come next
to treat of its punishment. Theft, by the Jewish law, was only punished with
And in the civil
a pecuniary fine, and satisfaction to the party injured,
law, till some very late constitutions, we never find the punishment capital.
with death: but his laws were said
The laws of Draco at Athens punished
to be written in blood; and Solon afterwards changed the penalty to pecu
niary mulct. And so the Attic laws in general continued; (J) except that
was made capital to break into
once, in time of dearth,
garden and steal
figs: but this law and the informers against the offence, grew so odious, that
name which we
from them all malicious informers were styled sycophants;
have much perverted from its original meaning. From these examples, as
well as the reason of the thing, many learned and scrupulous men have ques
not lawfulness of inflicting capital punishment for simtioned the propriety,
a

Crompt 86.

a

Hawk. P. C. 93.
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(z)

ass.

Hal. P. C. 511.

The King v. Martin, by all the judge*.

6.

I.
7,

i

1

2.
8.

)

1

1

(c) Hal. P. C. 512.
(8) See book H, p. 393.
fa) Hal. P. C. 611.
(d See the remarks in page 4. The statute hath now continued eighteen sessions of parliament unre
pealed.
106.
(/) Oravin.
fo) See book H, page 429.
(e) Hal P. C. 518.
(•) Kxod. c. xxii.
(A) Montesq. Sp. L. b. 30. ch. 19.
LL.
Attic.
tit.
(J) Petit.

1

8

2

2

is

a

(9) Dog stealing, under statute 24 and 25 Vic., c. 96, may be visited with the maximum
punishment of six months' imprisonment, or forfeiture of twenty pounds over and above
the value of the dog.
made highly penal by statutes in the United States.
It
(10) Violation of the sepulture
■wasan indictable offense at the common law, even where the body was taken up for the
East P. C, 652; Roscoe Cr. Ev., 392; R v. Lynn.
See
purpose of dissection.
T. R,
Pick., 370; Tate v. State, GBlackf.,
738; R v. Sharpe, Dears. &B., 160; Com. v. Loring,
111. As to proprietary rights in bodies and burial rights, see Pierce v. Proprietors, 10 R L,
■327; Wynkoop v. Wynkoop, 42 Penn. St., 293; Meagher v. Driscoll, 99 Mass., 281; Guthrie
v. Weaver,
Mo. Ap. R, 136.
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And certainly

the natural punishment for injuries to property
of the offender's own property; which ought to be univer
all men's fortunes equal.
But as those who have no prop
generally the most ready to attack the property of others,
necessary instead of a pecuniary to substitute a corporal
punishment; yet how far this corporal punishment ought to extend, is what
has occasioned the doubt.
and the marquis Beccaria,
Sir Thomas More,
(m) at the distance of more than two centuries from each other, have very
sensibly proposed that kind of corporal punishment which approaches the
nearest to
pecuniary satisfaction; viz.,
temporary imprisonment, with an
obligation to labour, first for the party robbed, and afterwards for the public,
in works of the most slavish kind: in *order to oblige the offender to
r*>n<>iT-|
repair, by his industry and diligence, the depredations he has com
mitted upon private property and public order. But notwithstanding all the
of speculative politicians and moralists, the punishment of
remonstrances
theft still continues, throughout the greatest part of Europe, to be capital;
and-Puffendorf, (n) together with Sir Matthew Hale, (o) are of opinion that
this must always be referred to the prudence of the legislature; who are to
judge, say they, when crimes are become so enormous as to require such san
guinary restrictions, (p) Yet both these writers agree, that such punishment
should be cautiously inflicted, and never without the utmost necessity.
Our ancient Saxon laws nominally punished theft with death, if above the
value of twelvepence; but the criminal was permitted to redeem his life by
stated num
pecuniary ransom; as, among their ancestors the Germans, by
ber of cattle, {q) But in the ninth year of Henry the First, this power of re
demption was taken away, and all persons guilty of larceny above the value
of twelvepence were directed to be banged; which law continues in force to this
For though the inferior species of theft, or petit larceny,
day. (r)
only pun
which
ished by imprisonment or whipping at common law,
statute
Geo.
c. 11, may be extended to transportion for seven years, as is also expressly
directed in the case of the plate-glass company,
yet the punishment of
grand larceny, or the stealing above the value of twelvepence (which sum was
the standard in the time of King Athelstan, eight hundred years ago),
at
Which, considering the great intermediate alcommon law regularly death.
terat'on (M) *n tne P"06 or denomination of *money,
undoubtedly
r*2<»fil
very rigorous constitution; and made Sir Henry Spelman (above cen
tury since, when money was at twice its present rate), complain, that while
every thing else was risen in its nominal value, and become dearer, the life of
true, that the mercy of juries
man had continually grown cheaper. (t>) It
will often make them strain point, and bring in larceny to be under the value
of twelvepence, when
really of much greater value: but this, though evi
only reduces the present nominal value
dently justifiable and proper, when
otherwise kind of pious perjury, and
of money to the ancient standard, (to)
does not at all excuse our common law in this respect from the imputation of
It likewise true, that
severity, but rather strongly confesses the charge.
by the merciful extensions of the benefit of clergy by our modern statute law,
a
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(a)
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(I)

seems to be the loss
sally the case, were
erty themselves are
it has been found

;

quippe neque
(It) Est enim ad vindicanda furta nimis atrox, nee tomen ad re/rcenanda sufficient
acinus est, ut eapite debeat pleeti neque ulla poena est tanta ut ab latrociniie cohibeat eos, qui nullum attorn artem quarendi victus habent. (Mori Utopia, edit. Olasg. 1T5G,
pag. 21.)—Denique.cum lex Mosaica.quanquam inclement et aspera tamenpecunia furtum, haud mortt,
mulctavit
ne putemue Deum. in nova lege clemential qua pater imperat flliis major em indulsisse nobis
Hose sunt cur non lieere pu'tem quam vero sit abturdum, atque etiam
invieem soiviendi licentiam.
perniciosum reipublica, furem atque homicidam ex aequo puntn nemo est (opinor) qui nesciat. (Jbid.
!

;

:

f

furtum simplex tarn ingens

1

8

1 8

8,

9.

is

J

2

I.
8,

I

1,

I,

8

(

())

0.
(p) Hal. P. C. IS.
Vtop. page 42.
(m) Ch. 22.
(») L. of N. b.
p) See page
(r) Hal. P. C. 12, Inst. 68.
(0) Tac de mor. Germ. c. 12.
HI,
Inst.
218.
18Geo.
c.
Stat.
88.
(f)
(»)
the stated value, at the exchequer, of a pasture-fed or, was one shil
(u) In the reign of King Henry
ling {Dial, de Scace.
7), which, if we should even suppose to mean the solidus legalit mentioned by
e. 18. See book H, page 609),or the 72d part of a pound of gold,
only equal to
tyndewode (Prov.
Us. 4d. of the present standard.
(v) Gloss. Sou.
(u>) Inst. 189.
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a person who commits a simple larceny to the value of thirteen pence, or thir
teen hundred pounds, though guilty of a capital offence, shall be excused the
And in many cases of
pains of death : but this is only for the first offence.
simple larceny the benefit of clergy is taken away by statute; as for horse
stealing in the principals, and accessories both before and after the fact;
theft by great and notorious thieves in Northumberland and Cumberland;
taking woollen cloth from off the tenters, (z) or linens, fustians, calicoes, or
cotton goods from the place of manufacture; (a) (which extends, in the last
case, to aiders, assisters, procurers, buyers, and receivers;) feloniously driving
away, or otherwise stealing one or more sheep or other cattle specified in the
*acts, or killing them with intent to steal the whole or any part of the r*nqQi
J
carcase, (o) or aiding or assisting therein; thefts on navigable rivers *■
above the value of forty shillings, (c) or being present, aiding and assisting
thereat: plundering vessels in distress, or that have suffered shipwreck; (d)
stealing letters sent by the post, (e) (11) and also stealing deer, fish, hares, and
conies under the peculiar circumstances mentioned in the Waltham black act.
Which additional severity is owing to the great malice and mischief of
the theft in some of these instances; and, in others, to the difficulties men
would otherwise lie under to preserve those goods, which are so easily carried
off. Upon which last principle the Roman law punished more severely than
other thieves the abigei, or stealers of cattle; (g) and the balnearii, or such as
stole the clothes of persons who were washing in the public baths; (A) both
And
which constitutions seem to be borrowed from the laws of Athens,
so, too, the ancient Goths punished with unrelenting severity thefts of cattle,
or corn that was reaped and left in the field: such kind of property (which no
human industry can sufficiently guard) being esteemed under the peculiar cus
tody of heaven. (J) And thus much for the offence of simple larceny.
such as has all the properties of the former,
Mixed or compound larceny
but
taking
accompanied with either one or both of the aggravations of
from one's house or person. First, therefore, of larceny from the house, and
then of larceny from the person.
seems (from the considerations men
Larceny from the house, though
tioned in the preceding chapter) (k) to have higher degree of guilt than sim
not at all ""distinguished
from the other at comple larceny, yet
r*24o1
unless where
mon law;
accompanied with the circumstance of
falls under another
breaking the house by night; and then we have seen that
But now
several acts of parliament
description, viz., that of burglary.
very ingeniously deduced by learned modern writer,
(the history of which
(m) who hath shown them to have gradually arisen from our improvements in
trade and opulence), the benefit of clergy
taken from larcenies committed in
a house in almost every instance; except that larceny of the stock or utensils
of the plate-glass company from any of their houses, &c,
made only
sin
gle felony, and liable to transportation for seven years, (n) The multiplicity
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VI, o. «S. 81 Eliz. o. 12.
(y) Stat. 18Car. II, c
(x) Stat. Edw. VI, o. 12. and Edw.
But, as sometimes Is difficult to prove the identity of the goods so stolen,
(*) Stat. 22 Car. n, o.
the onus probandi with respect to Innocence Is now by statute 15Geo. II, c. 27, thrown on the persons in
whose custody such goods are found; the failure whereof is, for the first time, a misdemeanor punish
able by the forfeiture of the treble value: for the second, by imprisonment, also; and the third time it
becomes a felony, punished with transportation for seven years.
given to the Judge to transport the
(a) Stat. 18Geo. II, c. 27. Note, in the three last cases an option
offender: for life In the first case, for seven years In the second, and for fourteen yean in the third; in
the first and third cases instead of sentence of death, in the second after sentence Is given.
page 88.
15Geo. II, c. 34. See book
(6) Stat. 14Geo. II, c.
(c) Stat. 24 Geo. II, c. 46.
(d) St. 12Ann. St. c. 18. 26 Geo. II, c. 19.
(el Stat. Geo. Ill, c. 60.
(/) Stat. Geo. c. SB.
17.
c 28.
(A) Ibid.
(0 Pott. Antiq. b.
to) Ft. 47, 14.
c.
5.
0') Stiernh. de Jure Qoth.
(m) Barr. 375,Ac.
(I) See page 223.
(t) Hawk. P. C. 98.
(n) Stat. 18Geo. m, o. SB.
1

7

(It) Offenses relating to the postofflce were provided for by statute Wm. IV, and Vic,
c. 86. As to the other offenses mentioned in this paragraph, see statute 24 and 26 Vic,
86.
In the United States the postal service being exclusively in the control of the national gov
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a

J

(t)

(«)

of the general acts is apt to create some confusion; but upon comparing them
diligently we may collect, that the benefit of clergy is denied upon the follow
ing domestic aggravations of larceny; viz.: First, in larcenies above the value
of twelvepence, committed, 1. In a church or chapel, with or without violence,
or breaking the same; (o) 2. In a booth or tent, in a market or fair in the
day-time or in the night, by violence or breaking the same; the owner or some
of his family being therein: (p) 3. By robbing a dwelling-house in the day
A. In
time (which robbing implies a breaking), any person being therein: (q)
a dwelling-house by day or by night, without breaking the same, any person
being therein put in fear; (r) which amounts in law to a robbery; and in both
these last cases the accessory before the fact is also excluded from his clergy.
Secondly, in larcenies to the value of five shillings, committed, 1. By breaking
any dwelling-house or any outhouse, shop, or warehouse thereunto belonging
in the day-time, although no person be therein;
which also now extends to
2. By privately stealing
aiders, abettors, and accessories before the fact:
coachhouse,
r*24i1 S00<^8» *wares, or merchandise in any shop, warehouse, (w)
or stable, by day or by night; though the same be not broken open,
and though no person be therein: (v) which likewise extends to such as assist,
hire, or command the offence to be committed. Lastly, in larcenies to the
value of forty shillings in
dwelling-house, or its outhouses, although the
same be not broken, and whether any person be therein or no; unless com
mitted against their masters by apprentices under the age of fifteen, (to) This
also extends to those who aid or assist in the commission of any such offence.
(12)
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2. Larceny from the person
either by privately stealing; or by open and
violent assault, which
usually called robberi/.
The offence of privately stealing from
man's person, as by picking his
pocket or the like, privily without his knowledge, was debarred of the benefit
of clergy, so early as by the statute Eliz. c. 4. But then
must be such
larceny as stands in need of the benefit of clergy, viz., of above the value of
For the
twelvepence; else the offender shall not have judgment of death.
statute creates no new offence; but only prevents the prisoner from praying
the benefit of clergy, and leaves him to the regular judgment of the ancient
seems to be
law. (a;) This severity (for
most severe law
certainly
owing to the ease with which such offences are committed, the difficulty of
guarding against them, and the boldness with which they were practiced (even
in the queen's court and presence) at the time when this statute was made:
besides that this
an infringement of property, in the manual occupation or
state
corporal possession of the *owner, which was an offence even in
!-„„
of nature. And therefore the saccularii, or cut-purses, were more
severely punished than common thieves by the Roman and Athenian laws.
(y) (is)
Edw. VI, c. 18.
HmL P. C. B18.
(o) Stat. 23Hen. vm, o.
1,

4

(
7.

9.

4

7.

1.
1,

it

(
1

), )
1

8.

8

8

9.
1

«

S

(
p)

Stat, and Edw. VI, c.
Hal. P. C. KB.
(q) Stat. and W. and M. o. t.
(r) Ibid.
'«) Stat. 88 Eliz. c. 15.
(0 Stat. and W. and M. c.
u) See Foster, 78. Barr. 879.
c. 83.
(v)
v) Stat. 10and 11Wm. Ill,
(to) Stat. 18Ann. at. c
Hal. P.O.
(*) Hawk. P. C. 98. The like observation will certainly hold in the cases of horse-stealing
Ml). thefte In Northumberland and"Cumberland, and stealing woolen cloths from the
is provided by any statute that simple larceny under
bly In such other cases where
stances shall be felony without benefit of clergy.
Pott. Antiq.
c. 28.
(V) Ff. 47, 11,

offenses which obstruct or interfere with its due performance are defined and
5463, et teq.
See Rev. St. U. 8. 1878,
punished by acts of congress.
Larceny from the
made
mails
felony.
(12) See, as to this offense, statute 24 and 25 Vic, c. 96. In the United States a distinc
commonly made by statute between larceny in a dwelling house and simple larceny,
tion
more severely punished.
and the former
also covered by statute 24 and 25 Vic. c. 96.
If robbery is com
(13) This subject
mitted, being armed, or by more than one person, and with personal violence, the punish
ment may be penal servitude for life; in other cases
is limited to penal servitude for not
more than fourteen nor less than three years, or to imprisonment not more than two years.
a
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4-_>-l
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Open and violent larceny from the person, or robbery, the rapina of the
■civilians, is the felonious and forcible taking from the person of another of
1. There
goods or money to any value, by violence or putting him in fear, (2)
must be a taking, otherwise it is no robbery. A mere attempt to rob was in
deed held to be felony, so late as Henry the Fourth's time: (a) but afterwards
it was taken to be only a misdemeanor, and punishable with fine and imprison
ment; till the statute 7 Geo. II, c. 21, which makes it a felony (transportable
for seven years) unlawfully and maliciously to assault another with any offen
sive weapon or instrument; or by menaces, or by other forcible or violent
manner, to demand any money or goods; with a felonious intent to rob.
still
the thief, having once taken a purse, returns
robbery; and so
whether the taking be strictly from the person of another, or in his presence
man in fear, and
only; as, where a robber by menaces and violence puts
the taking be
drives away his sheep or his cattle before his face. (6) But
no robbery, (c)
2.
not either directly from his person, or in his presence,
immaterial of what value the thing taken is:
penny as well as
pound,
3. Lastly, the taking must be
thus forcibly extorted, makes
robbery,
by force, or previous putting in fear; which makes the violation of the per

it

a

is

a

a

(d
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is
a
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it,
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a
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a

a

a

a
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HaL P. C. 632.

15.
(d) Hawk. PC. 97.
(y) Triii. Ann. by all the judges.
1

(a)

S

Hawk. P. C. 88.

1

(f)

1

it

a

is

if,

I

it

a

is

if

a a

it

is

if

it
is

it

it

is

is

it

is

^

if

is

son more atrocious than privately stealing. For, according to the maxim of
the civil law (e) " qui vi rapuit, fur improbior esse videtur." This previous
the criterion that distinguishes robbery from
violence, or putting in fear,
one *privately steals sixpence from the person
other larcenies. For
r*243l
no
of another, and afterwards keeps
by putting him in fear, this
capital, as privately steal
robbery, for the fear
subsequent:
(/) neither
Not that
indeed necessary,
ing, being under the value of twelvepence.
though usual, to lay in the indictment that the robbery was committed by
sufficient,
laid to be done by violence, (g) And when
putting in fear;
it
laid to be done by putting in fear, this does not imply any great degree
of terror or affright in the party robbed:
enough that so much force, or
threatening by word or gesture, be used, as might create an apprehension of
man to part with his property without or against his con
danger, or induce
man be knocked down without previous warning, and
sent. (A) Thus,
stripped of his property while senseless, though strictly he cannot be said to
sword
be put in fear, yet this
robbery. Or,
person with
undoubtedly
him through mistrust and apprehension of
drawn begs an alms, and
give
man
under pretence of sale,
felonious robbery, (i) So
violence, this
forcibly extorts money from another, neither shall this subterfuge avail him.
But
doubted, (J) whether the forcing
higler, or other chapman, to sell
his wares, and giving him the full value of them, amounts to so heinous a
crime as robbery. (14)

if

is

a

if

is

If

a

is

is

8

&

it
is

is
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is

it

1

a

a

it

a

3

it
is

it

5,

4

and
supra.
(14) As to the taking and intent, see notes
be in
The thing taken need not be actually severed from the person.
It enough
the presence and under the control of the person from whom
taken.
Clary v. State, 33
Ark., 561; Kit v. State, 11 Humph., 167; U. S. v. Jones,
Wash. C. C, 209. Where a
man went armed to house and, by threats of death, compelled the owner's wife to take
desk in the owner's presence, and then snatched
from her hand, held rob
money from
man
Turner v. State,
Ohio St., 422. The owner of certain goods, traveling with
bery.
in charge of some of these goods, was knocked senseless by the man, who then ran away
with the goods.
Held that the man's possession of the goods was that of the owner, and
the offense was robbery.
one carry
no robbery
James v. State, 53 Ala., 380. But
assaulted, and
thief
ing goods drops them to go to the assistance of the owner who
picks them up and runs off with them.
C. & P., 508.
R. v. Fallows,
It unnecessary to prove both violence and intimidation.
man
knocked senseless
and plundered,
the
robbery, though there may be no putting in fear; and where fear
-essential ingredient,
the law in odium spoliatorii will presume violence where there appears
11, 401.
Sm.
Just ground for it. State v. Burke, 73 N. C, 83; McDaniel v. State,

Vol. II.— 54

425

If

Offences Against Private Property.

243

IV.

[Book

This

species of larceny is debarred of the benefit of clergy by statute 23
c. 1, and other subsequent statutes, not indeed in general, but only
•when committed in a dwelling-house, or in or near the king's highway.
A rob
bery, therefore, in a distant field or foot-path, was not punished with death;
(k) but was open to the benefit of clergy, till the statute 3 and 4 W. and M. c.
before the
9, which takes away clergy from both principals and accessories

Hen.

VIII,

fact, in robbery, wheresoever committed.
II. Malicious mischief, or damage, is the next species of injury to private
property, whioh the law considers as a public crime. This is such as is done,
not animo furandi, or with an intent of gaining by another's loss; which if
some though a weak excuse: but either out of a spirit of wanton cruelty, or
black and diabolical revenge.
In which it bears a near relation to the crime
of arson; for as that affects the habitation, so this does the other property of
And therefore any damage arising from this mischievous disposi
individuals.
tion, though only a trespass at common law, is now by a multitude of statutes
made penal in the highest degree.
Of these
shall extract the contents im
order of time.
*An<l) first, by statute 22 Hen. "VTII, c. 11, perversely and maliciousI"*244l
*■
' ly to cut down or destroy the powdike, in the fens of Norfolk and
Ely,
is felony. And in like manner it
by many special statutes enacted upon the
occasions, made felony to destroy the several sea-banks, river-banks, public
navigations, and bridges, erected by virtue of those acts of parliament. (15)
By statute 43 Eliz. c. 13 (for preventing rapine on the northern borders), to
(*)

1

is,

I

Hal. P. 0. 835.

If

is

is

violence enough.
the
any struggle for the possession of the goods taken, this
be attended with circumstances of terror, such threatening word or gesture as in com
mon experience
likely to create an apprehension of danger and induce a man to part with
not necessary to prove actual
robbery." It
his property for the safety of his person,
fear, as the law will presume
in such
case.
the terror continue, the delivery of the
with the assault.
Long v. State, 12 Ga., 293. See
property need not be contemporaneous
East P. C, 712; State v. Howerton, 58 Md.,
Taplin's Case, Simon's Case', Spencer's Case,
street car, was pushed against the door by
man, as he stepped on
Where
581.
large
man standing on the platform, and then another man threw his arm round his neck, push
ing back his head and at the same time rifling his pocket, there was force enough to make
a robbery. Mahoney v. People, 10 N. Y. S. C, 202. For like case, see Com. v. Snelling,
Binn., 379. A thief snatchedfr man's watch from his fob. The watch was fastened to
chain going round the neck, and the chain only broke after three jerks. As the thief used
v. Mason, R.
actual force in overcoming the resistance of the chain, held robbery.
R., 419. So where silk watch-guard was broken, and at the same time the thief said that
I.,
McCune,
meant
to
R.
take
the
watch.
State
v.
60.
Where
he
watch-chain was
there was violence enough to carry out the intent,
snatched away, held that
was rob
State
v.
while
Broderick,
Mo.,
59
But
where
the
in a friendly
prisoner,
818.
walking
bery.
way, drew money from his friend's pocket, using only force enough to draw
from the
pocket, the court held, that "'the mere snatching of anything from the hand or person of
any one without any struggle or resistance by the owner, or any force or violence on the
"
McCloskey v. People, Park. Cr. R. 299. See
part of the thief, will not constitute robbery.
East P. C, 702; Steward's Case, ibid., where a wig and hat were taken
Baker's Case,
East P. C, 703, where an umbrella was snatched
from the owner's head Horner's Case,
watch, loosely held in the hands, was
C. & K., 214, where
from the hand; R. v. Wall,
In Shinn v. State, 64 Ind., 13, money was snatched from the owner, but the only
taken.
violence used was in preventing his retaking it; held no robbery. See Bonsall v. State, 35
Ind., 460.
That extorting money or other thing of value, by means of
charge of sodomy, may be
an exceptional case, and
Park. Cr. R., 108. But this
robbery, see People v. McDaniels,
held not robbery to extort money by means of the charge of any other offense, as for
instance, forgery.
Long v. State, 12 Geo., 293; Britt v. State,
Humph., 45. Obtaining
threat to accuse her husband of an indecent assault, wa*
woman under
money from
C. & P., 518;
Moo. & R., 257.
held not to be robbery, in Rex v. Edwards,
(15) See, as to this offense, statute 24 and 25 Vic, c. 97. The same statute provides geogerally for other offenses mentioned in this paragraph.
Aa to malicious mischief in the United States, at the common law, see State v. Robinson,
Dev. & Bat. 130, and the valuable note thereto in 32 Am. Dec., 662,
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(m) See pages 144,208,286,MO.
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(I)

barn any barn or stack of corn or grain; or to imprison or carry away any sub
ject, in order to ransom bim, or to make prey or spoil of his person or goods
upon deadly feud or otherwise, in the four northern counties of Northumber
land, Westmoreland, Cumberland, and Durham, or being accessory before the
fact to such carrying away or imprisonment; or to give or take any money or
contribution, there called blackmail, to secure such goods from rapine; is felony
without benefit of clergy. By statute 22 and 23 Car. II, c. 7, maliciously, un
lawfully, and willingly, in the night time, to burn, or cause to be burnt or des
troyed, any ricks or stacks of corn, hay, or grain, barns, houses, buildings, or
kilns; or to kill any horses, sheep, or other cattle, is felony; but the offender
may make his election to be transported for seven years; and to maim or hurt
such ""horses, sheep, or other cattle, is a trespass for which treble damr*24ni'
ages shall be recovered.
By statute 4 and 6 W. and M. c. 23, to burn *■
on any waste, between Candlemas and Midsummer, any grig, ling, heath, furze,
goss, or fern, is punishable with whipping and confinement in the house of cor
rection.
By statute 1 Ann. st. 2, c. 9, captains and mariners belonging to ships,
and destroying the same, to the prejudice of the owners (and by 4 Geo. I, c.
12, to the prejudice of insurers also), are guilty of felony without benefit of
And by statute 12 Ann. st. 2, c. 18, making any hole in a ship in dis
clergy.
tress, or stealing her pumps, or aiding or abetting such offences, or wilfully
doing any thing tending to the immediate loss of such ship, is felony without
benefit of clergy. By statute 1 Geo. I, c. 48, maliciously to set on fire any un
derwood, wood, or coppice, is made single felony. By statute 6 Geo. I, c. 23,
the wilful and malicious tearing, cutting, spoiling, burning, or defacing of the
garments or clothes of any persons passing in the streets or highways, with in
tent so to do, is felony. This was occasioned by the insolence of certain wea
vers and others, who, upon the introduction of some Indian fashions prejudic
ial to their own manufactures, made it their practice to deface them; either by
open outrage, or by privily cutting, or casting aqua fortia in the streets upon
such as wore them.
By statute 9 Geo. I, c. 22, commonly called the Waltham
black act, occasioned by the devastations committed near Waltham in Hamp
shire, by persons in disguise or with their faces blacked (who seem to have re
sembled the Roberdsmen, or followers of Robert Hood, that in the reign of
Richard the First committed great outrages on the borders of England and
say, which has in part been mentioned under
by this black act,
Scotland) ;
farther en
the several heads of riots, menaces, mayhem, and larceny, (to)
extended by
acted, that to set fire to any house, barn, or outhouse (which
statute
Geo. IH, c. 29, to the ^malicious and wilful burning or setting
r*o4fll
fire to all kinds of mills, or to any hovel, cock, mow, or stack of corn,
straw, hay, or wood; or unlawfully and maliciously to break down the Bead of
any fish pond, whereby the fish shall be lost or destroyed; or in like manner to
kill, maim, or wound any cattle; or cut down or destroy any trees planted in
an avenue, or growing in
garden, orchard, or plantation, for ornament, shel
ter, or profit; all these malicious acts, or procuring by gift or promise of re
ward any person to join them therein, are felonies without benefit of clergy;
and the hundred shall be chargeable for the damages, unless the offender be
convioted. In like manner by the Roman law to cut down trees, and especial
Geo.
By statutes
vines, was punished in the same degree as robbery, (n)
II, c. 37, and 10 Geo. II, c. 32,
also made felony, without the benefit of
clergy, maliciously to cut down any river or sea-bank, whereby lands may be
overflowed or damaged; or to cut any hop-binds growing in plantation of
hops, or wilfully and maliciously to set on fire, or cause to be set on fire, any
mine, pit, or delph of coal. By statute 11 Geo. II, c. 22, to use any violence
in order to deter any person from buying corn or grain to seize any carriage
or horse carrying grain or meal to or from any market or sea port; or to use
any outrage with such intent; or to scatter, take away, spoil, or damage such
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grain or meal; is punished for the first offence with imprisonment and public
•whipping : and the second offence, or destroying any granary where corn is
kept for exportation, or taking away or spoiling any grain or meal in such gran
ary, or in any ship, boat, or vessel intended for exportation, is felony, subject
to transportation for seven years.
By statute 28 Geo. II, c. 19, to set fire to
any goss, furze, or fern, growing in any forest or chase, is subject to a fine of
c. 33,
five pounds.
By statutes 6 Geo. HI, cc. 36, and 48, and 13 Geo.
"wilf ully to spoil or destroy any timber or other trees, roots, *shrubs,
T*v±n
J or plants, is for the two first offences liable to pecuniary penalties; and
*■
for the third, if in the day time, and even for the first, if at night, the offen
der shall be guilty of felony, and liable to transportation for seven years. By
statute 9 Geo. Ill, c 29, wilfully and maliciously to burn or destroy any en
gine or other machines, therein specified, belonging to any mine; or any fences
for inclosures pursuant to any act of parliament, is made single felony, and
punishable with transportation for seven years, in the offender, his advisers, and
procurers. And by statute 13 Geo. Ill, c. 38, the like punishment is inflicted
-on such as break into any house, &c, belonging to the plate-glass company,
with intent to steal, cut or destroy, any of their stock or utensils, or wilfully
and maliciously cut or destroy the same. And these are the principal punish
ments of malicious mischief.
III. Forgery, (16) or the crimen falsi, is an offence, which was punished by
the civil law with deportation or banishment, and sometimes with death, (o) It

Ill,

(o) Inst. 4, 18,7.

al

■

a

it a

a

a

it

it,

(16) Anciently, at common law, forgery could only be committed by making falsely or
uttering a matter of record, as an authentic matter of public nature, or deed, or will — some
1 Hawk. P. C, ch. 70, §§ 8-10 ; Com. v. Searle, 2 Binn., 332.
The
sealed instrument.
statutes of the different states of the American Union have added largely to the number of
Instruments which are the subject of forgery. The term as at present used is comprehen
"
sively defined as the false making or materially altering, with intent to defraud, of any
writing, which, if genuine, might apparently be of legal efficacy, or the foundation of a
2 Bish. Cr, L., 7th ed., § 572.
legal liability."
The false making. The making and uttering need not be by writing; as where, by engrav
ing, an Austrian bank-note was forged. People v. Rhoner, 4 Park. Cr. R, 166. The forgery
may be by printing: Com. v. Ray, 3 Gray, 441; by a stamp: Wheeler v. Lynde, 1 Allen.
402; even by a photograph: R. v. Rinaldi, L. & C, 830, where it was held forgery to take
a "positive" evanescent impression of a bank-note, though the culprit was caught before
" negative."
he had taken a lasting
It is not necessary that the whole instrument be forged. A false signature written on a
genuine instrument may be a forgery. Powell v. Com., 11 Gratt., 822; citing R v. Wickt,
R and R., 149, and R v. Winterbottom. 1 Den., 41. To make a material alteration on a
true instrument with fraudulent intent is a forgery. R. v. Dawson, 1 Stra., 19; Teagin'e
Case, 2 East P. C, 979.
Where words were inserted in a lease to express a contemporary
-oral agreement,
held, no forgery.
Pauli v. Com,, 89 Pa. St., 432. An agent was author
ized to sell and fill up blanks in insurance tickets.
By filling and falsely antedating such a
ticket the agent defrauded the company. This filling the blank falsely was held a material
alteration, and the man was convicted. People v. Graham, 6 Park. C. R., 135; citing R
v. Wilson, 2 0. and K., 527.
Where a clerk was given a blank check with authority to fill
it for a certain amount, and he wrote in a larger sum. See further as to forgery by fraudu
lent filling of blanks.
R v. Hart, 7 C. and P., 652; R v. Vanduzer, 1 Cox C. C, 186;
Wilson v. Park Commissioners, 70 111., 46; Van Duzer v. Howe, 21 N. Y., 531. Where a
bond was altered after execution, and one of the signers was by false representations in-duced to assent on the express understanding that the representations
were true; held, that
there was no forgery, as the assent, however fraudulently gained, removed the false char
State v. Flanders, 38 N. H., 824.
acter of the instrument
A deed made by the parties
purporting to make it was altered by them as to a material date with fraudulent intent
This was held forgery, Kelly, C. B., saying: "Every instrument which fraudulently pur
ports to be what it is not is a forgery, whether the falseness of the instrument consists in
the fact that it is made in a false name, or that the pretended date, when that is a material
R v. Ritson, L. R and C. C, 199; State v. Kattleman, 35
portion of the deed," is false.
Mo., 105. On the same paper with a promissory note, and below
was an agreement re
and qualifying it.
This was cut off. The act was forgery, because the
ferring to
teration was material, and changed
non-negotiable note into negotiable one, thus chang
"
ing the maker's liability.
State v. Stratton, 27 la., 420.
was held
So
material
428
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" the fraudulent making or
may with us be defined, at common law, to be,
alteration of a writing to the prejudice of another man's right;" for which
tion where a note was payable at either of two places, and a paper was pasted over the
name of one place, and on the paper a different name written, thus substituting the name
of a solvent for that of an insolvent firm. Treble's Case, R and R., 104. If one from a
course of dealing supposes he has authority to sign another's name, it is no forgery; other
R. v. Beard, 8 C.
wise if one signs thus, thinking he can take up the paper when due.
and P., 143. The defendant brought a bill to a banker's as from T. The bill was not in
The banker then wrote "per procura
dorsed, but the defendant said he would indorse it
tion T," beneath which the defendant signed his own name. Held, that this false assump
tion of authority was not forgery, as there was no false making. R v. White, 2 0. and
K., 404. Where two persons have the same name, and one signs this name with intention
that the instrument shall be thought that of the other person, it is forgery. Meade v.
Young, 4T. R, 28; Barfleld v. State, 29 Ga., 127. So if one uses his own name with
fraudulent intent to represent a fictitious firm. R. v. Rogers, 8 C. and P., 629. So where
the defendant induced his servant to sign a blank bill, and then filled it up, intendingto
R. v. Blenkinsop, 2 C. and K.,
charge anotherperson of the same name as the servant.
581 ; see R. v. Epps, 4 P. and F., 81.
Where one intends to utter a note as being the note
of some one not the signer, but of the same name, and induces an innocent person, who
"It matters not by whom the
does not intend to bind himself, to sign it, it is forgery.
signature is attached, if it be not attached as his own. If the note is prepared for the pur
pose of being fraudulently used as the note of another person, it is falsely made." The
fraudulent intent necessary need not be "in the mind of the one who holds the pen in writ
ing the signature. If that is done at the dictation or request of another, and for his pur
poses and use, and his designs are fraudulent so as to make it a forgery if he had written,
it himself, then the instrument is a forged one." Com. v. Foster, 114 Mass., 811. A
Biles v.
fraudulent error in keeping books by a confidential clerk was held forgery.
Com., 82 Pa. St, 629. But in State v. Young, 46 N. H., 266, it is held, that a man cannot
be guilty of forgery by making a false entry in his own books, in his own possession, and
before any settlement under which another has acquired rights, because the writing must
be false, not genuine, without regard to the truth of what it contains— "a writing which is
the counterfeit of something which has been or is a genuine instrument, or one which pur
" the writ
ports to be a genuine instrument, which it is not." The rule is said to be that
ing or instrument which may be the subject of forgery must generally be or purport to be
the act of another, or it must be at the time the property of another, or it must be some
writing or instrument under which others have acquired some rights, or liabilities sought
In R. v. Closs, Bears, and B., 460, a
to be effected, without their consent, by alteration.
man sold as an original a copy of a painting with a copy of the artist's name on it. Held,
that this was not forgery; that the name copied was no more than an arbitrary mark of
identification, and was not properly a writing.
So in Smith's Case, Dears, and B. , 566,
where B had sold a powder in packages with peculiar labels, and S copied the labels almost
exactly and put them on packages of spurious powder; held no forgery. But a fraudu
lent alteration of a book settlement was held forgery in Barnum v. State, 15 Ohio, 717; S.
C, 45 Am. Dec., 601.
There may be forgery of public instruments when no private individual is injured; as of
civil process.
R. v. Collier, 5 C. and P., 160 ; or of a returned writ by the officer issuing
it. Com. v. Mycall, 2 Mass., 136; or of a letter to a jailer authorizing the discharge of a
Brown ».
prisoner. R. v. Harris, 6 C. and P., 129; or, under a statute, of a court record.
People, 86 111., 239. The forged instrument need not have been acted on: the false mak
ing with intent to defraud is the gist of the offense.
Commonwealth v. Ladd, 15 Mass.,
626; United States v. Shellmire, Bald., 370; State v. Pierce, 8 Iowa, 231.
The crime con
"
sists essentially in trying
to give an appearance of truth to mere deceit and falsity, and
either to impose that upon the world as the solemn act of another which he is no way privy
to, or at least make a man's act appear to have been done at a time when it was not done,
and by force of such falsity to give it an operation which in truth and justice it ought not
to have." 1 Hawk. P. C, ch. 73, § 2.
2. The apparent validity of the forged instrument.
The forged instrument should in all
essential points have upon the face of it the similitude of a true one, so that it is not radi
cally defective and illegal in the very frame of it. 2 East P. C, 952. The forgery of a
void instrument is not indictable; otherwise, if by a possibility the State or some person
might be defrauded.
Henderson v. State, 14 Tex., 503. Where three witnesses were re
quired to a will and a false will had but two, held so plainly invalid as to be no forgery.
Wall's Case, 2 East P. C, 953. So where a bill of exchange required a witness andi the
imitation had none.
Moffat's Case, 2 East P.O., 954. See for the same principle, State
t. Jones, 1 Bay. 207; State v. Gutridge, 1 Bay, 285. The fraudulent adding of the name
of a subscribing witness to an instrument not requiring one, is not forgery. State v. Gher
kin, 7 Ired., 206. In an indictment for forging a promissory note, the false instrument set
forth contained no promise to pay money to bearer or order.
Held, that this was no for
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And also by a variety
the offender may suffer fine, imprisonment, and pillory.
a more severe punishment is inflicted on the offender in many par

-of statutes,

ry, since the instrument, if genuine, would not be a good promissory note in legal effect,
Where a statute required that certain orders should be sealed
v. Burke, R and R, 496.
and directed to a treasurer; held, no forgery to make a false order without seal and directed
to a constable.
R v. Rush worth, R and R., 317. So where an order was drawn without
a payee.
R v. Richardson, R. and R, 193. But where a forged bill was uttered without
the drawee's indorsement, it was held that the instrument was so far a bill as to be the sub
ject of forgery. R. v. Wicks, R. & R, 149. So, an order differing only in some minute
from the statutory form, held not so far void that the false making might not
Particulars
e forgery.
R v. Lyon, R & R, 255. The principle upon which these distinctions rest is
laid down thus: An instrument void in law upon its face is not the subject of forgery,
because the genuine and counterfeit would be equally useless, imposing no duty, conferring
no right. State v. Smith, 8 Yerg., 150. "An instrument should be so far perfect in form
It is not the falsity of the writing alone, but also
and substance as to be valid if genuine.
If the forged instrument
its supposed fraudulent effect, which makes a forgery criminal.
is so obviously defective in its form as this is, the law will not presume that it can accom
The rule seems to be well settled that a writing,
plish the fraud which is perhaps intended.
void in itself and which cannot be made good by averment, if it were genuine, is not the
subject of forgery." People v. Harrison, 8 Barb., 560; Abbott v. Rose, 62 Me., 194. In
order to be forgery, the instrument must be of such character that, if genuine, it would be
The instrument must be such that, when forged, it does or
evidence of the fact it recites.
State v. Anderson, 30 La. An., 557;
may tend to prejudice the rights of another.
Barnum v. State, 15 Ohio, 717. In an indictment for forgery of a note, the instrument set out
was an agreement without any consideration, to be paid in labor, and there was no aver
As the instrument, on its face,
ment of any extrinsic fact to make the contract operative.
was without legal effect, and it was not shown operative by averment, it was held no
forgery, although an ignorant man might be imposed upon by the instrument. People v.
Shall, 9 Cow., 778. While one cannot be convicted of forgery if the instrument is appar
ently void, one may be when the invalidity is shown by proof of some extrinsic fact,
because here there is a probability that some one may be defrauded.
People v. Galloway,
17 Wend., 540; citing Sterling's Case, 1 Leach, 99, where the defendant was convicted of
forging a will while the testator was alive; because, though in fact the will could not be
the instrument purported on its face to be good for the purpose intended. In
" If the writing is invalid on its face, it
Ssnuine,
tate v. Pierce, 8JCowa, 231, it is said:
cannot be the
subject of forgery, for the obvious reason that it has no tendency to effect a fraud. Where,
however, the invalidity is to be made out by the proof of some extrinsic fact, the instru
ment, if good on its face, may be legally capable of effecting a fraud, and the party making
See also Brown v. People, 86 111., 239; State v. Shelters. 51
the same may be punished."

Vt,

102.

There may be a forgery of a bill of exchange, though not stamped according to law, not
withstanding this defect appears on the face of the instrument, since the stamp acts are rev
enue laws and not meant to vary the law of crimes.
Hawkeswood's Case, 2 East P. 0.,
955; Morton's Case, ibid. : Teague's Case, id., 979; R. v. Pike, 2 Moo.. 70; Cross v. People
47Di, 152; People v. Frank. 28 Cal., 507; Horton v. State, 82 Tex., 79..
8. Intent,
The intent to defraud is the essence of the crime. It is not necessary that one
should be actually defrauded.
If the jury can infer from the circumstances of the case an
intent to utter the instrument, that fact will be enough to imply an intent to defraud. Hen
derson v. State, 14 Tex., 503. There must be an intent to defraud some person or corpora
tion, but the intent may be gathered from knowingly forging the instrument
TJ. 8 v
Shellmire, 1 Bald. C. C, 370; Brown v. Com., 2 Leigh, 769. If the jury can fairly infer
an intent to utter the forged note, the act of forgery will be sufficient to imply an intent to
defraud. But if there could not possibly be any fraud effected by the false making, there
could be no fraud intended, and hence no forgery. State v. Redstrake, 39 N. J., 365. Al
though one may intend to take up a bill when due, if he utters it knowing it to be forged
and believing that he could raise money on it, there is a sufficient fraudulent intent to con
stitute forgery, and this, too, though the forger has actually paid the bill before conviction.
R. v. Geach, 9 C. & P., 499. A man issued in payment of a debt a bill which he knew was
There was reason to suppose that he meant to take it up at maturity, but he did
fictitious.
not communicate this to the creditor, who thought the bill genuine.
Held, forgery. R v.
Hill, 2 Moo., 80. To constitute an intent to defraud, it is not necessary to intend to de
fraud a particular person, if the consequence of his act would necessarily defraud some per
son, but there must be a possibility of some one being defrauded.
R v. Marcus, 2 C. & K.,
A man had altered a genuine medical diploma so as to make it appear that the docu
856.
ment had been issued to him. On the discovery of the fraud he was indicted for forgery.
The jury found that he altered the instrument with intent to induce the belief that it was
genuine, but without intent to deceive any particular person.
Held, no forgery, because it
was necessary that, at the time of the alteration, there should have been an intent to defraud
430
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ticular cases, which are so multiplied of late as almost to become general.
shall mention the principal instances. (17)
By statute 5 Ehz. c. 14, to forge or make, or knowingly to publish or give in
evidence, any forged deed, court-roll or will, with intent to affect the right 01
real property, either freehold or copyhold, is punished by a forfeiture to the
party grieved of double costs and damages; by standing in the pillory, and
having both the ears cut off, and the nostrils slit and seared; by forfeiture to
the crown of the profits of the offender's lands, and by perpetual imprisonment.
For any forgery 'relating to a term of years, or annuity, bond, obli- r# . .-,
i
gation, acquittance, release, or discharge of any debt or demand of
any personal chattels, the same forfeiture is given to the party grieved; and on
the offender is inflicted the pillory, loss of one of his ears, and a year's impris
onment; the second offence in both cases being felony without benefit of clergy.
Besides this general act, a multitude of others, since the revolution when
paper credit was first established, have inflicted capital punishment on the
forging, altering, or uttering as true, when forged, of any bank bills or notes,
or other securities; (p) (18) of bills of credit issued from the exchequer; (q)
of army or navy
of South Sea bonds, Ac; (r) of lottery tickets or orders;
of East India bonds; («) of writings under the seal of the
debentures;
London or royal exchange assurance; (w) of the hand of the receiver of the
pre-fines; (a;) or of the accountant-general and certain other officers of the
letter of attorney or other power to receive or
court of chancery; (y) of
transfer stock or annuities; and on the personating
proprietor thereof, to
c. 82. 15Geo. H, e. 18. 18Geo. m. c. 79

n,o. M.

§

j
1

a

is

it

a

8

9

8

a

6

2

S.

a
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R. v. Hodgson, Dears. & B.,
The intent in uttering
some particular person.
forged
instrument may be inferred from the uttering of other like instruments. State v. Williams,
C., 45 Am. Dec., 741.
Rich., 418;
the various statutes on this subject, and goes
(17) The 24 and 25 Vic, c. 98, consolidates
with great particularity into an enumeration of the cases which shall be punishable under it.
The punishment in some cases may be penal servitude for life.
Besides the punishment to which the forger is subject, he becomes, at common law,
b.
Co. Litt.,
Greenl. Ev.,
878. But to
infamous, and incapable of giving evidence.
conviction and a judgment. Rex v. Castell,
East,
have this effect, there must be both
id.,
Cow.,
309;
v.
Teal,
11
707. The disability will be
People
Whipple,
77; Rex v.
of
or
Pease,
Cas.,
reversal
v.
Johns.
judgment,
by
pardon:
People
838; and
removed by
not competent to attach to the pardon condition that the disability shall still remain.
Ibid.
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Statutes, in some cases, have changed this common law rule, either by making the con*
victed party competent witness after he has endured the punishment, or by making the
infamy of person an objection, to his credibility only.
an uttering.
v. Mitchell,
paper
good
(J.
Bald. C. 0., 866.
(18) Declaring that
" To
to declare or assent, directly or indirectly, by words or actions, that
utter and publish
in payment would be an uttering or publishing."
Offering
Common
a note
good.
Binn., 832.
an offense to utter
note the forgery of which is an
wealth v. Searle,
R. v. Sharman, Dears., 285; overruling R v. Boult,
C. & K.,
offense at common law.
was held no offense to utter an instrument unless the fraud succeeded.
Utter
604, where
not enough to make an offense.
R. v. Heywood,
C. & K., 852.
ing to an accomplice
Com. v. Hill, 11 Mass.
There may be an uttering through the bands of an innocent agent.
sufficient
Simply handing a bill with
forged indorsement to clerk for payment
186.
0. & P., 408. A man gave
forged bill to
banker and asked
uttering. R. v. Arscott,
debt, and the banker said that it would depend on his inquir
him to take
as security for
Held, this conditional uttering .was enough.
R v. Cook, C. & P. ,|582. A debtor
ies.
exhibited to creditor
in his
forged receipt for the debt, claiming credit for it, but kept
Held,
own hands.
sufficient uttenng, for, unlike
need not be ten
promissory note,
C. & K., 707: but the mere exhibition of
false not*
dered to be taken.
R. v. Radford.
with fraudulent intent,
not an uttering. R. v. Shukard, R. & R, 200. Handing another
in circulation,
not an uttering.
a counterfeit note as specimen of engraving, not to put
counterfeit in charity. R. v.
P., 428; neither is to give knowingly
R. v. Harris,
C.
P., 122.
C.
Page,
431
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Geo. m, o. 80.
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See the several stamp acts.
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Stat. 81Ueo. II, c. SB, 78.
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receive or transfer such annuities, stock or dividends;
also on the person
ating, or procuring to he personated, any seaman or other person, entitled to
wages or other naval emoluments, or any of his personal representatives; and
the taking or procuring to he taken, any false oath in order to obtain
pro
bate, or letters of administration in order to receive such payments; and the
forging or procuring to he forged and likewise the uttering, or publishing, as
°^ any counterfeited seaman's *will or power:
(a) to which
r*249l true>
may he added, though not strictly reducible to this head, the counter
feiting of Mediterranean passes, under the hands of the lords of the admiralty,
to protect one from the piratical states of Barbary; (6) the forging or imitat
ing of any stamps to defraud the public revenue (c) and the forging of any
marriage register or license; (d) all which are by distinct acts of parliament
made felonies without benefit of clergy.
By statute 13 Geo. Ill, cc. 52 and
69, forging or counterfeiting any stamp or mark to denote the standard of
gold and silver p!,ate, and certain other offences of the like tendency, are
By statute 12 Geo. Ill, c
punished with transportation for fourteen years.
48, certain frauds on the stamp duties, therein described,
principally by using
the same stamps more than once, are made single felony, and liable to trans
And the same punishment
inflicted by statute
portation for seven years.
13 Geo. Ill, c. 38, on such as counterfeit the common seal of the corporation
for manufacturing plate glass (thereby erected) or knowingly demand money
of the company by virtue of any writing under such counterfeit seal.
There are also certain other general laws with regard to forgery of which
Geo. II, c. 25, whereby the first offence in forging or procuring to
the first
be forged, acting or assisting therein, or uttering or publishing as true any
forged deed, will, bond, writing obligatory, bill of exchange, promissory note,
indorsement, or assignment thereof, or any acquittance or receipt for money
or goods, with intention to defraud any person (or corporation), (c)
made
Geo. II, c. 22, and 18
felony without benefit of clergy. And by statute
Geo. Ill, o. 18,
equally penal to forge or cause to be forged, or utter as
bill of exchange, or the number or principal
true, counterfeit acceptance of
8um °^ any accountaD'e
receipt for any note, bill, or any *other
*2B0l
security for money; or any warrant or order for the payment of
So that
believe, through the number of these
money, or delivery of goods.
now hardly
case possible to be con
general and special provisions, there
real
ceived wherein forgery, that tends to defraud, whether in the name of
not made
or fiotitious person, (/')
capital crime. (19)
These are the principal infringements of the rights of property: which were
the last speoies of- offences against individuals or private subjects which the
We have before examined the
method of distribution has led us to consider.
nature of all offences against the public, or commonwealth; against the king
or supreme magistrate, the father and protector of that community; against

a

is

it

forgery.
If one indorses note or bill in an'assumed name, with intent to defraud,
R, 75. So, even by the use of the fictitious name no credit is added.
Marshall, B.
R, 90; R. v. Francis, R R, 209. So, false making in an assumed
Whiley, R
bill which was afterwards dis
accepted
Thompson v. State, 49 Ala., 16.
name.
honored. When the drawer next saw him he was called B. On the evidence the court held
before
did not sufficiently appear that the prisoner had not gone by the name of
that
the time of accepting the bill, or that he had assumed the name for the purpose of fraud.
R. v. Boutien, R. & K. 360. By false representations and using an assumed name, the de
Held, that when his real name appeared he must show
fendant had defrauded another.
that he had used this assumed name for other purposes.and before the fraud, and that when
name for fraudulent purposes, the drawing the instrument ti
proved to have assumed
R, 278. See R v. Marshal], R & R, 75;
that name was
forgery. R. v. Peacock, R
State v. Givens,
Ala. 747.
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the universal law of all civilized nations, together with some of the more atro
cious offences, of publicly pernicious consequence, against God and his holy
And the several heads comprehend the whole circle of crimes and
religion.
misdemeanors, with the punishment annexed to each, that are cognizable by
the laws of England.

CHAPTER XVIII.

OF THE MEANS OF PREVENTING OFFENCES.

I

We are now arrived at the fifth general branch, or head, under which pro
posed to consider the subject of this book of our Commentaries; viz., the
means of preventing the commission of crimes and misdemeanors.
And really
it is an honour, and almost a singular one, to our English laws, that they fur
nish a title of this sort; since preventive justice is, upon every principle of
reason, of humanity, and of sound policy, preferable in all respects to punish
ing justice; (a) the execution of which, though necessary, and in its conse
quences a species of mercy to the commonwealth, is always attended with
many harsh and disagreeable circumstances.
This preventive justice consists in obliging those persons whom there is a
probable ground to suspect of future misbehaviour, to stipulate with and to
give full assurance to the public, that such offence as is apprehended shall not
happen; by finding pledges or securities for keeping the peace, or for their
This requisition of sureties has been several times mentioned
good behaviour.
before, as part of the penalty inflicted upon such as have been guilty of cer
tain gross misdemeanors;
but there, also, it must be understood rather as a
caution against the repetition of the offence, than any immediate pain or pun
ishment. And indeed, if we consider all human *punishraents in a r*9fio n
J
large and extended view, we shall find them all rather calculated to *■
prevent future crimes, than to expiate the past; since, as was observed in a former
chapter, (b) all punishments inflicted by temporal laws may be classed under
three heads; such as tend to the amendment of the offender himself, or to de
prive him of any power to do future mischief, or to deter others by his ex
ample; all of which conduce to one and the same end, of preventing future
crimes, whether that can be effected by amendment, disability, or example.
But the caution that we speak of at present is such as is intended merely for
prevention, without any crime actually committed by the party, but arising
only from a probable suspicion that some crime is intended or likely to happen;
and consequently it is not meant as any degree of punishment, unless, per
haps, for a man's imprudence in giving just ground of apprehension.
By the Saxon constitution these sureties were always at hand, by means of
King Alfred's wise institution of decennaries or frankpledges; wherein as has
more than once been observed, (c) the whole neighbourhood or tithing of free
men were mutually pledges for each other's good behaviour.
But this great
and general security being now fallen into disuse and neglected, there hath
succeeded to it the method of making suspected persons find particular and
special securities for their future conduct: of which we find mention in the
laws of Bang Edward the Confessor; (d) tradat fidejussores depace et legalitate
tuenda." Let us, therefore, consider, first, what this security is; next, who
may take or demand it; and, lastly, how it may be discharged.
L This security consists in being bound, with one or more securities, in a
recognizance or obligation to the king, entered on record, and taken in some
court or by some judicial officer; whereby the parties acknowledge themselves
(a) Beccar. ch. 41.
(e) See book I, page 114.
(6) Bee page U.
(d) Cap. ia
433
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to be indebted to the crown in the sum required (for instance, 100Z.), withcondition to be void and of none effect if the *party shall appear in court
L
-I on such a
day, and in the mean time shall keep the peace; (1) either
generally towards the king and all his liege people; or, particularly, also, with
regard to the person who craves the security. Or, if it be for the good be
haviour, then on condition that he shall demean and behave himself well (or
De of good behaviour), either generally or specially, for the time therein
limited, as for one or more years, or for life. This recognizance, if taken by
a justice of the peace, must be certified to the next sessions, in pursuance of
the statute 3 Hen. VII, c. 1, and if the condition of such recognizance be
broken, by any breach of the peace in the one case, or any misbehaviour in
the other, the recognizance becomes forfeited or absolute; and being estreated
or extracted (taken out from among the other records) and sent np to the ex
chequer, the party and his sureties, having now become the king's absolute
debtors, are sued for the several sums in which they are respectively bound.
2. Any justices of the peace, by virtue of their commission, or those who are
ex officio conservators of the peace, as was mentioned in a former volume,
may demand such security according to their own discretion; or
maybe
granted at the request of any subject, upon due cause shown, provided such
demandant be under the king's protection; for which reason
has been for
praemunire
merly doubted, whether Jews, pagans, or persons convicted of
were entitled thereto. (/")
the justice
averse to act,
Or,
may be granted
Dy
mandatory writ, called supplicavit, issuing out of the court of king's
oench or chancery; which will compel the justice to act, as
ministerial and
not as
return to such writ, specifying
judicial officer: and he must make
his compliance, under his hand and seal, (g) But this writ
seldom used:
for, when application
made to the superior courts, they usually take the re
c, 8.
And,
cognizances there, under the directions of the statute 21 Jac.
indeed,
peer or peeress cannot be bound over in any other place than the
courts of *king's bench or chancery: though
justice of the peace has
r*oK/
power to require sureties of any other person, being compos mentis
and under the degree of nobility, whether he be
fellow-justice or other magi
strate, or whether he be merely
private man. (A) Wives may demand
against their husbands; or husbands,
necessary, against their wives. (*) But
feme coverts, and infants under age, ought to find security by their friend*
only, and not to be bound themselves: for they are incapable of engaging
themselves to answer any debt; which, as we observed,
the nature of these
recognizances or acknowledgments. (2)
3. A recognizance
may be discharged, either by the demise of the king, to
whom the recognizance
made; or by the death of the principal party bound
not before forfeited; or by order of the court to which such recog
thereby,
nizance
certified by the justices (as the quarter sessions, assizes, or king's
was
bench),
they see sufficient cause; or in case he at whose request
or does not make
granted,
granted upon private account, will release
his appearance to pray that it may be continued, (k)
Thus far what has been said
applicable to both species of recognizances,
for the peace, and for the good behaviour: depace, et legalitate, tuenda, as ex-
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limit to the time of imprisonment in default of finding sureties.
(1) There must be
B., 1020
Prickett v. Gratrex,
But one may be bound over for longer time than UH
the nest sessions.
Willes v. Bridger,
B. <fcAid., 278, where the imprisonment was for
two years.
8ee R. v. Bowes,
T. R, 696. See next note.
committed to prison, but
not to be de
(2) In default of giving security, the party
tained on the warrant of
for more than twelve calendar months. Stat
single magistrate
ute 16 and 17 Vic, c. 30,
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Bat as these two species of securities
pressed in the laws of King Edward.
are in some respects different, especially as to the cause of granting, or the
means of forfeiting them,
shall now consider them separately: and, first,
shall show for what cause such a recognizance, with sureties for the peace, is
grantable; and then, how it may be forfeited.
1. Any justices of the peace, may, ex officio, bind all those to keep the
peaoe, who in his presence make any affray : or threaten to kill or beat another;
or contend together with hot and angry words; or go about with unusual
weapons *or attendance, to the terror of the people; and all such as he
r*.->55i'
knows to be common barretors; and such as are brought before him by <•
the constable for a breach of peace in his presence; and all such persons, as,
haying been before bound to the peace, have broken it and forfeited their
Also, wherever any private man hath just cause to fear
recognizances.
that another will burn his house, or do him
corporal injury, by killing, im
prisoning, or beating him; or that he will procure others so to do; he may de
mand surety of the peace against such person: and every justice of the peace
he who demands
will make oath that he
bonnd to grant
actually
nnder fear of death or bodily harm; and will show that he has just cause to
be so, by reason of the other's menaces, attempts, or having lain in wait for
him; and will also further swear, that he does not require such surety out of
called swearing the peace against
malice, or for mere vexation, (to) This
the party does not find such sureties, as the justice in his dis
another: and,
cretion shall require, he may immediately be committed till he does, (n)
2. Such recognizance for keeping the peace, when given, may be forfeited
by any actual violence, or even an assault, or menace, to the person of him who
if be special recognizance; or the recognizance be general,
demanded
or tends to breach of the
by any unlawful action whatsoever, that either
peace; or more particularly,
any one of the many species of offences which
were mentioned as crimes against the public peace in the eleventh chapter of
this book; or by any private violence committed against any of his majesty's
But bare trespass upon the lands or goods of another, which
a
subjects.
wilful breach of the peace,
ground for civil aotion, unless accompanied with
is no forfeiture of the recognizance, (o) Neither are mere reproachful words,
as calling
man
knave or liar, any breach of the peace, so as to forfeit one's
recognizance, (being *looked upon to be merely the effect of unmean- r*o5B-i
ing heat and passion), unless they amount to challenge to fight, (p)
The other speoies of recognizance, with sureties,
for the good abearance
or good behaviour.
This includes security for the peace, and somewhat more;
we will therefore examine
in the same manner as the other.
1. First, then, the justices are empowered
by the statute 34 Edw. Ill, c.
to bind over to the good behaviour towards the king and his people, all of
them that be not of good fame, wherever they be found; to the intent that the
people be not troubled or endamaged, nor the peace diminished, nor merchants
and others, passing by the highways of the realm, be disturbed nor put in the
Under the general words of this
peril which may happen by such offenders.
holden that
expression that be not of good fame,
man may be bound to
his good behaviour for causes of scandal, contra bonos mores, as well as contra
pacem: as, for haunting bawdy-houses with women of bad fame; or for keep
ing such women in his own house; or for words tending to scandalize the gov
ernment, or in abuse of the officers of justice, especially in the execution of
their office.
Thus, also,
justice may bind over all night-walkers; eaves-drop
pers; such as keep suspicious company, or are reported to be pilferers or rob
bers; such as sleep in the day, and wake in the night; common drunkards;
whoremasters; the putative fathers of bastards; cheats; idle vagabonds; and
other persons whose misbehaviour may reasonably bring them within the
general words of the statute, as persons not of good fame: an expression,
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must be owned, of so great a latitude, as leaves much to be determined by the
discretion of the magistrate himself. But if he commits a man for want of
sureties, he must express the cause thereof with convenient certainty; and take
care that such cause be a good one. (q) (3)
*2> A recognizance for the good behaviour may be forfeited by all
r^qnn
J the same means as one for the security of the peace may be: and also
*■
As, by going armed, with unusual attendance, to the terror of
by some others.
the people; by speaking words tending to sedition; or by committing any of
those acts of misbehaviour which the recognizance was intended to prevent
But not by barely giving fresh cause of suspicion of that which perhaps may
never actually happen: (r) for, though it is just to compel suspected person*
to give security to the public against misbehaviour that is apprehended; yet
it would be hard, upon such suspicion, without proof of any actual crime, to
punish them by a forfeiture of their recognizance.

CHAPTER XIX.

OF COURTS OF A CRIMINAL JURISDICTION.
Thb sixth, and last, object of our inquiries will be the method of inflicting
those punishments which the law has annexed to particular offences; and
In
which
have constantly subjoined to the description of the crime itself.
shall pursue much the same general method that I
the discussion of which,
followed in the preceding book, with regard to the redress of civil injuries;
by, first, pointing out the several courts of criminal jurisdiction, wherein
offenders may be prosecuted to punishment; and by, secondly, deducing down
in their natural order, and explaining, the several proceedings therein.
First, then, in reckoning up the several courts of criminal jurisdiction, I
shall, as in the former case, begin with an account of such as are of a public

I

I

and general jurisdiction throughout the whole realm; and afterwards, proceed
to such as are only of a private and special jurisdiction, and confined to some
particular parts of the kingdom.
L In our inquiries into the criminal courts of public and general jurisdic
con
tion,
must, in one respect, pursue a different order from that in which
For there, as the several courts had a gradual sub
sidered the civil tribunals.
ordination to each other, the superior correcting and reforming the errors of
the inferior,
thought it best to begin with the lowest, and so ascend gradut0
^>Q courts of appeal or those of *the most extensive powers.
a^
r*2B91J
>But as it is contrary to the genius and spirit of the law of England to
suffer any man to be tried twice for the same offence in a criminal way,especially if acquitted upon the first trial; therefore these criminal courts may be
said to be all independent of each other; at least, so far as that the sentence of
the lowest of them can never be controlled or reversed by the highest jurisdic
tion in the kingdom, unless for error in matter of law, apparent upon the face
of the record; though sometimes causes may be removed from one to the
other before trial. And therefore as in these courts of criminal cognizance,
shall rank them
there is not the same chain and dependence as in the others,
according to their dignity, and begin with the highest of all, viz.:

I

I

I

I

(a) 1 Hawk. P. 0. 182.

(r) 1 Hawk. P. C. 133.

(8) The subject of this chapter will be found covered by statutes in the several state* of
the American Union, and treated of in the treatises published for the guide of magistrates
in criminal casts, and also in some of the works on criminal law.
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1. The high court of parliament; which is the supreme court in the king
dom, not only for the making, but also for the execution, of laws: by the trial
of great and enormous offenders, whether lords or commoners, in the method
of parliamentary impeachment. (1) As for acts of parliament to attaint par
ticular persons of treason or felony, or to inflict pains and penalties, beyond
or contrary to the common law, to serve a special purpose,
speak not of
them; being to all intents and purposes new laws, made pro re nata, and by
no means an execution of such as are already in being. But an impeachment
before the lords by the commons of Great Britain, in parliament, is a prosecu
tion of the already known and established law, and has been frequently put in
practice; being a presentment to the most high and supreme court of crimi
nal jurisdiction by the most solemn grand inquest of the whole kingdom, (o)
A commoner cannot, however, be impeached before the lords for any capital
offence, but only for high misdemeanors:
(b) a peer may be impeached for any
*crime. (2) And they usually (in case of an impeachment of a peer
r*2(.0n
'
for treason) address the crown to appoint a lord high steward for the
and
of
their
greater dignity
regularity
proceedings; which high steward was
formerly elected by the peers themselves, though he was generally commis
sioned by the king; (c) but it hath of late years been strenuously maintained
{d) that the appointment of an high steward in such cases is not indispensably
The articles of im
necessary, but that the house may proceed without one.
peachment are a kind of bills of indictment, found by the house of commons,
and afterwards tried by the lords; who are, in cases of misdemeanors, con
sidered not only as their own peers, but as the peers of the whole nation. This
is a custom derived to us from the constitution of the ancient Germans: who,
in their great councils, sometimes tried capital accusations relating to the pub
lic: "licet apud consilium accusare quoque, et discrimen capitis intendere."
And it has a peculiar propriety in the English constitution; which has
{e)
much improved upon the ancient model imported hither from the continent.
For, though in general the union of the legislative and judicial powers ought
to be more carefully avoided, (f) yet it may happen that a subject, intrusted
with the administration of public affairs, may infringe the rights of the people,
and be guilty of such crimes as the ordinary magistrate either *dares r»o«ii
*
not or cannot punish. Of these the representatives of the people, or *■
house of commons, cannot properly judge; because their constituents are the

I

(a) 1 Hal. P. C. ISO.
(M When In 4 Edw. in. the Icing demanded the earls, barons, and peers to (rive judgment against Simon
de Bereford, who had been a notorious accomplice In the treasons of Roger, Earl of Mortimer, they came
before the king in parliament, and said all with one voice that the said Simon was not their peer ; and,
therefore, they were not bound to judge him as a peer of the land. And when afterwards, m the same
parliament, they were prevailed upon, in respect to the notoriety and heiiiousness of his crimes, to re
ceive the charge, and give judgment against him, the following protest and proviso was entered in the
parliament-roll:
"And it is assented and accorded by our lord the king, and all the great men, in full
parliament, that albeit the peers, as judges of the parliament, have taken upon them in the presence of
our lord the king, to make and render the said judgment, yet the peers who now are, or shall be in time
to come, be not bound or charged to render judgment upon others than peers; nor that the peers of the
land have power to do this, but thereof ought ever to be discharged and acquitted; and that the afore
said judgment now rendered be not drawn to example or consequence in time to come, whereby the said
peers may be charged hereafter, to judge others than their peers, contrary to the laws of the land, if the
like case happen, which God forbid/1' (Rot Pari. 4 Ed. III. n. 2 and 6. 2 Bred. Hist. 190. Sclden, Judic.
in Pari. o. U
(c) 1 Hal. P. C. 850.
(<I) Lords' Journ. 12May, 1679. Com. Journ. 15May, 1679. Fost. 142,&c.
(e) Tacit, de mor. derm. 12.
(/) See book L page 289.
(1) In the United States, as well as in the several states of the Union, the senate tries im
while the lower house prefers the charges.
peachments,
The whole law of impeachment
was very fully considered on the trial of President Johnson, to the report of which the
See also 6 Am. Law Reg., N. S., 257 and 641.
reader is referred.
The constitution of the United States forbids the passage of bills of attainder, by either
the national or state governments.
Const. U. S., art. 1, §§ 9 and 10.
This precludes spe
cial acts imposing punishments on particular persons or classes of persons by lesislative
For a full discussion of these provisions, see Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall.,
authority.
277; Bxpart* Garland, 4 Wall., 883; Drehman v. Stifle, 8 Wall., 595.
however, peers are tried, like commoners,
by jury.
R.
(2) On charges of misdemeanor,
v. Lord Faux, 1 Bulstr., 197.
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Bnt before what court shall
parties injured, and can therefore only impeach.
this impeachment be tried?
Not before the ordinary tribunals, which would
naturally be swayed by the authority of so powerful an accuser. Reason,
therefore, will suggest that this branch of the legislature, which represents the
people, must bring its charge before the other branch, which consists of the
nobility, who have neither the same interests nor the same passions as popular
assemblies, (g)
This is a vast superiority, which the constitution of this
island enjoys, over those of the Grecian or Roman republics; where the people
It is proper that the no
were, at the same time, both judges and accusers.
bility should judge, to insure justice to the accused; as it is proper that the
people should accuse, to insure justice to the commonwealth. And, therefore,
among other extraordinary circumstances attending the authority of this court,
there is one of a very singular nature, which was insisted on by the house of
commons in the case of the earl of Danby, in the reign of Charles II; (h) and
it is now enacted by statute 12 and 13 Wm. Ill, c. 2, that no pardon under
the great seal shall be pleadable to an impeachment by the commons of Great
Britain in parliament, (i)
2. The court of the lord high steward of Great Britain (k) is a court insti
tuted for the trial of peers, indicted for treason or felony, or for misprision of
The office of this great magistrate
either.
very ancient: and was form
but now
erly hereditary, or at least held for life, or dum bene se gesserit
usually and hath been for many centuries past, (m) granted pro hoc vice only;
hath been the constant practice (and therefore seems now to have beand
to lord of parliament, else he
incapable
r*2A2l come necessary, to grant *it
to try such delinquent peer, (n) When such an indictment
therefore
found by
grand jury of freeholders in the king's bench, or at the assizes be
to be removed by a writ of certior
fore the justices of oyer and terminer,
ari into the court of the lord high steward, which only has power to de
termine it. A peer may plead pardon before the court of king's bench, and
the judges have power to allow it; in order to prevent the trouble of appoint
But he
ing an high steward, merely for the purpose of receiving such plea.
may not plead, in that inferior court, any other plea; as guilty or not guilty, of
the indictment; but only in this court: because, in consequence of such plea,
possible that judgment of death might be awarded against him. The king,
therefore, in case
peer be indicted for treason, felony or misprision, creates
lord high steward pro hac vice by commission under the great seal; which re
cites the indictment so found, and gives his grace power to receive and try
Then, when the indictment
re
Angliat.
secundum legem et consuetudinem
gularly removed by writ of certiorari, commanding the inferior court to cer
tify
up to him, the lord high steward directs a precept to a Serjeant at arms,
This precept was
to summon the lords to attend and try the indicted peer.
formerly issued to summon only eighteen or twenty, selected from the body
then the number came to be indefinite; and the custom was for the lord
Eeers;
igh steward to summon as many as he thought proper (but of late years not
less than twenty-three,) (o) and that those lords only should sit upon the trial:
monstrous weight of power into the hands of the crown, and
which threw
this its great officer, of selecting only such peers as the then predominate party
should most approve of. And accordingly, when the Earl of Clarendon fell
II, *there was design formed to prorogue the
r*ozoaj disgrace with Charles
select number of peers;
being
parliament, in order to try him by
doubted whether the whole house could be induced to fall in with the views
upon all trials of peers for
the court, (p) But now by statute Wm. Ill, c.
>

5,

2

6.

9

4

3

:

4

1

4

B

6.

(o) Montesq. Sp. L. ll,
May, 1679.
Hawk. P. C.
421. Job. 64.
(H) Com. Journ.
(0 See c. 81.
(fc) Inst. 68.
(m) Pryn. on Inst. 46.
(!) Bulstr. 198.
in) Quand un seigneur de parlement terra arreign de treason ou felony, le roy par set let tret patent*
/era un grand et sage seigneur d>«fr« le grand teneschal d' Anqleterre qui—doit /aire un prteevtpvr /aire venir xx seigneurs, ou xviii, dtc. (Yearb 13 Hen. VIII, 11.) See Standf. P. C. 152. lost
hut. 69.
Hawk. P. C.
Ban. 234.
(p) Carte's Life of Ormonde, VoL D.
(o) Kelynge, 66.
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(r) State Trials, vol. It. 814,232,233.

(•) Fost. 139.

(i) Lords' Journ. IS May, 167S.

(8) In the United States all the members of the house which
are summoned.
The right of challenge was somewhat discussed
Johnson, but was not conceded.

to try the impeachment
on the trial of President

is

(fl) Fort. 141.

J

it

is

(t)

treason or misprision, all the peers who have a right to sit and vote in parliament
shall be summoned, at least twenty days before such trial, to appear and vote
therein; and every lord appearing shall vote in the trial of such peer, first tak
ing the oaths of allegiance and supremacy, and subscribing the declaration
dgainst popery. (3)
During the session of parliament the trial of an indicted peer is not proper
ly in the court of the lord high steward, but before the court last mentioned,
of our lord the king in parliament, (q) It is true, a lord high steward is al
ways appointed in that case, to regulate and add weight to the proceedings:
but he is rather in the nature of a speaker pro tempore, or rchairman of the
court, than the judge of it; for the collective body of the peers are therein the
judges both of law and fact, and the high steward has a vote with the rest, in
right of his peerage. But in the court of the lord high steward, which is held
in the recess of parliament, he is the sole judge of matters of law, as the lords
triors are in the matters of fact; and as they may not interfere with him in re
gulating the proceedings of the court, so he has no right to intermix with them
in giving any vote upon the trial, (r) Therefore, upon the conviction and at
tainder of a peer for murder in full parliament, it hath been holden by the
(a) that in case the day appointed in the judgment for execution should
i'udges,
apse before execution done, a new time of execution may be appointed by
either the high court of parliament during its sitting, though no high steward
be existing; or, in the recess of parliament, by the court of king's bench, the
record being removed into that court.
*It has been a point of some controversy, whether the bishops have r*n<ui
*
now a right to sit in the court of the lord nigh steward, to try indict- *■
ments of treason and misprision. Some incline to imagine them included under
the general words of the statute of King William, "all peers who have a right
to sit and vote in parliament;" but the expression had been much clearer if it
had been, "all lords," and not "all peers;" for though bishops, on account of the
baronies annexed to their bishopricks, are clearly lords of parliament, yet, their
blood not being ennobled, they are not universally allowed to be peers with
the temporal nobility: and perhaps this word might be inserted purposely with
a view to exclude them.
However, there is no instance of their sitting on trials
for capital off ences, even upon impeachments or indictments in full parliament,
much less in the court we are now treating of; for indeed they usually with
draw voluntarily, but enter a protest declaring their right to stay.
It is observ
able that, in the eleventh chapter of the constitutions of Clarendon, made in
parliament 11 Hen. H, they are expressly excused, rather than excluded, from
sitting and voting in trials, when they come to concern life or limb: "episcopi,
sicut cceteri barones, debent interesse judiciis cum baronibus, quosque perveniatur ad diminutionem membrorum, vel ad mortem;" and Becket's quarrel with
the king hereupon was not on account of the exception (which was agreeable
to the canon law), but of the general rule that compelled the bishops to at
tend at all. And the determination of the house of lords in the earl of Danwhich hath ever since been adhered to,
consonant to these con
by's case,
stitutions; "that the lords spiritual have a right to stay and sit in court in capi
tal cases, till the court proceeds to the vote of guilty, or not guilty." It must
be noted that this resolution extends only to trials in full parliament: for to the
court of the lord high steward (in which no vote can be given, but merely that
of guilty, or not guilty), no bishop, as such, ever was or could be summoned;
and though the statute of King William *regulates the proceedings in
r*n*c-\
that court, as well as in the court of parliament, yet
never intended
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to new-model or alter its constitution: and consequently does not give the lords
spiritual any right in cases of blood which they had not before, (u) And
that they have no right to be
what makes their exclusion more reasonable
tried themselves in the court of the lord high steward, (u>) and therefore sure
For the privilege of being thus tried depends
ought not to be judges there.
seat in the house: as appears from the
upon nobility of blood, rather than
trials of popish lords, or lords under age, and (since the union) of the Scots'
nobility, though not in the number of the sixteen; and from the trials of fe
males, such as the queen consort or dowager, and of all peeresses by birth;
and peeresses by marriage, also, unless they have, when dowagers, disparaged
themselves by taking
commoner to their second husband. (4)
3. The court of king's bench, (z) concerning the nature of which we partly
inquired in the preceding book, (y) was (we may remember) divided into
takes
crown side and a plea side.
And on the crown side, or crown office,
cognizance of all criminal causes, from high treason down to the most trivial
misdemeanor or breach of the peace. Into this court also indictments from
all inferior courts may be removed by writ of certiorari, and tried either at
bar, or at nisi prius, by
jury of the county out of which the indictment
The judges of this court are the supreme coroners of the kingdom.
brought.
And the court itself
the principal court of criminal jurisdiction (though the
For
two former are of greater dignity) known to the laws of England.
which reason by the coming of the court of king's bench into any county (as
was removed to Oxford on account of the sickness in 1665), all formeV com
missions of oyer and terminer, and general gaol delivery, are at once ab*in the same manner as by the
r*2fifil soroed and determined ipso facto (5)
old Gothic and Saxon constitutions, "jure vetusto obtinuit, quievim
omnia inferiora judicia, dicente jus rege." (z)
Into this court of king's bench hath reverted all that was good and salutary
camera stellata; (a) which
of the jurisdiction of the court of star-chamber,
Hen.
court of very ancient original, (b) but new-modeled by statutes
was
VII, c. and 21 Hen. Vni, c. 20, consisting of divers lords, spiritual and tem
poral, being privy counsellors, together with two judges of the courts of com
Their jurisdiction extended
mon law, without the intervention of any jury.
misbehaviour of sheriffs, and other *noto*2fl7l 'e8a"y over riots, perjury,
rious misdemeanors, contrary to the laws of the land. Yet, this was
afterwards (as Lord Clarendon informs us) (c) stretched " to the asserting
I.

8,

8.

2

2.
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Trial. MS.
(to) Bro. Abr.
(u) Fost. 948.
page 41.
Hat P. O.
tx) Inst. 70.
Hawk. P. a
(s) Stlernhook,
(u) See book
said (Lamb. Arch. 154)to nave been so called, either from the Saxon word pceopanto titer or
(a) This
govern; — or from its punishing the crimen stellionatus, or cosenage;— or because the room wherein
sat, the old council-chamber of the palace of Westminster (Lamb. 148),which is now converted into th«
lottery office, and forms the eastern side of New Palace-yard, was full of windows; or (to which Sir Ed
ward Coke, Inst. 66,accedes) because haply the roof thereof was at the first garnished with gilded start
As all these are merely conjectures (for no stars are now in the roof, nor are any said to have remained
there so late as the reign of Queen Elizabeth), It may be allowable to propose another conjectural ety
mology, as plausible perhaps as any of them. It Is well known that before the banishment of the Jews
under Edward
their contracts and obligations were denominated in our ancient records starra or
ttarrs, from a corruption of the Hebrew word shetar, a covenant. Tovey's Anal, judaic. 32. Selden, cl
of Hon.
84. Uxor, ebraic
14. These Starrs, by an ordinance of Richard the First, preserved by
Hoveden, were commanded to be enrolled and deposited in chests under three keys in certain place*;
one, and the most considerable, of which was in the king's exchequer at Westminster; and no Starr was
allowed to be valid unless It were found in some of the said repositories. (Memorand. in Scacc P. Edv.
prefixed to Maynard's year-book of Edw. II, fol.
Madox. hist. exch. a vii,
6.) The room at the
exchequer, where the chests containing these Starrs were kept, was probably called the starr<hamber
and when the Jews were expelled the kingdom, was applied to the use of the king's council, sitting in
their judicial capacity, To confirm this, the first time the Btarr-chamber is mentioned in any record,
Is said to have been situated near the receipt of the exchequer at Westminster; the king's council, bis
chancellor, treasurer, justices, and other sages, were assembled en la chaumbre des esteilles pres is
Claus. 41. Edxc. Hi, m. 18. For in process of time, when the meaning of the
rescetpt la Westminster.
Jewish ttarrs was forgotten, the word Starr-chamber was naturally rendered in law- French, la chaumbre
des etteilles and in law-latin camera ttellata
whi«h continued to be the style in latin till the dissolution
of that court.
(6) Lamb. Arch. 166.
(c) Hist, of Reb., books and 8.

is

6

4

and Vic, c. 22, "Every lord of parliament or peer of this realm, ha viae; place
(4) By
or voice in parliament, against whom any indictment for felony may be found, shall plead
to such indictment, and shall, upon conviction, be liable to the same punishment as any
other of her majesty's subjects are or may be liable upon conviction for such felony."
now otherwise by statute.
(5) This
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all proclamations and orders of

state : to the vindicating of illegal commis
sions, and grants of monopolies; holding for honourable that which pleased,
and for just that which profited, and becoming both a court of law to deter
mine civil rights, and a court of revenue to enrich the treasury; the council
table by proclamations enjoining to the people that which was not enjoined
by the laws, and prohibiting that which was not prohibited; and the starchamber, which consisted of the same persons in different rooms, censuring the
breach and disobedience to those proclamations by very great fines, imprison
ments, and corporal severities: so that any disrespect to any acts of state, or
to the persons of statesmen, was in no time more penal, and the foundations of
right never more in danger to be destroyed." For which reasons it was finally
abolished by statute 16 Car. I, c. 10, to the general joy of the whole nation.

<«)(«)
4. The court of chivalry (e) of which we also formerly spoke (f) as a mili
tary court, or court of honour, when held before the earl marshal only, is also
-a criminal court when held before the lord high constable
of England jointly
with the earl marshal.
And then it has jurisdiction over pleas of life and
member, arising in matters of arms and deeds of war, as well out of the realm
•as within it.
But the criminal, as *well as civil part of its authority, r*o«oi'
is fallen into entire disuse: there having been no permanent high con- *•
stable of England (but onlyjwo hac vice&t coronations and the like), since the
attainder and execution of Stafford, duke of Buckingham, in the thirteenth
year of Henry VIII ; the authority and charge, both in war and peace, being
<leemed too ample for a subject: so ample that when the chief justice Fineuz
was asked by king Henry the Eighth, how far they extended, he declined an
swering, and said the decision of that question belonged to the law of arms,
and not to the law of England, (g)
5. The high court of admiralty, (h) held before the lord high admiral of
England, or his deputy, styled the judge of the admiralty, is not only a court
This court hath cognizance of all
of civil but also of criminal jurisdiction.
■crimes and offences committed either upon the sea, or on the coasts, out of the
body or extent of any English county; and by statute 15 Ric. II, c. 3, of death
and mayhem happening in great ships being and hovering in the main stream
of great rivers, below the bridges of the same rivers, which are then a sort of
ports or havens; such as are the ports of London and Gloucester, though they
But, as this court proceeded without
lie at a great distance from the sea.
jury, in a method much conformed to the civil law, the exercise of a criminal
jurisdiction there was contrary to the genius of the law of England: inasmuch
as a man might be there deprived of his life by the opinion of a single judge,
without the judgment of his peers.
And besides, as innocent persons might
thus fall a sacrifice to the caprice of a single man, so very gross offenders
(d) The just odium into which this tribunal had fallen before its dissolution, has been the occasion that
few memorials have reached us of its nature, jurisdiction and practice; except such as, on account of

their enormous oppression, are recorded in the histories of the times. There are, however, to be met with

-some reports of its proceedings in Dyer, Croke, Coke, and other reporters of that age, and some in manu
script, of which the author hath two; one from 40 Eliz. to 18 Jac. I, the other for the first three years of
King Charles; and there is In the British Museum (Harl. M88. vol. I. No. 1226)a very full, methodical,
and accurate account of the constitution and course of this court, compiled by William Hudson of Gray's
Inn, an eminent practitioner therein, and a short account of the same, with copies of all its process, may
also be found in 18Kym. Foed. 192,&c.
to) Duck, de authorit. fur. civ.
(e) 4 Inst. 123. 2 Hawk. P. 0. 9.
(/) See book m, page 68.
(A) 4 Inst 134,147.

In
Vic,

the court of criminal appeal, established by 11 and
c. 78.
It consists of the judges of the superior courts of common law, any five of whom, includ
ing one of the chief justices, or the chief baron, shall constitute a quorum. On a convic
tion before a court of oyer and terminer, gaol delivery or quarter sessions, the judges before
•whom the cause was tried, may reserve the questions of law for the consideration of this
court. The court, after argument, may make such order in the premises as justice may re•quire, and maj- cither pronounce the proper judgment themselves, or remit the record for
that purpose.
13

(6)

this place should be mentioned
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might, and did frequently, escape punishment: for the rale of the civil law is,
how reasonably shall not at present inquire, that no judgment of death can
be given against offenders, without proof by two witnesses, or a confession of
This was always a great offence to the English na
the fact by themselves.
tion: and therefore in the eighth year of Henry VI it was endeavoured to apply
*a reme<^7 1Q parliament: which then miscarried for want of the royal
r*289l
J assent. However, by the statute 28 Hen. VULi, c 15, it was enacted,
«■
that these offences should be tried by commissioners of oyer and terminer, un
der the king's great seal; namely, the admiral or his deputy, and three or four
more (among whom two common law judges are usually appointed); the indict
ment being first found by a grand jury of twelve men, and afterwards tried
by a petty jury: and that the course of proceedings should be according to
the law of the land. This is now the only method of trying marine felonies
in the court of admiralty; the judge of the admiralty still presiding therein,
as the lord mayor is the president of the session of oyer and terminer in Lon

I

don. (7)

is

2

Hawk. P. C. 28.

(m) See book

I,

HaL P. 0. 80.

22

(0

2*

I

a

*■

a

a

(I)

I

a

(i)

7.

6,

a

a

it,

These five courts may be held in any part of the kingdom, and their juris
diction extends over crimes that arise throughout the whole of
from one
end to the other.
What follow are also of
general nature, and universally
diffused over the nation, but yet are of
local jurisdiction, and confined to
Of which species are,
particular districts.
The courts of oyer and terminer and the general gaol delivery,
which
are held before the king's commissioners,
among whom are usually two judges
of the courts at Westminster, twice in every year in every county of the
kingdom; except the four northern ones, where they are held only once, and
London and Middlesex, wherein they are held eight times.
These were slightly
mentioned in the preceding book, (k) We then observed that, at what is
usually called the assizes, the judges sit by virtue of five several authorities:
two oi which, the commission of assize and its attendant jurisdiction of nut
civil nature, were then explained at large; to
prius, being principally of
whioh
shall only add, that these justices have, by virtue of several statutes,
criminal jurisdiction, also, in certain special cases.
The third, which
was also treated of in
the
"commission
of
the
former volume,
peace,
r*ni»m
justice of the
(m) when we inquired into the nature and office of
shall only add, that all the justices of the peace of any county,
peace.
Hawk. P. 0. 14,23.
(fc) See book Id, p. ML
(0 Inst 168.188. Hal. P. C. 22, 32.
p. 881.

i

1

7

by

is

I

<

if

§

of

is

it

a

2,

8

7

it

is

a

5

4

and
Wm. IV and Vic, c. 77,'the central criminal
Wm. IV, c. 86, and
(7) By
district composed of London and Middlesex, and parts of Kent and
was created, with
composed of the lord mayor of London, the lord chancellor, the common law
Surrey. It
Judges, the judges of the courts of bankruptcy and admiralty, the dean of the arches, the
aldermen of London, the recorder and common sergeant of London, Ithe judges of the
sheriff's court of London, and the ex-chancellors and ex-judges of the superior courts. Any
two
two or more may hold the court, land, in practice,
generally presided over
It has jurisdiction
judges of the superior courts and the law officers of the city of London.
of offenses committed within the district,[and also of all offenses committed on the high seal
and other places within the jurisdiction of the admiralty.
after reciting that the issuing of special commission in the man
By and Vic, c.
enacted that her majes
ner prescribed by 28 Hen. VIII, c 15, was found inconvenient,
ty's justices of assize, or others, her majesty's commissioners, by whom any court shall be
holden under any of her majesty's commissions of oyer and terminer, or general gaol deliv
ery, shall have the powers which by any act are given to any commissioners named in soy
commission of oyer and terminer, tor the trying of offenses committed within the jurisdic
tion of the admiralty, and to deliver the gaol, etc., of any person therein for any offense
alleged to have been committed on the high seas and other places within the jurisdiction
the admiralty.
And several subsequent statutes de
See, also, 18 and 19 Vic, c. 91,
21.
clare that offenses committed within the jurisdiction of the admiralty shall be deemed
land
offenses of the same nature and liable to the same punishments, as
committed upon
~
within England or Ireland, and may be tried in any county or place in which the
may be apprehended or in custody.
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•wherein the assizes are held, are hound hy law to attend them, or else are lia
ble to a fine; in order to return recognizances, Ac, and to assist the judges in
such matters as lie within their knowledge and jurisdiction, and in which some
of them have probably heen concerned, by way of previous examination. But
the fourth authority is the commission of oyer and terminer (n) to hear and
determine all treasons, felonies and misdemeanors.
This is directed to the
iudges and several others, or any two of them; but the judges or serjeants at
law only are of the quorum, so that the rest cannot act without the presence
of one of them. The words of the commission are, " to inquire, hear and de
termine;" so that, by virtue of this commission, they can only proceed upon
an indictment found at the same assizes; for they must first inquire by means
of the grand jury or inquest, before they are empowered to hear and deter
mine by the help of the petit jury.
Therefore, they have, besides, fifthly, a
commission of general gaol delivery (6) which empowers them to try and de
liver every prisoner, who shall be in the gaol when the judges arrive at the

j

oirouit town, whenever or before whomsoever indicted, or for whatever crime
committed.
It was anciently the course to issue special writs of gaol delivery
for each particular prisoner, which are called the writs de bono et malo : (p)
but these being found inconvenient and oppressive, a general commission for
all the prisoners has long been established in their stead. So that, one way or
other, the gaols are in general cleared, and all offenders tried, punished, or de
livered, twice in every year; a constitution of singular use and excellence. (8)
Sometimes, also, upon urgent occasions; the king issues a special or extraor
dinary commission of oyer and terminer, and gaol delivery, confined to those
offences which stand in need of immediate inquiry and punishment: upon
which the course of proceeding is much the same, as upon general and ordinary
commissions. Formerly it was held, in ^pursuance of the statutes 8 r«o<ri-i
7
Ric. II, c. 2, and 33 Hen. Vlil, c. 4, that no judge or other lawyer Icould act in the commission of oyer and terminer, or in that of gaol delivery,
•within his own county where he was born or inhabited; in like manner as they
But
are prohibited from being judges of assize and determining oivil causes.
that local partiality, which the jealousy of our ancestors was careful to pre
vent, being judged less likely to operate in the trial of crimes and misdemean
ors, than in matters of property and disputes between party and party, it was
thought proper by the statute 12 Geo. II, c. 27, to allow any man to be a jus
tice of oyer and terminer, and general gaol delivery, within any county of
England.
8. The court of general quarter sessions of the peace (q) is a court that must
be held in every county once in every quarter of a year; which, by statute 2
Hen. V, c. 4, is appointed to be in the first week after Michaelmas-day; the
first week after the epiphany; the first week after the close of Easter; and in
the week after the translation of St. Thomas the Martyr, or the seventh of
July. It is held before two or more justices of the peace, one of whom must
be of the quorum. (9) The jurisdiction of this court, by statute 34 Edw. HI,
o. 1, extends to the trying and determining all felonies and trespasses whatso
ever: though they seldom, if ever, try any greater offence than small felonies
within the benefit of clergy; their commission providing, that if any case of
difficulty arises, they shall not proceed to judgment, but m the presence of one
of the justices of the court of king's bench or common pleas, or one of the
And therefore, murders, and other capital felonies, are usu
judges of assize.
ally remitted for a more solemn trial to the assizes. (10) They cannot also try

J

(n) See Appendix, } 1.
(o) See Appendix, {1.

(p) 2 Inst. 48.

(a) 4 Inst. 170. 2 Hal. P. G 42. 2 Hawk. P. C. 82.

(8) For a full discussion of this point, see 2 Hawk. P. C, ch. 6.
The terms of th«
(9) The commission so runs, but it is made immaterial by statute.
court are also now altered by statute.
(10) Since the statute 5 and 6 Vic., c. 38, this court cannot try any person for treason or
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is

is

is

in is

(t)
a

any new created offence, without express power given them by the statute
which creates it. (r) But there are many offences and particular matters,
which by particular statutes belong properly to this jurisdiction, and ought
against
Tmoijoi *° De prosecuted in this court; as, the *smaller misdemeanors
J the public or commonwealth, not amounting to felony; and, especially,
I
offences relating to the game, highways, ale-houses, bastard children, the set
tlement and provision for the poor, vagrants, servants' wages, apprentices, and
popish recusants. («) Some of these are proceeded upon by indictment; and
others in a summary way by motion and order thereupon; which order may,
for the most part, unless guarded against by particular statutes, be removed
into the court of king's bench, by a writ of certiorari facias, and be there
The records or rolls of the sessions are com
-either quashed or confirmed.
mitted to the custody of a special officer, denominated the custos rotulorum,
who is always a justice of the quorum; and among them of the quorum (saith
man for the most part especially picked out, either for wis
Lambard)
The nomination of the custos rotulorum (who
dom, countenance, or credit.
the chief
the principal civil officer in the county, as the lord lieutenant
by the king's sign manual: and to him the nomination
military command)
of the clerk of the peace belongs; which office he
expressly forbidden to

for money, (w)
In most corporation towns there

sell

9

a

a

^

a

a

(z)

is,

a

a

is

it

is

a

is

J

1

„

is

a

a

is

8

is

a

in

are quarter sessions kept before justices of
their own, within their respective limits: which have exactly the same author
very few
ity as the general quarter sessions of the county, except in
the matter of appeals from
stances: one of the most considerable of which
orders of removal of the poor, which, though they be from the orders of cor
and
poration justices, must be to the sessions of the county, by statutes
sometimes
Wm. Ill, c. 30. In both corporations and counties at large, there
few justices, for dispatching smaller busi
special or petty session, by
kept
ness in the neighbourhood, between the times of the general sessions; as, for
licensing ale-houses, passing the accounts of the parish officers, and the like.
,
court of record, held
*9. The sheriff's toum, (») or rotation,
month after Easter and Michaelmas, before
twice every year, within
the sheriff, in different parts of the county; being, indeed, only the turn of the
court-leet in each respective hundred: (w>) this, therefore,
sheriff to keep
the court-baron: for
the great court-leet of the county, as the county court
taken.
out of this, for the ease of the sheriff, was
court of record,
10. The court-leet, or view of frankpledge, (x) which
particular hundred, lord
held once in the year, and not oftener, (y) within
ship, or manor, before the steward of the leet: being the king's court, granted
Its original intent was
by charter to the lords of those hundreds or manors.
the freeman within the liberty; who (we may
to view the frankpledges, that
according to the institution of the great Alfred, were all mutu
remember),
Besides this, the preserv
ally pledges for the good behaviour of each other.
ation of the peace, and the chastisement of divers minute offences against the
public good, are the objects both of the court-leet and the sheriff's tourn; which
have exactly the same jurisdiction, one being only larger species of the other;
All freeholders
over more territory, but not over more causes.
-extending
within the precinct are obliged to attend them, and all persons commorant
therein; which commorancy consists in usually lying there:
regulation, which
But persons under twelve and
owes its original to the laws of king Canute, (a)
1,

and Burns' JusUoe.

1,
{!

1

1.

1,
{

2,

2

8 2

8.

4,

44

It'

4

Mod. 879. Salk. 406. Lord Raym. 1144.
(«) See Lambard Eirtnarcha,
W*.and M. st.
c. 81.
c.
B.
(u) Stat. 87 Hen. VHI. c.
18,18.
Hawk. P. C. GS.
(to) Mirr. c.
(v) Inst. 259. Hal P. C. 89.
(y) Mirror, o.
10.
tx) Inst. 881. Hawk. P. C. 72.
c. 19.
(a) Part
(i) See book HI, p. 118.
(r)

l

is

is

a

murder, or for any felony which, when committed by person not previously convicted of
felony,
punishable by transportation for life; and its jurisdiction
still further
by subsequent statutes.
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(e)

above sixty years old, peers, clergymen, women, and the king's tenants in
ancient demesne, are excused from attendance there: all others being bound toIt was
appear upon the jury, if required, and make their due presentments.
also, anciently, the custom to summon all the king's subjects, as they respec
tively grew to years of discretion and strength, to *come to the court- T^nhir'
leet, and there take the oath of allegiance to the king. The other *■
general business of the leet and tourn, was to present by jury all crimes what
soever that happened within their jurisdiction : and not only to present, but also
to punish, all trivial misdemeanors, as. all trivial debts were recoverable in the
court baron, and county oourt: justice, in these minuter matters of both kinds,
being brought home to the doors of every man by our ancient constitution.
Thus in the Gothic constitution, the hcereda, which answered to our court-leet,
"de omnibus quidem cognoscit, non tamende omnibus judicaV (b) The objectsof their jurisdiction are therefore unavoidably very numerous: being such as,
in some degree, either less or more, affect the public weal, or good governance
of the district in which they arise; from common nuisances and other material
offences against the king's peace and public trade, down to eaves-dropping,
But both the tourn and the leet
waifs, and irregularities in public commons.
have been for a long time in a declining way ; a circumstance, owing in part tothe discharge granted by the statute of Marlbridge, 52 Hen. Ill, c. 10, to all
prelates, peers, and clergymen, from their attendance upon these courts; which
And, hence, it is that their business
occasioned them to grow into disrepute.
hath, for the most part, gradually devolved upon the quarter sessions; which
it is particularly directed to do in some cases by I Edw. IV, o. 2.
11. The court of the coroners (c) is also a court of record, to inquire when
any one dies in prison, or comes to a violent or sudden death, by what manner
he came to his end.
And this he is only entitled to do super visum corporis.
Of the coroner and his office we treated at large in a former volume, (d) among
the public officers and ministers of the kingdom: and therefore, shall not here
repeat our inquiries; only mentioning his court by way of regularity, among
the criminal courts of the nation.
incident to every fair
*12. The oourt of the clerk of the market
r*o^Bi
and market in the kingdom, to punish misdemeanors therein; as court
piepoudre is, to determine all disputes relating to private or civil property.
The object of this jurisdiction (f)
principally the oognizance of weights
and measures, to try whether they be according to the true standard thereof,
or no, which standard was anoiently committed to the custody of the bishop,
who appointed some elerk under him to inspect the abuse of them more nar
called the clerk
rowly; and hence this officer, though now usually layman,
of the market, (g) If they be not according to the standard, then, besides
the punishment of the party by fine, the weights and measures themselves
the most inferior court of criminal jurisdiction in
ought to be burnt. This
the kingdom: though the objects of its coercion were esteemed among the Ro
mans of such importance to the public that they were committed to the care
of some of their most dignified magistrates, the curule sediles.
IX There are few other criminal courts of greater dignity than many of
more confined and partial jurisdiction; extending only to some
these, but of
particular places, which the royal favour, confirmed
act of parliament, has
distinguished by the privilege of having peculiar courts of their own for the
punishment of crimes and misdemeanors
arising within the bounds of their
These, not being universally dispersed, or of general use as the
cognizance.
former, but confined to one spot, as well as to
determinate species of causes,,
may be denominated private or special courts of criminal jurisdiction.
4

I,

8.

1
2 1,

8.

8.

)

4

Stiernhook de Jure Qoth.
c
Inst. 271. 2HaLP. a 68.
page 848.
Hawk. P. C. 42.
(e) Inst. 878.
(d) See book
See it. 17Oar. II, a 18. 88Car. H, c.
88 Car. II, c. 18.
to) Bacon of English Got. b. x. c.
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I

speak not here of ecclesiastical courts; which punish spiritual sins, rather
than temporal crimes, by penance, contrition and excommunciation, pro salute
animus; or, which is looked upon as equivalent to all the rest, by a sum of
t0 tne officers of the court by way of commutation of penance.
r*276l* *money
*■
am
Of these we discoursed sufficiently in the preceding book. (A)
now speaking of suoh courts as proceed acoording to the course of the com
mon law; whioh is a stranger to such unaccountable barterings of public
justice.
1. And, first, the court of the lord steward, treasurer, or comptroller of the
Hen. VUL, o. 14, to inquire of
was instituted by statute
king's household,
felony by any of the king's sworn servants, in the oheque roll of the house
hold, under the degree of lord, in confederating, compassing, conspiring, and
imagining the death or destruction of the king, or any lord or other of his
majesty's privy council, or the lord steward, treasurer, or comptroller of the
The inquiry, and trial thereupon, must be by jury according
king's house.
to the course of the common law, consisting of twelve sad men (that is, sober
and discreet persons) of the king's household.
2. The court of the lord steward of the king's household, or (in his absenoe)
of the treasurer, comptroller, and steward of the marshalsea, (k) was erected
by statute 33 Hen. VIII, c. 12, with jurisdiction to inquire of, hear, and deter
mine, all treasons, misprisions of treason, murders, manslaughters, bloodshed,
and other malicious strikings; whereby blood shall be shed in, or within the
limits (that
within two hundred feet from the gate) of any of the palaces
and houses of the king, or any other house where the royal person shall abide.
The proceedings are also by jury, both grand and petit one, as at common law,
taken out of the officers and sworn servants of the king's household. The
form and solemnity of the process, particularly with regard to the execution
of the sentence for cutting off the hand, whioh
part of the punishment for
shedding blood in the king's court, are very minutely set forth in the said
statute 33 Hen. VIII, and the several officers of the servants of the household
*n an<* aDout sach execution are ^described; from the Serjeant of the
1**2771
wood-yard, who furnishes the chopping-block, to the serjeant-farrier,
who brings hot irons to sear the stump. (12)
we mentioned the courts of the two univer
8. As in the preceding book
will not
sities, or their chancellor's courts, for the redress of civil injuries;
short word concerning the jurisdiction of their
be improper now to add
The chancellor's court
criminal courts, whioh
equally large and extensive.
of Oxford (with whioh university the author hath been chiefly conversant,
similar jurisdiction) hath auth
though probably that of Cambridge hath also
ority to determine all causes of property, wherein privileged person one of
the parties, except only causes of freehold; and also all criminal offences or
The prohibi
misdemeanors under the degree of treason, felony, or mayhem.
tion of meddling with freehold still continues: but the trial of treason, felony,
and mayhem, by
committed to the university-jurisdic
particular charter,
tion in another court, namely, the court of the lord high steward of the un
iversity.
For by the charter of 7th June, Hen. IV, (confirmed, among the rest,
the statute 13 Eliz. c. 29), cognizance
granted to the university of Oxford
of all indictments of treasons, insurrections, felony and mayhem, whioh shall
scholar or privileged person;
be found in any of the king's courts against
and they are to be tried before the high steward of the university, or his dep
to be nominated by the chancellor of the university for the time
uty, who
called forth into action, suoh high steward must
being. But when his office
a

(It)

Inst. 188.

Hal. P. 0.

7.

lost. 133.

1

(I) See book m, page S-

6

is

ill)

3

The statute
Hen. VII. c. 14, was repealed by the
Geo. IV, c. 81.
(12)That part of statute 33 Hen. VIII, c. 12, relating to this subject, was
Geo. TV, c. 81, and this court
therefore become obsolete.
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be approved by the lord high chancellor of England; and a special commission
under the great seal is given to him, and others, to try the indictment then
depending, according to the law of the land and the privileges of the said uni
When, therefore, an indictment is found *at the assizes or [-•q*qi
versity.
elsewhere, against any scholar of the university, or other privileged ■person, the vice-chancellor may claim the cognizance of it; and when claimed
(in due time and manner) it ought to be allowed him by the judges of assize:
and then it comes to be tried in the high steward's court. But the indictment
must first be found by a grand jury, and then the cognizance claimed: for
take it that the high steward cannot proceed originally ad inquirendum; but
only, after inquest in the common-law courts ad audiendumet determinandum.
Much in the same manner, as when a peer is to be tried in the court of the lord
high steward of Great Britain, the indictment must first be found at the assizes,
or in the court of king's bench, and then (in consequence of a writ of certio
rari) transmitted to be finally heard and determined before his grace the lord
high steward and the peers.
When the cognizance is so allowed, if the offence be inter minora crimina
or a misdemeanor only, it is tried in the chancellor's court by the ordinary
But if it be for treason, felony, or mayhem, it is then, and then only,
judge.
to be determined before the high steward, under the king's special commission
to try the same. The process of the trial is this. The high steward issues
one precept to the sheriff of the county, who thereupon returns a panel of
eighteen freeholders; and another precept to the bedels of the university, who
thereupon return a panel of eighteen matriculated laymen, "laicoe privilegio
universitatis gaudentea :" and by a jury formed de medietate, half of freehold
ers and half of matriculated persons, is the indictment to be tried; and that in
And if execution be necessary to be
the guildhall of the city of Oxford.
awarded, in consequence of finding the party guilty, the sheriff of the county
must execute the university-process; to which he is annually bound by an
oath.
*I have been the more minute in describing these proceedings, as r»niym
J
there has happily been no occasion to reduce them into practice for *•
more than a century past; nor will it perhaps be thought advisable to revive
them: though it is not a right that merely rests in scriptis or theory, but has
formerly often been carried into execution. There are many instances, one
in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, two in that of James the First, and two in
that of Charles the First, where indictments for murder have been challenged
by the vice-chancellor at the assizes, and afterwards tried before the high stew
ard by jury. The commissions under the great seal, the sheriff's and bedel's
panels, and all the other proceedings on the trial of the several indictments,
are still extant in the arohives of that university.

I

CHAPTER XX.

OF SUMMARY CONVICTIONS.

I

We are next, according to the plan have laid down, to take into considera
tion the proceedings in the courts of criminal jurisdiction, in order to the
punishment of offences.
These are plain, easy, and regular; the law not ad
mitting any fictions, as in civil causes, to take place where the life, the liberty,
and the safety of the subject are more immediately brought into
jeopardy.
And these proceedings are divisible into two kinds, summary and regular: of
the former of which
briefly speak, before we enter upon the latter, which
will require a more thorough and particular examination.

I
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I

mean principally such as is directed by
By a summary proceeding (1)
several acts of parliament (for the common law is a stranger to it, unless in
for the conviction of offenders, and the inflicting of
the case of contempts)
certain penalties created by those acts of parliament. In these there is no in
tervention of a jury, but the party accused is acquitted or condemned by the
An
suffrage of such person only, as the statute has appointed for his judge.
institution designed professedly for the greater ease of the subject, by doing
him speedy justice, and by not harrassing the freeholders with frequent and
trouble80me attendances to try every minute *offence. But it has of
r*2Ri1
l
-I late been so far extended, as, if a check be not
timely given, to threaten
the disuse of our admirable and truly English trial by jury, unless only in
capital cases. For,
I. Of this summary nature are all trials of offences and frauds contrary to
the laws of the excise, and other branches of the revenue: which are to be
of the respective depart
inquired into and determined by the commissioners
ments, or by justices of the peace in the country; officers, who are all of them
appointed and removable at the discretion of the crown. And though such
convictions are absolutely necessary for the due collection of the public money,
and are a species of mercy to the delinquents, who would be ruined by the
and
expense and delay of frequent prosecutions by action or indictment;
though such has usually been the conduct of the commissioners, as seldom,
if ever, to afford just grounds to complain of oppression, yet when we again
(a) consider the various and almost innumerable branches of this revenue;
which may be in their turns the subjects of fraud, or, at least, complaints of
fraud, and, of course, the objects of this summary and arbitrary jurisdiction;
we shall find that the power of these officers of the crown over the property
of the people is increased to a very formidable height.
Another branch of summary proceedings is that before Justices of the
peace, in order to inflict divers petty pecuniary mulcts, and corporal penalties
denounced by act of parliament for many disorderly offences; such as common
swearing, drunkenness, vagrancy, idleness, and a vast variety of others, for

IL

which

I

must refer the student to the justice-books formerly cited, (b)
(a) See book I, page 819,&o.

and

(ft) Lambard and Burn.

(1) There were two reasons for holding inferior courts to great strictness in exercising au
thority to convict of petty offenses in a summary way: 1. That jury trial, which is sup
posed to be favorable to accused parties was not allowed, and 2. No appeal was given, and
therefore the conviction was final.
It was perfectly reasonable, therefore, as Pratt, J., sayt
" No compari
in R v. Marriott, Stra., 67, to keep the magistrate up strictly to the law.
"
son," says Lord Kenyon,
can be made between summary proceedings on a conviction be
* * It is necessary for court*
fore magistrates, and actions in the courts of common law.
of justice to hold a strict hand over summary proceedings before magistrates, and never
will agree to relax any of the rules by which they have been bound. Their jurisdiction is
of a limited nature, and they must show that the party was brought within it." Rex v.
Stone, 1 East, 639, 649, 650. See also Rex v. Corden, Burr., 2279.
In People v. Phillips.
1 Park. Cr. R, 95, it is said that a record must be made up in every case as a prerequisite
to the execution of the conviction; the reasons of which are: 1. For protection of the
accused, that he may not again be convicted of the same offense; 2. for protection of the
magistrate: a proper record being conclusive evidence in his favor in cases within hit
jurisdiction; 8. in the absence of appeal the only mode by which the accused can obtain a
review of the sentence is by habeas corpus or certiorari, founded on the record. To the
same purport is Bennac v. People, 4 Barb., 164. And the record must recite the facts; not
legal conclusions merely, or it will be void. Therefore, a complaint and conviction of
defendant for that, on the Lord's day, commonly called Sunday, " he performed certain
worldly employment or business, the same not being a work of necessity or charity, by
driving certain horses to which was attached a carriage in which certain persons, not trav
elers, but residents of the aforesaid county, were carried over the streets of the city of Pitts
burgh," were held bad, because they did not show the purpose for which the carriage wis
driven. " No citizen," Bays Lowrie, Ch. J., " could have any sort of protection against the
ignorance or wickedness of inferior magistrates, if these were authorized to convict citizens
of offenses, and yet allowed so to record their proceedings that the very act done cannot be
ascertained,
and thus their judgment cannot be tested by their judicial superiors."
Com
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which used to be formerly punished by the verdict of a jury in the oourt-leet.
change in the administration of justice hath, however, had some mis
chievous effects; as, 1. The almost entire disuse and contempt of the oourtleet, and sheriff's tourn, the king's ancient courts of common law, formerly
muoh revered and respected.
*2. The burthensome increase of the r *oooi
J
business of a justice of the peace, which discourages so many gentle- »•
men of rank and character from acting in the commission; from an apprehen
sion that the duty of their office would take up too much of that time, which
they are unwilling to spare from the necessary concerns of their families, the
improvement of their understandings, and their engagements in other services
of the public. Though if all gentlemen of fortune had it both in their power
and inclinations to act in this capacity, the business of a justice of the peace
would be more divided, and fall the less heavy upon individuals: whioh would
remove what, in the present scarcity of magistrates, is really an objection so
formidable that the country is greatly obliged to any gentleman of figure who
will undertake to perform that duty, which, in consequence of his rank in life,
he owes more peculiarly to his country. However, this backwardness to act
as magistrates, arising greatly from this increase of summary jurisdiction, is
that this trust, when slighted by
productive of, 3. A third mischief: which
gentlemen, falls, of course, into the hands of those who are not so; but the
And then the extensive power of
mere tools of office.
justice of the peace,
which, even in the hands of men of honour,
highly formidable, will be pros
tituted to mean and scandalous purposes, to the low ends of selfish ambition,
And from these ill consequences we may col
avarice, or personal resentment.
lect the prudent foresight of our ancient lawgivers, who suffered neither the
property nor the punishment of the subjeot to be determined by the opinion
of any one or two men; and we may also observe the necessity of not deviat
ing any farther from our ancient constitution, by ordaining new penalties to
be inflicted upon summary convictions. (2)
must be owned,
The process of these summary convictions,
extremely
Though the courts of common law have thrown in one cheok upon
speedy.
them, by making
necessary to summon the party accused before he
This now held to be an indispensable requisite: (c) r*2B3l
•condemned.
though the justices long struggled the point; forgetting that rule of
natural reason expressed by Seneca.
(c) Salic 181.

S
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that in cases in which jury trial is allowed, and especially if an appeal is
Kish. Cr. Pro., §§ 722-725.
Even in those
See
less strict rule will be applied.
appear on the face of the proceedings that the magis
cases, however,
necessary that
general rule, applicable to
trate had jurisdiction of the case under the statute; this being
Hill, 89; State v. LaBore, 26 Vt., 765;
all inferior tribunals. See People v. Koeber,
Clark v. Holmes, Doug. (Mich.), 390; Cooper v. Sunderland, Iowa, 114; Tift v. Griffin,
5Ga., 185; Jennings v. Stafford.
Ired.. 404; State v. Metiger, 26 Mo., 65; Perrine v.
the record appar
Farr, 22 N. J., 856; Sullivan v. Blackwell, 28 Miss., 787. And even
Fawcett r. Fouby other evidence.
competent to disprove
ently show jurisdiction,
N. T., 497; Sears v. Terry, 26 Conn., 278;
lis,
Man. & Ry., 102; Sheldon v. Wright,
R. L, 564; Clark v. Holmes,
Iowa, 114; Brown v. Foster,
Cooper v. Sunderland,
the jurisdiction depend upon matter of fact to be found by
Doug. (Mich.), 890. Though
B. & B., 432. See Mather
conclusive. Brittain v. Einnaird,
the magistrate, his finding
Virg. Cases, 270; Em parte Kellogg,
Johns., 44; Mackaboy v. Commonwealth,
v. Hodd,
Vt, 509; Facey v. Fuller, 13 Mich., 527; Ricketts v. Spraker, 77 Ind., 871; Freeman on
Judgments,
523, and cases cited.
statute was under consideration which
Caines, 259, where
(2) In Bennett v. Ward,
proceeding
summary proceeding, and in another for
seemed in one part to provide for
statute admits of two
in the ordinary way, Chief Justice Kent remarked that, "where
consonant to the ordinary mode of
constructions,
that which
advisable to give
given,

a very proper and just rule.
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" Qui statuit

aliquid, parte inaudita altera,

jEquum licet statuerit, hand

A

acquits

fuitf*

by

is,

rule, to which all municipal laws, that are founded on the principles of
justice, have strictly conformed: the Roman law requiring a citation at the
least; and our common law never suffering any fact (either civil or criminal)
to be tried, till it has previously compelled an appearance by the party con
cerned.
After this summons, the magistrate, in summary proceedings, may
go on to examine one or more witnesses, as the statute may require, upon oath;
and then make his conviction of the offender, in writing: upon which ha
usually issues his warrant, either to apprehend the offender, in case corporal
punishment is to be inflicted on him: or else to levy the penalty incurred, by
This
in general, the method of summary
distress and sale of his goods.
proceedings before a justice or justices of the peace; but for particulars we
must have recourse to the several statutes, which create the offence, or inflict
the punishment: and which usually chalk out the method by which offender!
are to be convicted. Otherwise they fall of course under the general rule,
and can only be convicted by indictment or information at the common law.
TTT To this head, of summary proceedings, may also be properly referred
the method, immemorially used by the superior courts of justice, of punishing
attachment, and the subsequent proceedings thereon. (3)
contempts
The contempts, that are thus punished, are either direct, which openly insult
or resist the powers of the courts, or the person of the judges who preside there;
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(8) The power to punish for contempt seems to have originated in the fact that the king,
in contemplation of law,
supposed to be always present in his courts.
Only courts
record, however, are, properly speaking, the king's courts, and therefore
has been said
that they alone, at common law, have authority to fine and imprison for contempt
Queen
B., 184; In re Kerrigan, 83 N. J., 844; Rhinehart v. Lance, 43 N. J..
v. Lefroy, L. R.
811; 8. 0., 89 Am. Rep., 592; Noyes v. Byxbee, 45 Conn., 382.
The power is therefore
Also, Albright v. Lapp, 26 Penn. St., 99.
denied to Justices of the peace.
See above cases.
But in some states
held that these magistrates have it. In re Cooper, 82 Vt, 253; and
in some
held that the power
necessary incident in establishing a tribunal as a court
Brown v. People, 19 Dl., 613; Middlebrook v. State, 48 Conn., 257; U.
v. New Bedford
C, Am. Dec. 246;
Wood. & M., 401; Respublica v. Oswald, DalL, 819;
Bridge Co.,
State v. Morrill, 16 Ark., 884; Ex parte Adams, 25 Miss., 883; Ex parte Robinson, 19 Wall.,
CoL, 436; see Robb v. McDonald, 29 Iowa, 830 8. C,
505; Hughes v. jPeople,
Am.
to be restricted to contempt*
Rep., 211 though perhaps the power of justices of the peace
which are direct, as distinguished from those which are consequential or constructive.
McCord, 110; Lining v. Bentham,
State v. Applegate,
State v. Johnson,
Bay,
B., 134
It has been held that the power of legis
Bay, 385; Queen v. Lefroy, L. R
lative bodies to punish for contempts of their authority
inherent
Anderson v. Dunn,
Wheat, 204; Burnham v. Morrissey, 14 Gray, 226; In re Falvey,
Wis., 680. For the
limits to this authority, see Eilbourn v. Thompson, 108 U. 8., 168.
At common law, adjudications of contempt by courts of competent jurisdiction are not
Johns., 895; Williamson't
subject to review by any higher tribunal. Yates v. Lansing,
Case, 26 Penn. St,
Watson v. Williams, 36 Miss., 331; Ex parte Smith, 53 Cal, 204;
Fischer,
102 TJ. 8., 121. But the question
Tyler v. Hammersley, 44 Conn., 398; Hayes v.
of jurisdiction
And in some states
always open.
Q. B., 134
Queen v. Lefroy, L. R.
See Whitlaw v. State, 86
given by statute.
power to review proceedings in contempt
Mich.,
State,
245;
Iowa,
Simonson,
v.
v.
People
Ind,, 196; Dunham
492.
Whether
general power to pardon will embrace cases of convictions for contempt, see Re Muller,
Blatch., 23;
Ibid., 317; State v. Sauvinet, 24 La. An., 119.
Op. Atty. Gen., 622
into direct and constructive. The con
The most common classification of contempts
tempt
direct when committed in the presence of, or so near to, the court as to interrupt
its proceedings.
Constructive contempts are not committed in the presence of the court
but tend, by their operation, to interrupt, obstruct, or prevent the due administration of
justice. Whittem v. The State, 36 Ind., 196; Stuart v. The People, 84 Dl., 895; State v.
Orleans Civil Judges, 32 La. An., 1256. Direct contempts are usually punished upon tht
view and personal knowledge of the judge without taking evidence, or making a rule to
show cause.
If the offender leave the court-room before he can be punished, the judge
may, without first issuing process for his arrest, sentence him. Middlebrook v. The Bute,
43 Conn., 257; State v. Orleans Civil Judges. 32 La. An., 1256.
In constructive contempts the court will, upon affidavit specifically making the charge,
make
rule to show cause, or issue an attachment, and the party accused will have
right
to be heard in his defense by himself or counsel.
If he denies that he committed the acts
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or else are consequential which (without such gross
tion) *plainly tend to create an universal disregard

insolence or direct opposi
of their authority, r
*284l
The principal instances, of either sort, that have been usually (d) pun- <• *
ishable by attachment, are chiefly of the following kinds. 1. 1 hose committed
by inferior judges and magistrates; by acting unjustly, oppressively or irregu
larly, in administering those portions of justice which are intrusted to their
distribution: or by disobeying the king's writs issuing out of the superior
courts, by proceeding in a cause after it is put a stop to or removed by writ of
prohibition, certiorari, error, supersedeas, and the like. For, as the king's
superior courts, and especially the court of king's bench, have a general super
intendence over all inferior jurisdictions, any corrupt or iniquitous practices of
subordinate judges are contempts of that superintending authority, whose duty
it is to keep them within the bounds of justice. 2. Those committed by sher
iffs, bailiffs, gaolers, and other officers of the court, by abusing the process of the
law, or deceiving the parties, by any acts of oppression, extortion, collusive
behaviour, or culpable neglect of duty. 3. Those committed by attorneys and
solicitors, who are also officers of the respective courts: by gross instances of
fraud and corruption, injustice to their clients, or other dishonest practice.
For the malpractice of the officers reflects some dishonour on their employers:
and, if frequent or unpunished, creates among the people a disgust against the
4. Those committed by jurymen, in collateral matters
courts themselves.
(d) SHawk. P. 0. 142,Ac
complained of, or insists that they do not constitute a contempt, the court will hear the
Whittem v. The State, 36 Did. , 196 ; Ex parte Ireland,
evidence, and upon that determine.
88 Tex., 844.
The following may be given as illustrations of direct contempts: Striking an attorney
while he is addressing the court. Middlebrook v. State, 43 Conn., 267. Calling another a
liar in the presence of the court. TJ. S. v. Emerson, 4 Cranch, C. C, 188. Addressing in
Com
sulting language to the Judge while he is proceeding to take his seat on the bench.
monwealth v. Dandridge, 2 va. Cas., 408. Charging the judge with prejudice in a paper
Harrison v. State, 36 Ark., 468.
filed.
It is a constructive contempt of court to publish an article concerning pending proceed
ings calculated and intended to influence the result, or to bring the court in its dealings
Branson's Case, 12 Johns., 460; Respublica v.
with it into public discredit or disgrace.
Oswald, lDalL,819; S. C, 1 Am. Dec., 246; State v. Matthews, 87 N. H., 450; In re
Sturoc, 48 N. H., 428; People v. Wilson, 64 El, 195. Compare State v. Anderson, 40 Iowa,
207; Storey v. People, 79 IlL, 45.
It is a constructive contempt of court to serve with summons a witness who has come
from another state to testify, but who has not since had time to return. Be Healey, 68 V t. ,
694; 8. C, 38 Am. Rep., 718.
Where no private interests are Involved, a party guilty of contempt will sometimes be dis
charged without punishment on his sworn disavowal that he intended to commit a con
See People v. Freer, 1 Caines, 485; People v. Wilson, 64
tempt; but this is not of course.
HI.. 195; Watson v. Savings Bank, 5 8. C, 159; Hughes v. People, 5 Col., 436.
Attachments as for contempt may issue to compel the performance of duty by municipal
Bass v.
bodies, but in such case the proceedings must be against the individual members.
Shakopee, 27 Minn., 250. They may also issue against inferior courts or judges for refus
Westchester,
cause,
of
a
bill
of
v.
2
People
to
exceptions.
Judges
Johns.
sign
ing, without
Cas., 118; for refusing to obey a writ of mandamus: People v. Pearson, 4 111., 270; or any
Monr.,
the
Gorham
v.
Luckett,
of
court.
6
B.
688.
superior
mandate
other lawful
Also against attorneys for refusing to pay over to clients moneys received in the profes
Ex parte Btaats, 4 Cow., 76; Ex parte Biggs, 64 N. C, 202; Smith v.
sional character.
McLendon, 59 Ga., 623; or for addressing insulting language to the judge, orally or in
Hill v. Crandall, 52 HI., 70; In re Cooper, 82 Vt., 258; In re Woolley, 11
papers filed.
Bush, 95; Harrison v. State, 86 Ark., 468; for entering appearance in a case and confess
Denton v. Noyes, 6 Johns., 296, and the like.
ing judgment without authority.
Also against sheriffs for neglecting to pay over moneys collected: Bagley v. Yeates, 3
McLean, 465; Matter of Stephens, 1 Ga., 584; for negligently suffering an escape, Craig v.
Maltbie, 1 Ga., 544; for levying on property in the custody of the law: Matter of Hopper,
6 Paige, 489.
See People v. Pierson, 4 111., 270.
Also against a clerk for refusing to comply with a mandamus: People v. Salomon, 54 111.,
Delaney v. Regulators, 1 Yates, 408.
89; or to furnish copies of papers wanted for a trial.
Also against a witness for refusing to answer any proper question.
TJ. S. v. Canton, 1
Cranch C. C, 150; Bumham v. Morrissey, 14 Gray, 226; Hirsh v. State, 8 Bax.. 89; Hol
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relating to the discharge of their office; such as making default, when sum
moned; refusing to be sworn, or to give any verdict; eating or drinking with
out the leave of the court, and especially at the cost of either party ; and other
misbehaviours or irregularities of a similar kind: but not in the mere exercise
of their judicial capacities, as by giving a false or erroneous verdict. 5. Those
committed by witnesses: by making default when summoned, refusing to be
sworn or examined, or prevaricating in their evidence when sworn. 6. Those
committed by parties to any suit, or proceeding before the court: as by disobe^ience to any *rule or order, made in the progress of a cause; by nonr*2R>»l
-I
l
payment of costs awarded by the court upon a motion; or, by nonobservance of awards duly made by arbitrators or umpires, after having entered
into a rule for submitting to such determination, (e) Indeed the attachment
for most of this species of contempts, and especially for non-payment of costs
and non-performance of awards, is to be looked upon rather as a civil
execution for the benefit of the injured party, though carried on in the shape
of a criminal process for a contempt of the authority of the court. And,
therefore, it hath been held that such contempts, and the process thereon, be
ing properly the civil remedy of individuals for a private injury, are not re
leased or affected by a general act of pardon. And upon a similar prin
ciple, obedience to any rule of court may also, by statute 10 Geo. HI, c. 50, be
enforced against any person having privilege of parliament by the process of
distress infinite. 7. Those committed by any other persons under the degree
of a peer: and even by peers themselves, when enormous and accompanied
with violence, such as forcible rescous and the like; (f) or when they import
a disobedience to the king's great prerogative writs of prohibition, habeas cor
Some of these contempts may arise in the face of the
pus, {g) and the rest.
court; as by rude and contumelious behaviour; by obstinacy, perverseness, or
prevarication: by breach of the peace, or any wilful disturbance whatever:
others in the absence of the party; as by disobeying or treating with disres
pect the king's writ, or the rules or process of the court; by perverting such
writ or process to the purposes of private malice, extortion, or injustice; by
speaking or writing contemptuously of the court or judges, acting in their judi(e) 8ee book IIL page-17.
(/) 8tyl. 277. 2 Hawk. P. C. 162. Cro.Jao.419.
(0) 1 Burr. 632. Lord's Jour. 7 Feb. 8 June 1767.

Balk. BBS.

it

it,

Rive*
man v. Austin, 34 Tex., 668; Ex parte Renshaw, 6 Mo. App., 474. See Maxwell
11 Nev., 218; or for remaining in the court-room after being excluded by order of thecourt. People v. Boscovitch, 20 Cal., 436.
Also against jurymen for separating from their fellows and mingling with the community
at large, or holding communications with others than their fellows or the officer in charge.
B, M. Chart., 48.
Parties may be punished as for contempt for violating an injunction; Doubleday v. Sher
man, 8 Blatch., 45; Ex parte Hamilton, 51 Ala., 66; Baker v. Cordon, 86 N. C, 116; 8. G.
41 Am. Rep., 448; Winslow v. Nayson, 118 Mass., 411; for refusing to pay alimony in a
divorce suit: Petrie v. People, 40 111., 334; O'Callaghan v. O'Callaghan, 69*111.. 552; or to
obey any proper order of the court : Blair v. Nelson, 8 Bax. , 1 ; McClure v. Gulick. 17 N. J.,
840; Baker v. Baker, 23 Hun, 356; for preventing by open force the service of process upon
Conoverv. Wood, 5 Abb. Pr., 84; for keeping a witness who has been duly
themselves:
summoned from attending court: Commonwealth v. Feely, 2 Va. Cas., 1; for addressing
an insulting letter to the judge in regard to his judicial conduct: In re Pryor, 18 Kan., 72;
8. C, 26 Am. Rep., 747, ana note; for bringing a fictitious case in order to get the opinion
of the court on matters presented by it. Smith v. Brown, 3 Tex., 860. And in the case of
Haines v. People. 97 III., 181.
an administrator, for failing to obey an order of distribution.
The foregoing are only illustrative cases. Where the contempt consists in the failure of
any officer or party to comply with an order of the court, the guilty party may be impris
oned until he complies or gives satisfactory excuse for failure to do so. But when impris
onment is inflicted as a punishment, the order therefor must fix a limit or it is void. People
v. Pirfenbrink, 96 111., 68.
The case ought to be plain before any court should assume to punish a contempt of its
authority.
Batchelder v. Moore, 42 Cal., 412. Court commissioners have no such power.
nor can
be con
Haight v. Lucia, 36 Wis. , 355. And municipal bodies neither have
ferred upon them.
Whitcomb's Case, 120 Mass., 118.
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cal capacity; by printing false accounts (or even true ones without proper per
mission) of causes then depending in judgment; and by any thing, in short,

that

demonstrates a gross want of that regard and respect which, when onoe
are deprived of, their authority (so necessary for the good
order of the kingdom) is entirely lost among the people.
*The process of attachment, for these and the like contempts, must r*n86-i
J
For laws without a *■
necessarily be as ancient as the laws themselves.
competent authority to secure their administration from disobedience and con
tempt would be vain and nugatory. A power, therefore, in the supreme
courts of justice to suppress such contempts, by an immediate attachment of
the offender, results from the first principles of judicial establishments, and
must be an inseparable attendant upon every superior tribunal. Accordingly,
we find it actually exercised as early as the annals of our law extend.
And
though a very learned author (h) seems inclinable to derive this process from
the statute of Westm. 2, 13 Edw. I, c. 39 (which ordains, that in case the pro
cess of the king's court be resisted by the power of any great man, the sheriff
shall chastise the resisters by imprisonment, "a qua non deliberenter sine spedali prcecepto domini regis . and if the sheriff himself be resisted, he shall cer
tify to the courts the names of the principal offenders, their aiders, consentors, commanders, and favourers, and by a special writ judicial they shall be at
tached by their bodies to appear before the court, and if they be convicted
thereof they shall be punished at the king's pleasure, without any interfering by
any other person whatsoever), yet he afterwards more justly concludes, that
it is part of the law of the land, and, as such, is confirmed by the statute of
magna carta.
the contempt be committed in the face of the court, the offender may be
with
instantly apprehended and imprisoned, at the discretion of the judges,
out any farther proof or examination. But in matters that arise at distance,
and of which the court cannot have so perfect a knowledge, unless by the con
the judges upon affidavit see
fession of the party or the testimony of others,
sufficient ground to suspect that a contempt has been committed, they either
make a rule on the suspected party to show cause why an attachment should not
issue against him; (J) or, in very flagrant instances of contempt, the attach
no sufficient
ment issues in the first instance; (k) as
also '''does,
r*oo7i
cause be shown to discharge; and thereupon the court confirms, and
makes absolute, the original rule. This process of attachment
merely in
tended to bring the party into court: and, when there, he must either stand
committed, or put in bail, in order to answer upon oath to such interrogatoriet
as shall be administered to him, for the better information of the court with
These interrogatories are in the
respect to the circumstances of the contempt.
nature of
charge or accusation, and must by the course of the court be ex
hibited within the first four days:
and,
im
any of the interrogatories
and move the court to have
proper, the defendant may refuse to answer
struck out. (m) If the party can clear himself upon oath, he
discharged;
but, if perjured, may be prosecuted for the perjury, (n) If he confesses the
contempt, the court will proceed to correct him by fine, or imprisonment, or
both, and sometimes by corporal or infamous punishment, (o) If the con
nature that, when the fact
once acknowledged, the court
tempt be of such
can receive no farther information by interrogatories than
already pos
sessed of (as in the case of a rescous), (p) the defendant may be admitted to
make such simple acknowledgment, and receive his judgment without answer
ing to any interrogatories: but
he wilfully and obstinately refuses to ans
wer, or answers in an evasive manner, he
then clearly guilty of
high and
repeated contempt, to be punished at the discretion of the court.
It cannot have escaped the attention of the reader, that this method of mak«) Ollb. Htat. 0. P. ch.
(fc) Salt 84. Stra. 185,564. .
(0 Staund. P. 0. 78,b.
U Styl. 877.
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(o) Oro. Oar. 148.
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(m) Stra. 444.
(n) Mod. 78.
Elkins, M. Geo. m, B. E.,
Burr. 2129.
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ing the defendant answer npon oath to a criminal charge, is not agreeable to
the genins of the common law in any other instance; {g) and seems indeed to
have been derived to the courts of king's bench and common pleas through the
medium of the courts of equity. For the whole process of the courts of
equity, in the several stages of a cause, and finally to enforce their decrees, was
t'le *mtr°duction °f sequestrations, in the nature of a process of
l"*28Rl
J contempt; acting only in personam and not in rem. And there, after
L
the party in contempt has answered the interrogatories, such his answer may
be contradicted and disproved by affidavits of the adverse party: whereas, in
the courts of law, the admission of the party to purge himself by oath is more
favourable to his liberty, though perhaps not less dangerous to his conscience;
for, if he clears himself by his answers, the complaint is totally dismissed.
And, with regard to this singular mode of trial, thus admitted in this one par
shall only for the present observe, that as the process by at
ticular instance,
tachment in general appears to be extremely ancient, (r) and has in more mod
ern times been recognized, approved, and confirmed by several express acts of
so the method of examining the delinquent himself upon oath
parliament,
at least of as high antiquity,
and
with regard to the contempt alleged,
now become the law of the land.
long and immemorial usage
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CHAPTER XXI.
OF ARRESTS.
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Wb are now to consider the regular and ordinary method of proceeding
the courts of criminal jurisdiction; whioh may be distributed under twelve
general heads, following each other in a progressive order, viz.: 1. Arrest;
Commitment, and bail; 8. Prosecution; 4. Process; 5. Arraignment, and its
Trial, and conviction; 8. Clergy; 9. Judg
incidents; 6. Plea, and issues;
10. Reversal of judgment; 11. Reprieve, or par
ment, and its consequences;
don; 12. Execution; all of which will be discussed in the subsequent part
this book.
the apprehending or restraining of one's
First, then, of an arrest; which
person, in order to be forthcoming to answer an alleged or suspected crime.
To this arrest all persons whatsoever are, without distinction, equally liable
in all criminal cases: but no man
to be arrested, unless charged with such
And, in gen
a crime as will at least justify holding him to bail when taken.
eral, an arrest may be made four ways:
By warrant; 2. By an officer with
out warrant; 3. By
private person also without warrant; 4. By an hue and
cry.
-A- warrant may be granted in extraordinary cases by the privy
r*200l
council, or secretaries of state: (a) (1) but ordinarily by justices of the
This they may do in any cases where they have a jurisdiction over the
peace.
offence, in order to compel the person accused to appear before them: (b) for
would be absurd to give them power to examine an offender, unless they

1

{
5.

2,

5. S

2,
$

2

6

ff.
$
S.

2,

(r) Yearb. 20Hen. VI, c. 37. 22 Edw. IV, c. 29.
(0) See book Ht, pp. 100,101.
IS Car. H, St.
c.
4.
and 10Wm. in, a 15. IS Ann. st.
a 14,
(j) Stat. 43 Ellz. e.
(t) M. Edw. IV, rot. 76, cited In Rast. Ent. 268, pL
(6) Hawk. P. O. 84.
(a) Lord Eaym. 86.

is

is

now, by several recent statutes, expressly conferred upon private individual*
(1) Power
The caution to abstain from so doing
to make arrest of persons found committing offenses.
■where no apparent necessity exists
nevertheless worthy of being observed.
To ascertain what officers may issue warrants in the American states, the statutes of the
several states must be consulted.
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had also a power to compel him to attend, and submit to such examination.
And this extends undoubtedly to all treasons, felonies, and breaches of the
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(e)

and also to all such offences as they have power to punish by statute,
geace;
ir Edward Coke indeed (c) hath laid it down that a justice of the peace can
not issue a warrant to apprehend a felon upon bare suspicion; no, not even till
an indictment be actually found : and the contrary practice is by others (<?)
held to be grounded rather upon connivance than the express rule of law;
though now by long custom established. A doctrine which would in most
cases give a loose to felons to escape without punishment; and therefore Sir
Matthew Hale hath combatted it with invincible authority and strength of
reason: maintaining, 1. That a justice of the peace hath power to issue a war
rant to apprehend a person accused of felony, though not yet indicted;
and,
2. That he may also issue a warrant to apprehend a person suspected of felony,
though the original suspicion be not in himself, but in the party that prays his
warrant; because he
a competent judge of the probability offered to him of
such suspicion.
But in both cases
fitting to examine upon oath the party
requiring a warrant, as well to ascertain that there is felony or other crime
actually committed, without which no warrant should be granted; as also to
prove the cause and probability of suspecting the party against whom the
warrant is prayed. (/) This warrant ought to be under the hand and seal of
the justice, should set forth the time and place of making, and the cause for
which it
made, and should be directed to the *constable or other r*ooii
may be, to any private person by name), (g) requir- •■
peace officer (or,
ing him to bnng the party either generally before any justice of the peace for
the county, or only before the justice who granted it; the warrant in the latter
case being called
special warrant. (A) A general warrant to apprehend all
persons suspected, without naming or particularly describing any person in
for
the duty of the
special,
illegal and void for its uncertainty;
magistrate, and ought not to be left to the officer, to judge of the ground of
crime therein
And warrant to apprehend all persons, guilty of
suspicion.
no legal warrant: for the point upon which its authority rests,
specified,
a fact to be decided on
subsequent trial; namely, whether the person appre
therefore in fact no war
hended thereupon be really guilty or not. (2) It
rant at all; for
will not justify the officer who acts under it: (k) whereas, a
should ex
warrant properly penned (even though the magistrate who issues
will, by statute 24 Geo. II, c. 44, at all events indemnify
ceed his jurisdiction)
And when
the officer who executes the same ministerially.
warrant
re
bound to execute
ceived by the officer he
so far as the jurisdiction of the
A warrant from the chief or other justice of
magistrate and himself extends.
the court of king's bench extends all over the kingdom: and
teste'd, or dated,
England not Oxfordshire, Berks, or other particular county. But warrant
of
justice of the peace in one county, as Yorkshire, must be baoked, that
is, signed by
justice of the *peace in another, as Middlesex, before
r*2o2l
can be executed there.
Formerly, regularly speaking, there ought to
been
a
fresh
in
but
the
of
have
warrant
every fresh county:
practice
backing
22

1

)
2

8

o

ly

i

24

Hawk. P. C. 81
(d
to) Salk. 178.
(e) Hal. P. 0. 106.
(/) Ibid. 110.
(e) Inst. 176.
Hawk. P. C. 82.
(0 HaL P. C. 680.
(h) Hawk. P. C. 88.
(k) A practice had obtained in the secretaries1 office ever since the restoration, erounded on some
in the acts for regulating the press, of Issuing general warrants to take up (without naming any
in particular) the authors, printers, or publishers of such obscene or seditious libels as were par
specified in the warrant. When those acts expired in 1694,the same practice was Inadvertently
led in every reign, and under every administration, except the four last years of Queen Anne,
the year 1763;when such a warrant being issued to apprehend the authors, printers, and pub
lishers, of a certain seditious libel, its validity was disputed; and the warrant was adjudged by the whole
court of king's bench to be void, in the case of Money v. Leach. IVin. Geo. Ill, B. B. After which
the issuing of such general warrants was declared illegal by a vote of the House of Commons. (Com.
Journ. 22 Apr. 1766.)
(3) Warrants to arrest Idle, loose, or disorderly persons are an exception to this rule, and
by several statutes, peace officers are expressly authorized to apprehend them without any
warrant at all.
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warrants bad long prevailed without law, and was at last authorized by statutes
And now, by statute 13 Geo. Ill, c
28 Geo. II, c. 26, and 24 Geo. II, c. 55.
31, any warrant for apprehending an English offender, who may have escaped
into Scotland, and vice versa, may be indorsed and executed, by the local magis
trates, and the offender conveyed back to that part of the united kingdom, in
which such offence was committed. (3)
1. By a justice of
2. Arrests by officers without warrant may be executed,
the peace; who may himself apprehend or cause to be apprehended, by word
only, any person committing a felony or breach of the peace in his presence.
2. The sheriff; and 3. The coroner, may apprehend any felon within the
county without warrant. 4. The constable, of whose office we formerly spoke,
(m) hath great original and inherent authority with regard to arrests. He
breach of the peace, committed
may, without warrant, arrest any one for
his view, and carry him before
justice of the peace. And in case of felony
like to ensue,
actually committed, or dangerous wounding, whereby felony
he may upon probable suspicion arrest the felon; (4) and for that purpose
page 855.
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c.
provides that no person upon the Lord's day shall sent
(3) Statute 29 Car.
any writ, process or warrant, except in cases of treason, felony or breach of the peaceIt is not necessary
Under this, an arrest may be made on Sunday for an indictable offense.
actual or constructive. Rawlini
for the officer to inquire whether the breach of the peace
v. Ellis, 16 M. & W ., 172. So, for violating a city ordinance against keeping open a drink
ing shop on Sunday. Main v. McCarty, 15 111., 441. The arrest may be made by night ai
88; State v. Smith,
East P. C., ch.
N. H., 846.
well as by day.
made for arresting and sending back for trial supposed offenders
By statute, provision
who may have fled to the United Kingdom from any of the British colonies, and also for
foreign governments under
the extradition of supposed offenders who may be demanded
In the United States the power to extradite fugitives from the justice
extradition treaties.
of foreign countries
one belonging to the national government, and
exercised under
Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet., 540; Ex parte Holmes, 12 Vt,
treaties made for the purpose.
Y,
Curtis,
50 N.
321. The constitution of the United States provides that,
681; People v.
"A person charged in any state with treason, felony or other crime, who shall flee from
state, shall, on demand of the executive authority of the
be
found
in
another
justice and
state from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of
Art.
Under this provision, the offense must actually liave been com
the crime."
mitted within the state making the demand, and the accused must have fled therefrom.
McLean, 121; Hartman v. Aveture, 63 Ind., 344; Wilcox v. Nolze, 34
Ex parte Smith,
Ohio St, 520; Jones v. Leonard, 50 Iowa, 106; S. C, 32 Am. Rep., 116. The accused may
be arrested to await the demand, and the states provide by law for such arrest.
The de
either by the indictment of the
made on
prima facie showing of guilt, which
mand
State v. Swope, 72 Mo., 899; Ex parte Sheldon,
supposed offender, or by affidavit of facts.
made on the governor of tba
Tex. Ap. R., 645. It
84 Ohio St., 319; Ham v. State,
state to which the offender has fled, who will issue his warrant of extradition, if the cause
shown
he
satisfactory. But he may revoke this at any time before its execution,
Work v. Corrington, 34 Ohio St, 64; S. C, S8
satisfied
ought not to have been issued.
Am. Rep. 345. The courts have no power to compel the governor to perform his duty in
Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How., 66; Matter of Manchester,
the extradition of offenders.
Cal., 287.
(4) As to arrests without process in general, see Ruloff v. People, 45 N. Y., 213: Reuck
v. McGregor, 82 N. J., 70; State v. Holmes, 48 N. H., 877; Somerville v. Richards, 37
Mich., 299; Newton v. Locklin, 77 111., 108; Corbett v. Sullivan, 54 Vt. 619; State v.
that peace officer who has reasonable ground
Freeman, tJ6 N. O, 688. The general rule
felony has been committed, may at the common law detain the suspected
to suspect that
B, & C, 635; Davis v. Russell,
Beckwith v. Philby,
party until inquiry can be made.
Cush., 281. And even though no felony proves to have
Bing., 354; Rohan v. Sawin,
been committed, the officer will be justified in making an arrest upon suspicion, if he acts
Burnes v. Erben, 40 N. Y., 468. So,
in good faith upon apparently reliable information.
breach of peace committed in his presence.
an officer may arrest without*warrant for
And perhaps for some high misdemeanors.
Smith v. Donelly,
Hawk. P. O, ch. 18,
But not for misdemeanors «in general.
Com. v. Carey, 12 Cush., 246; Quinn
66 111., 464.
Mich.,
Case,
Heisel,
Mich.,
41
40
576: Way's
299.
Any private party present at the
v.
Wia,
Keenan v. State.
commission of
felony may arrest the felon without warrant.
And
prisoner who has broken jail, though
132.
private party may lawfully recapture
the breaking was only
misdemeanor.
State v. Holmes, 48 N. H., 877.
And may stop
breach of the peace, though he cannot arrest for it.
Phillips v. Trull, 11 Johns., 486.
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authorized (as upon a justice's warrant) to break open doors, and even to kill
the felon if he cannot otherwise be taken ; and, if he or his assistants be killed
in attempting such arrests, it is murder in all concerned, (n)
6. Watchmen,
either those appointed by the statute of Winchester, 13 Edw. I, c. 4, to keep
watch and ward in all towns from sun-setting to sun-rising, or such as are
mere assistants to the constable, may virtute officii arrest all offenders, and
particularly night-walkers, and commit them to custody till the morning, (o)
3. Any private person (and a fortiori a peace officer) that is present when
any felony is committed, is bound by the law to *arrest the felon, on r*oo,3l
'
pam of fine and imprisonment, if he escapes through the negligence of *■
the standers-by. (p) And they may justify breaking open the doors upon fol
lowing such felon; and if they kill him, provided he cannot be otherwise taken,
it is justifiable: though if they are killed in endeavouring to make such arrest,
it is murder, (q) Upon probable suspicion also a private person may arrest
the felon, or other person so suspected, (r) But he cannot justify breaking
open doors to do it; and if either party kill the other in the attempt, it is man
It no more, because there no malicious de
slaughter, and no more.
amounts to so much, because
would be of most pernicious
sign to kill: but
under pretence of suspecting felony, any private person might
consequence,
break open
house, or kill another; and also because such arrest upon sus
picion
barely permitted by the law, and not enjoined, as in the case of those
committed.
who are present when felony
4. There
yet another species of arrest, wherein both officers and private
men are concerned, and that
upon an hue and cry raised upon
felony com
the old
mitted. An hue (from huer, to shout, and cry), hutesium et clamor,
common-law process of pursuing, with horn and with voice, all felons, and such
as have dangerously wounded another,
It
also mentioned by statute
and
Edw. stat. de officio coronatorif. But the
Westm.
Edw.
c.
that of Winchester, 13 Edw.
cc.
principal statute, relative to this matter,
and
which directs that from thenceforth every county shall be so well kept,
♦,hat immediately upon robberies and felonies committed, fresh suit shall be
made from town to town, and from county to county; and that hue and cry
ehall be raised upon the felons, and they that keep the town shall follow with
hue and cry with all the town, and the towns near; and so hue and cry shall be
made from town to town, until they be taken and delivered to the sheriff. And
that such hue and cry may more effectually be made, the ^hundred
bound by the same statute, chapter
to answer for all robberies there- [*294]
in committed, unless they take the felon; which
the foundation of an action
against the hundred, (u) in case of any loss by robbery. By statute 27 Eliz,
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(p)
Hawk. P. 0. 74.
{o) Ibid. 98.
(n) Hal. P. C. 90.91
(») Ha!. P. C. 82,83.
(r) Stat. 80 Geo. H, c. 84.
(o) HaL P. O. 77.
tr.
a
Mirr. o.
(u) 8ee book HI, page 161.
(<) Bracton,
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person detected in an attempt to commit felony may be arrested without warrant. R. v.
Hunt,
Moo., 93; but not one merely suspected of the commission of misdemeanor.
Fox
Ad., 798. The apprehension by private party upon suspicion
B.
only for
v. Gaunt,
Ga.,
the purpose of taking the suspected person before
298.
Long v. State, 12
magistrate.
If felony has in fact been committed by the person arrested, the arrest may be justified
warrant,
inno
If an
whether there
time to obtain one or not.
by any person without
arrested upon suspicion by
excused
cent person
private individual, such individual
committed,
If felony was in fact
and there was reasonable ground to suspect the person
arrested.
But
no felony was committed by any one, and private individual arrest with
he acted upon
out warrant, such arrest
illegal, although an officer would be justified
Jones, N. C,
Wend., 350; Brockway v, Crawford,
reliable information.
Holley v. Mix,
S.&R.,
433;Com. v. Carey, 12 Cush., 246; Wakely v. Hart, Binn., 316; Com. v. Deacon.
49; Burns v. Erbin, 40 N. Y., 463; and see Doughty v. State, 33 Tex.,
Upon suspicion
of felony merely,
house, or kill the suspected party;
private party cannot break open
and in making the arrest he must give notice of his purpose to arrest for felony. Brooks v.
Com., 61 Penn. St., 852. The purpose to arrest must be made known, and the individual
charged
the latter
attempting to make the arrest has no right to kill the suspected party
with an inferior felony and does not resist, but flies. State v. Bryant, 65 N. C, 327.
Vol.
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IS, no hue and cry is sufficient, unless made with both horsemen and footmen.
And by statute 8 Geo. II, o. 16, the constable or like officer, refusing or neg
lecting to made hue and cry, forfeits 5/.: and the vill or district is still in strict
ness liable to be amerced,
according to the law of Alfred, if any felony
An institution which hath
be committed therein, and the felon escapes. (5)
c.

a

8

ft,

long prevailed in many of the eastern countries, and hath in part been intro
duced even into the Mogul empire, about the beginning of the last century:
which is said to have effectually delivered that vast territory from the plague
of robbers, by making in some places the villages, in others the officers of
justice, responsible for all the robberies committed within their respective dis
tricts, (w)
Hue and cry (aj) may be raised either by precept of a justice of the
peace, or by a peace officer, ,or by any private man that knows of a felony.
The party raising it must acquaint the constable of the vill with all the cir
cumstances which he knows of the felony, and the person of the felon; and
thereupon the constable is to search his own town, and raise all the neighbour
ing vills, and make pursuit with horse and foot; and in the prosecution of such
hue and cry the constable and his attendants have the same powers, protection
and indemnification, as if acting under a warrant of a justice of the peace.
But if a man wantonly or maliciously raises an hue and cry, without cause, he
shall be severely punished as a disturber of the public peace, (y)
In order to encourage farther the apprehending of certain felons, rewards
and immunities are bestowed on such as bring them to justice, by divers acts
of parliament. The statute 4 and 5 W. and M. c. 8, enacts, that such as ap
prehend a highwayman, and prosecute him to conviction, shall receive a reward
°^
from the publio; to be paid to them (or if 'killed in the endear*20f>l
*■
J vour to take him, their
executors) by the sheriff of the county ; besides
the horse, furniture, arms, money, and other goods taken upon the person of
of such robber, with a reservation of the right of any person from whom the
same may have been stolen: to which the statute 8 Geo. II, c. 16, superadds
10Z. to be paid by the hundred indemnified by such taking.
By statutes 6 and
7 Wm. Ill, c. 17, and 15 Geo. D, c. 28, persons apprehending and convicting any
offender against those statutes, respecting the coinage, shall (in case the offence
be treason or felony) receive a reward of forty pounds; or ten pounds, if it only
amount to counterfeiting the copper coin. By statute 10 and 11 Wm. HI, c.
23, any person apprehending and prosecuting to conviction a felon guilty of
burglary, house-breaking, horse-stealing, or private larceny to the value of 6*.
from any shop, warehouse, coach-house, or stable, shall be excused from all
parish offices. And by statute 5 Ann. c. 31, any person so apprehending and
prosecuting a burglar, or felonious house-breaker (or, if killed in the attempt,
his executors), shall be entitled to a reward of 40/. (z) By statute 6 Geo. I, c.
23, persons discovering, apprehending, and prosecuting to conviction, any per
son taking reward for helping others to their stolen goods, shall be entitled
to forty pounds. By statute 14 Geo. II, o. 6, explained by 15 Geo. H, c 84,
any person apprehending and prosecuting to conviction such as steal, or kill
with an intent to steal, any sheep, or other cattle specified in the latter of the
said acts, shall for every such conviction receive a reward of ten pounds. Last
c. 15, and
Geo. Ill, c. 15, persons discovering, ap
ly, by statute 16 Geo.
prehending, and convicting felons and others being found at large during the
term for which they are ordered to be transported, shall receive
reward of
twenty pounds. (6)

(5) All these acts are now repealed.
(6) These statutes are repealed and new provisions substituted.
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(y) Hawk. P. C. 75.
(u>)Hod. Un. Hist. Ti, 383.Til, 1S«.
(as) Hal. P. C. 100-104.
and W. and M. c.
and Wm. HL 0. 17,and Ann. c. 31 (together with
(<) Tbe statutes
Geo.
e. 15,
which directs the method of reimbursing the sheriffs), are extended to the county palatine of
Durham, by stat. 14Geo. in, c. 48.
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CHAPTER XXII.
OF COMMITMENT AND BAIL.
When a delinquent is arrested by any of the means mentioned in the pre
ceding chapter, he ought regularly to be carried before a justice of the peace:
(1) and how he is there to be treated, I shall next show, under the second
head, of commitment and bail.
The justice before whom such prisoner is brought is bound immediately to
examine the circumstances of the crime alleged: and to this end by statute 2
and 3 P. and M. c. 10, he is to take in writing the examination of such
prisoner, and the information of those who bring him: which, Mr. Lambard
observes, (a) was the first warrant given for the examination of a felon in the
English law. For, at the common law, nemo tenebatur prodere eeipsum: and
his fault was not to be wrung out of himself, but rather to be discovered by
other means and other men. (2) If upon this inquiry it manifestly appears
(a) Eirenarch,

b. 2, c. T. Bee page 867.

(1) A private party who makes an arrest may deliver the prisoner to an officer or take
him before a justice. 1 Chitty Cr. L., 20. In general, a prisoner should be taken before a
for examination as soon as circumstances will allow. State v. Freeman, 8ft
magistrate
N. C, 683. Where a man was arrested on suspicion of felony, a delay of three days in
taking him up for examination was held unreasonable.
Wright v. Court, 4 B. & C, 596.
A prisoner may be detained a reasonable time while the officer tries to find a justice before
whom to bring him. Arnold v. Steeves, 10 Wend., 614. So. where one is arrested on
probable ground of suspicion, he may lawfully be detained a reasonable time while a war
rant is taken out for him.
Wheeler v. Nesbitt, 24 How., 644.
By statute 11 and 12 Vic, c. 42,
(2) The statute 2 and 3 P. and M., c. 10, is repealed.
6 17, when a person appears or is brought before a justice or justices, charged with an in
dictable offense, the justice or one of the justices shall "read or cause to be read to the
"accused the depositions taken against him, and shall say to him these words or words of
'
the like effect: Having heard the evidence, do you wish to say any thing in answer to the
charge ? You are not obliged to say anything unless you desire to do so, but whatever you
say will be taken down in writing, and may be given in evidence against you on your
trial;' and whatever the prisoner shall then say in answer thereto shall be taken down in
writing and read over to him, and shall be signed by the said justice or justices, and kept
with the depositions of the witnesses, and shall be transmitted with them as hereinafter
mentioned; and afterwards, upon the trial of said accused person, the same may, if neces
sary, be given in evidence against him without further proof thereof, unless it shall be
proved that the justice or justices purporting to sign the same did not in fact sign the same;
provided always, that the said justice or justices, before such accused person shall make
any statement, shall state to him and give him clearly to understand that he has nothing to
hope from any promise of favor and nothing to fear from any threat which may have been
holden out to him to induce him to make any admission or confession of his guilt, but that
whatever he shall then say may be given in evidence against him on the trial, notwithstand
ing such promise or threat; provided, nevertheless, that nothing herein enacted or con
tained shall prevent the prosecutor in any case from giving in evidence any admission or
confession or other statement of the person accused or charged, made at any time, which by
law would be admissible as evidence against such person." Some further provisions are
made by statute 30 and 81 Vic, c. 85.
The statement of one defendant is not evidence against another arrested on the same
charge.
Reg. v. Swinnerton, 1 C. & M., 603. It must not be taken on oath, or it will be
Rex v. Smith, 1 Stark. N. P., 242; R v. Rivers, 7 C. &P., 177; R. v. Pikesinadmissible.
did.,
124.
ley,
In the United States provisions are made by statute for the arrest and examination of
offenders before justices of the peace and other local magistrates, and for their being held
for trial in the proper court. These provisions are different, but have a general similarity.
The accused, after the proofs against him are taken, is permitted to make a statement with
out oath, which he makes or not at his option, and it is quite customary to caution him
that what he says may be used in evidence against him. After the statement is received,
the magistrate, if he decides to hold the accused to trial, makes an order accordingly, and
if the case is bailable, fixes the amount of bail. But the accused, without the taking of
459
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that either no such crime was committed, or that the suspicion entertained of
the prisoner was wholly groundless, in such cases only it is lawful totally to
discharge him. Otherwise he must either be committed to prison, or give
bail: that is put in securities for his appearance, to answer the charge against
him. (3) This commitment, therefore, being only for safe custody, wherever
bail will answer the same intention, it ought to be taken; as in most of the
>n^eri°r crimes: but in felonies, and other offences of a 'capital nature,
1"*90'7l
L
J no bail can be a security equivalent to the actual custody of the per
For what is there that a man may not be induced to forfeit, to save hii
son.
own life ? and what satisfaction or indemnity is it to the public, to seize the
•effects of them who have bailed a murderer, if the murderer himself be suffered
Upon a principle similar to which the Athenian
U> escape with impunity?
magistrates, when they took a solemn oath never to keep a citizen in bond*
that could give three sureties of the same quality with himself, did it with an
exception to such as had embezzled the publio money, or been guilty of trea
What the nature of bail is hath been shown in the pre
sonable practices. (6)
ceding book, (c) viz., a delivery or bailment, of a person to his sureties, upon
their giving (together with himself) sufficient security for his appearance: he
being supposed to continue in their friendly custody, instead of going to gaoL
In civil cases we have seen that every defendant is bailable; but in criminal
matters it is otherwise. Let us therefore inquire in what cases the party ac
cused ought, or ought not, to be admitted to bail.
And, first, to refuse or delay to bail any person bailable is an offence against
the liberty of the subject, in any magistrate by the common law, (d ) as well
as by the statute Westm. 1, 3 Edw. 1, c. 15, and the habeas corpus act, 31
Car. II, c. 2. And, lest the intention of the law should be frustrated by the
justices requiring bail to a greater amount than the nature of the case de
W. and M., st. 2, o. 2, that exces
mands, it is expressly declared by statute
sive bail ought not to be required; though what bail should be called excessive
must be left to the courts, on considering the circumstances of the case, to de
termine. And, on the other hand, if the magistrate takes insufficient bail he
Bail may be
is liable to be fined, if the criminal doth not appear, (e) (4)
taken either in court, or in some particular cases by the sheriff, coroner, or
other magistrate, (5) but most usually by the justices of the peace. Regularly,
offences either against the common *law or act of parliament,
r* al in all
l
J that are below felony, the offender ought to be admitted to bail, unless
(c) See book III, page 29a
(d) 2 Hawk. P. C. 90.
W Ibid. ft.
(6) Pott. Antiq. b. 1, c. 18.

I

proofs against him, is allowed to waive examination; and he will then be held for trial as if
a case had been proved.
On the examination, the prisoner, if held in irons, should be released from them, though
if he waives examination without having them removed, the fact of his being in irons at the
State v.
time will be no ground for a plea in abatement to the subsequent indictment
Lewis, 19 Kan., 260; 8. C, 27 Am. Rep., 113.
in cases of alleged felony, may cause the material witnesses who
(3) The magistrate,
have appeared for the prosecution to enter into recognizance to appear at the trial, and if
2 Hawk. P. C, ch. 16, § 2; 1
sufficient sureties are not given, may commit the witness.
Bish. Cr. Proa, § 84. In some of the United States this power of requiring the witness to
recognize is not restricted to cases of felony. The liability of witnesses to be thus detained
is sometimes a great hardship, and probably in some cases where persons become cognizant
of crimes when they happen to be al a distance from their homes, and from the means of
giving bail, the danger of their being detained in prison leads to a concealment of the facts
within their knowledge.
(4) To bail one charged with an offense not bailable is, in the absence of statute, a negli
But where a magis
2 Hawk. P. 0., ch. 15, §7; R v. Clarke, Stra., 1216.
gent escape.
trate has admitted one to bail, he has no right to order his re-arrest upon the supposition
that the bail is insufficient. Ingram v. State, 27 Ala., 17.
(5) The court of king's bench, or any judge thereof, in vacation, may at their discretion
admit persons to bail in all cases whatsoever: but none can claim this benefit dt jut*. 3
Hale, 129. As to when this court will bail, see 1 Chit. C. L., 2d ed., 98.
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be prohibited by some special act of parliament, (f) In order, therefore,
more precisely to ascertain what offences are bailable,
Let us next see, who may not be admitted to bail, or what offences are not
bailable.
And here shall not consider any one of those cases in which bail
is ousted by statute, from prisoners convicted of particular offences: for then
such imprisonment without bail is part of their sentence and punishment.
But, where the imprisonment is only for safe custody before the conviction,,
and not for punishment afterwards, in such cases bail is ousted or taken away,
wherever the offence is of a very enormous nature; for then the public is en
titled to demand nothing less than the highest security that can be given, viz.,
the body of 'the accused; in order to insure that justice shall be done upon
him if guilty. Such persons, therefore, as the author of the Mirror observes,
(g) have no other sureties but the four walls of the prison. By the ancient
common law, before (A) and since
the conquest, all felonies were bailable,
till murder was excepted by statute: so that persons might be admitted to bail
before oonviction almost in every oase. But the statute Westm.
Edw.
o. 16, takes away the power of bailing in treason, and in divers instances of
and and
The statutes 23 Hen. VI, o.
P. and M. c. 13, give far
felony.
ther regulations in this matter; (6) and upon the whole we may collect, (k\
that no Justice of the peace can bail,
Upon an accusation of treason: (7>
the prisoner be clearly
nor, 2. Of murder: nor, 3. In case of manslaughter,
the slayer, and not barely suspected to be so; or
any indictment be found
against him: nor, 4. Such as, being committed for felony, have broken prison;
because
not only carries presumption of guilt, but
also superadding one
felony to another: 5. Persons outlawed: 6. Such as have abjured the realm:
7. ^Approvers, of whom we shall speak in
subsequent chapter, and
*oqq~i
Persons taken with the mainour, or in
persons by them accused:
the fact of felony: 9. Persons charged with arson: 10. Excommunicated per
sons taken by writ de excommunicato capiendo: all of which are clearly not
admissible to bail by the justices. Others are of a dubious nature; as, 11.
Thieves openly defamed and known: 12. Persons charged with other felonies,
or manifest and enormous offences, not being of good fame: and, 13. Acces
sories to felony, that labour under the same want of reputation. These seem
to be in the discretion of the justices, whether bailable or not.
The last class
are such as must be bailed upon offering sufficient surety; as, 14. Persons of
bare suspicion of manslaughter, or other inferior
fame, charged with
food
omicide: 15. Such persons, being charged with pefjt larceny, or any felony
not before specified: or, 16. With being acoessory to any felony. Lastly, it
of king's bench (or any judge (m) thereof in time
agreed that the court
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84.
(/) Hal. P. C. 127.
(o) C.
(A) Inst. 189.
m In omnibus placitit de felonia tolet accusatus per plegioe dimitti, prattcrquam in placito de homu
ciaio, ubi ad terrorem altter itatutum est. (OUqt.
14,o. 1.)
(fc) Inst. 186. Hal. P. C. 129.
(J) Inst. 189. Latch. 12. Vaugb, 1S7. Comb. Ill, 298. Oomyn's Dig. 495.
(m) Skin. 683. Salic. 106. Stra. 911. Comyn'a Dig. 497.
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(6) These statutes are since repealed, and much more liberal authority
justices to admit to bail.
In the United States
provided by the national and state constitutions that unreason
able bail shall not be required.
reasonable
But what
necessarily left to the discretion
of the officer who
empowered to fix it. Ball
usually denied in offenses punishable
capitally, where, in the opinion of the magistrate, the proof of guilt
evident or the pre
sumption great; but, nevertheless,
there is power to let to bail even in capital cases.
United States v. Hamilton,
Dall., 17; United States v. Jones,
Wash. C. C, 209; Com
monwealth
Semmes, 11 Leigh, 665; Commonwealth v. Archer,
Oratt., 705; State v.
Summons, 19 Ohio, 189; People v. Smith.
Cal.,
Barronet's Case,
£1. and Bl.
As to the duty of the justices in taking bail to look into the nature of the charge and the
evidence to sustain it, see the case last cited.
The duty
essentially judicial.
Linford v.
B., 240; Reg. v. Badger,
id., 468.
Fitsroy, 18
charge of treason, bail cannot be taken, except by order of
(7) On
secretary of state,
or by the court of queen's bench, or, in vacation, by one of the judges thereof. 11 and 18
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of vacation) may bail for any crime whatsoever, be it treason (n), murder (o),
or any other offence, according to the circumstances of the case. And herein
the wisdom of the law is very manifest. To allow bail to be taken commonly
for such enormous crimes would greatly tend to elude the public justice: and
yet there are cases, though they rarely happen, in which it would be hard and
unjust to confine a man in prison, though accused even of the greatest offence.

The law has therefore provided one court, and only one, which has a discre
tionary power of bailing in any case: except only, even to this high jurisdic
tion, and of course to all inferior ones, such persons as are committed by either
house of parliament, so long as the ^session lasts; or such as are comr*<tnnl
*■
J mitted for contempts by any of the king's superior courts of justice, (p)
Upon the whole, if the offence be not bailable, or the party cannot find bail,
he is to be committed to the county gaol by the mittimus of the justice, or
warrant under his hand and seal, containing the cause of his commitment:
there to abide till delivered by due course of law. (q) But this imprisonment,
as has been said, is only for safe custody, and not for punishment: therefore,
in this dubious interval between the commitment and trial, a prisoner ought
to bo used with the utmost humanity; and neither be loaded with needless
fetters, nor subjected to other hardships than such as are absolutely requisite
for the purpose of confinement only; though what are so requisite must too
often be left to the discretion of the gaolers; who are frequently a merciless
race of men, and, by being conversant in scenes of misery, steeled against any
Yet the law (as formerly held) would not justify them in
tender sensation.
fettering a prisoner, unless where he was unruly, or had attempted to escape;
(r) this being the humane language of our ancient lawgivers: («) "custodes
poenam sibi commissorum non augeant, nec eos torqueant ; sed omni tcevitia
remota, pietateque adhibita,judicia debite exequantur."

CHAPTER XXIII.

OF THE SEVERAL MODES OF PROSECUTION.
The next step towards the punishment of offenders is their prosecution, or
And this is either upon a previous
the manner of their formal accusation. (1)
finding of the fact by an inquest or grand jury; or without such previous find
ing. The former way is either by presentment or indictment.
X A presentment, generally taken, is a very comprehensive term; including
not only presentments, properly so called, but also inquisitions of office and
indictments by a grand jury. A presentment, properly speaking, is the notice
(n) In the reign of Queen Elizabeth It was the unanimous opinion of the judges, that no court could bail
upon a commitment lor a charge of high treason, by any of the queen's privy council. 1 Anders. 898.
dimitti, prceterquam in placito dmKomi(o) In omnibus placitis de felonia tolet accusatus per plegioa
cirlio. (Olan. 1.14,o. 1.) Sciendum tamen Quod, in hoc placito non tolet aeoumatut per plegiot dimitti,
nisi ex regice pottstatis beneftcio. (Ibid. c. !.)
(j) 2 Hal. P. C. 128.
(p) StaundfTP. 0. 78,6.
(«) Flet. i. 1. c. 28.
(r) 2 Inst. 881. 8 Inst. 81.
(1) It is a requirement of constitutional law that a person accused of crime shall be en
titled to a speedy trial, and this has been said to mean a trial so soon after indictment u
the prosecution can, by a fair exercise of reasonable diligence, prepare for trial, regard be
ing had to the terms of court. U. 8. v. Fox, 3 Montana, 512. By the Habetu Corpus Act,
31 Car. II. c. 2, § 7, a person committed for treason or felony must be indicted at the next
term or sessions', and if not indicted and tried in the second term or sessions, he shall be du>
charged from confinement, unless the delay arises from the impossibility of reaching wit
Similar provisions are found in the statutes of the American
nessea for the prosecution.
States, and there are general statutes limiting the time within which prosecutions for crimi
nal offenses shall be instituted.
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taken by a grand jury of any offence from their own knowledge or observation,
(a) without any bill of indictment laid before them at the suit of the king: as
the presentment of a nuisance, a libel, and the like; upon which the officer of
the court must afterwards frame an indictment, (&) before the party presented
can be put to answer it. An inquisition of office is the act of a jury sum
moned by the proper officer to inquire of matters relating to the crown, upon
Some of these are in themselves convictions, and
evidence laid before them.
cannot afterwards be traversed or denied; and therefore the inquest or jury,
ought to hear all that can be alleged on both sides. Of this nature are all in
quisitions of fdodese; of flight in persons accused of felony; of deodands,
and the like; and presentments of petty offences in the sheriffs tourn or courtleet, whereupon the presiding officer may set a fine. (2) Other inquisitions
may be afterwards traversed and examined: as particularly the coroner's
♦inquisition of the death of a man, when it finds any one guilty of r*o0oi
*
homicide; (3) for in such cases the offender so presented must be *■
arraigned upon this inquisition, and may dispute the truth of it; which brings
it to a kind of indictment, the most usual and effectual means of prosecution,
and into which we will therefore inquire a little more minutely.
H. An indictment (c) is a written accusation of one or more persons of a
crime or misdemeanor, preferred to, and presented upon oath by, a grand jury.
To this end the sheriff of every county is bound to return to every session of
the peace, and every commission of oyer and terminer, and of general gaol
delivery, twenty-four good and lawful men of the county, some out of every
hundred, to inquire, present, do, and execute all those things which, on the
part of our lord the king, shall then and there be commanded them, (d) They
ought to be freeholders, (4) but to what amount is uncertain: (e) which seems
to Toe casus omissus, and as proper to be supplied by the legislature as the
qualifications of the petit jury, which were formerly equally vague and un
certain, but are now settled by several acts of parliament. However, they
are usually gentlemen of the best figure in the county. As many as appear
upon this panel are sworn upon the grand jury, to the amount of twelve at
the least, and not more than twenty-three; that twelve may be a majority.
Which number, as well as the constitution itself, we find exactly described, so
early as the laws of king Ethelred. (/") " Exeant seniores duodecim thani, et
praifectus cum eis, et jurent super sanctuarium quod eis in manus datur, quod
nolint ullum innocentem accusare, nec aliquem noxium celare." In the time
(a) Lamb. EirenarcK.
(c) See Appendix, { L

I f. c 5

(d) 2 HaL P.

(6) 8 Intt. 789.
154
(«) Ibid. 186.

a

(/)

WUk.

LL. Anal

Sax. 117.

He shows that inquisitions of
(2) Mr. Justice Coleridge points out an inaccuracy here.
Toomes v.
felo oU u may be traversed by the executors or administrators of the deceased.
R,
808, n. 1, ed. 1824; that inquisition is not taken of the flight of
Etherington, 1 Saund.
persons accused of felony distinct from the felony; that the finding as to deodands is not
so conclusive but that the court may interfere to diminish the value: Fost., 266; and that,
of petty offenses in the tourn or leet, Lord Mansfield has said that it
as to presentments
cannot be true that they are not traversable anywhere: Cowp., 469; and the law seems to
be that, before the fine is estreated and paid, though not afterwards, the presentment may
be removed by certiorari into the court of king's beneh, and traversed there.
Rex v. Heaton, 2 T. R, 184.
(3) That the finding of a coroner's jury is in itself an indictment upon which a trial may
be had without the intervention of a grand jury, see R. v. Ingham, 9 Cox, 508. The old
doctrine was that one might be put on trial for crime without indictment when a verdict
had in a civil action involved finding one guilty of crime. As if in trespass the jury found
the defendant stole the goods.
2 Hawk. P. C., c. 25, § 6; Com. Dig. Indictment, C. Or
in slander for calling one a thief, and the jury found a justification made out. Bac. Abr.
Indictment, B. 5. But no such proceeding is known to modern English law.
Capital or other infamous crimes against the United States are only to be tried on indict
ment. Const. U. S., Amendment 5. In a majority of the states there are similar constitu
tional provisions, but in some the grand jury is abolished, and an information filed by n
public prosecutor is substituted for an indictment
Russ. and R, 177.
(4) It is not essential that they be freeholders.
463

Prosecutions foe Ceime.

302

[Book

IV.

2,

8

(I)

9

I,

S
e

(i)

a

a

it

is,

of King Richard the First (according to Hoveden) the process of electing the
grand jury ordained by that prince, was as follows: four knights were to he
taken from the county at large, who chose two more out of every hundred;
which two associated to themselves ten other principal freemen, and those
twelve were to answer concerning all particulars relating to their own district.
'^n'8 numDer was probably *found too large and inconvenient; but
T*303l*
the traces of this institution still remain in that some of the jury must
out of every hundred. This grand jury are previously in
be summoned
structed in the articles of their inquiry, by a charge from the judge who pre
sides upon the bench.
They then withdraw, to sit and receive indictments,
which are preferred to them in the name of the king, but at the suit of any
private prosecutor; and they are only to hear evidence on behalf of the pro
secution: for the finding of an indictment is only in the nature of an inquiry
or accusation, which is afterwards to be tried and determined; and the grand
jury are only to inquire, upon their oaths, whether there be sufficient cause to
call upon the party to answer it. A grand jury, however, ought to be thor
oughly persuaded of the truth of an indictment, so far as their evidence goes;
and not to rest satisfied merely with remote probabilities: a doctrine that
might be applied to very oppressive purposes, {g)
The grand jury are sworn to inquire, only for the body of the county, pro
corpore comitatus; and therefore they cannot regularly inquire of a fact done
out of that county for which they are sworn, unless particularly enabled by an
act of parliament. And to so high a nicety was this matter anciently carried,
that where a man was wounded in one county, and died in another, the offender
was at common law indictable in neither, because no complete act of felony was
done in any one of them; but by statute 2 and 3 Edw. VI, c. 24, he is now
indictable in the county where the party died. And, by statute 2 Geo. II, c,
21, if the stroke or poisoning be in England, and the death upon the sea, or out
of England: or, vice versa; the offenders and their accessories may be indicted
in the county where either the death, poisoning, or stroke shall happen. And
so in some other cases; as particularly, where treason is committed out of the
realm, it may be inquired of in any county within the realm, as the king shall
direct, in pursuance of statutes 26 Hen. VIII, c. 13, 83 Hen. VTO, c. 23, 35
Hen. VIII, c. 2, and 5 and 6 Edw. VI, c. 11. And counterfeiters, washers, or
*°f tne current coin, together with all manner of felons and
r!■*<HUlJ mim8Ders
their accessories, mayby statute 26 Hen. VUi, c. 6 (confirmed and
explained by 34 and 35 Hen. VIII, c. 26, §8 85, 86), be indicted and tried for
those offences, if committed in any part (n) of Wales, before the justices of
gaol-delivery and of the peace in the next adjoining county of England, where
at present in the county of Hereford or Salop;
the king's writ runneth: that
and not, as
should seem, in the county of Chester or Monmouth: the one
being
county-palatine where the king's writ did not run, and the other part
Murders, also, whether committed in England
of Wales, in 26 Hen. VIII.
or foreign parts, (k) may by virtue of the statute 33 Hen. VHI, c. 23, be intired of and tried by the king's special commission in any shire or place in
kingdom. By statute 10 and 11 Wm. ni, c. 25, all robberies and other
capital crimes, committed in Newfoundland, may be inquired of and tried in
Geo.
c. 22, may
Offences against the black-act,
any county in England.
be inquired of and tried in any county in England, at the option of the pro
So felonies in destroying turnpikes, or works upon navigable
secutor.
Geo. H, c. 20,
rivers, erected by authority of parliament, may by statutes
and 13 Geo. Ill, c. 84, be inquired of and tried in any adjacent county. By
statute 26 Geo. II, c. 19, plundering or stealing from any vessel in distress or
c 18 (m) maybeprowrecked, or breaking any ship contrary to 12 Ann. st.
a

8

(flSee Hardr. St.
(o) State Trials. It, IBS.
(ft) Stra. 868. Hod. 134.
:k) Ely's Case, at the Old Bailer, Dec. 1720. Boache's Case, Dec. 1778.
(/; So held by all the judges, H. 11Qeorge III, Id the case of Richard Mortis, on
the Oid Bailey.
(ro) See page 244.
164
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secuted either in the county where the fact is committed, or in any county
next adjoining; and, if committed in Wales, then in the next adjoining English
county: by which is understood to be meant such English county as by the
statute 26 Hen. VIII, above mentioned, had before a concurrent jurisdiction
with the great sessions of felonies committed in Wales. (r») Felonies com
mitted out of the realm, in burning or destroying the king's ships,
•magazines, or stores, may by statute 12 Geo. Ill, c. 24, be inquired of r*qn(;i
J
and tried in any county of England, or in the place where the offence *•
is committed. By statute 13 Geo. Ill, o. 63, misdemeanors committed in India
may be tried upon information or indictment in the court of king's bench in
England; and a mode is marked out for examining witnesses by commission,
and transmitting their depositions to the court. But, in general, all offences
must be inquired into, as well as tried, in the county where the' fact is com
mitted. Yet, if larceny be committed in one county, and the goods carried
into another, the offender may be indicted in either; for the offence is com
plete in both, (o) Or he may be indicted in England for larceny in Scot
land, and carrying the goods with him into England, or vice versa/ or for
receiving in one part of the united kingdom goods that have been stolen in
another, (p)
But for robbery, burglary, and the like, he can only be indicted
where the. fact was actually committed; for though the carrying away and
keeping of the goods is a continuation of the original taking, and is therefore
larceny in the second county, yet it is not a robbery or burglary in that juris
And if a person be indicted in one county for larceny of goods origin
diction.
ally taken in another, and be thereof convicted, or stands mute, he shall not
be admitted to his clergy: provided the original taking be attended with such
circumstances as would have ousted him of his clergy by virtue of any statute
made previous to the year 1691. (g) (5)
When the grand jury have heard the evidence, if they think it a groundless
accusation, they used formerly to endorse on the back of the bill, " ignoramus;"
or, we know nothing of it: intimating, that though the facts might possibly be
true, that truth did not appear to them: but now, they assert in English more
absolutely, " not a true bill;" or (which is the better way) "not found;" and
But a fresh bill may
then the party is discharged without farther answer.
afterwards be preferred to a subsequent grand jury. If they are satisfied of
"a true bill;" r*qnfii
the truth of the accusation, they then *endorse upon
then said to be found, and
anciently " MUa vera." The indictment
the party stands indicted.
But to find bill there must at least twelve of the
the law of England of the lives of the subjects,
jury agree: for so tender
that no man can be convicted at the suit of the king of any capital offence,
unless by the unanimous voice of twenty-four of his equals and neighbours:
that
by twelve at least of the grand jury, in the first place, assenting to the
accusation: and afterwards, by the whole petit jury, of twelve more, finding
him guilty, upon his trial. But
twelve of the grand jury assent,
good
And the indictment, when
presentment, though some of the rest disagree, (r)
so found,
publicly delivered into court.

0,

2

9.

8

3.

1

(n) At Shrewsbury summer assizes, 1774,Parry and Roberts were convicted of plundering a vessel
which was wrecked on the coast of Anglesey. It was moved in arrest of Judgment, that Chester, and not
Salop, was the next adjoining English county. But all the judges (in Mich. 15Geo. Ill) held the prosecu
tion to be regular.
(p) Stat. 18Geo. Ill, c 81.
(o) Hal. P. c. 607.
W. and M. c.
1«1.
(«) Stat. 86Hen. Vffl, c.
(r) Hal. P.

it

2

a

if

§

,
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(

la

was necessary to state the venue in the body of the indictment, but
(5) Formerly
not so now. See statute 14 ana 15 Vic. c. 100, 23. And as the court by the same statute
has power to allow an amendment in the statement of the venue, an objection on this score
does not often become available, unless the indictment on its face, or the evidence given
on the trial, shows that the court had no jurisdiction.
the record on its face snows
And
the court to have no jurisdiction,
conviction cannot be sustained without amendment,
notwithstandingthe court had jurisdiction in fact. Reg. v. Mitchell,
Q. B., 636.
Vol. II.— 59
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Indictments must have a precise and sufficient certainty. (6) By statute
Hen. V, o. 5, all indictments must set forth the christian name, sirname, and
addition of the state, and degree, mystery, town, or place, and county of the
offender: and all this to identify his person. The time, and place, are also to
be ascertained by naming the day and township, in which the fact was com
mitted; though a mistake in these points is in general not held to be material,
provided the time be laid previous to the finding of the indictment, and the
place to be within the jurisdiction of the court; unless where the place is laid,
not merely as a venue, but as a part of the description of the fact. («) Bat
sometimes the time may be very material, where there is any limitation in
point of time assigned for the prosecution of offenders: as by the statute 7
Wm. Ill, c. 8, which enacts, that no prosecution shall be had for any of the
treasons or misprisions therein mentioned (except an assassination designed or
attempted on the person of the king), unless the bill of indictment be found
and in case of murder, the
within three years after the offence committed:
time of the death must be laid within
year and day after the mortal stroke
was given. The offence itself must also be set forth with clearness and cer
tainty; and in some crimes particular words of art must be used, which are so ap
entertains of the
propriated by the law to express the precise idea which
*offence, that no other words, however synonymous they may seem,
»..ki are
Thus, in treason, the facts must be laid to be
capable of doing it.
a (t)

Hawk. P. 0. 435.
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" The object of the indictment is, first, to furnish the accused with such a description
(6)
of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense, and avail himself of hit
further prosecution for the same cause; and,
conviction or acquittal for protection against
second, inform the court of the facts alleged, so that
may decide whether they are suffi
For this, facts are to be stated; not
conviction,
one should be had.
cient to support
A crime
made up of acts and intent; and these must be set
conclusions of law alone.
forth in the indictment, with reasonable particularity, of time, place, and circumstances."
TJ. 8. v. Cruikshank, 92 U. 8., 542, 558; Jarrard's Case. L. and C, 801; Merwin.v. People,
to the constitution of the United States an ac
26 Mich. 208. By the sixth amendment
entitled to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
cused party
him. The indictment must therefore set forth the offense with clearness and all necessary
Pet,
charged with. U. 8. v. Mills,
certainty to apprise the accused of the crime he
138. The alleged crime must be set forth with reasonable precision, directness, and full
ness.
Com. v. Phillips, 16 Pick., 211. Every ingredient of the offense must be clearly
U.
v. Cook, 17 WalL, 168. The requisites of an indictment are thus described
alleged.
carefully considered opinion: "An indictment must contain an alleby Justice Brett in
of every fact necessary to constitute the criminal charge preferred by it. As, in orcriminal mind, the existence
er to make acts criminal, they must always be done with
Sation
If, in order to support the charge,
of that criminality of mind must always be alleged.
committed,
necessary to allege that
necessary to show that certain acts have been
necessary to show that those acts, when they
those acts were in fact committed. If
particular intent,
necessary to aver that intention.
were committed, were done with
certain fact should
If
necessary, in order to support the charge, that the existence of
R. v. Aspinall,
B. D., 56; and see Bradbe negatived, the negative must be alleged."
B. D., 607. As to the last point, see Com. v. Hart, 11 Cush..
laugh v. The Queen,
an exception, the
statute there
180, where
held that if in the enacting clause of
party pleading an offense against the statute must show that his adversary is not within the
to be shown in de
in subsequent clause or statute,
exception; but, if the exception
" The ultimate design of all these objects " (that is, those sought to be accomplished
fense.
"
fairness to the prisoner; and consequently anv
by strictness in setting forth the charge),
indictment which has failed to set forth the offense with such certainty as to accomplish
any of these purposes as far as the nature and circumstances of the case would permit, has
generally been held bad upon general demurrer, or motion in arrest of judgment, or on writ
of error. It is, however, true that in some cases and to some extent the omission to state
facts not essential constituents of the offense in the abstract, but which are required to be
an allegation, on the face of the indictment, showing
known, may be excused
stated,
Thus, firtt, the grand jury may not have been able to
why they could not be stated.
ascertain the names of third persons whose names ought regularly to be stated; or, teeond,
the means used to take life in case of murder; or, third, if in forgery, the forged instru
ment be lost, or in the hands of, or concealed
by, the defendant; in the first case, the
names; in the second, the means used to produce death; and, in the third, the exact words
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done, "treasonably and against his allegiance;" anciently, "proditorie et contra
ligeantiae sum deoitum:" else the indictment is void. In indictments for mur
der, it is necessary to say that the party indicted "murdered," not "killed," or
"slew," the other; which till the late statute was expressed in Latin by the
In all indictments for felonies, the adverb "felonious
word "murdravit." (w)
ly," "felonies," must be used; and for burglaries also "burglariter," or in Eng
lish, "burglariously:" and all these to ascertain the intent. In rapes, the word
"rapuit," or "ravished," is necessary, and must not be expressed by any peri
phrasis; in order to render the crime certain. So in larcenies also, the words
"felonice cepit et asportaoit" "feloniously took and carried away," are necessary
Also
to every indictment; for these only can express the very offence.
in indictments for murder, the length and depth of the wound should in
general be expressed, in order that it may appear to the court to have been of
a mortal nature; but if it goes through the body, then its dimensions are im
material, for that is apparently sufficient to have been the cause of the death.
Also, where a limb, or the like, is absolutely cut off, there such description is
impossible, (v) Lastly, in indictments the value of the thing, which is the
In indict
subject or instrument of the offence, must sometimes be expressed.
ments for larcenies this is necessary, that it may appear whether it be grand or
petit larceny; and whether entitled or not to the benefit of clergy; in homicides
(«) See book m, page 321.

(«) 5 Bep. 122.

of the forged instrument,

;

it
is

if

,

a

§

9

a

a

a

§

it,

may be stated to the Jurors aforesaid unknown (though in the case
of the forged instrument, its loss or destruction, or its possession or concealment by the
And upon the same principle, the omis
prisoner mv^st be stated and its substance given).
sion of a specific statement of many other facts not absolutely essential to the existence of
in
same
the
way." Merwin v. People, 26 Mich., 298.
the offense, may doubtless be excused
The certainty required in an indictment is said by Justice Buller to be " what, upon a
fair and reasonable construction, may be called certain, without recurring to possible facts
which do not appear." R, v. Lyme Regis, 1 Doug., 159. "The court will construe the
words according to their ordinary and usual acceptation, and technical terms according to
An indictment is not vitiated by ungrammatical language or
their technical meaning.
An indictment is not objection
clerical errors, if the real meaning is sufficiently expressed.
intendment or
able as ambiguous or obscure if it be clear enough according to reasonable
construction, though not worded wth absolute precision. 'And if there is no necessary am
'
biguity in the construction of an indictment,' said Chief Justice Tindal, we are not bound
to create one by reading an indictment in the only way which will make it unintelligible."*
See further on the requisites of an indictment, Archbold Cr. Pr.
Heard's Cr. PL, 105-6.
and PL; Bish. Cr. Proa, §§ 819-713; Heard Cr. PL, 41-261, in which most of the cases
cited above are discussed.
Borne important changes have been made in the law relative to indictments by recent
By statute 14 and 15 Vic, c. 100, 8 24, no indictment is to be held insufficient
statutes.
for omitting to state the time at which the offense was committed when time is not of the
essence of the offense, nor by stating the time imperfectly, nor for stating the offense to
have been committed on a day subsequent to the pending of the indictment, or on an im
By section 9, a person on trial for an
possible day, or on a day that never happened.
may be convicted of an attempt to com
offense, if it shall appear that he did not complete
85,
person on trial for robbery may be acquit
mit the same. By 24 and 25 Vic, c. 96,
By section 72 there
ted on the main charge and convicted of an assault with intent to rob.
may be conviction for larceny on an indictment for embezzlement By section 88, per
By Geo. IV, c. 81, 14,
son indicted for false pretenses may be convicted of larceny.
woman indicted for the murder of her infant child may be convicted of endeavoring to con
And by 24 and 25 Vic. c. 94, an accessory before the fact to any felony may
ceal its birth.
he were the principal felon.
And by statutes 24 and 25 Vic.,
be indicted in all respects as
not necessary to set forth the manner in
c. 100, in an indictment for felonious homicide
which, or the means by which, the death was caused.
Indictments in other cases have been
In the United States, indictments for murder, not stating the
very much simplified.
manner of the killing, have bees sustained under statutes which provided that the manner
need not be alleged.
Cathcart v. Commonwealth, 87 Penn. St., 108; Campbell v. Com
monwealth, 84 Penn. St., 187; State v. Shay, 30 La. Ann., 114; People v. King, 27 Cal.,
507 8need v. People, 38 Mich., 248; Newcomb v. State, 87 Miss., 383: State v. Morrissey.
70 Me., 401; Williams v. State, 85 Ohio St., 175. Valuable discussions on the particularitj
required in indictments will be found in those cases.
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of all sorts it is necessary ; as the weapon with which it is committed is for
feited to the king as a deodand. (7)
The remaining methods of prosecution are withont any previous finding by
a jury, to fix the authoritative stamp of verisimilitude upon the accusation.
One of these by the common law, was when a thief was taken with the main
with the thing stolen upon him in manu. For he might, when bo
our, that
detected flagrante delicto, be brought into court, arraigned, and tried, without
indictment: as by the *Danish law he might be taken and hanged upon
r*S08l*
the spot, without accusation or trial, (w) But this proceeding was taken
away by several statutes in the reign of Edward the Third: (z) though in Scot
land
similar process remains to this day. (y)
So that the only species of pro
ceeding at the suit of the king, without
previous indictment or presentment
by
grand jury, now seems to be that of information.
HI. Informations are of two sorts: first, those which are partly at the suit
of the king, and partly at that of
subject; and secondly, such as are only
The former are usually brought upon penal statutes,
the name of the king.
which inflict penalty upon conviction of the offender, one part to the use of the
sort of qui tarn actions
king, and another to the use of the informer; and are
former book,) (z) only carried on by
(the nature of which was explained in
civil process: upon which shall therefore only observe,
criminal instead of
no prosecution upon any penal statute, the
that by the statute 31 Eliz. c.
suit and benefit whereof are limited in part to the king and in part to the pro*
secutor, can be brought by any common informer after one year
expired
since the commission of the offence; nor on behalf of the crown after the lapse
of two years longer; nor, where the forfeiture
originally given only to the
king, can such prosecution be had after the expiration of two years from the
commission of the offence. (8)
The informations that are exhibited in the name of the king alone, are also,
of two kinds: first, those which are truly and properly his own suits, and filed
ex officio by his own immediate officer, the attorney-general; secondly, those in
the nominal prosecutor, yet
at the relation of
which, though the king
some private person or common informer; and they are filed by the king's cor
oner and attorney in the court of king's bench, usually called the master of the
for this purpose the standing officer of the public The
crown-office, who
objects of the king's own prosecutions, filed ex officio by his own attorneyas peculiarly tend
Seneral> are properly such *enormous misdemeanors
r*l09l
*
to disturb or endanger his government, or to molest or affront him in
the regular discharge of his royal functions. For offences so high and danger
moment's delay would be fatal,
ous, in the punishment or prevention of which
the law has given to the crown the power of an immediate prosecution, with
out waiting for any previous application to any other tribunal: which power,
thus necessary, not only to the ease and safety, but even to the very existence
of the executive magistrate, was originally reserved in the great plan of the
English constitution, wherein provision
wisely made for the due preservation
of all its parts. The objects of the other species of informations filed
by the master of the crown-office upon the complaint or relation of a private
subject, are any gross and notorious misdemeanors, riots, batteries, libels, and
SSL

(7) Very broad powers to amend indictments are conferred upon the courts by 14 and 1*
c, 100. As to amendment of the record after judgment, see Gregory v. Reg., 15
B..
957; Bowers v. Nixon, 12 id., 546.
As to amendment of indictments in the United States,
see State v. Manning, 14 Tex., 402; State v. Corson, 59 Me., 137; Lasure v. State, 19 Ohio
St., 43; Commonwealth v. Hall, 97 Mass., 570.
(8) The time, unless otherwise expressly provided by statute relating to the particular
case,
limited in the case of offenses punishable on summary conviction, to six calendar
months. 11 and 12 Vic., c. 43, 86.
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other immoralities of an atrocious kind, (a) not peculiarly tending to disturb
the government (for those are left to the care of the attorney-general), but
which, on, account of their magnitude or pernicious example, deserve the most
public animadversion. (9) And when an information is filed, either thus, or by
the attorney-general ex officio, it must be tried by a petit jury of the county

the offence arises: after which, if the defendant be found guilty, the
be resorted to for his punishment.
There can be no doubt but that this mode of prosecution by information, (or
suggestion,) filed on record by the king's attorney-general, or by his coroner or
master of the crown-office in the court of king's bench, is as ancient as the
common law itself, (b) For as the king was bound to proseoute, or at least to
lend the sanction of his name to a prosecutor, whenever the grand jury in
formed him upon their oaths that there was a sufficient ground for instituting
a criminal-suit: so when these his immediate officers were otherwise sufficiently
assured that a man had committed a gross misdemeanor, either personally
against the king or his government, or against the public peace and good order,
they were at liberty, without waiting for any farther intelligence, to convey
that information to the court of king's bench by a *suggestion on record, r*qi ni
'
and to carry on the prosecution in his majesty's name.
But these informations (of every kind) are confined by the constitutional law to mere mis
demeanors only: for, wherever any capital offence is charged, the same law
requires that the accusation be warranted by the oath of twelve men; before
the party shall be put to answer it. And, as to those offences in which in
formations were allowed as well as indictments, so long as they were confined
to this high and respectable jurisdiction, and were carried on in a legal and re
gular course in his majesty's court of king's bench, the subject had no reason
to complain. The same notice was given, the same process was issued, the
same pleas were allowed, the same trial by jury was had, the same judgment
was given by the same judges, as if the prosecution had originally been by in
But when the statute 3 Hen. VII, c. 1, had extended the jurisdic
dictment.
tion of the court of star-chamber, the members of which were the sole judges
of the law, the fact, and the penalty; and when the statute 11 Hen. VII, c. 3,
had permitted informations to be brought by any informer upon any penal
statute, not extending to life or member, at the assizes or before the justices
of the peace, who were to hear and determine the same according to their own
discretion; then it was that the legal and orderly jurisdiction of the court of
king's bench fell into disuse and oblivion, and Empson and Dudley (the
wicked instruments of King Henry VII), by hunting out obsolete penalties,
and this tyrannical mode of prosecution, with other oppressive devices (c) conwhere

court must

fa) S Hawk. P. 0. 280.

(6) 1 Show. 118.

(e) 1 And. 1ST.

S. Const., "No person shall be held to answer for a capi
unless on a presentment
or indictment of a grand jury,
except in cases arising in the land and naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service
in time of war or public danger.*'
This provision has no application to prosecutions for
state offenses.
Fox v. Ohio, 5 How., 34; Livingston v. Moore, 7 Pet., 469. An infamous
offense is one involving moral turpitude in the offender, or infamy in the punishment, or
both.
That misdemeanors
Cooley, Principles of Const. Law, 291.
against the United
States may be prosecuted
by information, see U. 8. v. "Waller, 1 Sawyer, 701; U. S. v.
Block, 4 Sawyer, 211; U. S. v. Shepard, 1 Abb. U. 8., 431. As to prosecutions for state
offenses by information, see Commonwealth v. Barrett, 9 Leigh, 665; State v. Dover, 9
N. H., 468; Washburn v. People, 10 Mich., 372. An early case lays down the rule that
"all public misdemeanors which may be prosecuted by indictment may also be prosecuted
by information in behalf of the commonwealth, unless the prosecution be restrained by
statute to indictment."
Commonwealth v. Waterborough, 5 Mass., 257. Where it is the
practice to proceed by information, it is the rule that the substantial parts of the informa
tion shall be drawn as exactly and nicely as the corresponding parts of an indictment for
the same offense.
Enders v. People, 20 Mich.. 233; People v. Olmstead, 30 Mich., 431;
Chapman v. People, 39 Mich., 357; Rowan v. State, 30 Wis., 129; State v. Cockburn, 88
Oonn., 400; Vogle v. State, 31 Ind., 64; People v. Higgins, 15 111., 110; State v. Williams,
Tex., 256,
(9) By the fifth amendment, U.
tal or otherwise infamous crime,

*
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tinually harassed the subject, and shamefully enriched the crown.
of these acts was soon indeed repealed by statute 1 Hen. VJJJ, c.
court of star-chamber continued in high vigor, and daily increasing
ity, for more than a century longer till finally abolished by statute

IV.

The

latter
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(i)

Upon this dissolution the old common law (<?) authority of the oourt of
king's bench, as the custoa tnorum of the nation being found necessary to re
side somewhere for the peace and good government of the kingdom, was again
rev've<^ *n *Prac'i°e- («)
And it is observable, that in the same act of
'f*3HlJ
parliament which abolished the court of star-chamber, a conviction by
information is expressly reckoned up, as one of the legal modes of conviction
of such persons as should offend a third time against the provisions of that
statute, (f)
It is true Sir Matthew Hale, who presided in this court soon
after the time of such revival, is said {g) to have been no friend to this method
of prosecution: and, if so, the reason of such his dislike was probably the ill
use which the master of the crown-office then made of his authority, by per
mitting the subject to be harassed with vexatious informations, whenever ap
plied to by any malicious or revengeful prosecutor: rather than his donbt of
their legality, or propriety upon urgent occasions. (A) For the power of fil
ing informations, without any control, then resided in the breast of the mas
ter: and, being filed in the name of the king, they subjected the prosecutor to
no costs, though on trial they proved to be groundless.
This oppressive use
of them, in the times preceding the revolution, occasioned a struggle, soon
to procure
after the accession of King William,
declaration of their ille
But Sir John Holt who
gality by the judgment of the court of king's bench.
then presided there, and all the judges, were clearly of opinion, that this proceed
ing was grounded on the common law, and could not be then impeached. And,
more temperate remedy was applied in parliament,
in few years afterwards,
by statute and W. and M. c. 18, which enacts, that the clerk of the crown shall
not file any information without express direction from the court of king's
bench: and that every prosecutor, permitted to promote such information, shall
recognizance of twenty pounds (which now seems to be too
give security by
small sum) to prosecute the same with effect: and to pay costs to the defend
ant in case he be acquitted thereon, unless the judge, who tries the information,
shall certify there was reasonable cause for filing it; and, at all events, to pay
, costs, unless *the information shall be tried within a year after issue
shall not extend to
proviso in this act, that
joined. But there
any other informations than those which are exhibited by the master of the
orown-office: and consequently, informations at the king's own suit, filed
his attorney-general, are no way restrained thereby.
one species of informations, still farther regulated by statute
There
Ann. c. 20, viz., those in the nature of writ of quo warranto; which was shown,
in the preceding book, (ty to be remedy given to the crown against such as
had usurped or intruded into any office or franchise. The modern information
tends to the same purpose as the ancient writ, being generally made use of to
commenced
in the same
try the oivil rights of such franchises; though
manner as other informations are by leave of the court, or at the will of the at
criminal prosecution, in order to fine the de
torney-general being properly
fendant for his usurpation, as well as to oust him from his office; yet usually
civil proceeding. (10)
considered at present as merely
1

1

Sid. 151

R,

484, in which

was

held that

a

1

1
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(10) See Rex v. Francis,
granted in these cases.

3

5

1

I.

2
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Id) Mod. 484.
(€) Styl. Rep. 217,845. StyL Pract. Reg. tit. Information, p. 187,(edit. 1657). 8id. 7L
(p)5Mod. 460.
Sid. 174.
(k) Saund. 801.
(/) Stat. 16Car. 0. 10. $6.
Mod. 459. Oomb. 141. Far. 861.
Show. 106.
(0 M. W. and M.
<fc)See book in, page 262.
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There yet
These are all the methods of prosecution at the suit of the king.
remains another, which is merely at the suit of the subject, and is called an ap

peal.

IV. An appeal, in the sense wherein it is here used, does not signify any
complaint to a superior court of an injustice done by an inferior one, wmoh is
the general use of the word; but it here means an original suit, at the time of
its first commencement. (I) An appeal, therefore, when spoken of as a crimi
nal prosecution, denotes an accusation by a private subject against another, for

some heinous crime; demanding punishment on account of the particular in
As this method
suffered, rather than for the offence against the public.
of prosecution is still in force, cannot omit to mention it: but as it is very
little in use, on account of the *great nicety required in conducting
r*oioi
shall treat of
very briefly; referring the student for more partioulars to other more voluminous compilations, (m)
This private process, for the punishment of publio crimes, had probably its
original in those times when private pecuniary satisfaction, oalled weregild,
was constantly paid to the party injured, or his relations, to expiate enormous
This was a custom derived to us, in common with other northern na
offences.
tions, (n) from our ancestors, the ancient Germans; among whom, according to
Tacitus, (o) "luitur homicidium certo armentorum acpecorum numero; recipitque satisfactionem universa domus." (p) In the same manner by the Irish Brehon law, in case of murder, the brehon or judge was used to compound be
tween the murderer and the friends of the deceased who prosecuted him, by
causing the malefactor to give unto them, or to the child or wife of him that
was slain, a recompense which they called an eriach. (q) And thus we find in
our Saxon laws (particularly those of King Athelstan) (r) the several weregilds for homicide established in progressive order from the death of the ceorl
or peasant, up to that of the king himself, (s) And in the laws of King Henry
(t) we have an account of what other offences were then redeemable by weregild,
and what were not so. (w) As therefore during the continuance of this custom,
a process was certainly given, for recovering the weregild by the party to whom
seems that, when *these offences
was due;
degrees grew no
*314-i
longer redeemable, the private prooess was still continued, in order to
the
infliction
of
the
the
insure
offender, though
punishment upon
party injured
was allowed no pecuniary compensation for the offence.
But, though appeals were thus in the nature of prosecutions for some atrooious injury committed more immediately against an individual, yet
also
was anciently permitted, that any subject might appeal another subject of
high treason, either in the courts of common law, (v>\ or in parliament, or (for
treasons committed beyond the seas) in the court or the high constable and
marshal. The cognizance of appeals in the latter still continues in force; and
so late as 1631 there was a trial by battel awarded in the court of chivalry, on
such an appeal of treason: (x) but that in the first was virtually abolished (y)
Edw. Ill, c.
and 25 Edw. HI, o. 24, and in the second ex
by the statutes
Hen. IV, c. 14, so that the only appeals now in force for
pressly by statute
things done within the realm, are appeals of felony and mayhem.
(I) It Is from the French, "appellor," the verb active, which signifies to call upon, summon, or challenge
1

5

9,
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it

it

I,

a

a

I

it

*•

it,

I

*

jury

2

I.
8,

one; and not the verb neuter which signifies the same as the ordinary sense of "appeal" in English.
o. 4.
(n) Stlernh. dejure Suecm.
(m) Hawk. P. C. ch. 23.
(o) de M. O. c. 21.
(n) And In another place, (o. 12), Delicti/, pro modo pama: equorum pecorumque numero convict!
mulct antur.
Para mulctce regi vel civitati; para ipsi qui vindicatur, velpropinquia ejua exaolvitur"
(q) Spencer's State of Ireland, p. 1318,edit. Hughes, (r) Judic. Civit. Lund. WUk. 71.
(a) The weregild of a ceorl was 266thrysmas, that of the king 30,000;each thrysma being equal to about
a shilling of our present money. The weregild of a subject was paid entirely to the relations of the
slain; but that of the king wag divided; one-half being paid to the public, the other half to the royal
partg

by the officers
to revenge the
the matter for

l

2,

Vol. II.— 60

2,

if

Is

(u) In Turkey this principle
still carried so far, that even murder Is never prosecuted
of the government, as with us. It is the business of the next relations, and them only,
■laughter of their kinsmen: and
they rather choose (as they generally do, to compound
Is said about It. (Lady M. W. Montague, lett. <2.)
money^othlng^more
part
(a) By Donald lord Bea against David Ramsey. (Rushw. vol.
p. 112.)
(y)
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(z)

An appeal of felony may be brought for crimes committed either against
the parties themselves or their relations. The crimes against the parties them
And for these, as well as for mayhem, the
selves are lareeny, rape, and arson.
persons robbed, ravished, maimed, or whose houses are burnt, may institute
The only crime against one's relation, for which an appeal
this private process.
can be brought, is that of killing him, by either murder or manslaughter.
But
this cannot be brought by every relation : but only by the wife for the death
of her husband, or by the heir male for the death of his ancestor; which heir
ship was also confined, by an ordinance of King Henry the First, to the four
It given to the wife on account of the loss of
nearest degrees of blood,
she marries again, before or pending her appeal,
her husband; therefore,
lost and gone; or,
she marries after judgment, she shall not demand exe
cution. The heir, as was said, must also be heir male, and such
one as was
r*si5l ^e *next keir by the course of the common law, at the time of the
But this rule hath three exceptions:
If the
killing of the ancestor.
person killed leaves an innocent wife, she only, and not the heir, shall have the
If there be no wife, and the heir be accused of the murder, the per
appeal:
son who, next to him, would have been heir male, shall bring the appeal:
S.
If the wife kills her husband, the heir may appeal her of the death. And, by
Edw.
c.
all appeals of death must be sued
the statute of Gloucester,
within
year and
day after the completion of the felony by the death of the
party: which seems to be only declaratory of the old common law; for in the
Gothic constitutions we find the same "prmcriptio annalis, qua currit adoersi de homicida ei non constet intra annum a caide facta, nee
8us actorem,
quenquam interea arguat et accuset." (a)
These appeals may be brought previous to an indictment: and
the appellee
be acquitted thereon, he cannot be afterwards indicted for the same offence.
In like manner as by the old Gothic constitution,
any offender gained a ver
dict in his favour, when prosecuted by the party injured, he was also under
stood to be acquitted of any crown prosecution for the same offence: (b) but,
he made his peace with the king, still he might be prose
on the contrary,
a man be acquitted on an
cuted at the suit of the party. And so, with us,
indictment of murder, or found guilty, and pardoned by the king, still he ought
not (in strictness) to go at large, but be imprisoned or let to bail till the year
Hen. VII, c.
in order to be forth
and day be past, by virtue of the statute
coming to answer any appeal for the same felony, not having as yet been
he hath been found guilty of manslaughter on an
though,
punished for
indictment, and hath had the benefit of clergy, and suffered the judgment of
a maxim in law that,
the law, he cannot afterwards be appealed; for
" nemo bis punitur pro eodem delicto." Before this statute was made,
was
man for homicide within the time limited for appeals;
not usual to indiot
which produced very great inconvenience, of which more hereafter, (c)
*^
aPPe^ee be acquitted, the appellor (by virtneof the statute
r*<URl
13 Edw.
c. 12j shall suffer one year's imprisonment,
of Westm.
fine to the king, besides restitution of damages to the party for the
and pay
the appellor be inca
imprisonment and infamy which he has sustained: and
for him, and also be liable to
pable to make restitution, his abettors shall do
imprisonment. This provision, as was foreseen by the author of Fleta, (d)
great discouragement to appeals; so that thenceforward they ceased
proved
to be in common use.
If the appellee be found guilty he shall suffer the same judgment as he
had been convicted by indictment: bnt with this remarkable difference; that
at the suit of the king, the king may pardon and
on an indictment, which
at the suit of
remit the execution; on an appeal, which
private subject, to
make an atonement
for the private wrong, the king can no more pardon
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than he can remit the damages recovered in an action of battery. («) In like
manner, as, while the weregild continued to be paid as a fine for homicide, it
And the ancient usage
■could not be remitted by the king's authority. (/)
was, so late as Henry the Fourth's time, that all the relations of the slain
should drag the appellee to the place of execution; (g) a custom founded upon
that savage spirit of family resentment, which prevailed universally through
Europe, after the irruption of the northern nations, and is peculiarly attended
to in their several codes of law; and which prevails even now among the wild
and untutored inhabitants of America; as if the finger of nature had pointed
it out to mankind, in their rude and uncultivated state. (A) However, the
punishment of the offender may be remitted and discharged by the concur
rence of all parties interested; and, as the king, by his pardon, may frustrate
■an indictment, so the appellant by his release may 'discharge an ap- r*31yi
*
peal; (i) "nam quilibet potest renunciare juri pro st introducto." (11) >■
These are the several modes of prosecution, instituted by the laws of Eng
land for the punishment of offences; of which that by indictment is the most
shall therefore confine my subsequent observations principally to
general.
this method of prosecution; remarking by the way the most material varia
tions that may arise, from the method of proceeding, by either information or
appeal.

I

S.
(«) 2 Hawk. P. C. 892.
(/) LL. Edm. ( Robertson,
(g) 3i. 11Hen. IV. 12. s Inst. 131.
Ohaa. V, L 45.
(A)

1 Hal P.

a

ft

(11) These appeals had become nearly obsolete, but the right still existing was claimed,
and in part exercised, in the year 1818, by William Ashford, eldest brother and heir at law
of Mary Ashford, who brought a writ of appeal against Abraham Thornton, for the murder
of his sister. Thornton had been tried at the Warwick summer assizes, 1817, for the mur
der, and acquitted, though under circumstances of strong suspicion. The appellee, when
called upon to plead, pleaded " not guilty, and that he was ready to defend himself by his
body;" and, taking his glove off, he threw it upon the floor of the court. A counterplea
was afterwards delivered in by the appellant, to which there was a replication. A general
demurrer followed, and joinder thereon.
See a full detail of the proceedings in that singu
lar case, in the report of it, under the name of Ashford v. Thornton, 1 B. & A, 405
It
was held, in that case, that where, in an appeal of death, the appellee wages his battle, the
counterplea, to oust him of this mode of trial, must disclose such violent and strong pre
sumptions of guilt, as to leave no possible doubt in the minds of the court; and, therefore,
that a counterplea, which only stated strong circumstances of suspicion, was insufficient.
It was also held, that the appellee may reply fresh matter, tending to show his innocence,
as an alibi, and his former acquittal of the same offense on an indictment.
But it was
doubted whether, where the counterplea is per $e insufficient, or where the replication is a
good answer to it, the court should give judgment that the appellee be allowed his wager of
the court, by consent of both parties, ordered that judgment should be stayed in the appeal,
and that the appellee should be discharged.
This case, the first of the kind that had occur
red for more than half a century see Bigby v. Kennedy, S Burr., 2648 ; 2 W BL, 713; Rex
▼. Taylor, 5 Burr, 2793; Smith v. Taylor, id. ; the last cases upon the subject, where the
mode of proceeding is detailed at large, led to the total abolition of appeals of murder, as
well as of treason, felony, or other offenses, together with wagers of battle, by the passing
of the statute 59 Geo.
c. 46.

Ill,
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OF PROCESS UPON AN INDICTMENT.
Wb

are next, in the fourth place, to inquire into the manner of issuing proafter indictment found, to bring in the accused to answer it. We havs
hitherto supposed the offender to be in custody before the finding of the indict
ment; in which case he is immediately (or as soon as convenience permits) to be
arraigned thereon. But if he hath fled, or secretes himself, in capital oases: or
hath not, in smaller misdemeanors, been bound over to appear at the assizes or
sessions, still an indiotment may be preferred against him in his absence; since,
were he present, he could not be heard before the grand jury against it. And,
if it be found, then process must issue to bring him into court; for the indict
ment cannot be tried, unless he personally appears, according to the rules of
c. 3, in
equity in all cases, and the express provision of statute 28 Edw.
capital ones, that no man shall be put to death, without being brought to ans
wer by due process of law.
The proper process on an indictment for any petit misdemeanor, or on a
penal statute, is a writ of venire facias, which is in the nature of a summons
to cause the party to appear.
And
by the return to such venire,
appears
that the party hath lands in the county, whereby he may be distrained, then
distress infinite shall be issued, from time to time, till he appears.
But
the
sheriff returns that he hath no lands in his bailiwick, (then upon his non-apw"* °f capias *6hall issue, which commands the sheriff to
r*3l9l Pearance)
take his body, and have him at the next assizes; and
he cannot be
taken upon the first capias,
second and third shall issue, called an alias, and
apiaries capias. But, on indictments for treason or felony, capias
the first
process: and, for treason or homicide, only one shall be allowed to issue, (a) or
two in the case of other felonies, by statute 25 Edw. Ill, st
c. 14, thongh the
to issue only one in any felony; the provisions of this statute being
usage
most cases found impracticable, (b) And so, in the case of misdemeanors,
now the usual practice for any judge of the court of king's bench, upon cer
writ of capias immediately,
tificate of an indictment found, to award
order to bring in the defendant, (l) But
he absconds, and
thought
proper to pursue him to an outlawry, then greater exactness
necessary.
For, in such case, after the several writs have issued in a regular number, ac
cording to the nature of the respective crimes, without any effect, the of
fender shall be put in the exigent in order to his outlawry; that is, he shall be
exacted, proclaimed, or required to surrender, at five county courts; and
he
be returned quinto exactus, and does not appear at the fifth exaction or requisi
tion, then he
adjudged to be outlawed, or put out of the protection of the
in any respect, either
law; so that he
incapable of taking the benefit of
bringing actions or otherwise.
The punishment for outlawries upon indictments for misdemeanors
the
same as for outlawries upon civil actions (of whioh, and the previous process
by writs of capias, exigi facias, and proclamation, we spoke in the preceding
But an outlawry in treason
book)/ (c) viz., forfeiture of goods and chattels.
or felony amounts to conviction and attainder of the offence charged in the
indictment, as much as
the offender had been found guilty by his country.
(a) See Appendix,
(e) See book III, pp. 283,284.
(t>) Hal. P. a 185.
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This 'altered by statute 11 and 18 Vic,
43, which
wh
provides for the issue
(1) This
]o*'
=
gented to them of indictment found.
tices of
capias in such cases, upon certificate presented
In
the United States
the first writ issued to bring the offender before the
capias
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is,

however, still under the protection of the law, as hath form
His life
so that though anciently an outlawed felon
been "observed:
r*oool
was said to have caput lupinum, and might be knocked on the head
meet
that
should
him;
like wolf, by any one
because, having renounced
all law, he was to be dealt with as in state of nature, when every one that
holden
should find him might slay him; yet, now, to avoid such inhumanity,
entitled to kill him wantonly or wilfully: but in so doing
that no man
of murder, (g) unless
happens in the endeavour to apprehend him. (h)
fuilty
criminal prosecution, either of his
or any person may arrest an outlaw on
own head, or by writ or warrant of capias utlagatum, in order to bring him to
But such outlawry may be frequently reversed by writ of error;
execution.
fit they should be) exceedingly nioe and
the proceedings therein being (as
circumstantial; and,
any single minute point be omitted or misconducted,
illegal, and may be reversed: upon which reversal the
the whole outlawry
admitted to plead to, and defend himself against the indict
party accused
■■

(e)

■*

(d )
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Thus much for process to bring in the offender after indictment found;
that writs of certiorari facias are
daring which stage of the prosecution
usually had, though they may be had at any time before trial, to certify and

'

is

(/)

Mlrr.o.
Co. Utt. 128.
(») Hal. P. C. 210.
4.

(«) See page 178.
(ft) Braoton,/oJ 125.
Burr. 749.

2

21 8

(<J) Hal. P. 0. 205.
(o) Hal. P. C. 497.
Hawk. P. 0. 287.
(t)

2

it

a

a

it

(i)
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is

a
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it

is

1.

is

is

remove the indictment, with all the proceedings thereon, from any inferior
the
court of criminal jurisdiction into the court of king's benoh; (2) which
sovereign ordinary court of justice in causes criminal. And this
frequently
To consider and determine the
done for one of these four purposes; either,
validity of appeals or indictments and the proceedings thereon; and to quash
surmised that
or confirm them as there cause: or, 2. Where
partial or
re
insufficient trial will probably be had in the court below, the indictment
moved in order to have the prisoner or defendant tried at the bar of the court
so removed
of king's benoh, or before the justices of nisi prius: or, 3. It
in order to plead the king's pardon there: or, 4. To issue process of outlawry
against the offender, in those "counties or places where the process of r*S2ii
Such writ of certiorari,
the inferior judges will not reach him.
when issued and delivered to the inferior court for removing any record or
other proceeding, as well upon indictment as otherwise, supersedes the juris
diction of such inferior court, and makes all subsequent proceedings therein
entirely erroneous and illegal; unless the court of king's bench remands the
record to the court below, to be there tried and determined. A certiorari may
be granted at the instance of either the prosecutor or the defendant: the for
matter of discretion; and therefore
mer as matter of right, the latter as
is seldom granted to remove indictments from the justices of gaol-delivery,
or after issue joined or confession of the faot in any of the courts below, (k)
At this stage of prosecution, also,
that indictments found by the grand

1
,

4,

8

6

5

8
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a

a

a

is

a

is

a

it

§

a

§

6

5

by

statute
no certiorari issues from the queen's bench,
and Wm. IV, c. 83,
(2) Now,
except at the instance of the attorney general, unless on leave obtained from the court, or
And by statute 16 and 17 Vic, c. 30,
no indictment, except indict
judge at chambers.
ments against bodies corporate not authorized to appear by attorney in the courts in which
the same are found, can be removed into the queen's bench or the central criminal court, by
certiorari, at the instance of the prosecutor or defendant (other than the attorney general
be made to appear to the court that
acting on behalf of the crown), unless
fair and impartiaL trial cannot be had in the court below, or that some question of law of more than
usual difficulty and importance
likely to arise upon the trial, or that view of the prem
ises in respect whereof any indictment
preferred, or special jury, may be required for
the satisfactory trial of the same.
In some of the American states certiorari lies to some inferior court to remove pend
ing cause before trial. In some cases this
a statutory privilege.
Bee Kendrick v. State,
Cooke (TennA 474; State v. Studer,
Ired., 487; Nicholls v. State,
N. J., 539; State v.
Jones, 11 N. J., 289; State v. Canal Co., 18 N. J., 192; People v. Runkel,
Johns., 884;
People v. Rulloff,
Park. Or. R., 401.
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against a peer must, in consequence of a writ of certiorari, be certified
and transmitted into the court of parliament, or into that of the lord high
steward of Great Britain; and that, in places of exclusive jurisdiction, as tie
two universities, indictments must be delivered (upon challenge and claim of
cognizance) to the courts therein established by charter, and confirmed by act
of parliament, to be there respectively tried and determined.

jury

CHAPTER XXV.
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OF ARRAIGNMENT
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Wbes the offender either appears voluntarily to an indictment, or was be
fore in custody, or is brought in upon criminal process to answer it in the pro
per court, he is immediately to be arraigned thereon; which is the fifth stage
of criminal prosecution.
To arraign is nothing else but to call the prisoner to the bar of the court to
answer the matter charged upon him in the indictment, (a) The prisoner is
to be called to the bar by his name; and it is laid down in our ancient books
that, though under an indictment of the highest nature, he must be brought to
the bar without irons, or any manner of shackles or bonds: unless there be
evident danger of an escape, and then he may be secured with irons. Bat yet
in Layer's case, A. D. 1722, difference was taken between the time of arraign
ment and the time of trial; and accordingly the prisoner stood at the bar
chains during the time of his arraignment, (c)
*When he
called upon by name to hold
brought to the bar, he
*82ll
trifling circumstance, yet
may seem
up his hand: which, though
of this importance, that, by the holding up of his hand, constat de persona,
called, (d) However,
and he owns himself to be of that name by which he
is not an indispensable ceremony; for, being calculated merely for the purpose
of identifying the person, any other acknowledgment will answer the pur
the prisoner obstinately and contemptuously refuses
pose as well; therefore,
the person named,
to hold up his hand, but confesses he
fully suffici

is

a

it

it

a

if

it

is

Then the indictment
to be read to him distinctly in the English tongue
{which was law, even while all other proceedings were in Latin), that he may
After which
to be demanded of him whether
fully understand his charge.
he be guilty of the crime whereof he stands indicted, or not guilty.
By the
old common law the accessory could not be arraigned till the principal was
attainted, unless he chose it; for he might waive the benefit of the law: and
therefore, principal and accessory might, and may still, be arraigned, and plead,
the principal had never been
and also be tried together. But otherwise,
indicted at all, had stood mute, had challenged above thirty-five jurors peremp
torily, had claimed the benefit of clergy, had obtained
pardon, or had died
before attainder, the accessory in any of these cases could not be arraigned: for
non constitit whether any felony was committed or no, till the principal was
attainted; and
might so happen that the accessory should be convicted one
day, and the principal acquitted the next, which would be absurd. However,
was possible that
this absurdity could only happen where
trial of the prin
cipal might be had subsequent to that of the accessory; and therefore the law
still continues that the accessory shall not be tried so long as the principal re-
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mains liable to be tried hereafter. (1) But by statute, *1 Ann. c. 9, if
r*324i'
the principal be once convicted, and before attainder (that is, before he *■
receives judgment of death or outlawry), he is delivered by pardon, the bene
fit of clergy, or otherwise; or if the principal stands mute, or challenges per
emptorily above the legal number of jurors, so as never to be convicted at all;,
in any of these cases, in which no subsequent trial can be had of the princi
pal, the accessory may be proceeded against as if the principal felon had been
attainted; for there is no danger of future contradiction. And npon the trial
of the accessory, as well after as before the conviction of the principal, it seems
to be the better opinion, and founded on the true spirit of justice, (/) that the
accessory is at liberty (if he can) to controvert the guilt of his supposed prin
cipal, and to prove him innocent of the charge, as well in point of fact as in
point of law.

When

a criminal is arraigned, he either stands

mute, or confesses

the fact;,

which circumstances we may call incidents to the arraignment: or else he pleads
to the indictment, which is to be considered as the next stage of proceedings.
But, first, let us observe these incidents to the arraignment, of standing mute,
or confession.
I. Regularly, a prisoner is said to stand mute, when, being arraigned for
treason or felony, he either, 1. Makes no answer at all; or, 2 Answers foreign
to the purpose, or with such matter as is not allowable; and will not answer
otherwise: or, 3. Upon having pleaded not guilty, refuses to put himself upon
the country, (g) If he says nothing, the court ought ex officio to empannel a

jury

to inquire whether he stands obstinately mute, or whether he be dumb

est

(i)

visitalione Dei. If the latter appears to be the case, the judges of the court
(who are to be of counsel for the prisoner, and to see that he hath law and
justice) shall proceed to the trial, and examine all points as if he had pleaded
not guilty. (/«) (2) But whether judgment of death can be given against such
a *prisoner who hath never pleaded, and can say nothing in arrest of
■*
judgment, is a point yet undetermined,
he be found to be obstinately mute (which
prisoner hath been held to
be that hath cut out his own tongue), (k) then
be on an indictment of high
hath long been clearly settled, that standing mute
an equivalent to
treason,
a conviction, and he shall receive the same judgment and execution.
And
as in this the highest crime, so also in the lowest species of felony, viz. in
petit larceny, and in all misdemeanors, standing mute hath always been
But upon appeals and indictments for other felonies,
equivalent to conviction.
:
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an accessory before the fact to any felony may be
(1) Now, by 24 and 25 Vic, c. 94,
indicted, tried, convicted and punished in all respects as
he were the principal felon. By
whosoever shall counsel, procure or command any other person to commit any
section
felony shall be guilty of felony, and may be indicted and convicted, either as an accessory be
fore the fact to the principal felony, together with the principal felon, or may be indicted
and convicted of substantive felony, whether the principal felon shall or shall not have
been previously convicted, or shall or shall not be amenable to Justice, and may thereupon
be punished in the same manner as an accessory before the fact to the same felony,
con
victed as an accessory, may be punished. And by 24 and 25 Vic, c. 99,
the like pro
the
of
vision is made for
case
accessories after the fact.
the prisoner stands mute of
George IV, c. 28,
By and
provided that
malice, or does not answer directly to the charge, this may be entered as
plea of not
R v. Bernard, P. & P., 240. It proper for jury to determine whether or not
guilty.
the silence
Cox Or. C, 263. Where
malicious. R v. Israel,
deaf and dumb person
was silent at her arraignment,
was left to
jury to say whether the silence was from
malice or by visitation of God. They found that
was the latter.
They were then sworn
to determine whether the prisoner was able to plead, and they found that she was; then to
determine whether she was sane enough to warrant trial, and they found she was not. The
order of the court detained during her majesty's pleasure, under the
prisoner was then
as to the detention of persons found insane by
provisions of 39 andf 40 Geo. Ill, c. 64,
jury upon arraignment.
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treason, the prisoner was not, by the ancient law, looked apon as con
victed, so as to receive judgment for the felony; but should, for his obstinacy,
have received the terrible sentence of penance, or peine (which, as will appear
presently, was probably nothing more than a corrupted abbreviation of pritont)

or petit

forte

et dure.

Before this was pronounced the prisoner had not only trina admonitio, bat
also a respite of a few hours, and the sentence was distinctly read to him, that
he might know his danger; (m) and, after all, if he continued obstinate, and
his offence was clergyable, he had the benefit of his clergy allowed him, even
though he was too stubborn to pray it. (n) Thus tender was the law of inflict
ing this dreadful punishment; but if no other means could prevail, and the
prisoner (when charged with a capital felony) continued stubbornly mate, the
judgment was then given against him without any distinction of sex or degree.
A judgment, which was purposely ordained to be exquisitely severe, that by
that very means it might rarely be put in execution. (3)
The rack, or question, to extort a confession from criminals, is a practice of
a different nature; this having been only *used to compel a man
r*fl9«l
*J to put himself upon his trial; that being a species of trial in itself.
And the trial by rack is utterly unknown to the law of England ; though once
when the dukes of Exeter and Suffolk, and other ministers of Henry VI, had
laid a design to introduce the civil law into this kingdom as the rule of govern
ment, for a beginning thereof they erected a rack for torture; which was called
in derision the duke of Exeter's daughter, and still remains in the tower of
London; (o) where it was occasionally used as an engine of state, not of law,
But, when upon the
more than once in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, (p)
assassination of Yilliers, duke of Buckingham, by Felton, it was proposed in
the privy counoil to put the assassin to the rack, in order to discover his accom
plices; the judges, being consulted, declared unanimously, to their own honour
and the honour of the English law, that no such proceeding was allowable by
the laws of England, (q) It seems astonishing that this usage of administer
ing the torture should be said to arise from a tenderness to the lives of men:
and yet this is the reason given for its introduction in the civil law, and it*
subsequent adoption by the French and other foreign nations, (r) viz. : because
the laws cannot endure that any man should die upon the evidence of a false
or even a single witness; and, therefore, contrived this method that innocence
should manifest itself by a stout denial, or guilt by a plain confession. Thus
rating a man's virtue by the hardiness of his constitution, and his guilt by the
sensibility of his nervesl But there needs only to state accurately, («) in order
most effectually to expose this inhuman species of mercy, the uncertainty of
whioh, as a test and criterion of truth, was long ago very elegantly pointed
out kv Tally; though he lived in a state wherein it was "usual to torr •<»9'7l
327 J
ture slaves in order to furnish evidence; "tamen," says he, "ilia tormenta gubernat dolor, moderatur natura cujusque turn animi turn corporis, regit

I

I

(o) 8 Inst. SS.
( p) Burr. 82. 4M.
(m) 2 Hal. P. C. 820.
(») bid. 821. 2 Hawk. P. C. 832.
Fortesq. de LL. Ana. c 22,
(r) Cod. 1.9, (. 41, I. 8, <* t. 47, I. IS.
(o) Rushw. Coll. 1.638.
hag proposed this problem, with a
(») The marquis Beecarta (oh. 16),In an exquisite piece of raillery,
gravity and precision that are truly mathematical: 'The force of the muscles and the sensibility
— of the
nerves of an innocent person being itfven, it is required to find the degree of pain necessary to
crime."
of
a
given
confess himself guilty

was inflicted. See Case of Julians
(8) Many cases are on record in which this punishment
Quicke, Cro. Car., 118; Case of John Fussell, whose tortures are said to have been shortened
by compassionate bystanders casting stones upon him. Barrington's Statutes, 85, note. Ia
Kelynge's Rep., p. 27, it is said to have been the constant practice at Newgate, in the time
of Charles II, to tie the two thumbs together with whipcord in order that the pain might
compel the party to plead.
The only American case on record in which this punishment was inflicted was that' of
Giles Corey. 8 Bancroft's U. &, 93; 2 Hildreth's U. S., 160; 2 Upham'a History of
Witchcraft, 834-343.
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spes, infirmat metus, ut in tot rerum angustii*
loci relinquatur."
The English judgment of penance for standing («) mute was as follows
that the prisoner be remanded to the prison from whence he came; and put
into a low, dark chamber; and there be laid on his back, on the bare floor,
naked, unless where decency forbids: that there be placed upon his body as
weight of iron as he could bear, and more; that he have no susten
great
ance, save only, on the first day, three morsels of the worst bread; and on the
second day, three draughts of standing water, that should be nearest to the
prison door; and in this situation this should be alternately his daily diet till
he died, or (as anciently the judgment ran) till he answered, (v)
It hath been doubted whether this punishment subsisted at the common law,
Edw.
c 12,
(to) or was introduced in consequence of the statute Westm.
mentioned
For not word of
(as) which seems to be the better opinion.
in Glanvil or Bracton, or in any ancient author, case, or record (that hath yet
but there are instances on
been produced), previous to the reign of Edward
record in the reign of Henry III, (y) where persons acoused of felony, and
standing mute were tried in particular manner by two successive juries, and
asserted by the judges in
Hen. IV, that, by the common
convicted; and
law before the statute, standing mute on an appeal amounted to
conviction
" as
of the felony,
This statute of Edward directs such persons
r*328i
will not put themselves upon inquests of felonies before the judges at «■
the suit of the king, to be put into hard and strong prison {soient mys en la
prisone fort et dure) as those which refuse to be at the common law of the
And immediately after this statute, the form of the judgment appears
land."
in Fleta and Britton to have been only
very strait confinement in prison,
directed to be laid
with hardly any degree of sustenanoe; but no weight
upon the body, so as to hasten the death of the miserable sufferer: and indeed
any surcharge of punishment on persons adjudged to penance, so as to shorten
reckoned by Home in the Mirror (a) as
their lives,
species of criminal
It also clearly appears, by record of 31 Edw. HI, (b) that the
homicide.
prisoner might then possibly subsist for forty days under this lingering punish
should, therefore, imagine that the practice of loading him with
ment.
was usually calTed, pressing him to death, was gradually in
weights, or, as
Hen. IV, at which last period
troduced between 31 Edw. HI, and
first
appears upon our books; (c) being intended as a species of mercy to the delin
quent, by delivering him the sooner from his torment: and hence
presume
also was, that the duration of the penance was then first (d) altered; and in
stead of continuing till he answered,
was directed to continue till he died,
which must very soon happen under an enormous pressure.
The uncertainty of its original, the doubts that were conceived of its legality,
was rarely carried into practice) to the
and the repugnance of its theory (for
humanity of the laws of England, all concurred to require legislative abolition
of this cruel process, and restitution of the ancient common law: whereby
the standing mute in felony, as well as in treason and in trespass, amounted to
the corruption of the blood and the conse
Or,
confession of the charge.
quent escheat in felony had been removed, the judgment of peine forte et dure
monument of the r *oooi
might perhaps have still innocently remained, *as
savage rapacity with which the lordly tyrants of feudal antiquity
hunted after escheats and forfeitures; since no one would ever have been
horrid alternative. For the law was, that by stand
tempted to undergo such
ing mute, and suffering this heavy penance, the judgment, and of course the
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c. 12,ti ascun tut ettre appeal, et tut ettre mute, ill ter
(s) Al common lev, nvant le statute de Wat.
ra convict de felony. (M. Hen. IV. 2.)
Rym. 13.
Hen. IV,
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(a) Ch.
(e) Tearb.
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(d) Et f»it dit.queie contraire avait ettre /ait devant oa heure.
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corruption of the blood and escheat of the lands, were saved in felony and
petit treason, though not the forfeiture of the goods: and, therefore, this lin
gering punishment was probably introduced, in order to extort a plea: without
which it was held that no judgment of death could be given, and so the lord
But in high treason, as standing mute is equivalent to a con
lost his escheat.
viction, the same judgment, the same corruption of blood, and the same for
as in other cases of conviction, (e)
And very
feitures always attended
hath been enacted by statute 12 Geo. ID,
lately, to the honour of our laws,
c. 20, that every person who, being arraigned for felony or piracy, shall stand
mute or not answer directly to the offence, shall be convicted of the same, and
the same judgment and execution (with all their consequences in every respect)
the person had been convicted by verdict or
shall be thereupon awarded, as
confession of the crime. (4) And thus much for the demeanor of
prisoner
upon his arraignment, by standing mute; which now, in all cases, amounts to
constructive confession.
the prison
IL The other incident to arraignments, exclusive of the plea,
er's actual confession of the indictment.
simple and plain confession,
Upon
the court hath nothing to do but to award judgment: but
usually very
backward in receiving and recording such confession, out of tenderness to the
life of the subject; and will generally advise the prisoner to retract it, and plead
to the indictment.
But there another species of confession, which we read much of in our
far more complicated kind, which
called approvement.
anoient books, of
„.„.-, And that when a*person indicted of treason or felony, and arraigned
for the same, doth confess the fact before plea pleaded: and appeals or
accuses others, his accomplices, of the same crime, in order to obtain his par
In this case he called an approver or prover, probator, and the party
don.
called the appellee.
Such approvement can only be in
appealed or accused
as
were, equivalent to an indictment, since the ap
capital offences; and
he hath no reasonable and
equally called upon to answer it; and
pellee
gal exceptions to make to the person of the approver, which indeed are very
numerous, he must put himself upon his trial, either by battel, or by the coun
vanquished or found guilty, must suffer the judgment of the law,
try; and
and the approver shall have his pardon ex debito justitioe. On the other hand,
the appellee be conqueror, or acquitted by the jury, the approver shall re
ceive judgment to be hanged, upon his own confession of the indictment; for
the condition of his pardon has failed, viz., the convicting of some other per
son, and therefore his conviction remains absolute.
But
purely in the discretion of the court to permit the approver thus to
appeal or not: and, in fact, this course of admitting approvements hath been
long disused: for the truth was, as Sir Matthew Hale observes, that more mis
chief hath arisen to good men by these kind of approvements, upon false and
malicious accusations of desperate villains, than benefit to the public by the
And therefore, in the times when
discovery and conviction of real offenders.
such appeals were more frequently admitted, great strictness and nicety were
held therein: (g) though, since their discontinuance, the doctrine of approve
matter of more curiosity than use.
become
shall only observe,
ments
that all the good, whatever
be, that can be expected from this method of ap
fully provided for in the cases of coining, robbery, burglary,
provement,
house-breaking, horse-stealing, and larceny to the value of five shillings from
and
W. and M.C.
shops, warehouses, stables, and coach-houses, by statutes
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and
Geo. IV. c. 28,
for the court to enter a
(4) The practice now, since the statute
plea of not guilty for the accused party. See notes, pp. 824 and 325, supra.
the
When
prisoner
arraigned, he should be released from shackles if any are upon him.
People v. Harrington, 42 Gal., 166; 8.
10 Am. Rep., 296; State v. Kring, 64 Mo., 691
480

Chap.

Arraignment.

25.]

330

Ill,

(i)

c. 17, 10 and 11 Wm. HI, c. 23, and 5 and 6 Ann. c.
8, *6 and 7 W m.
r*331iJ
13, which enact, that if any such offender, being out of prison, shall discover two or more persons, who have committed the like offences, so as they
may be convicted thereof; he shall in case of burglary or house-breaking re
ceive a reward of 401., and in general be entitled to a pardon of all capital of
fences, excepting only murder and treason; and of them also in the case of
coining. (A) And if any such person, having feloniously stolen any lead, iron,
or other metal, shall discover and convict two offenders of having illegally
bought or received the same, he shall by virtue of statute 29 Geo. II, c. 30,
be pardoned for all such felonies committed before such discovery. (5) It hath
also been usual for the justices of the peace, by whom any persons charged
with felony are committed to gaol, to admit some one of their accomplices to
become a witness (or, as it is generally termed, king's evidence) against his
fellows; upon an implied confidence, which the judges of gaol-delivery have
usually countenanced and adopted that if such accomplice makes a full and
complete discovery of that and of all other felonies to which he is examined
by the magistrate, and afterwards gives his evidence without prevarication or
fraud, he shall not himself be prosecuted for that or any other previous offence
of the same degree,
(6)
(h) The pardon for discovering offences against the coinage act of 15Geo. II, c 88, extends only to all
tuch offences,
(0 The King v. Budd; Mich. 16Geo. HX, on a case reserved from the old Bailey, Oct. 1778.
(5)

The

statutes here mentioned

are since repealed.
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witness by the justice makes full and true disclosure,
(6) If the accomplice admitted as
But he cannot plead this in bar of an indictment, for
he ought not to be prosecuted.
is
merely an equitable claim lo the mercy of the crown from the magistrate's promise of in
Rudd,
certain
which
have
H.
upon
conditions
been
v.
831.
performed.
Cowp.,
demnity
In the United States,
would seem that,
the prisoner makes full disclosure, immunity
under implied,
not express, obligation not
substantially pledged him; the government
to prosecute. U. 8. v. Lee, McLean, 103; Com. v. Enapp, 10 Pick., 447; Poster v. People,
18 Mich., 266.
If the accomplice, after such understanding with the state and admission
his guilt, refuses to testify, or testifies falsely, he forfeits his immunity and may be prose
cuted and convicted on his own confession.
Com. v. Knapp, ubi supra.
matter
The importance to be attached to uncorroborated evidence of an accomplice
for the jury to determine.
They may legally convict upon it, but in general would not be
inclined to give much credit. R. v. Hastings,
C. & P., 152. So Lord Mansfield, in R.
v. Rudd, Cowp., 831, says, as to the evidence of accomplices: '• Though clearly competent,
seldom alone sufficient for
iury to convict upon." Lord Ellentheir single testimony
down that, " No one can seriously doubt that
conviction
borough laid
legal, though
proceed upon the evidence of an accomplice, only judges, in their discretion, will advise
confirmed, or only so much as he
a jury not to believe an accomplice, unless he
con
firmed; but
he
believed, his testimony
unquestionably sufficient to establish the facts
to which he deposes."
R. v. Jones,
Camp., 182. The court should not instruct the jury
as to what weight
to be given to an accomplice's testimony.
The matter lies peculiarly
within the province of the jury.
Hamilton v. People, 29 Mich., 178; George v. State, 89
Miss., 570. It
not error for a court to refuse to advise
jury that they ought not to con
vict on such evidence.
It
question for the jury, who may legally convict on the evi
dence.
People v. Jenness, Mich., 305. The jury may convict upon such evidence if they
are satisfied by it, but
alone insufficient to convict upon.
general practice to consider
Wheel. Cr. C, 148. The statements of an accomplice are always to be
People v. Reeder,
the testimony carries
received with caution, and the court should always so advise, but
the same effect as that of any other witness.
conviction to the jury, they should give
It
Costello,
83;
Denio,
will authorize conviction in any case. People v.
Allen v. State, 10
St.,
testifies,
must
make
He
Ohio
If an accomplice
he
full disclosure.
cannot stop
287.
short and claim the privilege of refusing to criminate himself. Foster v. People, 18 Mich.,
Jones, 418. But this disclosure need
266; Com. v. Price, 10 Gray, 472; State v. Condry,
not be made as to criminality in other cases than the one on trial. Pitcher v. People,
16 Mich., 142. In order to make an accomplice competent witness in behalf of the prose
cution, he must not be put on trial at the same time with the other prisoners.
It makes no
difference whether he has been convicted or not, or whether he
joined in the same indict
ment with others or not,
not tried with them.
only he
People v. Wright, 38 Mich.
744; Allen v. State, 10 Ohio St., 287; George v. Btate, 89 Miss., 570; State v. Brien, 82
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We are now to consider the plea of a prisoner, or defensive matter alleged
This is either,
by him on his arraignment, if he does not confess or stand mute.
1. A plea to the jurisdiction;
2. A demurrer; 3. A plea in abatement; 4. A
special plea in bar; or, 6. The general issue.
Formerly, there was another plea, now abrogated, that of sanctuary; which
is however necessary to be lightly touched upon, as it may give some light to
many parts of our ancient law: it being introduced and continued during the
superstitious veneration that was paid to consecrated ground in the times of
popery. First, then, it is to be observed, that if a person accused of any crime
(except treason, wherein the crown, and sacrilege, wherein the church, was too
nearly concerned), had fled to any church, or church yard, and within forty
days after went in sackcloth and confessed himself guilty before the coroner,
and declared all the particular circumstances of the offence; and thereupon took
the oath in that case provided, viz., that he abjured the realm, and would depart
from thence forthwith at the port that should be assigned him, and would
never return without leave from the king; he by this means saved his life, if he
observed the conditions of the oath, by going with a cross in *his
r*3<i3l
'
L
-< hand, and, with all convenient
speed, to the port assigned, and embark
ing. For
during this forty days' privilege of sanctuary, or in his road to
the seaside, he was apprehended and arraigned in any court, for this felony, he
might plead the privilege of sanctuary, and had
right to be remanded,
taken out against his will, (a) But by this abjuration his blood was attainted,
and he forfeited all his goods and chattels, (b) The immunity of these privi
leged places was very much abridged by the statutes 27 Hen. VIII, o. 19, and
82 Hen. VLH, o. 12.
And now, by the statute, 21 Jao. c. 28, all privilege of
sanctuary, and abjuration consequent thereupon,
utterly taken away and
abolished.
Formerly also the benefit of clergy used to be pleaded before trial or con
viction, and was called a declinatory plea; which was the name also given to
that of sanctuary, (c) But, as the prisoner upon
trial has a chance to be
convicted of clergyable felony,
aoquitted, and totally discharged; and,
entitled equally to his clergy after as before conviction: this course extremely
now very rarely pleaded;
disadvantageous; and therefore the benefit of clergy
found requisite,
but,
prayed by the convict before judgment
passed upon
him. (1)
proceed, therefore, to the five species of pleas before mentioned.
A plea to the jurisdiction, where an indictment
taken before
court
man be indicted for a rape at
that hath no cognizance of the offence; as
the sheriff's tourn, or for treason at the quarter sessions: in these, or similar
cases, he may except to the jurisdiction of the court, without answering at all
to the crime alleged, (d) (2)
H. A demurrer to the indictment. This incident to criminal cases, as well
M c'v^> w^en the fact as alleged is*allowed to be true, but the prisoner
r*<m1
joins issue upon some point of law in the indictment, by which he
HaL P. G 2SS.

it

it
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now abolished.
(1) It
never important where the want of jurisdiction appears
(3) A plea to the jurisdiction
on the face of the proceedings, as the defect may then be taken advantage of either by de
And
murrer or by motion in arrest of judgment
the objection
one which must ap
pear from the evidence of the prosecution,
may be taken without special plea wheneTer
appears.

Chap.

Plea and

26.]

334

Issue.

if

is

Hawk. P.

a Hi

to)

2

S

(/)
(«) HaL P. 0. 887.
(ft) See book in, page KB.

3

is

a

a

it

a

it

a

it

a

if

is

*

*•

a

is

;

a

is

if

is

a

a

a

is

a

by

a

a

it

it

it

it

a

is

if

(«)

if,

aists that the fact, as stated, is no felony, treason, or whatever the crime is al
leged to he. Thus, for instance, if a man be indicted for feloniously stealing
a greyhound; which is an animal in which no valuable property can be had,
and therefore it is not felony, but only a civil trespass, to steal it: in this case
the party indicted may demur to the indiotment; denying it to be felony,
that
on de
though he oonf esses the act of taking it. Some have held,
murrer, the point of law be adjudged against the prisoner, he shall have judg
convicted by verdict
But this
denied by others,
ment and execution, as
(f) who hold, that in such case he shall be directed and received to plead the
demurrer determined against him. (3) Which
general issue, not guilty, after
clear that
the prisoner freely dis
appears the more reasonable, because
to the opinion of the court, whether
covers the fact in court, and refers
foe felony or no; and upon the fact thus shown
appears to be felony; the court
will not record the confession; but admit him afterwards to plead not guilty.
And this seems to be case of the same nature, being for the most part
{g)
a mistake in point of law, and in the conduct of his pleading; and though
man
mispleading may in some cases lose his property, yet the law will not
suffer him by such niceties to lose his life. However, upon this doubt, demur
rers to indictments are seldom used: since the same advantages may be taken
plea of not guilty; or afterwards in arrest of judgment, when the ver
upon
dict has established the fact.
UL A plea in abatement
principally for misnomer,
wrong name, or
James Allen, gentleman,
indioted by
false addition to the prisoner. As,
the name of John Allen, esquire, he may plead that he has the name of James,
And if
and not of John and that he
gentleman, and not an esquire.
found by
jury, then the *indictment shall be abated, as r*qoBi
either fact
writs or declarations may be in civil actions; of which we spoke at
little advantage
large in the preceding book, (h) (4) But, in the end, there
the ex
acoruing to the prisoner by means of these dilatory pleas; because,
new bill of indictment may be framed, according to what
ception be allowed,
the prisoner in his plea avers to be his true name and addition. For
flaw must
rnle, upon all pleas in abatement, that he who takes advantage of
Let us therefore next con
at the same time show how
may be amended.
more substantial kind of plea, viz.:
sider
IV. Special pleas in bar; which go to the merits of the indictment, and give
at all, nor put himself upon
a reason why the prisoner ought not to answer
former acquittal, a
his trial for the crime alleged. These are of four kinds:
HaL P. O.S26.
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thus stated: A judg
(8) The present English doctrine as to this point in case of felony
final, and
ment on general demurrer, which contains confession of the subject matter,
one not given in such case.
the privilege to plead over
This privilege
only given upon
the overruling of
demurrer in abatement: one, that is, with which
plea of not guiltyR v. Faderman, Cox 0. C, 859. Previous to that de
might consistently be pleaded.
cision
was the practice for the court in its discretion to allow pleading over in favortm
vitm.
R v. Smith, Cox C. C, 43. It has been held that in case of misdemeanor, judg
East, 107; but see R v.
ment even on demurrer in abatement
final. R v. Gibson,
Birmingham, &c., By. Co., Q. B., 223, where the defendant was allowed to plead over. In
has been held generally that judgment on demurrer in case of misde
the United States
meanor was final. Com. v. Gloucester, 110 Mass., 491; State v. Merrill, 87 Me., 829: State
Me.,
569; People v. Taylor,
Denio, 91. If demurrer
▼. Dresser, 64
overruled,
may
be withdrawn by leave of the court, and then the defendant may plead over.
Evans v.
Met, 453; Bennett v. State,
Commonwealth,
Yerg., 472; Commonwealth v. Foggy,
Leigh, 638.
That leave to answer over
discretionary in such case, see State v. WilUns, 17 Vt, 151; Lewis v. State, 11 Mo., 866; Thomas v. State,
Mo., 457. In case of
unsettled, but generally pleading over is allowed.
felony the practice
Bish. Or. Proc.
784, thus following the doctrine in R v. Smith, cited above, and in
Hale P. 0., 88.
Vic,
Defects
this
of
Statute
14
15
now
and
c. 100,
description
are
amendable.
(4)
If objection was taken in any form, they would therefore be amended, and not taken,
they would be cured by verdict.
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(t)

former oonviction, a former attainder, or a pardon. There are many other
but these are applicable
pleas, which may be pleaded in bar of an appeal;
to both appeals and indictments.
First, the plea of autrefoits acquit, or former acquittal,
grounded on
this universal maxim of the common law of England, that no man
to be
And
brought into jeopardy of his life more than once for the same offence.
hence
allowed as
man
once fairly found not
consequence, that when
guilty upon any indictment, or other prosecution, before any court having
competent jurisdiction of the offence, (j) he may plead such acquittal in bar
of any subsequent accusation for the same orime. (5) Therefore an acquittal
on an appeal
And so also
good bar to an indictment on the same offence.
was an acquittal on an indictment a good bar to an appeal, by the common
law: (k) and therefore, in favour of appeals,
general practice was introduced,
not to try any person on an indictment of homicide, till after the year and day,
within which appeals may be brought, were past; by which time
often hap
To remedy which
pened that the witnesses died, or the whole was forgotten.
tne statute
Hen. VJLL, c.
enacts, that *indictments
*338l inconvenience»
shall be proceeded on, immediately, at the king's suit, for the death of
man, without waiting for bringing an appeal; and that the plea of autrefoits
acquit on an indictment, shall be no bar to the prosecuting of any appeal.
2. Secondly, the plea of autrefoits convict, or a former conviction for the
same identical crime, though no judgment was ever given, or perhaps will b<»
(being suspended by the benefit of clergy or other causes),
good plea in bat
to an indictment.
And this depends upon the same principle as the former,
that no man ought to be twice brought in danger of his life for one and the
same crime.
conviction of manslaughter,
has been held, that
Hereupon
on an appeal or an indictment,
bar even in another appeal, and much more
in an indictment of murder; for the fact prosecuted
the same in both,
It to be observed,
though the offences differ in colouring and in degree.
that the pleas of autrefoits acquit and autrefoits convict, or former acquittal,
and former conviction, must be upon
prosecution for the same identical act
But the case
otherwise in,
and crime.
former attainder; which
3. Thirdly, the plea of autrefoits attaint, or
be for the same or any other felony. For wherever
good plea in bar, whether
Hawk. P. 0. S7T.
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not enough to offer
(5) A former conviction or acquittal must be specially pleaded
State v. Barnes, 82 Me., 530; Com. v. Chesley. 1<>?
under the general issue.
evidence of
Mass., 223. The plea must show that the prisoner was acquitted upon an indictment suffi
he had been convicted, and charging the same offense as tbc
cient to induce punishment
overruled, the de
such plea
v. Taylor,
B. & C, 602.
one to which he pleads.
In misdemeanor the
fendant may plead over in case of felony, not in misdemeanor,
defendant's rights are concluded by such
plea, even though thus he Is not tried upon the
Eq., 428; and note 530. 'That
Eng. L.
R. v. Bird,
offense charged in the indictment.
W. &8., 77; Com. v. Goddard, 13 Mass..
not the American doctrine. Foster v. Com.,
overruled,
his plea in bar
the defendant may plead over
455. In Massachusetts
Com. v. Golding, 14 Gray, 49.
charged with felony or misdemeanor.
whether he
That an acquitted on an indictment which was sufficient to warrant a conviction will be
East, 437; Heikes v.
bar to future prosecution of the same offense, see Rex v. Emden,
A person
not to be
Commonwealth, 26 Penn. St, 518; People v. Cook, 10 Mich., 164
in jeopardy when he put upon trial
twice put in jeopardy on the same charge; and he
so far
before court of competent jurisdiction, upon an indictment or information which
valid as to be sufficient to sustain conviction, and the jury has been charged with his de
Ind., 290; State v.
577; Wright v. State,
&
liverance. Commonwealth v. Cook,
Port, 187; State v. Ephraim,
Dev. & Bat, 182;
Norvell,
Yerg., 24; State v. Ned,
Price v. State, 10 Ohio, 423. After the jury are impaneled and sworn, any discharge of
them without verdict and without the defendant's consent, except for reasons of necessity,
Caines, 304; Commonwealth v.
will be equivalent to an acquittal. People v. Barrett,
Tuck, 20 Pick., 865. And see Cooley's Const. Lim.. 327; Whart. Cr. L.,
541,
teq.
Odoll,
But the court must have had jurisdiction. State
Black
156; State v. Payne.
Mo., 370; State v. Hodgkins, 42 N. TL, 474.
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man is attainted of felony, by judgment of death either upon a verdict or
confession, by outlawry, or heretofore by abjuration; and whether upon an
appeal or an indictment; he may plead such attainder in bar to any subsequent
indictment or appeal, for the same or for any other felony, (to) And this
because, generally, suoh proceeding on a second prosecution cannot be to any
purpose: for the prisoner is dead in law by the first attainder, his blood is
already corrupted, and he hath forfeited all that he had: so that it is absurd
and superfluous to endeavour to attaint him a second time. But to this gen
eral rule, however, as to all others, there are some exceptions; wherein, cessante
ratione, cessat et ipsa lex. As, 1. Where the former attainder is reversed for error,
for then it *is the same as if it had never been. And the same reason r+qo/r-i
J
holds, where the attainder is reversed by parliament, or the judgment *■
vacated by the king's pardon, with regard to felonies committed afterwards.
2. Where the attainder was upon indictment, such attainder is no bar to an
appeal: for the prior sentence is pardonable by the king; and if that might be
pleaded in bar of the appeal, -the king might in the end defeat the suit of the
subject, by suffering the prior sentence to stop the prosecution of a second,
and then, when the time of appealing is elapsed, granting the delinquent a
3. An attainder in felony is no bar to an indictment of treason: be
pardon.
cause not only the judgment and manner of death are different, but the for
feiture is more extensive, and the land goes to different persons. 4. Where a
person attainted of one felony is afterwards indicted as principal in another,
to which there are also accessories, prosecuted at the same time; in this case
it is held, that the plea of autrefoits attaint is no bar, but he shall be com
pelled to take his trial, for the sake of publio justice; because the accessories
to such second felony cannot be convicted till after the conviction of the prin
cipal, (n) And from these instances we may collect that a plea of autrefoits
attaint is never good, but when a second trial would be quite superfluous.
•a

<*) (6)
4. Lastly, a pardon may be pleaded

(m)
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in bar; as at once destroying the end
and purpose of the indictment, by remitting that punishment which the prose
cution is calculated to inflict. There is one advantage that attends pleading a
pardon in bar, or in arrest of judgment, before sentence is past; which giveg
it by much the preference to pleading it after sentence or attainder. This
that by stopping the judgment
stops the attainder, and prevents the corrup
tion
the blood; which, when once corrupted by attainder, cannot afterwards
But as the title of pardons
be restored, otherwise than by act of parliament.
is applicable to other stages of prosecution; and they have their respective
force and efficacy, as well after as before conviction, outlawry, or *at- r*oooi
shall therefore reserve the more minute consideration of
tainder;
have gone through every other title except only that of execution.
them till
conclude this head of special pleas in bar,
Before
will be necessary once
man has his election what
more to observe, that though in civil actions when
concluded by that plea, and cannot resort to another
plea in bar to make, he
on an action of debt, the defendant
that be determined against him; (as
general release, and no such release can be proved, he cannot after
pleads
wards plead the general issue, nil debet, as he might at first: for he has made
was his own folly to choose
rotten
his election what plea to abide by, and
observed in civil actions, quia interest
defence;) though, say, this strictness
reipublicm ut sit finis litium: yet in criminal prosecutions in favorem vitce, as
found against
well upon appeal as indictment, when prisoner's plea in bar
him upon issue tried by
jury, or adjudged against him in point of law by
the court; still he shall not be concluded or convicted thereon, but shall have
Hawk. P.

a

875.

(n) Poph. 107.

(o) Staund. P. 0. 107.

4,

§

8

7

and
provides "that no plea setting forth any attainder
Geo. IV., c. 28,
(8) Stat.
shall be pleaded in bar of any indictment, unless the attainder be for the same offense as
that charged in the indictment."
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judgment of respondeat ouster, and may plead over to the felony the general
For the law allows many pleas, by which a prisoner
issue, not guilty, (p)
may escape death; but only one plea, in consequence whereof it can be
inflicted: viz., on the general issue, after an impartial examination and decision
of the fact, by the unanimous verdict of a jury. It remains, therefore, that
consider
V. The general issue, or plea of not guilty, (q) upon which plea alone the
In case of an indictment
prisoner can receive his final judgment of death.
of felony or treason, there can be no special justification put in by way of plea.
As, on an indictment for murder, a man cannot plead that it was in his own
defence against a robber on the highway, or a burglar; but he must plead the
general issue, not guilty, and give this special matter in evidence. For (besides
that these pleas do in effect amount to the general issue; since, if true, the
Mcqqni prisoner is most clearly not guilty) as the facts in treason are *laid to
J be done proditorie et contra ligeantias sum debitum, and, in felony, that
L
the killing was done felonice; these charges of a traitorous or felonious intent,
are the points and very gist of the indictment, and must be answered directly, by
the general negative, not guilty; and the jury upon the evidence will take
notice of any defensive matter, and give their verdict accordingly, as effec
So that this
tually as if it were, or could be, specially pleaded.
upon all
accounts, the most advantageous plea for the prisoner, (r)
When the prisoner hath thus pleaded not guilty, non culpabilis, or nient
culpable; which was formerly used to be abbreviated upon the minutes, thus,
" non
(or nient) cul." the olerk of the assizes, or clerk of the arraigns, on behalf
of the crown replies, that the prisoner
guilty, and that he
ready to prove
done by two monosyllables in the same spirit of abbreviation,
him so. This
"cul. prit." which signifies, first, that the prisoner
guilty cul., culpable, (or
ready to prove him so; prit, prossto sum,.
culpabilis), and then that the king
therefore
or paratus verificare. This
replication on behalf of the king
viva voce at the bar; which was formerly the course in all pleadings, as well
civil as in oriminal causes. And that was done in the concisest manner: for
when the pleader intended to demur, he expressed his demurrer in
single
word, "judgment;" signifying that he demanded judgment, whether the writ,
declaration, plea, &c, either in form or matter, were sufficiently good in law:
he meant to rest on the truth of the facts pleaded, he expressed that
and
also in
single syllable, "prit;" signifying that he was ready to prove h»
assertions: as may be observed from the year-books and other ancient reposi
tories of law.
By this replication the king and the prisoner are therefore
at issue; for we may remember in our strictures upon pleadings, in the pre
was observed, that when the parties come to a fact, which
ceding book,
affirmed on one side and denied on the other, then they are said to be at
*°f *act: which
evidently the case here, in the plea
r*840l *SBUe *n Pom*
non cul. by the prisoner; and the replication of cul. by the clerk. And
we may also remember, that the usual conclusion of all affirmative pleadings,
was by an averment in these words, " and this he
as this of cul. or guilty
hoc
et
here ex
paratus est verificare;" which same thing
ready to verify;
" prit."
pressed by the single word
matter of this importance in so odd and
How our courts came to express
obscure
manner, " rem tantam tarn negligenter," can hardly be pronounced
with certainty. It may perhaps, however, be accounted for by supposing, that
these were at first short notes, to help the memory of the clerk, and remind
was the short method of taking down in
him what he was to reply; or else
court, upon the minutes, the replication and averment, " cul. prit; which
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(o) See Appendix, {1.
(t) See book III, page 818,
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the ignorance of succeeding clerks adopted for the very words to

be by them spoken, (u)
But however it may have arisen, the joining of issue (which though now
usually entered on the record, (w) is no otherwise joined (a:) in any part of the

a

if

is

is

a

if

a

if

if

(z)

is,

proceedings) seems to be clearly the meaning of this obscure expression: (y)
whioh has puzzled our most ingenious etymologists, and is commonly under
stood as if the clerk of the arraigns, immediately on plea pleaded, had fixed
an opprobrious name on the prisoner, by asking him, " Ckdprit, how wilt thou
be tried?" For, immediately upon issue joined, it is inquired of the prisoner,
by what trial he will make his innocence appear. This form has at present re
ference to appeals and approvements only wherein the appellee has his choice,
either to try the 'accusation by battel or by jury.
But upon indict- r,...,
*
ments, since the abolition of ordeal, there can be no other trial but by *■
jury, per pais, or by the country; and therefore, if the prisoner refuses to put
himself upon the inquest in the usual form, that
to answer that he will be
tried by God and his country,
commoner; and,
peer, by God and
in treason,
his peers; (a) the indictment,
taken pro confesso; and the pri
he perseveres in his
soner, in cases of felony,
adjudged to stand mute, and
obstinacy, shall now (b) be convicted of the felony. (7)
When the prisoner has thus put himself upon his trial, the clerk answers in
the humane language of the law, which always hopes that the party's innocence
And
rather than his guilt may appear, " God send thee
good deliverance."
then they proceed, as soon as conveniently may be, to the trial; the manner of
which will be considered at large in the next chapter.

CHAPTEK

XXYII.

OF TRIAL AND CONVICTION.
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The several methods of trial and conviction of offenders established by the
laws of England, were formerly more numerous than at present, through the
superstition of our Saxon ancestors: who like other northern nations, were ex
character which Tacitus observes of the an
tremely addicted to divination:
cient Germans, (a) They therefore invented considerable number of methods
of purgation or trial, to preserve innocence from the danger of false witnesses,
notion that God would always interpose miraculously
and in consequence of
to vindicate the guiltless.
The most ancient (b) species of trial was that by ordeal: which was pecu
liarly distinguished by the appellation of judicium Dei; and sometimes vulga
from the canonical purgation, which was by the
ris purgatio, to distinguish
oath of the party. This was of two sorts, (c) either Jire-orde&l, or water-orde&l

S

:

i

8,

I

'

J

2

1.

;

it

daily Instances In the abnse of two legal terms of ancient French;
(u) Of this Ignorance ire may see
one, the prologue to all proclamations, "oyez," or hear ye, which Is generally pronounced most unmean
are all sworn, the officer bids
ingly, "o yes:" the other a more pardonable mistake, viz., "when the Jury
" but we now hear pronounced
the crier number them, for which fee word in law-French Is counter
in very good English, ''count these."
Hal. P. C.
P. C. 899. ■- >..-(y) 4...
(x) Hawk.
(to) See Appendix,
,J
—*-(«) A learned author.
is, "by God or
in the prisoner.
ordeal used formerly to be called judicium Dei. But it should seem, that when the question gives the
prisoner an option, his answer must be positive, and not in the disjunctive, which returns the option
back to the prosecutor,
(6) Stat. 12Geo. m, c 20.
(a) Ksylinge, 57. State Trials, pauim.
28.
(c) Mlrr. c
(a) De Uor. Germ. 10.
(6) LL. Inos, e. 77. Wilt 27.

2.

§

if

he puts himself upon the country, and the cere
he Btands mute the court
discontinued. And
and Geo. IV., c. 28,
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prisoner pleads "not guilty
C!) When
mony of asking him how he will be tried
will enter the plea of not guilty for him.
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the former being confined to persona of higher rank, the latter to the
Both these might be performed by deputy: but the principal
people, (d)
to answer for the success of the trial; the deputy only venturing some corporal

^or n're» or PernaP9 f°r friendship, (e)
Fire-ordeal was performed
either by taking up in the hand, unhurt, a piece of red-hot iron of one,
two, or three pounds weight; or else by walking barefoot and blindfold over
nine red-hot ploughshares, laid lengthwise at equal distances: and if the party
escaped being hurt, he was adjudged innocent; but if it happened otherwise,
as without collusion it usually did, he was then condemned as guilty.
How
ever, by this latter method Queen Emma, the mother of Edward the Confess
or, is mentioned to have cleared her character, when suspected of familiarity
with Alwyn, bishop of Winchester. (/)
Water-ordeal was performed, either by plunging the bare arm up to the el
bow in boiling water, and escaping unhurt therefrom: or by casting the person
suspected into a river or pond of cold water; and if he floated therein with
out any action of swimming, it was deemed an evidence of his guilt; but, if
It is easy to trace out the traditional relics of this
he sunk, he was acquitted.
water-ordeal, in the ignorant barbarity still practiced in many countries to dis
cover witches by casting them into a pool of water, and drowning them, to
And in the eastern empire the fire-ordeal was used to
prove their innocence.
the same purpose by the emperor Theodore Lascaris: who, attributing his
sickness to magic, caused all those whom he suspected to handle the hot iron:
thus joining (as has been well remarked) (g) to the most dubious crime in the
world the most dubious proof of innocence.
And, indeed, this purgation by ordeal seems to have been very ancient and
It was known to the
very universal in the times of superstitious barbarity.
in the *Antigone of Sophocles, (A) a person susfor,
ancient
Greeks:
r*"U4lJ
L
pected by Creon of a misdemeanor, deolares himself ready "to handle
hot iron, and to walk over fire," in order to manifest his innocence; which, the
And Grotius (i) gives us
scholiast tells us, was then a very usual purgation.
many instances of water-ordeal in Bythynia, Sardinia, and other places. There
is also a very peculiar species of water-ordeal, said to prevail among the Indi
ans on the coast of Malabar; wbere a person accused of any enormous crime is
obliged to swim over a large river abounding with crocodiles, and, if he escapes
unhurt, he is reputed innocent. As, in Siam, besides the usual methods of fire
and water-ordeal, both parties are sometimes exposed to the fury of a tiger let
loose for that purpose; and if the beast spares either, that person is accounted
innocent; if neither, both are held to be guilty; but if he spares both, the trial
is incomplete, and they proceed to a more certain criterion. (Je)
One cannot but be astonished at the folly and impiety of pronouncing a man
guilty, unless he was cleared by a miracle; and of expecting that all the powers
of nature should be suspended by an immediate interposition of Providenoe to
And yet, in Eng
save the innocent, whenever it was presumptuously required.
land, so late as King John's time, we find grants to the bishops and clergy to
And, both in England and Sweden,
use the judicium ferri, aqurn, et ignis.
was only performed in the churches or
the clergy presided at this trial, and
in other consecrated ground: for which Stiernhook (to) gives the reason: "non
deficit VXis opera et laboris pretium; semper enim ab ejusmodi judicio aliquid
its due praise, we find the can
lucri sacerdotibus obveniebcct." But, to give
on law very early declaring against trial by ordeal, or vulgaris purgatio, as be
ing the fabric of the devil, "cum sit contra prmceptum Domini, non tentabi*
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(d) Tmetur M purgare to qui accutatur, per Dei judicium tcilicet per calidum ferrum, vel per
aquam, pro divertitaie conditionit hominum; per ferrum calidum, si fuerit homo liber; per aquim
14, 0. 1.)
still expressed in that common form of speech, "of going through fire and water to
(«) This
another."
c.
(g) 8p. L. b. 12,c.
(/) Tho. Rudborne Hitt. ma). Winton,
(k) t. 270.
(0 On Numb, v, 17.
(fc) Mod. Univ. Hist, vll, 286.
(I) Spelm. Qlott. 435.
c.
(m) De Jure Bueonum,

fuerit rutticut (Glanv.
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Dominum Deum tuum." (n) Upon this authority, though the canons r^„
*
•themselves were of no validity in England, it was thought proper (as *■
had been done in Denmark above a century before)(o) to disuse and abolish this
trial entirely in our courts of justice, by an act of parliament in 3 Hen. HI, ac
cording to Sir Edward Coke, (jt>) or rather, by an order of the king in coun

cil, (q)
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IL Another species of purgation, somewhat similar to the former, but pro
bably sprung from a presumptuous abuse of revelation in the ages of dark sup
erstition, was the cormed, or morsel of execration: being a piece of chdese or
bread, of about an ounce in weight, which was consecrated with a form of ex
orcism; desiring of the Almighty that it might cause convulsions and paleness,
and find no passage if the man was really guilty; but might turn to health and
nourishment, if he was innocent: (r) as the water of jealousy among the Jews
(«) was, by God's special appointment, to cause the belly to swell, and the thigh
to rot, if the woman was guilty of adultery. This corsned was then given to
the suspected person, who at the same time also received the holy sacrament:
indeed, the corsned was not, as some have suspected, the sacramental
{t)
bread itself; till the subsequent invention of transubstantiation preserved
from profane uses with
more profound respect than formerly.
Our histori
ans assure us, that Godwin, earl of Kent, in the reign of King Edward the
Confessor, abjuring the death of the king's brother, at last appealed to his
corsned, "per buccellam deglutiendam abjuravit" (w) which stuck in his throat,
and killed him. This custom has long since been gradually abolished, though
the remembrance of
still subsists in certain phrases of abjuration retained
among the common people, (w)
•However, we cannot but remark, that though in European countries r*o4fl-i
this custom most probably arose from an abuse of revealed religion, yet
credulity and superstition will, in all ages and in all climates, produce the same
or similar effects. And, therefore, we shall not be surprised to find that, in the
kingdom of Pegu, there still exists a trial by the corsned, very similar to that
of our ancestors, only substituting raw rice instead of bread, (a;) And, in the
method of deciding lawsuits equally
kingdom of Monomotapa, they have
whimsical and uncertain. The witness for the plaintiff chews the bark of
then
tree endued with an emetic quality; which, being sufficiently masticated,
infused in water, which
given the defendant to drink. If his stomach rejects
condemned:
absolved, unless the plaintiff
it, he
stays with him, he
will drink some of the same water; and,
stays with him also, the suit
left undetermined, (y)
These two antiquated methods of trial were principally in use among our
The next, which still remains in force, though very rarely in
Saxon ancestors.
And
use, owes its introduction among us to the princes of the Norman line.
that is,
HI. The trial by battel, (1) duel, or single combat; which was another species
of presumptuous appeals to Providence, under an expectation that Heaven would
unquestionably give the victory to the innocent or injured party. The nature
writ of right, was
of this trial, in cases of civil injury, upon issue joined in
fully discussed in the preceding book: (z)to which have only to add, that the
trial by battel may be demanded at the election of the appellee, in either an
9,

8,

7.

6.

1

2

9

5,

2,

2,

Decretal, lib.
qu.
dist.
tit. 60, c. and Qloss. ibid.
cans.
(n) Deeret. part
(p)
Rep. 82.
(0) Mod. Ud. Hist, xxxii, 105.
Pryn Kec. Append. 20. Seld. Eadm. fol. 48.
(q) Rym. Foed. 228. Spelm. Gloss. 8S6.
LL. Canut c.
(u) Ingulph.
(r) Spelm. 01. 489.
(«) Numb. ch. v.
" " May this ({)
morsel be my last; " and the like.
(w) As, "I will take the sacrament upon it;
(y) Ibid, it, 484.
(x) Mod. UniT. Hist vli, 129.
(*) See book HE, p. 887.
(1)

Now

abolished

III.,

See the proceedings in the case of Lord
c. 46.
by statute 59 Geo.
B. & Aid.,
11 St. Tr. 134, and the case of Ashford v. Thornton,
fr., 483, note, and Mr. H. C. Lea's recent work entitled " Superstition

405.

See also

and Force."
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appeal or an approvement; and that it is carried on with equal solemnity as that
on a writ of right: but with this difference, that there each party might hire a
And therefore,
champion, hut here they must fight in their proper persona.
^ tne *aPPeUant or approver be a woman, a priest, an infant, or of
r*3471
*J the age of sixty, or lame, or blind, he or she may counterplead and
refuse the wager of battel; and compel the appellee to put himself upon the
country. Also peers of the realm, bringing an appeal, shall not be challenged
to wage battel, on account of the dignity of their persons; nor the citizens of
London, by special charter, because fighting seems foreign to their education
and employment. So, likewise, if the crime be notorious; as, if the thief be
taken with a mainour, or the murderer in the room with a bloody knife, the
appellant may refuse the tender of battel, from the appellee; (a) for it is unrea
sonable that an innocent man should stake his life against one who is already

half 'convicted.
The form and manner of waging battel upon appeals are much the same as
upon a writ of right; only the oaths of the two combatants are vastly more
striking and solemn, (b) The appellee, when appealed of felony, pleads iwt
guilty, and throws down his glove, and declares he will defend the same by his
body: the appellant takes up the glove, and replies that he is ready to make
good the appeal, body for body. And thereupon the appellee, taking the book
in his right hand, and in his left the right hand of his antagonist, swears to
this effect: " Hoc audi, homo quern per manum teneo," &c. " Hear this, O man,
whom hold by the hand, who callest thyself John by the name of baptism,
that L, who call myself Thomas by the name of baptism, did not feloniously
murder thy father, William by name, nor am any way guilty of the said felony.
So help me God, and the saints; and this will defend against thee by my
body, as this court shall award." To which the appellant replies, holding the
bible and his antagonist's hand in the same manner as the other: "Hear
this, O man, whom
hold by the hand, who callest thyself Thomas by the
name of baptism, that thou art perjured; and therefore perjured, because that
tnou fel°ni°U8ly didst murder my *father, William by name.
So help
r*"U8l
*•
J me, God, and the saints: and this will prove against thee by my body,
as this court shall award." (c)
The battel is then to be fought with the
same weapons, viz., batons, the same solemnity, and the same oath against
amulets and sorcery, that are used in the civil combat: and if the appellee be
so far vanquished that he cannot or will not fight any longer, he shall be ad
judged to be hanged immediately; and then, as well as if he be killed in battel,
providence is deemed to have determined in favour of the truth, and his blood
shall be attainted. But if he kills the appellant, or can maintain the fight
from sunrising till the stars appear in the evening, he shall be acquitted. So
also if the appellant becomes recreant, and pronounces the horrible word of
craven, he shall lose his liberam legem, and become infamous; and the appellee
shall recover his damages, and also be forever quit, not only of the appeal, but
of all indictments likewise for the same offence.
IV. The fourth method of trial used in criminal cases is that by the peers
of Great Britain, in the court of parliament, or the court of the lord high
steward, when a peer is capitally indicted: for in case of an appeal, a peer shall
be tried by jury, (d) (2)
Of this enough has been said in a former chapter; (<)
to which
shall now only add, that, in the method and regulation of its pro-
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I

I

I

Co) 2 Hawk. P. C. 427.
(6) Flet. 1.1, e. 34. 2 Hawk. P. 0. 426.
(c) There is a striking resemblance between this process and that of the court of Areopagus at Athens
for murder; wherein the prosecutor and prisoner were both sworn in the most solemn manner; the pro
secutor, that he was related to the deceased (for none but near relations were permitted to prosecute ia
that court) and that the prisoner was the cause of his death; the prisoner that be was innocent of the
charge against him. (Pott. Antlq. b. L c. 19.)
(a*) 9 Rep. SO. 2 Inst. 49.
(«) See page 259.
(8) The nobility are tried by jury like commoners,
and misprision thereof.
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ceedings, it differs little from the trial per patriam, or by jury; except that no
because the lords of
special verdict can be given in the trial of a peer;
.
parliament, or the lord high steward (if the trial be *had in his court), r
'
are judges sufficiently competent of the law that may arise from the <■
fact: and except, also, that the peers need not all agree in their verdict; but
the greater number, consisting of twelve at the least, will conclude, and bind
the minority, (g)
V. The trial by jury, or the country, per patriam, is also that trial by the
peers of every Englishman, which, as the grand bulwark of his liberties, is
secured to him by the great oharter: (h) " nullus liber homo capiatur, vel imprisonetur, aut exulet, aut aliquo alio modo destruatur, nisi per legale judicium
parium suorum, vel per legem terras."
The antiquity and excellence of this trial, for the settling of oivil property,
And
will hold much stronger id
has before been explained at large.
to be appre
criminal cases; since in times of difficulty and danger, more
hended from the violence and partiality of judges appointed by the crown, in
suits between the king and the subject, than in disputes between one individual
Our law
and another, to settle the metes and boundaries
private property.
has therefore wisely placed this strong and two-fold barrier, of
presentment
and
trial by jury, between the liberties of the people and the prerogative of
It was necessary, for preserving the admirable balance of our con
the crown.
stitution, to vest the executive power of the laws in the prince: and yet this
exerted
power might be dangerous and destructive to that very constitution,
without check or control, by justices of oyer and terminer occasionally named
by the crown; who might then, as in France or Turkey, imprison, dispatch, or
exile any man that was obnoxious to the government, by an instant declaration
But the founders of the English law
that such
their will and pleasure.
have, with excellent forecast, contrived that no man should be called to answer
to the king for any capital crime, unless upon the preparatory accusation of
twelve or more of his fellow-subjects, the grand jury; and that the truth of
every accusation, whether preferred in the shape of indictment, information, or
appeal, *should afterwards be confirmed by the unanimous suffrage r*350-i
of twelve of his equals and neighbours, indifferently chosen and superior to all suspicion. So that the liberties of England cannot but subsist so
long as this palladium remains sacred and inviolate; not only from all open
attacks (which none will be so hardy as to make) but also from all secret ma
chinations, which may sap and undermine it; by introducing new and arbitrary
methods of trial, by justices of the peace, commissioners of the revenue, and
And however convenient these may appear at first (as
courts of conscience.
doubtless all arbitrary powers, well executed, are the most convenient) yet let
it be again remembered, that delays and little inconveniences in the forms of
justice, are the price that all free nations must pay for their liberty in more
substantial matters; that these inroads upon this sacred bulwark of the nation
are fundamentally opposite to the spirit of our constitution; and that though
begun in trifles, the precedent may gradually increase and spread, to the utter
disuse of juries in questions of the most momentous concern.
What was said of juries in general, and the trial thereby, in civil cases, will
greatly shorten our present remarks, with regard to the trial of criminal suits:
shall consider in the same
indictments, informations and appeals: which trial
method that did the former; by following the order and course of the pro
ceedings themselves, as the most clear and perspicuous way of treating it.
When, therefore/a prisoner on his arraignment has pleaded not guilty, and
for his trial hath put himself upon the country, which country the jury are,
panel of jurors, liberos et legates ho
the sheriff of the oounty must return
freeholders, without just exoeption, and of tho
mines, de vieineto: that
11. Foster, M7.

(a)
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(fl See book III, page 379.
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(m) Fost. 250.

(n)

2

2

i.

2

Hawk. P. 0. 403.
Hal. P. C. 264.
Fost. 229. Append,
(I) Ibid. 230.
(O) See book m, p. S59.
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is

is,
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it
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it
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a

a

1

a

{I)

is is, (k)

visne or neighbourhood; which is interpreted to be of the county where the fact
is committed. (J) If the proceedings are before the court of king's bench,
there is time allowed, between the arraignment and the trial, for a jury to be
by a writ of venire facias to the sheriff, as in civil causes:
f *3511-I *imPanele^
and the trial in case of misdemeanor is had at nisi pritts, unless it be
of such consequence as to merit a trial at bar; which is always invariably had
But, before commissioners
when the prisoner is tried for any capital offence.
of oyer and terminer and gaol-delivery, the sheriff, by virtue of a general
precept directed to him beforehand, returns to the court a panel of forty-eight
jurors, to try all felons that may be called upon their trial at that session; and
therefore it is there usual to try all felons immediately, or soon after their
But it is not customary, nor agreeable to the general course of
arraignment.
proceedings (unless by consent of parties or where the defendant is actually
in gaol), to try persons indicted of smaller misdemeanors at the same court in
which they have pleaded not guilty, or traversed the indictment.
But they
usually give security to the court, to appear at the next assizes or session, and
then and there to try the traverse, giving notice to the prosecutor of the same.
In cases of high treason, whereby corruption of blood may ensue (except
treason in counterfeiting the king's coin or seals), or misprision of such treason,
it is enacted by statute 7 Wm III, c. 3, first, that no person shall be tried for
any such treason, except an attempt to assassinate the king, unless the indict
ment be found within three years after the offence committed: next, that the
prisoner shall have a copy of the indictment (which includes the caption),
but not the names of the witnesses, five days at least before the trial; that
for then
upon the true construction of the act, before his arraignment;
his time to take any exceptions thereto, by way of plea or demurrer; thirdly,
that he shall also have copy of the panel of jurors two days before his trial;
and, lastly, that he shall have the same compulsive process to bring in his wit
nesses for him as was usual to compel their appearance
against him. And
by statute Ann. c. 21 (which did not take place till after the decease of
the late pretender), all persons indicted for high treason or misprision
8^a^ have not only
list of all
C0PV 0* *e indictment, but
r*352l *t"ereo^>
*•
the witnesses to be produced, and of the jurors impaneled, with their
professions and places of abode, delivered to him ten days before the trial, and
in the presence of two witnesses; the better to prepare him to make his chal
But this last act, so far as affected indictments for the
lenges and defence.
inferior species of high treason, respecting the coin and the royal seals,
re
had been impossible to have tried
Geo. Ill, c. 53, else
pealed by the statute
those offences in the same circuit in which they are indicted
for ten clear
days, between the finding and the trial of the indictment, will exceed the time
And no person
usually allotted for any session of oyer and terminer, (m)
dicted for felony,
or (as the law stands) ever can be, entitled to such copies
before the time of his trial, (n) (3)
When the trial
called on, the jurors are to be sworn, as they appear, to the
number of twelve, unless they are challenged by the party.
Challenges may here be made, either on the part of the king, or on that of the
prisoner; and either to the whole array, or to the separate polls, for the very same
For
here at least as
reasons that they may be made in civil causes, (o)
Hawk. P. C. 410.

a

<

&

1 7

a

is is

it

is

not entitled as of right to copy of tbe indict
(3) Although in England the prisoner
ment in case of felony, yet the prosecution may give it, and their doing so on request
would be expected.
If not given, the court would direct the indictment to be read over
P., 836. In misde
C.
«lowly, in order that
might be taken down. Rex v. Parry,
meanors, the defendant
entitled to copy. Morrison v. Kelly,
W. Black., 385. In the
United States, the right
generally secured by statute or constitution in all
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necessary, as there, that the sheriff or returning officer be totally indifferent; that
whore an alien is indicted, the jury should be de medietate, or half foreigners, if
so many are found in the place; (which does not indeed hold in treasons, (p)
aliens being very improper judges of the breach of allegiance; nor yet in thecase of Egyptians (4) under the statute 22 Hen. VIII, c. 10), that on every panel
there should be a competent number of hundredors; (5) and that the particular
jurors should be omni exceptione mqjores; not liable to objection either prop
ter honoris respectum, propter defectum, propter affectum, or propter delictum,
*Challenges upon any of the foregoing accounts are styled challenges
'
Yor cause; which may be without stint in both criminal and civil trials. <■
in
Bat in criminal cases, or at least in capital ones, there
favorem vitas, al
lowed to the prisoner an arbitrary and capricious species of challenge to cer
called per
tain number of jurors, without showing any cause at all; which
emptory challenge: provision full of that tenderness and humanity to prison
ers for which our English laws are justly famous. (6) This grounded on two
As every one must be sensible, what sudden impressions and unac
reasons.
countable prejudices we are apt to conceive upon the bare looks and gestures
that
of another; and how necessary
prisoner (when put to defend his
good opinion of his jury, the want of which might totally
life) should have
disconcert him; the law wills not that he should be tried by any one man
prejudice, even without being able to assign
against whom he has conceived
2. Because upon challenges for cause shown,
a reason for such his dislike.
the reason assigned prove insufficient to set aside the juror, perhaps the bare
questioning his indifference may sometimes provoke resentment; to prevent
all ill consequences from which the prisoner is still at liberty,
he pleases, per
emptorily to set him aside.
The privilege of peremptory challenges, though granted to the prisoner, is
st.
which enacts, that the king
denied to the king by the statute 33 Edw.
shall challenge no jurors without assigning cause certain, to be tried and ap
held that the king need not assign his
proved by the court. However,
cause of challenge, till all the panel
gone through, and unless there cannot
be a full jury without the person so challenged. And then, and not sooner, the
king's counsel must show the cause: otherwise the juror shall be sworn, (q) (7).
The peremptory challenges of the prisoner must, however, have some reason
able boundary; otherwise he might never *be tried. This reasonable
r»,
settled by the common law to be the number of thirty-five;
boundary
that is, one under the number of three full juries. For the law judges that fiveand-thirty are fully sufficient to allow the most timorous man to challenge
through mere caprice; and that he who peremptorily challenges greater num
ber, or three full juries, has no intention to be tried at all. And, therefore, it
a

it

4,

is

(9)

Hawk. P. C. 418.

2

Hal. P. 0. 871.

2

2

(j>) Hawk. P. 0. 420.

2

J

a
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■■

is

it

a

I,

if

a

if

a

a

is,

1.

is

a

is

a a

is,

r,,..,

Hal. P. C. 271.

3

9

is

1

is

,

3.

This class of persons are now dealt with summarily, as rogues and vagabonds.
This ground of challenge
now taken away by statute.
No challenges are allowed on the trial of collateral issues. R. v. Radcliff,
W. Bl.,
The challenges must be made, before the jury sworn to try the cause. R. v. Frost,
C. and P. 129. The jury must be full, before the challenges are made. R. v. Lacey,
Cox,
(4)
(5)
(6)

8

7

9

4

4

a

a

1

1

if

if

a

517.
In the American states statutes regulate to a large extent the matter of challenges,
and practice has grown up to consider and determine challenges to favor as the jurors are
severally called.
to the favor are generally tried by two jurors already
(7) In the United States challenges
not, then by two indifferent bystanders appointed and
impaneled,
there are such, and
sworn by the court for that purpose, or by the court itself. The American decisions regard
ing challenges are collected in Waterman's Arch. Cr. L., 545, etseq. The subject of chal
lenges to' the polls was quite fully considered in People v. Bodine,
Denio, 281. There is.
good deal of diversity of opinion as to what previously received impressions of the party
called as juror, as to the guilt of the accused, should exclude him from sitting. Compare
Wend., 22!); Baxter v. People,
Freeman v. People, Denio, 9; People v. Mather,
111.,
368, withMoran's Case.
Ired., 61; Moses v. State, 10
Leigh, 651; State v. Ellington,
Humph., 456; Holt v. People, 13 Mich., 224.
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dealt with one who peremptorily challenges above thirty-five, and will not re
tract his challenge, as with one who stands mute or refuses his trial; by sen
tencing him to the peine forte et dure in felony, and by attainting him in
treason,
(r) And so the law stands at this day with regard to treason of any
kind.
But by statute 22 Hen. VIII, c. 14 (which, with regard to felonies, stands
say, no person
unrepealed by statute 1 and 2 P. and M. c. 10), by this statute,
arraigned for felony can be admitted to make any more than twenty peremp
But how if a prisoner will peremptorily challenge twenty -one?
tory challenges.
what shall be done? The old opinion was, that judgment of peine forte et dure
should be given, as where he challenged thirty-six at the common law: (s) bat
the better opinion seems to be,
that suoh challenge shall only be disregarded
and overruled.
Because, first, the common law does not inflict the judgment
of penance for challenging twenty-one, neither doth the statute inflict it; and
so heavy judgment (or that of conviction, which succeeds it) shall not be im
Secondly, the words of the statute are, "that he be not
posed by implication.
admitted to challenge more than twenty;" the evident construction of which
that any further challenge be disallowed or prevented: and therefore, being
can subject the pri
null from the beginning, and never in fact
challenge,
soner to no punishment; but the juror shall be regularly sworn. (8)
If, by reason of challenges or the default of the jurors,
sufficient number
rt 1 cannot be had of the original panel, tales '"may be awarded as in civil
sworn, "well and truly U> try,
causes, (u) till the number of twelve
and true deliverance make, between our sovereign lord the king, and the pri
soner whom they have in charge; and true verdict to give according to the
evidence."
be
cause of any consequence, the indictment
sworn,
When the jury
usually opened, and the evidence marshaled, examined, and enforced by the
settled rule at common law,
counsel for the crown or prosecution. But
prisoner upon his trial, upon the general
that no counsel shall be allowed
sue, in any capital crime, unless some point of law shall arise proper to be de
bated,
A rule, which (however may be palliated under cover of that
(w) (9)
noble declaration of the law, when rightly understood, that the judge shall be
shall see that the proceedings against him are
counsel for the prisoner; that
piece with the rest of
legal and strictly regular) (a;) seems to be not at all of
the humane treatment of prisoners by the English law. For upon what face of
man, which yet
reason can that assistance be denied to save the life of
Nor, indeed,
strict
allowed him in prosecutions for every petty trespass?
part of our ancient law: for the Mirror (y) having observed the
speaking,
necessity of counsel in civil suits, "who know how to forward and defend
the cause, by the rules of law and customs of the realm," immediately after
wards subjoins: "and more necessary are they for defence upon indictments
is
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8
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Hal. P. a 27a
(t) Hawk. P. 0. 414.
(t) Inst. 227.
(r) Hal. P. C. 283.
(u) See book m, page 884. But In mere commissions of gaol delivery, do tales can be awarded thoujrh
Inst. 168. St. Tr. 728. Oooke'i
the court may ore tentu order a new panel to be returned imtanter.
Case.)
400.
<u>) Hawk. P.
Inst. 137)gives another additional reason for this refusal, "because the evidence
(x) Sir Edward Coke
to convict a prisoner should be so manifest, as could not be contradicted.1' Which Lord Nottingham
St. Tr. 726)was the only good reason that could be given for it.
<when high steward) declared
(?) c.

if

6

a

is

is

is

7

al

8,

is

8

7

and Geo. IV, c. 28, s.
peremptory challenges beyond the number
(8) By statute
lowed by law are entirely void.
now allowed in all cases. See statute
and Wm IV,
(9) A full defence by counsel
constitutional right, and
c. 114. In the United States the right to counsel
the ac
cused party
unable to employ counsel, the court will designate some member of the bar
for that purpose, and he not at liberty to decline the appointment. See Vise v. Hamilton
County, 19 111., 18. See also, Cooley's Const. Lim., 884
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(z)

and appeals of felony, than upon other venial causes."
And the judges
themselves are so sensible of this defect, that they never scruple to allow pri
soner counsel to instruct him what questions to ask, or even to *ask r*q<rA-i
questions for him, with respect to matters of fact: for as to matters
of law, arising on the trial, they are entitled to the assistance of counsel. But,
lest this indulgence should be intercepted by superior influence, in the case of
state criminals, the legislature has directed by statute
Wm. Ill, c.
that
persons indicted for such high treason, as works
corruption of the blood, or
misprision thereof (except treason in counterfeiting the king's coin or seals),
may make their full defence by counsel, not exceeding two, to be named by the
prisoner and assigned by the court or judge: and the same indulgence, by
statute 20 Geo. II, c. 30,
extended to parliamentary impeachments
for high
treason, which were excepted in the former act.
in most respects, the
The doctrine of evidence upon pleas of the crown
same as that upon civil actions.
There are, however,
few leading points,
made between civil
wherein, by several statutes, and resolutions, difference
and criminal evidence.
First, in all cases of high treason, petit treason, and misprision of treason, by
and
statutes
Edw. VI, c. 12, and
Edw. VI, c. 11, two lawful witnesses are
required to convict
prisoner; unless he shall willingly and without violence
P. and M. c. 10,
farther exception
confess the same. By statute and
made as to treasons in counterfeiting the king's seals or signatures, and treasons
concerning coin current within this realm: and more particularly by chapter
11, the offences of importing counterfeit foreign money current in this king
dom, and impairing, counterfeiting, or forging any current coin.
The statutes
and
Wm. HI, c. 25, and 15 and *16 Geo. II, o. 28, in their subsequent
rtoE^-i
>■
extensions of this species of treason, do also provide, that the offenders
may be indicted, arraigned, tried, convicted, and attainted, by the like evidence
and in such manner and form as may be had and used against offenders for
But by statute Wm. Ill, c.
in prosecu
counterfeiting the king's money.
tions for those treasons to which that extends, the same rule (of requiring two
again enforced; with this addition, that the confession of the pri
witnesses)
of such proof, must be in open
soner, which snail countervail the necessity
hath been holden, (a) that confes
court. In the construction of which act
sion of the prisoner, taken out of court, before
magistrate or person having
and proved by two witnesses,
sufficient to con
competent authority to take
vict nim of treason. But hasty, unguarded confessions, made to persons having
no such authority, ought not to be admitted as evidence under this statute.
And, indeed, even in cases of felony at the common law, they are the weakest,
and most suspicious of all testimony; ever liable to be obtained by artifice,
false hopes, promises of favour, or menaces; seldom remembered accurately, or
reported with due precision; and incapable in their nature of being disproved
declared,
by other negative evidence. (10) By the same statute Wm. Ill,

. i
8

It

il

I

— In atiis omnibus potest et debet uti consilio" —But this consilium.
conceive, signifies only an imparl
ance, and the petitto consilii is craving leave to imparl; (see book III. page 298).which is not allowable in
any criminal prosecution. This will be manifest by comparing this law with a contemporary passage in
the grand coustumier of Normandy (ch. 86),which speaks of imparlances in personal actions. "Apres ce,
est tend le querelle a respondre; et aura cnnqie de soy conseiller. s'il le demande: et qnand
sera conseille
il pent nyer le fait dont ill est accuse." Or, as stands in the Latin text (edit. 1639),"Querelates au
tempostea tenetur respondere; et habebit licentiam consulendi, ti reauirat; kabito autem contilio, de
bet factum negare quo accusatus est."
(a) Fost. !M0-244.

5

is

is

only allowed for
not sufficient evidence of the corpus delicti, but
(10) The confession
the purpose of connecting the defendant with the offense when that has been established by
other evidence.
People v. Hennessey, 15 Wend., 147; Strinrfellow v. State, 26 Miss., 157;
Mich., 349.
State v. Guild, 10 N. J., 168; People v. Lambert,
The confession, to be admissible in any case, ought to appear to have been made volun
495

Trial

357

[Book IV.

and Conviction.

s

a

jury, (j)
Thirdly, by
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(c)

that both witnesses must be to the same overt act of treason, or one to one overt
act, and the other to another overt act, of the same species of treason, (b) and
not of distinct heads or kinds: and no evidence shall be admitted to prove any
And, therefore, in Sir John
overt act not expressly laid in the indictment.
Fenwick's case in King William's time, where there was but one witness, an
act of parliament
was made on purpose to attaint him of treason, and he
was executed, (d)
But in almost every other accusation one positive witness
down for a rule, (e) that those laws
sufficient. Baron Montesquieu lays
man to death in any case on the deposition of
which condemn
single wit
ness, are fatal to liberty; and he adds this reason, that the witness who affirms,
a necessity,
and the accused who denies, make an equal balance; (f) there
to call *in
third man to incline the scale.
But this
*9'>Rl tnerel°r0>
to be carrying matters too far: for there are some crimes, in which the
very privacy of their nature excludes the possibility of having more than one
the
witness, must these, therefore, escape unpunished? Neither, indeed,
bare denial of the person accused equivalent to the positive oath of a disin
In cases of indictment for perjury, this doctrine
terested witness.
better
not allowed to con
founded; and there our law adopts it: for one witness
vict man indicted for perjury; because then there
only one oath against
another, {g)
In cases of treason, also, there
the accused's oath of allegiance,
to counterpoise the information of
single witness; and that may perhaps be
one reason why the law requires
double testimony to convict him: though
the principal reason, undoubtedly,
to secure the subject from being sacri
ficed to fictitious conspiracies, which have been the engines of profligate and
crafty politicians in all ages.
Secondly, though from the reversal of Colonel Sidney's attainder by act of
that the mere similitude of
parliament in 1689, (h)
may be collected,
jury, without other concurrent testi
handwriting in two papers shown to
no evidence that both were written by the same person; yet undoubt
mony,
edly the testimony of witnesses, well acquainted with the party's hand, that
evidence to be left to
they believe the paper to have been written by him
a

a

(Z)

is

a

1.

J

1

a

LT

it

I,

c. 27,
mother of
bastard child, conceal
the statute 21 Jac.
ing its death, must prove by one witness that the child was born dead; other
wise such concealment shall be evidence of her having murdered it. (A)
{11)
Fourthly, all presumptive evidence of felony should be admitted cautiously;
for the law holds that
better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one
*And Sir Matthew Hale in particular
mnocent suffer.
lays down
*3591
two rules most prudent and necessary to be observed:
Never to con
vict
man for stealing the goods of
person unknown, merely because he will
give no account of how he came by them, unless an actual felony be proved of
such goods; and 2. Never to convict any person of murder or manslaughter,
till at least the body be found dead; on account of two instances he mentions,
where persons were executed for the murder of others, who were then alive,
but missing. (12)
(d) St Tr. V. 40. (•) Sp. L. b. 12,e.
ft) See St. Tr. n, 144. Foster, 285. (e) SUt 8Wm. m, c. 4.
2

2

Hawk. P. C. 431.
(h) St Tr. Vm, 478.
(0
(/) Beocar. o. 18.
(s) 10 Mod. 194.
(f) Lord Preston's Case, A. D., 1690. St. Tr. IV, 458. Francia's Case, A. D., 1718. St. Tr. VI, 69. Lay
er's Case, A. D., 1722. Ibid. 279. Henzev's Case, A. D., 1758. Burr. 644.
Hal. P. C. 290.
(k) See page 198.
(I)

1

§

1

,

1

a

a

is

4

5

it

tarily, and without motives of hope or fear being employed for the purpose of inducing
C. and P., 539; Earle v. Picken, id., 542. note; Morehead v. Stale,
Bex v. Enoch,
Harr., 563;
214, and note;
Humph.. 635; State v. Bostick,
Greenl. Ev.
Phil. Ev. by
Cowen, Hill and Edwards, 514, and cases cited.
since repealed.
(11) This statute
person who after
(12) A noted instance of conviction in America for the murder of
wards returned alive, obtained principally upon the confessions of the accused parties, has
had
tendency towards still greater caution. See the case referred to in OroenI Er
214, n., and given more at large by Mr. Galllson, in 10 N. A. Beview, 418.
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Montesq. Sp. L. b. 29,c. 11.
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(n) Domat. pobl. law, b.
(p) Hollingsh. 1112. St. Tr.
pafce 17.
72.
(o) 8*>e
(a) Bulst. 147. Cro. Car. 292.
79.
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summary,
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See
also
Hal.
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264.
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(r)
(0 Stat. Jac
(»)
12, 13,IS, 29,SOJun. 1607.
Jun. 1607.
(to) Com. Jouru.
(it) Coin. Journ.
(at)Co. Lltt. 227.
Inst 110. Fost. 27. Gould's Case. Hit. 1764.
<y) Hal P. C. 800.
Hawk. P. 0. 439.
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Lastly, it was an ancient and commonly received practice (m) (derived from
the civil law, and which, also, to this day obtains in the kingdom of France), (n)
that, as counsel was not allowed to any prisoner accused of a capital crime, so
neither should he be suffered to exculpate himself by the testimony of any wit
And, therefore, it deserves to be remembered to the honour of Mary I,
nesses.
(whose early sentiments, till her marriage with Philip of Spain, seem to have
been humane and generous), (o) that when she appointed Sir Richard Morgan
chief justice of the common pleas, she enjoined him, "that notwithstanding
the old error, which did not admit any witness to speak, or any other matter to
be heard, in favour of the adversary, her majesty Deing party; her highness's
pleasure was, that whatsoever should be brought in favour of the subject should
be admitted to be heard: and moreover, that the justices should not persuade
themselves to sit in judgment otherwise for her highness than for her sub
ject." ( p) Afterwards, in one particular instance (when embezzling the queen's
military stores was made felony by statute 34 Eliz. c. 4), it was provided, that
any person impeached for such felony, "should be received and admitted to
make any lawful proof that he could, by lawful witness or otherwise, for his
discharge and defence:" and in general the courts grew so heartily ashamed
of a doctrine so unreasonable and oppressive, that a practice was *gra- r*3fi0i
dually introduced ot examining witnesses for the prisoner, but not upon ■■ *
oath; (q) the consequence of which still was, that the jury gave less credit to
the prisoner's evidence than to that produced by the crown. Sir Edward Coke
(r) protests very strongly against this tyrannical practice; declaring that he
never read in any act of parliament, book-case, or record, that in criminal cases
the party accused should not have witnesses sworn for him; and, therefore,
there was not so much as scintilla juris against it.
And the house of com
mons were so sensible of this absurdity, that, in the bill for abolishing hostili
ties between England and Scotland,
when felonies committed by Englishmen
in Scotland were ordered to be tried in one of the three northern counties they
insisted on
clause, and carried
(w) against the efforts of both the crown and
the house of lords, against the practice of the courts in England, and the ex
press law of Scotland, (w) "that in all such trials for the better discovery of the
truth, and the better information of the consciences of the jury and justices,
there shall be allowed to the party arraigned the benefit of such credible wit
nesses, to be examined upon oath, as can be produced for his clearing and justi
fication."
At length by the statute Wm.
the same measure of jus
c.
tice was established throughout all the realm, in cases of treason within the
act: and
was afterwards declared by statute Ann. st.
c.
that in all cases
of treason and felony all witnesses for the prisoner should be examined upon
oath, in like manner as the witnesses against him.
When the evidence on both sides
closed, and indeed when any evidence
hath been given, the jury cannot be discharged (unless in cases of evident neces
sity) (a;) till they have given in their verdict; (13) but are to consider of it,
and deliver
in, with the same forms as upon civil causes; only they cannot,
in
criminal case which touches life or member, give privy verdict, (y) But

a

9

2

7 a

8

a 9 8.

(13) The discharge of the jury from any overruling necessity does not entitle the defend
Dev. and Bat., 162;
Wheat., 579; State v. Ephraim,
ant to his discharge: U.
v. Perez,
Commonwealth v. Fells.
Leigh, 613; People v, Goodwin, 18 Johns., 205. The sickness or
death of the judge, or of
juror, or inability of the jury to agree upon verdict, or the term
of the court coming to an end before the conclusion of the trial, would be such necessity.
Ind., 325; Mahala v. State, 10 Yerg., 635; State v. Battle, Ala., 259;
See Miller v. State,
State v. Wiseman, 68 N. C, 203; Hoffman v. State, 20 Md., 425; Price v. State, 36 Miss.,
631; Moseley v. State, 33 Tex., 671; Lester v. State, 33 Geo., 329.
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and Conviction.

the judges may adjourn while the jury are withdrawn to confer, and return to
receive the verdict in open court, (z) And such public or open verdict may be
oit^er general, guilty, or not guilty; *or special, setting forth all the
r*l«n
J circumstances of the case, and praying the judgment of the court,
I
whether, for instance, on the facts stated, it be murder, manslaughter, or no
crime at all. This is where they doubt the matter of law, and therefore choote
to leave it to the determination of the court; though they have an unquestion
able right of determining upon all the circumstances, and finding a general ver
dict, if they think proper so to hazard a breach of their oaths: and if their ver
dict be notoriously wrong, they may be punished, and the verdict set aside by
attaint at the suit of the king; but not at the suit of the prisoner, (a) (14) Bat
the practice heretofore in use of fining, imprisoning, or otherwise punishing
jurors, merely at the discretion of the court, for finding their verdict contrary
to the direction of the judge, was arbitrary, unconstitutional, and illegal: and
is treated as such by Sir Thomas Smith, two hundred years ago; who accounted
" such doings to be very violent, tyrannical, and contrary to the liberty and cus
tom of the realm of England." (b) For, as Sir Matthew Hale well observes,
most unhappy case for the judge himself,
the prisoner's fate
would be
depended upon his directions; unhappy, also, for the prisoner; for if the judge's
opinion must rule the verdict, the trial by jury would be useless. Yet, in many
where contrary to evidence the jury have found the prisoner
instances,
((f)
new trial granted
guilty, their verdict hath been mercifully set aside, and
the court of king's bench: for in such case, as hath been said,
cannot be set
right by attaint. But there hath yet been no instance of granting a new trial
where the prisoner was acquitted upon the first, (e) (15)
then forever quit
the jury, therefore, find the prisoner not guilty, he
and discharged of the accusation, (f) except he be appealed of felony within
the time limited by law. And upon such his acquittal, or discharge for want
of *prosecution, he shall be immediately set at large without payment
T*
the jury find him guilty, (A) he
of any fee to the gaoler. (<7) But
Which conviothen to be convicted of the crime whereof he stands indicted.
tion may accrue two ways: either by his confessing the offence and pleading
guilty; or by his being found so by the verdict of his country.
When the offender is thus convicted, there are two collateral circumstances
On
conviction (or even upon an acquittal where
that immediately arise.
reasonable ground to prosecute, and in fact a bona fide prosecution)
there was
for any grand or petit larceny, or other felony, the reasonable expenses of prothe prosecutor be poor, a compensation for his trouble and
■ecution, and also,
loss of time, are by statutes 25 Geo. II, c. 36, and 18 Geo. Ill, c. 19, to be
he petitions the judge for that purpose:
lowed him out of the county stock,
and by statute 27 Geo. II, c.
explained by the same statute, 18 Geo. "T, o. 19,
all persons appearing upon recognizance or mbpozna to give evidence, whether
any indictment be preferred or no, and as well without conviction as with
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St Tr. 781.
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(a)

12S

St. Tr. 231,486,485.
c.
Hal. P. 0. 810.
(c) HaL P. 0. 8M.
(6) Smith's Commonw.
Jones,
188. St. Tr. X, 418.
T.
li) Lev.
(e) Hawk. P. C. 442.
(/) The civil law In such case only discbarges him from the same accuser, but not from the same ac
cusation. Ff. 48, 2.7.
(a) Stat. 14.Geo. HI, c. SO.
(n) In the Roman republic, when the prisoner was convicted of any capital offence by his Jud£<-s,the
form of pronouncing that conviction was something peculiarly delicate; not that he was guilty, but that
CFufu*, 323.)
he bad not been enough upon his guard: "parum camue videtur."

(I)

;

J.,
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a

If
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ly
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Attaints are abolished, and the jury must be left perfect
no longer the law.
(14) This
dictates, and be protected
in so doing.
free to give such judgment as their conscience
Howell's St. Tr., 951 Vaughan, 135.
Bee Peon's Case.
convicted on one count of an indictment and acquitted on another,
the prisoner
(15)
and then obtains new trial, he
only tried afterwards on the count on which he was be
860; Common wealth v. Roby, 12 Pick.. 504;
fore convicted. State v. Cooper, 13 N.
Conn., 414; People v. McGowen, 17
Price v. State, 19 Ohio, 423; State v. Benham,
Wend, 886.
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are entitled to be paid their charges, with a farther allowance (if poor) for
their trouble and loss of time. 2. On a conviction of larceny, in particular,
the prosecutor shall have restitution of his goods, by virtue of the statute 21
Hen. VIII, c. 11. (16) For, by the common law, there was no restitution of
roods upon an indictment, because it is at the suit of the king only; and there-

fore the party was enforced to bring an appeal

'
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Bracton, dt Coron. e. 82.
(m) Bee book m, page

(i) See book II, 450.
(») Hal TP. 0. 641
1

Inst. 848.
Hal. P. C. MS.
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of robbery, in order to have his
But,
being considered that the party prosecuting the offloods
ender by indictment, deserves to the full as much encouragement as he who
prosecutes by appeal, this statute was made, which enacts, that
any person
be convicted of larceny, by the evidence of the party robbed, he shall have full
restitution of his money, goods and chattels; or the value of them out of the
he has any, by
writ to be granted by the justices. And
offender's goods,
the construction of this act having been in great measure conformable to the
has therefore in practice superseded the use of appeals of
law of appeals,
larceny. For instance: as formerly upon appeals, (J) so now upon indictments
of larceny, this writ of restitution *shall reach the goods so stolen, notendeavoured to be altered by
withstanding the property (k) of them
And though this may seem somewhat hard upon the
sale in market overt.
that "spoliatus debet, ante omnia, restitui;" es
buyer, yet the rule of law
pecially when he has used all the diligence in his power to convict the felon.
And, since the case reduced to this hard necessity, that either the owner or
the buyer must suffer; the law prefers the right of the owner, who has done
meritorious act by pursuing felon to condign punishment, to the right of the
buyer, -whose merit is only negative, that he has been guilty of no unfair trans
now usual for the court, upon the conviotion of
felon, to
action. And
order, without any writ, immediate restitution of such goods as are brought
Or else, secondly, without
into court, to be made to the several prosecutors.
such writ of restitution, the party may peaceably retake his goods, wherever
new property be fairly acquired therein.
ho happens to find them, (m) unless
Or, lastly, the felon be convicted and pardoned, or be allowed his clergy, the
party robbed may bring his action of trover against him for his goods; and re
But such action lies not before prosecution;
cover a satisfaction in damages.
unlaw
for so felonies would be made up and healed: (n) and also recaption
be done with intention to smother or compound the larceny;
then
ful, if
former
becoming the heinous offence of theft-bote, as was mentioned in
chapter, (o)
It not uncommon, when person
convicted of
which
misdemeanor,
principally and more immediately affects some individual, as battery, impris
onment or the like, for the court to permit the defendant to speak with the
the prosecutor declares
prosecutor, before any judgment
pronounced; and
himself satisfied, to inflict but trivial punishment. This done to re-imburse
the prosecutor his expenses, and make him some private amends, without the
trouble and circuity of
civil action. But
surely
dangerous practice;
*and though
majr be intrusted to the prudence and discretion of the r*oflj-i
judges in the superior courts of record, it ought never to be allowed in
local or inferior jurisdictions, such as the quarter sessions; where prosecutions
for assaults are by these means too frequently commenced rather for private
lucre than for the great ends of publio justice. Above all,
should never be
suffered where the testimony of the prosecutor himself
necessary to convict
the defendant: for, by these means, the rules of evidence are entirely subvert
suffered to bear wit
ed; the prosecutor becomes in effect
plaintiff, and yet
ness for himself.
Nay, even
voluntary forgiveness by the party injured
again,

(o) Bee page US.

M Vic.,

is

The present law on the
(16) These statutes are since repealed, and new provisions made.
24 and
restoration of property stolen, embezzled, etc, or received with guilty knowledge,
c. 96, a. 100.
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"This," says an
ought not, in true policy, to intercept the stroke of justice.
elegant writer, (jo) who pleads with equal strength for the certainty as for the
lenity of punishment, "may be an act of good nature and humanity, but it is
contrary to the good of the public. For, although a private citizen may dis
pense with satisfaction for his private injury, he cannot remove the necessity
The right of punishing belongs not to any one individual
of public example.
in particular, but to the society in general, or the sovereign who represents that
society: and a man may renounce his own portion of this right, but he cannot
give up that of others."

CHAPTER XXVIIL

OP THE BENEFIT OF CLERGY.
Aftee trial and conviction, the judgment of the court regularly follow,
of which the
unless suspended or arrested by some intervening circumstance;
principal is the benefit of clergy; (1) a title of no small curiosity as well as use;
shall therefore inquire: 1. Into its original, and the
and concerning which
various mutations which this privilege of clergy has sustained. 2. To what per
sons it is to be allowed at this day. 3. In what cases. 4. The consequences of

I

allowing it.
L Clergy, the privilegium clericale, or in common speech, the benefit of clergy >
had its original from the pious regard paid by Christian princes to the church
in its infant state; and the ill use which the popish ecclesiastics soon made of
that pious regard. The exemptions which they granted to the church, were
principally of two kinds: 1. Exemption of places consecrated to religious
duties, from criminal arrests, which was the foundation of sanctuaries; 2. Ex
emption of the persona of clergymen from criminal process before the secular
judge in a few particular cases, which was the true original and meaning of the
privilegium clericale.
But the clergy, increasing in wealth, power, honour, number, and interest,
began soon to set up for themselves: and that which they obtained by the
favour of the civil government, they now claimed as their inherent right: and
the highest nature, indefeasible, and jure divino. (a) By
r*Q«Ai 48 a *right of
L
68J their canons, therefore, and constitutions, they endeavoured at, and
where they met with easy princes obtained, a vast extension of these exemp
tions: as well in regard to the crimes themselves, of which the list became quit*
universal; (b) as in regard to the persons exempted, among whom were at length
not only every little subordinate officer belonging to the church
comprehended
or clergy, but even many that were totally laymen.
In England, however, although the usurpations of the pope were very m3nv
and grievous, till Henry the Eighth entirely exterminated his supremacy, yet a
total exemption of the clergy from secular jurisdiction could never be thorough
ly effected, though often endeavoured by the clergy: (c) and therefore, though
the ancient privilegium clericale was in some capital cases, yet it was not uni
versally allowed. And in those particular cases, the use was for the bishop or
ordinary to demand his clerks to be remitted out of the king's courts, as soon
as they were indicted: concerning the allowance of which demand there was
for many years a great uncertainty; (d) till at length it was finally settled in
(p) Becc. ch. 46.
(o) The principal argument upon which they founded this exemption waa that text of Scripture: Toodi
(Kellw. 1H1.
not mine anointed, and do my prophets no harm."
(c) Keilw. 180.
(d) 2 Hal. P. C. 377.
(6) See book III, page 62.

of clergy is now abolished, and tbe law of this chapter is obsolete.
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(«)

conviction, by way of arresting judgment. This latter way is most usually
practiced, as it is more to the satisfaction of the court to have the crime pre
viously ascertained by confession or the verdict of a jury: and also it is more
advantageous to the prisoner himself, who may possibly be acquitted, and so
'
need not the benefit of his clergy at all.
the
law
was
that
no
man
should
to
be
admitted
the
held,
Originally
privilege
of clergy, but such as had the *habitum et tonmram clericalem.(e) But r*oBhi
■*
in process of time a much wider and more comprehensive criterion was
established: every one that could read (a mark of great learning in those days
of ignorance and her sister superstition) being accounted a clerk or clericus
and allowed the benefit of clerkship, though neither initiated in holy orders,
nor trimmed with the clerical tonsure.
But when learning, by means of the
invention of printing, and other concurrent causes, began to be more generally
disseminated than formerly; and reading was no longer a competent proof of
clerkship, or being in holy orders; it was found that as many laymen as div
ines were admitted to the privilegium clericale : and, therefore, by statute 4
Hen. VII, c. 13, a distinction was once more drawn between mere lay scholars,
and clerks that were really in orders.
And, though it was thought reasonable
still to mitigate the severity of the law with regard to the former, yet they
were not put upon the same footing with actual clergy; being subjected to a
slight degree of punishment, and not allowed to claim the clerical privilege
more than once. Accordingly, the statute directs that no person once admit
ted to the benefit of clergy shall be admitted thereto a second time, unless he
produces his orders: and in order to distinguish their persons, all laymen who
are allowed this privilege shall be burnt with a hot iron in the brawn of the
left thumb. This distinction between learned laymen, and real clerks in orders,
was abolished for a time by the statutes 28 Hen. V11L c. 1, and 32 Hen. VHI,
<5. 3, but it is held
to have been virtually restored by statute Edw. VI, c.
12, which statute also enacts that lords of parliament and peers of the realm,
having place and voice in parliament, may have the benefit of their peerage,
■equivalent to that of clergy, for the first offence (although they cannot read,
and without being burnt in the hand), for all offences then clergyable to com
moners, and also for the crimes of house-breaking, highway robbery, horse
stealing, and robbing of churches. (2)
* After this burning, the laity, and before
the real clergy, were disr*388i
charged from the sentence of the law in the king's court, and delivered
over to the ordinary, to be dealt with according to the ecclesiastical canons.
Whereupon the ordinary, not satisfied with the proofs adduced in the profane
secular court, set himself formally to work to make
purgation of the offender
by new canonical trial; although he had been previously convicted by his
country, or perhaps by his own confession. (/) This trial was held before the
bishop in person, or his deputy; and by
jury of twelve clerks: and there,
first, the party himself was required to make oath of his own innocence; next,
there was to be the oath of twelve compurgators, who swore they believed he
spoke the truth; then, witnesses were to be examined upon oath, but on be
half of the prisoner only: and, lastly, the jury were to bring in their verdict
clerk, he was
upon oath, which usually acquitted the prisoner; otherwise,
degraded, or put to penance, (g) A learned judge, in the beginning of the
last century,
remarks ,with much indignation the vast complication of per
mock trial; the witjury and subornation of perjury, in this solemn farce of
S

2

2

(«) Hal P. 0. 1172.M. Paris.
Hal. P. C. 175
(e) Hob. 294.
to) P. Wms. 447. Hob. 2S9.
a

(2) A person convicted of
clergyable felony was entitled to discharge without being
fcurned in the hand.
Duchess of Kingston's Case, 20 How. St. Tr. 855.
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, the compurgators, and the jury, being all of them partakers in the guilt:
the delinquent party also, though convicted before on the clearest evidence,
and conscious of his own offence, yet was permitted and almost compelled to
swear himself not guilty: nor was the good bishop himself, under whose coun
tenance this scene of wickedness was daily transacted, by any means exempt
from a share of it. And yet by this purgation the party was restored to his
credit, his liberty, his lands, and his capacity of purchasing afresh, and was
entirely made a new and an innocent man.
This scandalous prostitution of oaths and the forms of justice, in the almost
constant acquittal of felonious clerks by purgation, was the occasion, that upon
r*ifto 1 ver7 heinous and *notorious oircumstances of guilt, the temporal courts
*■
J would not trust the ordinary with the trial of the offender, but deliv
ered over to him the convicted clerk, absque purgatione facienda: in which
situation the clerk convict could not make purgation; but was to continue in
prison during life, and was incapable of acquiring any personal property, or
receiving the profits of his lands, unless the King should please to pardon him.
Both these courses were in some degree exceptionable; the latter being perhaps
As,
too rigid, as the former was productive of the most abandoned perjury.
therefore, these mock trials took their rise from factious and popish tenets,
tending to exempt one part of the nation from the general municipal law; it
became high time, when the reformation was thoroughly established, to abolish
so vain and impious a ceremony.
enacts that, for the avoiding of such
Accordingly, the statute of 18Eliz. c.
perjuries and abuses, after the offender has been allowed his clergy, he shall
not be delivered to the ordinary, as formerly; but, upon such allowance and
burning in the hand, he shall forthwith be enlarged and delivered out of prison;
he thinks fit, continue the offender m gaol
with proviso that the judge may,
for any time not exceeding year. And thus the law continued, for above a
c.
allowed, that
century, unaltered, except only that the statute of 21 Jac.
women convicted of simple larcenies under the value of ten shillings should
(not properly have the benefit of clergy, for they were not called upon to read;
but) be burned in the hand, and whipped, (3) stocked, or imprisoned for any
And similar indulgence, by the statutes and
time not exceeding year.
W. and M, c. 24, was extended to women, guilty
and
and
W. and M. c.
of any clergyable felony whatsoever; who were allowed once to claim the
benefit of the statute, in like manner as men might claim the benefit of clergy,
and to be discharged upon being burnt in the hand, and imprisoned for any
The punishment of burning in the hand, being
time not exceeding year.
found ineffectual, was also changed by statute 10 and 11 Win. HI, c. 23, into
burning in the most visible part of the left cheek, nearest the nose; but such
an indelible stigma being found by experience to render offenders desperate,
Ann.,
this provision was repealed, about seven years afterwards, by statute
and till that period, all women, all peers of parliament and peeresses, and
c.
a^ ma"e commoners who could read, were discharged *in all clergyable
r*<?70
clerks in orders: and other com
felonies; the males absolutely,
moners, both male and female,
upon branding; and peers and peeresses
without branding, for the first offence: yet all liable (excepting peers and
the judge saw occasion, to imprisonment not exceeding a year.
peeresses),
under the degree of peerage, were
And those men who could not read,
hanged.
was considered, that education and learning were no
Afterwards, indeed,
the punishment of
extenuations of guilt, but quite the reverse: and that,

0
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a
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a

1

Geo. IV, c 57.
(8) Whipping of women In England was abolished in England by Stat
allowed in
few only of the American states. It
not
Whipping as
punishment
" cruel " or " unusual " punishment in
constitutional sense. Commonwealth v. Wyatt.
Rand., 694.
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death for simple felony was too severe for those who had been liberally in
structed, it was, a fortiori, too severe for the ignorant also. And thereupon,
by the same statute, 5 Ann. c. 6, it was enacted that the benefit of clergy
should be granted to all those who were entitled to ask
without requiring
them to read, by way of conditional merit. And, experience having shown
tbat so very universal lenity was frequently inconvenient, and an encourage
ment to commit the lower degrees of felony; and that, though capital punish
ments were too rigorous for these inferior offences, yet no punishment at all (or
next to none), was as much too gentle;
was further enacted by the same
statute, that when any person
convicted of any theft, or larceny, and burnt
in the hand for the same, according to the ancient law, he shall also, at the
discretion of the judge, be committed to the house of correction or publio
workhouse, to be there kept to hard labour, for any time not less than six
double con
months, and not exceeding two years; with
power of inflicting
finement in case of the party's escape from the first. And
was also enacted,
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c. 11, and
the statutes
Geo.
Geo.
c. 23, that when any persons shall
be convicted of any larceny, either grand or petit, or any felonious stealing or
taking of money, or goods and chattels, either from the person or the house of
any other, or in any other manner, and who by the law shall be entitled to the
benefit of clergy, and liable only to the penalties of burning in the hand, or
whipping, the court in their discretion, instead of such burning in the hand, or
whipping, may direct such offenders to be transported to America (or, by stat
ute 19 Geo. Ill, c. 74, to any other parts beyond the seas) for seven years: and
if they *return or are seen at large in this kingdom within that time, r*qjr-i
it shall be felony, without benefit of clergy. And by the subsequent
statutes, 16 Geo. II, c. 15, and Geo. Ill, c. 15, many wise provisions are made
for the more speedy and effectual execution of the laws relating to transporta
tion, and the conviction of such as transgress them. But now, by the statute
19 Geo. IH, c. 74, all offenders liable to transportation may, in lieu thereof, at
the discretion of the judges, be employed,
males, except in the case of petty
larceny, in hard labour for the benefit of some publio navigation; or, whether
males or females, may, in all cases, be confined to hard labour in certain peni
tentiary houses, to be erected by virtue of the said act, for the several terms
therein specified, but in no case exceeding seven years; with
power of sub
sequent mitigation, and even of reward, in case of their good behaviour. But
if they escape, and are retaken, for the first time an addition of three years
second escape
made to the term of their confinement; and
felony, without
benefit of olergy.
In forming the plan of these penitentiary houses, the principal objects have
been, by sobriety, cleanliness and medical assistance, by
regular series of
labour, by solitary confinement during the intervals of work, and by due re
ligious instruction, to preserve and amend the health of the unhappy offenders,
to inure them to habits of industry, to guard them from pernicious company,
to accustom them to serious reflection, and to teach them both the principles
And
the whole of this
and practice of every Christian and moral duty.
reason
plan be properly executed, and its defects be timely supplied, there
to hope that such a reformation may be effected in the lower classes of man
kind, and such a gradual scale of punishment be affixed to all gradations of
guilt, as may in time supersede the necessity of capital punishment, except for
very atrocious crimes.
It also enacted by the same statute, 19 Geo. Ill, c. 74, that instead of burn
ing in the hand (which was sometimes too slight, and sometimes too disgrace
ful punishment), the court, in all clergyable felonies, may impose
pecuniary
fine; or (except in the case of manslaughter) may order the offender to be
once or oftener, but not more than thrice, either publicly or privately whipped;
such private whipping (to prevent collusion or abnse) to be inflicted in the
presence of two witnesses, and in case of female offenders in the presence of
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females only. Which fine or whipping shall have the same consequences as
burning in the hand; and the offender, so fined or whipped, shall be equally
liable to a subsequent detainer or imprisonment.
In this state does the benefit of clergy at present stand; very considerably
different from its original institution; the wisdom of the English legislature
having, in the course of a long and laborious process, extracted by a noble
alchemy rich medicines out of poisonous ingredients; and converted, by grad
ual mutations, what was at first an unreasonable exemption of particular popish
ecclesiastics, into a merciful mitigation of the general law, with respect to cap
ital punishment.
From the whole of this detail we may collect, that however in times of ignor
ance and superstition that monster in true policy may for a while subsist, of s
body of men, residing in the bowels of a state, and yet independent of its laws;
yet, when learning and rational religion have a little enlightened men's minds,
society can no longer endure an absurdity so gross, as must destroy its very
fundamentals. For, by the original contract of government, the price of pro
tection by the united force of individuals is that of obedience to the united
will of the community. This united will is declared in the laws of the land:
and that united force is exerted in their due and universal execution.
IL am next to inquire, to what persons the benefit of clergy is to be allow
ed at this day: and this must be chiefly collected from what has been observed
*n tne Prece^ing *article.
For, upon the whole, we may pronounce
r*s72l-I
*■
that all clerks in orders are, without any branding, and of course with
out any transportation, fine, or whipping, (for those are only substituted in lien
of the other) to be admitted to this privilege, and immediately discharged; and
this as often as they offend,
Again, all lords of parliament and peers of
the realm, having place and voice in parliament, by the statute
Edw. VL c.
12, (which
likewise held to extend to peeresses) (k) shall be discharged
all clergyable and other felonies provided for by the act, without any burning
in the hand, or imprisonment, or other punishment substituted in its stead, in the
Last
same manner as real clerks conviot: but this
only for the first offence.
ly, all the commons of the realm, not in orders, whether male or female, shall,
for the first offence, be discharged of the capital punishment of felonies, with
in the benefit of clergy, upon being burnt in the hand, whipped, or fined, or
suffering
discretionary imprisonment in the common gaol, the house of cor-'
rection, one of the penitentiary houses, or in the places of labour, for the bene
fit of some navigation; or, in oase of larceny, upon being transported for seven
the court shall think proper. It hath been said, that Jews, and other
years,
infidels and heretics, were not capable of the benefit of clergy, till after the
statute
Ann. c.
as being under a legal incapacity for orders.
But
much question whether this was ever ruled for law, since the re-introduction
of the Jews into England, in the time of Oliver Cromwell.
For, if that were
the oase, the Jews are still in the same predicament, which every day's experi
ence will contradict: the statute of Queen Anne having certainly made no
teration in this respect;
only dispensing with the necessity of reading in those
persons, who, in case they could read, were before the act entitled to the bene
fit of their clergy.
III. The third point to be considered
for what crimes the privilegivm
to be allowed. And,
to be observed, that
clerieale, or benefit of clergy,
neither in high treason, nor in petit larceny, nor in any mere misdemeanors,
was indulged at the common law; and therefore we may lay
down for rule,
that
was allowable only in petit treason and capital felonies: which, for the
most Part> became legally entitled to this *indulgence by the statute
T*373l
de clero, 25 Edw. Ill, st.
which provides that clerks convict for
c.
treasons or felonies, touching other persons than the king himself or his royal
504

4,

3,

Hal. P. C. 875.
Hal. P. O. 878.

2

(0
(I)

82

*

*■

it

I

a

it

it

is

is

it

is,

it

al

5

6,

(/)

if

a

is

is

in

1

(i)

I

(*) Duchess of Kingston's Case in Parliament,
Hawk. P. C. 888. Fost. 80S.

a Apr.,

17T8.

Benefit of Clebgt.

Chap. 28.]

373

it

*

7.

it,

a

(qM Hawk. P. C. 842.
888.

(<) P. Wms. 487.
3

1

2

2

2

2

(m) Hal. P. C. 833.
(n) Hal. P. C. S4«.
Hal. P. O. 830.
(p)
(o) Moor. 786. Fost. 288.
HaL P. C. 529. Fost. 858,8S7.
(r)
(«) Hal. P.

is

4

8

is

is

a

(t)

a

is

is

(a)

1.

a

a

I

a

is

it

is

*■

is

a

is

is

is

is

if

is

is

by

a

it

it

I

a

is,

majesty, shall have the privilege of holy ohurch. But yet it was not allowable
in all felonies whatsoever: for in some it was denied even by the common law,
viz., insidiatio viarum, or lying in wait for one on the highway; depopulatio
ngrorum, or destroying and ravaging a country; (m) and combustio domorum,
kind of hostile acts,
or arson, that
the burning of houses: (») all which are
■and in some degree border upon treason.
And, farther, all these identical crimes,
together with petit treason, and very many other acts of felony, are ousted of
clergy by particular acts of parliament; which have in general been mentioned
under the particular offences to which they belong, and therefore need not be
shall only
here recapitulated. Upon all which statutes for excluding clergy
observe, that they are nothing else but the restoring of the law to the same
rigour of capital punishment in the first offence that exerted before the privisecond
still exerts upon
legium clericals was at all indulged; and whioh
clerks actually in
offence in almost all kinds of felonies, unless committed
orders.
But so tender
the law of inflicting capital punishment in the first
instance for any inferior felony, that, notwithstanding by the marine law, as
not allowed in
declared in statute 28 Hen. VTH, c. 15, the benefit of clergy
any case whatsoever; yet, when offences are committed within the admiraltycommitted by land, the constant
jurisdiction, which would be clergyable
course is to acquit and discharge the prisoner, (o) (4) And, to conclude this
head of inquiry, we may observe the following rules: 1. That in all felonies,
now allowable, unless taken
whether new created or by common law, clergy
away by express words of an act of parliament, (p) 2. That, where clergy
taken away from the principal,
not of course taken away from the acces
sory, unless he be also particularly included in the words of the statute, (q) 8.
taken away from the offence (as in case of
That when the benefit of clergy
murder, buggery, robbery, rape, and burglary),
principal in the second degree
as well *excluded from
being present, aiding and abetting the crime,
his clergy as he that
principal in the first degree: but 4. That, where
only taken away from the person committing the offence (as in the case
of stabbing, or committing larceny in dwelling-house, or privately from the
person), his aiders and abettors are not excluded; through the tenderness of
the law which hath determined that such statutes shall be taken literally, (r)
IV. Lastly, we are to inquire what the consequences are to the party, of al
speak not of the branding, fine, whip
lowing him this benefit of clergy.
ping, imprisonment, or transportation; which are rather concomitant conditions,
than consequences of receiving this indulgence. The consequences are such
as affect his present interest, and future credit and capacity: as having been
once felon, but now purged from that guilt by the privilege of clergy; which
operates as kind of statute pardon.
And we may observe,
That by this conviction he forfeits all his goods to
the king: which being once vested in the crown, shall not afterwards be restored
to the offender,
2. That, after conviction, and till he receives the judg
ment of the law, by branding, or some of its substitutes, or else
pardoned
to all intents and purposes
felon, and subject to all the dis
by the king, he
felon,
3. That after burning, or its sub
abilities and other incidents of
stitute, or pardon, he
discharged forever of that, and all other felonies before
committed, within the benefit of clergy; but not of felonies from which such
Eliz. c. and 18 Eliz. c.
excluded: and this by statutes
4. That,
benefit
he
restored to all
by the burning, or its substitute, or the pardon of

if

(4) By subsequent statutes, offenses committed on the high seas are to be considered
committed on shore.
treated in the same manner as
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capacities and credits, and the possession of his lands, as if he had never been
convicted. («) 5. That what is said with regard to the advantages of common
ers and laymen, subsequent to the burning in the hand, is equally applicable
to all peers and clergymen, although never branded at all, or subjected to
other punishment in its stead.
For they have the same privileges, without
which others are entitled to after
any burning, or any substitute for
(w)
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We are now to consider the next stage of criminal prosecution, after trial
and conviction are past, in such crimes and misdemeanors as are either too
that of
high or too low to be included within the benefit of clergy: which
judgment. For when, upon a capital charge, the jury have brought in their
verdict guilty, in the presence of the prisoner, he
either immediately, or at
he has anything to offer
a convenient time soon after, asked by the court
why judgment should not be awarded against him. And in case the defen
dant be found guilty of a misdemeanor (the trial of whioh may, and does
usually, happen in his absence, after he has once appeared), a capiat
awarded and issued, to bring him in to receive his judgment; and, if he ab
But whenever he appears
sconds, he may be prosecuted even to outlawry.
capital or inferior conviction, he may, at this period, a»
person, upon either
well as at his arraignment, offer any exceptions to the indiotment, in arrest or
stay of judgment: as, for want of sufficient certainty in setting forth either
the objections be
And,
the person, the time, the place, or the offence.
valid, the whole proceedings shall be set aside; but the party may be indicted
That none of the statutes of
And we may take notice,
again, (a) (1)
jeofails, (b) for amendment of errors, extend to indictments or proceedings
not aided
criminal cases; *and therefore defective indictment
verdict, as defective pleadings in civil cases are. 2. That, in favour
of life, great strictness has at all times been observed, in every point of an
dictment. Sir Matthew Hale indeed complains, " that this strictness
grown
to be a blemish and inconvenience in the law, and the administration thereof:
for that more offenders escape by the over-easy ear given to exceptions in
dictments, than by their own innocence." (c) And yet no man was more ten
der of life than this truly excellent judge. (2)
A pardon, also, as has been before said, may be pleaded in arrest of judg
has the same advantage when pleaded here as when pleaded upon
ment, and
arraignment, viz., the saving the attainder, and, of course, the corruption of
not
blood; which nothing can restore but parliament, when
pardon
And certainly, upon all accounts, when a man
pleaded till after sentence.
in the right to plead
as soon as possible.
hath obtained a pardon, he
Praying the benefit of clergy may also be ranked among the motions in arrest
of judgment: of which we spoke largely in the preceding chapter.
If all these resources fail, the court must pronounce that judgment which
the law hath annexed to the crime, and which hath been constantly mentioned,

§

(1) See Casborus v. People, 13 Johns., 351: Commonwealth v. Goddard, 13 Mass., 455.
(2) But now, formal defects apparent on the face of the indictment can only be taken advantage of by demurrer or motion to quash, and not afterwards.
Statute 14 and 15 Vic. c
100,
25.
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orime itself, in some or other of the former chapters.
Of
these, some are capital, which extend to the life of the offender, and consist
generally in being hanged by the neck till dead; though in very atrocious
crimes other circumstances of terror, pain or disgrace, are superadded; as, in
treasons *of all kinds, being drawn or dragged to the place of execui*3*»i*
tion; in high treason affecting the king's person or government, em- *■
boweling alive, beheading, and quartering; and in murder, a public dissection.
And, in case of any treason committed by a female, the judgment is to be
burned alive.
But the humanity of the English nation has authorized, by a
tacit consent, an almost general mitigation of such parts of these judgments
as savour of torture or cruelty: a sledge or hurdle being usually allowed to
such traitors as are condemned to be drawn; and there being very few in
stances (and those accidental or by negligence) of any person's being embow
eled or burned, till previously deprived of sensation by strangling.
Some
punishments consist in exile or banishment,by abjuration of the realm, ortrans: others in loss of liberty, by perpetual or temporary imprisonment,
§ortation
ome extend to confiscation, by forfeiture of lands, or movables, or both, or
of the profits of lands for life: others induce a disability, of holding offices or
employments, being heirs, executors, and the like. Some, though rarely, oc
casion a mutilation or dismembering, by cutting off the hand or ears; others
fix a lasting stigma on the offender, by slitting the nostrils, or branding in the
band or cheek.
Some are merely pecuniary, by stated or discretionary fines:
and lastly, there are others that consist principally in their ignominy, though
most of them are mixed with some degree of corporal pain; and these are in
flicted chiefly for such crimes as either arise from indigence, or render even
Such as whipping, hard labour in the house of correc
opulence disgraceful.
tion, or otherwise, the pillory, the stocks, and the ducking-stool.
Disgusting as this catalogue may seem, it will afford pleasure to an English
reader, and do honour to the English law, to compare it with that shocking
apparatus of death and torment, to be met with in the criminal codes of almost
every other nation in Europe. And it is, moreover, one of the glories of our
English law, that the species, though not always the quantity or degree, of
punishment is ascertained for every offence; and that it is not left in the breast
of any *judge, nor even of a jury, to alter that judgment, which the r*378i'
law has beforehand ordained, for every subject alike, without respect ••
For, if judgments were to be the private opinions or the judge,
of persons.
men would then be slaves to their magistrates; and would live in society with
out knowing exactly the conditions and obligations which it lays them under.
And besides, as this prevents oppression on the one hand, so on the other it
stifles all hopes of impunity or mitigation; with which an offender might flat
ter himself, if his punishment depended on the humour or discretion of the
court. Whereas, where an established
penalty is annexed to crimes, the
criminal may read their certain consequence in that law; which ought to be
the unvaried rule, as it is the inflexible judge, of his actions.
The discretionary fines and discretionary length of imprisonment, which our
courts are enabled to impose, may seem an exception to this rule. But the
in these
general nature of the punishment, viz., by fine or imprisonment,
cases, fixed and determinate: though the duration and quantity of each must
frequently vary, from the aggravations or otherwise of the offence, the quality
and condition of the parties, and from innumerable other circumstances.
The
quantum, in particular, of pecuniary fines, neither can, nor ought to be ascer
tained by an invariable law. The value of money itself changes from
thou
ruin to one man's fortune, may be
sand causes, and, at all events, what
Thus the law of the twelve tables at
matter of indifference to another's.
Rome fined every person that struck another five-and-twenty denarii: this in
the more opulent days of the empire, grew to be
punishment of so little con
sideration, that Aulus Gellius tells story of one Lucius Neratius, who mad»
607

Judgment

378

aht>

[Book IV.

its Consequences.

it his

diversion to give a blow to whomsoever he pleased, and then tender
Our statute law has not, therefore, often ascer
them the legal forfeiture.
tained the quantity of fines, nor the common law ever; it directing snch an
offence to be punished by fine in general, without specifying the certain sum;
sufficient, when we consider that *however unlimited
wn*on *8
T *S*ft1
*■
-I the power of the court may seem, it is far from being wholly arbi
trary; but its discretion is regulated by law. For the bill of rights (d) has
particularly declared, that excessive fines ought not to be imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted (which had a retrospect to some unprece
dented proceedings in the court of king's bench, in the reign of King James
the Second): and the same statute farther declares, that all grants and prom
ises of fines and forfeitures of particular persons before conviction, are illegal
and void. Now the bill of rights was only declaratory of the old constitu
tional law: and accordingly we find it expressly holden, long before, (c) that
all suoh previous grants are void; since thereby many times undue means, and
more violent prosecution, would be used for private lucre, than the quiet and
just proceeding of law would permit.
The reasonableness of fines in criminal cases has also been usually regulated
by the determination of magna carta, c. 14, concerning amercements for mis
" JLibcr homo non amercibehaviour by the suitors in matters of civil right.
etur pro parvo delicto, nisi secundum modum ipsius delicti/ et pro magno delicto,
secundum magnitudinem delicti; salvo contenemento suo; et mercator eodem
modo, salva mercandisa sua; et villanus eodem modo amercietur, salvo wainagio suo." (3) A rule that obtained even in Henry the Second's time (/)
and means only that no man shall have a larger amercement imposed upon
him, than his circumstances or personal estate will bear; saving to the land
or land; to the trader his merchandize; and to the
holder his contenement,
In order to
countryman his wainage, or team and instruments of husbandry.
ascertain which, the great charter also directs that the amercement, which is
always inflicted in general terms ( "sit in misericordia "), shall be set, ponatur,
or reduced to a certainty, by the oath of good and lawful men of the neigh
borhood. Which method of liquidating the amercement to a precise sum, was
usually performed in the superior courts by the assessment or affeerment of
the coroner, a sworn officer chosen by the neighborhood, under the equity of
the statute Westm. 1, c. 18; and then the judges estreated them into the exBut in the court-leet and court-baron it is still performed by
«hequer. (g)
0T suitors sworn to affeere, that is, tax and moderate the
*affieerors>
f*380lJ
*■
general amercement according to the particular circumstances of the
offence and the offender, (h) Amercements imposed by the superior courts on
their own officers and ministers were affeered by the judges themselves; bat
when a peculiar mulct was inflicted by them on a stranger (not being party to
and the ancient practice was,
•any suit), it was then denominated a fine;
when any such fine was imposed, to inquire by jury " quantum inderegi dare
valeat per annum, salca sustentatione sua, et uxoris, etliberorum suorum."
And since the disuse of such inquest,
never usual to assess
larger fine
than
man
able to pay, without touching the implements of his livelihood;
limited imprisonment, instead of such
but to inflict corporal punishment, or
fine as might amount to imprisonment for life. And this
the reason why
fines in the king's court are frequently denominated ransoms, because the pena
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(3) Cruel and unusual punishments are forbidden in the United States by constitutions!
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provisions. See Barker v. People.
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wealth v. Wyatt.
Rand., 694; Huber v. Reiley, 53 Penn. St., 112; Garcia v. Territorr,
New Mex., 415.
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(I)

alty must otherwise fall upon a man's person, unless it be redeemed or ran
somed by a pecuniary fine; (k) according to an ancient maxim, qui non habet
in erumena luat in corpore. Yet, where any statute speaks both of fine and
ransom, it is holden that the ransom shall be treble to the fine at least.
(4)
When sentence of death, the most terrible and highest judgment in the lawsof England,
pronounced, the immediate inseparable consequence from the
common law
attainder. For when
now clear beyond all dispute, that
the criminal
no longer fit to live upon the earth, but
to be exterminated
as
monster and
bane to human society, the law sets
note of infamy upon
him, puts him out of its protection, and takes no farther care of him than barely
to see him executed. (5) He
then called attaint, attinclus, stained or black
He no longer of any credit or reputation; he cannot be a witness iu
ened.
he capable of performing the functions of another man:
any court: neither
for, by an anticipation of his punishment, he
already dead in law. (m) This
after Judgment; for there
man convicted and
great difference between
attainted: though they are frequently through inaccuracy confounded together.
After conviction *only man
liable to none of these disabilities; for r*aai.i
*
there is still in contemplation of law a possibility of his innocence.
Something may be offered in arrest of judgment; the indictment may be erro
neous, which will render his guilt uncertain, and thereupon the present convic
tion may be quashed: he may obtain
pardon, or be allowed the benefit of
clergy: both which suppose some latent sparks of merit, which plead in extenu
ation of his fault. But when judgment is once pronounced, both law and fact
not the remotest possi
conspire to prove him completely guilty; and there
bility left of anything to be said in his favour. Upon judgment, therefore, of
death, and not before, the attainder of a criminal commences: or upon sucb
circumstances as are equivalent to judgment of death; as judgment of out
lawry on a capital crime, pronounced for absconding or fleeing from justice,
which tacitly confesses the guilt.
And, therefore, either upon judgment of
man shall be said to be at
outlawry, or of death, for treason or felony,
tainted.
The consequences of attainder are forfeiture and corruption of blood.
First, as to real es
Forfeiture
two-fold; of 'real and personal estates.
tates: by attainder in high treason (»)
man forfeits to the king all his lands
and tenements of inheritance, whether fee-simple or fee-tail, and all his rights
of entry on lands or tenements, which he had at the time of the offence corncommitted, or at any time afterwards, to be forever vested in the crown; and
also the profits of all lands and tenements, which he had in his own right for
life or years, so long as such interest shall subsist.
This forfeiture relates
backwards to the time of the treason committed; so as to avoid all intermedi
ate sales and incumbrances, (o) but not those before the fact: and therefore a
not forfeitable for the treason of her husband because set
wife's jointure
tled upon her previous to the treason committed. But her dower *is r*3fi„-i,
forfeited by the express provision of statute
and
Edw. VI, c. 11.
And yet the husband shall be tenant by the curtesy of the wife's lands,
the
not prohibited by the statute.
wife be attainted of treason: (p) for that
But, though after attainder the forfeiture relates back to the time of the treaInst. ML
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(4) In any case the judgment must be the same which the law allows, and not other or
reversed, even
different; for
will be erroneous, and the prisoner may have
be not so severe as should have been inflicted.
R. v. Bourne,
though
A. &E..58;
Y.,
167; Elliott v. People, 13 Mich 363. But
the punishment
Hartung v. People, 26 N.
consist of two severable things, as fine and imprisonment, the prisoner cannot be heard to
Wend., 203.
See Kane v. People,
complain that only one
imposed.
not well guarded.
Even an attainted felon cannot be killed with
(5) This statement
Impunity by any one without warrant of law.
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con committed, yet it does not take effect unless an attainder be had, of which
it is one of the fruits; and therefore if a traitor dies before judgment pro
nounced, or is killed in open rebellion, or is hanged by martial law, it worki
no forfeiture of his lands; for he never was attainted of treason, (q) But if the
ohief justice of the king's bench (the supreme coroner of all England) in per
son, upon the view of the body of one killed in open rebellion, records it and
returns the record into his own court, both lands and goods shall be for
feited, (r)
The natural justice of forfeiture or confiscation of property, for treason,
founded on this consideration: that he who hath thus violated the fundamen
tal principles of government, and broken his part of the original contract be
tween king and people, hath abandoned his connections with society; and hath
no longer any right to those advantages, which before belonged to him purely
as
member of the community; among which social advantages, the right of
one of the chief.
Such for
transferring or transmitting property to others
feitures, moreover, whereby his posterity must suffer as well as himself, will
man, not only by the sense of his duty, and dread of per
help to restrain
sonal punishment, but also by his passions and natural affections; and will
terest every dependent and relation he has to keep him from offending: accord
"nec vero me fugit quam sit acering to that beautiful sentiment of Cicero,
bum, parentum scelera filiorum pcenis lui sed hoc praeclare legibus comparatum
And therefore
est, ut caritas liberorum amiciores parentes reipublicas redderet."
Aulus Cascellius,
Roman lawyer in the time of the triumvirate used to boast
*^at ^e ^a<^tw0 reasons for ""despising the power of the tyrants; his old
f*383l
age and his want of children: for children are pledges to the prince
of the father's obedience. («) Yet many nations have thought, that this post
humous punishment savours of hardship to the innocent; especially for crimes
that do not strike at the very root and foundation of society, as treason against
the government expressly does. And therefore, though confiscations were
very frequent in the times of the earlier emperors, yet Arcadius and Honorius
in every other instance but that of treason thought
more just, "ibi esse pom■am, vbi et noxa est;" and ordered that "peccata suos teneant auctores, nec tdterius progrediatur metus, quam reperiatur delictum:"
and Justinian also made
law to restrain the punishment of relations, (w) which directs the forfeiture
to go, except in the case of crimen majestatis, to the next of kin to the delin
On the other hand, the Macedonian laws extended even the capital
quent.
punishment of treason, not only to the children, but to all the relations of the
delinquent: (z) and of course their estates must be also forfeited, as no man
was left to inherit them.
And in Germany, by the famous golden bulle (y)
the lives of the sons of such
(copied almost verbatim from Justinian's code),
as conspire to kill an 'elector are spared, as
expressed, by the emperor's par
ticular bounty.
But they are deprived of all their effects and rights of suc
cession, and are rendered incapable of any honour, ecclesiastical or civil: "to
the end that, being always poor and necessitous, they may forever be accom
panied by the infamy of their father; may languish in continual indigence; and
may find (says this merciless ediot) their punishment in living, and their relief
in dying."
With ns, in England, forfeiture of lands and tenements to the crown for
treason
no means derived from the feudal policy (as has been already ob
served), (a) but was antecedent to the establishment of that system in this islan
*Dem£ transmitted from our Saxon ancestors, (6) and forming
f*384l
But in certain trea
part of the ancient Scandinavian constitution,
sons relating to the coin (which, as we formerly observed, seem rather
of the crimen falsi, than the crimen lassos majestatis),
provided by
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of the modern statutes (d ) which constitute the offence, that it shall work no
forfeiture of lands save only for the life of the offender; and hy all, that it

a

a

is

a

;

it

is

a

7

it

(e)

And, in order to abolish such
shall not deprive the wife of her dower,
was enacted by statute Ann. c. 21, that,
hereditary punishment entirely,
after the decease of the late pretender, no attainder for treason should extend
to the disinheriting of any heir, nor to the prejudioe of any person other than
the traitor himself. By which, the law of forfeitures for high treason would
subsequent statute intervened to
by this time have been at an end, had not
somewhat singular,
give them a longer duration. The history of this matter
and worthy observation. At the time of the union, the crime of treason in
Scotland was, by the Scots' law, in many respects different from that of trea
son in England; and particularly in its consequences of forfeitures of entailed
estates, which was more peculiarly English yet seemed necessary, that crime
so nearly affecting government should, both in its essence and consequences, be
put npon the same footing in both parts of the united kingdoms. In new-model
ing these laws, the Scotch nation and the English house of commons struggled
hard, partly to maintain, and partly to acquire, total immunity from forfeiture
and corruption of blood, which the house of lords as firmly resisted.
At
established by this statute, viz.,
compromise was agreed to, which
length
that the same crimes, and no other, should be treason in Scotland that are so in
England; and that the English forfeitures and corruption of blood should take
place in Scotland till the death of the then pretender; and then cease through
the lords artfully proposing this tempor
out the whole of Great Britain:
that the prudence of succeeding r«,qfis-i
ary clause, in *hopes (it
said)
parliaments would make
perpetual. (A) This has partjy been done
by the statute 17 Geo. II, o. 39 (made in the year preceding the late rebellion),
the operation of these indemnifying clauses being thereby still farther sus
pended till the death of the sons of the pretender,
(6)
In petit treason and felony, the offender also forfeits all his chattel interests
absolutely, and the profits of all estates, of freehold during life; and after his
death, all his lands and tenements in fee simple (but not those in tail) to the
crown, for very short period of time: for the king shall have them for year
called the
and a day, and may commit therein what waste he pleases; which
king's year, dag, and waste, if) Formerly the king had only liberty of com
mitting waste on the lands of felons, by pulling down their houses, extirpating
their gardens, ploughing their meadows, and cutting down their woods. And a
punishment of similar spirit appears to have obtained in the oriental coun
tries, from the decrees of Nebuchadnezzar and Cyrus in the books of Daniel
which, besides the pain of death inflicted on the delinquents
(k) and Ezra;
"
there specified, ordain, that their houses shall be made
But this
dunghill."
was agreed, in the reign of
tending greatly to the prejudice of the public,
Henry the First, in this kingdom, that the king should have the profits of the
day, in lieu of the destruction he was otherwise at lib
land for one year and
erty to commit: (m) and therefore magna carta (n) provides, that the king
shall only hold such lands for year and day, and then restore them to the
But the statute 17 Ed w.
lord of the fee; without any mention made of waste.
II, de pratrogativa regis seems to suppose, that the king shall have his year, day
and waste; and not the *year and day instead of waste. Which Sir r*ofifin
Edward Coke (and the author of the Mirror, before him) very justly
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expediency
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look npon as an encroachment, though a very ancient one, of the royal prerog
ative, (o) This year, day, and waste, are now usually compounded for; bat
otherwise they regularly belong to the crown; and after their expiration, the
land would naturally have descended to the heir (as in gavelkind tenure it
still does), did not its feudal quality intercept such descent, and give it by way
of escheat to the lord. These forfeitures for felony do also arise only upon
attainder; and therefore a felo de se forfeits no lands of inheritance or freehold,
for he never is attainted as a felon, (p) They likewise relate back to the time
of the offence committed, as well as forfeitures for treason; so as to avoid all
This may be hard upon such as have
intermediate charges and conveyances.
unwarily engaged with the offender: but the oruelty and reproach must lie on
the part, not of the law, but of the criminal ; who has thus knowingly and dishon
estly involved others in his own calamities.
These are all the forfeitures of real estates created by the common law, as
here omit
consequential upon attainders by judgment of death or outlawry.
the particular forfeitures created by the statutes of praemunire and others:
look upon them rather as apart of the judgment and penalty, in
because
flicted by the respective statutes, than as consequences of such judgment; as
in treason and felony they are. But shall just mention, as a part of the for
feiture of real estates, the forfeiture of the profits of lands during life, which
extends to two other instances, besides those already spoken of; misprision of
treason, (q) and striking in Westminster-hall, or drawing a weapon upon a
' *
je there sitting in the king's courts of justice, (r)
"he forfeiture of goods and chattels accrues in every one of the higher kinds
of offence: in high treason or misprision ""thereof, petit treason, felonies
r* 387J
71
L
0f all sorts, whether clergyable or not, self-murder or felony de se, petit
offences of striking, Ac., in
larceny, standing mute, and the above-mentioned
For flight also, on an accusation of treason, felony, or even
Westminster-halL
petit larceny, whether the party be found guilty or acquitted, if the jury find
the flight, the party shall forfeit his goods and chattels: for the very flight is
an offence, carrying with it a strong presumption of guilt, and is at least an
endeavor to allude and stifle the course of justice prescribed by the law. But
the jury very seldom find the flight: (s) forfeiture being looked upon, since tbe
vast increase of personal property of late years, as too large a penalty for an
offence, to which a man is prompted by the natural love of liberty. (7)
There is a remarkable difference or two between the forfeiture of lands and
1. Lands are forfeited upon attainder, and not before:
of goods and chattels.
goods and chattels are forfeited by conviction. Because, in many of the cases
where goods are forfeited, there never is any attainder, which happens only
where judgment of death or outlawry is given: therefore in those cases the
forfeiture must be upon conviction or not at all; and, being necessarily upon
conviction in those, it is so ordered in all other cases, for the law loves uni
2. In outlawries for treason or felony, lands are forfeited only by
formity.
the judgment: but the goods and chattels are forfeited by a man's being first
put in the exigent, without staying till he is quinto exactus, or finally outlawed;
for the secreting himself so long from justice is construed a flight in law.
3. The forfeiture of lands has relation to the time of the fact committed, so as to
avoid all subsequent sales and incumbrances; but the forfeiture of goods and
man has at the
chattels has no relation backwards; so that those only which
Therefore
traitor or felon may bona
time of conviction shall be forfeited.
fide sell any of his chattels real or personal, for the sustenance of himself and
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the fact and conviction; (w) for personal property is of
•,
•so fluctuating a nature, that it passes through many hands in a short r
t.fi J
time; and no buyer could be safe, if he were liable to return the goods *•
which he had fairly bought, provided any of the prior vendors had committed
a treason or felony. Yet, if they be collusively and not bona fide parted with
merely to defraud the crown, the law, (and particularly the statute 13 Eliz., c.
5) will reach them; for they are all the while truly and substantially the goods
of the offender: and as he, if acquitted, might recover them himself, as not
parted with for a good consideration; so in case he happens to be convicted,
the law will recover them for the king.
II. Another immediate consequence of attainder is the corruption of blood,
both upwards and downwards, (8), so that an attainted person can neither in
herit lands or other hereditaments from his ancestors, nor retain those he is
already in possession of, nor transmit them by descent to any heir; but the
same shall escheat to the lord of the fee, subject to the king's superior right of
forfeiture: and the person attainted shall also obstruct all descents to his pos
terity, wherever they are obliged to derive a title through him to a remoter
ancestor, (v)
This is one of those notions which our laws have adopted from the feudal
constitutions, at the time of the Norman conquest; as appears from its being
unknown in those tenures which are indisputably Saxon, or gavelkind: wherein,
though by treason, according to the ancient Saxon laws, the land is forfeited
to the king, yet no corruption of blood, no impediment of descents, ensues;
and, on judgment of mere felony, no escheat accrues to the lord. And there
fore as every other oppressive mark of feudal tenure is now happily worn
away in these kingdoms, it is to be hoped, that this corruption of blood, with
all its connected consequences, not only of present escheat, but of future inca
pacities of inheritance even to the twentieth generation, may in process of
time be abolished by act of parliament: as it stands upon a very different foot
ing from the forfeiture of lands for high ""treason, affecting the king's r*389i
*
person or government. And, indeed, the legislature has, from time to
time, appeared very inclinable to give way to so equitable a provision; by
enacting, that, in certain treasons respecting the papal supremacy (w) and the
public coin (se)and in many of the new-made felonies, created since the reigu
of Henry the Eighth by act of parliament, corruption of blood shall be saved.
But as in some of the acts for creating felonies (and those not of the most
atrocious kind) this saving was neglected, or forgotten, to be made, it seems
to be highly reasonable and expedient to antiquate the whole of this doctrine
by one undistinguishing law: especially as by the aforementioned statute of 7
Ann. c. 21 (the operation of which is postponed by statute 17 Geo. II, c. 89),
after the death of the sons of the late pretender, no attainder for treason will
extend to the disinheriting any heir, nor the prejudice of any person, other
than the offender himself; which virtually abolishes all corruption of blood for
treason, though (unless the legislature should interpose) it will still continue
for many sorts of felony.

family between

(u) 8 Hawk P. C. 4Si.
(*) Stat. B Eliz. c 11. lSEUx.c.1.

■ (tj) See book n, page 251.
<w) Stat. 5 Ell*, c. 1.
15and 16Geo. II, o. 28.
8 and9 W. ID, cTK

(8) By Stat. 3 and 4 Wm. IV, c. 106, attainders no longer obstruct the descent of estates.
The constitution of the United States provides that " No attainder of treason shall work
corruption of blood or forfeiture except during the life of the person attainted." Art. 3,
§ 3. The whole law respecting attainders and forfeitures for treason and felony is now
practically obsolete in the United States.
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CHAPTER XXX.
OF REVERSAL OF JUDGMENT.
We are next to consider how judgments, with their several connected con
sequences of attainder, forfeiture, and corruption of blood, may be set aside.
There are two ways of doing this; either by falsifying or reversing the judg
ment, or else by reprieve or pardon.
I A judgment may be falsified, reversed or avoided, in the first place, without
a writ of error, for matters foreign to or dehors the record, that is, not appar
ent upon the face of it; so that they cannot be assigned for error in the su
perior court, which can only judge from what appears in the record itself: and
therefore if the whole record be not certified, or not truly certified, by the in
ferior court, the party injured thereby (in both civil and criminal cases) may
Thus, if any
allege a diminution of the record, and cause it to be rectified.

Hawk. P. 0. 480,

■

(o)

(6)

8

is

a

a

in

j

a

is

[or [by

judgment whatever be given by persons who had no good commission to pro
ceed against the person condemned, it is void, and may be falsified by show
ing the special matter without writ of error. As, where a commission issues to
A and B, and twelve others, or any two of them, of which A or B shall be one,
to take and try indiotments; and any of the other twelve proceed without the
r#„gi-| interposition or presence *of either A or B: in this case all proceed-*
*■
ings, trials, oonvictions and judgments, are void for want of a proper
authority in the commissioners, and may be falsified upon bare inspection
withont the trouble of a writ of error; (a) (1) it being a high misdemeanor in
the judges so proceeding, and little (if any thing) short of murder in them
So, likewise,
all, in case the person so attainted be executed and suffer death.
if a man purchases land of another; and afterwards the vendor is, either by
outlawry or his own confession, convioted and attainted of treason or felony
previous to the sale or alienation; whereby such land becomes liable to for
feiture or esoheat; now upon any trial the purchaser is at liberty, without
bringing any writ of error, to falsify not only the time of the felony or trea
son supposed, but the very point of the felony or treason itself; and is not
conducted by the oonf ession or the outlawry of the vendor; though the vendor
himself is concluded, and not suffered now to deny the fact, whioh he has by
confession or flight acknowledged. But if such attainder of the vendor was
verdiot, on the oath of his peers, the alienee cannot be received to falsify
at liberty to prove
contradict the fact of the orime committed; though he
a mistake in time, or that the offenoe was committed after the alienation, and
jnot before, (b)
Seoondly, judgment may be reversed by writ of error: which lies from all
inferior criminal jurisdictions to the court of king's bench, and from the king's
bench to the house of peers; and may be brought for notorious mistakes
man
fonnd guilty of
the judgment or other parts of the record: as, where
perjury and receives the judgment of felony, or for other less palpable errors;
such as any irregularity, omission, or want of form in the process of outlawry,
or proclamations; the want of
proper addition to the defendant's name, ac
cording to the statute of additions; for not properly naming the sheriff or
other officer of the court, or not duly describing where his county court was
Inst. SSL

lHlLP. G. 881.

7

5ut

if

as
the court had no
(1) That is,
Jurisdiction of the case, its proceedings may be treated
void whenever they come in question.
Even the prosecution may treat them as void, and
the accused party on trial again for the same offense.
Commonwealth v. Goddard. IS
[ass., 455; People v. Tyler,
Mich., 161.
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held; for laying an offence committed in the time of the late king, to he done
•against the peace of the present; and for many other similar causes, r *oB2-i
*
which (though allowed out of tenderness to life and liberty) are not *■
of the national justice. These writs of
much to the oredit or advancement
«rror, to reverse judgments in case of misdemeanors, are not to be allowed of
course, but on sufficient probable cause shown to the attorney-general; and
then they are understood to be grantable of common right, and ex debito justiticB. (2)
But writs of error to reverse attainders in capital cases are only
allowed ex gratia: and not without express warrant under the king's sign
manual, or at least by the consent of the attorney-general, (c) These, there
fore, can rarely be brought hy the party himself, especially where he is at
tainted for an offence against the state: but they may be brought by his heir,
or executor, after his death, in more favourable times; which may he some con
solation to his family.
But the easier and more effectual way
Lastly, to reverse the attainder by act of parliament. This may be and hath
been frequently done, upon motives of compassion, or perhaps from .the zeal
of the times, after sudden revolution in the government, without examining
too closely into the truth or validity of the errors assigned.
And sometimes,
though the crime be universally acknowledged and confessed, yet the merits of
the criminal's family shall after his death obtain
restitution in blood, hon
ours, and estate, or some or one of them, by act of parliament; which, (so far
as
extends) has all the effeot of reversing the attainder without casting any
reflections upon the justice of the preceding sentence.
The effect of falsifying, or reversing an outlawry,
that the party shall he
in the same plight as
he had appeared upon the capias; and,
he before
after conviction,
plea pleaded, he shall be put to plead to the indictment;
he shall receive the sentence of the law; for all the other proceedings, except
only the process of outlawry for his non-appearance, *remain good and r*oQ3-i
effectual as before. But when judgment, pronounced upon conviction,
falsified or reversed, all former proceedings are absolutely set aside, and the
he had never been at all accused; restored in his credit, his
party stands as
oapaoity, his blood, and his estates: with regard to which last, though they
be granted away by the crown, yet the owner may enter upon the grantee with
as little ceremony as he might enter upon disseisor, {d)
But he still remains
liable to another prosecution for the same offence; for the first being erroneous,
he never was in jeopardy thereby. (3)
Vern. 1TO,ITS.

(d)

Hawk P. 0. 482.
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E. and B., 54: Ex part* Newton,
id., 869. The right to sue
(2) See Mansell v. Beg.
in the United States government by statutes, and in some states
out such writs
given
to the prosecution as well as the accused.
R,
C,
In
trial
not
in
new
case
of
R
L.
P.
England
v. Murphy,
felony.
granted
(8)
635; Reg. v. Bertrand, 10 Cox, 618, overruling R v. Scaife,
Den. C. 0., 281; 8. O., 17
to recommend
pardon.
Q. B., 238. If the conviction appears improper, the practice
R v. Frost, Moo., 140, 171 and note. In misdemeanors new trials are allowed. R v.
Tremearne,
B. and C, 254.
In the United States new trials may be granted, whether the offense charged be treason,
Gratt,
McLean, 578; Grayson v. Com.,
U. 8. v. Conner,
felony, or misdemeanor.
Ala.,
712; Com. v. Roby, 12 Pick., 496; State v. Prescott, 7N. H., 287; State v. Slack,
final. In the absence
676. An acquittal, even though against the weight of evidence,
of statutory permission no new trial
granted the prosecution. R v. Praed, Burr., 2257;
State v. Brown, 16 Conn., 54; People v. Webb, 38 Cal., 467.
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CHAPTEE XXXI.

OF REPRIEVE AND PARDON.
Thk only other remaining ways of avoiding the execution of the judgment
are by a reprieve, or a pardon; whereof the former is temporary only, the latter
permanent.
I. A reprieve, from reprendre, to take back, is the withdrawing of a sen
tence for an interval of time; whereby the execution is suspended.
This may
be, first, ex arbitrio judicis; either before or after judgment; as where the
judge is not satisfied with the verdict, or the evidence is suspicious, or the
indictment is insufficient, or he is doubtful whether the offence be within
clergy; or sometimes if it be a small felbny, or any favourable circumstances
appear in the criminal's character, in order to give room to apply to the crown
for either an absolute or conditional pardon. These arbitrary reprieves may
be granted or taken off by the justices of gaol delivery, although their session
be finished, and their commission expired: but this rather by common usage,
than of strict right, (a)
Reprieves may also be ex necessitate legia : as, where a woman is capitally
convicted, and pleads her pregnancy; though this is no cause to stay the
This is a
judgment, yet it is to respite the execution till she be delivered.
mercy *dictated by the law of nature, in favorem prolis ; and therefore
„
-I no part of the bloody proceedings, in the reign of
L
Queen Mary, hath
been more justly detested than the cruelty that was exercised in the island of
Guernsey, of burning a woman big with child: and when, through the violenceof the flames, the infant sprang forth at the stake, and was preserved by the
bystanders, after some deliberation of the priests who assisted at the sacrifice,
they cast it again into the fire as a young heretic, (b) A barbarity which they
never learned from the laws of ancient Rome; which direct, (c) with the same
humanity as our own, "quod prcegnantis mulieris damnatce poena diferatur,
quoad pariat;" which doctrine has also prevailed in England as early as thefirst memorials of our law will reach, (d) In case this plea be made in stay
of execution, the judge must direot a jury of twelve matrons or discreet wo
men to inquire the fact: and if they bring in their verdict quick with chili
(for, barely with child, unless it be alive in the womb, is not sufficient), execu
tion shall be stayed generally till the next session; and so from session to session,
till either she is delivered, or proves by the course of nature not to have been with
child at all. But if she once hath had the benefit of this reprieve, and been deliv
ered, and afterwards becomes pregnant again, she shall not be entitled to the
For she may now be executed
benefit of a farther respite for that cause,
before the child
quick in the womb; and shall not, by her own incontinence,
evade the sentence of justioe.
the offender becomes non compos
Another cause of regular reprieve
between the judgment and the award of execution: (f) for regularly, as was
man be compos when he commits a capital
formerly (g) observed, though
he becomes non compos after, he shall not be indicted; if after
crime, yet
after conviction, he shall not receive
indictment, he shall not be convicted;
after judgment, he *shall not be ordered for execution:
judgment;
r*<*anl
a»oj £or
and the law knows not but he
uyur(osus 80i0 fUrore punitur"
in his senses, to have stayed these respec
might have offered some reason,
tive proceedings.
It therefore an invariable rule, when any time intervenes
between the attainder and the award of execution, to demand of the pri
soner what he hath to allege why execution should not be awarded against
c 38.
(a) Hal. P. 0. 412.
(d) Flet
(i) Fox, Acts and Moo.
(e) Ff. 48, 19.
(e)

Hal. P. 0. 889.

616

Ibid. 370.

(p) See page 24.
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if he appears to he insane, the judge in his discretion may and ought
Or, the party may plead in bar of execution; which plea
reprieve him.
may be either pregnancy, the king's pardon, an act of grace, or diversity of
person, viz., that he is not the same as was attainted, and the like. In this last
case a jury shall he impaneled to try this collateral issue, namely, the identity
•of his person; and not whether guilty or innocent; for that has been decided
before.
And in these collateral issues the trial should be instanter, (h) and no
time allowed the prisoner to make his defence or produce his witnesses, unless
he will make oath that he is not the person attainted:
neither shall any per
emptory challenges of the jury be allowed the prisoner; (j) though formerly
such challenges were held to be allowable, whenever man life was in ques
tion, (k)
II.
neither pregnancy, insanity, non-identity, nor other plea, will avail to
avoid the judgment, and stay the execution consequent thereupon, the last and
surest resort
in the king's most gracious pardon; the granting of which
the most amiable prerogative of the crown. Law (says an able writer) cannot
be framed on principles of compassion to guilt; yet justice, by the constitution
of England,
bound to be administered in mercy; this promised by the king
in his coronation oath, and
that act of his government which
the most
The king himself condemns no man;
personal; and most entirely his own.
that rugged task he leaves, to his courts of justice: the great operation of his
sceptre ia *mercy. His power of pardoning was said by our Saxon an- r*o9*-i
and
declared in
cestors (m) to be derived a lege suce dignitatis
parliament, by statute 27 Hen. VIII, c. 24, that no other person hath power to
pardon or remit any treason or felonies whatsoever: but that the king hath the
whole and sole power thereof, united and knit to the imperial crown of this
realm, (n)
This is indeed one of the great advantages of monarchy in general, above any
in his power
other form of government; that there
magistrate who has
deserved: holding
court of equity
to extend mercy, wherever he thinks
in his own breast, to soften the rigour of the general law, in such criminal
oases as merit an exemption from punishment. Pardons (according to some
perfect legislation, where punishments
theorists) (o) should be excluded in
tacit disap
are mild but certain: for that the clemency of the prince seems
probation of the laws. But the exclusion of pardons must necessarily intro
duce
very dangerous power in the judge or jury, that of construing the
criminal law
the spirit instead of the letter; (p) or else
must be holden,
what no man will seriously avow, that the situation and circumstances of the)
offender (though they alter not the essence of the crime) ought to make no
distinction in the punishment. In democracies however, this power of pardon
•can never subsist for there nothing higher
acknowledged than the magis
trate who administers the laws: and
would be impolitic for the power of judg
ing and pardoning to centre in one and the same person. (1) This, as the pres
ident Montesquieu observes) (q) would oblige him very often to contradict
himself, to make and to unmake his decisions:
would tend to confound all
ideas of right among the mass of the people; as they would find
difficult to
tell whether a prisoner was discharged by his innocence, or obtained
pardon
,
there be no stadtholder, r»
through favour. In *Holland, therefore,
there
no power of pardoning lodged in any other member of the
him: and
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(1) In the United State* the power to reprieve and pardon
the several states
given to the executive of the state, with some restrictions in some
them.
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But in monarchies the king acts in a superior sphere; and though he
regulates the whole government as the first mover^yet he does not appear in
any of the disagreeable or invidious parts of it. Whenever the nation see him
personally engaged, it is only in works of legislature, magnificence, or compas
sion.
To him, therefore, the people look up as the fountain of nothing bat
bounty and grace; and these repeated acts of goodness, coming immediately
from his own hand, endear the sovereign to his subjects, and contribute more
than any thing to root in their hearts that filial affection and personal loyalty
which are the sure establishment of a prince.
Under this head of pardons, let us briefly consider, L The object of pardon:
2. The manner of pardoning: 3. The method of allowing a pardon. 4. The
effect of such pardon when allowed.
1. And, first, the king may pardon all offences merely against the crown, or
the public; excepting, 1. That, to preserve the liberty of the subject, the com
Car.
by the habeas corpus act,
mitting any man to prison oat of the realm
II, c. made praemunire, unpardonable even by the king. Nor, 2. Can the
principally concerned in the prosecution
king pardon, where private justice
of offenders; "wow potest rex gratiam facer cum injuria et damno aliorum."
Therefore in appeals of all kinds (which are the suit, not of the king, but of the
injured) the prosecutor may release, but the king cannot pardon.
Saity
common nuisance, while
remains unredressed, or bo
Teither can he pardon
as to prevent an abatement of
though afterwards he may remit the fine:
vested in the king to avoid multiplicity of
because though the prosecution
suits, yet (during its continuance) this offence savours more of the nature of
r*qnni private '"injury to each individual in the neighborhood, than of public
Neither, lastly, can the king pardon an offence against
wrong,
popular or penal statute, after information brought; for thereby the informer
hath acquired private property in his part of the penalty. (w)
also
restriction of
There
peculiar nature, that affects the prerogative
of pardoning in case of parliamentary impeachments; viz., that the king's
pardon cannot be pleaded to any such impeachment so as to impede the inquiry,
and stop the prosecution of great and notorious offenders.
Therefore when,
in the reign of Charles the Second, the earl of Danby was impeached by the
and pleaded the
house of commons of high treason, and other misdemeanors,
king's pardon in bar of the same, the commons alleged, (v) " that there was no
precedent that ever any pardon was granted to any person impeached by the
commons of high treason, or other high crimes, depending the impeachment;"
and thereupon resolved, (w) "that the pardon so pleaded was illegal and void,
and ought not to be allowed in bar of the impeachment of the commons of
England;" for which resolution they assigned (x) this reason to the house of
lords, "that the setting up
pardon to be bar of an impeachment defeats the
whole use and effect of impeachments: for should this point be admitted, or
would totally discourage the exhibiting any for the future;
stand doubted,
whereby the chief institution for the preservation of the government would be
destroyed." Soon after the revolution the commons renewed the same claim,
not pleadable in bar of an impeachment"
and voted, (y) "that
pardon
was enacted by the act of settlement, 12 and 13 Wm. Ill, c.
And, at length,
"that no pardon under the great seal of England shall be pleadable to an im
But, after the impeachment has
peachment by the commons in parliament."
heard and determined,
not understood that the •king's
^een
8°lemn'7
T*400l
farther restrained or abridged: for, after the impeach
royal grace
ment and attainder of the six rebel lords in 1715, three of them werefrom time
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time reprieved by the crown, and at length received

most gracious pardon. (2)
2. As to the manner of pardoning.

400
the benefit of the king's

1. First, it must be under the great seal.
under the privy seal, or sign manual, though it may be a sufficient
authority to admit the party to bail, in order to plead the king's pardon, when
obtained, in proper form, yet is not of itself a complete, irrevocable pardon, (z)
2. Next, it is a general rule that, wherever it may be reasonably presumed the
ting is deceived, the pardon is void, (a) Therefore any suppression of truth,
or suggestion of falsehood, in a charter of pardon, will vitiate the whole; for the
king was misinformed, (b) 3. General words have also a very imperfect effect
in pardons. A pardon of all felonies will not pardon a conviction or attainder
of felony (for it is presumed the king knew not of those proceedings), but the
conviction or attainder must be particularly mentioned; (c) and a pardon of
felony will not include piracy; (d) for that is no felony punishable at the com
mon law. 4. It is also enacted by statute 13 Ric. II, st. 2, c. 1, that no pardon
for treason, murder, or rape shall be allowed unless the offence be particularly
specified therein; and particularly in murder it shall' be expressed, whether it
was committed by lying in wait, assault, or malice prepense.
Upon which Sir
Edward Coke observes
that
was not the intention of the parliament, that
the king should ever pardon murder under these aggravations; and therefore
they prudently laid the pardon under these restrictions, because they did not
conceive
possible that the king would ever excuse an offence by name, which
was attended with such high aggravations. And
remarkable enough, that
there
no precedent of a pardon in the register for any other homicide than
that *which happens se defendendo or per infortunium: to which two r*j.01-i
species the king's pardon was expressly confined by the statutes Edw. *•
c.
and 14 Edw. Ill, o. 15, which deolare that no pardon of homicide shall
be granted, but only where the king may do
by the oath of his crown; that
is to say, where man slayeth another in his own defence, or by misfortune. But
the statute of Richard the Second, before mentioned, enlarges by implication
the royal power; provided the king not deceived in the intended object of his
non ob
mercy. And, therefore, pardons of murder were always granted with
stante of the statute of King Richard, till the time of the revolution; when the
was doubted whether murder could be
doctrine of non obstantes ceasing,
was determined by the court of king's bench, (f)
pardoned generally; but
that the king may pardon on an indictment of murder, as well as
subject
few other restrictions,
is a
Under these and
may discharge an appeal.
general rule, that pardon shall be taken most beneficially for the subject, and
most strongly against the king.
A pardon may also be conditional,' that the king may extend his mercy
eondition either
upon what terms he pleases; and may annex to his bounty
precedent or subsequent, on the performance whereof the validity of the par
don will depend; and this by the common law. (a) Which prerogative
daily
exerted in the pardon of felons, on condition of being confined to hard labour
for stated time, or of transportation to some foreign country for life, or for
a term of years; such transportation or banishment (h) being allowable and
14, and both the impriswarranted by the habeas corpus act, 31 Car. II, c.
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Best and S., 811. As the Lords do not pass judgment in cases
(2) See Queen v. Boyes,
con
of impeachment, until the commons demand it, the commons may indirectly pardon
victed offender by failing to demand judgment.
In the United States the president can grant no pardon in case of impeachment Const,
similar exception to the power to pardon which
There
conferred
of U. 8., art.
upon the governors of the states.
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onment and transportation rendered more easy and effectual by statutes 8 Geo.
HI, c. 15, and 19 Geo. Ill, c. 74. (3)
3. With regard to the manner of allowing pardons: we may observe that a
by act °f parliament is more *beneficial than by the king's chariT*402l-I Paraon
but the court must ex officio take
ter, for a man is not bound to plead
neither can he lose the benefit of
notice of it;
by his own laches or neg
ligence, as he may of the king's charter of pardon, (k) The king's charter of
proper time for if a man
pardon must be specially pleaded, and that at
indicted, and has
paraon in his pocket, and afterwards puts himself upon
his trial by pleading the general issue, he has waived the benefit of such par
man avails himself thereof, as soon as by course of law he
But,
don.
pardon may either be pleaded upon arraignment, or in arrest of judg
may,
ment or in the present stage or proceedings, in bar of execution.
Anciently,
no pardon of felony could be allowed, unless the
by statute 10 Edw. Ill, o.
party found sureties for the good behaviour before the sheriff and coroners
But that statute
and
W. and
the county, (m)
repealed by the statute
M. c. 13, which, instead thereof, gives the judges of the court
discretionary
power to bind the criminal, pleading such pardon, to his good behaviour, with
two sureties, for any term not exceeding seven years.
to make the offender
4. Lastly, the effect of such pardon by the king,
new man; to acquit him of all corporal penalties and forfeitures annexed to
that offence for which he obtains his pardon and not so much to restore hia
new credit and capacity. But nothing can restore or
former, as to give him
the pardon be not allowed till after
purify the blood when once corrupted,
Yet,
attainder, but the high and transcendent power of parliament.
per
son attainted receives the king's pardon, and afterwards hath a son, that eon
may be heir to his father, because the father being made a new man, might
transmit new inheritable blood; though, had he been born before the pardon,
he could never have inherited at all. (n)
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There now remains nothing to speak of but execution; the completion
And this in all cases, as well capital as otherwise, must
human punishment.
be performed by the legal officer, the sheriff or his deputy; whose warrant for
so doing was anciently by precept under the hand and seal of the judge, as
still practised in the court of the lord high steward, upon the execution of
done by writ
peer: (a) though in the court of the peers in parliament,
was established, (c) that in case of life, the
from the king, (b) Afterwards
judge may command execution to be done without any writ. And now the
usage is, for the judge to sign the calendar, or list of all the prisoners' names,
left with the sheriff.
with their separate judgments in the margin, which
written opposite to the prisoner's name, " let him
As for capital felony,
be hanged by the neck;" formerly in the days of Latin an abbreviation, (J)
" tut. per col." for " suspendatur per collum." And this
the only warrant
that the sheriff has for so material an act as taking away the life of another.
499.
Staundf . P. C. 188.

and new provisions made.
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It may certainly afford matter of speculation, that in civil causes there
{«)
should be such a variety of writs of execution to recover a trifling debt, issued
in the king's name, and under the seal of the court, without which the sheriff
""cannot legally stir one step; and yet that the execution of a man, the
r*404iJ
most important and terrible task of any, should depend upon a mar- •■
ginal note.
The sheriff, upon receipt of his warrant, is to do execution within a conve
nient time; which in the country is also left at large. In London, indeed, a
more solemn and becoming exactness is used, both as to the warrant of execu
tion and the time of executing thereof: for the recorder, after reporting to the
king in person the case of the several prisoners, and receiving his royal plea
sure, that the law must take its course, issues his warrant to the sheriffs; direct
And,
ing them to do execution on the day and at the place assigned.
(1)
in the court of king's bench, if the prisoner be tried at the bar, or brought
there by habeas corpus, a rule is made for his execution; either specifying the
time and place, (g) or leaving it to the discretion of the sheriff. (A) And,
throughout the kingdom, by statute 25 Geo. II, c. 37, it is enacted that, in case
-of murder, the judge shall in his sentence direct execution to be performed on
But otherwise the time
the next day but one after sentence passed,
(2)
and place of execution are by law no part of the judgment, (k) It has been
well observed, (Z) that
of great importance, that the punishment should
follow the crime as early as possible; that the prospect of gratification or ad
vantage, which tempts the man to commit the crime, should instantly awake
the attendant idea of punishment. Delay of execution serves only to separate
these ideas; and then the execution itself affects the minds of the spectators
rather as terrible sight, than as the necessary consequence of transgression.
The sheriff cannot alter the manner of the execution by substituting one
death for another, without being guilty of felony himself, as has been formerly
said. (m\ It
held also *by Sir Edward Coke (n) and Sir Matthew
*405-i
Hale, (o) that even the king cannot change the punishment of the law,
by altering the hanging or burning into beheading; though, when beheading
And notwithstanding
part of the sentence, the king may remit the rest.
some examples to the contrary, Sir Edward Coke stoutly maintains that "judicandum est legibus, non exemplis."
But others have thought, (p) and more
justly, that this prerogative, being founded in mercy, and immemorially exer
cised by the crown,
part of the common law. For, hitherto, in every in
stance, all these exchanges have been for more merciful kinds of death; and
how far this may also fall within the king's power of granting conditional
pardons, viz., by remitting
severe kind of death, on condition that the crim
inal submits to
milder,
matter that may bear consideration. It
ob
servable that when Lord Stafford was executed for the popish plot in the reign
of King Charles the Second, the then sheriffs of London, having received the
king's writ for beheading him, petitioned the house of lords for command or
order from their lordships how the said judgment should be executed; for, he
notion, which
said to
being prosecuted by impeachment, they entertained
have been countenanced by Lord Russell, that the king could not pardon any
part of the sentence, (q) The lords resolved (r) that the scruples of the
sheriffs were unnecessary, and declared that the king's writ ought to be obeyed.
Disappointed of raising a flame in that assembly, they immediately signified
(*) to the house of commons by one of the members that they were not satis
fied as to the power of the said writ.
The house took two days to consider of
is
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(m) See page 179.
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(t)

sullenly resolved that the house was content that the sheriff
it; and then
It
further
do execute Lord Stafford, by severing his head from his body.
related, that when, afterwards, the same Lord Russell was condemned for high
upon indictment, the king, while he remitted the ignominious part of
" that his lordship would now find he was
t^ie *sentence> observed,
*ao«1
possessed of that prerogative which in the case of Lord Stafford, he
One can hardly determine, at this distance from those
had denied him." (u)
turbulent times, which most to disapprove of, the indecent and sanguinary
zeal of the subject, or the cool and cruel sarcasm of the sovereign.
clear that
To conclude:
upon judgment to be hanged by the neck till
he
dead, the criminal be not thoroughly killed, but revives, the sheriff must
hang him again. (w) For the former hanging was no execution of the sen
false tenderness were to be indulged in such cases a multitude
tence; and
of collusions might ensue. Nay even while abjurations were in foroe, (a;) such
a criminal, so reviving, was not allowed to take sanctuary and abjure the
realm; but his fleeing to sanctuary was held an escape in the officer, (y) (3)
And, having thus arrived at the last stage of criminal proceedings, or execu
tion, the end and completion of human punishment, which was the sixth and
last head to be considered under the division of public wrongs, the fourth and
last object of the laws of England;
may now seem high time to put a period
to these Commentaries, which the author
very sensible, have already swelled
to too great length. But he cannot dismiss the student, for whose use alone
these rudiments were originally compiled, without endeavouring to recall to his
memory some principal outlines of the legal constitution of this country;
short historical review of the most considerable revolutions that have happened
in the laws of England from the earliest to the present times. And this task
he will attempt to discharge, however imperfectly, in the next or concluding
chapter.
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CHAPTER XXXIII.

OF THE RISE, PROGRESS, AND GRADUAL IMPROVE
MENTS OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND.
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Befoek we enter on the subject of this chapter, in which propose, by way
of supplement to the whole, to attempt an historical review of the most re
markable changes and alterations that have happened in the laws of England,
must, first of all, remind the student that the rise and progress of many
principal points and doctrines have been already pointed out in the course of
these Commentaries, under their respective divisions; these having, therefore,
cannot be expected that
should re-ex
been particularly discussed already,
amine them with any degree of minuteness; which would be a most tedious
What therefore at present propose
only to mark out some
undertaking.
outlines of an English juridical history, by taking
chronological view of the
state of our laws, and their successive mutations at different periods of time.
shall consider the state of our legal pol
The several periods, under which
ity, are the following six: 1. From the earliest times to the Norman con
quest: 2. From the Norman conquest to the reign of King Edward the First:
2

Hawk. P.

t.

2

2

I

bid. n Dec 1680.
U)
(u)
Hume. 800.
(u» Hat P. C. 412.
(y) Fits. Abr.
corone. 88. Finch. L. 467.

a 488.

(x) See page S32.
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Statute
(8) Executions in England are now private and within the walls of the prison.
81 and 32 Vic. c. 24. And burning, as before stated,
See supra, 376, note.
abolished.
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From thence to the reformation: 4. From the reformation to the *restorationof King Charles the Second: 5. From thenoe to the revolution
in 1688: 6. From the revolution to the present time.
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L And, first, with regard to the ancient Britons, the aborigines of our island,
we have so little handed down to us concerning them with any tolerable cer
tainty, that our inquiries here must needs be very fruitless and defective.
However, from Caesar's account of the tenets and discipline of the ancient
Druids in Gaul, in whom centered all the learning of these western parts, and
to the island of Mona
who were, as he tells us, sent over to Britain (that
or Anglesey) to be instructed; we may collect a few points which bear great
affinity and resemblance to some of the modern doctrines of our English law.
Particularly the very notion itself of an oral, unwritten law, delivered down
from age to age, by custom and tradition merely, seems derived from the
practice of the Druids, who never committed any of their instructions to writ
remarkable that in all the antiqui
ing: possibly for want of letters; since
ties, unquestionably British, which the industry of the moderns has discov
not in any of them the least trace of any character or letter to
ered, there
be found. The partible quality, also, of lands by the custom of gavel-kind,
which still obtains in many parts of England, and did universally over Walestill the reign of Henry VHI,
undoubtedly of British original.
So, likewise,
is the ancient division of the goods of an intestate between his widow and
the statute of dis
children, or next of kin; which has since been revived
And we may also remember an instance of slighter nature, men
tributions.
tioned in the present volume, where the same custom has continued from
woman guilty of the crime of
Caesar's time to the present; that of burning
petit treason by killing her husband. (1)
The great variety of nations that successively broke in upon and destroyed
both the British inhabitants and *constitution, the Romans, the Picts,
*.no-i
and after them the various clans of Saxons and Danes, must necessarconfusion
and
in
the laws and antiquities of
uncertainty
ily have caused great
the kingdom; as they were very soon incorporated and blended together, and,
therefore, we may suppose, mutually communicated to each other their re
spective usages, (a) in regard to the rights of property and the punishment of
crimes. So that
morally impossible to trace out with any degree of accu
racy, when the several mutations of the common law were made, or what was
the respective original of those several customs we at present use, by any
chemical resolution of them to their first and component principles.
We can
seldom pronounce that this custom was derived from the Britons; that was left
behind by the Romans; this was
necessary precaution against the Picts; that
was introduced by the Saxons; discontinued by the Danes, but afterwards re
stored by the Normans.
matter of great curiosity, and some use:
"Wherever this can be done,
but this can very rarely be the case; not only from the reason above men
First, from the nature of traditional laws
tioned, but also from many others.
in general; which, being accommodated to the exigencies of the times, suffer
by degrees insensible variations in practice: (b) so that, though upon compari
son we plainly discern the alteration of the law from what
was five hundred
impossible to define the precise period in which that alter
years ago, yet
ation accrued, any more than we can discern the changes of the bed of a river,
which varies its shores by continual decreases and alluvions. Secondly, this
becomes impracticable from the antiquity of the kingdom and its government:
had been disturbed by no foreign invasions, would
which alone, though
make
impossible to search out the original of its laws; unless we had as
thereof as the Jews had by the hand of Moses, (c)
authentic monuments
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of the true origin of particular customs
must also in part have arisen from the means whereby Christianity was
propagated among our Saxon ancestors in this island; by learned foreigners
brought over from Rome and other countries, who undoubtedly carried with
them many of their own national customs; and probably prevailed upon the
«tate to abrogate such usages as were inconsistent with our holy religion,
and to introduce many others that were more conformable thereto.
And this
perhaps may have partly been the cause that we find not only some rules of the
Mosaical, but also of the imperial and pontifical laws, blended and adopted
into our own system.
A farther reason may also be given for the great variety, and of coarse the
uncertain original, of our anoient established customs; even after the Saxon
government was firmly established in this island: viz., the subdivision of the
kingdom into an heptarchy, consisting of seven independent kingdoms, peo
pled and governed by different clans and colonies. This must necessarily
create an infinite diversity of laws: even though all those colonies, of Jutes,
Angles, Anglo-Saxons, and the like, originally sprung from the same mothercountry, the great northern hive; which poured forth its warlike progeny, and
swarmed, all over Europe, in the sixth and seventh centuries.
This multipli
city of laws will necessarily be the case in some degree, where any kingdom is
cantoned out into provincial establishments; and not under one common dis
pensation of laws, though under the same sovereign power. Much more will
it happen where seven unconnected states are to form their own constitution
and superstructure of government, though they all begin to build upon the
same or similar foundations.
When, therefore, the West Saxons had swallowed up all the rest, and King
Alfred succeeded to the monarchy of England, whereof his grandfather Egbert
was the founder, his mighty genius prompted him to undertake a most great
have executed in as *masterly
f *4.n 1 an^ necesaary work, which he is said to
*•
a manner: no less than to new-model the constitution ; to rebuild it on
a plan that should endure for ages; and, out of its old, discordant materials,
which were heaped upon each other in a vast and rude irregularity, to form
This he effected, by reducing the
one uniform and well connected whole.
whole kingdom under one regular and gradual subordination of government,
wherein each man was answerable to his immediate superior for his own con
duct and that of his nearest neighbours: for to him we owe that master-piece
of judicial polity, the subdivision of England into tithings and hundreds, if
not into counties; all under the influence and administration of one supreme
magistrate, the king; in whom, as in a general reservoir, all the executive au
thority of the law was lodged, and from whom justice was dispersed to
every part of the nation by distinct, yet communicating, ducts and channels;
which wise institution has been preserved for near a thousand years unchanged,
from Alfred's to the present time. He also, like another Theodosius, collected
the various customs that he found dispersed in the kingdom, and reduced and
digested them into one uniform system or code of laws, in his Dom-bec, or
liber judicialis. This he compiled for the use of the court-baron, hundred
and county court, the court-leet and sheriff's tourn; tribunals, which he estab
lished, for the trial of all causes, civil and criminal, in the very districts wherein
the complaint arose all of them subject, however, to be inspected, controlled
and kept within the bounds of the universal or common law, by the king's
own courts; whioh were then itinerant, being kept in the king's palace, and
removing with his household in those royal progresses whioh he continually
made from one end of the kingdom to the other.
The Danish invasion and conquest, which introduced new foreign customs,
was a severe blow to this noble fabric: but a plan so excellently concerted could
So that, upon the expulsion of these intruders,
never be long thrown aside.
the English returned to their ancient law; retaining, however, some few of the
.
*410i-I
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Thirdly, *this uncertainty
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customs of their late visitants; which went *under the name of Dane- r*412 r
Lage: as the code compiled by Alfred was called the West- Saxon- Lage; *■ J
and the local constitutions of the ancient kingdom of Mercia, which obtained

in

the counties nearest to Wales, and probably abounded with many British,
And these three laws were, about the
customs, were called the Mercen-Lage.
beginning of the eleventh century, in use in different counties of the realm:
the provincial polity of counties, and their subdivisions, having never been
altered or discontinued through all the shocks and mutations of government,
from the time of its first institution; though the laws and customs therein used,
have (as we shall see) often suffered considerable changes.
For King Edgar (who, besides his military merit, as founder of the English
navy, was also a most excellent civil governor), observing the ill effects of three
distinct bodies of laws prevailing at once in separate parts of his dominions,
projected and begun what his grandson, King Edward the Confessor, after
wards completed, viz., one uniform digest or body of laws, to be observed
throughout the whole kingdom; being probably no more than a revival of King
Alfred's code, with some improvements suggested by necessity and experience;
particularly the incorporating some of the British, or rather Mercian, customs,
and also such of the Danish as were reasonable and approved, into the WestSaxon-Lage, which was still the groundwork of the whole. And this appears
to be the best supported and most plausible conjecture (for certainty is not to
be expected) of the rise and original of that admirable system of maxims and
unwritten customs which is now known by the name of the common law, as ex
tending its authority universally over all the realm; and which is doubtless of
Saxon parentage.
Among the most remarkable of the Saxon laws we may reckon. 1. The con
stitution of parliaments, or rather, general assemblies of the principal and wisest
men in the nation: the wittena gemote, or commune consilium, of the ancient
Germans, whioh was not yet reduced to the forms and *distinctions of r^...-.
'
our modern parliament; without whose concurrence, however, no new *•
2. The election of their magistrates by
law could be made, or old one altered.
the people; originally even that of their kings, till dear-bought experience
evinced the convenience and necessity of establishing an hereditary succession
to the crown. But that of all subordinate magistrates, their military officers or
heretochs, their sheriffs, their conservators of the peace, their coroners, their
port-reeves, (since changed into mayors and bailiffs), and even their ty thing-men
and borsholders at the leet, continued, some till the Norman conquest, others for
two centuries after, and some remain to this day. 3. The descent of the crown,
when once a royal family was established, upon nearly the same hereditary prin
ciples upon which it has ever since continued; only that, perhaps, in case of
minority, the next of kin of full age would ascend the throne, as king, and not
as protector: though after his death, the crown immediately reverted back to
the heir. 4. The great paucity of capital punishments for the first offence;
even the most notorious offenders being allowed to commute it for a fine or
toeregild, or, in default of payment, perpetual bondage; to which our benefit
5. The prevalence of certain
of clergy has now in some measure succeeded.
customs, as heriots and military services in proportion to every man's land,
which much resembled the feudal constitution: but yet were exempt from all
its rigorous hardships: and which may be well enough accounted for, by sup
posing them to be brought from the continent by the first Saxon invaders, irv
the primitive moderation and simplicity of the feudal law, before it got into
the hands of the Norman jurists, who extracted the most slavish doctrines and
oppressive consequences out of what was originally intended as a law of liberty.
6. That their estates were liable to forfeiture for treason, but that the doctrine
of escheats and corruption of blood for felony, or any other cause, was utterly
unknown amongst them.
7. The descent of their lands to all the males equally,
without any right of primogeniture; a custom which obtained among the
625
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Britons, was agreeable to the Roman law, and continued among the Saxons till
the Norman conquest: '"though really inconvenient, and more especially
J destructive to ancient families; which are, in monarchies, necessary
*■
to be supported, in order to form and keep up a nobility, or intermediate state
8. The courts of justice con
between the prince and the common people.
sisted principally of the county courts, and, in cases of weight or nicety, the
king's court, held before himself in person, at the time of his parliaments;
which were usually holden in different places, according as he kept the three
great festivals of Christmas, Easter, and Whitsuntide. An institution which was
adopted by King Alonzo VII, of Castile, about a century after the conquest:
who, at the same three great feasts, was wont to assemble his nobility and
prelates in his court; who there heard and decided all controversies, and then,
having received his instructions, departed home, (d) These county courts,
however, differed from the modern ones, in that the ecclesiastical and civil
jurisdiction were blended together, the bishop and the ealdorman, or sheriff,
sitting in the same county court; and also that the decisions and proceedings
therein were much more simple and unembarrassed; an advantage which will
always attend the infancy of any laws, but wear off as they gradually advance
to antiquity.
9. Trials among a people who had a very strong tincture of
superstition, were permitted to be by ordeal, by the corsned, or morsel of exe
cration, or by wager of law with compurgators, if the party chose it; but fre
quently they were also by jury: for, whether or no their juries consisted pre
cisely of twelve men, or were bound to a strict unanimity; yet the general
constitution of this admirable criterion of truth, and most important guardian
Thus stood
both of public and private liberty, we owe to our Saxon ancestors.
the general frame of our polity at the time of the Norman invasion; when the
second period of our legal history commences.
IL This remarkable event wrought as great an alteration in our laws as it
did in our ancient line of kings: and though the alteration of the former was
of the people than any right of oonen?e°te^ rather by the *consent
fL *4M "51
-*
quest, yet that consent seems to have been partly extorted by fear,
and partly given without any apprehension of the consequences
which after
wards ensued.
1. Among the first of these alterations we may reckon the separation of the
ecclesiastical courts from the oivil; effected in order to ingratiate the new king
with the popish clergy, who for some time before had bqen endeavouring all
over Europe to exempt themselves from the secular power; and whose demands
the conqueror, like a politic prince, thought it prudent to comply with, by rea
son that their reputed sanctity had a great influence over the minds of the
people; and because all the little learning of the times was engrossed into their
hands, which made them necessary men, and by all means to be gained over to
his interests.
And this was the more easily effected, because the disposal of
all the episcopal sees being then in the breast of the king, he had taken care
to fill them with Italian and Norman prelates.
2. Another violent alteration of the English constitution consisted in the de
population of whole counties, for the purposes of the king's royal diversion;
and subjecting both them and all the ancient forests of the kingdom to the
unreasonable severities of forest-laws imported from the continent, whereby
the slaughter of a beast was made almost as penal as the death of a man. In
the Saxon times, though no man was allowed to kill or chase the king's deer,
Bat
yet he might start any game, pursue, and kill it, upon his own estate.
the rigour of these new constitutions vested the sole property of all the game
in England in the king alone; (2) and no man was entitled to disturb any fowl

r *ji ji

(d) Hod. Un. Hist xx. 114.
(3) This Is controverted by Mr. Christian, in the note to p. 419, of book 2, of his editioa
of this work.
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the air, or any

beast of the field, of such kinds as were specially reserved
royal amusement of the sovereign, without express license from the
king by a grant of a chase or free warren: and these franchises were granted
as much with a view to preserve the breed of animals as to indulge the sub
ject. From a similar principle to which, though the forest-laws are now miti
gated, and by degrees *grown entirely obsolete, yet from this root has r#jlfl-i
sprang a bastard slip, known by the name of the game-law, now ar- >■
rived to and wantoning in its highest vigour: both founded upon the same un
reasonable notions of permanent property in wild creatures; and both produc
tive of the same tyranny to the commons; but with this difference, that the
forest-laws established only one mighty hunter throughout the land; the gamelaws have raised a little Nimrod in every manor. And in one respect the
■
ancient law was much less unreasonable than the modern: for the king's
grantee of a chase or free-warren might kill game in every part of his fran
chise; but now, though a freeholder of less than 1001. a year is forbidden to
kill a partridge upon his own estate, yet nobody else (not even, the lord of the
manor, unless he hath a grant of free- warren) can do it without committing a
trespass, and subjecting himself to an action.
third alteration in the English laws was by narrowing the remedial in
3.
fluence of the county courts, the great seats of Saxon justice, and extending
the original jurisdiction of the king's justiciars to all kinds of causes, arising
in all parts of the kingdom. To this end the aula regis, with all its multifarious
authority, was erected; and a oapital justiciary appointed, with powers so
large and boundless, that he became at length a tyrant to the people, and for
midable to the crown itself. The constitution of this court, and the judges
themselves who presided there, were fetched from the duchy of Normandy:
and the consequence naturally was, the ordaining that all proceedings in the
king's courts should be carried on in the Norman, instead of the English lan
A provision the more necessary, because none of his Norman justici
guage.
ars understood English; but as evident a badge of slavery as ever was imposed
This lasted till King Edward the Third obtained a
upon a conquered people.
double victory, over the armies of France in their own country, and their lan
But there was one mischief too deeply
guage in our courts here at home.
rooted thereby, and which this caution of *King Edward came too late r* . 1
to eradicate. Instead of the plain and easy method of determining >■ J
suits in the county courts, the chicanes and subtleties of Norman jurisprudence
had taken possession of the king's courts, to which every cause of consequence
was drawn. Indeed that age, and those immediately succeeding
were the
There
an active principle in the human
SBra of refinement and subtility.
soul, that will ever be exerting its faculties to its utmost stretch, in whatever
employment, by the accidents of time and place, the general plan of education,
or the customs and manners of the age and country,
may happen to find
self engaged. The northern conquerors of Europe were then emerging from
the grossest ignorance in point of literature; and those who had leisure to cul
tivate its progress, were such only as were cloistered in monasteries, the rest
And, unfortunately, the first rudiments of
being all soldiers or peasants.
science which they imbibed were those of Aristotle's philosophy, conveyed
through the medium of his Arabian commentators; which were brought from
the east by the Saracens into Palestine and Spain, and translated into bar
barous Latin.
So that, though the materials upon which they were naturally
employed, in the infancy of
rising state, were those of the noblest kind; the
establishment of religion, and the regulations of civil polity; yet having only
such tools to work with, their execution was trifling and flimsy.
Both the
divinity and the law of those times were therefore frittered into logical dis
tinctions, and drawn out into metaphysical subtleties, with
skill most amaz
ingly artificial: but which serves no other purpose than to show the vast pow
ers of the human
intellect, however vainly or preposterously employed.
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Hence law in particular, which (being intended for universal reception) ought,
to be a plain rule of action, became a science of the greatest intricacy; especi
ally when blended with the new refinements engrafted upon feudal property:
which refinements were from time to time gradually introduced by the Nor
man practitioners, with a view to supersede (as they did in great measure) the
more homely, but more intelligible, maxims of distributive justice among the
Faxons. And, to say the truth, these *scholastic reformers have transT*4l8l■!
L
mitted their dialect and finesses to posterity, so interwoven in the body
of our legal polity that they cannot now be taken out without a manifest in
Statute after statute has in later times been made, to
jury to the substance.
pare off these troublesome excrescences, and restore the common law to its pris
tine simplicity and vigour; and the endeavour has greatly succeeded: but still
the scars are deep and visible; and the liberality of our modern courts of jus
tice is frequently obliged to have recourse to unaccountable fictions and cir
cuities, in order to recover that equitable and substantial justice, which for a
long time was totally buried under the narrow rules and fanciful niceties of
metaphysical and Norman jurisprudence.
4. A fourth innovation was the introduction of the trial by combat, for the
decision of all civil and criminal questions of fact in the last resort. This was
the immemorial practice of all the northern nations; but first reduced to regu
lar and stated forms among the Burgundi, about the close of the fifth century,
and from them it passed to other nations, particularly the Franks and the Nor
mans: which last had the honour to establish it here, though clearly an un
But it was a sufficient
christian, as well as most uncertain, method of trial.
recommendation of it to the conqueror and his warlike countrymen, that it
was the usage of their native duchy of Normandy.
5. But the last and most important alteration, both in our civil and military
polity, was the engrafting on all landed estates, a few only excepted, the fic
tion of feudal tenure; which drew after it a numerous and oppressive train of
servile fruits and appendages; aids, reliefs, primer seisins, wardships, marriages,
esoheats, and fines for alienation; the genuine consequences of the maxim then
adopted, that all the lands in England were derived from, and holden, medi
ately or immediately, of the crown.
The nation at this period seems to have groaned under as absolute a slavery
^ wa8 *n t^le Power °* a warlike, an *ambitious, and a politic prince
r*4lfl1
-I to create.
L
The consciences of men were enslaved by sour ecclesiastic?,
devoted to a foreign power, and unconnected with the civil state under which
they lived: who now imported from Rome for the first time the whole farrago
of superstitious novelties, which had been engendered by the blindness and
corruption of the times, between the first mission of Augmstin, the monk, and
one kind, and the worship of saints and images; not forgetting the univer
The laws, too, as
sal supremacy and dogmatical infallibility of the holy see.
well as the prayers, were administered in an unknown tongue. The ancient
trial by jury gave way to the impious decision by battel. The forest-laws to
tally restrained all rural pleasures and manly recreations. And in cities and
towns the case was no better; all company being obliged to disperse, the fire
and candle to be extinguished, by eight at night, at the sound of the melan
choly curfeu. The ultimate property of all lands, and a considerable share of
the present profits, were vested in the king, or by him granted out to his Nor
man favourites; who, by a gradual progression of slavery, were absolute vas
sals to the crown, and as absolute tyrants to the commons.
Unheard of forfeit
ures, talliages, aids, and fines were arbitrarily extracted from the pillaged land
lords in pursuance of the new system of tenure. And, to crown all, as a consequence of the tenure by knight- service, the king had always ready at his com*
mand an army of sixty thousand knights or mUites; who were bound, upot
pain of confiscating their estates, to attend him in time of invasion, or to quel)
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Trade, or foreign merchandise, such as it then
any domestic insurrection.
was, was carried on by the Jews and Lombards, and the very name of an Englsh fleet, which King Edward had rendered so formidable, was utterly un
known to Europe: the nation consisting wholly of the clergy, who were also
the lawyers; the barons, or great lords of the land; the knights, or soldiery,
who were the subordinate landholders; and the burghers, or inferior trades
men, who, from their insignificancy, happily retained, in their socage and bur
* points of their ancient freedom. All the rest were
gage tenure, some
r* j 2n "i
*•
*
villeins or bondmen.
From so complete and well-concerted a scheme of servility, it has been the
work of generations for our ancestors to redeem themselves and their pos
terity into that state of liberty which we now enjoy; and which, therefore, is
not to be looked upon as consisting of mere encroachments on the crown, and
infringements on the prerogative, as some slavish and narrow-minded writers
in the last century endeavored to maintain; but as, in general, a gradual res
toration of that ancient constitution, whereof our Saxon forefathers had been
unjustly deprived, partly by the policy, and partly by the force, of the Nor
man. How that restoration has, in a long series of years, been step by step
effected, now proceed to inquire.
William Rufus proceeded on his father's plan, and in some points extended
it; particularly with regard to the forest-laws. But his brother and successor,
Henry the First, found it expedient, when first he came to the crown, to in
gratiate himself with the people; by restoring (as our monkish historians tell
The ground whereof is this:
us) the laws of King Edward the Confessor.
that by charter he gave up the great grievances of marriage, ward, and relief,
the beneficial pecuniary fruits of his feudal tenures; but reserved the tenures
themselves for the same military purposes that his father introduced them.
He, also, abolished the curfeu: (e) for, though it is mentioned in our laws a
full century afterwards, (
yet it is rather spoken of as a known time of
night (so denominated from that abrogated usage), than as a still subsisting
custom. There is extant a code of laws in his name, consisting partly of those
of the Confessor, but with great additions and alterations of his own; and
chiefly calculated for the regulation of the county courts. It contains some
directions as to crimes and their punishments (that of theft being made capital in
his reign), and a few things relating to estates, ^particularly as to the
recoilJ
descent of lands: which being by the Saxon laws equally to all th,e
sons, by the feudal or Norman, to the eldest only, King Henry here moderated
the difference; directing the eldest son to have only the principal estate, "primum patris feudum;" the rest of his estates, if he had any others, being equally
divided among them all. On the other hand, he gave up to the clergy the
free election of bishops and mitred abbots; reserving, however, these ensigns
of patronage, conge cPeslire, custody of the temporalties when vacant, and
He lastly united again for a time the civil and
homage upon their restitution.
ecclesiastical courts, which union was soon dissolved by his Norman clergy:
and, upon that final dissolution, the cognizance of testamentary causes seems
to have been first given to the ecclesiastical court. The rest remained as in
his father's time; from whence we may easily perceive how far short this was
of a thorough restitution of King Edward's or the Saxon laws.
The usurper Stephen, as the manner of usurpers is, promised much at his
accession, especially with regard to redressing the grievances of the forest-laws,
but performed no great matter either in that or in any other point. It is from
his reign, however, that we are to date the introduction of the Roman civil
and canon laws into this realm: and at the same time was imported the doc
trine of appeals to the court of Rome, as a branch of the canon law.
By the time of King Henry the Second, if not earlier, the charter of Henry
the First seems to have been forgotten: for we find the claim of marriage,

I
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(e) Spelm. Cod. LI. Wm. L 288. Ben. I, 2M.
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ward, and relief, then flourishing in full vigour. The right of primogeniture
seems also to have tacitly revived, being found more convenient for the public
than the parcelling of estates into a multitude of minute subdivisions.
How
ever, in this prince's reign much was done to methodize the laws, and reduce
them into a regular order; as appears from that excellent treatise of Glanvil;
which, though some of it be now antiquated and altered, yet, when compared
^tn tne co^e °* HenlT tne First, 'carries a manifest superiority, {g)
T*422
1
L
J Throughout his reign,
also, was continued the important struggle,
which we have had occasion so often to mention, between the laws of Eng
land and Rome: the former supported by the strength of the temporal nobil
ity, when endeavoured to be supplanted in favour of the latter by the
popish clergy. Which dispute was kept on foot till the reign of Edward the
First: when the laws of England, under the new discipline introduced by that
skilful commander, obtained a complete and permanent victory. In the pres
ent reign of Henry the Second, there are four things which peculiarly merit the
attention of a legal antiquarian: 1. The constitutions of the parliament at Clar
endon, A. D., 1164, whereby the king checked the power of the pope and his
clergy, and greatly narrowed the total exemption they claimed from the
secular jurisdiction: though his farther progress was unhappily stopped by
the fatal event of the disputes between him and Archbishop Becket. 2. The
institution of the office of justices in eyre, in itinere; the king having divided
the kingdom into six circuits (a little different from the present), and com
missioned these new created judges to administer justice, and try writs of
These remedies are said to have been then
assize in the several counties.
first invented; before which all causes were usually terminated in the county
courts, according to the Saxon custom; or before the king's justiciaries in
the aula regis, in pursuance of the Norman regulations. The latter of which
tribunals, travelling about with the king's person, occasioned intolerable ex
pense and delay to the suitors; and the former, however proper for little debts
or minute actions, where even injustice is better than procrastination, were
now become liable to too much ignorance of the law, and too much partiality
3. The introduc
as to facts, to determine matters of considerable moment.
tion and establishment of the grand assize, or trial by a special kind of jury in
a writ of right, at the option of the tenant or defendant, instead of the bar
barous and Norman trial by battel. 4. To this time must also be referred the in... -J troduotion of escuage, or pecuniary 'commutation for personal military
J service; which in process of time was the parent of the ancient subsi
*■
dies granted to the crown by parliament, and the land tax of later times.
Richard the First, a brave and magnanimous prince, was a sportsman as well
as a soldier; and, therefore, enforced the forest laws with some rigour; which
occasioned many discontents among his people: though (according to Matthew
Paris) he repealed the penalties of castration, loss of eyes, and cutting off the
bands and feet, before inflicted on such as transgressed in hunting; probably
He also, when abroad, comfinding that their severity prevented prosecutions.
a body of naval laws at the Isle of Oleron, which are still extant, and of
!osed
igh authority ; for in his time we began again to discover, that (as an island)
we were naturally a maritime power. But with regard to civil proceedings,
we find nothing very remarkable in this reign, except a few regulations regard
ing the Jews, and the justices in eyre: the king's thoughts being chiefly taken
up by the knight errantry of a oroisade against the Saracens in the holy land.
In King John's time, and that of his son, Henry the Third, the rigours of the
feudal tenures and the forest laws were so warmly kept up, that they occasioned
many insurrections of the barons or principal feudatories: which at last had this
effect, that first King John, and afterwards his son, consented to the two famous
charters of English liberties, magna carta and carta de foresta.
Of these the
latter was well calculated to redress many grievances and encroachments of the
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crown, in the exertion of forest-law: and the former confirmed many liberties
of the ohnrch, and redressed many grievances incident to feudal tenures, of no
small moment at the time; though now, unless considered attentively and with
this retrospect, they seem but of trifling concern. But, besides these feudal
provisions, care was also taken therein to protect the subject against other
from
amercements,
oppressions, then frequently arising from unreasonable
illegal distresses, or other process for debts or services due to the crown, and
•from the tyrannical abuse of the prerogative of purveyance and prer*42AiJ
emption. It fixed the forfeiture of lands for felony in the same man- ner as it still remains: prohibited for the future the grants of exclusive fish*
eries; and the erection of new bridges so as to oppress the neighbourhood.
With respect to private rights; it established the testamentary power of the
subject over part of his personal estate, the rest being distributed among his
wife and children; it laid down the law of dower, as it hath continued ever
since; and prohibited the appeals of women, unless for the death of their hus
In matters of public police and national concern: it enjoined an uni
bands.
formity of weights and measures; gave new encouragements to commerce, by
the protection of merchant strangers; and forbade the alienation of lands in
With regard to the administration of justice: besidesprohibiting
mortmain.
all denials or delays of
fixed the court of common pleas at Westminster,
that the suitors might no longer be harassed with following the king's person
in all its progresses; and at the same time brought the trial of issues home to
the very doors of the freeholders by directing assizes to be taken in the pro
also corrected some abuses
per counties, and establishing annual circuits;
then incident to the trials by wager of law and of battel; directed the regular
awarding of inquest for life or member; prohibited the king's inferior minis
ters from holding pleas of the crown, or trying any criminal charge, where
by many forfeitures might otherwise have unjustly accrued to the exchequer;
and regulated the time and place of holding the inferior tribunals of justice,
the county court, sheriff's tourn, and oourt-Teet.
It confirmed and established
the liberties of the city of London, and all other cities, boroughs, towns, and
And, lastly (which alone would have merited the title
ports of the kingdom.
that
bears, of the great charter),
protected every individual of the nation
in the free enjoyment of his life, his liberty, and his property, unless declared
to be forfeited by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land. (3)
,
•However, by means of these struggles, the pope in the reign of King
John, gained still greater ascendant here, than he ever had before en- joyed; which continued through the long reign of his son, Henry the Third:
in the beginning of whose time the old Saxon trial by ordeal was also totally
abolished. And we may by this time perceive in Bracton's treatise, still far
ther improvement in the method and regularity of the common law, especial
in the point of pleadings, (h) Nor must
be forgotten that the first traces
which remain of the separation of the greater barons from the less, in the con
stitution of parliaments, are found in the great charter of King John; though
omitted in that of Henry HI, and that, towards the end of the latter of these
reigns, we find the first record of any writ for summoning knights, citizens and
And here we conclude the second period of our
burgesses to parliament.
English legal history.
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(3) The 39th chapter of the charter of John was: "Ne corpus liberi hominis capiatur nec
lmprisonetur nec disseisietur nec utlagetur nec exuletur, nec aliquo modo destruatur, nec rex
eat vel mittat super eum vi, nisi per judicium parium suorum vel per legem terra."
By
the charter of Henry III, the provision was slightly altered: " Nullus liber homo capiatur
vel lmprisonetur aut disseisietur de libero tenemento suo vel libertatibus vel liberis consuo
tudinibus suis, aut utlagetur aut exuletur, aut aliquo modo destruatur, nec super eum ibimus, nec super eum mittimus, nisi per legale judicium parium suorum vel per legem tente."
See Cooley's Const Lam, 351, n.
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HL The third commences with the reign of Edward the First, who hatb
For in his time the law did receive
justly heen styled our English Justinian.
so sudden a perfection, that Sir Matthew Hale does not scruple to affirm,
that more was done in the first thirteen years of his reign to settle and estab
lish the distributive justice of the kingdom, than in all the ages since that time
put together.
It would be endless to enumerate all the particulars of these regulations; but
the principal may be reduced under the following general heads.
1. He estab
2. He
lished, confirmed, and settled the great charter and charter of forests.
gave mortal wound to the encroachments of the pope and his clergy, by limit
ing and establishing the bounds of ecclesiastical jurisdiction: and by obliging
the ordinary, to whom all the goods of intestates at that time belonged, to dis
3. He defined the limits of the several tem
charge the debts of the deceased.
poral courts of the highest jurisdiction, those of the king's bench, common
an<^ exchequer; so as *they might not interfere with each other's
r*42fil P'ea9>
proper business: to do which they must now have recourse to a fiction,
very necessary and beneficial in the present enlarged state of property. 4. He
settled the boundaries of the inferior courts in counties, hundreds, and manors:
confining them to causes of no great amount, according to their primitive
stitution: though of considerably greater, than by the alteration of the value
5. He secured the property
of money they are now permitted to determine.
of the subject, by abolishing all arbitrary taxes and tall ages, levied without
the consent of the national council. 6. He guarded the common justice of the
kingdom from abuses, by giving up the royal prerogative of sending mandates
He settled the form, solemnities and effect
to interfere in private causes.
of fines levied in the court of common pleas: though the thing itself was
He first established
Saxon original.
repository for the public records of
the kingdom; few of which are ancienter than the reign of his father, and
9. He improved upon the laws of King Alfred,,
those were by him collected.
by that great and orderly method of watch and ward, for preserving; the pub
lic peace and preventing robberies, established by the statute of Winchester.
10. He settled and reformed many abuses incident to tenures, and removed
some restraints on the alienation of landed property, by the statute of quia
11. He instituted
speedier way for the recovery of debts, by grant
emptores.
ing execution, not only upon goods and chattels, but also upon lands, by writ of
elegit; which was of signal benefit to a trading people: and upon the same com
mercial ideas, he also allowed the charging of lands in a statute merchant, to
12. He effec
pay debts contracted in trade, contrary to all feudal principles.
tually provided for the recovery of advowsons, as temporal rights; in which,
before, the law was extremely deficient. 13. He also effectually closed the
great gulf, in which all the landed property of the kingdom was in danger of
being swallowed, by his reiterated statutes of mortmain; most admirably ad
apted to meet the frauds that had then been devised, though afterwards connew
r* 91 trived to be evaded by the invention of uses. *14. He established
*^'J limitation of property by the creation of estates-tail; concerning the
very different
good policy of which, modern times have, however, entertained
15. He reduced all Wales to the subjection, not only of the crown,
opinion.
but in great measure of the laws of England (which was thoroughly com
entertained
pleted in the reign of Henry the Eighth) and seems to have
design of doing the like by Scotland, so as to have formed an entire and com
plete union of the island of Great Britain.
might continue this catalogue much farther — but upon the whole we may
observe, that the very scheme and model of the administration of common
justice between party and party, was entirely settled by this king; (k) and has
continued nearly the same, in all succeeding ages, to this day, abating
few alterations, which the humor or necessity of subsequent times hath
632
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«ioned. The forms of writs, by which actions are commenced, were perfected
in his reign, and established as models for posterity. The pleadings consequent
apon the writs, were then short, nervous and perspicuous; not intricate, verbose
and formal. The legal treatises, written in his time, as Britton, Fleta, Hengham, and the rest, are, for the most part, law at this day; or at least, were so,
till the alteration of tenures took place. And, to conclude, it is from this
period, from the exact observation of magna carta, rather than from its mak

ing

or renewal, in the days of his grandfather and father, that the liberty of
the weight of the military

Englishmen began again to rear its head: though
tenures hung heavy upon it for many ages after.

I cannot give a better proof

of the excellence of his constitutions than that
his time to that of Henry the Eighth, there happened very few, and those
not very considerable, alterations in the legal forms of proceedings. As to mat
ter of substance : the old Gothic powers of electing the principal subordinate
of the peace, were taken |*42q1
■magistrates, the sheriffs, and ""conservators
*
and Edward M; and jusfrom the people in the reigns of Edward
tices of the peace were established instead of the latter. In the reign, also, of
Edward the Third, the parliament is supposed most probably to have assumed
its present form by a separation of the commons from the lords. The statute
for defining and ascertaining treasons was one of the first productions of this
new-modelled assembly ; and the translation of the law proceedings from French
into Latin another. Much also was done, under the auspices of this magnani
mous prince, for establishing our domestio manufactures; by prohibiting the
exportation of English wool, and the importation or wear of foreign cloth or
furs; and by encouraging cloth- workers from other countries to settle here. Nor
was the legislature inattentive to many other branches of commerce, or indeed,
to commerce in general: for, in particular, it enlarged the credit of the mer
chant, by introducing the statute staple; whereby he might the more readily
And, as personal
pledge his lands for the security of his mercantile debts.
property now grew by the extension of trade to be much more considerable
than formerly, care was taken, in case of intestacies, to appoint administrators,
particularly nominated by the law, to distribute that personal property among
the creditors and kindred of the deceased, which before had been usually ap
plied, by the officers of the ordinary, to uses then denominated pious. The
statutes also of praemunire, for effectually depressing the civil power of the
pope, were the work of this and the subsequent reign. And the establishment
of a laborious parochial clergy, by the endowment of vicarages out of the over
grown possessions of the monasteries, added lustre to the close of the four
teenth century; though the seeds of the general reformation, which were there
by first sown in the kingdom, were almost overwhelmed by the spirit of persecu
tion, introduced into the laws of the land by the influence of the regular

from

II

clergy.
From this time

to that of Henry the Seventh, the civil wars and disputed
titles to the crown gave no leisure for farther *juridical improvement;
r*429i'
" nam silent leges inter arma." And yet it is to these very disputes that *•
we owe the happy loss of all the dominions of the crown on the continent of
France; which turned the minds of our subsequent princes entirely to domes
tio concerns.
To these, likewise, we owe the method of barring entails by the
fiction of common recoveries; invented originally by the clergy to evade the
statutes of mortmain, but introduced under Edward the Fourth for the pur
pose of unfettering estates, and making them more liable to forfeiture: while,
on the other hand, the owners endeavoured
to protect them by the universal
establishment of uses, another of the clerical inventions.
In the reign of Henry the Seventh, his ministers (not to say the king him
self) were more industrious in hunting out prosecutions upon old and forgot
ten penal laws, in order to extort money from the subject, than in framing any
new and beneficial regulations.
For the distinguishing character of this reign
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was that of amassing treasure in the ting's coffers, by every means that
could be devised: and almost every alteration in the laws, however salutary or
otherwise in their future consequences, had this and this only for their great
and immediate object. To this end the court of star-chamber was new model
led, and armed with powers the most dangerous and unconstitutional, over the
Informations were allowed to be re
persons and properties of the subject.
ceived, in lieu of indictments, at the assizes and sessions of the peace, in order
The statute of fines for landed pro
to multiply fines and pecuniary penalties.
perty was craftily and covertly contrived, to facilitate the destruction of en
tails, and make the owners of real estates more capable to forfeit as well as
to alien. The benefit of clergy (which so often intervened to stop attainders
and save the inheritance) was now allowed only once to lay offenders, who only
could have inheritances to lose. A writ of capias was permitted in all actions
on the case, and the defendant might in consequence be outlawed ; because up
In short, there
on such outlawry his goods became the property of the crown.
r< . „.-. is hardly a statute in this reign *introductive of a new law, or modify*J ing the old, but what either directly or obliquely tended to the emolu
ment of the exchequer.
IV. This brings us to the fourth period of our legal history, viz: the refor
mation of religion under Henry the Eighth, and his children; which opens an
entire new scene in ecclesiastical matters; the usurped power of the pope being
now forever routed and destroyed, all his connections with this island cut off,
the crown restored to its supremacy over spiritual men and causes, and the
patronage of bishoprics being once more indisputably vested in the king.
And, had the spiritual courts been at this time reunited to the civil, we should
have seen the old Saxon constitution with regard to the ecclesiastical polity
completely restored.
With regard also to our civil polity, the statute of wills, and the statute of
uses (both passed in the reign of this prince), made a great alteration as to
property; the former by allowing the devise of real estates by will, which be
fore was in general forbidden; the latter, by endeavouring to destroy the in
tricate nicety of uses, though the narrowness and pedantry of the courts of
And
common law prevented this statute from having its full beneficial effect
thence the courts of equity assumed a jurisdiction, dictated by common justice
and common sense; which, however arbitrarily exercised or productive of jeal
ousies in its infancy, has at length been matured into a most elegant system of
rational jurisprudence; the principles of which (notwithstanding they may
differ in forms) are now equally adopted by the courts of both law and equity.
From the statute of uses, and another statute of the same antiquity (which
protected estates for years from being destroyed by the reversioner), a re
markable alteration took place in the mode of conveyancing: the ancient assur
ance of feoffment and livery upon the land being now very seldom practised,
since the more easy and more private invention of transferring property, by
to uses, and long terms of years being now continually
secret conveyances
r«uoii created in mortgages and *family settlements, which may be moulded
L
J to a thousand useful purposes by the ingenuity of an able artist.
The farther attacks in this reign upon the immunity of estates-tail, which
reduced them to a little more than the conditional fees at the common law,
before the passing of the statute de donis ; the establishment of recognizances
for facilitating the raising of money upon
in the nature of a statute-staple,
landed security; and the introduction of the bankrupt laws, as well for the
punishment of the fraudulent, as the relief of the unfortunate, trader; all these
were capital alterations of our legal polity, and highly convenient to that char
acter, which the English began now to re-assume, of a great commercial peo
ple. The incorporation of Wales with England, and the more uniform admin
istration of justice, by destroying some counties palatine, and abridging the
unreasonable privileges of such as remained, added dignity and strength to the
£84
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monarchy; and, together with the nnmerons improvements before observed
upon, and the redress of many grievances and oppressions which had been in
troduced by his father, will ever make the administration of Henry VIII a
very distinguished sera in the annals of judicial history.
It mast be however remarked, that (particularly in his latter years) the royal
prerogative was then strained to a very tyrannical and oppressive height; and,
what was the worst circumstance, its encroachments were established by law,
under the sanction of those pusillanimous parliaments, one of which, to its
eternal disgrace, passed a statute, whereby it was enacted that the king's proc
lamations should have the force of acts of parliament; and others concurred in
the creation of that amazing heap of wild and new-fangled treasons, which
were slightly touched upon in a former chapter. (I) Happily for the nation,
this arbitrary reign was succeeded by the minority of an amiable prince; during
the short sunshine of which, great part of these extravagant laws were repealed.
And to do justice to the shorter reign of Queen Mary, *many salutary r*4o2T
and popular laws in civil matters were made under her administration ; >■ J
perhaps the better to reconcile the people to the bloody measures which she
was induced to pursue, for the re-establishment of religious slavery: the wellconcerted schemes for effecting which, were (through the providence of God)
defeated by the seasonable accession of Queen Elizabeth.
The religious liberties of the nation being, by that happy event, established
(we trust) on an eternal basis, (though obliged in their infancy to be guarded,
against papists and other n on -conformists, by laws of too sanguinary a nature) ;
the forest-laws having fallen into disuse; and the administration of civil rights
in the courts of justice being carried on in a regular course, according to the
wise institutions of King Edward the First, without any material innovations:
all the principal grievances introduced by the Norman conquest seem to have
been gradually shaken off, and our Saxon constitution restored, with consider
able improvements: except only in the continuation of the military tenures,
and a few other points, which still armed the crown with a very oppressive and
It is also to be remarked that the spirit of enriching
dangerous prerogative.
the clergy and endowing religious houses had (through the former abuse of it)
gone over to such a contrary extreme, and the princes of the house of Tudor
and their favourites had fallen with such avidity upon the spoils of the church,
that a decent and honourable maintenance was wanting to many of the bishops
and clergy.
This produced the restraining statutes, to prevent the alienation
of lands and tithes belonging to the church and universities. The number of
indigent persons being also greatly increased, by withdrawing the alms of the
monasteries, a plan was formed in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, more humane
and beneficial than even the feeding and clothing of millions; by affording them
And, the
the means (with proper industry) to feed and to clothe themselves.
farther any subsequent plans for maintaining the poor have departed from this
institution, the more impracticable and even pernicious their visionary attempts
have proved.
•However, considering the reign of Queen Elizabeth in a great and p^oo-i '
political view, we have no reason to regret many subsequent alterations
For, though in general she was a wise and excel
in the English constitution.
lent princess, and loved her people: though in her time trade flourished, riches
increased, the laws were duly administered, the nation was respected abroad,
and the people happy at home: yet the increase of the power of the starchamber, and the erection of the nigh commission court in matters ecclesiasti
She also kept her parliament at a very awful
cal, were the work of her reign.
distance: and in many particulars she; at times, would carry the prerogative as
It is true, she very seldom exerted
high as her most arbitrary predecessors.
this prerogative, so as to oppress individuals; but still she had it to exert; and
therefore the felicity of her reign depended more on her want of opportunity
(I) See page 88.
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and inclination, than want of power, to play the tyrant.
This is a high encom
ium on her merit; but at the same time it is sufficient to show, that these were
not those golden days of genuine liberty that we formerly were taught to be
lieve: for surely the true liberty of the subject consists not so much in the
gracious behaviour, as in the limited power, of the sovereign.
The great revolutions that had happened, in manners and in property, had
paved the way, by imperceptible yet sure degrees, for as great a revolution in
government: yet, while that revolution was effecting, the crown became more
arbitrary than ever, by the progress of those very means which afterwards
reduced its power.
It is obvious to every observer that, till the close of the
Lancastrian civil wars, the property and the power of the nation were chiefly
divided between the king, the nobility, and the clergy.
The commons were
generally in a state of great ignorance; their personal wealth, before the ex
tension of trade, was comparatively small; and the nature of their landed
property was such as kept them in continual dependence upon their feudal
rtAQAi l°r(i, being usually some powerful baron, some opulent abbey, *or
*J sometimes the king himself. Though a notion of general liberty had
strongly pervaded and animated the whole constitution, yet the particular lib
erty, the natural equality, and personal independence of individuals, were little
regarded or thought of; nay, even to assert them was treated as the height of
sedition and rebellion. Our ancestors heard, with detestation and horror, those
sentiments rudely delivered, and pushed to most absurd extremes, by the vio
lence of a Cade and a Tyler; which have since been applauded, with a seal al
most rising to idolatry, when softened and recommended by the eloquence, the
moderation, and the arguments of a Sidney, a Locke, and a Milton.
But when learning, by the invention of printing and the progress of reli- •
gious reformation, began to be universally disseminated; when trade and navi
gation were suddenly carried to an amazing extent, by the use of the compass
and the consequent discovery of the Indies; the minds of men, thus enlight
ened by science, and enlarged by observation and travel, began to entertain a
An inundation of
more just opinion of the dignity and rights of mankind.
wealth flowed in upon the merchants, and middling rank; while the two great
estates of the kingdom, which formerly had balanced the prerogative, the no
The popish
bility and clergy, were greatly impoverished and weakened.
clergy, detected in their frauds and abuses, exposed to the resentment of the
populace, and stripped of their land and revenues, stood trembling for their
The nobles, enervated by the refinements of luxury (which
very existenoe.
knowledge, foreign travel and the progress of the politer arts, are too apt to
introduce with themselves), and fired with disdain at being rivaled in magnifi
cence by the opulent citizens, fell into enormous expenses; to gratify which
they were permitted, by the policy of the times, to dissipate their overgrown
This gradually reduced their
estates, and alienate their ancient patrimonies.
power and their influence within a very moderate bound; while the king, by
the spoil of the monasteries, and the great increase of the customs, grew rich,
.„.■■ independent and haughty; and the *commons were not yet sensible of
L
J the strength they had acquired, nor urged to examine its extent by new
burthens or oppressive taxations, during the sudden opulence of the exchequer.
Intent upon acquiring new riches, and happy in being freed from the insolence
and tyranny of the orders more immediately above them, they never dreamed
of opposing the prerogative to which they had been so little accustomed;
much less of taking the lead in opposition, to which by their weight and their
property they were now entitled. The latter years of Henry the Eighth were
therefore the times of the greatest despotism that have been known in this
island since the death of William the Norman: the prerogative as it then stood
by common law (and much more when extended by act of parliament), being
too large to be endured in a land of liberty.
Queen Elizabeth, and the intermediate princes of the Tudor line, had almost
536

Rise, Progress,

Chap. 33.]

<fec,

of the Laws.

433

-*

a

a

if

it

I

it

it,

the same legal powers, and sometimes exerted them as roughly, as their father,
King Henry the Eighth. But the oritical situation of that princess with re
gard to her legitimacy, her religion, her enmity with Spain, and her jealousy
of the Queen of Scots, occasioned greater caution in her conduct. She,
probably, or her able advisers, had penetration enough to discern how the
power of the kingdom had gradually shifted its channel, and wisdom enough
not to provoke the commons to discover and feel their strength. She there
fore threw a veil over the odious part of the prerogative; which was never
wantonly thrown aside, but only to answer some important purpose: and,
though the royal treasury no longer overflowed with the wealth of the clergy,
which had been all granted out, and had contributed to enrich the people, she
asked for supplies with such moderation, and managed them with so much
economy, that the commons were happy in obliging her. Such, in short, were
her circumstances, her necessities, her wisdom, and her good disposition, that
never did a prince so long and so entirely, for the space of half a century to
gether, reign in the affections of the people.
*On the accession of King James I, no new degree of royal power r,,..-,
J
was added to or exercised by him; but such a sceptre was too weighty
to be wielded by such a hand. The unreasonable and imprudent exertion of
what was then deemed to be prerogative, upon trivial and unworthy occasions,
and the claim of a more absolute power inherent in the kingly office than had
ever been carried into practice, soon awakened the sleeping lion. The people
heard with astonishment doctrines preached from the throne and the pulpit
subversive of liberty and property, and all the natural rights of humanity.
They examined into the divinity of this claim, and found it weakly and falla
ciously supported: and common reason assured them, that if it were of human
origin, no constitution could establish it without power of revocation, no pre
cedent could sanctify, no length of time could confirm it. The leaders felt the
pulse of the nation, and found they had ability as well as inclination to resist
it: and accordingly resisted and opposed
whenever the pusillanimous temper
of the reigning monarch had courage to put
to the trial; and they gained
some little victories in the cases of concealments,
monopolies and the dispens
In the mean time, very little was done for the improvement of
ing power.
private justice, except the abolition of sanctuaries, and the extension of the
bankrupt laws, the limitation of suits and actions, and the regulating of infor
mations upon penal statutes.
For cannot class the laws against witchcraft
and conjuration under the head of improvements; nor did the dispute between
Lord Ellesmere and Sir Edward Coke, concerning the powers or the court of
chancery, tend much to the advancement of justice.
Indeed, when Charles the First succeeded to the crown of his father, and at
tempted to revive some enormities, which had been dormant in the reign of
King James, the loans and benevolences extorted from the subject, the arbi
trary imprisonments for refusal, the exertion of martial law in time of peace,
and other domestic grievances, clouded the morning of that misguided r*^3>ji
little to brighten,
began
prince's reign; which, though the noon of
It must
at last went down in blood, and left the whole kingdom in darkness.
be acknowledged that, by the petition of right, enacted to abolish these en
croachments, the English constitution received great alteration and improve
But there still remained the latent power of the forest-laws, which the
ment.
crown most unseasonably revived. The legal jurisdiction of the star-chamber
and high commission courts was extremely great; though their usurped author
we add to these the disuse of parliaments, the
ity was still greater. And
ill-timed zeal and despotic proceedings of the ecclesiastical governors in mat
ters of mere indifference, together with the arbitrary levies of tonnage and
poundage, ship-money and other projects, we may see grounds most amply
sufficient for seeking redress in legal, constitutional way. This redress, when
sought, was also constitutionally" given: for all these oppressions were actually
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abolished by the king in parliament, before the rebellion broke out, by the
several statutes for triennial parliaments, for abolishing the star-chamber and
high commission courts, for ascertaining the extent of forests and forest-laws,
for renouncing ship-money and other exactions, and for giving up the preroga
tive of knighting the king's tenants in capite in consequence of their feudal
tenures; though it must be acknowledged that these concessions were not mad*
with so good a grace as to conciliate the confidence of the people. Unfortu
nately, either by his own mismanagement, or by the arts of his enemies, tha
king had lost the reputation of sincerity; which is the greatest unhappiness
that can befall a prince. Though he formerly had strained his prerogative,
not only beyond what the genius of the present times would bear, but also be
yond the examples of former ages, he had now consented to reduce it to a
A conduct so
lower ebb than was consistent with monarchial government.
opposite to his temper and principles, joined with some rash actions and un
guarded expressions, made the people suspect that his condescension was merely
temporary. Flushed, therefore, with the success they had gained, fired with
resentment f°r Past oppressions, *and dreading the consequences if the
r*4<?Rl
*■
J king should regain his power, the popular leaders (who in all ages have
called themselves the people) began to grow insolent and ungovernable; their
insolence soon rendered them desperate: and despair at length forced them to
join with a set of military hypocrites and enthusiasts, who overturned the
church and monarchy, and proceeded with deliberate solemnity to the trial and
murder of their sovereign.
pass by the crude and abortive schemes for amending the laws in the times
of confusion which followed; the most promising and sensible whereof (such
as the establishment of new trials, the abolition of feudal tenures, the act of
navigation, and some others) were adopted in the
V. Fifth, period, which am next to mention, viz., after the restoration of
King Charles II. Immediately upon which the principal remaining grievance,
the doctrine and consequences of military tenures, were taken away and abol
ished except in the instance of corruption of inheritable blood, upon attainder
of treason and felony. And though the monarch, in whose person the regal
government was restored, and with it our ancient constitution, deserves no
commendation from posterity, yet in his reign (wicked, sanguinary and turbu
lent as it was), the concurrence of happy circumstances was such that from
thence we may date not only the re-establishment of our church and monarchy,
but also the complete restitution of English liberty, for the first time since its
For therein not only these slavish tenures, the
total abolition at the conquest.
badge of foreign dominion, with all their oppressive appendages, were removed
from incumbering the estates of the subject: but also an additional security of
his person from imprisonment was obtained by that great bulwark of our con
stitution, the habeas corpus act. These two statutes, with regard to our prop
erty and persons form a second magna carta, as beneficial and effectual as that
That only pruned the luxuriances of the feudal system;
of Running-Mead.
.. but the statute of Charles the Second extirpated all its *slaveries; exJ cept perhaps in copyhold tenure; and there also they are now in great
L
measure enervated by gradual custom, and the interposition of our courts of
justice. Magna carta only, in general terms, declared, that no man should be
imprisoned contrary to law: the habeas corpus act points him out effectual
means, as well to release himself, though committed even by the king in coun
cil, as to punish all those who shall thus unconstitutionally misuse him.
To these may add the abolition of the prerogatives of purveyance and pre
emption; the statute for holding triennial parliaments; the test and corpora
tion acts, which secure both our civil and religious liberties; the abolition of
the writ de hmretico comburendo ; the statute of frauds and perjuries, a great
and necessary security to private property; the statute for distribution of in
and jeofails, which cut off those
testates' estates, and that of amendments
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superfluous niceties which so long had disgraced onr courts: together with
many other wholesome aots that were passed in this reign, for the benefit of
navigation and the improvement of foreign commerce: and the whole, when
we likewise consider the freedom from taxes and armies which the subject then
enjoyed, will be sufficient to demonstrate this truth, "that the constitution of
England had arrived to its full vigour, and the true balance between liberty
and prerogative was happily established by law, in the reign of King Charles
the Second."
It is far from my intention to palliate or defend many very iniquitous proceedings, contrary to all late, in that reign, through the artifice of wicked politi
cians, both in and out of employment. What seems incontestible is this; that
by the law (m) as it then stood (notwithstanding some invidious, nay, danger
ous, branches of the prerogative have since been lopped *off, and the
r#440-»'
rest more clearly defined), the people had as large a portion of real lib- *■
erty as is consistent with a state of society; and sufficient power, residing in
their own hands, to assert and preserve that liberty, if invaded by the royal
For which need but appeal to the memorable catastrophe of the
prerogative.
next reign. For when King Charles's deluded brother attempted to enslave the
nation, he found it was beyond his power: the people both could, and did, resist
him; and, in consequence of such resistance, obliged him to quit his enterprise
and his throne together. Which introduces us to the last period of our legal
history, viz.:
VI. From the revolution in 1688 to the present time. In this period many
laws have passed; as the bill of rights, the toleration-act, the act of settlement
with its conditions, the act for uniting England with Scotland, and some others:
which have asserted our liberties in more clear and emphatical terms; have
regulated the succession of the crown by parliament, as the exigencies of re
ligious and civil freedom required; have confirmed and exemplified the doc
trine of resistance, when the executive magistrate endeavours to subvert the
constitution; have maintained the superiority of the laws above the king, by
pronouncing his dispensing power to be illegal; have indulged tender consci
ences with every religious liberty, consistent with the safety of the state; have
established triennial, since turned into septennial, elections of members to
serve in parliament; have excluded certain officers from the house of commons;
have restrained the king's pardon from obstructing parliamentary impeach
ments; have imparted to all the lords an equal right of trying their fellow-peers;
have regulated trials for high treason; have afforded our posterity a hope that
corruption of blood may one day be abolished and forgotten; have (by the de
sire of his present majesty) set bounds to the civil list, and placed the admini
stration of that revenue in hands that are accountable to parliament; and have
(by the like desire) made the judges completely independent of the king, his
ministers, and his successors.
Yet, though these provisions have, in appear
ance and ^nominally, reduced the strength of the executive power to r+AA-i-i
■*
a much lower ebb than in the preceding period; if on the other hand
we throw into the opposite scale (what perhaps the immoderate reduction of
the ancient prerogative may have rendered in some degree necessary) the vast
acquisition of force, arising from the riot-act, and the annual expedience of a
standing army; and the vast acquisition of personal attachment, arising from
the magnitude of the national debt, and the manner of levying those yearly
millions that are appropriated to pay the interest; we shall find that the crown
has gradually and imperceptibly, gained almost as much in influence as it has
apparently lost in prerogative.
The chief alterations of moment (for the time would fail me to descend to
minulice,) in the administration of private justice during this period, are the

I

(m) The point of time at which I would choose to fix this theoretical perfection of our public law. it In
(he year 1679.after the habeas cor [tut act was passed, and that for licensing the press had expired;
though the years which immediately followed it were times of great practical oppression.
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solemn recognition of the law of nations with respect to the rights of ambas
sadors: the cutting off, by the statute for the amendment of the law, a vast
number of excrescences, that in process of time had sprung out of the prac
tical part of it; the protection of corporate rights by the improvements in
writs of mandamus, and informations in nature of quo warranto: the regula
tions of trials by jury, and the admitting witnesses for prisoners upon oath:
the farther restraints upon alienation of lands in mortmain: the annihilation of
the terrible judgment of peine fort etdure: the extension of the benefit of
■clergy by abolishing the pedantic criterion of reading: the counterbalance to
this mercy, by the vast increase of capital punishment: the new and effectual
methods for the speedy recovery of rents: the improvements which have been
made in ejectments for the trying of titles: the introduction and establishment
of paper-credit by indorsements upon bills and notes, which have shown the
legal possibility and convenience (which our ancestors so long doubted) of as
signing a chose in action; the translation of all legal proceedings into the Eng
lish language; the erection of courts of conscience for recovering small debts,
and (which is much the better plan) the reformation of county courts: the
great system of marine jurisprudence, of which the foundations have been
'a^' kv °leariy 'developing the principles on which policies of insurT*442l
L
J ance are founded, and by happily applying those principles to particu
lar cases: and, lastly, the liberality of sentiment, which (though late) has now
taken possession of our courts of common law, and induced them to adopt
{where facts can be clearly ascertained) the same principles of redress as have
prevailed in our courts of equity, from the time that Lord Nottingham pre
sided there; and this, not only where specially empowered by particular statutes
{as in the case of bonds, mortgages and set-offs), but by extending the reme
dial influence of the equitable writ of trespass on the case according to its
primitive institution by King Edward the First, to almost every iastance of in
And these, think, are all the ma
justice not remedied by any other process.
terial alterations that have happened with respeot to private justice in the
course of the present century.
Thus, therefore, for the amusement and instruction of the student,
hare
endeavoured to delineate some rude outlines of a plan for the history of our
laws and liberties; from their first rise and gradual progress, among our Brit
ish and Saxon ancestors, till their total eclipse at the Norman conquest, from
which they have gradually emerged, and risen to the perfection they now en
joy, at different periods of time. We have seen in the course of our inquiries,
in this and the former books, that the fundamental maxims and rules of the
law, which regard the rights of persons, and the rights of things, the private
injuries that may be offered to both, and the crimes which affect the public,
have been and are every day improving, and are now fraught with the accumu
lated wisdom of ages: that the forms of administering justice came to perfection
under Edward the First; and have not been much varied, nor always for the
better, since: that our religious liberties were fully established at the refor
mation; but that the recovery of our civil and political liberties was a work of
longer time; they not being thoroughly and completely regained till after the
restoration of King Charles, nor fully and explicitly acknowledged and defined
till the fflra of the happy revolution. Of a constitution so wisely contrived,
80 8trongly raised, and so highly finished, it is hard to speak with that
T*443l*
*■
praise which is justly and severely its due: — the thorough and attentive
It hath been the endeav
contemplation of it will furnish its best panegyric
our of these Commentaries, however the execution may have succeeded, to ex
amine its solid foundations, to mark out its extensive plan, to explain the use
and distribution of its parts, and, from the harmonious concurrence of those
several parts, to demonstrate the elegant proportion of the whole. We have
taken occasion to admire at every turn the noble monuments of ancient sim
plicity, and the more curious refinements of modern art. Nor have its fanlti
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been concealed from view, for faults ithas; lest we should be tempted to think
it of more than human structure; defects, chiefly arising from the decays Of time,
or the rage of unskilful improvements in later ages. To sustain, to repair, to
beautify this noble pile, is a charge intrusted principally to the nobility, and
such gentlemen of the kingdom as are delegated by their country to parliament.
The protection of the Liberty of Britain is a duty which they owe to them
selves, who enjoy it; to their ancestors, who transmitted it down; and to their
posterity, who will claim at their hands this, the best birthright, and noblest in641
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Thb just exultation with whioh oar commentator reviewed the gradual
improvement in the laws of England, which had continued to his own time,
may well be felt by the English statesman of the present day, when the legis
lation of the succeeding period is presented to his view. During no equal
period in English history were the changes in the English constitution so great
and manifest, nor the modifications in English law so radical or so beneficent.
in many particulars, so different from the
Indeed, the England of to-day
England of Blackstone's time, and its system of law
pervaded by spirit so
much milder and more just, that, upon many points, our author seems to be
writing of some far-off and barbarous realm, rather than of the England
which we know, and the justice, humanity, and equity of whose laws we
admire, and are, for the most part, content to copy.
In notes to the preceding pages, we have endeavored to point out the
changes in the law whioh have been introduced by statute, and the student
will be enabled, as he progresses, to compare the past with the present, and
to form some estimate of how the English system of laws which now pre
vails differs from that which was in force when our English ancestors oolonized
this country, bringing with them the common law to plant and acclimate upon
our shores.
But may be desirable that, at the conclusion of our task, we
refer briefly to some of the most striking and important of the changes which
have been made, as we may thus, by bringing them together into one general
summary, the better appreciate the general effect of all, than conld possibly
be done by the contemplation of each as a separate and distinct event.
The union of Ireland with England, and the abolition of the Irish parlia
ment, was an act which promised at once strength to the empire and benefi
more intimately as
constituent part of
cence to Ireland, by incorporating
con
the realm, and advancing its people from the condition of those of
quered province, controlled and governed mainly in the interest of the con
like voice with their fellows in the
querors, to that of freemen, entitled to
If the result of
making of the laws, and to the like redress for all injuries.
in
the union has not thus far answered the expectations of its advocates,
part, because the difficulties were too deeply seated to be reached, except by
long and patient probing and experiment; and we may reasonably hope that
the more recent efforts in that direction — the abolition of the Irish ohuroh
establishment,
and the pending reform in the land laws — will do muoh to
in point of pros
relieve the distress of that unhappy country, and to place
level with other parts of the empire.
perity and contentment, on
The most important statutes in the interests of our common humanity were
those which made the foreign slave trade piracy, and whioh finally uprooted,
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utterly the condition of servitude in all the territories subject to the crown of
Great Britain.
In immediate prosperity to the countries directly concerned,
this act also, has failed to answer expectation, but the general benefit to the
world at large has been incalculable, and the effects are constantly spreading
wider and farther, until the present generation may well hope to witness the
utter extinction of human slavery among the nations professing the Christian
religion, or entitled, by their civilization and intelligence, to claim the benefits
and come under the obligations of the laws of nations.
The representation of the people in the house of commons was greatly
changed by the reform act of 1832, and many boroughs which had ceased to
be populous and invited corruption, were entirely disfranchised.
Further
changes were made by the reform acts of 1867, which increased very largely
the number of electors, and established such liberality of qualification as to
bring the elective franchise within the reach of all but the hopelessly poor
and dependent.
Since then, by the introduction of the secret ballot, the inde
pendence of electors has been secured so far as, in the nature of things, this
was possible.
Concurrent with the changes in public sentiment which have
made these reforms possible, has gone on another change, perceptible only at
considerable intervals of time, by which the house of lords has been shorn of
a considerable portion of its former power and importance, and the authority
of the government has been steadily concentrating in the house of commons.
Hitherto this change has been beneficial; but how far it can continue without
necessitating other and more radical changes, the future alone can telL In
alluding to the reforms in parliament we must not forget to mention the im
provement in the laws for the punishment of bribery in elections, and the
elections to a judicial tribunal, by means of which
referenoe of contested
party favoritism in their determination is rendered impossible, and the actual
will of the electors is reasonably certain to prevail.
The advance in religious liberty has been so remarkable, that it seems im
possible in the brief space we can allot to the subject here, fitly to characterize
or indicate it. A oentury ago the law not only supported and encouraged the
state ohurch, but, from motives of state policy, it threatened severe penalties
against the teachers of another prominent body of Christians, and it imposed
burdens and disabilities upon all who were not connected with the establish
Jews and Catholics, in particular, were made to feel the weight of
ment.
governmental displeasure, but all classes of dissenters were, in various ways,
discriminated against; and, so far as the laws could effectually do so, confor
mity with the established church was sought to be enforced. It cannot yet
be said that religious equality is the law of England, nor can it be, so long as
burdens are imposed upon the people for the support of a favored church; bat
religious toleration is now universal, and all classes may take part in the
The corporation and test acts,
making of the laws which are to govern them.
which excluded Catholics and dissenters from petty offices, and even from some
other employments, were at length swept away by an act passed in 182£,
though with a proviso which excluded Jews from some of its benefits, and
precluded their taking seats in parliament as representatives of the people for

thirty

years longer.
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" on the faith of a Christian," to be omitted
allowed the obnoxious words
from the declaration made by a member on taking his seat. The marriage
laws have been wholly reformed, so as to enable all parties to have this most
important rite celebrated according to such form as will satisfy their own con
sciences; the scruples of Quakers and others, however singular or absurd they
may seem to most people, are respected by law; and there is a steady and very
rapid advance to that entire equality of sects, and perfect freedom of religious
Catholic emancipa
opinion and expression which now prevails in America.
tion, after long resistance on the part of the crown and of a majority of the
national church, was finally effected, under the leadership of Sir Robebt Peel,
in 1829, and the penal legislation since aimed at that denomination, in order
to defeat the supposed encroachments of the court of Rome, has been allowed
to remain a dead letter, and will probably be repealed at any time when any
considerable portion of the people shall express a desire to that end. And a
crowning act of justice to the Catholics has been done in the abrogation of
the state church in Ireland, where it was the church of a small fraction of the
people only, so that its support was a grievous oppression.
was characterized by exceedingly
The last half of the reign of George
stringent measures to repress freedom of opinion and of expression, which, in
deed, at one time threatened the most alarming disorders, and were well cal
culated to excite intense anxiety. The excesses of the French Revolution, and
the spirit of independent inquiry which that great event made so active in
England, alarmed the conservative government of the day, and led to coer
cive measures which tended to produce the very dangers which the govern
The proseoutions for treason for engaging in organ
ment sought to preclude.
ized, and sometimes, it must be confessed, in imprudent and threatening
opposition to the existing authorities, were treated by British juries with an
a prudence and a wisdom which was something new in state
independence,
prosecutions, and the liberties of the people found protection in the courts of
law at a time when the parliament was lending itself to despotic measures.
The parliament, however, is entitled to the credit of passing the libel act,
under which juries were at liberty to pass upon the intent of publications
prosecuted as libelous, and which, perhaps, has done more than anything else
Indeed, we may
to make the press as free in fact as it was before in theory.
safely say, now, that the restraint upon the licentiousness of the press in its
discussion of public affairs and of the conduct of public men, consists rather
in a regard to a just and enlightened public opinion than in any penalties
And while the press
which the law threatens or would be likely to impose.
of Great Britain is now much more free and much less subject to restraining
laws than that of many other countries, it is gratifying to know that its free
dom has not been productive of license, but that a gradual improvement in
its tone and character is perceptible, and self-imposed restraints are generally
found sufficient to prevent serious abuse.
The ameliorations in the criminal law have been so numerous and so great,
that it would be impossible to enumerate them all in the compass of a note.
Among the principal are, allowing a full defense by counsel in all cases; the
entire abolition of trials by battle, appeals of murder and felony, and the ab
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sard privilege of benefit of clergy, and the reduction of the list of capital
offenses to the two — treason and murder — regarded as the most heinous; tba
discontinuance of the pillory, the burning and whipping of females, the hang
ing in chains, the horrible accompaniments of capital executions for treason,
and the punishment of families of offenders by corruption of blood. And at
length, by the statutes 24 and 25 Victoria, the body of the criminal law has
been revised and methodized, and its punishments moderated and better pro
portioned. And, by extradition treaties with other nations, provision is made
whereby one country no longer becomes an asylum for the desperate criminals
of others.
Imprisonment for debt has at last been abolished in Great Britain. A clear
idea of the barbarity of treating an unfortunate debtor as a criminal seems to
have dawned slowly upon the minds of legislators in any country; but when
once the publio attention was fixed upon
the inhuman laws which permit
ted
were not long suffered to disgraoe the statute books. Only in cases of
fraud or other wrong in contracting the debt, or in obstructing the creditor
obtaining satisfaction, oan the body of the debtor be now seized, and even then
he
relieved from imprisonment on making surrender of his property to be ap
plied to the just demands against him. And while thus the good of the unfor
tunate debtor has been had in view, the interest of the creditor, also, has been
consulted in various statutory changes which have improved his remedies.
One of the principal of these — the subjecting of real estate to the payment of
debts —
alluded to further on; but the creation of courts for small demands,
in which justice could be had speedily and inexpensively, has also had an
effect highly beneficial upon all the branches of small trade and commerce
which the middle and poorer olasses of the people are most particularly inter
ested, while
has aided the poor in giving confidence to credit, and protect
them
The law of bank
against ruinous oosts in oases of misfortune.
ing
and
its
barbarous
has
also
been
remodeled,
wholly
ruptcy
penalties mitigated;
many restraints upon trade and upon the freedom of artificers to employ their
services in their discretion have been abolished, and the penalties for usury
have been entirely done away with, without being followed by the evils which
so many were ready to predict.
The same spirit of philanthropy which has secured the improvement of the
criminal code, has also effected great reforms in prison management, and the
law now endeavors to prevent parties who are accused of crime being pun
ished as criminals before condemnation, or subjected to needless and inhuman
The care of insane persons
also better provided for,
barbarities afterwards.
and asylums in which they are confined are not now, as formerly, mere prisons
in whioh to restrain their excesses, but are retreats where, unless improper
the most, careful, patient
persons shall chance to obtain the management,
.believed possi
and humane efforts are made for their cure, so long as cure
ble, and for their comfort afterwards.
No invention of either ancient or modern times has so sensibly affected the
motive power, and especially for the con
laws as the application of steam as
Railroads have introduced many new
veyance of freight and passengers.
questions in the law of eminent domain, of principal and agent, of bailments,
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and of negotiable securities, which have been solved by the application of
old principles of the common law, but under such new circumstances as to
make them really innovations, and sometimes of a very remarkable character.
To particularize all these cases would fill many pages of this work; and even
a complete enumeration would give but a faint impression of the manner in
which business and society have been affected by them, unless we go beyond
the law books, and, at the centres of traffic and exchange, consider how large
a proportion of all business transactions is connected with steam transporta
tion, and governed by the principles of law which have been laid down and
established with special reference to these improved modes of conveyance.
Railroad securities now constitute a very large share of the commercial paper
of the world, and the law of negotiable paper has been modified and changed
so as to embrace them: and they have become for many purposes a substitute
for money in the markets of the world, not surpassed in value or convenience
by any other securities, except, possibly, the public debt of a few of the lead
ing nations.
Perhaps in no particular has the change in the law of property been so pal
pable and so beneficial as in its relations to real estate. This species of prop
erty has at last been made liable generally to the payment of the debts of its
owner, and the absurd exemption which formerly prevailed has been done
away. Estates tail are also brought under more reasonable rules; restraints
upon alienation have been limited within narrow bounds; the forms of con
veyance have been simplified; fines and recoveries have given way to a simple
deed, acknowledged by the party and expressing the real purpose of the con
veyance; real actions have been abolished, and the proceedings to try claims
to real property have been reduced to the action of ejectment, which, at the
same time has been divested of all its cumbrous forms and needless fictions.
Limitation laws have also been passed, under which claims to real property
must be pursued within a reasonable period; and the law of descent has been
considerably improved.
The establishment of penny postage has increased the correspondence of the
kingdom to enormous proportions, and has doubtless tended, in a considerable
degree, to the spread of intelligence among the people, and to a more general
desire that the means of education may be brought within the reach of all,
which bids fair, at a period not now remote, to result in a general systein of
free schools supported by public taxation. Postage to the colonies and to
foreign countries is also established at very low rates, and the facilities which
are afforded for still more rapid communication by means of the electric tele
graph, though comparatively expensive, are made available, by means of a
cheap publio press, for diffusing among all classes of the people the speedy
intelligence of important affairs as they transpire in every quarter of the globe.
When our commentator wrote, the general disposition among the statesmen
of England was, to assert and maintain the unlimited power of the British
parliament to control and govern the British colonies at its discretion, and to
bind them by its enactments as well in respect to local concerns as to those of
a more general nature. The attempt to enforce this view by military power
lost to the empire the finest portion of her colonies, and the dissevered country
547
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has since, by the establishment of free institutions, by the enactment of just
laws, and by the cultivation of the arts of peace, attracted to itself a large

it,

immigration of industrious, enterprising, and liberty-loving people, and
attained a population, a wealth of resources and a financial standing that give*
it rank among the first nations of the globe in point of influence, power and
importance. The lesson of this loss has not been thrown away upon the British
nation, and a more liberal and just spirit now controls the relations between
the mother country and its colonies.
The right of the colonies to regulate
At the same time it is per
their internal affairs is conceded and protected.
ceived that those colonies are but embryo states, whose maturity and inde
pendence must at some time be recognized, and the government, instead of
seeking to perpetuate their condition of pupilage and dependence, favors and
encourages their increase in strength, population and resources, and prepares
the way for making the separation, should it take place, result in the mutual
benefit of both, and in permanent amity between them. The cruel and exact
ing government of India by the East India Company, has been abolished, and
though the subject people of that country are not likely soon to be in condition
to share the blessings of self-government, the rule of the crown is much more
mild and just than that which it superseded, and the change is a long stride
in the direction of substantial progress.
Much has been done in the interest of humanity by the laws which regulate
the working of children in mines, factories, etc., and which give for the benefit
of the surviving family an action against the party whose negligence or default
has caused the death of another. Much also has been done for public morals,
and for the equal and just administration of the law in the interest of the
people, by the abolition of profitable sinecures, and by modification of official
emoluments, to make them correspond in some degree with the services per
And, while to those who live under
formed and the responsibilities assumed.
in
a
less decidedly aristocratic in
and
of
form
society
government,
a simpler
emoluments
of many English offices
the
and
sentiment,
habits
organization,
must still appear enormous, yet the change in the direction of economy has
been as great, perhaps, as oould reasonably have been expected, and the phrase
that " all abuses are freeholds," once justly applied to the English official sys
tem, may now be dismissed as obsolete.
Of the petty annoyances to which British subjects were liable, and which,
in the aggregate, amounted to serious evils, two of the chief were abolished
by the statutes so modifying the game laws as to do away with the previous
qualifications, and those for abolishing tithes and substituting a rent charge in
stead. These will be found particularly alluded to, and the extent of the changes
The abolition of tithes has undoubtedly done
indicated in the preceding pages.
something to strengthen and support the national church, or, at least, to render
and the statutory provisions
it less odious to those not in communion with
source
of serious complaint, and
removed
another
have
also
pluralities
against
all together have resulted to the substantial benefit of the cause of religion and
publio morals.
The poor laws of Great Britain have been wholly revised since the time of
our author; and we wish we could say, with entire confidence, that they have
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been greatly improved. No doubt the ohangea are for the better; but with so
large a pauper population as that country unfortunately possesses, the inherent
difficulties are great, and we must still look to the future for any suoh reforms
as can benefit their condition to any considerable degree.
Upon these, and
similar subjects, changes must generally be in the nature of experiment, and it is
difficult to determine, many timed, until after considerable experience, whether
they do or do not constitute substantial improvements.
Upon OM particular subject we are glad to have it in our power to say that
the English system and English opinions have undergone no change.
We re
fer to the deep settled conviction, that standing armies are inconsistent with
liberty; which has prevented the people from being burdened with the support
of large military forces, which could only constitute a means of oppression to
the people at home, and of menace to other nations.
While some of the neigh
boring nations have been steadily and rapidly enlarging their standing armies,
nntil they constitute a very large proportion of their able-bodied men, and the
life and energy of their people are exhausted by their withdrawal from the
avocations of industry, and being made* a charge upon the public, instead of
contributing to the publio wealth, Great Britain, secure in her insular position,
and trusting to tne patriotism of her people to protect her against unexpected
assaults, has contented herself with garrisons for her forts and other fortified
places, and relied upon the training of voluntary organizations to fit them
for the wars which may be inevitable, but which the policy, not less than the
In this
best sentiment of her Christian people, now inclines her to avoid.
is
followed
the
of
the
western
she
by
great
republic
hemisphere, which,
policy
in the most important and threatening crisis of its national existence, has de
monstrated that, with a free people, standing armies are worse than useless, and
that the best dependence of any government is in civil and political liberty,
and in just laws, justly administered.
Among the minor changes deserving of note are the abolition of the coun
ties palatine, and the bringing of Wales more directly within the jurisdiction
of the English courts. Among those of greater importance are the simplifi
cation and expediting of proceedings in chancery; the abolition of the office of
master in chancery, and the introduction of jury trial in the courts of
equity; the taking away, from the ecclesiastical courts, the jurisdiction over
orobate and matrimonial causes, and conferring it upon courts specially created
/or its exercise; the simplification of pleadings and proceedings in courts of
law; the transfer to a more suitable tribunal of most of the appellate jurisdiction
of the house of lords; the remodelling of the judicial committee of the privy
council, so as greatly to enlarge its powers and give to its constitution and
proceedings more of judicial character and importance; the establishment
of a court of oriminal appeal, and the almost total abolition of the legal ob
All the new improvements in these
jections to the competency of witnesses.
are
in
matters
noted
the
and similar
preceding pages, and so given as to enable
the
with that which it has displaced.
to
reader
system
compare
existing
the
Many of the most useful and beneficial changes in English law could not,
with any propriety, be given in notes to the foregoing Commentaries, because
they relate to subjects not treated in them, and but distantly, if at all, re
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ferred to. Among these are the establishment of a hoard for the administration
of charitable trusts; the statutes establishing or providing for local regulations
of police for ensuring cleanliness and good order, and thereby promoting the
health and happiness of the people, and those, also, which encourage local lib
raries and schools, and other means of voluntary instruction of the people.
Mention should also be made of the provision for a general system of public
secular instruction, aided by the publio treasury, and brought within the reach
of rich and poor alike. The condition of women has also been improved — in
deed, we might

justly

say, the condition of society — by the more distinct rec

ognition of their right to property, and by lessening the power of control which
the common law allowed to the husband over the wife and over her possessions.
And we must not omit to mention, in this place, that the system of local selfgovernment, which has always characterized England, has been greatly improved
and amplified by the modern municipal corporation acts; and the tendency of
late in Great Britain — unlike that in some other countries — has been towards a
strengthening of the local authorities, and an increase of their powers and

'
jurisdiction.
In closing this review of the recent modifications in English law, it may be
justly remarked that the changes have not been made in haste and unadvisedly,
or often under the influence of passion or excitement, but that they have been
introduced with caution, discussed freely, fully and calmly, and only adopted
after reasonable deliberation, and after all objections had been considered and
weighed. Indeed, the eminent conservatism of the English character has
often tended to continue for long periods what have been known and admitted
But if this has been a just ground for reproach,
to be abuses in their system.
admit
that the general result has been that, when
same
time
the
at
we must
amendments have finally been made in the law, they have been beneficial, safe,
prudent and permanent, and that English legislation has been characterized by
more stability than that of some other countries.
The changes in American law have not been so great or so striking as those
in the law of England, because, in many particulars, America began at - point
In the adoption of the constitu
which Great Britain has only now reached.
tion of the United States, the great idea of religious freedom and equality
was assumed as fundamental; no state had a church establishment; there were
no tithes to abolish, or religious oppression to be relieved from; and the few
traces of discriminations against particular classes of persons, based on reli
gious beliefs or professions, have been allowed to disappear by common con
sent. The oppressive features of the feudal system, which clung so long to
the law of real estate in England, were never transplanted into America; the
right of primogeniture in descents was generally discarded; the forms of con
veyance were always simple, and real estate was, from the first, made assets
for the payment of debts. And many of the most repulsive features in the
common law of England were never engrafted in the law of America, which,
from the very beginning, gave more full effect to the presumption of inno
cence on behalf of persons accused of crime, and avoided the severe punish
ments in the case of small offenses, which were deemed necessary in England
at the middle of the last century.
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The United States exerted its authority to forbid the importation of slaves
into the country at the very earliest period permitted by its constitution, and
followed this prohibition, in a few years, by making the slave trade piracy.
Within the states, however, the government of the nation had no control of
the domestic institutions, and the relation of slavery was allowed to exist in
some of them until overthrown in the course of a great civil war.
It is now
entirely at an end throughout the whole country; but some of the evils, neces
sarily resulting from so great and sudden a change in society, are still npon
the country, and it will require time, patience, and wise statesmanship
to

is

a

a

a

is

it,

wholly eradicate them.
The right of married women to the real and personal estate of every name
and description possessed by them at the time of their marriage, or in any
manner acquired afterwards, and to make contracts in relation thereto, and to
sell or otherwise dispose of the same, has gradually come to be recognized in
most of the states; and the evils anticipated from this great departure from
the common law principle, that the civil existence of the wife is swallowed
At the same time,
up in that of the husband, have been looked for in vain.
the law has come to pay more regard to the rights of the family in the prop
erty acquired by its head, generally through the joint exertions of all ; and
while facilitating and simplifying the processes for the collection of debts, it
has in most states made liberal exemptions for the benefit of the family, and,
in case of the homestead, and sometimes of other property also, has forbidden
the husband to incumber or dispose of
except with the wife's assent.
relation by contract, into which par
Marriage
generally recognized as
ties can enter by such ceremony as they please, or without any ceremony
whatever; and the regulations by statute are only such as are deemed essen
tial to prevent irregular and discreditable relations, and to insure
proper
transaction.
record of so important
abolished throughout the country, and ample pro
Imprisonment for debt
made everywhere for the support of the helpless poor.
vision
Asylums for
the insane and for other unfortunate classes are established by state laws, and
believed, they are made generally to
supported by state taxation; and,
The large number of im.
subserve faithfully the purposes of their creation.
migrants landing every year upon our shores, renders regulations for their
comfort and to protect them against fraud and dishonesty important; and
The
provision of the most liberal character has been made for these purposes.
thrown open to actual settlers for the choice of home,
vast public domain
reasonable
amount, are donated to them by the, govern
steads, which, to
they desire to add to these possessions from the adjacent terri
ment; and
fixed at
rate to make them accessible
tory, the price of other public lands
the
to
labor,
who,
having
ability
joins thereto
to any person
disposition to
and
frugality
economy.
industry,
Suffrage in the United States has always been nearly universal; generally
only the dependent classes being excluded from participation; and in the
small property qualification was at first established,
has
states in which
afterward been abolished; and provision has been made bylaw for the natu
ralization of the aliens who come to cast their lot in the new world, through
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a

a

is

if

a

is

,

it

is

.

4D3

561

Editor's Review.
a proceeding both simple and inexpensive.
Indeed, in some of the new states,
even this formality has once been dispensed with, for, in framing their consti

tutions, they have allowed every bona fide resident to participate, and given to
all an equal voice in the government.
One of the most noticeable changes in the law of America has been in the
direction of imposing restraints upon the legislative power in the enactment of
laws. The American people, from the first, have shown great solicitude, lest
fundamental individual rights should be trampled upon, and they have made
each of their constitutions a magna carta, by means of which barriers are
erected against the encroachments
of government. The promise extorted
from King John, that no freeman should be taken, or imprisoned, or dis
seised, or outlawed, or banished, or any way destroyed, except by the judg
ment of his peers, or the law of the land, is repeated in substance in them all;
and, lest this comprehensive declaration should prove insufficient, there is a
careful enumeration of rights which are guarded from the encroachments of
power, and of securities for the protection of liberty, where government is
exercising its acknowledged authority. Religious liberty shall not be invaded;
freedom of speech shall be inviolate; soldiers shall not be quartered upon
citizens in time of peace, unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be al
lowed; the press shall be free; and a jury shall pass upon the criminality of
Taxes shall only be levied in accordance with
any of its alleged excesses.
law, and when voted by the people's representatives; the military shall be
subordinate to the civil authority; the privilege of the writ of habeas corput
shall be inviolate; no accused party shall be compelled to give evidence against
himself, and none shall be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb for the same
offense.
But the disposition of late is to go far beyond this specification of
individual rights, to inhibit class legislation, as well as the omnibus system of
making laws, and to restrain within reasonable bounds the private legislation
Forms of pro
of which all our law-making bodies are apt to be so prolific.
the
of
which
is to insure
are
also
in
cases,
some
purpose
ceeding
prescribed
care and deliberation in the enactment of laws, and to prevent the legislature
being taken by surprise by designing and unscrupulous men. And a strong
inclination has been developed to forbid private and special acts in all cases
where publio and general laws can reasonably accomplish the end designed.
The proceedings in courts of justice have been greatly simplified within a
In this direction, however, there was not the same room for im
few years.
Many of the states had no distinct equity system,
provement as in England.
and those which had established one had, at the same time, established regula
tions to render its remedies speedy and reasonably inexpensive. At this time
equitable and legal remedies are generally administered by the same courts,
and under forms which are very simple, and with such ample power in the
court to amend the pleadings and proceedings for the advancement of justice,
that it is not easy for the forms of law to be employed for the furtherance of

In some states statutes have been passed, the
unjust and oppressive schemes.
purpose of which was to sweep away at a single blow all legal subtleties and
technicalities in the forms of pleadings and proceedings; and where changes
so radical have been avoided, the old forms have been greatly simplified, and
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the lawyer may now safely give more attention to the merits of his cause, and
less to the forms provided by law, by means of which his client's rights are to
be protected or his wrongs redressed.
Many of the modern changes in the English law enumerated in this note
have been simultaneously made in America, and with the like good results.
Among them may be mentioned the remedy given to the family of any deceased
whose
death has been caused
person
by the wrongful act, neglect or de
fault of another, and the doing away with objections to the competency of
witnesses based upon their interest in or connection with the cause.
The latter
innovation has been followed in some states by statutes permitting accused
parties in criminal cases to give their own account of the transaction to
the jury; and the result has been generally satisfactory. America preceded
England in abolishing imprisonment for debt, and she has also exhibited a
greater readiness to modify the law of nations for the protection of the rights
and interests of neutrals in time of war. But as, in this respect, the interest
of each is identical, and the voice of religion and humanity pleads earnestly
for such changes as will limit and circumscribe the calamities of war so as to
make them affect the least possible number of persons, we may confidently ex
pect the efforts in this direction to be hereafter made by these two nations con
jointly, and with a reasonable degree of success.
Great as have been the changes in the law here chronicled, we may still look
forward, with reasonable confidence, to others of the like gratifying character,
to be introduced by the Anglo-Saxon nations, upon the basis of the common
law of England, by the like gradual but sure and safe steps, and as speedily as
the public sentiment may be prepared to receive and perpetuate them.
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LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN GREAT BRITAIN.
Ab the local institutions of Great Britain have very largely been remodeled
in onr day, it seems desirable to give some brief account of them, as they ex
England was always celebrated for the freedom of iti
ist at the present time.
local government, and though this was probably more complete during the
Saxon period than at any time afterwards, it is made very apparent by the ac
count which is given of the local magistracy in the preceding pages, that the
power to regulate their local affairs through the agency of local officers, ha«
been left at all times in the hands of municipal corporations and districts.
The following summary will give the means of comparison between the old
system and the new, and will serve to show that while some reforms have been
introduced, changes have also been made, which have become necessary in con
sequence of the great inorease in population, and the wonderful growth of
modern towns.
The primary division of the realm for local purposes is into parishes. The
parish is called by Prof. Stubbs, the ancient township in its ecclesiastical form.
When the parish is spoken of the oivil parish is commonly intended, and this
is defined by Stat. 20 and 30 Vic. o. 113, as " a place for which a separate poor
rate is or can be made, or for which a separate overseer is or can be appointed"
The civil parish is therefore the Poor Law parish, though there are also bj
custom some highway parishes, whioh are not identical with the others. There
The corporate organi
are about 15,000 oivil parishes in England and Wales.
The vestry " is the ratepayers of
zation consists of the vestry and overseers.
the parish in vestry assembled," the minister of the parish presiding, if pres
ent.
By custom, there are special vestries in some parishes, consisting of
a select number of ratepayers, and by statute parishes having more than 800
The powers of the vestry are small, and
ratepayers may have select vestries.
The
are limited in the main to managing the parish property and charities.
overseers are nominally overseers of the poor.
They are appointed by th«
justices, but the churoh wardens are also ex officio overseers, when the oivil is
an ecclesiastical
parish as well. They make and levy the poor rate, and thej
also prepare the jury list, and the lists of voters for parliamentary and muni
cipal elections.
Of ecclesiastical parishes there are 13,000 in England and Wales. Since
compulsory ohuroh rates were abolished, eoolesiastical parishes have been of
little importance in local government. Their affairs are controlled by the ves
try, which is composed of the minister, churchwardens, and parishioners.
The minister has custody of the churoh, and makes reoords of baptisms, mar
riages, and burials. The freehold of the ohurch-yard is also in him, bat he
can no longer as formerly control the burials in it; the act of 1880 authorising
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the intervention of the minister, and with or without
religious services, as the friends may direct. The churchwardens are two in
number, and are chosen annually hy the minister and parishioners. Their
duties have beoome nominal, and so have those of the parish clerk, who once
was an important officer.
A more important division for poor-law purposes is the union. This com
monly consists of several poor-law parishes, though in some cases a single
parish constitutes a union. The whole number of unions is between six and
seven hundred. The governing board is a board of guardians, of which the
justices within the union are ex officio members, and others are chosen annually
by the ratepayers and landowners. The number to be chosen is determined
by the local government board. The ohief funotion of the guardians is the
administration of the poor relief fund, and the appointment of local officers
connected therewith. In rural districts they are also the sanitary authority,
and in some cases the highway authority also.
The boundaries of unions and of parishes may intersect those of counties
and of boroughs, and in many oases do so.
Of counties there are forty in England, and twelve in Wales. The officers
are the lord-lieutenant, who is appointed by the crown, and is commonly custos
rotulorum, or keeper of the records, and as such the chief magistrate of the
Next to him is the sheriff, also appointed by the crown. As presid
county.
ing officer of the county court, his functions were once of high importance,
but that court has now little more than a nominal existenoe.
The chief
duties of the sheriff now are to summon juries, to act as executive officer of
the courts, and to enforce their judgments. He appoints an under sheriff, for
The custody of prisons was taken from the
whose acts he is responsible.
sheriff in 1877, and transferred to the central government. Each county has
For the most part they are elec
its coroner, and some counties have several.
tive by the freeholders, but by oustom in some districts they are appointed by
the lord of the manor, or some other authority.
The ohief duty of the corouer
is to hold inquests over the bodies of persons who have been killed, or have
In this he calls a jury to
died in prison, or suddenly from unknown causes.
Justices for the county are appointed by the crown on the
his assistance.
recommendation of the lord-lieutenant, and the number is indefinite. They
The chief
have polioe powers for the county, and appoint the chief constable.
The justices have the duty
constable appoints the subordinate police force.
of maintaining county bridges and pauper lunatic asylums, and they appo'it
inspectors of weights and measures, and an analyst of food and drugs. County
expenses are paid by an assessment upon the parishes, called a oounty rate.
The treasury refunds to the county one-half the cost of the police foroe.
The subdivision of the realm into sanitary districts is now exceedingly
important. Of these there are two olasses, the urban and the rural. The
rural are identical in territory with the poor-law unions, except as the urban
may be carved out of them, and the guardians are the rural sanitary board.
The sanitary authority in the urban districts is the town council, or some other
The sanitary organization begins with the public health act,
local board.
1848, whioh created a general board of health, whose members were to be
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appointed by the crown, and who had power to create local boards of health.
The name indicates the duties. The duty of general supervision was trans
ferred to the local government board in 1871. The local boards are corpora
tions, with power to make by-laws, and besides the ordinary functions of sani
tary bodies, they are given authority to construct sewers and gas works when
In the
necessary, and the urban boards may open, construot and repair streets.
seaports there are local sanitary authorities constituted by the local govern*
meat board.
The division of England into school districts dates from the passage of Mr.
Forster's elementary education act of 1870. Prior to that act voluntary
schools received occasional aid from public moneys, but the duty of educating
the people was now assumed as a public duty. The prominent features of the
act as since amended are these: It is declared to be the duty of every one
standing in loco parentis to a child to see that he receives efficient elementary
instruction in reading, writing and arithmetic. In every school district ade
quate public school accommodations must be supplied for this purpose, and if
there is neglect by the local authorities, the education department of the
government must see that the duty is performed. In general every borough
or city constitutes a school district, and so does every parish and part of a
parish not within a borough or city. The whole of the metropolis is one dis
trict.
The local authority in a district is either a sohool board or a school
attendance committee.
A school board is created by the education depart
ment on the application of the local authorities, and the department prescribes
the number of members.
The term of office is three years.
They are chosen
the
and
each
voter has as many votes as there are persons to
by
ratepayers,
be chosen, and may distribute them as he pleases, and give two or more to one
The school board appoints the teachers, and
candidate, if such is his choice.
has certain powers to compel attendance of children upon the schools.
A child
who refuses may be sent to an industrial school.
Certain fees are paid for
»ttendance
by such of the parents and guardians as are able, and to the
extent that the fees fail to meet the expenditure, the deficiency is made up by
a rate levied as a part of the borough rate, or, outside of the boroughs, as a
part of the poor-rate. On an average the rates exceed the aggregate of fees
Where there is no sohool board, a school attendance com
as three to one.
mittee is appointed by the borough council, or some other local authority.
The highways in the main are kept in repair by the parishes.
For this pur
not
be
same
however,
the
the
as
the
parish may
poor-law parish, as a
pose,
particular hamlet, which is a part of a poor-law parish, may by custom be a
The quarter sessions have authority to
separate parish for highway purposes.
combine two or more parishes into one or more highway distriots. In rural
distriots the highway authority is either a parish surveyor, a parish board, a
district board, or the guardians. In urban districts the sanitary authority is
also the highway authority.
Formerly there were many turnpikes in the hands
of trustees, who kept them in repair, and collected tolls for their nse. Nearly
all of these have now become free highways, and the cost of keeping the main
roads in repair is shared by the county and the parish or district.
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London in government is an enigma to people
doubt it is also to some extent to the people of the
United Kingdom, except so far as from their youth they may have been made
familiar with its peculiarities. In any reference to the government, it is al
ways essential to distinguish between the city proper, the ancient corporation
known as the city of London, and which embraces, but little more than a mile
square of territory, and the vast metropolis, which has grown up about the city,
and which in common parlance, and in the commercial and political intercourse
of the world, takes the name of London, though never in law a part of it.
The city was an important town during the period of Roman supremacy, but
the extent of its powers as a corporation it would be impossible now to deter
mine. In subsequent periods, we know the city, first, as an association of trades
men and industrial societies united for mutual protection, and exercising im
portant powers for that purpose under claim of right, and with general public
acquiescence. These powers were such as properly pertain to corporations; and
whatever may have been their origin, they in time became rightful by pre
The societies or guilds were severally composed of persons of one
scription.
industrial calling, and their purpose in organizing was to ensure proficiency in
the members, and to protect themselves and the public against frauds and im
positions.
They were also to some extent charitable societies, and accumulated
funds as such.
The authority of the guilds was not strictly confined to the
territorial limits of the town, but by custom was extended outside, in some
cases for several miles; and they were permitted to seize and destroy fraudulent
or defective goods, and to fine and imprison persons guilty of violating their
No one was suffered to pursue an industrial calling, until he had
regulations.
been made free of the proper guild, and this he became entitled to by serving
an apprenticeship and paying certain fees. The guilds gradually became weal
thy and powerful, and their customs were so far modified that it was no longer
essential to membership, that one should serve an apprenticeship, or follow any
particular calling; but membership might be obtained by purchase, and it
would also pass from father to son by descent.
Distinguished lawyers and
statesmen became members; an illustration of which we have in the case of
Lord Chancellor Hatherley, who was a member of the guild of fishmongers.
The following will give some idea of the government of these guilds. Each
guild has a court of assistants, composed of a master warden, wardens and as
Neither the voters nor
sistants, who are chosen from and by the liverymen.
those whom they select for these offices are required to be residents of the city,
but they are required to possess a property qualification within it. The guilds
expend their accumulated funds at discretion, and they own expensive halls and
are accustomed
to give costly entertainments.
By custom their members
constitute the citizens of London, and the government of the city is therefore
in their hands.
The first charter of the city was granted by William the Con
queror, but it was a very simple instrument, and constituted little more than
a recognition of an existing corporation,
(a) From that time the cor
porate bounds have never been extended, except by the small addition of
the ward of Bridge Without in the reign of Edward IV.
The govern-

•f other

countries,

as no

(a) See Stubbs,

Const.

Hist., ch.
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This is composed of 24
the corporation is the Common Council.
The alder
aldermen, chosen in as many wards, and 240 common councilmen.
men are not only local legislators, bat they are also judicial officers with limited
powers. They are not required to reside within the city, and in 1876, thera
were aldermen residing in all parts of the United Kingdom from Stoke-uponTrent to Brighton, and not one of the aldermen had a city address, though the
majority lived within the metropolis. The chief executive officer of the city
is the mayor, who is chosen in common hall from the aldermen. He has the
title of Lord Mayor, and is allowed within the city to assume regal pomp and
ing body of

ceremony.
The city is only the nucleus of the vast metropolis of 4,000,000 people,
which embraces parts of four counties, and includes the city of Westminster, and
the parliamentary boroughs of Southwark, Finsbury, Marylebone and Tower
Hamlets. The local government is [consequently varied and without unity.
The whole area is about 125 square miles. The common authority for the
whole is a board of public works, chosen by the vestrymen. Besides this there
are numerous local boards in separate districts for lighting and [paving pur
poses, and there are also, as elsewhere, guardians, governors, and trustees of the
There is also a metropolitan police district, but this is much larger than
poor.
the metropolis itself, being made to embrace so much of the surrounding
The oity pro
territory as seems neoessary to a complete and efficient system.
per is not included within this district, but has its own police.
Boroughs.
Up to 1835, the boroughs of England and Wales were without
in
uniformity
history, organization and powers, and many of them were close
The local abuses
with
authority defined only by prescription.
corporations,
were very great, and the corruptions notorious. These were remedied by the
Municipal Corporations Act of that year, the purpose of which was to bring
them all under one general system, with the control in the hands of the citizens
To that end the franchise was made uniform, and was based upon
in general.
ratepaying residence within the borough or within seven miles of it. The
government is now strictly representative, and any burgess is eligible to all
The governing body is the borough council, composed of the mayor,
offices.
aldermen and councillors. The councillors are chosen by the burgesses by ballot,
for a term of three years, and they choose the aldermen for a term of six
years. They also choose the mayor. The mayor has judioial as well as execu
tive powers, and there are also other local judges appointed by the Crown. The
polioe force is under the control of a watch committee of the council The franch
ise for local and for parliamentary purposes is not the same, and in local elec
The bor
tions women are voters, if possessing the ratepaying qualification.
oughs have authority to contract debts for ordinary local purposes, on obtain
ing the consent of the local government board mentioned below, or, in a few
oases, of some other central authority; but for any other purposes, it would be
It is also essential to have the
necessary first to secure special legislation.
council, and also of the rate
of
common
the
assent of an absolute majority
board or the legislature
local
the
before
government
It is customary,
payers.
to
have
debts,
special
inquiry made into its
for
contracting
grants permission
necessity.
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of a bishop are called oities;

(b) but their organization is the same with that of other boroughs.
Local Government Board. Sinoe 1871, the central authority,

which has

had general supervision and oontrol in matters of local government, has been

the board with the above title. This board consists of a salaried president ap
pointed by the orown, and the following ex officio members: The Lord Presi
dent of the Council, the several Secretaries of State, the Lord Privy Seal, and
the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The powers of this board are in part advis
ory, and in part oompulsory, and vary with the subjects. One of the most im
portant duties is to keep the local authorities from contracting unnecessary or
burdensome debts, and when consent to indebtedness is given, it is only in
connection with provisions for payment by annual instalments, or for setting
apart an adequate sinking fund. This board also audits the accounts of the local
boards, and may disallow such as are unauthorized or illegal, and charge the
sums over to those who improperly incurred them.
In poor law and sanitary
matters the oontrol of the board is very complete, and the supervision of the
Rivers Pollution Acts, the Adulteration Acts, and the Vaccination Acta are
specially committed to its superintendence.
(i) 1 BL Com.,
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In a note to the first book of these Commentaries (p. 109), the Colonial
System of Great Britain is spoken of as the grandest in extent and power tat
world has ever known. A more detailed account of the system, and of the
countries and places embraced within
than was given in the place referred
to, will justify the statement there made, and at the same time will give u
particulars of British Colonial government in all its varieties.
In respect to government the British colonies and possessions are classified
First; Those properly denominated
officially in three classes, as follows:
crown colonies, in which the crown has entire control of legislation, and the
administration of whose affairs
carried on by officers under the control
the home government. In this class are: In Europe, Gibraltar, Heligoland,
In America: Falkland Islands, Guiana, Honduras, Jamaica,
Malta, Cyprus.
In Africa: Ascension, Gambia, Gold Coast, Sierra Leone,
and Turks Island.
St.
Helena.
In Asia: India, Aden and Perim, Hong Kong, Labuan,
Lagos,
Straits Settlements. In Australasia: Fiji Islands, Rotumah.
For each
an executive officer, appointed by the crown, and removable at
these there
Governor, except as follows: For India
pleasure, and whose title of office
Governor-General; for Honduras
Lieutenant-Governor; for Jamaica
Administrator.
Captain-General, and for Gambia, Gold Coast and Lagos
The population of each of these was as follows at the dates given Cyprus
(1871)150,000; Gibraltar (1871) 14,764; Heligoland (1871) 1,913; Malta (1871)
Falkland Islands (1871) 803; Guiana (1871) 193,491; Honduras
149,084;
(1870) 24,710; Jamaica and Turks Island (1871) 510,354; Ascension (1871)
27; Gambia (1871) 14,790; Gold Coast (1871) 408,070; Sierra Leone (1881)
60,546; Lagos (1871) 62,021; St. Helena (1871) 6,241; India (1881) 252,541,210; Aden (1871) 22,507; Perim (1871) 211; Hong [Kong (1876) 139,144;
Labuan (1871) 4,898; Straits Settlements (1871) 308,097; Fiji Islands (1881)
Second; Those which have legislative bodies
124,999; Rotumah (1881) 2,500.
veto on legislation in the representative
chosen by their own people, with
the crown, and
general control of public officers in the home government.
These are: In America: Bahamas, Bermudas, Leeward Islands, Windward
In Asia: Ceylon. In Australasia: Western Aus
Islands. In Africa: Natal.
tralia. Each of these has an executive appointed and removable by the crown,
and whose title of office
governor. The population of these at the date*
named was as follows: Bahamas (1871) 39,162; Bermudas (1871) 12,121; Lee
ward Islands (1871) 120,491; Windward Islands (1871) 284,078; Natal (1877)
Third;
326,612; Ceylon (1876) 2,459, 542; Western Australia (1881) 31,000.
Those which not only have legislatures of their own election, but whose gov
ernors, though appointed and removable by the crown, must reflect in their
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government and administration the sentiments of the legislature as ex
In America: Dominion of Canada, New
These are:
pressed by its votes.
In Austral
In Africa: Cape of Good Hope and dependencies.
foundland.
asia: New South Wales and Norfolk Island, New Zealand, Queensland, South
The population of these severally in the year
Australia, Tasmania, Victoria.
1881 was as follows:
Canada, 4,324,310: Newfoundland, 161,374: Cape of
Oood Hope and dependencies, 1,420,162; New South Wales and Norfolk Island
New Zealand, 544,032; Queensland, 213,525; Tasmania, 116,705;
751,468;
This class is supposed to embrace all the colonies that are
Victoria, 862,346.
fitted, by the numbers and character of their population, and by other circum
stances, to be entrusted with the sole responsibility of making their own laws
and guiding their own destiny.
Responsible parliamentary government for these colonies began in Canada,
and may be said to have originated with the Earl of Durham, who, as gov
ernor-general in the year 1831, in a report made to the home government, re
commended as a remedy for the widespread and long-continued discontent in
the extensive provinces of Lower and Upper Canada, that representative insti
tutions, which should be " an image and transcript of the British constitution,"
should be allowed to the people.
In accordance with this recommendation,
Mr. Poulette Thomson, the successor to the Earl of Durham, was directed to
introduce a government which should be responsible to the representatives of
the people, and the principal officers of which, constituting the governor's
advisers, should possess the confidence of the legislature, and be subject to
removal from office whenever any sufficient motives of public policy should
suggest the expediency.
Accordingly, this official, on his arrival in Canada,
made public announcement that henceforth its government should be con
ducted in accordance with the wishes of the people as expressed by their rep
The understanding which was had of this announcement, and
resentatives.
which has ever since been acted upon, is tersely expressed in three resolutions
adopted by the Legislative Assembly of Canada, in the year 1841, and which
are as follows:
" 1. That the head of the executive government of the province, being,
within the limits of his government, the representative of the sovereign, is
responsible to the imperial authority alone; but that nevertheless the manage
ment of our local affairs can only be conducted by him, by and with the
assistance, counsel and information of subordinate officers in the province.
" 2. That in order to preserve between the different branches of the provin
cial parliament that harmony which is essential to the peace, welfare, and good
government of the province, the chief advisers of the representative of the
sovereign, constituting a provincial administration under him, ought to be men
possessed of the confidence of the representatives of the people; thus afford
ing a guarantee that the well understood wishes and interests of the people,
which our gracious sovereign has declared shall be the rule of the provincial
government, will, on all occasions, be faithfully represented and advocated.
" 8. That the people of this province have, moreover, a right to expect from
■ach provincial administration the exertion of their best endeavors that the
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imperial authority, -within its constitutional limits, shall be exercised in Um
manner most consistent with their well understood wishes and interests."
It will be seen that this gave to the province of Canada a government
which, as respects local affairs, was not to differ in its general features froa
that which existed within Great Britain itself. Its success in giving content
to the people was immediate, and Lord Elgin, who went out as governorgeneral of Canada in 1847, and who was most influential in settling it upon
secure foundations, was constrained to say, that, with his constitutional and
changing cabinet, he was allowed by the free consent of the people to exercise
greater authority than was permitted to the same office in colonies where re
sponsible government did not exist. The like institutions were introduced
into the colonies named at the dates following: Nova Scotia and New Bruns
wick, 1848; Tasmania and Victoria, 1855; New South Wales, South Australia
When
and New Zealand, 1856; Queensland, 1860; Cape of Good Hope, 1872.
in 1867 Upper and Lower Canada and New Brunswick were united into one
government by the name of The Dominion of Canada, the imperial act of
union declared that the constitution of the new dominion should be similar in
Upper Canada was at this time
principle to that of the United Kingdom.
and
Lower
Canada
name
of
that of Quebec, and authority
Ontario,
the
given
was given to the Queen in council to admit into the Union any of the other
British-American provinces whose legislature might express a desire to that
effect.
Under this authority Manitoba was admitted in 1870, British Colum
bia in 1871, and Prince Edward's Island in 1873. Each of the provinces has
a legislature of its own, and a lieutenant-governor appointed by the governorgeneral, and subject to removal by him, but not within five years from his ap
Government in the several provinces, aa
pointment except for cause assigned.
in the Dominion itself, is responsible to the representatives of the people.
In the colonies, as in the united kingdom, the executive is a constituent
part of the legislature, and the governor may withhold assent to any bill which
The
may be passed, and take the opinion of the home government thereon.
home government may also, even against the opinion of the governor, disallow
any colonial act, but it will only do so where the reasons seem imperative, or
In judicial matters an appeal lie*
where the act is regarded as ultra vires.
from the colonial courts to the queen in council. It seems to have been
doubted, after the creation of the Supreme Court of Canada, with power to
hear and finally adjudicate upon appeals from the highest courts of the sev
eral provinces, whether appeals to the privy council would any longer lie, bat
it was decided that parties at their option might appeal to either tribunal.
In respect to the self-governing colonies and provinces, as much as to all
others, the imperial government reserves to itself the power of legislation on
all subjects of general imperial policy, and retains control of international in
tercourse, and of all questions of war or peace with other nations.
The custom*
however, of all the colonies, are under the control and manage
establishments,
ment of the several colonial governments, and the colonial legislatures are
permitted to establish their own customs regulations and rates of duty.
Canada has taken advantage of this authority to establish a protective tariff,
663
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in direct antagonism to the principles of free trade, which for a long time
hare prevailed with the home government.
Among the snbjeots for which the imperial parliament still legislates for all
the colonies and dependencies are those of copyrights and patents, and the
establishment of admiralty courts. Theoretically it has power to legislate to
any extent; but how far this would be consistent with the constitutional rights
of British subjeots, or with true imperial policy must depend very much upon
the condition of the colony or dependency legislated for, and the fitness of
the people under the circumstances in which they are placed, to take their des
The general policy of the imperial government
tinies into their own hands.
has now for a long time been to foster and encourage independent self-govern
ment, to the fullest extent consistent with local safety and the general interests
In one noted instance, experience demonstrated to the entire
of the empire.
satisfaction, not only of the home government, but of the colony itself, that
the time for self-government had not yet arrived. Jamaica, which had been
allowed a government responsible to the local representatives, abandoned it
voluntarily in 1866, and with its own consent was remanded to the condition
of a crown colony. It has now a legislative council, composed in part of offi
cial, and in part of non-official members, and the governor's council is respon
sible only to himself. The advice of this council the governor follows only
so far as he finds it satisfactory to his own judgment.
The imperial authority over all the colonies is administered through the
agency of a member of the administration, who is designated secretary of
In all the crown colonies, however, the governor is
state for the colonies.
has
been said by one of them, " he not only reigns, but
As
absolute.
nearly
governs in the striotest sense. All subordinate officers act in accordance with
his directions. He is responsible for their short-comings if he fails to correct
them.
They are liable to suspension at his wilL The legislature is so con
structed as to enable him to secure, should he deem it necessary, the passage
of any enactment he may frame. He is in the colony the ultimate referee on
* * * *
almost every conceivable subject of administration or legislation.
—
In all orown colonies there exist and it is the reason for the maintenance of
so peculiar a form of constitution — two or more different races, to neither of
which can safely be entrusted the charge of governing the other, and the ex
istence of which is the cause of the establishment of what is in fact a species
of despotism, modified by a power of appeal to the imperial government at
home, and by the action of public opinion and common sense upon the mere
legal rights of the post." This was said with special reference to the Fiji
Islands, but was intended to be applicable to all whose condition is described
in it.
The case of India is in some respects different from that of any of the other
British possessions, it being by far the most populous of all, and only a small
per centage of the inhabitants being of British birth or origin, while an uncertain proportion of the remainder are ill-affected to the British rule. The
necessity for a strong and somewhat autocratic government is, under such cir
cumstances, apparent, and this has been provided by imperial legislation. The
It began
history of British dominion over that extensive country is familiar.
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with the charter granted by William HI, in 1698, to a company of merchants,
for trading with that country. This company became great and powerful, and
acquired for its purposes the control of territory for which it became necessary
to establish civil and criminal courts, and these were provided for by letters
patent of the king. The government was in a board of directors, having it*
office in London.
In the latter part of the 18th century, the company carried
on extensive wars with the native princes, and won great victories over them,

which resulted in the acquisition of immense territories.
In 1783 parliament
it necessary to interfere to prevent abuses, and passed what is known
as the regulating act.
This act reoites that " the several powers and authori
ties granted by charters to the United Company of Merchants of England
trading to the East Indies, have been found by experience not to have suffi
cient force and efficacy to prevent various abuses which have prevailed in the
government and administration of the affairs of the said united company, as
well at home as in India, to the manifest injury of the public credit, and of
the commercial interests of the said company." It then proceeds to empower
his majesty to erect and establish a supreme court of judicature for the com
pany's dominions, to consist of a chief justice and three other judges, being
barristers of England, or Ireland, of not less than five years' standing.
This
was an important step in parliamentary control, and it was followed in 1833
with one still more important, which formally converted the trading corpora
tion into a purely political body, with authority, under the parliament, to
A governor-general was provided for.
govern the British dominions in India.
and the governor-general in council was to have general legislative authority,
with power, however, in the court of directors of the company, to disallow any
law or regulation that might be made.
The legislative power conferred was further restricted, as follows: "The said
governor-general in council shall not have the power of making any laws or
regulations which shall in any way repeal, vary, suspend or affect any of the
provisions of this act, or any of the acts for punishing mutiny and desertion
of officers and soldiers, whether in the service of his majesty or of said com
pany, or any provisions of any act hereafter to be passed in any wise affecting
the said company, or the said territories or the inhabitants thereof, or any lavs
and regulations which shall in any way affect any prerogative of the crown,
or the authority of parliament, or the constitution or rights of the said com
pany, or any part of the unwritten laws or constitution of the United King
dom of Qreat Britain and Ireland, whereon may depend in any degree the
allegiance of any person to the crown of the United Kingdom, or the sovereignty
or dominion of the said crown over any part of the said territories."
A still more important step was taken in 1858, when the direct government
of India was finally transferred from the company to the crown. At the same
"
time a " council of India was created, consisting of fifteen persons, of whom
seven were to be elected by the court of directors of the company, and eight
The president of the council was to be a secre
to be appointed by the orown.
tary of state, who was to be charged with the administrative functions pre
viously vested in the board of directors. The members of the council were
to hold office during good behaviour, but this was so changed in 1869 as to
deemed
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limit their term of office to ten years, and all vacancies in the council were to
be filled by the crown. Several acts in modification of the act of 1858 have
since been passed without introducing any very radical changes.
In 1876 the title of Empress of India was conferred upon the Queen by act

of

parliament.

As the proportion of colonists in India is very small as compared with the
native population, it would obviously be unsafe to confer upon the people the
powers of self-government, and it is not likely that any attempt going very
far in that direction will be made for a long time to come. Local officials of
the native races are allowed to exercise authority over their own people, and
it is now proposed to give to native magistrates jurisdiction in small cases
even where Europeans are parties.
565

LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES.
To present completely local government as it exists in the United Sutet
would require a volume. Every one of the thirty-eight states has a code of its
own with some peculiar features, and the changes which from time to time have
been made in some states, are numerous and important, and would require pre
sentation, if the existing system were to be fully explained. It would be possible
to group the states into classes, composed of those whose systems are similar,
but the classification oould not be exact and might mislead. What we shall say,
therefore, will be aimed at an explanation of certain general features, whieh
are to be met with in all the states, and of some of the most important peculi
arities.
It is to be said in the first place, that the sovereign authority within every
state is in the state itself, and that all inferior public authorities are of state
creation. The general rule is, that the state may create inferior public agencies
at discretion, and may alter and abolish them at will. Barnes v. District of
Columbia, 91 U. S. Rep., 540; Laramie Co. v. Albany Co., 92 U. S. Rep., 807;
St. Louis v. Allen, 13 Mo., 400; People v. Draper, 15 N. Y., 532; Philadelphia
T. Fox, 64 Penn. St., 169; Martin v. Dix, 52 Miss., 53 ; Goff v. Frederick, 44 Mi,
67. It is believed, however, that every one of the American constitutions hat
been adopted with either an express or an implied understanding, that local self*
government in some form was to be continued, and that it would not be com
petent for any state legislature wholly to abolish local institutions and substitute
no others in their stead. People v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich., 44; People v. Lynch, 51
Cal., 15.
There are two ways in which the people of a state may provide for their
local institutions: 1. by their constitution; 2. bylaws enacted by their represen
tatives in the state legislature./ Generally it will be found that the two are
combined; the constitution marking out the general features of local govern
ment, and leaving all else to the legislature. This is the desirable method, as
it ensures steadiness and uniformity, by making the main features subject to
change only by the deliberate action of the people themselves, at the same time
that it leaves minor matters, in respect to which there might be frequent occa
sion for modification and change, entirely at the control of the legislative power.
There has however of late been a growing tendency in all constitutional revis
ions to particularize more and more, and this is quite as observable in respect
But as the most important
to matters of local government as to any others.
to prevent abuse of local
of
restrictions
nature
in
the
provisions have been
from
of
them.
result
harm
will
no
any
powers, probably
The feature common to the local government of all the states is that of
county government. The counties are created at the will of the legislature,
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territory, the inhabitants of which are authorized to
ohoose certain officers, and ezeroise certain powers of a public nature.
The
authority thus conferred is corporate authority, and the county is quasi a cor
poration, and may sue and be sued as such, though it is sometimes provided
that suits by or against it shall be in the name of its corporate board, or of
some designated corporate officer.
The oounty officers commonly are a sheriff,
a treasurer, a county clerk, one or more coroners, and a publio prosecutor or
state's attorney.
In some states, there are also a recorder of deeds, a sur
The titles of these officers perhaps
veyor and a superintendent of sohools.
Besides these the county has a governing
sufficiently indicate their duties.
board of some sort, with jurisdiction in respect to accounts against
and to
its taxation and all financial matters.
There
great diversity in the com
In some states,
position of this board, and in the methods of its selection.
board of commissioners or supervisors selected directly or indirectly by
the people of the county at large, in some
board of supervisors com
posed of the supervisors chosen in the respective towns or districts, in some
county oourt, made up in part or wholly of magistrates chosen in towns
or districts, and in Louisiana
a police jury, composed of members ohosen
also
by the people at large. The diversity in the powers of these boards
In some states they have large powers of local legislation in res
very great.
pect to highways, bridges, ferries, navigable waters, fences, the running at large
of cattle, and the destruction of noxious weeds, and final authority in respect
to claims against their respective counties. They also review the local assess
ments, determine the tax levy, and have general supervision of all county af
They thus constitute the most important agenoy
fairs, buildings, and offices.
in state legislation under the legislature itself, and, in respect to many of their
In
powers, are altogether independent, so long as they do not exceed them.
other states the powers of the county board are much less important.
It
should be stated that in Louisiana the districts of territory having county gov
certain
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a
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is

it

is
a

it

is

it,

by setting apart

are designated parishes.
very large proportion of the states, but not in all, the counties are sub.
divided into districts, which are designated either as towns or townships. In
the New England states the people of these towns constitute
democracy,
which annually in town meeting chooses selectmen to manage its affairs, makes
In New York
by-laws and gives general direction in respect to town business.
not so prominent,
and the Western states generally, the democratic feature
but the town meeting
very important, and possesses considerable powers
town board composed of offi
Wherever township government exists, there
In the Western
cers chosen by the people, and constituting the financial board.
states the following officers are generally provided for: a supervisor, a clerk,
treasurer, several justices of the peace, an overseer of the poor, one or more
commissioners of highways, one or more constables, and one or more school in
not made assessor, an officer by that name
Where the supervisor
spectors.
In some states there
one.
more
than
chosen; perhaps
township superin
statement
This
schools.
sufficiently indicates the importance of
of
tendent
is
a

is

is

a

a

is

is

is

a

In

a

ernment

the town government.
In Virginia the subdivisions of the county for local purposes are called ma
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gisterial districts, each of which chooses three justices, ft supervisor, ft conof the poor for a term of two years.
These district*
do not differ essentially from townships, elsewhere, except in name.
Where township government exists, the townships are generally subdivided
Each of these districts is a little muni
into school districts and road districts.
cipality with corporate powers for school or road purposes, and with author
ity to ohoose its own officers and to control its own affairs, subject to the gen
eral laws of the state.
Where township government does not exist, the coun
ties may be divided into similar road districts, and into school districts also
if a public school system has been established for the state.
Besides the municipal corporations already mentioned, and which are created
by the legislature without any grant of special charter, there are others created
for densely populated districts, which are designated cities, boroughs or village!.
Until recently these have been created by special charter, and the powers con
ferred have had some regard to the size and importance of the town. Almost
universally, they have exceeded the powers which it is customary to confer up
on townships, and they are given authority to abate nuisances, establish market
and places, and over many other sub
rules, and regulate public conveyances
has
no occasion to concern itself.
The
a
rural
population
jects with which
towns
of
these
have
been
chartered
un
and
most
generally
important
largest
der the designation of city; the smaller under that of borough, or town per
In this, however, it cannot
haps, but more commonly under that of village.
be said that there has been any uniformity of action; for while there are some
The dif
very large villages, there are some very small chartered oities.
ference between city and village, is nevertheless not wholly in name, for a vil
lage, where carved out of a township, will generally be left subject to town
government, except as the village charter shall provide, and will thus consti
tute a corporation within a corporation:
Campbell v. Fair Haven, 54 Vt,
336; Jones v. Kolb, 56 Wis., 263; when a city thus carved out, would be set
off from the township altogether, and made wholly independent. Recently a
strong disinclination to the granting of special municipal charters has grown
up, and in several state constitutions, it is now provided that municipal bodies
shall only be created by general law.
The highest type of local self government in the United States, is to be found
in the city. As cities have been created at different periods, and by so great
a number of states, it could not be expected that the plan of incorporation
would be uniform, or that the diversity should not be, as indeed we find
Still there are some leading features present in city government
very great.
body of electors composed
everywhere. The American cities have severally
of all the adult male citizens, by whom the executive officer, usually called the
mayor, and the local legislature, usually called the common council, are chosen.
sometimes, but not always, composed of two nouses,
The common oouncil
subdivided into wards.
and for the purposes of their election, the city
not also
the city
county by itself, the wards, or the city at large, will be
may be called.
given representation in the county board, by whatever nam*
The common council
generally given large powers of local government,
is

it

a

is

is

If

is

a

it,

■table, and an overseer
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though sometimes the powers of one house are restricted to financial questions.
officers will be chosen, as the charter may provide, either
by popular vote, or by the common council, or by the mayor with the concur
rence of the common council or one of its branches.
Cities have no inherent
taxing powers, but they are given large powers of taxation for city purposes,
and also the power to contract debts for like purposes.
In these powers have
been found to lurk the chief evils of city government: they are not only abused
corruptly, but also, from over-confidence in future city growth and prosperity,
they have led in some cases to enormous city debts and to practical bank
ruptcy. Protection against such calamities can only be made secure by the
legislature imposing exact restrictions of the powers granted. This is now
commonly done.
The cities are made responsible for the preservation of order within their
limits, and are given very extensive police powers for that purpose.
The pre
servation of publio order is really, however, a state duty, and when authority
over it is conferred upon a municipality, the municipality is made a state agency
in respect to that duty, and may be compelled by the state to perform
and
to levy all necessary taxes, and provide all necessary officers for the purpose.
state system of publio instruction, the city
there
also given some part
in that, and may be required to perform it. But, in respect to matters which
concern its own people exclusively, suoh as providing parks, water or gas works,
entitled to be governed by the judgment of its
city buildings, etc, the city
own people and its own authorities, except that, as already said, the state may
general rule that cities,
impose restrictions to prevent abuse of power. It
and indeed all municipal corporations, are entitled to the same protection in
their property, that private citizens can claim, and even the state cannot de
Cranch, 43; Mills v. Charleton, 20 Wis.,
prive them of it. Terrett v. Taylor,
400; People v. Common Council, 51 111., 58; Park Commissioners v. Common
Council, 28 Mich., 228. But where the property was acquired for publio pur
poses, the state undoubtedly has a certain undefined right to direct as to its oontrol and disposition, and
dissolved, the state as
munioipal corporation
trustee will dispose of its property, keeping in view in doing so the purposes,
was acquired.
for which, and the people for whose benefit,
Congress has no authority to create municipal corporations within the
states, but
may create them in the District of Columbia and in the terri
tories. But in the territories
customary to leave this authority with the
local legislature.
In none of the American states
there
body corresponding to the Local
Government Board in Great Britain, and in none, perhaps,
the supervision
of the municipalities as complete as would be desirable. Indeed, the general
that
rule
city, county, town or village, performs such state duties as may
be imposed by law upon
the state does not concern itself further, but
leaves local evils to be remedied
If munioipal
by the people themselves.
its officers exceed theirs,
corporation exceeds its powers, its acts are void;
they may be held to personal accountability in the courts.
Threatened
abuses, such as
misapplication of funds, may be restrained by injunction on
Vol. 11—72
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the application of any person whose pecuniary interests would be injuriously
affected thereby.
The general doctrine of the conrts is that grants of municipal powers are to
be striotly construed.
Nashville v. Ray, 19 Wall., 468; Bennett v. Birming
ham, 81 Penn. St., 15; Johnston v. Louisville, 11 Bush, 527; Burritt T. New
Haven, 42 Conn., 174; Jeffries v. Lawrence, 42 Iowa, 498; Clark v. School
District, 3 R.
199; Williams v. Davidson, 43 Tex., 1; Vanoe ▼. Little Bock,
80

Ark.,

485;

Pullen
070.

v. Raleigh,

68

N. C,

451.

THE TERRITORIES
In the

common

OF THE UNITED

STATES.

acceptation of those terms the United States has no colonies

and no foreign possessions.

of the United States that " new states
may be admitted by the Congress into this Union, but no new state shall be
formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other state, nor any state be
formed by the junction of two or more states or parts of states, without the
consent of the legislatures of the states concerned as well as of the Congress."
Art. 4, § 3, cl. 1. Also that " the Congress shall have power to dispose of and
make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory and other prop
erty belonging to the United States; and nothing in this constitution shall be
so construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States or of any par
ticular state." Art. 4, § 3, cl. 2. Also that " the Congress shall have power "
" to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over such district,
not exceeding ten miles square, as may by cession of particular states, and the
acceptance of Congress, become the seat of government of the United States,
and to exercise like authority over all places purchased, by the consent of the leg
islature of the state in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, maga
Art. 1, § 8, cl. 17.
zines, arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful buildings."
It is always to be borne in mind, in considering the constitution of the
United States, that it was made for sovereign states.
Nevertheless its pur
pose was to create a sovereignty, which in respect to some of the highest
powers of government, should be supreme over all the states, and which should
be the sole representative of all the states in the family of nations. And no
doubt any such sovereignty would possess all the incidental powers belonging
to any sovereignty, of providing for the exercise of its constitutional func
Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat., 304;
tions, and of perpetuating its existence.
United States v. Bevans, 3 Wheat., 836; McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat.,
316; Osborn v. United States, 9 Wheat., 738; United States v. Coombs, 12
Pet., 72; Ableman v. Booth, 21 How., 506.
But the United States as a nation was possessed at the time the constitution
was formed of certain territory which had been ceded to it by the states.
Within the limits of the cessions there were many private estates, which had
been acquired by grant from the crown, or from the colonies then owning the
territory, but the title to the land not thus granted passed by the cessions to
the United States, which thus became proprietor of the soil, so far as it had
not previously become private property, and ruler of the territory and of its
Previous to the adoption of the constitution a government had been
people.
provided for the territory northwest of the Ohio, and as that government has
to a considerable extent been a model since, it may be useful to give some

It

was provided by the constitution
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of the provisions of the ordinance establishing it. This was the
ordinance of July 13,1787.
The ordinance provided for a governor of the territory, to be appointed by
Congress for the term of three years; a secretary, to be in like manner ap
pointed for the term of four years, and three judges, to hold office during good
behavior. The judges were not only to exercise judicial authority, bat thej
were to be the legislature for the territory until it should have five thousand
inhabitants, when the people were to elect representatives to sit in a general
Meantime the governor was to appoint magistrates and other civil
assembly.
officers.
The general assembly was to consist of the representatives, constitut
ing one house, and a council of five members chosen by the Congress from tea
names nominated to it by the representatives. All laws required the assent
of both houses and of the governor. The fifth article of the ordinance pro
vided that there should be formed within said territory not less than three nor
more than five states; and after indicating boundaries for three states, it de
clares that, " whenever any of the said states shall have sixty thousand free
inhabitants therein, suoh state shall be admitted, by its delegates, into the
Congress of the United States, on an equal footing with the original states in
all respects whatever, and shall be at liberty to form a permanent constitution
and state government.
After the federal government was organized under the constitution, the
appointing power for the territory was transferred from the Congress to the
president, but in other respects the ordinance remained in force. New terri
tories were formed within its limits, however, as the needs of the people
seemed to require separate governments, and in time, when the requisite popu
lation was obtained, the five states contemplated as possible by the ordinance,
were formed and admitted into the Union in the following order: Ohio, Indi
ana, Illinois, Michigan and Wisconsin.
Here we observe a normal condition of things contemplated by the consti
tution when it speaks of the admission of new states into the Union.
It con
templated that settlements would be formed on the unoccupied lands belong
ing to the United States; that the people would for a time be governed by
" rules and regulations" established for them by Congress, but that eventu
the
states suitable in sise
ally, when the population was sufficient to warrant
should be admitted to the Union on an equal footing with the original states.
What should be sufficient population to justify admission has never been defi
should be equal to the
has generally been thought
nitely agreed, but
number required to entitle the existing states to
representative in Congress
stands at the time.
acoording to the ratio of representation as
territory,
Congress has not, always — nor generally of late — in organizing
has provided for
made the judges
legislature
legislative authority, but
chosen exclusively by the people.
Whatever may be the local legislature,
to bo exercised, however, in conformity to
legislative
power,
possesses general
Miners' Bank v.
the constitution of the United States, and to the organic law.
Vincennes University v. Indiana 14 How., 268; Cross t.
Iowa, 12 How.,
Harrison, 16 How., 164. But Congress may, in its discretion, disallow any
territorial legislation, and legislate directly for the territory itself, so far at
1;

it

a

it

a

a

it

a

it

it

it,

statement
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or expedient: American Ins. Co., v. Canter,
Englebrecht, 13 Wall., 434; Reynolds v. United States,

deem necessary

611; Clintonv.
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1

Pet.,

98

U. S

Rep., 145.
Before any state can be admitted to the union, there must be a state ready
to admit; and this implies that there shall be a state with a constitution and
laws, so that when admitted, it can proceed at once in the performance of sover
The regular method of obtaining admission is for Congress
eign functions.
to pass an "enabling act," as it is called, which empowers the people of the
territory who possess such qualifications as voters as the act prescribes, to elect
representatives to a convention, for forming a constitution, and to vote upon
the adoption of such instrument as the convention shall frame.
If this authority
shall be acted upon, and a constitution adopted and submitted to Congress,
that body, if satisfied with the constitution, will pass another act admitting
the state to the union under it. In some oases the people of territories have
proceeded irregularly to form a state constitution, without the previous author
ity of Congress, and Congress has deemed it wise to overlook the irregularity,
There is no question of its power to do so.
and pass an act of admission.
But though it was probably expected that new states would generally be
formed from territory belonging to the United States, there was nothing in the
constitution to preclude the United States from acquiring new territory from
The general
foreign nations, and this has been done to a very large extent.
understanding has always been, that all such territory shall have suitable ter
ritorial governments established for its people, and that eventually states of
suitable size and population shall be formed from it. And many new states
In no case, with
have already been admitted from the territory thus acquired.
the possible exception of Alaska, has it been supposed that the territory would
Such may possi
remain permanently in a territorial or dependent condition.
It is certain that it has no suit
bly be the fate of the country just named.
able population at the present time to be entrusted with legislative authority,
and that the probability of a self-governing state being formed within its
limits, is very remote and uncertain.
For the formation of a new state within the limits of an existing state, we
See Virginia v. West Vir
have a precedent in the case of West Virginia.
ginia, 11 Wall., 39; Kanawha Coal Co. v. Kanawha Coal, etc. Co., 1 Blatch.,
The precedent comes from troublous times, and possesses some features
391.
which are never likely to present themselves again; but it nevertheless serves
to show the operation of the constitutional provision.
In several cases — notably those of Missouri, Michigan and Nebraska — Con
gress has admitted states to the union subject to a condition to be thereafter
That conditions may thus be imposed will probably
accepted by the states.
as
all new states must come into the union "on an
but
be
not
questioned;
states," any condition that would preclude
with
the
original
footing
equal
this must be inoperative.
The constitution under which any state can be received, must be republican
in form. Const, of U. S., Art. 4, § 4.
The territory which the constitution contemplated should be obtained for
the seat of government, was afterwards acquired by cessions from Maryland
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Over this district,
and Virginia, and was named the District of Columbia.
with the exception of a portion, subsequently retroceded to Virginia, Congress
See Loughborough v. Blake, S
exercises all the powers of sovereignty.
Wheat., 317, 322; Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat., 264, 424
For a time the
district was given a territorial government, but the experiment was not satis
The executive and administrative authority of
factory, and it was abolished.
the district is now vested in two commissioners appointed by the president.
As the power of exclusive legislation carries with it exclusive jurisdiction
(United States v. Cornell, 2 Mass.,60), the states cannot take cognizance of acts
done in places acquired by the United States, with the consent of the states,
for forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards and other needful buildings, and the
inhabitants of those places cease to be inhabitants of the states, and can no
Commonwealth
longer exercise any civil or political rights under state laws.
v. Clary, 8 Mass., 72; Sinks v. Reese, 19 Ohio St., 306.
But it is competent
for the United States to acquire lands for its purposes under the eminent do
main, without the consent of the states: Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. Rep.,
367; and whenever it acquires or holds territory within the limits of a state,
without its consent, state jurisdiction is not excluded.
People v. Godfrey, 1*
Johns., 225. It is common for the states, when ceding jurisdiction of small
parcels of territory for national purposes, to reserve authority for the service
of state process within them.
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APPENDIX.
Sect.

1.

Record or ah Indictment and Conviction or Mordeb,
at the Assizes.

) Ba it Remembered, that at the general session of the lord the Session of oyer
terminer.
to wit,
X king of oyer and terminer hoMeii at Warwick, in and for the
said county of Warwick, on Friday, the twelfth day of March, in the second
year of the reign of the lord George the Third, now king of Great Britain, be
fore Sir Michael Foster, knight, one of the justices of tne said lord the king
assigned to hold pleas before the king himself, Sir Edward Clive, knight, one
of tne justices of the said lord the king, of his court of common bench, and
others their fellows, justices of the said lord the king, assigned by letters patent
of the said lord the king, under his great seal of Great Britain, made to them Commission of
the aforesaid justices and others, and any two or more of them, (whereof one
of them the said Sir Michael Foster and Sir Edward Clive, the said lord the
king would have, to be one) to inquire (by the oath of good and lawful men of
the county aforesaid, by whom the truth of the matter might be the better
known, and by other ways, methods, and means, whereby they could or might
the better know, as well within liberties as without) more fully the truth of
tbe treasons, misprisions of treasons, insurrections, rebellions, counterfeiting,
clippings, washings, false coinings, and other falsities of the moneys of Great
Britain, and of other kingdoms or dominions whatsoever; and of all murders,
felonies, manslaughters,
killings, burglaries, rapes of women, unlawful meet
ings and conventicles, unlawful uttering of words, unlawful assemblies,
misprisions, confederacies, false allegations, trespasses, riots, routs, retentions,
maintenances,
oppres
escapes, contempts, falsities, negligencies, concealments,
deceits, and all other misdeeds,
offences, and injuries
sions, champerties,
whatsoever, and also the accessories of the same, within the county aforesaid,
as well within liberties as without, by whomsoever and howsoever done, had,
perpetrated, and committed, and by whom, to whom, when, how and in what
manner; and of all other articles and circumstances in the said letters patent
of the said lord the king specified; the premises, and every or any of them
howsoever concerning; and for this time to hear and determine the said trea- oyer and ter~
sons and other the premises, according to the law and custom of the realm of miner,
England; and also keepers of the peace, and justices of the said lord the king
assigned to hear and determine diverse felonies, trespasses, and other mis- *nd of the
demeanors committed within the county aforesaid, by the oath of Sir James peace.
Thompson, baronet, Charles Roper, Henry Dawes, Peter Wilson, Samuel
Rogers, John Dawson, James Phillips, John Mayo, Richard Savage, William Grand jury.
Bell, James Morris, Lawrence Hall, and Charles Carter, esquires, good and
lawful men of the county aforesaid, then and there impanelled, sworn, and
charged to inquire for the said lord the king and for the body of the said
county, it is presented; That Peter Hunt, late of the parish of Lighthorne in Indictment,
the said county, gentleman, not having the fear of God before his eyes, but
being moved and seduced by the instigation of the devil, on the 5th day of
March, in the said second year of the reign of the said lord the king, at the
parish of Lighthorne aforesaid, with force and arms, in and upon one Samuel
Collins, in the peace of God and of the said lord the king, then and there being,
feloniously, wilfully, and of his malice aforethought, did make an assault;
and that the said Peter Hunt, with a certain drawn sword, made of iron and
steel, of the value of five shillings, which he the said Peter Hunt in his right
hand then and there had and held, him the said Samuel Collins, in and upon
the left side of the bellv of him the said Samuel Collins, then and there felon
iously, wilfully, and of his malice aforethought, did strike, thrust, stab, and
penetrate; giving unto the said Samuel Collins, then and there, with the sword
drawn as aforesaid, in and upon the left side of the belly of him, the Bald
Samuel Collins, one mortal wound of the breadth of one inch, and the depth
of nine inches; of which said mortal wound he the said Samuel Collins, at the
parish of Lighthorne aforesaid, in the said county of Warwick, from the said
fifth day of March in the year aforesaid, until the seventh day of the same
month in the same year, did languish, and languishing did live; on which said
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seventh day of March, in the year aforesaid, the said Samuel Collins, at the parish
of Lighthorne aforesaid, in the county aforesaid of the said mortal wound did
die; find so the jurors aforesaid, upon their oath aforesaid, do say, that tfc<
said Peter Hunt, him the said Samuel Collins, in manner and form aforesaid,
feloniously, wilfully, and of his malice aforethought, did kill and murder,
against the peace of the said lord the now king, his crown, and dignity.
Capiat.
Whereupon the sheriff of the county aforesaid is commanded, that he omit not
for any liberty in his bailiwick, but that lie take the said Peter Hunt, if In
may be found in his bailiwick, and him safely keep, to answer to the felony
Which said indictment the said jns{tensionof gaol and murder whereof he stands indicted.
dellvety.
tices of the lord the king above named, afterwards, to wit, at the delivery of
the gaol of the said lord the king, holden at Warwick, in and for the county
aforesaid, on Friday, the sixth day of August, in the said second year of the
reign of the said lord the king, before the right honorable William lord Mans
field, chief justice of the said lord the king, assigned to hold pleas before the
king himself, Sir Sidney Stafford Smythe, knight, one of the barons of the ex
chequer of the said lord the king, and others their fellows, justices of the said
lord the king, assigned to deliver his said gaol of the county aforesaid of the
prisoners therein being, by their proper bands to deliver here in court of record
Arraignment
And afterwards, to wit, at the same delivery
in form of the law to be determined.
of the gaol of the said lord the king of his county aforesaid, on the said Fri
day, the sixth day of August, in the said second year of the reign of the said
lord the king, before the said justices of the lord the king last above-named,
and others their fellows aforesaid, here cometh the said Peter Hunt, under tie
custody of William Browne, esquire, sheriff of the county aforesaid, (in whose
custody in the gaol of the county aforesaid, for the cause aforesaid, he had
been before committed,) being brought to the bar here in his proper person by
not
Plea:
the said sheriff, to whom he is here also committed : And forthwith being deguiltymanded concerning the premises in the said indictment above specified and
charged upon him, how he will acquit himself thereof, he saith that he is not
guilty thereof ; and thereof for good and evil, he puts himself upon the country:
And John Blencowe, esquire, clerk of the assizes for the county aforesaid, who
prosecutes for the said lord the king in this behalf doth the like:
Therefore.
let a jury thereupon here immediately come before the said justices of the
lord the king last above mentioned, and others their fellows aforesaid, of free
and lawful men of the neighbourhood of the said parish of Lighthorne, in the
county of Warwick aforesaid, by whom the truth of the matter may be the
better known, and who are not of kin to the said Peter Hunt, to recognize
upon their oath, whether the said Peter Hunt be guilty of the felony and murder
in the indictment aforesaid above specified, or not guilty: because as well the
said John Blencowe, who prosecutes for the said lord the king in this behalf,
And the
as the said Peter Hunt, have put themselves upon the said jury.
iarors of the said jury, by the said sheriff for this purpose impanelled and re
turned, to wit, David Williams, John Smith, Thomas Home, Charles Nokes,
Richard May, Walter Duke, Matthew Lion, James White, William Bates,
Oliver Green, Bartholomew Nash, and Henry Long, being called, come; who,
being elected, tried and sworn, to speak the truth of and concerning the preVerdlet: guilty miscs, upon their oath say, thai the said Peter Hunt is guilty of the felony
of murder.
gjjd mUrder aforesaid, on him above charged in the form aforesaid, as by the
indictment aforesaid is above supposed against him; and that the said Peter
Hunt, at the time of committing the saiti felony and murder, or at any time
since to this time, had not nor hath any goods or chattels, lands, or tenements, in
or elsewhere, to the knowledge of the said
the said county of Warwick,
jurors. (1) And upon this it is forthwith demanded of the said Peter Hunt, if
he hath or knoweth any thing to say, wherefore the said justices here ought
not upon the premises and verdict aforesaid to proceed to justice and execution
Where
against him: who nothing farther saith, unless as he before hath said.
upon all and singular the premises being seen, and by the said justices here fully
understood, it is considered by the court here, that the said Peter Hunt be taken
to the gaol of the said lord the king of the said county of Warwick from whence
he came, and from thence to the place of execution on Monday now next ensu
ing, being the ninth day of this instant August, and there be hanged by the
•» J direction, neck, until he be dead; and that afterwards his body be dissected and i
ixed.
(1) This averment la now rendered unnecessary.
«87,n. (7)
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is

is

upon their oath say, that the said Peter Hunt is not guilty of
the murder aforesaid, above charged upon him; but that the said Peter Hunt
is guilty of the felonious slaying of the aforesaid Samuel Collins; and that he
had not nor hath any goods or chattels, lands, or tenements, at the time of the
felony and manslaughter aforesaid, or ever afterwards to this time, to the
knowledge of the said jurors. (2) And immediately it is demanded of the said
Peter Hunt, if he hath or knoweth any thing to say, wherefore the said lustices here ought not upon the premises and verdict aforesaid
to proceed to
judgment and execution against him: who saith that he is a clerk, and prayeth
the benefit of clergy to be allowed him in this behalf.
Whereupon, all and
singular the premises being seen, and by the said justices here fully understood, it is considered by the court here, that the saia Peter Hunt be burned in
And immediately he
his left hand, and delivered.
burned in his left hand,
delivered, according to the form of the statute. (3)
and

Verdict: not
guilty of mur-

j™i.?"i!S»of

clergy prayed,
Judgment to
b!Jrnjd
delivered!,

ind

Sect. 2. Conviction
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Entry of a Trial instantrr in the Court of King's Bench,
a Collateral Issue and Rule of Court for Execution

upon

Michaelmas

Term,

in

the Sixth Tear

of

THEREON.

the Reign of

King

George the Third,

The prisoner at the bar being brought into this court
in custody of the sheriff of the county of Sussex by
against
Thomas Rogers.
virtue of his majesty's writ of habeas corpus,
ordered
that the said writ and the return thereto be filed. And
appearing by
certain record of attainder, which hath been removed into this court by his
majesty's writ of certiorari, that the prisoner at the bar stands attainted, by
the name of Thomas Rogers, of felony for
robbery on the highway, and the
said prisoner at the bar having heard the record of the said attainder now read
to him, is now asked by the court here what he hath to say for himself, why
the court here should not proceed to award execution against him upon the
He for plea saith, that he
said attainder.
not the same Thomas Rogers in
the said record of attainder named, and against whom judgment was pronounced: and this he
ready to verify and prove, Ac. To which said plea
the honorable Charles Torke, esquire, attorney-general
of our present sovereign
and
who
for
our
said lord the king in this behalf prosecuteth, being
lord
king,
court,
here
in
heard
the
said prisoner at the bar
now present
and having
what
hath now alleged, for our said lord the king by way of reply saith, that the
said prisoner now here at the bar
the same Thomas Rogers in the said record of attainder named, and against whom judgment was pronounced as aforesaid and this he prayeth may be inquired into by the country and the said prisjury in this behalf immediately
oner at the bar doth the like: Therefore let
come here into court, by whom the truth of the matter will be the better
known, and who have no affinity to the said prisoner, to try upon their oath,
whether the said prisoner at the bar be the same Thomas Rogers in the said
record of attainder named, and against whom judgment was so pronounced as
aforesaid or not: because, as well the said Charles Yorke, esquire, attorneygeneral of our said lord the king, who for our said lord the king in this behalf
prosecutes, as the said prisoner at the bar, have put themselves in this behalf
And immediately thereupon the said jury come here into
upon the said jury.
court; and being elected, tried and sworn to speak the truth touching and con
cerning the premises aforesaid, and having heard the said record read to them,
do say, upon their oath, that the said prisoner at the bar
the same Thomas
and against whom judgment
Rogers in the said record of attainder named
was so pronounced as aforesaid, in manner and form as the said attorneyhath by his said replication to the said plea of the said prisoner now
And hereupon the said attorney-general,
feneral
ere at the bar alleged.
on behalf
of our said lord the king, now prayeth that the court here would proceed to
award execution against him, the said Thomas Rogers, upon the said attainder,
Whereup<m,&\\ and singular the premises being now seen and fully understood
irrdercd by the court here, that execution be done upon
by the court here,
the said prisoner at the bar for the said felony, in pursuance of the said judg
And
ment, according to due form of law.
lastly ordered, that he, the said
Thomas Rogers, the prisoner at the bar, be now committed to the custody of
8

(2) See preceding note.
(3) Benefit of clergy and burning in the hand being now abolished: seeOQeo. IV, c. SB;
and Oeo. IV, c. 28, omte, p. 874,n. (8) this form will require alteration accordingly.
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the sheriff of the county of Kent (now also present here in court) for the purpose aforesaid; and that the said sheriff of Kent do execution upon the aaid
defendant, the prisoner at the bar, for the said felony, in pursuance of the
said judgment, according to due form of law.
On the motion of Mr. Attorney-General.
By the Court.

Sec. 4.

Warrant of Execution on Judgment of Death, at the Qkxkkal
Gaol Delivery in London and Middlesex .

London
and

the city of London; and to the sheriff of the
) To the sheriffs of
> county of Middlesex: and to the keeper of his majesty's gaol

Middlesex. )

of Newgate.

at the session of gaol delivery of Newgate, for the city of London
and county of Middlesex, holden at Justice Hall, in the Old Bailey, on the nine
teenth day of October last Patrick Mahony, Roger Jones, Charles King and
Mary Smith received sentence of death for the respective offences in their
several indictments mentioned: Noa it is hereby ordered, that execution of
the said sentence be made and done upon them, the said Patrick Mahony and
Roger Jones, on Wednesday, the ninth day of this instant month of Novem
ber, at the usual place of execution.
And it is his majesty's command that
execution of the said sentence upon them, the said Charles King and Mary
Smith, be respited until his majesty's pleasure touching them be farther
Whereat,

known.

Given under my hand

and seal, this fourth day of
seven hundred and sixty-eight

Sect. 5.

Writ

November, one

thousand

James Eyrk, Recorder.
[l. a.]
of Execution upon a Judgment of Murder, bepore thj
Kino in Parliament.

Oeoroe the Second, by the grace of God, of Great Britain, France, and Ire
land king, defender of the faith, and so forth; to the sheriffs of London, tod
Whereat Lawrence Earl Ferrers, Viscount
sheriff of Middlesex, greeting.
Tamworth, hath been indicted of felony and murder, by him done and com
mitted, which said indictment hath been certified before us in our present
parliament; and the said Lawrence Earl Ferrers, Viscount Tamworth, hath
been thereupon arraigned, and upon such arraignment hath pleaded not guilty;
and the said Lawrence Earl Ferrers, Viscount Tamworth, hath before us in
our said parliament been tried, and in due form of law convicted thereof; and
whereas,
judgment hath been given in our said parliament that the said
Lawrence Earl Ferrers, Viscount Tamworth, shall be hanged by the neck
till he is dead, and that his body be dissected and anatomized, the execution
of which judgment yet remaineth to be done: We require, and by these present*
strictly command you, that, upon Monday, the fifth day of May Instant,
between the hours of nine in the morning and one in the afternoon of the
same day, him, the said Lawrence Earl Ferrers, Viscount Tamworth, with
out the gate of our tower of London (to you then and there to be delivered,
as by another writ to the lieutenant of our tower of London or his deputy
into your custody you then and receive'-'
directed, we have commanded)
and him, in your custody so being, you forthwith convey to the accustomed
and
that you do cause execution to he
at
Tyburn:
place of execution
done upon the said Lawrence Earl Ferrers, Viscount Tamworth, in your
custody so being, in all things according to the said judgment. And this yoa
are by no means to omit, at your peril
Witneu ourself at Westminiter, tb»
second day of May, in the thirty -third year of our reign.
YoRKB and Yowa.
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when to be tried, iv, 323.
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Accident, remedy in case of, iii. 431.
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441.
Alimony,
suit for, iii, 94.
none
allowed in case of divorce

ii,

;

i,

adultery, ib.
Allegation, iii, 100.
366, 869, a. iv, 74.
Allegiance,
local, 870.
natural,
369, 370, n.
367-369; iv, 278.
oath of,
to whom due,
371.
origin of oath of,
53.
refusing oath of, iv, 116.
withdrawing from, iv, 87.
seducing soldiers or sailors from, iv, 102,n.
Alliances, how made,
257.
47, 60.
Allodial property,
Allodium, derivation and nature of,
45.
;

ii,

ii,

i.

ii,

i,

47, 60, 105.

ii,

Allowance of franchise, iii, 263.
of pardon, iv, 401, 402.
of writs of error, iv. 892.
Alluvion, title to.
261, 262, a.
Almanac, inspection of, iii, 333.
deeds,
ii,
Alteration of
808.
Ambassadors,
how appointed,
253.
their privileges,
254-256.
violation of privilege of, iv, 70, 441.
killing, iv, 86.
i,

7.

ii,

i,

ii,

293.

i.

i,

i,

ii,

(See "Contract.")
Agriculture, its origin,
Aid-prayer, iii, 800.
Aiders and abettors, iv, 84.
Aids, feudal,
63, 86. 87; iv, 411.
307.
parliamentary,
580

274, 293.

merchants and artificers, leases to,
dower of,
181
descent through,
226, n.
royal grant to, ii. 847.
naturalization and denization of,

i,

ii,

ii,

ii,

8.

1,

i,

i,

ii,

488.

"

Easement")
prescriptive right to, not recognized
395, n. iii. 217, a.
America,
nuisance by infecting, iii, 122.
Albinatus jus,
372.
Alderman,
116.
of,
Isle
106.
Alderney,
Alehouses, offences in, iv, 64, 168.
Alfred, his laws,
64, 113.
his dome-book,
64, 66, 114; iv, 411.
Alias writ, ifi, 283.
Alien priories,
386; iv, 113.
248, n.
Alienation of mind of Geo. Ill,
Alienation, history of the right of,
287.
fines for,
71; iv, 418.
who may alien and to whom, ii. 290.
restraint on. allowed in favor of married
woman,
434, n.
of rights of action, &c., ii, 290.
different modes of,
293.
295.
by deed,
373.
by devise,
865.
by special custom,
344.
by matter of record,
forfeiture by,
268.
conditions in restraint of,
157, a.
866, 371.
Aliens,
disabilities of,
871.
315, 872.
duty on,
249,
may take, but cannot hold lands,
i,

ii,

ii,

ii,

i,

ii,

800.

14, 266, n.

(See

i,

ii,

ii,

a

i,

I,

i,

ii,

ii,

i,

iii,

qf consent to marry,
436.
full, what,
463; iv, 22.
of criminal responsibility, iv. 22 el teg.
Agents, embezzlement by, iv, 231.
public not answerable on contracts for pub
lic,
243, u.
469.
Aggregate corporation,
330.
Aggregate fund,
452.
Agistment,
285.
Agnati,
Agnus Dei, &c., iv, 115.
Agreement, specific performance of, ill, 485,

to,

i, i,

108, n.

law in,
83.
trial of offonces in, iv, 268, 209, n.
clerk,
Admission of
390.
366, 870.
Admittance to copyhold,
Admittenduin clericum, writ ad, iii, 860.
Ad quod damnum, writ of,
271.
441; iv, 64, 65, 101.
Adultery,
divorce for,
441.
alimony not allowed In cases of divorce
for, iii, 94.
action of trespass, or on the case, may be
brought for, iii, 189.
198, n., 266, n.
Adverse possession,
290, n.
conveyances in case of,
Advocates, iii, 126.
or want of
liability of, for negligence
skill, iii, 164, and a.
Advocatus fisci, iii, 27.
Advowson, ii, 21; iv, 426.
22.
appendant or in gross,
how conveyed, ib.
right of presentation before and after vac
22, 24, n.
ancy,
22.
presentative, collative, or donative,
donative, how destroyed, ii, 23.
lapse, ii, 24, n., 276.
24, n.
prerogative presentation,
278, el seq.
simony,
127.
curtesy of,
who may be disturbers of right of, iii, 244.
limitations to actions for, iii. 25, a.
writ of right of, abolished, iii, 250 ,n.
330; iii, 441.
.iEquitas sequitur legem,
Affectum, challenge propter, iii, 863; iv, 852.
Affeerorsof amercements, iv, 880.
Affidavit, iii, 804.
verification of plea in abatement to indict
ment by, iv, 334, n.
434, 435, n.
Affinity,
Affirmance of judgments, iii, 411.
Affray, iv, 145.
breach of the peace chargeable upon him
who begins, iii,
Age, action formerly suspended by non-age,

Air, right

ii,

it,

Admiralty, proceedings in, iii, 108.
suit for beaconage may be brought in
iii, 107.
iii, 68, n.,
lias jurisdiction as to prizes,

i,

482
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i,

i,

ii,

ii,

1,

ii,

ii,

i,

1,

i,

ii,

ii,

ii,

160, and n.

i,

Apprenticii ad legem, ill, 37.
335, n.
Appropriation of supplies,
of ecclesiastical dues,
884.
84; iii, 240.
Approvement of common,
Approvers, iv, 829.
Appurtenants and appendants distinguish
ed, ii. 33, 88, n.
18, n., 84, n.
grant of,
118.
Arbitrary consecration of tithes,
160.
power,
Arbitration, iii, 16.
submission to revocable, iii, 16, n.
agreement to settle controversies by, ib.
581
i,

i,

ii,

38,

23,
n.
'
376.
Appointment to charitable uses,
134.
Apportionment of rent,
Appraisement, commission of, iii, 263.
436, 437.
Apprentices,
834.
duty on fee,
embezzlement
by, iv, 280.
trade
without having been, iv,
exercising

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

5,

ii,

278.

Appellee on approvement, iv, 330.
Appendants and appurtenants distinguished,

i,

i,

i,

i,

ii,

.

878.

Annus luctus,
457.
Answer in equity, iii, 437, 488, 446.
upon oath, iii, 100.
of peer upon honor,
402.
Apology for defamation, iii, 135, n.
Apostacy, iv, 48.
Apparel, excess in, iv, 171.
208.
Apparent heir,
Appeal, iii, 66.
by approvers, iv, 880.
of death, iv, 814, 424, 443, n.
of felony, ib.
of treason, iv, 314.
in convictions, iv, 382.
prosecution by, iv, 812, 424.
to parliament, iii, 454.
• to Rome, iv, 115, 431.
courts of, iii, 441.
from decree in equity, iii, 453, 454.
in matters of lunacy, iii, 427.
from commission under statutes of chari
table uses, iii, 428.
to quarter sessions, iii, 455.
new evidence on, ib.
from IrUh courts,
104.
different from writ of error, iii, 56.
Appearance, iii, 286, 390.
by defendant, how made, iii, 287, n.
in chancery, iii, 443, 445.
Appearance day of the term or return, iii,

i,

i,

i,

i,

ii,

ii,

i,

i,

ii,

40, n.,

for lives,
461.
memorial of,
461.
Annulum et baculum, investiture per,

ii,

ii,

;

i,

i,

i,

i,

i.

i, i, i,

i,

i,

i,

i,

i,

i, i,

i,

;

ii,

i,
i,

ii,

ii,

118.

i,

states, statutes of, when to take
effect, i, 46, n.
exercise of legislative power in, i, 53, n.,
58. n., 89, n.. 125, n.
sovereignty in, i, 49, n., 53, n.
rights of married women to property in, i,
55, n. ;
433, n. iv, 443, n.
68, n.
common law of,
civil divisions of, 119, n.
135, n.
habeas corpus in,
protection of private property in, 189, n.
143, n.
right of petition in,
143, n.
right to bear arms in,
179, n.
property qualification of electors,
214,
n, 232, n.
executive power in,
257, n.
treaties, how made in,
257, n.
war, how declared by,
commerce,
264, n.
power over
power to pardon,.!. 289, n.
in,
268,
n.
judicial tenure
272, n.
titles of nobility forbidden,
273, n.
how corporations created,
277, n.
legal tender in,
300, n.
251, n.
corruption of blood,
302, n.
escheats in,
321, n.
national taxes of,
justices of the peace in, 354, n.
of, as affecting status of in
independence
habitants,
366, n., 369, n.
372, n.
escheats for alienage,
375, n.
naturalization in,
376, n.
religious societies in,
423, n.
abolition of slavery in,
102, n.
tenures of land,
119, n.
estate tail in,
159, n.
foreclosure of mortgages in,
registry system in, ii, 343, n.
conveyances in, by private statutes,
346, n.
438, n.
married women's property in,
476, n., 481, n., 484,
bankrupt law of,
n., 488, n.
courts of, iii, 60, n. 70, n.
habeas corpus in, iii, 138, n.
suits against, iii, 257, n.
treason in, iv, 76, n.
local government in, iv, app., 468.
119, n.
American war,
Anatomy, offence of stealing bodies for,
429.
Ancestors,
203, 209.
210; see 240, n.
not heirs,
Ancestral actions, iii, 180.
286;
90, 99.
Ancient demesne,
writings prove themselves, iii, 367.
389, 390, 408.
Animals property in,
laming of, iv, 235.
killing or maiming, iv, 244.
389. 40?
ferae natural,
trespasses by, iii, 211.

20, n.

Animus furandi, iv, 230, 233.
Animus revertendi, u, 392.
Annual parliaments,
153.
20, n., 40.
Annuities,
may be granted in fee or in tail,

a

46, n.

American

Animals, trespass in hunting wild, iii, 218.
(See "Cattle," "Game.")
Animosity between clergy and lawyers,

if,

Amendments of pleadings, history of the
doctrine of, iii, 408.
of variances in indictments, It, 489.
American colonies, i, 107, 109, n.
transportation to, iv, 401.
American states, how constitutions of, dif
fer from English, i, 49, n.
ex post facto laws cannot be passed in, i,

483

Gener

484

Archbishops, 5, 155, 377.
court of, i, 83.
mode of appointment of, i. 877,
powers and duties of, i, oSO.
Archdeacon, i, 383.
Archdeacon's court, iii, 64.
Archdeaconry, i, 112.
Arches, court of. iii, 64.
dean of, iii, 65.
Areopagus, court of, iii. 365; iv, 169, 848.
Aristocracy, i, 49, 164, 396; iii, 380.
Armed, being unusually, iv, 149.
Armies, who can raise, i, 362, 366.
standing, i, 413, 414; iv, 419, 439, 441,

Assault, on king's chancellor, &c., iv, 84.
in king's palace, iv, 120.
in courts of justice, ib.
on constables, iv, 129.
on clergymen, iv, 317.
in rescues, iv, 131.
to raise price of wages, iv, 159, 217, n.
to stop progress of grain, &c., iv, 217, a.
with intent to commit felony, ib.
on doorkeepers and gamekeepers, ib.
on persons saving wreck, ib.
on revenue officers, iv, 155.
on commissioners of taxes, iv, 158.
Assembly, riotous or unlawful, iv, 146.
of estates,
147.

221.

a

where house must be burnt, ib.
what burning, iv, 222.
malice, ib.
punishment, ib.
appeal of, iv, 814.
(See

"Burning," "Fire.")

ii,

i,

i,

i,

Articles of the navy,
420.
415, 417.
of war,
of the peace, iv, 255.
Artificers,
407.
laws against combination by, iv, 159.
seducing from the realm, iv, 160.
As, Roman, divisions of,
462.
Asportation, what is, iv, 231.
Assault, what is, and how redressed, iii, 120;
iv, 216, 217.
costs in action for, iii, 100.
582

i,

325.

ii,

i,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii, ii,

ii,

ii,

;

ii,

for waste, iii, 228.
Assets,
510.
estates pour autre vie, ii. 260.
by descent, ii. 244, 303, 340 iii, 430.
when not liable for personal wrongs,
803.
real, in equity, iii, 430.
Assignees in bankruptcy,
480.
" Bankruptcy)")
(See
440.
Assignments,
326.
fraudulent,
296. 441.
of chose in action,
397. n.,442.
distinguished
from an underlease,
327, n.
of bills of exchange, &c,
468.
of errors, iii, 406.
Assigns,
289.
Assize, general,
148.
of arms,
411;
66.
commission of, iii, 60; iv, 269. 424.
grand, iv, 422.
justices of, iii, 59; iv, 269.
killing them, iv, 84.
could not formerly sit in their own
country, iii. 59, 335.
of bread, the offence of breaking, iv, 157.
of nuisance, iii, 220.
courts of, iii, 58.
certificate of, iii, 389.
writ of. iii. 184; iv, 423.
of mort d'ancestor, &c., iii, 185, 232.
turned into an inquest, iii, 402.
Association, writ of, iii, 60.
Assumpsit, implied, iii, 159, 162.
consideration to support,
443.
ii,

a

fa,

i,

i,

i,

i,

i,

i,

i,

i,

Arms, right of having,
143.
training to, iv, 102, n.
iv,
149.
going armed,
and ammunition, exporting,
265.
418.
Army, regular,
of,
408.
history
how raised,
232, 366.
413,
414; iv, 419, 439, 441.
standing,
~*
Arraignment, iv, 322, 449.
incidents to, iv, 324.
411.
Array, commissions of,
challenge to the, iii, 858; iv, 853.
Arrest of judgment, iii, 393; iv, 375.
of persons, when allowed, iii, 287, n.
of seamen and soldiers, 421.
how made, iii, 288, and n.
what persons are privileged from, iii, 288.
liability of soldiers, &c, to, iv, 421.
of persons in criminal cases, iv, 281).
by warrant, and by whom, and for what
granted, iv, 290.
form of warrant, ib.
backing warrant, iv, 291.
time and place of, iv, 292.
by officers without warrant, iv, 392.
by private persons, iv, 393.
by hue and cry, iv, 393.
of clergymen going to perform divine ser
vice, &c, iv, 218.
in trespass, iii, 281.
447.
Arrha,
Arson, in general, iv. 220, 872.
what house to constitute this offence, iv,

taxes,

i,

411.

Assessed

Assessment of damages

Assurance.

Assurances,
covenant

"

(See
Insurance.")
common, ii, 294.
for further, ii, App.

Atheling,
199.
Attachment in pone, iii, 280.
against witnesses, iii, 369.
for contempts, iii, 443; iv. 283.
Attachments, court of, iii, 71.
Attainder, act of, iv, 259.
forfeiture of real property by, in treason,
iv, 881.
in felony, iv, 385.
by praemunire, iv, 386.
of personal property, ib.
difference between forfeiture of lands and
goods, iv, 887.
plea of previous attainder, iv, 336.
i,

of,

i.

,

ii,

428; iii, 105.
Armorial ensigns,
Armor, &c. embezzling the king's, iv, 101.
statutes

Index.

i,

443, n.

,
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i,

if

291.

i,

i,

346.

i, i,

special,

i.

;

1,

ii,

ii,

844; iv, 88.
Bailiwick,
Bailments,
295, et seq.
classification of,
451 and n.
Bakers, regulation as to baking, &c., bread,
iv, 156.
selling bad bread, iv, 162.
Balance of powers in government,
62, n.
155, n.

ii,

ii,

il,

i,

Ballot for jurors, iii, 858.
Balnearii, iv, 239.
Banc, what are days in, iii, 277.
138, 187; iv, 877, 401.
Banishment,
Bank notes, ii, 470, n.
checks,
470, n.
Bank of England, misbehavior of its offi
cers; iv, 234.
by, iv, 230.
embezzlement
notes, forgery of, iv, 248.
stealing notes of, iv, 234.
Bankers, checks of, ii, 470, n.
Bankers, embezzlement by, iv, 231, n.
forging their plates, iv, 250 and n.
472.
Bankrupt, the word,
promise to pay by, after certificate must
466, n.
be in writing,
of effects by, iv, 156.
embezzlement
271, 488, n.; iv, 431, 486.
Bankruptcy,
472.
Roman law of,
bankrupt formerly treated as an offender,
ii,

ii,

471, n.

ii,

473, 474.
confined to traders,
what
476.
trading,
feme covert, ii, 477.
475.
petitioning creditors' debt,
477.
act of bankruptcy,
fraudulent, iv, 155 and n.
479.
proceedings in,
assignee's title to estate and property of
bankrupt, ii. 285, 485.
dividend,
487, 488, n.
priorities of creditors, ib.
landlord's rent,
487.
488.
contingent debts,

ii,

il,

ii,

ii,

ii,

interest,

488.

i,

ii,

488.
superseding commission,
court or bankruptcy, iii, 56, 428, n.
court of review, iii. 428, n.
jurisdiction of equity, iii, 428, n
Banks of rivers, <fcc., destroying, iv, 144, 245.
Banneret, knight,
403.
Banns,
489.
583

i,

if

.

i.

Bachelor, knight,
404.
Backing warrants, iv, 291
Bail, above, Iii, 290.
below, iii, 291.
common, iii, 287.
sheriff obliged to take, iii, 289.
not put in, plaintiff may
to the action,
sue the sheriffs bail, iii, 290.
when and how put in, iii, 290.
special, when required, iii, 291.
plaintiff in error must find, iii, 411.

ii,

ii,

ii,

iii,

piece,

Bailable or not, who, iv, 297, 298, 299.
Bailee, larceny by, iv, 230.
larceny from, iv, 231.
Bailiffs,
345.
of hundreds,
116, 345.

ii,

i,

i,

1,

i,

ii,

ii,

ii,

iv, 800.
personating of, iv, 128, n.
bond, iii, 290.

is
a

ii,

it

T,

a

ii,

;

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

401.
abolished, iii, 351, n.
Attainted persons, iv, 880.
Attempts to rob, iv, 242.
to steal fish, iv, 235.
Attestation of deed,
307.
808.
royal,
870, 501.
of wills,
Attesting witness, proof by, iii, 308.
Attorney, iii, 25.
subject to censure of the judges, iii, 26.
must be admitted and sworn, iii, 26.
communications made to him in his pro
fessional capacity, iii, 36.
may recover fees in United States, iii,
28, n.
liability of, iii, 164, and n.
right of, to defend client for felony, iv,
356.'
summary proceedings against, iv, 284.
to deliver seizin,
815.
warrant of, iii, 307.
Attorney-general, iii, 97.
information by, iii, 261 iv, 808.
information by, in matters of charity, iii,
42.
72, 290.
Attornment,
Attornment, wrongful,
forfeiture,
275.
Aubaine, droit d',
872.
lies, iii. 405.
Audita querela, when
Augmentation of vicarages and curacies,
388.
Aula regia, iii, 37; iv, 416, 422.
275.
Aulnager,
Aurum reginse,
221.
Authorities in law,
72.
Auterfois acquit, iv, 835.
attaint, iv, 336.
convict, iv, 836.
Autre droit,
177.
Autre vie,
120.
(See "Estate.")
Averium,
424.
Averment, in pleading, iii, 318.
in indictments, iv, 840.
Avowry, iii, 149.
Avulsion of land,
261.
Award, what is, iii, 16.
real property cannot pass by, iii, 16.
under rule of court, iii, 16.
Ayle, writ of. iii, 186.

against, iii,
416.
scire facias against, iii, 416.
in criminal cases, iv, 297.
135; iv, 297.
taking excessive,
taking insufficient, iv. 297.
what offences bailable, iv, 298.
what to be done,
offence not bailable,

Bail, when may be proceeded

ii,

ii,

ii,

Attainder, escheat on.
251. 290.
dower of felon's wife,
233.
Attaint, writ of, iii, 851.
verdicts formerly reversed by, iii, 888.
superseded
by motions for new trials, iii,

485
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ii,

ii,

i,

ii, ii,

i,

i.

i,

are not peers,
401.
mode of appointment,
377.
381, 382.
powers and duties,
crown entitled to hounds of, on death of,
418.
426.
mortuary to crown on death of,
used to sit in the county court, iii, 61.
what matters tried by certificate of, iii
335.
not electing or consecrating, iv, 115.
not entitled to trial as peers,
401 iv,
264.
Bishoprics, nominating to, iv, 108, 115, 415,
430.
Bissextile year,
141.
Black act, threatening letters, iv, 144.
shooting at another, iv, 208.
going disguised, Ac, iv., 244.
burning houses, &c, iv, 246.
Blackmail,
43; iv, 344.
Blanch rent,
43.
Blasphemy, iv, 59.
Blench holding, ii, 43.
Blind persons, wills by, ii, 497 and n.
Blood, corruption of, ii, 251; iv, 388.
restitution in, iv, 402.
70, 194;
half,
227.
225, 226.
royal,
Boat, stealing from, iv, 240, n.
Bocland,
90.
Bodies, remedy for stealing, <fcc.,
429.
467.
Body corporate,
of,
134.
protection
Boiling to death, iv, 196.
notabilia,
Bona
509.
Bona vacantia,
296. 299.
Bonds in general, ii. 340, and App: iv, 442.
how far charge on land, ii, 840.
effect of illegal or impossible condition,
840.
the whole penalty not always recoverable,
841.
of arbitration, iii, 16.
to resign
living, when legal,
280
relief against penalty, iii, 432.
stealing of, iv, 234.
forgery of, iv, 249.
Bono et malo, writ de. iv. 270.
Books, copyright in.
40o.
popish, importing or selling, iv, 110.

i, i,

140; iv, 436.

Bequest.

"Will.")

i, ii,

a

i,

ii,

i,

i,

consideration for,
584

446.

ii,

ii,

a

346.

ii,

466 el tea.

ii,

i,

ii,

patent,

of indictment, iv, 302.
of exceptions, iii, 372.
of Middlesex, iii, 285.
in equity, iii, 442.
of privilege, iii, 289.
Bills of exchange and promissory notes,

ii,

(See

99.
Berwick-upon-Tweed,
Besayle, writ of, iii, 186.
Bible, right to print, ii, 410 and n.
Bigamy, iv, 163.
Bill in parliament, 181.
how passed,
181.
128, 211-217; iv, 440.
of rights,

;

ii,

i,

ii,

ii,

iv, 333,

ii,

;

Benevolence, compulsive,

i,

365, 413, 429, 441.

i,

i,

ii,

i,

9.

ii,

i,

Beheading, iv, 92, 377.
. .
Benefices, iv, 107.
377, 402, n.
Benefit of clergy,

for

469.

action on, ii, 470.
463, n.
interest on,
forging, iv, 248, 249, and 260, n.
stealing, iv, 234, and n.
Bills of banks,
470, n.
Bills of lading,
449.
Billa vera, iv, 805.
418.
Billeting military,
155, 877, 382.
Bishops,

ii,

i,

ii,

ii, i, i, i,

ii,

i,

i,

402.

ii,

i,

ii,

i,

ii,

i,

ii,

a

is,

trained, iii,
Beaumont, Viscount,
898.
Bees, property in,
898 and n.
Behavior, good, security for, iv, 251, 256,

stamp,

ii,

433.
(See "Husband and wife.")
Baronet,
403.
63, 90.
Baronies,
Baronies of bishops,
156.
Barratry, iv, 134
Barrister,
23; iii, 20.
no action lies to recover his fee, iii, 28.
defence of prisoner by, iii, 27.
Base fee,
109.
service and tenure,
61, 148.
Bastard,
454.
458.
Incapacities of,
457, 458.
of,
maintenance
455.
legitimation of,
cannot inherit,
247.
248.
eigne,
administration to,
505.
concealment of its death, iv, 358.
punishment for having, iv, 65.
Bastardy, issue as to, iii. 835.
Bath, knight of the,
403.
Battle, trial by, iii, 105, 337, 846, 418, 421,
424.
Battery, iv, 216.
of
clergyman, iv, 81 .
Hi, 120.
what
when Justifiable, iii, 120.
remedies for. iii, 120.
inspection of, iii, 333.
(See "Assault and Battery.")
Bawdy houses, iv, 29. 64, 167.
suit for in admiralty court, iii,
Beaconage,
107.
Beacons,
204.
Beasts of the plow, when they may be dis
i,

and feme,

Bills of exchange and promissory notes,
negotiability of. ii, 442, n.
may l>e taken in execution., iii, 417, n.
foreign and inland, ii, 47.
for what amount legal, ii, 468.
468.
assignment of,
acceptance, protest, presentment for pay
ment, days of grace, ii, 469.
notice of dishonor, ii, 470.

i,

i,

ii,

Bar, plea in, iii, 306; iv, 385, 396.
trial at, iii, 3S2; iv, 851.
338.
Bargain and sale of lands,
Barn, setting fire to, iv, 245.
Baron,
398.

ii,
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I,

ii,

ii,

i,

i,

ii,

1,

i,

ii,

i,

i,

.<

i,

i,

i,

i.

i,

a

per,

218.

441.

18, 237, 876, 413,

Capite, tenure in,
60.
Caption of indictment, iv, 351, 448.
Captives, property in,
402.
Caput lupinum, iv, 320.
Carnal knowledge of infants, iv, 212.
of women by force, iv, 210.
boy under fourteen presumed incapabla
of, iv, 212.
Carriers, special and general,
45, n.
liabilities of special and general,
430, n.
iii, 164.
lien of,
451, n.
585

;

i,

ii,

a

i,
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succession

Capital punishment, iv,

ii,

(See "Boroughs.")
iv, 222, 223.
iv, 224 and n.
and residence, ib. and n.
of committing, iv, 226.
breaking, iv, 226 and n.
there must be
also an entry, iv, 227 and n.
as to the intent, iv, 228 and n.
Burial, of felo de se. iv, 290.
508.
expenses allowed to executor,
Burning in the cheek, iv, 99. 370, 377.
in the hand, iv, 387. 369, 370, 872,877, 451.
malicious, iv, 244, 245, 246.
to death, iv. 93, 204, 216, 222, 377, 403.
815.
Butlerage,

Burglary, what,
as to the time,
as to the place
as to the mode

non est inventus returned,
plaintiff
may proceed against the bail,' iii, 416.
Withernam,
Capias in
iii, 148.
Capias pro fine, iii, 398.
iii,
284; iv, 320.
Capias utlagatum,
Oapiatur, judgment quod, iii 398, and App.
Capita, distribution per,
517.
ii,

Burgesses.

419.

9,

ii,

ii,

ii,

i, i,

i,

local government in, iv, App.
63; iv, 108.
Britons, ancient, their laws,
Britton,
72, 427.
Brooke,
72.
Brothels, frequenting, iv, 64
keeping, iv, 29, 64, 167.
Bubbles.lv, 117.
Buggery, iv, 215.
297, n.
Buildings, erected under license,
86, n.
lateral support for,
109,
iv,
Bulles, papal,
110.
82, iv, 419.
Burgage tenure,

ii,

be tried, iv,

ii,

to

ii,

where

805.
colonies,

9,

105.

subjects abroad,

it

islands,

i,

i,

i,

i,

ii,

i,

100; iv, 313.
Brehon laws in Ireland,
Brevia testata,
307.
Bribery of magistrates, &c., iv, 139 and n.
179, 180, n.
in elections,
857; iv, 424
Bridges,
annoyances in, iv, 167.
50, 51.
British constitution,
(See "Constitution.")

Cabinet,
230, n.
in United States,
232, n.
Calais, captain of, his certificate, iii, 334
Calendar, new style,
140, n.
Calendar of prisoners, iv, 403.
Calling the plaintiff, iii, 376.
Canal, destroying works of, iv, 244.
banks, &c, breaking down, iv, 244
Cancellation of deed,
309.
of will,
503.
of letters patent, iii, 47, 260. 261.
Canon law,
14, 19, 82, 83; iv, 421, 423.
79, 83, n.
authority of,
degrees of consanguinity under,
206.
Canonical obedience, iv, 106, 112, 204.
purgation, iv, 368.
Canonists should study the common law, 15.
church,
Canons of
383.
of Edw. VI.
83.
of A. D. 1608.
88.
Canterbury, archbishop of,
381.
of,
380,
precedence
n.
York,
and
Canterbury
struggle between
115, n., 404, n.
archbishops of,
to
or
purchase
convey, ii, 290.
Capacity
of guilt, iv, 20.
Capias ad audiendum judicium, iv, 375.
Capias ad respondendum in criminal
iv, 818, 429, 459.
allowed in actions of account by the
utes of Marlbridge, iii, 281.
in actions of debt and detinue by 25 Edw.
in. c. 17, iii, 281.
in all actions on the case by 19 Hen. VII,
iii, 281.
c.
was usually sued out in the first instance,
iii, 282.
return of non est inventus to, iii, 282.
testatum, iii, 282.
arrest of defendant upon, iii, 237.
Capias ad satisfaciendum, iii, 413.
when
may issue after writ of elegit, iii,

ii,

to make distress, iii, 11.
to make arrest, iii, 288.

Bye-law of corporation,
475, 476, n.
action of debt on, iii, 160.

if

3.

i,

i,

i,

i,

ii,

ii,

i,

ii,

i,

l,

i,

i,

i,

ii,

Books and papers, production of, iii, 382.
Books of account, entries in, when may be
read in evidence, iii, 368.
Books of rates, i, 817.
83.
Borough English, i, 75;
115.
Boroughs,
475, n.
corporations of,
172, n.
parliamentary,
election for,
174.
members for,
174
courts, iii, 80.
453.
Borrowing, contracts of,
115, 356; iv, 413.
Borsholder,
35, 122.
Botes or estovers,
457, 461.
Bottomry,
345.
Bound bailiffs,
315.
Bounties on exportation,
286.
Bounty, Queen Anne's,
Bourdeauz. mayor of, his certificate, iii, 334
Boxing, offence of, iv, 183.
Bracton,
72, 425.
Breach of the peace, iv, 142.
chargeable upon him who begins an affray,
iii,
Breach of prison, iv, 130.
of close, iii, 209.
of pound, iii, 146.
Breaking, in burglary, iv, 228.
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"Charities.")

(See

"Libel.")

Charge to grand Jury, iv. 303.

to traverse jury, iii, 375.
Chariots and cabriolets,
325.
Charitable uses,
479.
void gifts to. ii, 268, 373. 376.
estate tail may be appointed to.
119.
Charities, jurisdiction of chancery, iii. 427.
remedy for breaches of trust, iii, 427.
Chapel, breaking and stealing from, ir, 241.
Charles
his judges,
209, 316.
Charter,
395.
of the king,
346.
government in America,
103.
Charter land,
90.
Charter of incorporation,
472.
of our liberties,
127, 139.
88, 416; iv, 415.
Chase,
beasts of, ib.
Chattels, real and personal,
143, 384.
(See "Personalty.")
"
estates,
(See
Estate.")
Chastity, homicide in defence of. iv, 181.
consort,
&c., violation of, iv, 81.
of queen
violating by force, iv, 210.
Chance medley, iv, 184.
Cheat, action against, iii, 164.
Cheating, offence of, iv, 157.
at play, iv, 173.
Cheek, burning in, iv, 99, 870, 877.
470, n.
Cheque, banker's,
stealing, iv, 234.
forging of, iv, 249.
Chester, county palatine of,
117, 118.
courts of county palatine of, abolished,
iii, 79.
Chevisance, the word, ii, 474.
Chief justices, iii, 40. 41.
Chief justiciar, iii, 87; iv, 416.
decline of his authority, iii, 89.
42.
Chief rent,
Child stealing, iv, 319.
130.
Child in ventre sa mere,
Children, duties of,
453.
453.
custody of,
parent remedy for abduction of, iii, 149.
evidence of, iv, 214.
ii,

i,

I,

i,

ii,

ii.

ii,
i,

i,

ii,

ii,

i,

ii,

original writs, issue out of, iii, 48.
origin of the name, iii, 46.
jurisdiction of legal court of, iii, 47.
equity, court of. history of its Jurisdic
tion, iii, 49.
586

i,

(See

"Tenure.")

Chivalry, court of. iii. OS: iv, 307.
its jurisdiction, iii, 10:1; iv, 367.
proceedings in, iii. 104.
462.
guardian in,
Chose in action, ii, 396. 442.
what are assignable,
468, 470, n.
ii,

"Equity.")

ii,

i,

a

a

(See

"

(See
Infants.")
296.
Chirograph,
Chivalry, tenure in, ii, 61.

i,

47.

formerly not layman, iii, 433.
killing of, iv, 84.
diocese,
382.
Chancellor of
of duchy of Lancaster, iii, 78.
of exchequer, iii. 44.
of university, his court, iii, 83.
Chance medley, iv, 184.
Chancery, court of, iii, 47; iv, 436.

i,

i,

ii,

i,

i,

34.

i,

a

(See

383.
Chapters,
Character of witnesses in rape, questioning,
iv, 318.
infamous witness, iii, 370.
defaming,

ii,

iii,

Centumviri, iii, 315.
Cepi corpus, iii, 288.
482, 488.
Certificate of bankrupt,
438.
of marriage,
of poor,
864.
of bishop, iii, 335.
for costs, iii, 214.
into chancery, iii, 455.
of assize, iii, 389.
of customs of London, iii, 888.
trial by, iii, 333.
Certiorari facias, iv, 262, 265, 272. 320, 321.
Cessavit, writ of, iii, 232.
473, 483, 488.
Cessio bonorum,
benefice,
393.
Cession of
Cestui que trust, ii, 338.
328.
Cestui que use,
Cestui que vie, ii, 138.
Chains, hanging in, iv, 202.
Challenge of Jury, iii. 859, 365. iv, 352.
to fight, iv, 150.
Chamberlain, lord great, iii, 37.
Champerty, iv, 135.
Champions in trial by battle, iii. 339.
Chance, iv, 26.
Chancellor, lord high, his authority, iii, 37,

to

guardianship of infants, iii, 436.
custody of idiots and lunatics, iii, 487.
appeal from, in matters of lunacy, iii, 437.
Jurisdiction over charities, iii, 427.

ii,

116;

equity court

56, 437.

s

i,

i,

impounding, iii, 12.
malicious killing or maiming, iv, 244.
owner when answerable criminally for in
juries by, iv, 197.
Causa matrimonii pwelocuti, writ of entry,
iii, 183.
Cause, challenge for, iii, 861; iv. 333.
Caveat against proving will, iii, 98.
against admission of clerk, iii, 216.
Centenarius,
115.
Centeni,

iii,

i,

297.

appeal
house of peers,

ii,

i,

212, estrays,

from

Chancery,

i,

ii,

ii,

Carriers, traveling on Sunday, iv, 64.
larceny by, iv, 230.
Cart-bote,
35.
Case, action on, iii, 123; iv, 442.
and trespass, iii, 209.
for nuisance, iii, 222.
for waste, iii, 226.
reserved, iii, 378.
from chancery, iii, 453.
Castigatory for scolds, iv, 169.
Castle, what,
19, n.
Castration, iv, 208.
Casual ejector, iii, 201.
Catholics.
(See "Church," "Roman Catholics.")
Cattle, owner of, liable for trespass by, iii,

Index.

i,

Gen:
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General Index

;

i,

ii,

i,

ii,

ii,

235.

Cognizance, iv, 278.
must be claimed before defence made, iii,
297.

it

when
may be claimed, iii, 297.
in replevin, iii, 149.
Cognizor, and cognizee, ii, 841, 350; iii, 157.
Cognovit actionem, iii, 297, 304.
Coin, falsifying, &c., iv, 84, 88, 90, 98, 100,
120.

relating to, iv
84, 88, 90 et teq.
Coinage, instruments of, offences relating to
iv, 90 el uq.
duties,
295.
277.
right of,
Coke, Sir Edward,
72, 78.
of
his
causes
removal
from the office of
chief justice of the king's bench, iii, 55
Collateral consanguinity,
204, 220.
Collateral issue, iv, 238, 396.
Collatio bonorum, ii. 517.
Collation to benefice, iv, 391.
471.
Colleges,
their visitors,
482.
leases by,
822.
469.
Collegia in the civil law,
Collieries, malicious injuries to, iv, 246.
Colonial assemblies,
109.
Colonies,
107-110.
transportation to, iv, 401.
local government in, iv, app.
i,

felonies and misdemeanors

i,

i,

a

i,

i,

ii,

i,

i,

i,

206.

ii,

i,

18-20.
always preferred by the clergy,
79.
its authority,
79, n.
not strictly law,
degrees of consanguinity according to,

Cognate,

ii,

440.

2.

i,

i,

City.i, 114.
Civil corporations,
470.
132; iii, 121, 257; Iv,
Civil death,
iii,
Civil injuries,
81 iv, 421, 422.
Civil law,

Clothes, malicious injuries to, iv, 246.
Coal mines, setting tire to, &e., iv, 246.
30(1; iii, 105.
Coat of arms,
Code of Justinian,
81.
of Theodosius,
81.
Codicil,
500.

i,

i,

i,

ii,

Chose, how assigned, ill, 441, 442.
stealing, iv, 234.
Christian courts, iii, 64.
Christianity, offences against, iv, 43 et $eq.
part of the law of England, iv, 60.
Church, head of, i, 279.
marriages in, i, 439.
rate, i, 395; iii, 92.
title to pews in,
429.
repair of, iii, 92.
burglary in, iv, 224.
larceny in. iv, 241.
riotously demolishing, iv, 143.
offences against, iv, 50.
church yards of, affrays in, iv, 145.
376, n.
societies in America,
Churchwardens,
894
Cinque ports, courts of, iii. 79.
Circuits, iii, 58, 856; iv, 422, 424.
Circumstantial evidence, iii, 371.
Citation in ecclesiastical courts, iii, 100.
Citizens in Parliament.
" Boroughs.")
(See

489

i,

.

Commendams,
393.
Commentaries,
84.
plan of the,
Commerce,
king the arbiter of, 27?
411.
Commission of array,
of lunacy,
805. 306. n.
of the peace,
351 iv, 270.
480.
in bankruptcy,
37, n.
in the army, sale of,
iii,
rebellion,
444.
of
iii,
of,
court
68.
high
of review, iii, 67.
to examine witnesses, &c., iii. 75, n., 883,
438, 449.
under the statute of charitable uses, iii,
427.
Commitment of persons accused, iv, 296.
reason for which
made must be ex
pressed, iii, 138.
Committee, judicial, of the privy council,
231, n., 280, n.
how organized, iii, 69, n.
306.
of lunatic,
of peers, iii, 56.
294.
Common assurances,
i,

i.

i,

it

ii,

ii,

;

i,

ii,

7.

ii,

Combustio domorum, iv, 374
Comburendo heretico, writ de. iv, 41, 439.
Commenda. iv, 107.

i,

i, ii, ii,

i,

i,

i.

iv,

is

i,

i,

i, i,

i,

i,

plea of, iv, 334.
prayer of, iv, 447.
abolition of, iv, 365, n.
Clergyman, beating of. iv, 217.
426.
mortuary to bishop on death of,
when prohibited from hunting,
412.
and
disabilities,
privileges
Clerical
377.
habit and tonsure, iv, 336.
Clerico admittendo, writ dc, iii, 418.
Clerk in office,
17.
in orders,
888; lv, 867.
395.
parish,
of the market, his court, iv, 275.
of the peace, iv, 272.
or servant, embezzlement by, «&c., iv, 221.
Clipping the coin, iv, 90.
Close, breach of, iii, 209.
346.
Close writs and rolls,

&c.,

138, 160.

i,

,

i,

i,

429. 441.

Colonization, right of,
Color, in pleading, iii, 809.
Combinations, among workmen.

ii,

15.

Clarendon, constitutions of iv, 422.
Cl&UBum fregit, iii, 209.
82.
Clementine constitutions,
876.
Clergy,
adverse to the common law,
18-20.
20, n.
and lawyers, animosity between,
17.
formerly proficients in law,
175, n.
excluded from parliament,
13, 14.
should study law,
simony by, iv, 62.
877, 402, n; lv. 333, 305, 413,
benefit of,

i,

i,

i,

i,

subjection, iv, 28.
Civilians should study the common law,

i.

6,

251.

i,

i,

125,
Civil liberty,
332, 335.
Civil list,
Civil state, 396.
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ii,

a

ii,

i,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

i,

i,

i,

i, ii,

iv,

i,

ii,

i,

i,

i, i,

202, 206.

i,

collateral, ii, 304.
Conscience, laws binding on the,
54 57, n.
courts of, iii, 441.
830; iv, 115.
Consecration of bishops,
Consequential damages, iii, 153.
350; iv, 413,
Conservators of the peace,
i,

Conservators,
69.

(See

"Justice.")

truce and safe-conducts,

iv,

481.

Conservatory, robbery of, iv. 233, and n.
contract,
443, 444, a,
Consideration for
ii,

ii,

ii,

degrees of,

i,

ii,

ii,

153, n., 189, n.

160, n.
how composed,
revenue bills in,
170, n.
185, n.
approval of bills,
Conies, taking, killing or stealing, iv, 235.
Conjugal rights, suit for restitution ot, iii,
94
Conjuration, iv, 60, 436.
Conquest, the words, ii. 48, 242.
199; iv 414. 415.
Conquest, Norman,
introduction of feudal tenures on,
48.
Consanguinity,
434. 435, n.

468.

moral obligation,
445, n.
in a deed,
296.
different kinds of,
444
inadequacy of, ii. 444, n.
Consideratum est per curiam, iii, 398.
Consilium, or imparlance, iv, 356.
Consimili casu, writ of entry in, iii, 183.
ii,

9,

i,

i,

i,

i,

76.

Compensatio, iii, 305.
Composition with creditors,
484
Compound larceny, iv, 239.
(See "Larceny.")
Compounding felony, iv, 133.
other prosecutions, iv, 130.
Compulsion, iv, 27.
Compurgators, iii, 343; iv. 868, 414
in equity, iii. 447.
Computation of time,
140, n.
Concealment from the crown, iv, 486.
of bastard's death, iv, 198.
Conclusion of pleas, iii, 803.
688

"Estate.")

(See

Conditional limitation, ii. 156.
Conditional pardon, iv, 401.
Confession by prisoners, iv, 357
of indictment, iv, 329.
441, n.
in divorce cases,
of cause of action, iii, 803, 397.
in ejectment, iii, 203.
of debt barred by statute, iii, 306, n.
Confinement to the realm,
265.
Confirmation,
325.
378, 380; iv, 115.
of bishops,
Confiscation, iv, 377.
Confiscations, part of royal revenue,
299.
Confusion and intermixture of goods, ii,4US.
879, 382; iv, 421.
Conge d'eslire,
Congregations, religious, disturbances of,
54 and n.
Congress of United States, meetings of,

ii,

339, n.

(See "Mortgage.")
109, n.

Conditional fee,

i,

a

iii,

common,

ii,

a

i,

i,

a

ance to

Commons, house of,
158.
its members should study law,
10.
its peculiar laws,
169.
Commonwealth, offences against, iv. 137.
Commorancy, iv, 373.
Communem legem, writ of entry ad, iii, 180.
14
Community of property,
Commutation of penance, iv, 105, 317, 276.
of tithes,
383. n.
Compact distinguished from law,
45.
Companies, public, forgeries on. iv, 249.
(See "Corporations.")
Compassing the death of the king, &c., iv,

299.

154
precedent or subsequent,
155.
in deed and in law,
effect of breach of, ii, 156. 281 .
impossible or illegal, ii. 156, 340.
estate in mortgage, ii, 157.

i,

i,

iv,50.

Common recovery, iv, 439.
(See "Recovery.")
Common scold, iv, 169.
Common seal,
475.
Common utterer of false money, iv, 100.
403.
Commonalty,
Commoners, when they may abate
nuis

262.

300; iii, 259.
of deodands,
17, n.. 110, 399.
Condition,
Condition, distinguished from a remainder
156.
and
conditional limitation,
estates upon, ii, 153.
153, 154
implied or express condition,

ii,

880.

Common informer, iii, 160.
Common nuisances, iv, 166.
Common pleas, court of, its origin, iii, 38.
fixed at Westminster,
83, 23; iv, 434
only sergeants admitted, iii, 38.
number of judges, iii, 40.
writ of error from, iii, 40.
Common prayer book, offence of reviling,

304; iii, 157.
Concord in fine,
Condemnation of goods in the exchequer.

ii,

ii,

a

l,

•

i,

i,

i,

i,

ii,

ii, ii,

ii,

,

ii,

Common, estate in,
191 399.
(See "Estate.")
Common, right of,
83 et »eq., 203.
approvement and inclosure of, ii, 34.
of piscary, li, 84, 39, 40.
34
of turbary,
of estovers,
85.
disturbance of, iii, 236.
distress for surcharging, iii, 337.
action on the case for surcharging, iii, 339.
enclosing or obstructing, iii, 239.
when the lord may enclose, iii, 240.
Common barretor, iv, 183.
Common bench, iii, 87.
justices of, killing, iv, 84
451, n.
Common carriers,
action against, iii, 164
Common jury, how returned, iii, 858.
63, 67; iii, 267; iv, 411, 413.
Common law,
despised by the clergy,
30.
67.
distinguishable into three kinds,
472.
corporation by,
461.
guardian by,
of operation of
deed by,
preference

Index.

a

Generj
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ii,

"Debt,"

"Borrowing,"

"Exchange," "Hiring,"

"Sale.")

ii,

i,

439; iii, 93.
of marriage,
actions on, iii, 117.
specific performance of, iii, 435. 433.
for sale of lands, possession under,
140,
xu, 146. n.

i,

i,

i,

forbidden by law are void,
58.
Contractu, action e, iii, 117.
151, 152.
Convention of estates,
152.
of parliament,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

i,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

11,

ii,

surrender, re-grant

and admittance, ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

866, 868 et teq.
trusts of, ii, 867, n.
devisee of, by unadmitted heir, devisee or
surrenderee,
867, n
868.
estate of surrenderor,
entails of, how barred,
113.
free bench, ii, 132.
forfeiture for breach of custom, ii. 284.
when affected by an act of parliament, ii,
118.
could not formerly be taken in execution,
iii, 418.
but may now, iii, 419, n.
405 et teq., 410.
Copyright,
prerosative copyright of crown in acts of
410.
parliament, bibles, &c.
Corn, may be destrained, iii,
destroying, iv, 246.
9. ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

\>y

ii,

ii,

ii,

i,

i,

ii,

ii,

ii,

(See "Remainder.")
290, 354.
conveyance of,
uses,
334.
legacy, ii, 513.
316; iii, 174.
Continual claim,
Continuances, iii, 316.
Oontiauando, laying trespass with a, iii, 212.
439; iii, 93.
Contract of marriage,
implied in the organization of government,
iii, 158.
233.
original, between king and people,
Contracts, ii, 442 et teq.
446, 465.
are either special or parol,
442, 447.
when to be in writing,
execution,
447
partial
one party only,
442.
signature
443; iii, 153, 158.
express or implied,
executed or executory,
443.
465.
simple or special,
to
296, 448.
support,
consideration
444.
improvidence of,
nudum pactum,
445.
kinds of,
446.
(Bee "Bailments,"

9,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

i,

rales of, in equity, the same as at law, iii,
430.
87, 91.
of statutes, rules for,
" Interpretation of
(See also
Law.")
Constructive treason, iv, 75, 85.
taking, in larceny, iv, 230, n.
Consul, offences to his person, iv. 70, n.
Consultation, writof, wuyso called, iii, 114.
Contempt against the king, iv, 121.
in courts of law, iv, 283.
of court, process in equity, iii, 443.
Contentment, iv, 379.
169.
Contingent remainders,

ii,

115, 297

$97 etteq.

ii,

etteq.,

389.
uses,
339.
of revocation and defeasance,
339.
at the common law, or under the statute
309, 337.
of uses,
344.
by matter of record,
of freehold,
Conveyances
811 et teq.
of contingent remainders,
290, n., 354
of incorporeal hereditaments,
317.
fraudulent,
296.
Convict, transportation of, iv, 401.
rescue of, iv, 181.
execution of, iv, 408.
Conviction in general, iv, 280.
in frauds against revenue laws, iv, 281.
before justices for disorderly offences in
general, iv, 281.
by judgment, iv, 362.
Convocation,
279.
court of bishops in, iii, 67.
187.
Coparceners,
(See "Estate.")
Copper coin, counterfeiting, iv, 100.
Copy of indictment, right of prisoner to, iv,
351.
of record of indictment, iii, 126.
90, 95, 147.
Copyhold,
varieties of tenures by custom,
148.
tenant's right of renewal,
148.
107, 149.
•customary freeholds,
lands, parcel of the manor,
97.
demisable immemorially by custom, ii,97.
97, 98.
inheritable or for life,
heriots,
97, 422, 424.
98.
wardship,
admittance of heir,
97. n., 371.
90, n.
customary courtand court-baron,
court of ancient demesne,
100.
fines,
98.
modes of alienation,
865.

ii,

States.")

ii,

"American

lease and release,
to lead or declare

ii,

Constable, petty, i, 355.
Constitution, British, i, 49, 50, 127. 144, 154,
160, 213, 217. 283, 237; iv, 439.
changes in, 155, n.
American, how they restrain legislative
i, 49, n., 62, n., 58, n., 89, n.,
Swer,
J, n.
(See

ii,

li,

ii,

ii,

a

iv,

296.

Construction of deeds and wills,

Conversion, iii, 152.
Conveyances, origin and history of,
287; iv, 430.
attornment,
290.
who may convey, and to whom,
290.
to
290.
corporation,
294, 309 et teq.
kinds of,
writing essential to,
297.
to be signed,
306.
293.
by deed,

ii,

Consistory court, iii, 64
Consolidated fund, i, 831.
Consort, queen's, i. 219.
Conspiracy, law of, in general, iv, 136.
to raise wages, iii, 160.
action of, iii, 126.
Constable, 355, 411 ; iv, 202.
high, i, 115.
lord high, i, 355; iii, 37; iv, 208.
his court, iii, 68; iv, 267.
his duty, on arrest in criminal cases,
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i,

i,

by

i,

i,

ii,

1,

i,

i,

i,

i,

a

a

Westminster, ib.
Court, payment into, when
304, n.

it

il,

i.

i,

i,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

i,

il,

a

1,

ii,

et

i,

ii,

i, i,

i,

i,

i, i, i,

i,

i,

1,

i,

1,

i.

i,

i,

i,

i,

i,

i,

i,

i,

i, i,

i,

i,

i,

i,

i,

ii,

II,

;

i,

ii.

i,

i,

i,

modern,
235.
made use of to prevent catholic emanci
236, n.
pation,
847.
Coronatore eligendo, writ de,
writ de,
exonerando,
848.
Coroner,
346; iv, 292, 418.
duration of office of,
348.
mode of appointing,
347.
848.
power and duty of,
119, n.
of duchy of Lancaster,
when venire facias issues to, iii, 364.
Coroner, his court, iv, 274.
apprehending felon, iv, 292.
Saxon laws, as to, iv, 413.
inquest of, equivalent to finding of grand
Jury, when, iv, 274, n.
inquisition of, formal defects in, ib.
120.
Corporate counties,
name,
474.
officers, remedy by mandamus for refusal
264
to admit to,
franchises, usurpation of, iii, 262.
Corporation acts, iv, 58. 439, 443, a.
467.
Corporations,
469.
aggregate,
ecclesiastical,
470.
470.
eleemosynary,
dissolution of,
484.
of,
480.
duties
how created,
472.
and
476, 479.
powers of,
incidents
470.
lay.
of,
468.
origin
476, 477.
privileges and disabilities of,
sole,
469.
visitors of,
484.
franchises of, are granted upon condition,
153. n.
in the reign of
against,
proceedings
iii 268.
Charl js
process by distringas against, iii, 445.
courts of, iii, 80.
430.
property passes by succession,
when may take chattel by succession,
431.
108, 200.
conveyance to,
no escheat or extinction of,
256.
leases by, ii, 319
teg.
grants to, in mortmain.
(See "Mortmain.")
17.
Corporeal hereditaments,
42!).
Corpse, stealing of,
82.
Corpus juris canonica,
81.
Corpus juris civilis.
Correction of apprentices,
428.
452, 453; iv, 183.
of children,
iv,
of scholars,
463;
182.
of servants,
428; iv, 1S2.
of wives,
444.
house of, iv, 870, 371, 877.
Corruption of blood,
861; iv, 383, 413,
438, 440.

590

Corse-present,
425.
Corsned, trial by, iv, 845, 414.
Cosinage, writ of, iii, 186.
Costs, title to, by judgment,
432.
statutes by which they are given, iii, 199.
king neither pays nor receives, iii. 400.
exceptions, iii, 400, n.
when executors liable to pay, iii, 400.
in actions on the case, when plaintiff re
covers less damages than 40s., iii, 314
400.
paupers excused from paying, iii, 400.
trespass, iii, 214.
on not going to trial, iii, 367.
in equity, iii, 451.
in criminal cases, iv, 362 and n.
Council, judicial committee of privy,
282,
n.,280 n.; iii, 61, n, 80. n.
230. n.
president of the,
its present organization, iii, 69, n.
the great,
148.
Councils of the king,
22.
Counsel, iii, 26.
Counsel, king's, iii, 27.
cannot maintain an action for his fees, iii,
28.
action against, iii, 164.
not answerable for any matter spoken
him, iii, 29.
for prisoners, iv, 855.
116, 398.
Count,
in declaration, Iii, 293, 295.
indictment,
iv, 98, 306, n.
in
Counterfeiting the king's coin, iv, 84, 68,
100, n.
the king's seals, iv, 83. 89.
296.
Counterpart of deed,
116; iv, 411.
Counties,
120
corporate,
117-119; iv, 431.
palatine,
courts of, iii, 79.
members for,
159.
172, 173
electors for,
Country, trial by the, iv, 849.
267; iii, 85; iv, 411, 441.
County court,
of Middlesex iii, 82.
343.
holden by the sheriff,
its jurisdiction, iii, 86.
when holden, iii, 86.
court of great dignity, id.
formerly
formerly as much spiritual as temporal
tribunal, iii, 61.
90; iii, 83; iv, 411.
Court-baron,
may hold plea of personal actions under
40». iii, 34.
writ of false judgment lies to courts it

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

Com, sporting, Ac., in, Iv, 174.
stopping it going to market, iv, 168.
Corn rente,
322.
74
Cornage,
226, a.
Cornwall, duchy of,
284;
40.
Corody,
236.
Coronation oath, ancient,

Index.
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mav be, iii.

Court hand, iii, 323.
Courts, their nature and incidents, iii, 23;
Iv, 258, 414
derived from the power of the crown, iii',23.
some are of record, others not, iii, 24
their constituent parte, iii, 25.
assaults in, iv, 125.
are of four sorts, common law and equity,
ecclesiastical,
military, and maritime,

iii,

80.

General Index.

general

jurisdiction of,

i,

it

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

1,

ii,

2,

ii, 1,

ii,

i,

,

i,

ii,

ii,

i,

ii,

ii,

a

a

ii, ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

U,

ii,

ii,

71.

of commissions of sewers, iii, 73.
of policies of insurance, iii, 74.
of the marshal sea, iii, 76.
of Wales, iii, 77.
of duchy of Lancaster, iii, 78, 429.
of counties palatine, iii, 79.
stannary, iii, 80.
of London, Ac., iii, 81.
of the universities, iii, 83.
Costumier of Normandy,
107.
Covenant, what
is. iii, 156.
wbo may take advantage of, iii. 157 and n.
what run with the land, iii, 157, n.
against devisees, iii, 430, n.

ii,

of chivalrv, iii, 68; iv, 267.
of admiralty, iii, 68; iv, 268.
of oyer and terminer, iii, 58; iv, 269.
commission of assize and nisi prius, iii,
57; iv, 269.
of general quarter sessions, iv, 271 and n.
central criminal court, iv, 271, n.
sheriff's tourn, iv, 273.
court-leet, or view of frank-pledge, ib.
of coroner, Iv, 274.
of clerk of market, iv, 275.
of special and private jurisdiction, ib.
of lord steward, treasurer, or comptroller
of king's household, iv, 276.

iii,

ii,

a

810, 429, 433, 437.

ii, ii,

i,

of high commission, iii, 417.
of master of rolls, iii, 451.
of vice chancellors, iii, 426.
criminal, iv, 259 et teq.
of parliament, iii, 56; iv, 2o9.
of lord high steward, iv, 261.
of king's bench, iii, 41; iv, 265.
of star chamber,
230; iii, 445; iv, 266,

forest,

ii,

of royal mat

i,

of, in respect

428.
Courts of exchequer,
iii, 43.

ii,

iii,

ii,

ters,

511 and n.
executor, iii, 18.
conveyances and assignments, when fraud
ulent against,
296.
Crimes, divisions of, iv,
5.
conversation,
Criminal
139.
information, iv, 308.
punishments, 133; iv, 7-16, 252, 258, 877.
Croft, what,
19.
Crops of corn, &c. setting fire to, iv, 246.
Cross-bill, iii, 448, 451.
Cross-remainders,
implication of,
381.
Crown, descent of the,
191; iv, 413.
office, iv, 265, 308.
lands,
286.
Crown, leases,
287.
power of,
335-387.
all lands are held of,
51.
18, 48.
royal mines,
403.
royal fish,
title to chattels by prerogative,
408,
505.
ancient jewels of, are heir-looms,
428.
chattel by succession,
may take
432.
cannot be joint owner of
chattel with
400.
subject,
prerogative copyright, IL 410.
property in game, ib.
no lapse of right to present by,
277.
413, 426.
mortuary on death of bishop,
forfeiture of lands to,
267.
no general occupancy against,
259.
words of limitation in grants to,
109.
descent of, to collateral relation of the
half-blood allowed,
258.
reversion in, not barrable,
118.
not bound by sale in market overt,
449.
308, 346.
grants by,
mistake or deceit of,
848.
cannot grant monopolies,
except for in
ventions,
407.
injuries to, remedied by usual commonlaw actions or inquests of office, iii, 257.
peculiar jurisdiction of exchequer in re
spect of, iii, 428.
Cucking stool, iv, 169.
Cui ante divortium, writ of, iii, 183.
Cui in vita, writ of, iii, 183.
339.
Culprit,
Cumberland, theft in, iv, 238.
Curate,
393.
i,

426.

jurisdiction

51L
appointing debtor executor,

ii,

ii,

of equity, i, 62, 92.
jurisdiction of, iii, 46, 443.
proceedings in, iii, 425 et teq.
" Equity," "Pleading,"
(See "Chancery,"
"
Practice.")
Christian, and others, which receive pecu
liar laws, i, 83; iii, 61.
martial, i, 416; iii, 68.
profits of, i, 289.
of piepoudre, iii, 82.
baron, iii, 33.
90.
customary,
of bankruptcy, iii, 56, 428, n.
court,
iii, 84.
hundred
county, iii, 35.
of wards and liveries, ii, 69.
of common pleas, iii, 87.
of exchequer, equitable jurisdiction of, iii,

to stand seized,
838.
850; iii, 156.
Covert-baron,
442.
Coverture,
442.
" Husband and
(See
Wife.")
Craven, iv, 348.
meaning of the word, iii, 340, n.
Credible witness, iii, 370.
Creditors, payment of debts of, by executor,

writ of,

i,

of officers,

835.

ii,

iii,

it

31, 40.

i,

iii,

tageous,

power to erect, i, 207; iii, 24.
practice of tried by certificate

Covenant by or with persons not parties to
the deed, iii, 296, n.
448, n.
implied,
real,
804; iii, 157.
for title,
804.
when
runs with the land,
804, n.
ii,

80.

inferior, have fallen into decay, ib.
aula regia, iii, 37.
establishment of distinct, has been advan

ii,

Court, origin of, iii,

493

his remedy for non-payment of his sti
pend, iii, 90 and n.
891
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Debenture, for money, &c., 6tealiDg, ir,
384.
Debet et detinet,

i,

action in, iii, 155.
325; ir,
Debt, national and charge thereof,
441.

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

li,

ii.

ii, ii,

i,

i,

1,

writ, iii,

i,

a

332.
abolished,

a

iii, 233, n.
Decree in equity, iii, 451.
judgment, iii, 453.
has the force of
Decretals,
82.
82.
Decretum Gratiana,
85, n.
Dedication of ways,
188, n.
dower barred by,
352; it, 351; in,
Dedimus potestatem,
447.
Deed, conveyance by, ii, 295.
295.
what is,
several species of deeds, ii. 309.
395.
indenture or deed-poll,
original and counterpart, ii, 296.
covenants by or with persona not partiei,
ii, ii, i,

296.

297.
may be printed,
396.
consideration not essential to,
by feme covert, ii, 361, 302, 392.
19, 379.
construction of,
293.
recitals in,
lie
deed-poll taken most strongly against
121, 380.
grantor,

ii,

i, i,

i,

i,

ii,

i,

54.

86.
Declinatory plea, iv, 333, 336.
De consuetudinibus et servitiia,

ii,

379.

statutes,

i,

iii,

...

394.

conclusion of, iii, 394.
Declaratory part of law,

ii,

grace,

.

ii,

ii,

6.

ii,

of

888.
Deacon,
439.
Dead body, stealing,
from, iv, 236.
shroud
stealing
Dead man's part, ii, 518.
Deadly feud, iv. 344.
497.
804;
Deaf, dumb and blind,
wills by, ii, 497 and n.
383.
Dean and chapter,
383.
Dean, rural,
133; ii, 121.
Death, civil,
appeal of, iv, 814, 424.
execution of sentence of, iv, 403, 404.
action for causing, iii, 119.
of party, when suit abated by, iii, 301.
De bene esse, iii, 383.
592
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Debtor, relief of insolvent, in. 415; iv. 415.
refusing to discover his effects, iv, 156.
(See "Bankruptcy.")
Deceit, action of, iii, 165, 166, 405.
writ of. iii. 405.
114; iv, 252.
Decennary,
246.
Deception of the king in his grants,
69.
Decisions of the courts,
Decisive oath, iii, 342.
Declaration, iii, 393.
different counts formerly inserted in, in,

ii,

i,

i,

i,

ii,

i,

65; iv, 413.
Dane lage,
Darrein presentment, assize of, iii, 345.
abolished, iii, 245, n.
execution in, iii. 412.
304.
Date of deed,
140, n.
Day, fraction of a,
in banc, iii, 277.
in court, iii, 316.

466.

(See "Bills of Exchange.")
promise to pay, when to be in writing,
466.
406.
acknowledgment of,
payment by executors, and priority of,

ii,

ii,

i,

i,

i,

187.

negotiable,

ii,

ii,

i,

i,

i, i,

i,

ii,

Damage to things personal, iii, 152.
Damage feasant, iii,
438; iii,
Damages, title to, by judgment,

ii,

i,

517.

"Covenant," "Judgment."*)
465.
by simple contract,
465.
merger of,

(See "Bond,"

i,

effects,

of London, how tried, iii, 334
alienation by, ii, 365.
dower by, ii, 132.
91, n.
Customary court,
100, 149.
freeholds,
dues to mills, &c., iii, 235.
68-74; iii, 50.
Customs general,
70-74, 76.
how proved,
69.
how settled,
74-79.
Customs particular,
78.
how allowed,
85, n.
76-78;
when legal,
314, 816.
Customs on merchandize,
349; iv, 272.
Custos rotulorum,
315.
Custuma antiqua sive magna,
315.
Custuma parra et nova,
Cutpurses, iv, 242.
Cy pres doctrine, 480, n.

Debts,
404 et seg.
465.
of record,
by specialty, ii, 465.

i,

ii,

ii,

i,

i,

7

i,

of temporalities, 282.
Custody of the law, goods in not to be dis
trained, iii, n.
75, 76.
Custom of London,
75.
of merchants,
263.
distinguished from prescription,
title to personalty by, ii, 422.
of York and London, as to distribution of

ii,

ii,

ii,

303; iii,

427.

Intestate's

its legal acceptation, iii, 154.
maybe brought, iii, 15*.
action of, when
on amercement, iii, 159.
on escape iii, 164.
on bye-law, iii, 159.
on judgment, iii, 158.
on penal statutes.^ iii, 159.
information of, iii, 261.
formerly the exact sum demanded mnrt
have been recovered, iii, 155.

it

1,

ii,

Curative laws, i, 46, n.
Curator of infants, i, 460.
Curatores riant m. i, 358.
Curfew, ir, 119, 430.
Curialitas,
136.
276-279.
Currency,
Cursing, ir, 59.
126.
Curtesy,
127, n.
of trusts,
of adrowson, ii, 127.
Custody of idiots and lunatics,

General Index.
ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

i,

5.

i,

ii,

,

i, i,

i,

ii,

ii,

9.

i,

201.

different kinds of,
202.
in borough English and gavel-kind,
84.

ii,

ii,

88,

ii,

no lineal ascent,
210.
See 240, n.
males preferred to females,
212.
56, 214
primogeniture,
202, 207, n.
consanguinity and degrees,
and 224
Descent, collateral consanguinity,
204.
heirs apparent and presumptive,
208.
canons of descent,
208 et teq.
lineal descent to issue of person last
seized,

208.

ii,

ii,

partible descent among daughters,
214.
descent of title of honor to daughter,
ii, ii,

representation,

216, 219.
220. 224.

ii,

216.

ancient partible descent in socage,

215.

collateral heir,
fiction of feudum novum, held aut anti
221.
quum,
effect of union of legal and equitable

ti

i, i,

De homine replegiando, writ of, iii, 128.
Dehors, matter of, iii, 387; iv, 890.
Delay of the law, iii, 428.
Delegates, court of, iii, 66, 69.
its powers transferred to the king in coun
cil, iii, 67. n.
52, n.
Delegating legislative powers,
Delegation not representation,
159.
iii,
362; iv, 352.
delictum, challenge propter,
JDeliverance, second writ of, iii, 150.

ii,

207 and n.,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii, ii,

,

ii,

;

i,

i,

ii,

i,

413.

hereditary, but subject to limitation by
194
parliament,
of lands, iv, 413, 421.
et
200
title by.
teg.
feudal, origin of,
56.
distinguished from purchase and escheat,
ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

a

817.

Demise of the crown,
188, 249.
Demi-vills,
115.
49.
Democracy,
Demolishing churches, houses, &c. iv, 148.
Demurrer, iii, 814
joinder in, iii, 315.
to evidence, iii, 872.
how decided, iii, 828.
in equity, iii, 446.
by the parol, iii, 430.
to indictment, iv, 338.
Demurrer book, iii, 817.
Denizen,
874;
249, 293.
Deodands,
300, 802; iii, 259.
De otio et atia, writ of, iii, 128.
Departure in pleading, iii, 810.
De populatio agrorum, iv, 374
Depositions, iii, 388.
against prisoners, iv, 296.
in equity, iii, 449.
in ecclesiastical courts, iii, 100.
393.
Deprivation of clerks,
De proprietate probanda, iii, 148.
Dereliction of property,
title to new land left by the sea,
261.
Descender, formedon in, iii, 192.
Descent of the crown collateral,
193; iv,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii, ii,

ii,

ii,

224.
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Demise,

90, 100.

of the crown,
286.
Demi-mark, tender of, iii,

ii.

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii, ii,

a

of guilt, iv, 84
in writs of entry, iii, 181.
of kindred, computation of,

lands,
Demesnes

i,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

120.
effect of conveyance without words of
limitation,
107, 108, n., 120, n.
implication of cross-remainders,
381.
of,
formal parts
298.
298.
premises,
habendum,
298.
tenendum, ii, 298.
reddendum, ii. 299.
condition,
299.
warranty, ii, 300.
covenants for title, &c.
304.
conclusion, date, &c,
304.
must be read on request,
304.
signing and sealing, ii. 305.
statute of frauds,
806.
execution while incomplete,
807.
806.
delivery,
escrow,
806.
attestation,
807.
297.
stamps on,
defeasance to,
327.
how avoided,
308.
erasure or alteration of,
808.
808.
breaking the seal, cancellation,
disclaimer,
309.
309.
avoiding by judgment or decree,
428.
right to custody of,
266, n.
presumption of lost deed,
stealing of, iv. 324.
iv,
248.
forging of,
427.
Deer in park are heir-looms,
iv,
235, 239.
Deer stealing,
&c,
in general, iv, 174.
hunting, killing,
in disguise, iv, 144
Default, Judgment by, iii, 296, 395.
Defeasance, ii. 327, 342.
Defectum, challenge propter, iii, 362 iv,352.
Defence, its legal signification, iii, 296.
by counsel in criminal cases, iii, 355.
Defensive allegation, iii, 100.
Deforcement, iii, 172.
850; iii, 174
Deforciant,
Definitive sentence, iii, 101.
402.
Degradation of peer,
881.
Degrees conferred by the archbishop,

"Sale.")

(See

Demandant and tenant.
(See "Ejectment.")
De medietate lingua?, Jury, iii, 859.
Demesne, seisin in,
105.

i,

ii,

ii,

of operation at the common
law,
379. n.
creation of estates by.
(See "Estate.")
form of conveyance
of estate for life,

306.

ii,

838, 870.

tles,

ii,

another,
preference

Delivery of deed,
of goods.

ii,

ii,

ii,

Deed, the first of two repugnant clauses pre
ferred,
881.
intended to operate one way may operate

495

222, n.
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152.

i,

ii,

iii,

170.

ii,

802.
warranty commencing by,
writ of entry, sur, iii, 188.
release of right,
325.
Dissenters, protestant, iv. 50.
disturbing worship of, iv, 54.
Dissolution of parliament,
187.
Dissuading witnesses, offence of, iv, 126.
Distrainers, must find
proper pound, iii,

i,

a

13, n.
Distress, remedy by,
41, 42. 43. 452; iii.5.
for what
may be made, iU, 6.
must be an ancient demise at a fixed rent

iii,

6.

what may be destrained, iii,
exemptions from, iii,
for benefit of trade, iii,
n.
n.
goods in custody of the law, iii,
when goods or cattle of
stranger msy
be distrained, iii,
fixtures cannot be taken, iii,
123, n., 404.
of emblements,
when corn may be taken, iii,
when implements of trade may be taken,
iii,
n.
mere pledge,
formerly looked upon as
a

9.

ii,

a

9,

10

by

li,

i,

ii,

i,

i,

ii,

ii,

Disabling statutes, ii, 820; iv, 432.
Disclaimer of tenure,
275; iii, 233.
of estate,
309.
£94

iv,

must be made
day, iii, 10.
unless in case of damage feasant, iii, 10.
may be made within six months after de
termination of lease, iii, 10.
goods clandestinely carried off premises
may be taken, stat.
Ann. c. 14, iii,
and n.
cannot be made twice, iii, 11.
must not be excessive, iii, 11.
remedy for excessive, iii, 12.
how to be disposed of. iii, 12.
impounding, iii, 12.
sale of, iii, 13.
Distress, party distraining not to be deemed
trespasser ab initio, iv, 18.
remedy by, for subtraction, iii. 221.
illegal, for crown debts, iv, 423.
irregularity in, does not make the land
lord trespasser ab initio, iii, 213.
infinite, iii, 231, 280; iv, 285, 31S.
SIS;
Distribution of intestate's effects,
iv. 403, 424, 439.
8

I,

ii,

ii, ii,

limbs or members,

205-207.

Iii,

9.

ii, ii,

i.

i,

801.
man's

9.

8.

"Wills.")

i,

iii,

a

to,

at election,

9,

ii,

ii,

(See

executory, ii, 172.
373.
title by, in general,
375, n,
by married woman,
revocation of, ii, 876.
Die eat sine, iii, 316, 899.
Diet, excess in. iv, 171.
Diets,
147.
81.
Digests,
24L
Dignity of the king,
87, 91.
Dignities,
descent of,
216.
128, n.
curtesy of,
Dilapidations, remedy for, iii, 91.
Dilatory pleas, iii, 801.
within what time to be pleaded, iii, 801, n.
Diminishing the coin, iv, 90.
Diminution of record, iv, 390.
Diocese,
111.
Direct prerogatives,
239.
55.
Directory part of a law,
Disabilities, iv, 877.
to purchase and convey,
291.
of Roman catholics, relief from,
868, n.
plea

167, 198.

7,

execution, iii, 413.
Devastation,
508.
Devises,
873; iv, 430.

Disabling

iii,

Dissection of murderers, iv, 202, 377, 468.
Disseisin,
195, 802; iii, 169.

a

iii,

Dispossession,

7.

it

ii,

ii,

Description of property, construction of
particular words, u, 19.
Detainer, forcible, iii, 179; iv, 148.
unlawful, iii, 151.
Determinable fee,
109.
"
(See
Estate.")
Determination of will,
146.
Detinet, action of debt in the, ill, 156.
Detinue, action of, when
may be brought,

171.

ii.

i,

i,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

(See "Escheat")
modes of failure of hereditary blood,
246.
240, n.
changing the stock of descent,
effect of partition on, ii, 191.
of equity changed by merger in legal es
tates, ii, 337, n.
862.
change of by recovery,
240, n.
when heir takes by purchase,
may toll right of entry, iii, 176.
of copyholds, admittance of heir,
871.
rules followed in equity, iii, 430.
453.
Desertion of children,
416; iv, 102.
by soldiers,

iii,

estate,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

226, 250.
half-blood,
227, 233, 240.
possessio patris, ii, 228.
234, 240, n.
preference of male stocks,
rules of descent, subsequent to the year
240, n.
1833,
lineal ascent,
240, n.
226, n., 250, 251.
through an alien,
251, 253.
corruption of blood,
escheat,
244.

of

Discovery on oath, iii, 882, 437.
of accomplices, iv, 330, 331.
483.
by bankrupt,
Discretion of judges, iii, 433.
Discretionary fines and imprisonment, iv,87S
Disfiguring, iv, 207.
Disguise, offences in, iv, 144.
Dismembering, punishment by, Iv, 877.
Dismission of, bill, iii, 451.
Disorderly houses, iv, 167.
persons, iv, 169.
Disparagement, ii, 70.
142, 186,
Dispensing power of the king,
342; iv, 436. 460.
Dispensation from the pope, iv, 115.
ii,

sisters,

Discontinuance of suit, iii, 296.

it

ii,

11,

Descent, different heirs to the same person
in respect of different estates,
222, n.
immediate descent between brothers and

6.
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ii,

punishment for, &c., Iv, 64
497, and n.
will made during,
Duchy court of Lancaster, iii, 78.

i,

ii,

8,

i,

i,

i,

ii,

ii,

ii,

i,

i,

ii,

l,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

i,

i,

Ealdormen,
398.
Ear, loss of, iv, 148, 157, 160, 206, 248, 377.
166, 898.
Earl,
Earl marshal, his court, iii, 63; iv, 267.
Earnest,
447.
Easements,
distinguished from rights of
common, &c, ii, 32, n.
86, n.
description and classification of,
36, 266, n.
how gained and transferred,
266,
peculiarity of right to light and air,
n, 402.

ii,

ii,

right of way, by grant, by prescription,
35.
by necessity,
264, n.
abandonment of,
Eat inde sine die, iii, 816, 899.
Eaves-droppers, iv, 168.
Ecclesiastical matters.
(See

"Advowson," "Simony."

Ecclesiastical courts, separation
civil, iii, 62; iv, 415, 421.
what injuries are cognizable
have no jurisdiction to try
tithes, iii, 88.
method of proceeding in, iii,
Jurisdiction, how limited at

of, from the

by, iii, 87.
the right to
98.
present,

iii,

67, n.
376, n.
societies in America,
470.
corporations,
when separated from civil, iv, 415, 421.
Ecclesiastical persons, residence of,
322.
leases and renewals by, ii, 818 et teq.
66; iv, 412.
Edgar, King, his laws,
450.
Education of children,
Edward the Confessor, his laws,
66, 67, n.
iv. 412, 420.
iv,
126.
Egyptians,
Ejectione firms, writ of, iii, 197.
Ejectment, action of, iv, 441
now the only mode of trying title of lands,
iii, 197, n.

ii,

i,

.

it

i,

i,

il,

ii,

ii,

ii, ii,

a

209, n.
been seized,
of trust, 127, 132, n.
253.
of wife of felon,
136.
how prevented,
137.
Jointure in lieu of,
unde nihil habet, writ of, iii, 182.
writ of right of, iii, 182.
writ of admeasurement of, iii, 182.
467.
Draft for money,
forgery of, iv, 248.
407, n.
Dramatic piece, right to represent,
Drawbacks,
315.
iv,
92,
837.
Drawing to the gallows,
Druids, their customs,
63;iv, 408.
Drunkenness, how far
excuses crime, iv,
85.

288.

i,

ii,

Ii,

136 etteq.
how barred,
of wife of heir, who died without having

iii,

to make arrest,

i, i,

129 et teq.

Ducking-stool, iv, 167, 877.
Due process of law, what is.
135, n.
Duelling, iii, 887, 851; iv, 145, 185, 199.
Dukes,
897, 409.
Dumb and deaf persons, trial of, iv, 324
497.
wills by,
Dum fuit infra setatem, writ of, iii, 183.
Dum non compos mentis, writ of, iii, 188.
Duodecima manus, iii, 343.
Duplex querela, iii, 246.
Duplicates, iii, 310.
Duplicity in pleading, iii, 308, 311.
Duress of imprisonment,
131, 136.
131.
per minas,
wills made under,
497.
292.
conveyance by person under,
of testator,
497.
Durham, county palatine of,
117, 118.
now united to the crown, iii, 79, n.
Duties of persons,
123.
of the king,
233.
n.
Duty, origin of,
action for breach or neglect of, iii, 164
Dwelling-house, what is, iv, 224 and n.
breaking in, burglary, iv, 226.
to make distress, iii, 11, n.

1,

ii,

i,

ii,

i,

ii,

i,

ii,

ii,

ii,

i,

ii,

i,

i,

ii,

ii,

i,

ii,

Distribution of intestate's effects, law of
domicile,
387, n.
112, n.
District of Columbia,
iii,
280.
Distringas,
abolished,
iii,
280,
now
a.
in detinue, iii, 413.
in equity, iii, 445.
Disturbance, iii, 236.
of common, iii, 237.
of franchises, iii, 236.
of patronage, iii, 292.
of tenure, ui, 292.
of ways, iii, 241.
Disturbance of religious assemblies, It, 54,
and n.
Disturber,
278.
Diversity of person, plea of, iv, 396.
Dividend warrants, forgery of, iv, 248, 250.
Dividend on bankruptcy,
487.
42.
Divine law,
offences against, iv, S50.
right of bishops, iv, 436.
191.
of kings,
108.
Divine service, tenure by,
440; iii. 94
Divorce,
130, n.
dower lost by,
court of, iii, 67, n., 95, n.
Dock, stealing from, iv, 240.
Docket of judgment, ii, 511, iii, 397.
Doctrines, illegal, asserting or publishing,
iv, 91, 116, 183.
393.
Dogs, property in,
416.
right to keep,
iii,
153.
damage by,
stealing, iv, 236
Alfred,
64, 66, 114; iv, 411.
Dome-book of
Domesday book, ii, 49. n., 99; iii, 331.
Domicile, regulates succession to personal
887, n.
ty,
(See "Dwelling House.")
Dominions, foreign,
110.
514
Donatio mortis causa,
Double plea, iii, 808.
224; iv, 81.
Dowager, queen,
princess, iv, 81.
Dower, title by, in general, iv, 424
estate in, its origin, nature and incidents,
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Emblements, of tenant for life,
122.
of tenant for years, ii, 145.
of tenant at will, ii, 146.
what are emblements, ii, 143.
Emblements, rights of devisee and heir re
122.
spectively,
rights of incumbents, executors, Ac.,

fi,

ii,

123.

rights of sub-lessees, ii, 123.
Emboweling alive, iv, 92, 377.
Embracery, iv, 140.
Eminent domain,
189, n. ii, 35, n.
Emperor, his authority,
242.
Empson and Dudley, iv, 310.
Enabling statute, ii, 319.
Enciente, capacity of child of which woman

203.

204, n.

if lease,

entry and ouster not confessed at
trial, plaintiff must be nonsuited,

169.

ii,

iii, 204.
consequence

11,

is

ii,

it,

i,

i,

a

thereof, iii, 204.
question may be retried, iii, 204.
when a court of equity will interfere to
iii, 204.
prevent
will not lie for incorporeal hereditaments,
except tithes, iii, 206.
in arrear, iii, 206.
remedy where rent
877; iv, 115, 421.
Election of bishops,
478, n.
by corporations,
840; iv, 413, 427.
of magistrates,
of members of parliament,
170, 177.
169; iv, 416.
of Scotch peers,
104, n.
of Irish peers,
of widow between devise and dower, ii,
138, n.
of remedy in case of nuisance, iii, 220
and n.
Elective monarchy, iv, 418.
172, n.
Electors in boroughs,
172, n.
in counties,
privilege of, from arrest, iii, 289, n.
471.
Eleemosynary corporations,
161.
Elegit,

ii,

i,

'401, n.

i,

i,

i,

i,

i,

i,

i,

i,

i,

i,

i,

i.

ii,

i.

i,

i,

ii,

i,

captives,
403.
Enfranchisement of villeins,
04.
of slaves,
423. n.. 425. n.
of copyhold,
150.
England, countries subject to,
93.
classification of laws of,
63.
146.
parliament of,
190.
king of,
366.
people of,
civil divisions of, 118.
ecclesiastical divisions,
110.
local government in, iv, app. 458.
Engleschire, iv, 195.
English courts, delays in, as compared
courts of civil law, iii, 424.
enumeration of.

ii,

(See

130;

ii,

the

;

i,

is.

jury to determine whether woman is, iii,
862; iv, 395.
Enclosure, disseisin by, iii, 170.
of common, ii, 34
Enclosure acts,
34, n.
Encroachment by sea or river,
261.
Endowment of vicarages,
887.
Enemies,
257, 373, n.
adhering to, offence of, iv. 82.
Enemy, prize of goods of,
401.
contract with, ii, 401.
right to bring suit suspended during war,

"Judgment")

ouster of estate held by, iii, 198.
writ of, iii, 417; iv, 426.
when capias ad satisfaciendum may issue
after, fli, 419.
Elisors,
349; iii, 365.
442.
Elopement,
Ely, Isle of, 120.
county of, now abolished, iii, 79, n,
destroying powdikes in, iv, 244.
423, n., 425, n.
Emancipation of slaves,
453, n.
of children,
270.
Embargo,
Embezzlement of the king's stores, &c, iv,

English language, pleadings required to b»
in, iii, 817.
proceedings ordered to be in, except tech
nical words, iii. 822.
407.
Engravings, copyright in,
Engrossing, offence of. iv, 160.
ii,
l'estatc,
324.
Eniarger
87.
Enlarging statutes,
Enquiry, writ of, iii, 898.
Enrollment of annuity,
461.
of bargain and sale,
338.
Entails, Ti, 112; iv, 427, 481.
of personalty, ii, 398.
(See "Estates.")
812; iii,
174
Entry,
when may be made, iii, 175.
within what time must be made, iii, 179,a.

i,

ii,

i,

i, i,

i,

i,

i,

101.

clerks or servants, iv, 231
servants of persons deceased, iv, 231.
bankrupts, iv, 156.
persons in the public service, iv, 123.
persons employed in the post-office, iv,
235 and n.
Emblements, right to,
408.
go to the executor,
403.
distress of,
404.
596

i

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

.

by
by
by
by
by

with

(See "Courts.")
for trial of criminal causes, iv, 259. ei teq.
English law, proceedings in, iii, 322; iv, 441.
variety of, iii, 265.
causes of intricacy of, iii, 266.
vindicated, iii, 827.

5.

iii,

i,

invention of new method of trying titles
by, iii, 202.
notice to tenant in possession, iii, 203.
tenant may defend, iii, 203.
landlord may be made defendant, iii, 204.
tenant must confess lease, entry and ous
ter, iii, 203.
must specify in the rule of court the
premises for which he intends to defend,

ii,

fli,

ii,

Ejectment, when it lies, Hi, 199.
introduction of judgment to recover the
term, and writ of possession, iii. 200.
how applied to the use of trying the title
to land, iii, 201.
notice to be given to the tenant in posses
sion, iii, 201.
regular method of bringing an action of,

i,
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T,

ii,

ii,

ii,

a

is

i,

ii,

necessary,

ii, ii,

165 et seq.

in futuro,

144,

ii,

165.

ii,

ii, ii,

uses,

freehold to commence

possession

tenants,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii, if,

ii,

ii,

ii, ii,

ii,

alienation of,
287 et »eq., 290, n.
on condition, ii. 152 el seq.
" Condition," " Mortgage.")
(See
in severalty,
179.
in joint tenancy, ii, 179 etteq., 192.
lease by joint tenants,
103.
severance of jointure,
185.
crown cannot hold chattel in,
409.
in coparcenary,
et
187
teq.
partition of,
189.
m common,
191.
194, n.
adverse possession by tenant,
194, n.
good faith required of tenants,
194.

194, n.
repairs by,
disclaimer of,
309.
forfeiture of,
274
division of,
163.
freehold or chattel,
16.
in fee simple, ii, 104
in demesne,
105.
abeyance of the freehold, ii, 107.
rule in Shelley's Case,
172, n., 242.
in fee in annuity,
41.
fees simple, conditional and determinable
109, 110.
distinguished,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

109.
base fee,
fee tail in personalty,

ii,

ii,

373, n.

Escrow,
307.
74; iv, 433.
Escuage,
406.
Esquire,
son of, entitled to kill game when', iv, 175.
Essoign day, iii, 277.
Estates in personalty, ii, 898.
conditional limitations, conditions and
remainders,
169 etteq.
in remainder,
163.
(See "Remainder.")
rules as to limitations by way of remain
der, executory devise
and springing

ii, ii,

488.

administration of assets by, iii, 439.
jurisdiction over loans and securities, ib.
jurisdiction over trusts, iii, 431, 439.
proceedings in, iii, 443 etteq.
(See "Pleading;'^ "Practice.")
right of parol to demur, iii, 430.
time given to infants by, iii, 480, n.
of statute, 1, 61, 63, n. ; iii, 431.
reserved, iii, 453.
Equity of redemption, ii. 159.
Erasure in deed, effect of,
808, n.
Eriach, iv, 813.
Error, writ of, iii, 406; iv, 891.
where prosecuted, iv, 391.

of gavelkind lands,
84.
writ of, iii, 194.
whether inquest of office

a ii,

mode of relief, specific performance, iii,

extinct,

356.

ii,

to perpetuate testimony, iii,

488, 450.

201.

246, n.
trust,
where there
none when corporation becomes

ii,by

jurisdiction

418, 418.

distinguished from purchase and descent,

i,

iii. 481.
sends some matters to law. iii, 431.
bound by precedents, iii, 433.
cognizance of fraud, iii, 430.
Telieves against accident and mistake, iii,
481.
remedies defective assurances in some
cases, iii, 431.
interferes in whose favor, iii, 431, n.
proceedings in courts of, iii, 435, 443 etteq.
jurisdiction in bankruptcy, iii, 438.
jurisdiction over charities, iii, 427.
jurisdiction in case of infants, lunatics,
&c.. iii, 426, 437.
favors creditor's children, &c., iii, 431. n.
remedy in case of bonds, mortgages, &c,
iii, 434, 439.
jurisdiction to enforce agreements, iii, 435,
488.
relief against penalties in, iii, 435.
regards foreign law, when, iii, 436.
enforcing discovery by, iii, 437.
mode of proof in, iii, 437, 438.
jurisdiction in cases of fraud, iii, 437,
489.
mode of trial in, iii, 438.
examination of witnesses, iii, 438.

415.

ii,

general nature of, iii, 429.
-cannot alter the common law, iii, 429.
concurrent jurisdiction, when exercised,

iii,

negligent, when sheriff excused for,iii,4 15.
assisting in. iv, 131.
Escheat,
302;
11, 72, 89, 241; iv, 338,

ii,

484, 441.

Error.differences between appeals and writs
of, iii. 56.
bail by plaintiff in, iii, 411.
costs in, iii, 399. 410.
in equity, iii, 454.
in lunacy, iii, 437.
Escape, iii, 290, 415.
upon mesne process, action on the case
for, iii, 165.
after judgment, action of debt for, ib.
sheriff liable for, iii, 415.
voluntary, prisoner cannot be taken after,

ii,

be made after
alienation by tenant in tail, iii, 178.
nor upon deforcement, iii, 178.
tolled by descent, iii, 176, 177.
a speedy remedy in Saxon times, iii, 183.
forcible, iv, 148.
in burglary, iv, 236 and n.
Equilibrium of powers, ii, 152, n., 155, n.
Equity, history of. iii, 49, 430.
Equity, courts of, i, 62, 02.
distinguished from law, iii, 436, 442.
jurisdiction of exchequer, iii, 44, 426.
origin of its jurisdiction, iii, 436, 442.
full development of, iii, 440.
former jealousy of, iii, 440.
character of, in its infancy, iii, 433.
sometimes makes merely technical distinc
tions, ill, 432.
foundation of jurisdiction of, iii, 434, 442.
when it follows rules of law, iii, 429, 430,

a

Entry, could not formerly
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398;
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iii,

113.

Index.

ii,

ii,

ii,

"

Curtesy.")
(See
129.

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii, ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii, ii, ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

(See "Lease.")
143.
may commence in futuro,
144
inter esse termini,
898.
entail of term,
144, n., 147.
from year to year,
147.
arising out of parol lease,
150, n.
tenancy under mortgagee,
144, 145.
estovers and emblements,
particular estate, remainder and rever
sion,
176.
175, n.
executory bequest of term,
146, n.
notice to quit,
over,
160.
tenant holding
151.
forcible ejectment,
and
827, n.
under lease
assignment,
177.
merger,
and
160.
elegit,
by statute

ii,

ii,

ii,

i,

898

title,

ii,

ii,

ii,

i,

46, n.

Excise,
288, 819, 322.
Exclusion bill,
210.
Excommunication, greater and lesser, iii,

iii,

165.

150.

144, n.

equity jurisdiction transferred to lord
chancellor, iii, 45, n.
writs of error to exchequer chamber, iii,

of, iii, 102.
discontinued except as spiritual censure,

ii,

a

ii,

at sufferance,

Estates of the kingdom,
156.
Estoppel, iii, 807.
from disputing
by possession,

iii, 44,

426,427.

•101.
consequences

ii,

(See "Copyholds.")
remainder,
cannot support

45.

equity court of, its jurisdiction,

i,

(See "Judgment")
145.
emblements,
in case of,
146.
determination of the will,
146.
147.
copyholders,

will,

ii,

at

299.

Exceptions, bill of, iii, 872.
to answer in equity, iii, 448.
Exchange,
323.
implied warranty and right of re-entry
case of,
823.
of chattels, ii. 446.
bills of, iii, 466.
Exchequer chamber, iii, 56 and n.
Exchequer, court of, set up by William the
Conqueror, iii, 44.
why so called, iii, 44.
common-law court of, its jurisdiction, iii.
ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

if,

a

ii,

177.
140 et teg.
less than freehold,
140, 386.
for years,
431.
goes to executor,
141.
origin of,
143.
requisites to lease,

in

"Dower.")

a

(See

258.
pour autre vie, occupancy of,
260.
in case of copyhold,
260.
in incorporeal hereditaments,
is assets,
260.
entail of,
113, 260.
compelling appearance of tenant for life,

ii,

in dower,

ii,

ii,

ii,

a

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

death,
121.
<fcc,
estovers, emblements,
122.
124.
apportionment of rent,
126.
by the curtesy,

i,

a

ii,

ii,

ii,

civil

i,

371.

forfeiture of entail,
117.
liable for debts to the crown or of
bank
119.
rupt,
119.
maybe appointed to charity,
177.
cannot merge,
leases of, ii, 819.
after possibility, &c,
124.
in term for years,
898.
ii,
115.
frank marriage,
not of inheritance,
120.
indefinite grant passes estate for life of
when,
121.
grantee,
121.
for life determinable,
121.
Estate, joint life,

i,

ii,

864.

in copyholds, how barred,

Estoppel, bv record,
465, n.
354, n.
by fine,
by recovery,
361.
295, 808.
by deed,
Estovers, common of,
85.
tenant's right to, ii. 85, n.
of tenant for life,
122.
of tenant for years,
144.
of a wife,
441.
Estoveris habendis, writ de,
441.
297.
Estrays,
title of crown to, ii, 409.
Estreat of recognizance, &c., iv, 253.
Estrepement, writs of, iii, 224.
Evidence, written, iii, 867.
must be the best, nature of case will ad
mit of, iii, 868.
meaning of this rule, iii, 868, a.
privileged communications, iii, 368, a.
hearsay, when admissible, iii, 368.
demurrer to, iii, 372.
in equity, iii, 487, 438. 447, 449.
of witnesses abroad, iii, 438.
Evidence, preservation of, iii, 438, 450.
on an appeal, iii, 455.
of foreign law, iii, 436.
must be relevant to issue, iii, 367.
deeds not stamped, ii, 297.
in criminal cases, iv, 356.
recognizance to give, iv, 296, n.
stifling offence of, iv, 308.
Examination of prisoners, iv, 296 and n.
in equity, iii, 449.
of witnesses, iii, 372.
trial by, iii, 331.
Exception, distinguished from reservation,
ii,

ii,

•

ii,

ii,

ii,

110 et teq.
Estates, in lands,
in annuity,
41, 112.
quasi in tail, iii, 113.
incidents to,
115.
destruction of entail,
116, 848. 354, n.,

ii,

500

101, n.

Excusable homicide, iv, 182.
Execution, iii, 412, 479.
in real or mixed actions, iii, 418.
in other cases, iii, 412.
what may be taken in, iii. 417.
from what time goods bound by, iii, 421.

.

ii,

iv, 161.

46.

i,

cannot be passed in America,
46, n.
constitutional meaning of the term, lb.
Express malice, iv, 198.
condition, ii, 154.
contract,
443; iii, 154.
801.
warranty,
Extendi facias, iii, 420.
Extent, when issued, iii, 420.
Extinguishment of right.ii, 825.
Extortion by officers, iv, 141.
or blackmail, iv, 244.
Extra judicial remedy does not exclude or
dinary course of justice, iii, 22.
Extra parochial places,
114.
Extra parochial tithes,
284.
Extravagantes Joannis,
82.
Eye, putting out, iv, 206, 207.
in,
iii, 58, 72; iv, 432, 428.
Eyre, justices
killing of, iv, 84.

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

i,

ii,

Exposing infected persons,

Ex post facto laws,

i, i, i,

n.

criminal, iv, 403.
award of, iv, 263, 4S2.
plea in bar of, iv, 396.
precept of, iv, 403.
rule for, iv, 404.
varying from judgment, iv, 179, 404
of devises,
876.
of uses,
833.
190, 250.
Executive power,
Executors and administrators, history of
491.
right to administer,
503.
appointment of executor,
infant executor,
503.
504.
appointment of administrators,
administration durante minoritate,
503.
administration cum testamento annexo,

501

ii, ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

Execution, when to be sued out, iii, 421.
161.
by elegit,
certificate of judge for immediate, iii, 394.
sale of goods after,
447.
447,
priority of conflicting executions,

Index.
i.

Gene

163.

ii,

i,

i, 1

i,

8,

i,

ii,

i,

ii,

28

physician cannot recover, iii, 28, n.
Feigned issue, iii, 452.
Felo de se, iv, 189 and n.
409, 499.
forfeiture of goods of,
Felon cannot make will, ii, 499.
who is, iv, 94.
Felonious homicide, iv, 188.
(See "Murder," "Manslaughter.")
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ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

estate,

remainder,
169.
Exigent, writ of, iii, 283; iv, 819.
Exigi facias, writ of, iii, 283; iv, 319.
Exile,
137.
of offenders, &c. iv, 362.
Ex officio informations, iii, 427; iv, 308.
Ex officio oath, iii, 100, 447.
Ex parte remedies, iii, et teq., 15, n.
869, 370 and n.
Expatriation, right of,
Expectancy, estates in, ii, 163.
Expenses of prosecution, iv, 362 and n.
of witnesses, iii, 369; iv, 362 and n.
Exportation of wool, &c., iv, 154, 428.
Exposing person, offence of, iv, 65.
goods for sale on Sunday, lv, 64.

ii,

846 n.

ii,

iii,

when liable to pay costs, iii, 400 and n.
173, 334.
Executory devise,
contract,
443.

i,

ii,

distribution among next of kin, &c.,
515 ft seq.
distribution by custom,
517.
promise by, to pay debt of estate, iii, 158.
actions by, iii, 301 and n.
may be sued on simple contract demands,

Facto, king de,
204, 871; lv, 77.
Factor,
427; iii, 437.
goods in hands of, not distrainable,
n.
Fair,
88; iii, 218.
who appoints,
274.
nuisance to, iii, 218.
False imprisonment, what constitutes, iii,
127; iv, 218.
action of, iii, 138.
False judgment, writ of, iii, 34, 406.
False personation of bail, iv, 128.
of soldiers, seamen, &c., iv, 250.
False pretences, offence of, iv, 158.
False return, action for, iii, 110.
False rumors, when indictable, iv, 149.
False verdict, iii, 402; iv, 140.
False weights and measures, iv, 157.
Falsi crimen, iv, 89, 134, 156, 247.
Falsifying attainder, iv, 890.
coin, iv, 84, 88, 90, 98, 100, n.
judgment, iv, 890.
records, iv, 128.
45, 53, 86, 176, 867.
867;
Fealty,
subtraction of, iii, 230.
how remedied, iii, 231.
Fear, putting in, iv, 242.
of crime, security in case of, iv, 251.
104.
Fee simple,
tail,
112.
will
what words
pass a, ii. 108, n., 109, n.
(See "Estate.")
43.
Fee farm rent,
Fees, ecclesiastical, must not be contrary
to common law, iii, 89.
action to recover back from barrister will
not lie, iii, 89.
counsel cannot maintain action for, iii,
ii,

11,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

503.
de bonis non,
506.
durante absentia,
503.
husband's right to on wife's estate,
435.
where there are no relations, ii. 505.
executor of executor. &c,
500.
Executors, duties of executor of,
507 et
$eq.
acts before probate,
507.
executor de son tort,
507.
probate of will,
508.
burial of deceased,
508.
inventory, ii, 510.
collecting and converting assets,
510.
payment of debts, in what order, ii, 511.
appointing debtor or creditor to be execu
tor,
511, 512.
512.
payment of legacies,
abatement and refunding of legacies,
512.
right to residue,
513.

Index.

a

218

ii,

;

i,

ii,

ii,

ii,

i, i,

ii,

i,

ii,

ii,

ii,

;

ii,

ii,

i,

i,

i,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

420, 431.

Forest courts, iii, 71.
Forests, carta de, iv, 423.
Forests,
289
14, 89.
Forestalling, iv, 159.
Foretooth, striking out, iv, 206.
Forfeiture,
299.
title by,
153. 267; iii, 160; iv, 881. 48«.
267, 409,
for crimes and misdemeanors,
420, 431; iv, 377, 381, 386, 423, 434.
;

ii,

9,

ii,

ii,

ii,

887, n.

Foreign prince, pension from, iv, 122.
Foreign service, iv, 100.
Forest laws,
38, 416, 419; iii, 73; iv, 415,

ii, i,

ii,

ii, ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

i,

ii,

ii,

120.

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

i,

ii,

it

ii,
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159.

Foreign country, indictment in, iv, 303, 305
and n.
Foreign documents, forgery of, iv, 350
and n.
110.
Foreign dominions,
Foreign law, when regarded and on whit
evidence, iii, 436.
succession,
regulated by law of domicil,

i.

ii,

44 et seq., 52,
418.
services due to the lord,
54.
oath of fealty,
53.
54.
homage,
feuds not hereditary at first,
55.
56, 87.
reliefs,
descent,
56.
restraints on alienation,
57.
feuds, proper and improper,
53.
all lands held of the crown,
51.
gradual relaxation, ii. 52.
Feudum antiquum, ii, 212, 221.
52,
Feudum novum held ut antiquum,
n.. 221.
Fictions, legal, beneficial and useful, iii, 43,
107.
in fictione Juris consistit eequitas, iii,
283.
Fictitious plaintiff, iv, 184.
bail, iii, 291.
Fidei commissum,
827.
Fidejussors, iii, 108, 291.
Fief,
45.
Fieri facias, Iii, 416, 417.
Fifteenths,
309.
Fighting, offences of, iv, 183.
Filial portion, ii, 519.
Final judgment, iii, 398.
decree, iii, 452.
Finding indictments, iv, 305.
295;
403.
Finding of goods,
Fine for alienation, ii, 71, 89.
135.
for endowment,
93.
for copyhold,
118, 348, 352; iii, 156, 166;
Fine of lands,
iv, 426, 429.
bar by non-claim,
354, 356.
how affects parties, privies and strangers,
358.
bar of feme covert,
855.
deeds to declare uses of,
368.
now abolished,
364, n.
Fines and forfeitures, when grantable, iii,
259; iv, 379.

n;iv,413,

iii,

are debts,

Finger, disabling, iv, 206.
431 iv, 223.
Fire, negligence of,
(See "Arson," "Burning.")
881.
liability of tenant for accidental,
Fire-bote,
35.
Fire ordeal, iv, 842.
First fruits, 284; ii, 66; iv, 107.
Fish, royal,
233, 290;
403.
in pond are heir looms,
4S7.
stealing, iv, 236.
39, 40, 417; iv, 424.
Fishery,
common of, ii, 34.
right of, in public waters, ii. 84.
Fish pond, destroying, iv, 246.
Fitzherbert,
72; iii, 183.
Fixtures, when removable,
281, n.'
cannot be destraiaed, iii,
or
from
ripping
building, Ssc,
stealing
iv, 233.
Fleet prison, iii, 444.
262, iv, 419.
Fleets,
Fleta,
72;iv, 427.
Flight, confession by, iv, 387.
Floodgates, destroying, iv, 144, 245.
Flotsam,
293; iii, 106.
Folkland,
90.
Food, offences of selling short weight, 4c.,
iv, 158.
forestalling, regrating, Ac., iv, 159.
supplying unwholesome, iv, 163.
stinting apprentices in, iv, 197.
451, n.
implied warranty in sale of,
Force when repellable by death, iv, 181.
injuries with and without, iii, 118.
Forcible abduction and marriage, iv, 308
and n.
entries, remedies for, iii, 179.
entry and detainer, iii, 179 iv, 148.
resumption of possession, iii, 5,n.,179.
151, n.
ejectment,
Foreclosure of mortgage,
159 and n.
467.
Foreign bills,
coin,
Foreign
forging, iv, 89, 99, 100, n.,
i,

Fetters, iv, 300, 322.
Feudal actions, iii, 117.
Feudal system, history of,

Fines and forfeitures, when grantable, far
misdemeanors,
iv, 377, 378.

9. ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

i,

i,

i,

ii,

ii,

Felony, definition of, iv, 94.
appeal of, It, 310.
compounding, iv, 134.
misprision of, iv, 121.
punishment of, iv, 98, 216, 232.
284, 409, 499.
forfeiture by,
290.
conveyance to felon,
Females, discrimination against,
445, n.
punishment of, for treason, iv, 93.
215.
as reigning monarchs,
petty treason by, iv, 75, 203 .
stealing or sed.iction of, iv, 209.
jury of, iii, 362; iv, 395.
Feme covert,
442.
(See "Dower," "Husband and Wife.")
Feoffment,
310 et seq.
811 et seq., 815.
livery of seisin,
Feorme,
318.
389, 403.
Ferae naturae, animals,
Fern, setting Are to, iv, 246, n., 247.
nuisance, iii,
Ferry near ancient ferry

a
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Index.

i,

ii,

ii,

i,

i, i,

ii, ii,

ii,

ii,

i,

i,

197.

ii,

i,

when guilty of murder in cruelty, iv,
Gardens, robbing of, iv, 233.
damaging trees in, iv, 247.
Garter, Knight of the,
403.
74, 76, n., 79;
Gavelkind,
84, 123,
iv, 409, 413.
General demurrer, iii, 315.
General fund,
831.
General issue, why so called, iii, 305.
when formerly pleaded, iii, 305; iv,
what
in the several actions, iii,
special plea amounting to, iii, 309.
General occupancy,
258.
General services, iv, 272.
General statute,
85.
General verdict, iii, 378; iv, 354.
General warrant, iv, 391.
Generalissimo,
261.
Gentlemen,
405, 400.
should know the laws,
18, 36.
Gibbon, commendation of Blackstone
i,

220;

i,

i,

i,

7,

by,

Gifts of land, ii, 316.
of chattels,
440.
Gilda mercatoria,
473.
Girl, abduction of, iv, 209.
carnally abusing, iv, 212.
Glanvil,
72, 421.
Gleaning, illegal, iii. 213, n., 312.
God and religion, offences against, iv. 63 to
i,

65, 403.

,

Good behavior, security for, iv, 351 356.
Good consideration,
397.
Goods and chattels,
334.
(See "Personalty.")
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ii, ii,

ii

37, n.

ii,

ii,

ii,

i,

ii,

ii,

ii,

338.
805.

ii,

it

ii,

ii,

ii,

is

ii, i,

i,

il,

ii,

ii,

ii,

Qage, estates in, iii. 157.
and pledges, iii, 280.
Game, property in,
14, 394, 410 tt teq.
laws respecting,
410 el seq.; iv, 175, n;
217, n.
of free warren,
89.
beasts of park or chase,
38.
shooting person in pursuit of, iv, 27, n.,
174.
trespass in pursuing, iii, 213, 214.
418; iv, 217, n.
Game-keeper,
Gaming, iv, 167, 170, 171.

i,

i,

ii,

i,

a

ii,

ii,

11—76

iv,

128.

61, 104.
(See "Tenures.")
Fraud, Jurisdiction in case of, iii, 481, 437,
439, 442.
Fraud, criminal, iv, 158.
444, n.
vitiates contracts,
297,
Frauds and perjuries, statute of,
306. 364, 448, 466, 500, 515; iii, 158; iv,
439.
297.
parol leases, when valid,
as to contracts,
442.
trusts,
337.
363,
declaration of uses of fines, &c,
364.
376.
execution of wills,
296, 441.
Sec.,
Fraudulent conveyances,
devises,
378; iii, 430.
38, 417.
Free warren,
Free-bench, ii, 122, 129, n.
ii,
89, 410, 417.
Free fishery,
Free services,
60.
Freehold, fixtures to, when removable,
281, n.
(See "Estate.")
149.
customary freeholds,

Vol.

297.
trees, destroying or damaging,
246 and n.
Full age,
463.
824.
Fumage,
Funds, public,
331.
Funeral expenses,
508.
Furandi animus, iv, 230, 232.
Furze, setting fire to, iv, 247.
Futuro, freehold in,
144, 166.

i,

i,

i,

a

480.

ii,

tenement,

Fresh suit,

Fruit

{See "^Wagers.")
Gaming-houses, iv, 171.
Gaol delivery, iv, 270.
Gaol distemper,
846.
Gaols,
846; iv, 377.
Gaolers,
346; iv, 300.
compelling prisoners to be approvers, Iv,

i,

Frank

county courts, iii,

36.

ii,

142.

of action, iii, 116.
Fornication, iv, 64.
263.
Forts and castles,
Fortune tellers, iv, 62.
Forty days' court, iii, 71.
Founder of corporation, who is,
131.
Foundling hospitals,
141, n.
Fraction of day,
of,
iv, 247.
&c,
Frames, breaking
Franchise, royal,
302.
37, 40, n.
Franchises,
disturbance of, iii, 236.
of,
iii, 262.
usurpation
allowance of, iii, 263.
" Corporation.")
(See
77, 101.
Frankalmoign,
333, n.
Franking letters,
115, 190.
Frankmarriage,
114; iv, 252.
Frank-pledge,
view of, iv, 273.

Freeholders, judges of

i,

ment,

i,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

Forfeiture, of estate tail for treason,
117;
iv, 881.
mortmain,
for alienation in
263.
874
for alienation to an alien,
alienation,
274.
by tortious
275.
by disclaimer,
276.
on lapse of presentation,
278.
by simony,
condition,
of
breach
281.
by
for waste,
281.
of copyholds by breach of custom,
84.
285.
by bankruptcy,
relief from, in equity, iii, 435.
equity will not aid, ii. 157, n.
Forfeitures are debts, iii. 159.
Forgery, what is, iv, 247.
what instruments the subjects of, iv, 248,
249, 250 and n.
of parish registers, iv, 163.
450, n.
forged indorsement of bill,
Forgiveness by prosecutor, iv, 364.
Forma pauperis, suit in, iii, 400.
Formedon, action of, iii, 191.
Forms of law, unalterable except by parlia

503

ii,

i,

ii,

i,

i,

ii,

i,

i,

i,

i,

i,

ii,

(See

"Descent")

,

ii,

ii,

ii,

Heiress, stealing of, iv, 208, 209, n.
17, 427 et teq.
Heir looms,
not devisable apart from freehold
429.
Heirs, when word necessary to create fee,
107, 120, n.

i,

ii,

108, n., 109, n.
exceptions to this rule,
Helping to stolen goods for reward, iv, 132.
72; iu, 409; iv, 427.
Hengham,
his laws, iv, 420.
Henry
Heptarchy, iv, 410.
Herald's visitation books, evidence of pedi
gree, iii, 105.
34, 35, n.
Herbage, right to,
Hereditament, what,
17, 20, 106.
ejectment for, iii, 200.
288, 319, 322.
Hereditary excise,
191, 209.
Hereditary right to the crown,
Heresy, iv, 44.
Heretico comburendo, writ de, iv, 46, 431.
307, 408; iv, 413.
Heretochs,
Heriots,
97, 422.
Heriot service and heriot custom,
422.
seizing, &c., iii, 14.
Hermogenian code,
81.
■•
High commission court, iii, 67, 447; ivf 48,

i,

i,

i,

ii,

/

i,

433, 439.

i
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■
.

i,

i,

180.
Habeas
corpus ad faciendum et recipien
dum, iii, 181.
when cause not to be removed by, iii, 131.
ad subjiciendum, iii, 131-184.cum causa, iii, 77.
Habeas corpus act,
128, 135; iv, 438.
suspension of,
136.
iii,
of,
135,
n.
passage

ii,

Habeas corpora juratorum, iii, 354.
Habeas corpus ad respondendum, iii, 129.
ad satisfaciendum, iii, 129.
ad prosequendum, testificandum, &c., iii,

ii,

ii,

I,

ii,

it

i,

1,

ii,

i,

i,

is

s

if

i,

i,

i,

i,

i, i, i, i,

462.
462, n.
461.
statute,
462.
461.
for nurture,
in socage,
461.
361, n., 462.
of the poor,
225, 462, n.
of the royal family,
his ward be taken
remedy
guardian
from him, iii. 140.
court of chancery
general guardian, iii,
426.
461, n; iii, 427.
Guardian ad litem,
462;
67; iii,
Guardianship, in chivalry,
140.
in socage,
88.
107.
Guernsey, Isle of,
474.
Guild or Guildhall,
Gunpowder, exclusive patent for making or
importing, iv, 116.
keeping or carrying
illegally, iv, 168.
Gypsies, iv, 165.

ii,

463.

custom,
election,
nature,

house.")
Hackney coaches and chairs,
325.
Half-blood,
70, 194;
233.
Hamesecken, iv, 223.
Hamlets,
115.
Hannaper office, iii, 49.
Hand, burning in, iv, 367, 369, 371, 877.
disabling, iv, 206.
holding up, iv, 323.
loss of, iv, 125, 154, 276, 377.
Handsel,
448.
Handwriting, similitude of, iv, 858.
Hanging, iv, 876.
Hanover,
110.
Harbors, injuries to, iv, 144.
Hard labor, punishment of, iv, 877,
Hares, stealing of, iv, 235.
Havens,
264.
Hay bote, ii, 35.
Hawks, stealing of, iv, 236.
Head of the church,
279; iv, 430.
114.
Headborough,
Health, protection of,
124.
offences against public, iv, 161.
nuisances to, iii, 122.
Hearing in equity, iii, 451.
Hearsay evidence, iii. 868.
Hearth money,
826.
Hedge-bote, u, 35.
Heir, apparent and presumptive,
206.
expectant, sale by,
444.
240, a.
when he takes by purchase,
favor to,
450.
nemo est hares viventis, ii, 224.
ii,

by
by
by
by

Habeas corpus act, subsequent extension of,
iii, 137, n.
substance and use of,
137, n.
Habendum, ii, 298.
iii, 413.
Habere facias possessionem,
Habere facias seisinam, iii, 412.
Habitation, offences against, iv, 220.
(See "Arson," "Burglary," "Dwelling-

i,

i,

i,

i,

i,

ii,

i,

ii,

ii,

ii,

a

ii,

ii,

i,

i,

i,

ii,

Goods and chattels, effect of condemnation
262, n.
of, in exchequer,
when bound by execution, iii, 421.
larceny of.
(See "Larceny.")
Gorse, setting Are to, iv, 246.
Government, origin and object of,
48.
its forms,
49.
iv,
123.
contempts against,
Grand assize, trial by, iii, 341, 850; iv, 422.
106.
Grand costumier of Normandy,
Grand juror disclosing evidence, iv, 126.
Grand jury, iii. 861, 403; iv, 802.
Grand and petty larceny, iv, 339.
78, 77, 78.
Grand serjeanty,
ii, 317.
Grant, of hereditaments,
construction of, 879 et seq.
266, n.
presumption of lost grant,
of chattels,
440.
846.
by the crown,
109, n.
by government,
147.
Great council,
346; iii, 47.
Great seal,
counterfeiting it, iv, 83, 93.
388.
Great tithes,
Green-house,
robbery of, iv, 288.
81.
Gregorian code,
Growing crops.
(See "Emblements.")
460; iii, 141.
Guardian and ward,
by appointment of the court of chancery,

Index

i,

Gekeeax,

504

'«»•

General Index.
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House, its members should understand law,

court of, iii, 68; iv, 267.
iv, 121.
High misdemeanors,
impeachments for, iv, 259.
(See "Impeachment.")
High steward of Oreat Britain, court of, iv,
261, 84a
in parliament, iv, 260, 268.
High steward of Oxford, court of, iv, 277.
High treason, iv, 75.
trials in, iv, 851, 440.
Highway, remedy when oat of repair,

155, 158.
House of lords,
its peculiar laws, &c.
167.
writ of error to, from Ireland, iii, 410, n.
appeal to, from chancery, iii, 56.
its jurisdiction upon appeals and writs of
error, iii. 57, 427, 428.
quorum of, iii, 56, n.
Hue and cry, iv, 293.
Hundred,
116.
action against for robbery, &c, iii, 160;
iv, 246, 293, 411.
Hundred court, iii, 84, 85; iv, 411.
Hundredors, as jurors, iii, 359; iv, 852.
Hunger, does not excuse stealing, iv, 81.
Hunting.

i,

355;

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

445, n.

liability of wife to be made bankrupt, ii,
477, 488, n.

restitution of conjugal rights, iii, 94.
action by husband for battery of wife, iii,
140.

i,

is

excused, iv, 28.
how far wife's crime
surety of peace for, iv, 204.
(See "Curtesy," "Divorce," "Dower,")
224.
Husband of the queen,
Hustings, court of, iii, 80.
810.
Hydages,
159.
Hypothecs,
Hypothecation of ship, ii, 457.
bond, suit upon, iii, 117, n.

i,

,

;

Ml; It, 808.

i,

i,

i,

i,

,

i,

ii,

i.

i, it

i,

ii,

trespass,

i,

a

ii,

ii,

i,

ii,

is

iii, 212.
(See "Arson,'* "Burglary.")
House-bote,
35.
House duties,
825.
House of commons,
158.
175, 177.
how elected,
its peculiar laws, &c.
169.
methods
of proceeding in elections,
177, 181.

Identity of persons, iv, 396.
803, 807.
Idiots, custody of lands of,
438.
their marriages,
who are,
803.
497.
cannot make wills,
jurisdiction of chancellor, iii, 427.
inspection of, iii, 832.
cannot appear by attorney, iii, 125.
conveyance by or to, iii, 127, 291.
303.
Idiota inquirendo, writ de,
Idleness, iv, 169.
Ignominious punishments, iv, 877.
Ignoramus, iv, 805.
excuses crime, iv, 27.
Ignorance, when
50, n.
Illegal contracts,
156.
Illegality of deed, &c.,
Imagining the king's death, iv, 76.
Imbezzling king's stores, &c., iv, 101.
(See "Embezzlement")
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i,

i.

ii,

Hop-binds, destroying, iv, 246.
Horse races, iv, 178.
Horses, sale of,
450.
ill treatment of, iv, 246.
471, 474.
Hospitals,
482.
their visitors,
190, 515, 517.
Hotchpot,
Hot house, robbery of, iv, 233.
land,
18.
House,
grant of. ii, 18. n.
immunities of, iv, 223.
larceny from, iv, 240.
entering to demand or pay money not

004.

liability of husband on wife's contracts, ii,

ii,

i,

ii,

i,

8,

i,

i,

a

ii,

ii,

i,

234, 379; iv, 421.
Homage, by bishops,
nature and varieties of,
54, n. 300.
of court-baron,
91.
867.
liege,
867.
simple,
Homicide, iv, 177.
when justifiable, iv, 178, 179.
in self-defence, iii,
n. iv, 183.
when excusable, iv, 182.
felonious, iv, 188.
self-murder, iv, 189.
manslaughter, iv, 191, 192.
murder, Iv, lHetieg.
Homine replegiando, writ de, iii, 129.
402.
Honor of peer,
answer upon, iii, 446.
Honor, court of, iii, 104.
271;
87, 91, 216; iv, 271.
titles of,
Honoris respectum, challenge propter, iii,

ii,

a

on,

ii,

ii,

;

ii,

,
i,

i,

453.

ii,

n.

Husband and wife,
433; iii, 92.
joint estate of,
182, n.
292, 861, 862.
power of wife to convey,
lease of wife's lands,
819.
will of feme,
497.
husband's power over wife's property, ii,
433 et uq.
wife's title by survivorship,
483.
wife's equity to
settlement,
434, n.
separate estate and restraint on anticipa
tion,
298, n.,484, n., 436, n.
wife's paraphernalia,
485.
husband's title by administration,
485.
ii,

i,

ii,

469

i,

(See '•Game.'')

5.

Hiring,

History of the law, iv, 407.
Hogs, Keeping of in towns, iv, 168.
Holding over by tenant, iii, 210.
151 iii, 211.
penalty therefor,
Holidays, note not to be protested

1,

i,
ii,

86, n.

how established,
85, n.
annoyances in, iv, 107.
offence of not repairing, iv, 167.
■ubbery in or near, iv, 243.
nuisances to, iii.
857, 858.
Highways, surveyors of,

10.

ii,

of England,

constable

268.

9,

It,

High

Industriam, property per,
891.
Infamous witness, iii, 870.
464, 466.
Infancy, its incidents,
Infants, contracts by,
465, 466, n.
in ventre sa mere,
129, 130, 463, n.;

ii,

It,

503.

ii,

to stay waste,

282, n.

ii, 2, ii,

882, n.
dissolution of,
118.
Injuries, civil, iii,
Inheritable blood,
246.
Inheritance, words of, essential to create
fee,
107 and n.
(See "Descent,"
"Estate.")
Inn, entering an, not trespass, iii, 212.
disorderly, iv, 167.
Innkeeper, liabilities and lien of,
414, n.,
451, n.; iii, 164
430, n;
Inns of court and chancery,
23, 25.
Innuendo, iii, 126.
448;
502.
Inofficious wills,
248, 302, n.
Inquests by coroners,
Inquests of office, remedy for injuries
crown, iii, 257; iv, 301, 424.
372, n. iii, 258.
in case of escheats,
prosecutions on, iv, 274, 801, 302.
Inquiry, writ of, iii, 898.
68; iii, 257.
Inquisitio postmortem,
is, iii, 257.
Inquisition, what
gives the king his right by record, iii, 253.
may be traversed, iii, 260.
461.
Inrolment of annuity deeds,
of bargain and sale, ii, 33S.
Insidiatio viarum, iv, 874.
Insimul computassent, iii, 162.
Insolvent debtors, relief of, iii, 415, n. 434.

i,

i,

ii,

to

i,

;

i,

ii,

ii,

.
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ii,

i,

i, i,

ii,

ii,

executors,

jurisdiction of chancery over, iii, 428.
inspection of, iii, 832.
carnal knowledge of, iv, 212.
evidence by, iv, 214.
when liable for crimes, iv, 22, 24, 158.
instigating to crimes, iv, 40.
stinting in food, <fcc., iv, 217.
child stealing, iv, 219.
Inferior courts, writs of error from, iii, 411
and n.
Information in the exchequer, iii, 261.
in respect of charities, iii, 427.
in the ecclesiastical courts, iii, 101.
appeal from, iii, 428.
compounding of, iv, 136.
criminal, iv, 808, 429, 436.
ex officio, iii, 427; iv, 308.
in crown office, iv, 808.
in nature of quo warranto, iv, 312, 441.
Informer, common,
437; iii, 160; iv, 303.
Infortunium, homicide per, iv, 182.
Injunction, iii, 442.

a

ii,

i,

i,

i,

i,

ii,

884, n.

291.

a

ii,

1,

Infants, conveyances by and to,
wills of,
497.

it

ii, i,

i,

106.

ejectment for, iii, 206.
Incorrigible roguery, iv, 169.
Incumbrances, covenant against,
App.
" Mortgage,")
(See
Indecency, public offence of, iv, 65.
by vagrants, iv, 170, n.
Indebitatus assumpsit, iii, 154.
Indefeasible right to the throne,
195.
Indentures,
295, 351.
of apprenticeship,
426.
Independence of the United States,
109,
n., 366, n.
India, government of,
109, n.
misdemeanors in, iv, 805.
Indicavit, writ of, iii, 91.
Indictable, what is, iv, 218.
Indictment, form of, iv, 80S.
venue in, iv, 805.
copy of, iii, 126; iv, 851.
locality of, iv, 803.
certainty required in, iv, 808 and n.
when sufficient after verdict, iv, 806, n.,

and time to show

430.

ii,

ii,

i,

377.

Incendiaries, iv, 220.
Incest, iv, 64.
240.
Incidental prerogatives,
34; iii, 240.
Inclosure of common,
destroying, iv, 247.
Income tax,
814, n.
472, 474.
Incorporation, power of,
20, 36, n.,
Incorporeal hereditaments,

iii,

cause,

i,

289, n.

demurrer by parol,

ii,

for debt, iii,

Improper feuds, ii, 58.
886.
Impropriations,
Improvements, patents for invention of,
407 and n.
Incapacities, imposed as punishments, iv,

169.
465.
mortgagees,
trustees,
465.
who are,
463.

ii,

i,

i,

i,

i,

ii,

ii,

ii,

i,

i,

9,

i,

i,

i,

484.
Impediments of marriage,
Imperial chamber, iii, 39.
80.
Imperial constitutions,
Imperial crown and dignity,
241.
n.
Implements of trade, distress of, iii,
472, n.
Implication, corporations by,
89, n.
repeals by,
448; iii, 159.
Implied contracts,
condition, &c.,
152, 300, 381, 443.
malice, iv, 200.
800.
warranty,
Importing agnus dei, crosses, &c, iv, 115.
counterfeit money, iv, 84, 89, 100, n.
Impossible condition, ii, 156.
Impostures, religious, iv, 62.
434.
Impotency,
420.
Impressment,
134, 186; iv, 244, 377, 486.
Imprisonment,
137; iv, 116.
beyond sea.
false, iii, 127; iv, 218.
relief from, iii, 130 et seq.

it,

ii,

812;

i,

246, n.

467;

i, i,

i,

186, n.

391;

ii,

i,

benefice,

107.

Impeachment of president of United States,
i,

441.

Induction to

407, n.

Imparlances, iii, 299, 801.
Impeachment, in parliament, iv, 259.
not affected by session terminating,

Indorsement of bills and notes,
a

ii,

Immorality, public offence of, iv, 65.
Immoral work, &c., no copyright in,

ii,

Index.
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Issue, on distringas, iii, 280.
Itinerant courts, iv, 411, 422.
justices, iii, 59; iv, 422.

It,

ii, ii,
ii,

Insurance,
458 et teq; iii, 74; iv, 441.
on lives,
459.
marine,
460.
460.
wagering policies,
interest or no interest,
460.
of lender on bottomry and respondentia,

135.

i,

i,

ii,

449.

485, n.
marriages of,
may now sit in parliament,

ii,

i,

i,

i,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

n.

i,

i,

i,

it

binds lands, iii, 420.
from what time
scire facias to revive, iii, 421 and n.
action of debt on, iii, 160.
jurisdiction of equity over, iii, 437.
decree in equity has the force of, iii, 453.
in criminal cases, iv, 375 et teq.
Judge in one's own cause, iii, 289 and n.
Judges, iii, 25, 850; iv, 440.
267.
commissions of,
are counsellors to the king,
229.
69.
depositories of the common law,
killing of, iv, 84.
assaults upon, iv, 125.
threats or reproaches to, iv, 126.
how counsel for prisoners, iv, 355.
are always made sergeants, iii, 26.
in equity, iii, 441, 442, 444.
punishment for misbehavior, iii, 408.
summing up of, iii, 375, n.
Judicial committee of the privy council,
232, n., 280, n; iii, 67, n., 80, n.
its present organization, iii, 69, n.
Judicial decisions, 63, 64.
Judicial power, 267, 269.
Judicial writs, iii, 282.
Judices ordinarii, iii, 815.
Judicium Dei, iv, 341, 342.
605

^.

of, iv,

443, n.
100, n., 154, n.
Irish peerages,
Irons to secure prisoners, iv, 300, 322.
91, n.
Irrepealable laws,
Islands, title to new,
261.
iii,
Issuable terms,
353.
Issue, collateral, iv, 396.
in criminal cases, iv, 899.
joinder of, iii, 815; iv, 340.
tender of, iii, 312, 314.
of fact, when said to be joined, iii, 315.
directed by court of equity, iii, 452.

180 et teq.

i,

ii,

ii,

ii,

i,

435.

disestablishment of state church

tenancy,

dissolution of,
185.
194, n.
good faith required in,
187, 180.
Jointure,
Judgment, title to chattels by,
486.
465.
debt by,
102.
remedy by elegit,
void
jurisdiction wanting, iii, 24, n.
arrest of, iii, 898, 394.
operates as a charge upon lands, iii, 419,.

i,

ii,

ii,

i,

i,

i,

a

169.

information of, iii, 261.
writ of, iii, 183.
407.
Inventions, patents for,
510,
Inventory of deceased's effects,
Investiture,
82, 53, 209, 811.
Involuntary manslaughter, iv, 192.
99, 104.
Ireland,
writ of error from superior courts of, iii,
410, n.
relief from forfeitures of leases in, iii,

409.

Joint

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

308, n.

Interlocutory judgment, iii, 396, 448.
decrees, ih, 101, 452.
Interpleader, iii, 300, n.
by sheriff, iii, 417, n.
in equity, iii, 448.
58.
Interpretation of law,
60, 62.
rules for,
(See "Statutes.")
196, 249.
Interregnum,
Interrogatories, iii, 383, 438, 444.
examination on, iv, 287.
494; iv, 425, 428.
Intestate,
(See "Executors and Administrators.")

Intrusion, iii,

relief from disabilities,
157, n., 875, n.,
iv, 443, n.
John, King, his resignation of the crown to
the pope, iv, 108, 111.
magna charta of,
127; iv, 423, 425.
Joinder of issue, iii, 315.
in demurrer, iii, 115.
Joinder of actions, iii, 295, n.
Joint owner of chattel, crown cannot be, ii,
i,

454 et teq., 463, n.

462.
among the Romans,
513.
on legacy,
488.
in bankruptcy,
distinction between contract for reducing
and contract for increasing, iii, 432.
Interested witness, iii, 870.
808.
Interlineation in deed,
presumption of law as to the making,

ii,

on money,

157, n., 375;

n.

if

ii,

ii,

Interdictum, iii, 42.
144.
Interesse termini,

i,

i,

25, n.

i,

ii,

461.
of lives by annuitants,
Intent in larceny material, iv, 232.
in forgery, iv, 248, n.
in offences against the person, iv, 208, n.
in case of crime by drunken person, iv,

Interest

Jeofails, statutes of, iii, 407; iv, 375, 439.
106.
Jersey, Isle of,
293; iii, 106.
Jetsam,
Jew bill,
375.
Jews, iv, 873.
exclusion of,
875.
appointment of guardian by,
462, n.
legal protection to, 425.
maintenance of their protestant children,
i,

ii,

ii,

461.

Jactitationis matrimonii causa, iii, 93.
Jenks, refusal to grant habeas corpus to, iii,.

i,

23;

i,

390;

ii,

benefice,

i,

to

i,

107.

a

i,

ii,

Inspection, trial by, ili, 331.
312.
Instalment,
Instanter, trial, iv, 396.
Institutes of Justinian,
81.

Institution
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i,

i,

(See

"

ii,

207

Crown.")

lord paramount, ii, 59.
constituent part of parliament,

i, i,

i,

i, i.

i.

i,

i,

i,

i,

i,

i,

i,

i,

i,

151,
261.
can do no wrong,
246; iii, 254; iv, S2.
councils of,
227.
241.
dignity of,
duties of,
226.
241.
sovereignty of,
title of,
190.
270.
ubiquity of,
834, 835.
expenditures of,
the arbiter of commerce,
278.
the fountain of justice,
266.
the fountain of honor,
271.
head of the church,
279.
iii,
254
injuries by or to,
246.
perfection of,
of,
249.
perpetuity
250.
power of,
287.
prerogative of,
compassing or imagining death of, iv, 76.
adhering to enemies of, iv, 82.
contempts against government of, iv, 128.

homicide, in advancement of, iv, 179.
Justice-seat, court of, iii, 72.
606

ii,

ii,

H,

ii,

ii, ii,

ii,

277.

il,

418, 426.
mortuary on death of bishop,
forfeitures of lands to,
267.
no general occupancy against,
259.
words of limitation in grants to, U. 109.
descent of crown to half -blood, ii. 253.
not bound by sale in market overt,
448.

li,

oppression, iv,

no lapse of time bars right to present by

il,

conspiracy, iv, 186.
threatening letters, and perjury, iv, 187.
bribery, embracery and false verdict, iv,
negligence and

i,

24, n.

136.

140.

ii.

iv,

a

Information,

505.

cannot be joint owner with subject,
409.
410.
prerogative copyright,
410.
property in game,
chattel by succession,
482.
may take
ancient jewels of, are heir-looms,
428.
prerogative presentation to
living,

ii,

criminal

ii,

1

i,

134, 185.

against courts of, iv, 124
counterfeiting money of, iv, 84, 98. 100, n.
all lands held of,
51.
18.
right to mines,
403.
royal fish,
titles to chattels by prerogative, ii, 408,

a

8,

i,

ii,

and n.
King, 190.

i,

i,

ii,

204

barratry, maintenance and champerty, iv,

140, 141.

Admin

istrators.")
Kindred, degrees of, how computed,

teq.
neglect or refusal of, iii, 109.
offences against, iv, 128.
obstructing process, iv, 129.
escapes, prison breaches and rescues, iv,
129.
returning from transportation, iv, 132.
receiving stolen goods, &c., iv, 182.
theft-bote, iv, 183.

official

205.

" Descent," " Executors and

(See

n.
Justice, origin of,
141.
right to,
266.
king, the fountain of,
et teq.
remedy by party's own act, iii,
remedy by means of the courts, iii, 22 et

compounding

")

Kin,

impartial administration of the law pro
moted by, iii, 879.
defects of trial by, iii, 881.
must formerly be hundredors, iii, 858.
may retire to consider verdict, iii, 875.
special, iii, 857.
common, iii, 858.
trial by, in criminal cases, iv, 348.
jury process, iv, 850.
award of tales, iv, 854
verdict, iv, 860.
Jury, what persons exempted from serving
on, iii, 363.
unanimity of, iii, 875.
Jury of women, iii, 362; iv, 365.
Jury, grand, iv, 302-306.
indictment by, iv, 303.

212.
Jus ad rem,
Jus divinum of kings,
Jus prsBtorium, iii, 49.

8.

i,

i,

on their own knowledge,

374
may be sworn as witness, iii, 874.
should understand law, i, 8.
Jury, trial by, iii, 349.
its establishment in England, iii, 360.
excellence of trial by. iii, 354
the glory of the English law, iii, 878.

Keeper, lord, iii, 47.
Kidnapping, iv, 219.
Killing, what amounts to murder, iv, 1M.
what to manslaughter, iv, 190.
" Homicide.
(See

i,

iii,

358, 862, 363; iv, 352.
861 and n.
or, iii, 863.

iii,

ii,

851.

352.

i,

n.

Jurors, fining or imprisoning, iv, 861.
list of, in sheriff's office, iii, 854, n; iv,

ii,

want of, renders judgments void, iii, 24,

challenge of, iii,
qualification of,
trial of challenge
verdict formerly

Justices of the peace,
849.
appointment of,
850.
number and qualification,
power and duty of,
353.
should understand law,
Justicies, writ of, iii, 36.
Justifiable homicide, iv, 178.
Justification, plea of, iii, 806.
in slander, iii, 125.
of bail, iii, 291.
Justinian, pandects of,
81.
i,

Judicium ferri, imn et ignis, It, 344.
Jure, king de, i, 204; iv, 77.
Jure divino right of kings, i, 191.
Juris utrum, writ of, iii, 252.
Jurisdiction, plea to, iii, 301; iv, 333.
of courts of equity, iii, 426.
encroachment of, 'iii, 111.

a
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i,

i,

i,

ii,

ii,

is

ii,

ii,

ii,

i,

ii,

i,

i,

t,

5.

27.

421. 422.

common,
63-67.
courts of, their profits,
289.
divine or revealed,
42.
written,
185.
interpretation of,
59-62, 87-9L
unwritten,
63-67; iv, 408.
martial,
418; iv, 436.
607
i,

i,

79, n.

i,

1,

Lancaster, county palatine of,
117, 119.
court of duchy and county of, iii, 78, 429.
practice of court of common pleas of, Iii,

i,

i,

396.

science,

French, iii, 317; iv, 416, 428.
Greek, iii, 821.
history of, iv, 407 et teq.
14, 19, 79. 80, 83.
civil,
canon, authority of,
14, 19, 79, 88; iv,

ii,

i,

ii,

Land, what is.
16.
license to occupy,

279, n.

i,

Laity,

i,

i,

i,

i,

ii,

Labor, the origin of property,
punishment by, iv, 870, 371, 877.
Laborers,
407, 426.
Laches of infants,
465.
not imputable to the crown,
247.
Lsssa) majestatis crimen, iv, 75, 79.
Lsssione fldei, suit pro, iii, 52.

a

i,

i,

ii,

ii,

i,

ii,

62.

1.

a

ii,

i, i,

i,

i,

i, i,

service,

from wrecks, ib.
of reclaimed animals, ii, 289; iv, 235.
of fish, hawks and swans, iv, 286.
of domestic animals,
289; iv, 285.
where owner
not known, iv, 236.
punishment of, iv, 287.
aggravating circumstances in, iv, 289.
from specified buildings, &c, iv, 241, 242.
from the person, iv, 242.
by robbery, iv, 243.
sale of stolen goods,
450.
receiving stolen goods, iv, 183.
taking reward to help to stolen goods, ib.
Latitat, iii, 285.
Law, study of the,
care and circumspection of the, iii, 422.
signification of,
88.
is

42, n.

from what courts
court of appeal, iii,
43 and n.
writ of error from, to excheqner chamber,
iii, 48 and n.
process in, by original, iii, 284.
by bill of Middlesex, iii, 285.
by latitat, iii,;285.
justices of, killing. iv, 84.
"ns" counsel, iii, 27.
King's
850.
King's silver,
Knight, tenure of lands by,
62.
bachelor,
404.
banneret,
403.
of the bath,
408.
of the garter, 410.
to be returned on a lord's jury, iii, 859.
of the shire,
176.
404;
G9; iv, 487.
Knighthood,
404, ii, 62.
Knight's fee,

a

;

i,

,

when preferred to other creditors, iii, 420
and n.
judgment of, affects all lands of his offi
cers, iii, 420.
neither pays nor receives costs, iii, 400.
exceptions, iii, 400, n.
jurisdiction of exchequer in matters con
cerning, iii, 420.
palaces of, contempts against, iv, 124
persoD of, contempts against, iv, 123.
prerogative of contempts against, iv, 122.
felonies against, iv, 98.
counterfeiting seals of, iv, 83, 89, 92, n.
levying war against, iv, 123.
refusing to advise or assist, iv, 122.
iii, 254.
can do no wrong,
243-246
personal irresponsibility of, iii, 254.
King's bench, court of, iii, 40; iv,265.
not fixed to certain place, iii, 41.
jurisdiction of, iii, 41.
fiction of defendant being in custody, iii,

Knight

209.
possession of, sufficient to maintain tres
pass against strangers, iii, 210, n.
plea in abatement not admitted in suit for,
iii, 802.
judgment
charge upon, iii, 419.
from what time judgment binds, iii, 420.
Landlord, when may break open doors, iii,
11.
144, n
liability for nuisance,
may be made defendant in ejectment, iii,
204.
wno considered such, iii, 204, n.
in arsummary remedy by, when rent
rear, iii, 206, n.
priority of, before execution creditor, iii,
417.
tenant estopped from disputing title,
144, n.
(See "Tenure.")
309-314; iv, 423.
Land tax,
Lapse of devise and bequest,
512.
of right to present to church,
276; iv,
107.
Larceny, iv, 229-243.
must be taking, iv, 230, 231.
by servants, clerks, agents, officers, Ac.,
iv, 231,285.
by lodgers, iv, 281 and n.
by party stealing his own goods, iv, 281.
the asportation, iv, 281.
the felonious intent, iv, 232.
of letters, iv, 235.
a

295.

ii, ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

iii,

Land, left by sea or river,
261.
287.
history of right to alien,
re-entry on, iii, 4.
limitation of actions to recover, iii, 178, n.
in eye of the law
always enclosed, iii,
is

H, 308. 346.

restrictions on alienations by,
846, n.
mistake or deceit,
348.
cannot grant monopolies except for in
ventions,
407.
revenue extraordinary of, 306.
281.
ordinary revenue,
219, 225.
royal family of,
seals of,
346; iii, 47.
suits formerly discontinued by demise of,

is

King, grants by,
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ii,

I,

of

i,

58,

i,

i,

i,

i,

ii,

i,

i,

i,

a

8,
a.

ii,

:

i,

ii,

i,

i,

ment,

of psrli*

140.

i,

i,

ii,

,

i,

Levying war against the king, iv, 81.
Lewdness, iv, 64.
Lex mercatoria,
76.
Lex talionis, iv, 12.
Libel, remedies for, iii, 126.
truth as a defence, iii, 126, n.
apology in mitigation of damages, ib.
what kind indictable, and how, iv, 150.
iv, 69.
blasphemous,
on sung and government, iv, 123.
on judges, &c. iv, 160.
how far things imputed must be criming
iv, 150.
malice in, ib.
what publication necessary, ib.
modes of prosecution, iv, 161.
trial of, ib.
in newspaper, proof of, iv, 160.
judgment and punishment, iv, 151.
in ecclesiastical courts, iii, 100.
Liberam legem, losing, iii, 840, 404; iv, 348.
Liberties or franchises,
167.
127-129.
English charters of,
126, 261.
Liberty, civil,
natural,
125.
184.
personal,
125, 861.
political,
of the press, iv, 151.
personal, injuries to, and criminal
iii, 127; iv, 81.
297, n.
License to erect buildings,
of mortmain,
269.
of alienation,
78.
to administer oaths, iii, 59.
489.
marriage,
wine,
289.
from the pope, iv, 115.
implied, to enter on lands, iii, 818.
Licensing of books iv, 152, 439.
Licentia loquendl, iii, 299.
6,

i

ii,

ii,
ii,

ii,

ii,

i,

1,

239.

Levari facias, iii, 417.
Levitical degrees,
485.
Levying money without

6,

;

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,
ii,

ii,

ii,

payable in future, ib.
interest upon, ib.
67;
Legal memory,
81.
Legal proceedings, wherein their uncertain
ty consists, and to what owing, iii, 825.
277 and n.
Legal tender,
60S

248, n.

Letter missive, iii, 446.
for electing bishop,
879.
Letters, stealing of, iv, 285.
sending threatening, iv, 144.
322, n.
opening in the post-office,
copyright in,
407, n.
Letters of marque,
258, 259, n.
Letters patent, ii, 346.
scire facias, for repeal of, iii, 260, -31.
for inventions,
407.
Levant and couchant, meanii - of, iii,

ii, ii,

i,

ii,

814.
tenant cannot deny landlord's title,
144, n.
293.
to an alien,
defeasance of,
327.
distinction between assignments and un
327, n.
derleases,
relief from forfeiture, iii, 435.
839.
and release,
entry and ouster, iii, 204.
407,. n.
Lectures, copyright in,
Leet, iv, 278, 411, 424.
512; iii, 98.
Legacies,
suits for in ecclesiastical courts, iii, 98.
in chancery, iii, 98, n.
lapsed,
513.
when vested,
613, n.

91, n.

1,

i,

i,

ii,

ii,

319.

non-resiilence of incumbent,
322.
college leases, ib.
corn rents, ib.
must be perfected by lessee's entry,

sequent,

how far controllable,
161.
Legislature.
(See "Legislative Power," "Parliament")
446.
Legitimacy,
English and Scotch laws respecting,

i, i,

177.
24, n.
calling to the bar,
Lay corporations, 470.
of
378.
investiture
bishops,
Lazarets, escaping from, iv, 162.
Lead, stealing of, iv, 233.
receiving stolen, iv, 132. 188.
Leading interrogatories, iii, 449.
141.
Leap year,
Lease,
817 et »eq., 144, n., 150, n. iii, 41.
when by parol and when by deed,
299.
318 el teq., 290 et seq.,
who may make,

Legatine constitutions,
82.
Legislative power,
51, 53, 147.
cannot be delegated, 52, n.
how restrained in America,
58, n.,
n., 89, n.
one legislature cannot limit power
nib-

i,

i,

i,

i,

i,

i,

i,

;

U,

ii,

Law, merchant, 1, 75, 273.
mora] obligation of, i, 48, n., 67, 68.
municipal, i, 44.
of God, i, 41.
offences against, iv, 48.
of nations, i, 48, 44, n.
offences against, iv, 66.
of nature, i, 89.
parts of a law, i, 54, 58.
promulgation of, i, 6, n., 45.
statute, i, 85.
study of, i, 1-37.
amendment
of, statute for, iv, 44L
feudal, iv, 418.
Latin, iii, 819; iv, 428.
causes of delays of, iii, 428.
of property, necessarily arbitrary,
18.
18.
consistency of, with natural justice,
wager of, iii, 841 iv, 414, 424
Law of the land, 135, n.
23, 25, n., 80, n.
Law schools,
Law side of the chancery court, iii, 47.
of the exchequer, iii, 45.
64.
Laws of Alfred,
66.
of Edward the Confessor,
Law suits, cause of multitude of, iii, 328.
chiefly arise from disputed facts, iii, 829.
11, 25.
Lawyers, noble,
attempts to exclude from parliament,

i,
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il,

i,

ii,

ii,

ii,

i,

i,

ii, i, i,

(See

"Idiot")

conveyance by, ii, 291.
plea of non-competency, ib.
fine by,
855. n.
will of,
497.
489.
marriage of,
when chargeable for crimes, iv, 24, 195.
Luxury, laws against, iv, 170.
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i,

i,

i,

;

i.

i,

i,

i,

i.

ii,

i,

ii,

i,

ii,

i,

ii, ii,

ii,

ii,

i,

ii,

ii,

ii,

(See "Descent.")
203.
consanguinity,
301.
warranty,
Linen, stealing, iv, 238.
Lip, cutting off, iv, 207.
405.
Literary property,
Littleton,
72, 73.
church,
iii,
243,
246.
Litigious
Liturgy, reviling, iv, 50.
311.
Livery of seisin,
abolished, ii, 314, n.
of ward,
68.
in deed,
315.
316.
in law,
140; iv, 436.
Loan, compulsive,
454 et teq.
interest upon,
(See "Interest.")
99; iii, 294.
Local actions,
Local government in England, iv. app., 456.
in British Colonies, ib, 462.
in United States, ib, 468.
Locality, of, trial, iii, 884; iv, 304.
(See "Venue.")
Locks on rivers, destroying, iv, 144.
Lodgers, larceny by, iv, 231.
distress of goods of, iii,

i, i,

of lands.

Machinery, destroying or injuring, iv, 247.
and n.
exportation of, iv, 160, and n.
Madder roots, stealing of, iv, 283.
146.
Magistrates,
supreme and subordinate,
338.
oppression by, iv, 141.
Magna assisa elegenda, writ de, iii, 851.
127; iv, 423,425.
Magna charta,
contents of, iv, 423, 424.
Mail, stealing from, iv, 235, n.
322, n.
opening letters in,
Mainour, iii, 71 iv, 807.
Mainpernors, iii, 128.
Mainprize, writ of, iii, 128.
Maintenance of bastards,
458.
of children,
447.
of parents,
454.
428; iv, 184.
of suits,
442.
of wife,
law of, in America,
290, n.
Making law, iii, 343.
Mal-administration of government, iv, 191
Mala in se and mala probibita,
54, 57, 58
58, n.
distinction reprobated,
Male line preferred to female in descent to
crown,
194.
preferred to female in descent,
212.
Malice, express, iv, 199.
implied, iv, 200.
609
i,

i,

ii,

ii,

ii,

i,

(See "Estate.")
statutes of.do not run against the state,
247.
adverse possession by tenant in common,
ii, 194, n.
acknowledgment of debt, iii, 806, n.
not stopped by subsequent disability, iii,
806, n.
entry of writs to save statute of, iii, 807,
n.
in equity, iii, 439.
of indictments, iv, 306, 308, 815, 351, 486.
506.
Limited administration,
fee,
109.
891.
property,
Lineal descent of the crown,
194.

i,

;

178, 188, 192, 196, 250, 806.

ii, ii,

ii,

i,

i,

a

ii,

i,

i,

("See Estates.")
293; hi, 106.
Ligen,
866.
Ligeance,
14, 266, n.,
Light, prescriptive right to,
895, n., 402; iii, 217, n.
obstruction of, nuisance, iii, 216.
264.
Light-houses,
Limbs,
130; iii, 121, 833.
(See "Mayhem.")
194, n., 266,
Limitation of actions, &c.,

iii,

succession,
432.
customs of, how tried, iii, 883.
whether defendant be citizen, how tried,
iii, 884.
Lord, feudal,
53.
Lords, house of,
155, 168.
its peculiar laws,
167.
iii,
of,
56, n.
quorum
155,
156.
spiritual,
157-159.
temporal,
act,
488,
Lords'
n.
Lords committees for courts, ill, 67.
Lords justices, iii, 55, n.
Lords triers, iv, 259, 260, 440.
Lotteries, iv. 168.
Lunacy, jurisdiction over, iii, 427.
appeal in matters of, ib.
Lunatic, iv, 24, 895.
a

i,

461.
401, n.
peerage,
crimes against, iv, 177.
estates for.

n.

ii,

ii,

11, 177,

annuities,

ii,

ii,

121.

177, n.
presumption of death,
compelling production of cestui que vie,

Logic, its effects upon law and theology,
83;
58. iv, 417.
Lollardy, iv, 47.
London, franchises of, not forfeitable, iii,
264; iv, 424.
courts of, iii, 81.
75, 76.
customs of,
custom of, on intestacy,
618.
market overt in,
449.
trading by feme covert in,
477.
chamberlain of, may take bonds, &c, by
i,

ii,

i,

i,

ii,

ii,

Liege, 1, 867.
449, n.
Lien of vendor of goods,
453, n.
of bailee,
Lieutenant, lord of Ireland,
412; iv, 272.
Life,
129.
action for deprivation of, iii, 119.
distinction between natural and civil,
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i,

i,

i,

i,

i.

i,

i,

ii,

ii,

i,

i,

i,

i,

817.

(See

"Divorce.")

i,

l»,

i,

180; iii, 121, 833.
appeal of, iv, 314.
inspection of, iii, 332.
offence of, iv, 205.
elements of the offence, iv, 207, 203.
Mayors among the Saxons, iv, 413.
Measures and weights,
274-277; iv, 875,
424- false iv 159.
Medietate, jury 'de, iii, 246, 360; iv, 128
166, 278, 352.
Meeting for military training forbidden,
143.
Members of Congress privileged from u
rest, iii, 289, n.
Members of parliament,
153.
elections of,
170-180.
number of,
159.
175.
Qualifications of,
should study the law,
10.
164-170.
privileges of,
Memorial of annuity,
461.
67;
81.
Memory, time of legal,
iii,
Menaces,
120.
servants,
Menial
425.
65; iv, 412.
Mercen-lage,
Merchants, custom of,
75.
9,

i,

i,

218.

610

U,

ii,

iii,

i,

114.

l

i,

new court for, iii. 67 n.
Matrons, jury of, iii, 862; iv. 895.
Maxims of law,
68.
Mayhem, what is, and how remedied,

i,

i,

i,

93.

embezzlement by servant, iv, 28L
Master in chancery, iii, 443, 453.
Master of the rolls, iii, 56. 442, 451.
Matrimonial causes, iii, 92.

i,

ii,

ii,

Mark, signature by,
80S.
Market,
38.
how established,
274.
overt, sale in, ii, 449.
another,
nuisance,
holding near
towns,

iii,

conditions in restraint of, ii, 154, 155,n.
forcible, iv, 208.
in chivalry, iv, 418, 420, 421.
licenses and registers, forging or destroy
ing, iv, 163,249.
Married Women.
" Husband and
(See
WifO
Marshal of the king's bench, iii, 43, 285.
of the king's host, iii, 334.
Marshalsea, court of, iii, 76; iv, 276.
Martial courts,
413, n; iv, 436.
413, n., 415.
Martial law,
Mass books, iv, 115.
Master and servant,
423.
429.
liability of master,
action for inveigling servant, iii, 141.
action for battery of servant, ib.
stinting servant in food, offence of, iv,

i,

419.

settlement,
864.
suit on contract of,

i,

state,

1,

ii,

1,

i,

11,

i,

ii,

Manufactories, rioters destroying engines
in, iv, 148.
Injuries to, iv, 247.
stealing from, iv, 240.
Manumission of villeins,
94, 847.
Marchers, lords,
898.
Marechal, lord, hi, 88, 68.
Marine felonies, how triable, iv, 269 and n.
Marine insurance,
460.
Marines,
416.
420.
impressment of,
Mariners, wandering, iv, 165.
70, 80.
Maritagium,
Maritime causes, iii, 106.
courts, iii, 69.

897.

433.
Marriage,
injuries to rights of, iii, 92.
" Husband and
(See
Wife.")
statute regulating,
435, 437, n., 438, n.
civil contract, iv, 433, 439.
clandestine,
439; iv, 162.
disabilities of,
434, 435.
225, 226.
royal,
when good,
436, 439, 440.
of ward,
70, 88.

i,

11,

ii,

ii,

11,

ii,

ii,

ii,

cer, iii, 264.
to elect corporate officers, iii, 265.
is now in the nature of an action, iii, 264.
Mandates, royal, to the Judges, i, 142; iv,
426.
Manhood, ceremony of,
54.
20, 90.
Manors,
lands,
90.
demesne
within manors or houses,
91.
court-baron or customary courts,
90.
of,
ib.
extinguishment
created,
now
be
cannot
91.
90; iv, 224.
Mansion-house,
Manslaughter, iv, 191.
punishment of. iv, 192.
conviction of, iv, 219.
iv, 219.
Man-steaHng,
Manufacturers, seducing them abroad, tv,
160.
embezzlement
by, iv, 231, 800.
encouragement of, iv, 428.

Marquesses,

i,

57, n.

Man, Isle of, i, 406.
Mandamus, writ of, iii, 110; iv, 441.
return to, iii, 110.
demurrer to return, ib.
writ of error in case of, ib.
remedy for refusal to admit corporate offi

Market, clerk of, his court, Iv, 875.
Marque and reprisal, letters of, 258, 359,b.

i,

Malice prepense, iv, 198, 206.
in libels, ill. 123, n. ; iv, ISO.
in false prosecutions, iii, 126, n.
in murders, iv, 198.
in arson, iv, 222 and n.
under black act, iv, 246.
intent to injure inferred from wrongful
act, iv, 222.
Malicious prosecution, action for, iii. 126.
destruction of powdike in fens in Norfolk
and Ely, iv, 245.
of sea and river, &c., banks, bridges, turn
pikes, &c, iv, 144, 145.
of corn, barns, stacks, <fcc, iv, 245-247.
of horses, cattle, <Ssc.,iv, 246.
ships, &c, iv, 245.
of other property, iv, 247.
Malt tax, i, 314.
Malum prohibitum and malum in se, i, 54,

a
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68.

5, ")

i,

ii,

ii,

ii, ii,

ii,

i,

ii, ii,

li,

"King.")

i,

192.
not elective, but hereditary,
Monasteries, effect of dissolution of, upon
tithes, ii, 32.
876.
Money,
bills,
170, 184,

ii,

ii,

i,

ii,

ii,

1

i,

ii, ii,

246, n.

i,

i,

nor of king,
246.
Mount, or bank,
328.
Mountebanks, iv, 167.
Movables,
384.
(See "Personalty.")
Mulier puisne,
248.
Multiplicity of laws, iii, 325.
Municipal corporation,
475.
" Corporation.")
(See
44; iii,
Municipal law,
Murder, defined, iv, 194.
by perjury, lv, 188, 196.
person killed must be reasonable being
iv, 197.
malice aforethought, iv, 198.
of, iv, 201.
omicide, when pardonable, iv, 194, 400.
Sunishment
Murdrum, iii, 321; iv, 195.
Music, copyright in,
407, n.
Muta canum,
427.
Mute, standing, iv, 324 and n.
iv, 126.
advising
Mutilation,
130; iii, 121; iv, 207.
punishment by, iv, 877.
152, 415, 416.
Mutiny act,
Mutual debts, iii, 305.
1.

i,

ii,

ii,

by

8,

i.

119-126.

Mistake, iv, 27.
remedies at law and in equity, iii, 481.
Misuser in office, ii, 153.
485, n.
of franchise,
Mitigation of damages in slander, ill, 185, n.
325.
Mitter le droit,
824.
Mltter 1'estate,
Mittimus, iv, 300.
Mixed actions, iii, 118.
Modus,
29. (See " Tithes.
n, 181.
Molliter manus imposuit, iii,
49.
Monarchy,

108, 424, 426, 441.

personal annuities of inheritance,
41.
devises in,
375.
license of,
268, 272.
Mortuaries,
425.
Mother church,
112.
Motion in court, iii, 304.
Motives of legislators not inquirable into,

i,

1,

i,

ii,

ii,

ii,

i,

"Infant")

248.
none in the king,
Misadventure, homicide by, iv, 189.
Mischief, malicious, iv, 244 et $eq.
Misdemeanor, iv, 1-5.
forcible, self-defence against, iii,
n.
Mise, iii, 805.
Misfortune, unlawful act by, iv, 26.
Misnomer, consequence of, ill, 802; iv, 884.
verdict, iii, 894.
Mispleading, when cured
Misprision against king and government, iv,

482.

parol evidence to show deed to be,
158 n.
Mortmain, statutes of,
479;
268; iv,

Namlum vestitum, iii, 148.
National debt,
828-831.
611
i,

64.

Mines,
295.
84.
right to dig turf, gravel, &c.,
18.
included in land,
firing, iv, 246.
18.
royal mines,
destroying works of, 247.
stealing ore out of, iv, 284.
Ministers, responsibility of,
250.
" Cabinet.")
Ministry.
(See
of,
464.
Minority, incidents

i, i,

ii,

ii,

ii,

i.

(See "Tenure.")
Militia, 410, 412.
Milk, may be sold on Sunday, iv,
Mill, customary dues to, iii, 235.

(See

ii,

ii,

i,

i,

409.
418.
54, 57, 61.
287;

(See

i,

ii,

i,

i,

service,

i,

testaments,

i.

history of,

,
1.

ii,

i,

408.

i,

state,

ii,

iii,

ii,

88;

436.

Monster oannot inherit,
246.
Monstrans de droit, iii, 256.
Monuments are heir looms,
428.
Month, lunar and calendar,
141.
Moral consideration,
445, n.
Mort d'ancestor, assize of, iii, 185.
for rent, iii, 281.
157 et *eq.
Mortgage,
distinguished from pawn,
452.
160.
tacking,
who primarily liable upon, ib.
power of sale in, ib.
equitable mortgage by deposit of title
deeds, ib.
150, n.
tenancy under mortgagee,
effect of bankruptcy of mortgagor,
487.
jurisdiction of equity over, iii, 435, 439.
provision for reduction of interest, iii,

i, it,

courts,

417; iii, 103.
law,
commissions,
413, n.
415; iv, 101.
offences,
262.
power of the crown,

Money, payment of, into court, iii, 804,
paid for another, iii, 162.
received to another's use, ib.
counterfeiting, iv, 84, 88.
interest upon,
454 el seg.
'•
(See
Inleiest.")
legal tender,
277 and n.
Monks
182.
Monopolies, statute against,
407; iv, 159,

i,

Military

i,

7.

i, i, ii,

ii,

i,

ii,

li,

Merchants, foreign, i, 260; It, 424.
Mercheta,
83.
177.
Merger, doctrine of,
19.
Merton, parliament of,
Mesne profits, action for, iii, 205, 279, 419.
Mesne, writ of, iii, 234.
59.
Mesne lords,
Messuage, what, ii. 19, a>
Metal stealing, iv, 233.
Metaphysics, their effects upon law and
58; iv, 417.
theology,
147.
Michel-gemote,
147.
Michel-synoth,
Middlesex, county court of, ill, 82.
bill of, iii. 285.
Migration, ii,
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i,

897.

created,

i.

1,
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fine,

ii,

of

a

ii,

ii,

i.

1,

Northern borders, rapine on. iv, 244.
Norman conquest,
99; ii, 60; iv, 414. 41i
107.
Normandy, grand coustumicr of,
Norman French, use of, in legal proceed
ings, iii. 817.
Nose, cutting or slitting, iv, 207, 877.
Not guilty, plea of. iv, 838. 450.
effect of plea in actions of trespass, iii. 80V
in actions on the case, iii, 305.
Note of hand,
467.
small notes prohibited,
468, n.
of banking companies, ib.
351.

5,

ii,

a

i.

i,

ii,

ii,

i,

ii,

,

Notice to quit, ii, 146, n. 147, n.
to terminate estate at will, ii. 146, a.
of dishonor,
470.
of trial, iii. 857.
in ejectment, iii, 203. 463.
Novel disseisin, assize of, iii, 186.
Novels In the civil law,
81.
Nudum pactum
296, 445.
disseisin,
of,
iii,
Nul
80S.
plea
Nul tiel record, iii, 831.
Nul tort, iii, 805.
421;
Nuncupative will,
500, 514
Nuper obilt, writ of. iii, 186.
Nurture, guardian for,
461.
Nuisance, definition of. iii, 216.
cases of, iii, 216 et teq.
indictment for, Iii, 219.
when action lies fur, ib.
fresh, iii, 220.
every continuance
assize of, iii, 221, 413.
liability of landlord for,
144, n.
abatement of, iii,
220 and n.
when notice to remove must be given, iii.
5,

i,

ii,

ii,

if,

1,

i, ii,

ii,

ii,

i,

i,

homicide by, iv, 178.
ways by, ii, 85, n.
478.
Negative in corporations,
of the king,
154, 184, n.
Negligence, iii, 163.
liability of advocate for, iii, 165 and n.
of bailee,
451. n.
of officers, iv, 140.
Negligent escape, iii, 415; iv, 130.
442, n.
Negotiable paper,
(See "Bills of Exchange and Promissory
Notes.")
127, 425;
402.
Negro,
425; iv.
slavery abolished,
Neife,
94.
Nembda, iii. 850.
New assignment, iii, 811.
New promise to revive debt, iii, 806, n.
New trial, when granted, iii, 887, 891.
origin of practice of granting, iii, 388.
promotes the ends of justice, iii, 391.
granting upon terms, iii, 898.
motion for, when to be made, lb.
in criminal cases, iv, 361, 438.
New style, ii, 140.
News, spreading of false, iv, 149.
Newspaper, libel by, iii, 125, n.
224.
Next of kin.
504.
right of, to administer,
distribution amonir, ii. 515.
305.
guardian for lunatic, &c.,
Nient culpable, plea of, iv, 339.
Night, in burglary what is, iv, 224.
Night-walkers, iv. 292.
Nihil, return of. iii, 282.
Nihil debet, plea of. iii. 395.
Nihil dicet, judgment by, iii, 369.
Nisi prius, courts of, iii, 58.
commission of, iii, 60; iv, 269.
opening of commission, ib.
clause of, in venire facias, iii. 352.
trial at, iv, 851.
writ of, not grnntable when the king
party, iii. 352, n.
Nobility,
157. 1196.

hoT

"Lunacy.")

Non-conformity, iv, 51. 432.
Non culpabilis, iii, 3U5; iv, 339.
Non est factum, plea of, iii, 805.
Non est inventus, return of, iii, 333.
Non-juror, iv, 124.
Non prosequitur, iii, 296.
Non obstante,
342; ii, 273; iv, 401.
Non obstante veredicto, judgment, iii, 891.
n., 897, n.
Non residence of clergy,
391.
Nonsuit, iii, 296, 316, 857, 876.
Non sum informatus, judgment by, iii,
i,

i,

i,

i,

i,

31.

ii,

8,

ii,

i,

895.

i,

3,

i,

i, 123.

persons,

born subjects, 1, 866, 370.
Naturalization, i, 874; ii, 249.
Nature, state of, as to property,
n.
guardian by,
461.
law of,
36. 39, 125,
crime against, iv, 215.
Navigable rivers. (See "Rivers.")
418; iv, 439.
Navigation acts,
420
Navy, articles of,
Neadmittas, writ of, iii, 248.
Ne exeat regno,
187, 266; iv, 122.
Ne injuste vexes, writ of, iii, 234.
Necessaries,
449, 466, n.
liability for,
excuses crime, iv. 27,
Necessity, when

402.
Nobility, how lost.
271.
king the fountain of,
incidents of,
401.
11, 12, 25.
study of law by,
Nocturnal crimes, preventing or resisting,
iv, 180.
Non assumpsit, plea of, iii, 305.
infra sex annos, iii, 808.
Non claim after a fine, iii, 854.
of infant.-*,
465.
Non compos mentis,
804;
497; iv,

i,

Nations, law of, i, 43. 44. 68-71.
offences against laws of, iv, 66-71.
violation of safe conducts, &C. , iv, 68,
offences against ambassadors,
iv, 70
piracy, iv, 71.
Natural liberty, i, 125.
life, i, 132.

i,
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n.
to private ways, HI, 241.
to highways, bridges, rivers, Ac., iv, 167.
by offensive trades, disorderly
Ac, iv, 167.
lotteries, fireworks, eavesdroppers
common scolds, iv, 108.

General Index
i,

i,

i,

ii,

;

ii,

i,

i,

ii,

ii,

i,

ii,

ii,

11,

ii,

i,

i,

,

ii,

i, i,

i,

140.

i,

8,

i,

i,

ii,

i, i,

i,

ii,

ii,

iii,

duties of,
446-452.
powers of,
452-454.
consent of, to marriage of children,
437
n.
defence of children by, iii,
deserting children, iv, 170, u.
of bastard children,
458.
Pares curias,
54.
Pares, trial per, iii, 349.
Pari materia, statutes in,
60, n.
Parish,
112.
clerk,
895.
Parks,
38, 416.
Parliament,
141, 146; iv, 412, 425, 428.
186.
adjourning,
152, 211, 214.
convention,
613
i,

i,

i,

i,

i,

i,

261, 889, 440.

269; iv, 897.
king's prerogative of,
in the United States,
269, n.
Parent and child,
446.
Parents, remedy for abduction of children,

i,

i,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

Parceners,
187.
Parco fracto, writ de, ill, 146.
Pardon, iv, 816, 887, 876 396.
for discovering accomplices or receivers,
iv, 831.
not pleadable to impeachment,
834; iv,

i,

assault on, iv, 155.
constable, assault on, iv, 129.
public, embezzlement by, iv, 230.
refusal to admit, iii, 264.
Offices,
86.
when gran table in reversion,
36.
37, n.
property in,
126, n.
curtesy of,
pay of certain officers not assignable,
86, 141, n.
and pensions, duty on,
827, 328, n.
usurpation of, how remedied, iii, 262.
Old age does not disqualify from making
will,
497.
Oleron, laws of,
419; iv, 423.
160.
Omnipotence of parliament,
crown,
how remedied,
243.
Oppression of
lv,
141.
of magistrates,
of
the
Option
archbishop,
381.
Optional writs, iii, 274.
Orchards, robbery of, iv, 233.
damaging plants, &c, in, iv, 247.
Ordeal, trial by, iv, 342, 414, 425.
Order of sessions, iv, 272.
for money, &c, forgery of, iv, 250.
Orders, holy,
388.
Ore, stealing, iv, 234.
211,
Original contract of king and people,
233.
810.
conveyances,
writ, UL 272, 278.
teste and return of, iii, 274.
process, in king's bench by, iii, 284.
519.
Orphanage,
Ouster, different methods of, iii, 167, 198.
68.
Ouster le main,
Outlawry, proceedings to, iii, 283.
of, iii, 284.
consequences

ii,

i,

;

ii,

i,

200.

of revenue,

Pains and penalties, act to inflict, iv, 259.
act for, forbidden in America, iv, 259, n.
Pais, trial per. iU. 349; iv, 849.
matter in,
294.
Palace, court of, iii, 76.
assault in, iv, 125.
Palatine counties,
116, 119; iii, 79; iv,431.
Pandects of Justinian,
17, 81.
Panel of jurors, iii, 854; iv, 302, 350.
Papal encroachment, iv, 104.
process, obedience to, iv, 115.
466; lv, 441.
Paper credit,
Paper books, iii, 817, 407.
81.
Papirian code,
Papists, disabilities of,
257, 293.
449, 451.
children of.
Papists, laws against, iv, 55, 87, 425.
relief of.
(See "Pope," "Roman Catholics.")
Paramount lord,
59, 91.
Paraphernalia,
435.
Paravail, tenant,
60.
Parcels, construction of particular words,
1.

ii,

ii,

259, n.

Officers, arrest by, iv, 292.
Officers, killing of, in execution of office, iv,

ii,

U,

8,

261.
258.
special,
Odhal right,
45.
Odio et atia, writ de, iii, 128.
Offensive trades, &c., nuisance by, iii, 217.
Office, king the fountain of,
271.
inquest of, iii, 258.
of the six clerks, iii, 443.
"Office found,"
870, n.
249, n., 268, n;

ill,

448.

justices, killing of, iv, 84.
Oyez, iv, 840.
Oysters, stealing of, iv, 236 and n.
893, n.
property in,

ii, i, i.

of new lands left by the sea or river,

Outlawry, reversal of, ib.
now abolished, iii, 280, n.
142; iv, 319.
in criminal cases,
359, 861.
Overseers of the poor,
359.
antiquity of office of,
Overt acts of treason, iv, 79, 86, 357.
449.
market,
pound, iii, 12.
421 iv, 154
Owling,
Oyer, iii, 299.
Oyer and terminer, commission of, lv, 269,

ii,

ii,

258, 400.

8,

ii,

Oath against bribery at elections, i, 180.
of allegiance, i, 367.
of supremacy and abjuration, i, 368, n.
to witness, form of, iii, 365.
of the party, iii, 382, 437.
ex officio, abolished, iii, 100, 447.
to the government, refusal or neglect to
take, iv, 116, 117, 123.
when nature of not understood, trial may
be put off, iv, 214, n.
voluntary and extra-judicial, iv, 187.
Obedience to parents, i, 452.
Obligation of human laws, i. 43, 57, 59.
or bond,
840.
Obstructing process, lv, 120.
Occupancy the origin of property,
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ii,

Parol

296, 442, 447.

;

i,

i,

1,

i,

;

i,

1,

i.

i,

227.

;

ii,

1,

i,

of

i, i,

ii,

1,

175.

i,

i,

ii,

ii,

i,

ii,

i,

ii,

i,

i,

ii,

Payment into court, iii, 804.
511.
of debts of deceased person,
277.
tender of,
place of tender, iii, 803.
257.
Peace and war, right of making,
614

mons,

People, 866.
49, n., 52 n.
sovereignty in,
Per quod, iii, 124.
Per quod consortium amisit, iii. 140.
Peremptory chall nges, iv, 353, 396.
Peremptory mandamus, iii. 111, 265.
246.
Perfection of the king,
Perjury, iv, 187 and n.
in capital cases, iv, 138, 196.
281.
Permissive waste,
394.
Perpetual curate,
Perpetuating testimony, iii, 4-V).
174.
Perpetuities, rule against,
249.
Perpetuity of the king,
Persecution, religious, iv, 46, 428. 432.
Person, larceny from the, iv, 242 and n.
injuries to and offences against, iii, 119:
iv, 177 et teg.
i,

ii,

ii,

ii,

nature of contract with,

452.

1,

i,

ii,

ii,

ii,

3.

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

i,

ii,

i,

400.
peerage,
of precedence, iii, 28.
Patriam, trial per, iii, 849; iv, 84a
Patron,
21.
Patronage, usurpation of, iii, 242.
how remedied, iii, 243.
407.
Patterns copyright in,
Pauper, when excused from paying costs,
111,400.
support of. (See "Poor.")
452.
Pawn of goods,

i,

i,

i,

ii,

ii,

802.

899, n.
Partners, interest of, in personalty,
399.
survivorship between,
accounts of, in equity, iii, 437.
260.
Passports,
violation of, iv, 68.
82, 84, n., 35, n.
Pasturage, right of,
32.
common of,
iii, 237.
Pasture, writ of admeasurement,
282.
waste by plowing up,
346; iii,
Patent, letters,
846.
rolls and writs,
407; iv, 159.
for Inventions, law of,
scire facias to repeal, iii, 260.

Pawnbroker,

359; iv, 853.

how created,
899.
401.
Irish and Scotch,
pedigrees of, iii, 106.
401.
foreign,
168.
protests by,
proxies of, ib.
process against, in equity, iii, 445.
401 iv, 260, 368.
trial by,
54.
of the lords* court,
in equity,
of,
12, a.
answer
157.
spiritual,
of,
156.
house
jurisdiction of, upon appeals and writs
error, iii, 57.
pedigrees to be delivered in, iii, 106.
quorum of, iii, 56, n.
Peine forte et dure, iv, 325 and n.
88; iv, 429.
Penal statutes,
82, n.
construction of,
actions on, iii, 161.
437.
Penalties, title to, by judgment,
relief against, iii, 435.
Penance, commutation of, iv, 105, 217, 278.
for standing mute, iv, 325.
in ecclesiastical courts, iv, 105, 275, 368.
Penitentiary houses, iv, 371.
Pensions, from foreign princes, iv, 123.
ecclesiastical,
281.
176;
40.
from the crown,
826.
duties on,
Pensioners excluded from house of eomi,

S

demurrer by the, iii, 480.
Parricide, iv, 202.
384.
Parsons and vicars,
appointment of, 388.
891.
powers and duties of,
165.
Particular estate,
Particulars of demand, iii, 300, n.
Parties to suits in equity, iii, 442.
185, 189. 194, 300, 323; iii,
Partitions,

of

iii,

227, 228; iii, 56.
great council of,
hereditary councillors of the crown,

i,

iii, 869.
leadings, iii, 292.
emurrer, iii, 300.

401

273. 267.

i

ii,

446 n.
contracts,
evidence,

401.

trial of, ib.
Peers, privileges of,

i,

445.
court of the king in, iv, 259, 263.
disuse of, iv, 437.
Stealing proceedings of, from post, iv,
235, n.
houses of public meeting near, iv, 148.
Parliamentum indoctum, f, 177.
296,
distinguished from writing,

Peeresses,

i,

iii,

Peace, commission of,
351 iv. 270.
349.
conservation of,
349;
282, 428.
iv,
270,
of,
justices
(See "justices of the Petca.")
118, 268, 850.
the king's,
breach of, iv, 142.
security for, iv, 251, 254.
clerk of, iv, 272.
off ences against, iv, 142-150.
Peculatus, iv, 122.
Peculiars, court of, ill, 65.
Peerage, benefit of, in offences, iv, 887.

i,

Parliament, constituent parts of, 1, 154.
dissolving, 1, 188.
estates of, i, 154, n., 150.
intermission of, i, 153.
laws of, i, 160-168.
of France, i, 147.
of Merton, i, 19.
origin of, i, 147-149.
power of, i, 160.
privileges of, i, 164-167.
proroguing, i, 187.
rolls, I, 181.
sessions of, i, 46, 186, 187.
summons of, i, 150.
process against members of, in chancery,

i,
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i,

ii,

i,

i.

ii,

ii,

answer,

iii,

443. 446, 447.

ii,

cross-bill, iii. 448, 451.
amended and supplemental bill, iii, 448.
bills of revivor and interpleader, ib.
bill to perpetuate testimony, iii, 450.
right of parol to demur, ill, 430.
Pleading in equity, bill of review, iii, 453.
Pleas of the crown,
424.
157, 452.
Pledge,
estates in,
157.
Pledges of prosecution, iii, 147, 275.
of appearance, iii, 280.
Plenary, iii, 243.
Plough, beasts of the, when may be dis
trained, iii,
n.
Plou^h-bote,
85.
Pluralities,
892.
Pluries, writ, iii, 283; iv, 819.
habeas corpus, iii, 135.
Poaching in night, iv, 175, n.
Pocket sheriffs,
842.
Poisoning, iv, 196 and n.
administering poison with Intent to mur
der, ib.
615
ii,

ii,

ii,

i,

i,

i,

ii,

i, i,

i,

ii,

ii,

ii,

8

ii,

ii, ii,

ii,

emblements,
403.
title by accession, confusion and intermix
ture,
404.
405, 407.
copyright, designs, &c.,
405, n.
distinctive trade-marks,
for inventions,
patent
407.
title by gift, grant and contract,
440.
409.
title of crown by prerogative,
441.
fraudulent assignments of,
Personating others in courts, &c, iv, 128.
proprietors of stock, iv, 248.
bail, iv, 128.
Persons, natural,
128.
123, 467.
artificial,
122.
righto of,
Peter pence, iv, 107.
Petit sergeanty,
81.
Petition of appeal, 111,454.
iv, 437.
128,
243;
of right,
to what applicable, iii, 255, n., 256, 428.
de droit, iii, 256.
143; iv, 147.
Petitioning, right of,
tumultuous, ib.
Petty bag office, iii, 423.
why so called, iii, 40.
355.
Petty constables,
iury, iii, 851
larceny, iv, 229.
81.
sergeanty,
sessions, iv, 272.
treason, iv, 75, 203, n.
Pews, title to,
420 and n.
Physician, iv, 197.
canuot maintain an action for fees, iii, 28 n.
may make special contract, ib.
liable for negligence or unskilfulness, iii,
122.
should be acquainted with law,
14.
Piepoudre, court of, Hi, 32.
150.
Pignus,
Pillory, iv, 136, n., 877.
iv,
71.
Piracy,
Piscary, common of, ii, 34, 89.
Placemen, excluded from house of com
mons,
175; iv, 440.
Plagiaril, iv, 219.

9,

ii,

ii,

ii,

400.

ii,

ii,

399, n.

title to, by occupancy,
401.
prize, &c.,
403.
goods found,
animals fern naturae, ib.

ii,

ii,

entail of, ib.
899.
title of partners to,
real estate converted into, in equity,

i,

ii,

11,

ii,

ii,

ii,

884.
885.
chattels real and chattels personal,
succession to, regulated by domicil,
387, n.
finder of, entitled to possession except as
896, n.
against owner,
306.
chose in action,
may be settled for life with remainder
over,
898.

ii,

380, 400.

Plaeue, irregularity during, iv, 161.
Plaint, iii. 273.
Plaintiff, iii, 25.
Plantation, burning or destroying, iv, 246.
Plantations, law in the,
107.
Plants, destruction of, iv, 246.
stealing of, iv, 233.
407, n.
Play, right to represent,
Plays and players, license of, iv, 167.
Plea, dilatory, iii. 801.
within what time to be pleaded, iii, 301, n.
must be verified, ill, 802.
conclusion of, ib.
effect of allowing or overruling, iii, 303.
to the action, iii, 808.
in bar, iii, 806.
conditions and qualities of, iii, 307.
special, conclusion of, ib.
in equity, iii, 446.
in abatement, not admitted in suit for
lands, iii. 302.
to indictments, iv, 382.
sanctuary, ib.
benefit of clergy, iv, 332, 364.
to the jurisdiction, iv, 838.
demurrer, ib.
in abatement, iv, 384 and n.
autrefois acquit, iv, 335.
autrefois convict, iv, 886.
autrefois attaint, ib.
pardon, iv, 837.
not guilty, iv, 338 et eeq.
in bar of execution, iv, 896.
of lunacy,
291.
Pleading, times for, iii, 299.
departure in, iii, 309.
formerly vim wee, now in writing, iii, 293.
in criminal cases, iii, 427.
required to be in English, iii, 317.
Pleading in equity, iii, 442 et $eq.
commencement
of suit, bill, iii, 422.
information, iii, 437.
parties to suit, iii, 442.
demurrer, iii, 446.
pleas, ib.

i,

In animals,

Broperty
ttle regarded in former times,

ii,

ii,

ii,

Personal actions, HI, 117.
what die with the person, ill, 802.
liberty, 1, 184.
security, i, 129.
384, 389 et uq.
Personalty,
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Poisoning, of woman quick with child, iv,

i,

ii,

i,

431, 438, 430.

adverse,

366, n.

ii,

ii,

when must be surrendered before adverse
144, n.
claim can be set up,
of land, insufficient to maintain trespass
against stranger, iii, 210, n.
140, n.,
of land under contract of sale,

peer or member of par
liament, ib.
defendant's pleading, ib.

amendments,

iii,

446, 488.

hearing of cause, iii, 488, 450, 451.
examination of witnesses, iii, 449.
publication of evidence, ib.
dismissing bills for want of prosecution,
iii, 451.
subpoena to hear judgment, ib.
decree, interlocutory or final, iii, 451, 453.
decree against infant, iii, 480, n.
costs, iii, 451.
feigned issue, iii, 453.
reference to master,
master's report, ib.
final decree, ib.

iii,

453.

rehearing, ib.
iii, 453, 454
enforcement of decree, iii, 453.
enrolment of decree, ib.
bill of review, iii, 454
new evidence on appeal, iii, 455.
350; iii, 195, 274
Praecipe,
tenant to,
358; iii, 182.
Praemunire, iv. 103, 43a
appeal,

Praetor's edicts,

80.

Prayer in aid, iii, 299.
Preamble of statute,
60, n.
Pre-audieDce, iii, 38.
883.
Prebendary,
Precedence, how settled,
372; iii, 105.
of royal family,
235.
405, n. iii, 27.
table of,
letters patent of, iii, 38.
880, n.
among bishops,
70, n.
Precedents, authority of,
in equity, iii, 433.
Precept of election to parliament,
177.
Pre-contract of marriage,
434
387; iv, 116, 434 489.
Pre-emption,
Pregnancy, plea of, iv, 894
456; iv, 895.
trial of,
Premier sergeant, iii, 37.
Premises in a deed,
298.
Prerogative, different kinds of,
239.
limited,
141.
review of its progress,
836; iv, 431,433.
i,

146, n.

writ of, iii,

iii, 455.
process againBt

203, 413.

ii,

Possessory actions, nature of,

198;

iii,

i,

i,

i,

i,

;

i,

t,

i,

H,

i,
1,

i,

1,

i,

ii,

i,

i,

ii,

ii,

a

ii,

limitation to, iii, 188.
169.
Possibility upon
possibility,
390.
not assignable,
Postea, iii, 886.
Post-fine,
350.
Post, writ of entry in, iii, 182.
Post-disseisin, wnt of, iii, 188.
Postman in exchequer, iii, 38.
323-334.
Post-office duties, &c,
embezzlement by servants in, iv, 331.
misbehaviour of officers of, iv, 334.
333, n.
examining correspondence in,
180;
160.
Posthumous children,
Pound, iii, 18.
breach, what, and remedies for, iii, 146.
376, n.
troy, of gold and silver,
616

i,

I,

179.

i,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

i,

i,

i,

ii,

;

i,

'*)

encroachments of, iv, 104, 419, 424, 435.
Jurisdiction, defending, iv, 87, 115.
reconciliation to, iv, 87.
Popery, iv, 55.
" Roman Catholics.
(See
Popish books, importing or selling, iv, 115.
priests, iv, 57, 87, 115.
recusants, iv, 56, 134.
seminaries, education in,
451 iv, 55, 115.
maintaining, iv, 115.
437; iii, 160.
Popular action,
Portland, Isle of,
105.
Port-reeve, iv, 413
364.
Ports and havens,
injuries to, iv, 144.
Positive proof, iii, 371.
343.
Posse comitatus,
neglecting to join, iv, 133.
337.
Possessio fratris,
163, 388.
Possession,
estate in,
195.
title by,
iii,
177,
ii,
196;
180.
right of,

i,

Pope, his authority how abolished, iv, 104,

sequestration, ib.
taking bill pro confesso, Ib.
process against corporation by distringat,

ii,

iv,

170, n.
overseers of, I, 859-361.

answer, iii, 443, 447.
process of contempt, iii, 443, 444.
iii, 443, 445.
appearance,
commission of rebellion, iii, 444.

ii,

court of, iil, 74
Political liberty, i, 125.
rights, i, 139, 145.
Polling at elections, 1, 178.
Polls, challenge to, iii, 861; iv, 852.
Polygamy, i, 436; iv, 163.
Pone, iii, 34, 87, 195, 280.
Poor, i, 359.
laws, history of, i, 359-862; iv, 432.
settlements, i, 362.
returning to parish, &c., vagrants,

i,

1,

"Insurance.")

(See

316; iv, 437.
Poundage,
Powdike, cutting; iv, 244.
Power of appointment,
will,
379, n.
of the crown,
250.
51.
sovereign, where lodged,
in America,
49, n., 52, n.
102, 108.
Poyning'slaws,
Practice in equity, iii, 442, el teq.
injunction, iii, 442, 443.
filing bill and subpoena, iii, 443.
officers of court, iii, 448.
affidavits, iii, 448.
hi

198.
attempts at, iv, 196, n.
Police, offences against, iv, 163.
Policies of Insurance, iv, 441.

i,
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ii,

i,

ii,

ii,

i,

i,

1,

i,

i,

i,

1,

1,

ii,

i,

ii,

i,

259;

admiralty court no jurisdiction

401.

as to,

iil,

70, n.

Probable cause, iii, 126, n.
494, 507; iii, 98.
Probate,
(See

"Wills.")
i,

court of, iii, 67, n., 95, n.
353; iil, 109.
Procedendo, writ of,
Process, iil, 279, 386.
in equity, iii, 426, 443.
former abolished and new writs substitu
ted,

iii,

287, n.

431.
of estrays,

writ of, iii,

on attachment in chancery, iii, 444.
Proctor, iii, 25.
Procuration money, iv, 157.
805.
Prodigals,
Profanity, iv, 59.
curia,
iii, app.
in
Profert
408.
Profession of arms,
133.
religious,
289.
Profits of courts,
Progress, royal, iv, 411.
617
i,

;

270, 271

I,

298.
234.
in outlawry, iv, 819.
under the riot act, iv, 143.

i,

i,

464
Prochein ami,
Proclamation by the king,

i,

i,

ii,

334.
purse,
847.
seal and signet,
iv,
89.
forging,
Privy verdict, iii, 877; iv, 860.
Prize, of enemy's goods, &c.,
court, iii, 70, n.
commission of, iii, 69.

I,

i,

i,

ii,

i,

1,

Privy
Privy

i,

ii,

i,

i,

i,

i,

i.

i,

ii,

i, ii,
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,

ii,

i,

i,

i,

i,

i,

ii,

ii,

a

fl,

i.

226.

94, 323.
Princess of Wales,
violation of, iv, 81.
Principal and accessory, iv, 34 eteeq.
principals, iv, 34.
accessories, iv, 35.
what offences admit of, ib.
before the fact, iv, 36.
after the fact, iv, 37.
punishment of, iv, 39.
Principal challenge, iii, 363.
Prints, copyright in,
407.

i,

429.

franchises, fisheries, &c,
88 et eeq.
473.
corporation by,
not applicable to highways,
35, n.
Presentation to benefice,
389.
(See "Advowson.")
Presentment of offences, iv, 301.
President of the council,
230.
of corporations,
478.
214, n.
of the United States,
oath of office of,
235, n.
232, n.
cabinet of,
powers and duties of,
233, n.
impeachment of,
246, n.
185, n.
approval of bills by,
Press, liberty of, iv, 151.
iv,
death,
828.
Pressing to
of seamen,
419.
Presumption, iii, 871. ■
of grant,
31, n., 35. n., 266, a.
of corporate grant,
473.
177, n.
of death,
Presumptive evidence of felony, iv, 858.
heir,
208.
Pretended titles, selling or buying, iv, 186.
Pretender and his sons, treasons relating to,
iv, 91.
Prevention of crimes, iv, 251.
homicide in, iv, 180.
Priest,
388.
(See "Roman Catholics.")
Primarte preces,
381.
Primer fine,
350.
66, 87; iv, 418.
Primer seisin,
194;
56; iv, 421.
Primogeniture,
94, 223.
Prince of Wales,
Prince and princesses of the royal blood,

ii,

ii,

pews,

i,

a

ii,

38; iii, 238.

ii,

in respect of common,
to right of way,
86.

for

/

ii,

ii,

11,81.

216.

188.
property, rights to,
persons, arrest by, iv, 293.
35 and n.
ways,
(8ee"Ways.")
259, n.
Privateering,
Privately stealing from the person, Iv, 242.
Privies to fine,
855.
bound by estoppel.
(See "Estoppel.")
272.
Privilege, king, the fountain of,
164-167.
of parliament,
bill of iii, 289.
from arrest, ib.
254.
of ambassadors,
Privileged places, iv, 129.
46.
Privilegia.
Privilegium clericale, iv, 865.
229-232, 280, n.
Privy council,
231, n., 280, n;
Judicial committee of,
iii, 69, n.
iil,
427.
appeal to, in lunacy,
Privy councillor, killing or attempting to
iv,
kill, 232;
100.

ii,

11,

ii,

266, n.

donative advowson by,
23.
discharge from tithes,
28 et uq.
commencement of time of legal memory,

iii,

nuisance,

i,

ii,

li,

ii,

ii,

in gross,

ii,

98-100.

offences against king's council, iv, 100.
other offences against, iv, 101-103.
title to chattels by,
408.
(See "Grown.")
509, Iil, 65, 77, n.
Prerogative court,
28, 263, 264, 266,n.
Prescription, title by,
abandonment of right by,
264, n.
none, of right arising by record,
265.

611.
Priority of debts,
Priors,
155.
814.
Prisage,
Prison of the Fleet, ill, 444.
breach of, iv, 180.
488.
Prisoner, insolvent, relief of,
402; iii, 132, n.
of war,
Prisons, regulation of, iv, 877.
Prit, iv, 839.
86;
344.
Private act of parliament,

ii,

Prerogative, causes of its increase and de
cline, iv, 438.
contempts against, iv, 123.
offences relating to coin and treason, iv,
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Iv,
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Progress of the laws, iv, 407.
Prohibition, writ of, iii, 112.
to what courts may issue, ib.
in what cases, ib.
prooedure upon, iii, 113.
Promise, what it is, iii, 158.
(See "Contract.")
remedy for breach of, ib.
467.
Promissory note,
(See "Bill of Exchange.")
45, 185, n.
Promulgation of laws,
Proof, when positive, required, iii, 870.

In

Public policy, excludes copyright
Im
moral work, iii, 407, n.
Public verdict, iii, 877; iv, 860.
Publication of deposition, iii, 450.
Pueritia, iv, 22.
Puis darrein continuance, plea of, iii. SIS,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

314, n.
pretended,

iv, 149.
109.
governments in America,
probanda, writ de, iii, 148.
of parliament,
187.
268.
by the king,
expenses of, iv, 362.
of offenders, different modes of, iv, 801.
malicious, iii, 126.
Prostitutes, vagrants, iv, 170.
Protection of children,
450.
of ambassadors,
254.
writ of, iii, 289.
Protector or regent,
248.
467, n., 469.
Protest of bill of exchange,
of peers,
168.
Protestant dissenters, '»▼,53.
succession,
216, 217; iv, 90.
treason against, iv, 90.
Protestation, iii, 811.
Province,
111.
Provincial constitutions,
82.
109.
governments in America,
Provisions, papal,
60; iv, 107.
selling unwholesome, iv, 162.
forestalling, &c., iv, 158.
451, n.
warranty; in sale of,
Proviso, trial by, iii, 857.
Provisors, statutes against, iv, 100 et seq.
Proxies in house of lords,
168.
Puberty, age of, iv, 22.
Public act of parliament,
85.
i,

i,

debts,
828-331.
companies,
stock in,
with judgment debt,

618

may be charged
iii, 419, n.

7.

7.

9,

i

%

when lies, iii, 206.
abolished, iii, 207, n.
Quare clausum fregit, iii, 281.
Quare impedit, wnt of, iii, 246-251.
costs in, iii, 249.
execution in, iii, 412.
Quare incumbravit, iii, 248.
Quare non admisit, iii, 250.
Quarreling in church or church yard,

i»,

ii,

ii,

ii,

i,

i,

i,

Quadruplicatio, iii, 810.
Qualification for killing game, iv, 175.
171, 175.
of electors to parliament,
of justices of the peace,
352.
of members of parliament,
175.
of jurors, iii, 362; iv, 852.
109.
Qualified fee,
(See "Estate.")
391.
property,
Quantum meruit, iii, 161.
valebat, ib.
Quarantine, irregularity in, iv, 161.
of widow,
185.
Quare ejecit infra terminum, writ of,
it

199.

146.

414, 415.
Quartering of soldiers,
Quartering traitors, iv, 98, 877.
Quarter sessions, court of, iv, 271.

i,

i,

ii,

i,

i,

i,

i,

i,

i,

ii,

i,

i,

i,

i,

i,

1,

Prophecies,
Proprietary
Proprietate
Prorogation
Prosecution

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

tax,

i,

(See "Personalty.")
injuries to, iii, 144, 167.
cnmes against, iv, 230 et teq.

201, 241, 243. 245.

rule in She! ley's Case, ii, 242 and n.
modes of taking by,
244.
heir taking by,
240, n.
of write, iii, 273, 274.
Purgatio vulgaris, iv, 342.
Purgation, canonical, iii, 342; iv, 368.
oath of, iii, 100, 447.
Purlieu, ii, 419, n.
Purpresture, iv, 167.
Pursuit of remedies, iii, 270.
287; iv, 116, 424, 439.
Purveyance,
Putting in fear, iv, 242.
ii,

ii,

9.

8,

ii,

i,

i,

ii,

l

if,

14
some things still in common,
title by occupancy,
400.
division according to nature of subject and
estate therein,
16, n.
realty and personalty, ii, 16.
28.
right of presentation to church,
in waters,
18.
in things personal,
889 etttg.
in animals,
889, 402.
891, 896.
qualified, limited or special,
in personalty, as to time of enjoyment and
398.
number of owners,

i,

868.

generally,
ecclesiastical courts, iii, 100.
Proper feuds,
58.
123, n.,
Property, rights to, in general,
n., 12, 197.
188;
origin of rights of alienation and descent,

i,

iii,

i,

i,

,

ii,

817.

Puisne barons of exchequer, iii, 44.
judges, iii, 40, 41.
Pulling down churches, houses, «fcc iv, 141
Pulsation, iii, 120.
133; iv,
Punishment, nature of,
18, 236.
capital, iv,
certainty of, iv, 879.
end and purpose of, iv, 11, 252.
mode of Inflicting, iv, 258.
measure of, iv, 12.
power of punishment, iv,
severity of. iii, 404; iv, 16.
(See "Correction.")
Pur auter vie, estate in.
(See "Estate.")
Purchase,
215.
distinguished from escheat and
ii,

520
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to,

iii,

455.

Quarto die post, iii, 278.

General Index
;uashing, iii, 303; iv, 321.

i,

4.

8;

ii,

ii,

i,

ii,

ii,

ii,

i,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

U,

ii,

i,

a

ii,

"Rent.")

ii,

4

ii,

i,

175, n.

i,

i,

a

Reformation of religion, iv, 430.
clerk,
Refusal of
389.
241.
Regalia majora et minora,
Regard, court of, iii, 72.
248 and n.
Regent,
i,

queen,

219.

Registef of seamen,

i,

is

ii,

ii,

ii,

"Property.")

(See

Re-entry on land, iii,
after exchange, on eviction,
823.
Reeve-land,
48, n., 90.
Reference to master, iii, 453.
Reform acts,
157, n., 159, n., 172, n...

i,

i,

i,
;

11,

i,

ii,

ii,

ii,

Rabbits, taking, &c, iv, 235.
Racing, when unlawful, iv, 173.
Rack, iv, 825.
Rack rent,
43.
Rail, stealing of, iv, 233.
destroying and injuring, iv, 247, n.
Railroads,
85, n. iv. 443.
Ransom, illegal,
402; iii, 436; iv, 07, 388.
Rape of women, iv, 210.
evidence in, iv, 213.
assault to commit, iv, 217.
appeal of, iv, 814.
Rape in counties,
117.
Rapina, iv, 248.
Rasure in deed.
308.
Rationabili parte, writ de, iii, 194.
Rationabili parte bonorum, writ de,
492.
Ravishment of children, iii, 141; iv, 212.
of ward, iii, 141.
of wife, iii, 139.
Reading on claim of clergy, iv, 367, 441.
Real actions, iii, 117, 177, 198, 232.
Real property, annuity of inheritance
not,
41, n.
306, n.
what
an interest in land,
is

133.
letters, iv, 234, n.
deed,
297.
Recitals in
341, 465.
Recognizance,
for the peace or good behavior, iv, 252.
to prosecute, iv, 296.
to give evidence, ib.
in value,
Recompense
359.
Reconciliation to the pope, &c, iv, 87.
Record,
69; iii, 24, 817; iv, 426.
tried by nothing but itself, iii, 24.
when may be disputed, iii, 24, n.
for the assizes, iii, 356.
transcript of, to be annexed to writ of
error, iii, 400 n.
alienation by,
344.
debts of,
465.
no prescription of right by,
265.
embezzling, &c, iv, 128.
courts of, iii, 24, 34, 406.
nisi prius, iii, 356.
trial by, iii, 830.
Recordari facias loquelam, iii, 34, 195.
Recoupment, iii, 808, n.
Recoveries,
857 et teq.
common, invention of,
116, 270.
vouchers in,
358-860.
regarded as common assurances,
860.
tenant to the praecipe,
362.
deeds to lead or declare the uses of,
868.
abolished, ii, 364, n.
of copyholds,
871; iii, 166.
Recreant, iii, 840; iv, 348.
Rector of church,
384.
388.
Rectorial tithes,
Recusants, popish, iv, 56, 124
Recusatio judicis, iii, 361.
299.
Reddendum,
Re-disseisin, writ of, iii, 188.
Reditus,
57.

is

ii,

i,

ei

deforciat, writ of, iii, 198.
uod
uod nocumentum amoveatur, iii, 418.;uod permittat, iii, 240.
iii, 221.
;uod permittat prosternere,
uorum,
351.
clause in commissions, ib.
in corporations,
478, n.
of house of peers, iii, 56, n.
Quo warranto, writ of. iii, 262.
information in nature of,
485; iii, 262;
iv, 811, 441.
used in corporation disputes, iii, 263.
within what time to be brought, iii, 264.

(See

Recaption, iii,
iv, 863.
rights of, how exercised, iii,
writ of, iii, 151.
Receipt, forgery of, iv, 250 and n.
Receipt of pari of
debt in satisfaction of
all, 16, 23.
Receiving stolen goods, offence of, iv, 132,

a

ii,

426.

Quick with child, plea of, iv, 395.
Qulnto exactus, iii, 283; iv, 319.
42.
Quit rents,
Quo minus, writ of, iii, 45, n.
in exchequer, iii, 286.

iv,

a

1,

i,

i,

102, n.

Question or torture, iv, 325.
Qui tarn actions, iii, 160; iv, 307
Quia dominus remisit curiam, iii. 195.
91, 102; iv,
Quia emptores, statute of,

265;

122, 160.

i,

i,

i,

273.

ii,

286;

ii,

i,

(See "Estovers.")
Re-assurance,
460.
Rebellion, commission of, iii, 444.
Rebutter, iii, 310.
Recall of subjects from abroad,

ii,

ii,

"Crown," "King.")

consort,
220.
224.
dowager,
husband of, ib.
210.
Queen regnant,
her attorney and solicitor,
219.
her revenue,
219.
regnant's husband,
222.
consort, compassing or imagining her
death. It, 76.
violating, iv, 81.
offences against person of, not treasonable,

iv,

492, 516; iv, 408, 424.

estovers.

i,

(8ee

ii,

Reasonable part,

;uay8, i, 264.
e estate,
264.
219.

Anne's bounty,

521
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ii,

ii,

;

ii,

ii,

i.

i,

i,

it

i,

ii,

i,

ii,

ii,

4.

i,

i,

ii,

i,

a

ii,

a

ii,

ii,

i, i,

i,

ii,

4

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

i,

ii,

ii,

it

i,

i,

55; ill, 23.
86, 88.
Remitter, iii, 189, 190.
is, iii, 19.
what
reason of, iii, 20.
450.
to owner of stolen goods,
Remoteness,
rale against,
174.
iii,
11.
Removal, fraudulent,
864.
of poor,
of
for
lives,
copyholds
Renewals
98.
41, 56, 86, 299.
Rent, origin of,
rent service, rent-charge and rent-seek,
41 et seg.
rent of assize, quit-rents, rack-rents, and
fee farm-rents,
42.
41.
distinguished from annuity,
reservation
of,
297. »
incident to the reversion,
176.

Remedial part of laws,
statute,

251; iv, 436, 440.
right of,
must not exceed bounds of mere defence
and n.
and protection, iii,
Respite of jury, iii, 354.
458, 461.
Respondentia,
Respondeat ouster, judgment of, iii, 30$,
896; iv, 888.
Restitution of temporalities,
380; iv,43L
in blood, <fcc., iv, 402.
iii,
94.
of conjugal rights,
of stolen goods, iv, 862.
188,
iv,
363.
of,
writ
210; iv, 438.
Restoration of 1660,
820; iv, 432.
87:
Restraining statute,
396, n,
conveyance,
Resulting use. on
835; iv, 430.
511; iii, 18.
Retainder of debts,
executor of his own wrong cannot retain,
iii, 19.
of servant, iii, 142.
Retaliation, law of, iv, 12
Resistance,

i,

ii,

ifa, 211.

it

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

204.

may cause tenant for life to be produced,

ii,

ii,

i,

a

ii,

a

ii,

ii,

176.
distinguished from reversions,
cross, implication of,
881.
398.
in personalty,
formedon in, iii, 192.
Remainder-man, defence of freehold by, iii,

i,

i,

8.

ii, ii,

ii,

ii,

156.

none out of personalty, ib.
when and where payable,
43; Hi, 10, n.
apportionment of, fa, 43, n., 134.
43.
extinguishment of,
limitation of right to recover arrears,
266, n.
206, 231 iv, 441.
remedy for, iii,
action of debt for, iii, 231.
to be paid by sheriff, iii, 417.
Repair of way, ii, 36, n.
of leasehold premises, ii, 144, n.
Repleader, when will be awarded, iii. 395
Replevin, iii, 18, 170.
how made, iii, 147.
action of, when may be brought, iii, 141
proceedings in, iii, 149.
execution in. iii, 418.
bond, iii, 147.
Replication, iii, 809.
in equity, iii, 448.
in criminal cases, iv, 339.
Reports of adjudged cases,
71.
by master, iii, 453.
159.
Representation not delegation,
194, 201.
in descent of the crown,
216, 219
in descent of real property,
of facts, distinguished from warranty,
460, n.
in distribution,
517.
Reprieves, iv, 894.
Reprisals on foreigners,
258.
of goods, &c, in,
502.
Republication, of wills,
156.
Repugnant conditions,
134; iii, 128.
Reputation, protection of,
230; iii, 51, 81.
Requests, court of,
Rere fiefs,
57.
Rescous, what and how remedied, iii, 148.
58.
Rescripts of the emperor,
Rescue, when
may be made, iii, 12, 170
iv, 125, 131.
Reservations,
299.
390, 392.
Residence of spiritual persons,
882, 393.
Resignation,
to resign
living,
engagements
leg^ility^of

ii,

i,

i,

ii,

ii,

by extinguishment, lb.
by entry and feoffment, lb.
Reliction,
261, n.
Reliefs,
56, 65, 87; iv, 418, 420.
Religion, offences against, iv, 43 et seq.
Religious impostures, iv, 61, 62.
876, n.
societies in United States,
Rem, information in, iii, 262.
Remainders,
163.
fee,
fee limited in remainder on
165.
alternative contingent, ib.
futuro,
freehold In
ib.
166, 167.
particular estate,
vested or contingent, ii, 168, 169.
upon
169.
possibility
possibility,
conveyance of contingent estates, ii,290,n.
117, 119, 171, 354, n.
destruction of,
trustees to preserve contingent,
171.
172 et uq,
executory devises,
172, n.
rale in Shelley's Case,
174.
rale against perpetuities,
distinguished from conditional limita
tions,

may issue out of tithes,

42, n.

6,

ii,

as

485, 486, n.
of Judgment, iii, 420, 421.
in forfeiture, iv, 381, 886, 387.
Relations, domestic,
422-466.
public,
146.
Relative rights and duties,
123, 146.
Relatives, defence of, iii,
Relator, iii, 264, 427; iv, 808.
Release, by way of enlargement,
324.
lease and, ii. 339.
824.
per mitter l'estate,
825.
per mitter le droit,
signees,

Rent, rent-service
ii,

ii,

Register of mariners, iii, 105.
falsifying, iv, 163.
Registrant omnium brevium, iii, 183.
Registry of conveyances,
843.
Regrating, iv, 160.
iii,
453.
Rehearing in equity,
Rejoinder, iii, 310.
Relation back, of title of bankrupt's

1
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5,

a

ii,

i,

i,

i,

i,

ii,

ii,

ii,

a

i,

i,

i, i,

ii,

i,

«

i, i,

i,

i,

i,

ii,

i,

a

is

2.

i,

i,

i,

ii,

8,

ii,

ii,

ii,

i,

is
a

i,

ii,

i,

i,

ii,

i,

i,

225; iv, 117.
marriages,
223, 290;
403.
forests,
289.
832, 834
income,
248.
Uability,
295.
mines,
246.
perfection,
249.
perpetuity,
237.
prerogative,
revenue,
281.
241.
sovereignty,
267.
ubiquity,
Rule in Shelly's Case,
172, n., 243.
of court, iii, 804.
Rural dean,
383.
111.
deanery,
bill,
Rider to
183.

fish,

breaking, iv, 63.
Sacrament, reviling of, iv, 50.
Sacramentum decisionis, iii, 342.
259, 260; iv, 68.
Safe conducts,
Saint Martin le grand, court of, iii, 80.
309.
Saladine tenth,
446.
Bale of chattels, ii,
after execution,
447.
of distress, iii, 14
448,.
what contracts of to be in writing,
effect of part execution, ib.
ii, 9,

i,

i,

Sabbath

ii,

ii,

i,

i, i,

1,

i,

i,

i,

i,

122, n.
128, 142, n; iv, 440.
how secured,
141.
129.
personal,
128; iv, 487.
petition of,
129-145.
political,
relative,
146.
to property,
138.
Riot, iv, 125, 142, 146.
act, iv, 142, 143, 440.
Riotous assemblies felonious, iv, 142.
River, title to land left by,
261.
Rivers, annoyances in, iv, 167, n.
banks, destroying of, iv, 144.
legal,

bill of,

66.

Romney marsh, laws of, iii, 74
Roots, destroying, iv, 246.
stealing, iv, 233.
Rope dancers, iv, 168.
Routs, iv, 146.
Royal assent to bills,
185.
250.
authority,
241.
dignity,
218, 224.
family,
i,
i, i,

177.

i,

merger,

Reverter, formedon in, iii, 192.
Review, commission of, iii, 67.
court of, iii, 428, n.
bill of, iii, 454.
Reviling church ordinances, iv, 50.
Revivor in equity, iii, 448.
Revocation of uses,
335, 339.
of wills,
376, 502.
211; iv, 440.
Revolution of 1688,
Reward, taking of, to help to stolen goods,
iv, 132.
for apprehending offenders, iv, 294, 295.
for discovering accomplices, iv, 331.
Rhuddland, statute of,
94.
117.
Ridings,
n., 15,
Right, nature and varieties of,
n., 197.
of property and possession,
196.
release and extinguishment of,
325.
of advowson, writ of, iii, 243, 250.
close, writ of,
99; iii, 84, 195.
where there
also
legal, there
legal
remedy, iii, 23.
writ of, ui, 192.
when must formerly have been brought,
Ui, 190.
in what court proceedings upon, iii, 195.
patent, writ of, iii, 141.
of dower, writ of, iii, 188.
of ward, writ of, iii, 141.
petition of, iii, 256.
Rights of persons and rights of things, iii ,2.
of persons, absolute and relative, iii, 11V,
122; iii,
and wrongs,
absolute,!, 123-125.
natural,
122, n.

Rivers, sluices on, destroying, iv, 144.
thefts on navigable, iv, 239.
nuisances to navigation, iii,
n.
Roads,
35, n., 36, n.
(See "Highway.")
Robbery, iv, 242, 244, n.
(See "Larceny.")
there must be
taking, iv, 243.
not material when taken, ib.
must be force or putting in fear, ib.
punishment, iv, 245 and n.
assaulting with intent to rob, ib.
Roguery, incorrigible, iv, 169, n.
Rogues, iv, 169.
(8ee "Vagrants.")
Rolls, master of, iii, 451.
Roman law.
(See "Civil Law.")
division of money and interest,
462.
Roman Catholics, disabilities of,
257„
293; iv, 55.
relief from disabilities,
868 n;
257, n.
schools of,
451.
members of parliament,
163, n.
rights and protection of, iv, 58.
patrons, rights of universities to benefices.
belonging to, iii, 261.
462, n.
guardians,
Rome, appeals to, in ecclesiastical cases, ill.

a

ii,

ii,

Retorno habendo. plegii de, HI, 147.
writ de, iii, ISO, 413.
Retraxit, iii, 296, 395.
RetrospectiYe legislation, i, 46, n.
Return days, iii. 275.
false or double, i, 180; iii, 111, 372.
irreplevisable, writ of, iii, 150.
of writs, iii, 273, 275.
Revealed law of Qod, i, 42.
Revenue, extraordinary, i, 307.
ordinary, i, 281.
Jurisdiction of exchequer, iii, 428.
causes, trial of, iv, 281.
officers, assaults on, iv, 155 and n.
Reversal of judgment, iii, 411; iv, 390.
of outlawry, ui, 284; iv, 820, 302.
Reversion, ii, 111, 175.
incidents to, fealty and rent,
175.

523.
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Seduction, action, for,
429, n.. Hi, 140, n.
public offence of, iv, 64.
of women and children, iv, 209, 212.
of soldiers and sailors, iv, 102.

of

ii,

i,

ii,

i,

i,

i,

i,

i,

i,

iii,

444.

ii, 78, 77, 81.

i,

at arms,
Sergeantry,
Servants,

423.

i.

i,

i,

i, i,

i,

battery of, iii, 142.
characters to, iii, 125.
fires by negligence of,
482; iv, 228.
425.
husbandry,
429.
liability of,
430,
master of, when answerable for,
481; iii. 153.
Servants, menial,
425.
retainer of, ib.
827.
duties of,
. embezzlement
by, iv, 231.
larceny by, iv, 280.
of ambassador,
256.
Service, incidents of,
427.
i,

i,

Services,

ii,

ii,

i,

i,

8;

ii,

i,

8;

i,

293, n.
Septennial elections,
189.
Sequestration, iii, 417, 444, 445.
24; iii, 26, 23.
Sergeant at law,
premier, iii, 28.

i,

it

ii,

ii,

i,

i,

Senatus decreta,
86.
Separate estate of wife,

41, 60.

i,

i,

i,

ii, 1,

ii,

i,

i,

(See "Tenure.")
subtraction of, iii, 234
remedy for, iii, 235.
Sessions of gaol delivery, iv, 270.
great, of Wales, iii, 77.
186, 187.
of parliament,
46, n.
formerly one day,
of oyer and terminer, iv, 270.
quarter, iv, 271, 274
Set-off, iii, 304; iv, 442.

impressment of, ib.

wages of, iii, 107.

iii,

ii,

must be pleaded,

304, n.

i,

i,

487, n.
in bankruptcy,
128, 216; iv, 440.
Settlement of the crown,
362, 364
of the poor,
marriage, trustees to preserve contingent
remainders,
171.
364, n.
protector of,
of personalty, ii, 398.
179.
Severalty, estate in,
186.
Severance of joint estate,
Severity of punishments, impolicy of, iv, 18.
Sewers, commissioners of, iii, 73.
I

ii,

i,

ii,

ii,

ii,

i,

counterfeiting will or powers of, Iv, 248.
personation of, iv, 249.
Second deliverance, writ of, ill, 150.
Surcharge, writ of, iii, 239.
Secretaries of state,
338.
Sect a, iii, 295, 344
ad molendinum, iii, 235.
iii, 289.
Secunda superoneratione,
129.
Security of person,
for good behavior, iv, 251, 258.
for the peace, lv, 251, 254.
for money, iii, 489.
(See "Bond," "Mortgage," "Statute.")

8.

ii,

ii,

ii,

i,

i,

i,

iii,

442.
Scam alum magnatum,
402; ill, 123.
Schire-men,
898.
Schoolmaster,
453; iv, 54.
Sciences, auxiliary to study of the law,i,33.
Scire facias to repeal patents, iii, 47, 260,301.
against bail, ill, 416.
in detinue, iii, 413.
to remove usurper's clerk, iii, 248.
to revive judgment, iii, 421.
Scold, common, iv, 169.
Scot or assessment, iii, 74.
Scotch peers, election of,
169; iv; 117.
97, 99, 165, 401, n.
privileges of,
Scotland,
95-98.
arrest of offenders in, iv, 292.
offences committed in, iv, 804.
Scripture, scoffing at, iv, 59.
310;
74.
Scutage,
iv,
8e defendendo, homicide,
180; iii,
182
Sea, tide to land left by, ii, 261.
39, 40.
rights of fishing,
banks, destroying, lv, 144.
marks,
264.
294.
destroying,
Seal, great and privy,
346, 347; 111,46.
counterfeiting the king's, iv, 83, 89.
of corporation,
475.
305.
Sealing of deed,
Seamen,
420.
a

105.

in homicide,
iv, 183.
130; Hi,
Self-murder, iv, 189.
iii,
Semi-plena probatio,
870.
Senatus consulta,
80, 86.

lv,

428.

1

in descents,

of incorporeal heredit aments,
106.
writ of,
359; iii, 412.
Seisin, of heriots, iii, 15.
Selden, conduct of judges upon committal
of, iii, 134.
Selecti judices of the Romans, iii, 366.
Self-defence, excuse for breaches of peace,

64; iv, 410, 412.
Saxon laws,
Scale of crimes and punishments, iv, 18.
Scandal and impertinence in pleading, iii,

a

160.

important

208, 209.
in deed,
209.
^livery of, ii, 811.
in one's demesne,

ii,

of stolen goods,
449.
451.
warranty of title,
of quality, ib.
Salt duty,
322.
293;
458, 460.
Salvage,
Sanction of laws,
56.
Sanctuary, iv, 332, 365, 436.
Bark, Isle of,
107.
Satlsriatio, iii, 291.
Satisfaction, entry on record, iii, 421;
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iv,

artificers,

Seisin, formerly

Sextons,

i,

460.

ii,

ii,

horses,

ii,

of

449.

ii,

i,

tl,

of earnest,
447.
448, 449.
delivery,
when property passes,
448.
when right of possession passes,
stoppage in transitu, ib.
of goods to be manufactured, ib.
bill of lading, ib.
vendor's lien, ib.
ii,

Sale of chattels,

395

General Index.

i,

1,

ii,

ii,

i,

8.

i,

i,

ii,

i,

i,

i,

i,

:

i, i,

i,

i,

i,

i.

statute,
sessions,

86.

iv, 272.

ii,

ii,

verdict, iii, 877; iv, 306.
warrant, iv, 294.
administrator,
506.
imparlance, iii, 306.
891.
property,
Special case, verdict subject to, iii, 877.
stating for the opinion of the court, iii,
877, n.

i,

ii,

Special jury, when had, iii, 357.
how struck, ib.
certificate that cause required, iii, 367, n.
Special plea, iii, 305.
466; iii, 155.
Specialty,
Specific performance of contract, iii, 438.
of agreement to arbitrate, iii, 17, n.
Spiriting away persons, iv, 219.
470.
Spiritual corporations,
courts,
61; iil, 61.
155, 157.
lords,
persons,

376.

a

ii,

ii,

Spoliation, remedy for, iii, 90.
413.
Sporting, restrictions upon,
334
Springing uses,
iv,
nuisance
168.
by,
Squibs,
Stabbing, iv, 198.
nuisance, iv, 167.
Stage plays, when
323; iii, 323.
Stamp duties,
297.
on deed, &c.
469.
on bill of exchange,
forgery of, iv, 249.
when material in forgery, &c., iv, 847.
ii,

248.

278.
Standard of coin,
of weights and measures,

i,

ii,

i,

i,

27.

ii,

a

i,

i,

iii,

general,

Son assault demesne, iii, 120, 306.
Sorcery, iv, 60.
South Sea Company, misbehavior of officers
of. iv, 231, n., 234
fund,
831.
51.
Sovereign power, where lodged,
America,
in
52, n.
242.
Sovereignty, royal,
243, n. iii, 257, n.
not liable to suits,
Speaker of each house of parliament,
181.
Speaking with prosecutor, iv, 363.
345.
Special bailiffs,
bail, iii, 287.

i,

1,

124, n.

truth as justification, iil, 125.
when words privileged, iii, 125.
mitigation of damages in, iii, 125, n.
418, 428.
Slavery,
abolition of,
423, n., 425, n.
Slaves,
127 and n., 423-425;
403.
Sluices on rivers, destroying, iv, 144.
Small debts, courts for, iii, 81; iv, 441.
Small debtor's act, iii, 488, a.
Small tithes,
388.
Smells, offensive, iii, 217.
Smoke farthings,
324.

100.

Soldiers,
178, 408.
wandering, iv, 164
quartering,
414 415.
Solicitor, iii, 26.

275.
418, 414.
Standing armies,
Stannary courts, iil, 80.
623

i,

"Parol.")

Sokeman,

i,

(See

Sinecure,
386.
Single combat, iv, 346.
Si non omnes, writ of, iil, 60.
Six clerks, iii, 443, 451.
Skins, exporting of, iii, 154.
Slander, iii, 123.
when actionable, iii, 124.
when replication of, may be justified, Iii,

sending letters charging party with, iv,
144
Sodor and Man, bishopric of,
106, 112.

i,

;

ii,

i,

et

ii,

a

ii,

ii,by

ii,

i,

i,

s

a

i,

ii,

ii,

ii,

cape, iii, 415.
when excused for negligence, ib.
Sheriff's court in London, iii, 80.
Sheriff's tourn, iv, 273, 411, 424.
401, 402.
Ship, prize and ransom of,
457-461.
bottomry and respondentia,
insurance,
468.
293.
in distress, plundering,
money, iv, 473.
for,
iv, 69.
seized as prize, remedy
plundering in distress, iv, 235.
iv,
246.
burning, destroying, <fec,
burning, &c, king ships, iv, 102, 245.
291.
Shipwrecks,
Shire,
116.
iv, 207.
at
another,
Shooting
Shop books, iii, 363.
Shroud, stealing of, iv, 235.
Shrubs, destroying, iv, 246.
stealing, iv, 238.
Sifecerit te securum, iii, 274
Sign manual,
347.
forgery of, iv, 89, 93, n.
mark,
805, 877, n.
Signature
to deed,
305.
347.
Signet, privy,
Slgniflcavit, iii, 102.
Similitude of handwriting, iv, 358.
389, 393; ii, 278
Simony,
ieq.; iv, 62.
465.
Simple" contract,

It,

i,

290.

return of jurors by, iii, 358, n. iv, 350.
liability for escape of prisoner, iil, 415.
cannot retake prisoner after voluntary es

318; iv, 155.
78 «t teg.;
Socage, free and villein,
409.
461.
guardian in,
47;
Society, origin and nature of,
Sodomy, offence of, iv, 215.
soliciting to commit, iv, 215.
assault to commit, iv, 217.

Smuggling,

i,

if

i,

i,

i,

i,

ii,

8heep, &c., stealing, and killing with intent
to steal, iv, 239.
173, n., 342.
Shelly's Case, rule in,
Bhepway, court of, iil, 79.
Sheriff,!, 117, 839; iv, 293, 418, 428.
duration of office,
342.
duties and powers,
348.
how chosen,
339.
officers of,
345.
trial before, iii, 61, n.
official misfeasance or nonfeasance, iii, 163.
obliged to take bail, iii, 289.
responsible
bail not put in to action, iii,
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874, 275;

iv,

General Index.
Study of the law, neglected in the onivc r-i

Staple commodities, i, 31S.
Star chamber, court of, i, 230; iii, 445; iv,

ties,

Style, new and old, ii, 140, n.
91, 102.
Subinfeudations, statute against,
Subjection, civil excuse from crime by. iv,
ii,

266, 810, 429, 433, 437.
Stare decisis, i, 70.
State, sovereign, not suable except by con
sent, i, 243, n.
statutes of limitations do not run against,
i, 247, n.
Stated damages, iii, 435.
Statute, i, 85.
equity of, i, 62, n.
how passed, i, 181.
guardian by, i, 462.
tabor, i, 58, 358.
law, i, 85.
344.
private,
46.
when to take effect,
113.
when applicable to copyhold,
515.
of distributions,
270.
de religiosis,
" Frauds, Statute of.")
of frauds. (See
160; iv, 426, 431.
merchant,

28.

ii,

Submission to arbitration, iii, 16.
Subordination of perjury, iv, 137.
Subpoena ad testificandum, writ of, iii, 3Ml
duces tecum, iii, 382.
in equity, iii, 442, 443.
writ of, by whom devised, iii, 51.
opposition to, in parliament, iii. 52.
Subscriptions unlawful, iv, 117.
condition,
154.
Subsequent,

ii,

i,

i,

i,

i,

i,

ii,

ii,

at,

estate

150.

i,

172, n.
Suffrage, who entitled to,
Suggestion for prohibition, iii, 113.
prosecution by, iv, 309.
Suicide, iv, 189.
murder, when, iv, 189, n.,300.
abetting,
forfeiture of goods on, ii, 409.
suit at law, iii, 116.
Suit, general and orderly parts of, iii, 272.
when abated by death of party, ill, SOL
899, n.

ii,

i,

ii,

i,

i,

,

in equity, iii, 442.
of court, how compelled, iii, 281.
of witnesses, iii 295.
Summary convictions, iv, 280 et tag.
Suminoners, iii, 279.
Summons, iii, 279.
149, 150.
to parliament,
before conviction, iv. 281.
126; iv, 170.
Sumptuary laws,
Sunday, no judicial day, iii, 278, 290.
469, n.
rule when paper falls due upon,
business and entertainments on. iv, 64.
Sabbath breaking generally, iv, 63.
353.
Supersedeas, writ of,
272; iii, 410.
Superstitious uses,
iii,
bill,
448.
Supplemental
Suppletory oath, iii, 870.
iv,
253.
Supplicavit,
308, 313.
Supplies,
land,
right to, ii, 36, n.
Support of
447, 458.
Support of children by parents,
453.
of parents by children,
359.
of the poor,
368 and a. iv, 115.
Supremacy, oath of,
i,

i,

420.

:

i,

i.

Supreme court of England, iii, 30, n.
146.
Supreme magistrate,
49, 146.
power,
Surcharge of common, iii, 237.
Bur disclaimer, iii, 233, n.
l,

ii,

8.

i,

i,

197;

is

1,

ii,

ii,

i,

Sufferance,

1,

1,

i,

i,

i,

i,

0.

230.

remedy for, by distress, iii, 231.
of conjugal rights, iii, 94.
of legacies, iii, 98.
of tithes, iii, 88, 102.
to the crown, history of,
Succession
iv, 440.
430.
title to personalty by,

i,

i,

i,

i,

i,

i,

i, i,

ii,

ii,

be distrained, iii,
18, n., 206,
Stream of water, property in,
n., 402.
Striking in the king's palace or courts, iv,
125, 276.
Study of the law, to whom essential, i,6-16.
of,
31.
discouragements
uses of,
16, 26-37.
in the universities,
31.
mode of commencing,
should be combined with other studies,
27, 38.
24.
formerly restrained in London,
i,

403, 454.

i,

ii,

i,

ii,

ii,

•

ii,

iii,

263.
of the household, his court, iii, 76; iv, 276.
of the university, his court, iv, 277.
■Upend, curate's remedy for non-payment
of,
90 and n.
Stipulatio, iii, 291.
Stipulation in admiralty court, iii, 108.
217, 517.
Stirpes, claim per,
Stocks, punishment of, iv, 377.
Stolen goods, receiving, &c, iv, 132, 238.
taking reward to help to, iv, 131.
449
sale of,
Stolen marriages, iv, 209.
488, n; iii, 305.
Stoppage in transitu,
Stores, embezzling the king's, iv, 101.
receiving stolen, iv, 183.
Stranger, when his goods or chattels may
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iii,

evidence,

Subsidies, ecclesiastical,
312.
308, 811; iv, 423.
lay,
316.
on exports and imports,
Subtraction of fealty, suit of court and rent,

ib.
87-91.
rules for construction of,
85, 86.
division of,
182, n.
how enrolled,
85, n.
how stated,
108, n.,479.
of mortmain,
45, 185, n.
promulgation of,
60, n.
in pari materia,
60, n.
of,
preambles
86.
penal, how construed,
Staundforde,
72.
Stealing an heiress, iv, 209 and n.
" Larceny.")
(See
449, u.
Step-children,
278.
Sterling,
427.
Steward,
lord high, his court, iii, 37; iv, 360, 261,

staple,
Statutes,

i,
4.
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Index

negligence,

&c., iii,

Sur-rebutter,

ii,

ii,

iii, 810.
Bur-rejoinder, iii, 310.

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

Surrenders,
826.
326, n.
in law,
366.
of copyholds,
Surveyors of highways,

tt

ii,

ii,

escheat,

ii,

escuage,

fl,

coinage,

73, 74, 77,81.

74.

ii,

destruction of military tenures,
76.
77.
frankalmoign,
modern English tenures,
78 tt ttq.

;

paravail, ib.
bound to give landlord notice of eject
ment, iii, 204.
not liable for accidental Are, ii, 281 Hi,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii, ii,

86-88.

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

i, ii,

il,

spiritual, or frankalmoign,
101.
102.
by divine service,
profits of military,
287.
disturbance of, iii, 242.
Term of years,
148; iv, 480.
170, n.
executory bequest of,
Terms of court, origin of the, iii, 275.
when they begin and end, iii, 277, a,
91,328.
Terre tenant,
Test act, iv, 59, 439.
Testament,
489, 499; iv, 424, 430.
(See

" Will.")

Testamentary causes in county courts, iii,
95; iv, 421.
in equity, iii. 437.
in ecclesiastical courts, iii, 96, 437.
462.
Testamentary guardian,
Testatum capias, iii, 288.
179; iii, 274.
Teste of writs,
Testes, trial per. iii, 383.
Thainland,
90.
Thanet, Isle of,
105.
407, n.
Theater, copyright in plays, <&c.,
Theft, iv, 229, 236, 420.

i,

Vol.

IT.—

79

U,

i,

"Larceny.")

(See

Theft-bote, iv, 133, 368.
Thellusson act,
175, n.
81.
Tbeodosian code,
real
and
personal,
Things

il,

i,

16, 884.

(See "Property.")
Threatening letters, iv, 187, 144
Threats of accusation, to extort money,
144.
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ii,

ii,

ii, i.

i,

ii,

144, n.
right of, to demand repairs,
assignment by, ib.
101, 148.
Tenant-right of renewal,
Tender of amends, iii, 16.
of issue, iii, 818.
277; iii, 803.
of money,
plea of, iii, 803.
868; iv, 124.
of oaths,
16, 59, 102.
Tenement,
90, 93.
Tenemental lands,
Tenendum,
298.
Tenths, ecclesiastical,
284; iv, 309.

ii,

ii,

ii,

144, o.

ii,

when bound to rebuild, ib.
liable to pay rent after fire, ib.
to dispute landlord's title,
estopped

i,

i,

228, n.

free socage,
78.
81.
sergeanty,
Eetit
urgage, ii, 82.
borough English,
88.
ii, 84.
Sivelkind,
cidents of socage tenures,
89, 92, 98.
villeinage,
97, 98.
copyholds,
manors,
90.
ancient demesne,
98.

ii,

ii,

i,

i,

i,

i,

i,

i,

i,

i,

i,

i,

estate in.
(See "Estates.")
Taking, felonious, iv, 230, 232.
unlawful, iii, 145.
Tale or count, iii, 293.
Tales, iii, 865; iv, 844.
Talionis, lex, iv, 12.
811; iv, 419, 426.
Talliage,
Tariff,
818.
169.
Taxation, by house of commons,
principle of imposition of, 818.
iii,
of costs,
899.
189, 808.
Taxes,
828; iv, 426, 439.
their annual amount,
Teacher and scholar,
458 and n.
Technical words in indictments, iv, 306.
157-159.
Temporal peers,
282; iv, 421.
Temporalities of bishops,
880; iv, 421.
their restitution,
Tenant, to the praecipe,
859, 361.
(See "Estate.")
in capite, ii, 60.

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii, ii, i,

ii,

72, 89.

grand sergeanty,

406, n.
202-206.
160, n.

70, 88.
71, 89.

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

i,

ii,

knighthood, ib.
marriage of ward,
fines for alienation,
attornment,
72.

i,

Tail,

ii,

ii,

of

60, 61, 79.
free and base services,
certain and uncertain services, ii, 61, 79.
frank tenement and villeinage, ib.
tenure in chivalry,
61.
incidents to knight's service,
63
ttq.
aids,
63, 86.
reliefs,
65, 87.
primer seisin or first fruits,
66, 87.
67, 87.
wardship,
court of wards and liveries,
69.

ii,

i,

ii,

i,

867.
183, 899; iii, 163, 164.
Survivorship,
136.
Suspension of habeas corpus,
of action for civil injury in case
iii,
119.
felony,
Sua. per col., iv, 403.
226, n.
Sussex, marriage of duke of,
Swans,
393; iv, 236.
Swearing, profane, iv, 60.
the peace, iv, 255.
of witnesses, iii, 871.
Sweinmote, court of, iii, 72.
296.
Syngrapha,
279.
Synods,

Table of precedence,
of consanguinity,
Tacking mortgages,

Tenths, temporal,
309; iv, 107.
Tenure, ancient English,
59 tt teg.
lord paramount and mesne lord,
59.
tenant paravail and tenant in capite, ii,60.
statute quia emptores,
91, 102.
60.
lay tenure,
ii,

liability of, for

ii,

Surgeon,
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ii,

;

i,

occurrit regi,

tempus

lii,

46, 88, 102,

i,

80

i,

parliaments,
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1,

6.

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

1

213.

regulations as to costs in, iii, 214, 401.
vi et amiis, iii, 120, 209.
merged in felony, when, iv,
malicious, offence of, iv, 347.
ab initio, iii, 15, 151, n., 218.
Trespass on the case, iii, 122, 218.
Trial, what
is, iii, 829.
seven species of, iii, 330.
by record, ib.
by inspection, iii, 331.
by certificate, when allowed, iii, 833.
by witnesses, iii,335.
notice of, iii, 356.
countermand of, ib.
locality, iii, 383.
in criminal cases, iv, 342, 411.
new, iii, 387; iv, 361, 438.
by ordeal, iv, 342, 414, 425.
by battle, iii. 105, 337, 346, 418, 421, 434,
Triennial elections,
189.
i,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

i,

i,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

by

ii,

i,

iv, 160.

i,

ii,

261.

266, n.
under statute of limitations,
287.
by alienation,
208.
by descent,
of chattels by occupancy,
400.
custom,
422.
by
430.
by succession,
438.
by marriage,
440.
by gift, grant and contract,
471.
by bankruptcy,
489.
by testament and administration,
regulated by law of domicil,
887, a.
436.
Judgment,
of honor, descent to daughters,
216.
126, n.
courtesy of,
Toft,
19.
Toleration, iv, 52, 58. 440.
Tolling entry, iii, 176.
Tolt, writ of, iii, 84, 195.
Tongue, cutting out, ordisabling,iv,206,207.
316; iv, 487.
Tonnage,
Tonsura clericalis, iv, 367.
Tort, action of, iii, 117.
Torture, iv, 825.
Tourn of the sheriff, iv, 273, 411, 424.
Tout temps prist, iii, 808.
Town,
115.
Trade, its progress in England, iv, 419-438.
offensive, iv, 167.
unlawful exercise of, iv, 159.
offences against, iv, 151,
owling, iv, 154.
smuggling, ib.
fraudulent bankruptcy, iv, 156.
usury, iv, 156.
cheating, iv, 157.
assize of bread, iv, 157.
false weights and measures, ib.
false pretences, iv, 158.
n grating and engrossing, ib.
iv, 158, 159.
monopoues,
exercising trade without apprenticeship,

,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

i

i,

i,

199.

by occupancy of lands left by sea or rivers,

i,

32, n.

Tithing,
114: iv, 411.
Title of acts of parliament,
183.
to the crown,
190.
pretended, selling or buying, iv, 136.
451.
warranty of, to goods sold,
to things real,
195.
by possession, ib.
196.
right of possession,
197.
right of property,

it

ii,

;

i,

266, n.
limitation of right to,
now practically at an end,
388, n.

complete,

ii,

i,

24-32;

ii,

j,

ii,

i,

140, 141, n.
the maxim nullum
247.
Tippling, iv. 04.
Tithes,
384, 388;
487.

Trade, seducing artists, ib.
Trade, restrictions on exercise of,
497.
Trade marks,
405, n.
Trader,
474. 488, n.
(See "Bankruptcy.")
Tradesmen,
407.
actions against, iii, 164.
Training to arms, &c., iv, 104.
Traitors, iv, 75.
(See "Treason.")
Transitory action, iii, 294.
137; iv, 371, 377, 401.
Transportation,
returning from, iv, 132, 371.
Traverse of indictment, iv, 35L
of officer, iii, 260.
of plea, iii, 312.
Treason, appeal of, iv, 314.
misprision of, iv, 120.
petit, iv, 75, 203.
trials in, iv, 351, 440.
&c. death of king, iv, 78.
compassing,
how far words treasonable, iv, 80.
violating king's companion, Ac, iv, 61.
levying war, ib.
adhering to enemies, iv, 83.
counterfeiting king's seal, iv, 83, 89.
counterfeiting king's money, iv, 84.
slaying chancellor or judges, ib.
treason since
iv, 87.
Mary, c.
for securing protestant succession, iv,
punishment of, iv. 92, 93.
Treasure trove,
295.
concealment of,
297; iv, 121.
Treasurer, lord high, iii, 44, 56.
killing of, iv, 84.
Treaties, leagues and alliances,
257.
Trebucket, iv, 169.
Trees, right to cut,
34, n., 281.
destroying, &c. iv, 247.
stealing, iv, 233.
Trcsayle, iii, 186.
Trespass, signification of, iii. 308.
what constitutes, iii, 209.
what property in land requisite to main
tain, iii, 209.
when justifiable, iii, 212.
cured by right of entry and freehold, iii,
ii,

ii,

Threats of accusation, remedy for, iii, 120.
duress by, i, 181.
Timber,
34, n., 281.
stealings iv, 233.
destroying, iv, 247.
Time, division and computation of,
463

i,

Gene:
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153.
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11,

U,

ii,

ii,

i, i,

876.

by writ of attaint, iii,

888.

legacies,

513.

34, n.
of land,
namium, iii, 148.
184, n., 185, n.

ii,

of

Vesture
Vetitum
Veto,
Vicar,

ii,

ii,

ii,

what omissions aided by, iii, 894.
Verge, tenant by,
148.
Verge of the court, iii, 76; iv, 276.
Verification, iii, 813.
Vert, venison, and covert, injury to, iii, 71.
168, 174.
Vesting of estates,

818 et teg.
(See "Tithes.")
387; iv, 428.
Vicarages,
Vice-admiralty court, iii, 69.
Vice-chancellors, iii, 55, n. 426. n.
Vice-warden of the stannaries, court of,
80, n.
884;

,

U,

ii,

it

ii,

ii,

ii,

48.

iii,

privy verdict, ib.
public, iii, 377.
special, ib.
formerly reversed

ii,

;

ii, ii,

ii,

ii.

863.

In equity,

i,

ii,

i,

ii,

;

i, i,

i,

ii,

ii,

ii, ii,

337.
forms of conveyances,
864, n.
resulting, rebutted by parol,
339,
deeds to lead, declare or revoke,

854.

456.
Ventre inspiciendo, writ de,
130;
Ventre sa mere, children in,
169.
Venue, how to be laid, iii, 293; iv, 305.
changing, iii, 293, 384.
in criminal cases, iv, 304.
Verberation, iii, 120.
Venderors, iii, 71, 73.
Verdict, iv, 860, 457.
false, iii, 403; iv, 140.
in action, indictment on, iv, 302, n.
must be unanimous, iii, 375.
plaintiff must be present at delivery of,

i,

i,

i,

f,

i, i,

26, 37. 471.

certificate of chancellor of, iii, 335.
407.
copyright of,
right of to benefices, iii. 341.
Unknown persons, larceny from, iv, 236,359.
Uses, invention of,
271.
187, 271, 837 et teg. iii, 53.
and trusts,
833; iv, 430.
statute of,
334.
springing, shifting and resulting,
what not executed by statute of,
835.
336.
continued as trusts,
estates of trustee and cestui que trust,
887.

i,

ii,

i,

ii,

i,

i,

i, ii,

of.

212, 214.
Vacancy of the throne,
296, 299.
Vacantia bona,
Vacant possession, iii, 202.
Vacating records, iv, 138.
Vacations of court, iii, 276.
sittings in, iii, 278, n.
Vadium,
157.
Vagabonds, iv, 169.
Vagrants, iv, 170.
harboring, ib.
in criminal cases, iv, 305.
Valor beneficiorum,
385.
70, 88.
maritagii,
Valuable consideration,
297.
Valvasors,
408.
iii,
Variance, amendment of,
393 n.
45 et teg.
Vassal,
"Feudal
System.")
(See
53, n.
the word,
158, n.
Vendor's lien,
Venire de novo, when awarded, iii, 394.
Venire facias, iii, 851, 357.
teste and return of, iii, 353.
issues to coroners or elisors, iii,
when
i,

ii, ii,

i,

270.
Ubiquity of the king,
45.
Udal right,
Ultra vires,
480.
Umpire, iii. 16.
Unanimity of jurors, iii, 376; iv, 414.
Uncertainty of legal proceedings, iii, 836.
Uncore prist, 111,303.
Underlease, iii, 176, 327.
Under-sheriff,
345.
Underwood, stealing, iv, 238.
injuring, Ac., iv, 347.
Union of England and Scotland,
96.
of Great Britain and Ireland,
99, n.
iv, 437, 440.
Unitarians, iv, 50, n.
United States of America.
(See "American States.")
Unities of joint estates, ii, 180.
University, study of law in,
16, 26-37.
174.
burgesses of,
iii,
83;
83,
of,
iv,
courts
277.
nature

ii,

ii,

i,

ii,

ii,

806, 837.
estates of trustees and cestui que trust,
887.
137, n., 132, n.
curtesy of,
837, n.
merger of,
Tub-man in the exchequer, iii, 38.
Tumultuous petitioning,
143; iv, 147.
84.
Turbary, common of,
iv,
233.
Turnips, stealing,
Turnpikes, destroying, iv, 145.
Tutor,
806, 458, 460.
Twelve tables, laws of, 80.
136, 133.
Tyranny,

Usura maritima,
458.
Usurpation of patronage, iii, 343.
iii,
for,
243.
remedy
of franchise or office, iii, 262.
454 et teg.; iv, 116, 156.
Usury,
Usus fructus, ii, 327.
Uttering false money, iv, 89, 90.
forged notes, iv, 348, 250.

ii,

60.

Trinoda necessitas, i, 363, 387;
103.
Triors, lords, iv, 262, 263.
Triors of jurors, iii, 263.
Triplicate, iii, 810.
116.
Trithing,
Triverbial days, iii, 434
Trover, action of, iii, 153; iv, 363.
Truce breakers, iv, 68.
conservators of. iv, 69.
Trustees of charities, &c., jurisdiction
of
equity in regard to, iii, 427, n.
Trusts,
837 et teg.. 336.
jurisdiction over, iii, 431, 439.
when cognizable, ib.
of lands, must be manifested by writing,

1, i,

Trinity, denial of, iv,
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ill,

ii,

i,

i,

i,

i,

116.
Wapentakes,
415, 417,
War, articles of,
levying against the king, iv, 81.
War and peace, right of making, 257.
356; iv, 292, 436
Ward by constables, Ac.,
Wards and liveries, court of, iii, 258.
52, 67. 87, 97.
Wardship,
in chivalry, iv, 418, 420, 421.
Warlike stores, embezzlement of, iv, 101.
Warrant,
137
arrest by, iv, 290.
arrest without, iv, 292. 293.
Warrant of attorney, iii, 397.
Warrantia chartse, iii, 300.
300; iii.
Warranty, express and implied,

ii,

165.

ii,

ii,

ii,

229. n.

ii, ii,

5,

ii,

ii,

i,

i.

a

of repair, ii, 36 and n.
nuisance, iii, 218.
obstruction of
action for obstruction, iii, 241.
307.
Ways and means, committee of,
274-277;
iv, 275,
Weights and measures,
278, 424.
false, iv, 159.

i,

i,

5.

Wells, property in, ii,
Welsh mortgage, ii. 157. n.
Weregild, iv, 188, 313, 413.
65; iv, 412.
West Saxon lage,
223.
Whales, royal fish,
264.
Wharfs,
Whipping, punishment of, iv, 372, 377.
42.
White rent,
518.
Widow's chamber,
135.
quarantine,
433.
Wife,
ii,

ii,

ii,

i,

i,

i,

85.
necessity,
remedy, when out

i,

i,

ii,

ii, i,

i,

i,

78, n.

Wandering soldiers and mariners, iv, 104.
persons, vagrants, iv, 170, n.
628

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

iii,

14. 90.
Waste lands,
356; iv, 2'J2. 426.
Watch,
Water, how described, ii, 18.
18, 266, n., 402.
property in,
36, n., 20C, n.
ater course,
261, n.
alluvion, &c, upon,
offences as to, iv, 167.
n.
abatement of nuisances in, iii,
Watermen overloading their boats, iv, 193.
plying on Sunday, iv, 64.
Water ordeal, iv, 342.
Way, right of, by grant, prescription, and

i.

418, 421, 424.

abolished, iii, 337, n.
bistorv and mode of, iii, 337 et seq.
Wagero'f law, iii, 342; iv, 414, 424.
manner of, iii, 842.
when not allowed, iii, 345.
abolished, iii, 341, n., 347.
460; iv, 173.
^Wagers, when illegal,
174.
Wages, of members of parliament,
428.
of servants,
409.
Waifs,
296;
Wainage, iv, 879.
Wales,
93, 94.
99.
part of England,
venue in criminal cases in, iv, 304.
prince of, 94, 225.
compassing and imagining his death,
iv, 76.
225.
princess of,
violation of, iv, 81.
court of principality of, abolished, iii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

125.

of villeins,
282.
who may sue for, iii, 244.
282, n., iii, 227. 442.
injunction to stay,
writ of, iii, 227.
action on the case in nature of. iii, 229, n.
estates without impeachment of. ii. 122,n.
by stranger, tenant may be held liable for,

W

ii,

459, 460.
Wagering policies,
Wager of battle, trial by, iii, 337; iv, 846,

333.

ii,

ii,

ii,

on exchange,

Warranty of goods, ii, 451 and n.
446, n.
on exchange of goods,
Warren,
417.
robbery of, iv, 235.
in disguise, iv, 144.
38.
beasts and fowls of,
185, 281 et $eq.; iii, 223.
Waste,
281.
voluntary or permissive,
115; iii. 223.
by tenant in tail,
by tenant in tail after possibility, &c.,

i,

21.

Visitation books of heralds, iii, 105.
Visne, iii, 294; iv, 850.
Viva voce examination in equity, iii, 378.
157.
Vivum vadium,
Void and voidable, ii, 291, 825, 432.
Voir dire, iii, 332.
when fraudulent
Voluntary conveyances,
and void, ii, 296.
escape, iii, 415; iv, 130.
jurisdiction, iii, 66.
manslaughter, iv, 191.
oaths, iv, 137.
Voucher, iii, 800.
357 etseq.
in recoveries,
Vulgaris purgatio, iv, 842.

lineal and collateral, ii, 301.
present effect of, ii, 302, 303, n.

•

a

i,

i,

i,

i,

i,

i,

i,

i,

i,

i,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

Vicineto, jury de. Hi, 3851
Vicontiel writs, iii, 238.
Vidames, i, 408.
View, iii, 299, 358.
of frankpledge, iv, 279.
Viewers, appointment of jurors for, iii, 858.
Vill, i, 114.
92; iv, 420.
Villeins,
94
enfranchisement of,
282.
waste of,
89,
92,
98.
61,
53,
Villenage,
Villeinous judgment, iv, 136.
Vinculo divorcia, iii, 94.
56-59.
Vindicatory part of a law,
27.
Viner's foundation,
222, 223; iv, 81.
Violating the queen, &c.,
forcible. (See "Rape.")
Violent presumption, iii, 371.
Viscount,
898.
480.
Visitor,
481.
of civil corporations,
482.
of eleemosynary corporations,
480.
of lay corporations,
483.
power of,
civilian and canonist,
Virgin Mary,

Index.

1,
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ii,

i,

i,

i,

i,

ii,

i,

177.

it

of error, bow differs from appeal, iii, 56.
lies coram nobis or vobis, iii,
when
406, n.

it

lies, iii, 411.
from and to what courts
of inquiry, iii, 897.
of proteclion, iii, 289.
of summons, personal actions now commenced by, iii, 287, n.
form, teste and service of, ib.
original, issued out of chancery, iii, 48.
forms of, iii, 51, 188, 273; iv, 427.
Writing, treason by, iv, 80.
stealing of writings, iv, 234.
instrument, contents of, how
Written
proved, iii, 368.
122.
Wrongs,
how remedied, iii, 116.
classification of, as public and private, iii,
private, termed civil injuries, ib.
public, called crimes and misdemeanors,
iv,
how private wrongs redressed, iii,
three several species of private wrongs,
iii,

869, 870,

ii

i,

292, 297, 298; iii, 176.
of death, iv, 315, 335.
in murder, iv, 197, 306.
Tear, day and waste,
252; iv, 885.
appeals

ii,

in

books,

72.

Years, estate for,

ii,

Year

i,

140.
(See "Estate.")
Yeoman,
406.
of the guard,
408.

ii,

York, custom of, on intestacy,

517.

archbishop of, claimed precedence
404, n
Canterbury,
629
i,

878, 601.

140.

Year'andday,

i,

will,

trial by, iii, 836.
may be compelled to attend before arbi
trator, iii, 16, n.
oath of, iii, 371.
privilege of, from arrest, iii, 289, n.
what persons admissible as. iii, 819.
how attendance of, compelled, iii, 369.
two always required by civil law, iii, 370;
iv, 850.

Year

i,

to

ii,

ii,

;

i,

8.

288.

Witchcraft, iv, 60. 436.
Withdrawing from allegiance,
n. iv, 87,
record, iii, 857.
Withernam, iii, 129, 146, 413.
307.
Witness to deed,

273.
close and patent,
346.
of election to parliament,
of peerage,
400.

2,

ii,

licences,

i,

i,

i,

381.

Writ, iii,

2.

"Deed.")

209.

when guilty of clergyable offences, iv, 369.
jury of, iii. 862; iv, 895.
Wood, stealing, iv, 233.
burning, damaging, &c, iv, 246.
Woodmote, court of, iii, 71.
Wool, «&c, transporting, iv, 154, 488.
Words, action for, iii, 123.
costs in action for, iii, 400.
treasonable, iv, 79.
of statutes must prevail,
81, 88.
Work house, iv, 371.
iv,
iii,
121;
208, 216.
Wounding,
291, 293; ii, 14, 409.
Wreck,
iv,
239,
804.
plundering,

i,

(See

implication of cross remainders in,
431.
fraudulently obtained,
forgery of, iv, 249, 250.
measure,
274.
Winchester
325, 326.
Window duties,
Windows, ancient, ii, 402.
Wine, adulteration of, iv, 162.

ii,

ii,

ii,

a

ii,

ii,

ii,

f

ii, ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

ii,

Beasts (See "Animals.")
defect of, excuse for crime, iv, 20.
vicious, iv, 21.
estate at,
145.
(See "Estate.")
Wills, origin of,
10, 12, 373, 489 el seq.;
iv, 424, 430.
491.
jurisdiction over,
494, 507; iii, 98.
probate of,
496 el seq., 502.
who may make,
499.
definition of,
codicil,
500.
500, 514,
verbal or nuncupative,
how avoided, ii, 502.
unofflcious, ib.
503.
appointment of executor,
jurisdiction over, iii, 95.
annexo,
administration cum testamento
ii, 503.
domicil,
of chattels, regulated by
887, n.
512, 513.
payment, &c., of legacies,
514.
-donatio mortis causa,
514.
right of executor to residue,
873.
alienation by devise, history of,
867, 871,
•customary power of devising,
n., 373.
875.
devise of use,
devises to charity, &c., ib.
376, 501,
signature and attestation of,
revocation of, ii, 376, 379, 502.
377.
gifts to witnesses,
378.
raudulent devises,
379, n.
land purchased after will made,
379, n., 518.
lapse of gifts,
108, 120, n.
fee,
■what words pass
heir looms not devisable apart from free
hold,
429.
379.
rules of construction,

•

Wild
Will,

Witness to deed, advantages of open ex
amination,
373.
examination when abroad or unable to
attend, iii, 388, n.
for prisoners, iv, 359, 441.
their expenses, iv, 362.
two, when necessary, iii, 870; iv, 850.
to give evidence by, iv, 296.
recognizance
148; iii, 37; iv, 412.
Wittena-gemote,
Women, appeals by, iv, 424.
and children, stealing or seduction of, iv.

1.

Wife, when she may be taken in execu
tion, ill, 413, n.
battery of, iii, 140.
'*
(See
Husband and Wife.")
Wight, Isle of, i, 105.
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